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Substantial unity and living things in Aristotle.

I

It is well attested that Aristotle identifies living things, such as animals and plants within the sublunary region, as the paradigm instances of substances. (1) From the standpoint of unity, they are more unified than non-living things such as heap-like elements (2) (earth, water, air, and fire) and artificial products (3) (like beds and houses). Rather, living organisms are the most unified things. Thus, if we appeal to unity as the criterion of substantiality, it would seem that all living organisms turn out to be substances. As a matter of fact, this view has been endorsed by many commentators. (4)

In contrast to their view, in this paper I shall argue that not all living organisms enjoy unity in the same degree. In fact, some are not sufficiently unified to be classified as substances. (5) The truly unified organisms are unified as a whole such that they perform all the natural functions appropriate to their natural kind, which implies that the following two senses of essential unity are obtained: one in number and one in form. As we shall see, since non-substantial entities could also be unified both in terms of one in number and one in form, I shall refer to the essential unity obtained by substances in terms of one in number as numerical substantial unity and in terms of one in form as formal substantial unity. By numerical substantial unity I mean the intrinsic unity that obtains between the soul and the body of an organism such that it exists as an individual at any given time; and by formal substantial unity I mean the unity that obtains among the efficient, the formal, and the final causes such that they exist as one and the same form universally across time. These two senses of unity are not independent and unrelated, but rather are themselves unified by having the same origin in the soul, whose function contributes to the unity of the whole organism. Furthermore, formal substantial unity, in turn, implies the unity of formula that expresses the essence of an organism.

The aforementioned senses of essential unity fail to obtain in the case of hybrids and spontaneously generated organisms. They are not unified wholes since they are incapable of the most natural function of all living things--the reproduction of offspring that resembles their own form; and, as a result of this defect, they do not enjoy numerical substantial unity nor do their forms enjoy formal substantial unity (and, consequently, the formulae that express their essences fail to be indivisible). Thus, they are not substances.

To defend this view, I shall appeal to the different senses of essential unity identified by Aristotle in Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6 and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 1. By examining each of these in turn, I will eliminate some while identifying others as the criterion of substantiality. I shall show how the pertinent senses of unity are all inter-related to form a unified account of the nature of substantial unity.

II

To orient the reader, a brief discussion of a number of preliminary points will be helpful here. The first one is concerned with the precise nature of the problem in question. In examining Aristotle's Metaphysics, commentators have found it useful to draw a distinction between two kinds of metaphysical questions: 1) what things are substances ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]); and 2) what constitutes the substantial being ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) of substances. The problem I am concerned with in this paper is not 2) but 1); Furth (1987) calls it the Population Problem. According to some, Aristotle was less concerned with this question: for example Kosman states that 'Aristotle is concerned with a theory of being and not a classification of entities' (1987, 390; his emphasis); and according to others, the Population Question itself cannot be solved by metaphysics: for example Furth's migration resistance (6) 'does not itself include any criterion for the identity or distinctness of the temporarily separated individuals' (1987, 56; his emphasis). The contention of this paper is that because the unity of form, in contrast to the unity of any given individual, is not temporary but rather eternal, Aristotle does provide us with the metaphysical criterion to pick out substances in the universe.

The second and related point is concerned with the notion of 'unity' and the notion of 'substance' as they are applied to both an organism and its form. In this paper, I shall be examining not only the substantial unity of an organism but also the substantial unity of its form. As a consequence, I shall refer to both (an organism and its form) as 'substances'. Henceforward, unless the context requires that I need to specify between a composite substance and its form as a substance, I shall simple use the term 'substance', otherwise I shall use '[substance.sub.c]' to refer to a composite substance and '[substance.sub.f]' to refer to its form regarded as a substance. In this way, I shall set aside (as noted above) the second metaphysical question: whether an organism itself or its form constitutes its substantial being. Rather, in view to answering the Population Question, I shall be defending the following: 1) Necessarily, x is a [substance.sub.c] if and only if x enjoys a numerical substantial unity; 2) Necessarily, y (where y is a form of x) is a [substance.sub.f] if and only if y enjoys a formal substantial unity; and 3) Necessarily, x is a [substance.sub.c] if and only if y is a [substance.sub.f]. Furthermore, in addition to the unity of an organism and the unity of its form, I shall also examine the unity of its genus and its logos; that is, I shall in fact be discussing four different kinds of unity: the unity of an organism, its form, its genus, and its logos. I shall argue that unity in one sense implies unity in all the other senses. Thus, for example, if an organism is truly unified, then its form, its genus and its logos are all truly unified; or, if the genus of an organism is truly unified, then the organism as well as its form and its logos are also truly unified, and mutatis mutandis with the form and the logos of an organism. Consequently, any fragmentation that occurs at any of the senses of unity will imply the fragmentation in all the other senses. For example, if the genus of an organism or its logos is fragmented, I shall argue that the organism in question is itself fragmented (or not truly unified) and hence is not a substance.

The third and final point is concerned with the selection of reproduction as the key unifying activity of living thing qua substance. In his biological works, reproduction is not given any privileged status but is only one among many different activities that Aristotle investigates. (7) In History of Animals, in fact, he identifies four major differentiae in virtue of which animals differ: manner of life ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), activities ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), dispositions ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), and parts ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (8). Thus, qua biologist, Aristotle may well appeal to a different criterion, other than reproduction, in unifying living things. But if substances are to play the role of efficient causes, as I shall stress (as well as the final and the formal causes), then qua metaphysician, one would not be surprised at, but rather would expect, the prominence that Aristotle places on reproduction, as can be seen in a number of passages in the Metaphysics. (9) Hence the topic of the paper is concerned not simply with any kind of overall unity exhibited by living things, but rather with the substantial unity enjoyed by them in so far as they are substances.

III

Since 'unity' just as 'being' is said in many ways, (10) the main task of this paper is to isolate the pertinent senses of 'unity' that identify substances. Let us then turn to the list of 'unity' that Aristotle himself recognizes. In Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6 and i 1, (11) Aristotle lists somewhat different sets of four senses of essential ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) unity. (12) In [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, we find the following:

D1) by being continuous ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1015b36-16a3);

D2) by the substratum not differing in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), that is, whose form is indivisible to the sense ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1016a17-24);

D3) whose genus is one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1016a24-8); and

D4) whose formula which states the essence is indivisible ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1016a32-5).

In contrast, in I1, the list is as follows:

I1) what is continuous by nature ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a19-21);

I2) that which is a whole ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a22-8);

I3) that which is one in number ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), that is, an individual ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a31-2); and

I4) that which is one in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), that is, a universal ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a32-3, 35-6).

For the sake of brevity, I will refer to them (13) as follows:

D1--Unity qua Continuity;

D2--Unity qua Substratum;

D3--Unity qua Genus;

D4--Unity qua Formula;

I1--Unity qua Continuity by Nature; (14)

I2--Unity qua Whole;

I3--Unity qua Number; and

I4--Unity qua Form.

I shall explain each of the senses in due course (at least to the extent that is pertinent to our discussion), but the first thing that I will like to do with the lists is to eliminate some of the senses of essential unity that are obviously not relevant in identifying substances. We can do so, first, by turning to the celebrated passage of Metaphysics Z16, where Aristotle denies that the parts of living things and elements (earth, water, air and fire) are substances (15) because they are 'potentialities'. The following reasons are given: in the case of elements, they are not 'one' but like a heap; and in the case of the parts of living things, they are incapable of existing separately, except as matter.

Let us take each in turn. As regards elements, the unity in question is D2--Unity qua Substratum. In [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, 1016a17-24, the example that is given is water, which is one qua indivisible in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), and water or air is identified as the ultimate substratum in virtue of which oil and wine are said to be one. But since elements are likened to be heaps rather than unified, (16) and thereby fail to be substances, we can eliminate D2--Unity qua Substratum as the pertinent sense of unity we are seeking.

With regard to the parts of living things, unlike in the case of elements, failing to be unified is not used as the ground for their being potentialities. (17) As a matter of fact, Aristotle affirms that the parts of living things are unified. But, since they fail to be substances, (18) the sense of unity that they enjoy is not what we are concerned with. The unity in question is stated thus: 'But in fact they all are only potentiality--that is, when they form a continuous unity by nature; when they are unified by force or by growing together that is simply an abnormality (19) ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' (1040b14-16). The sense of unity here corresponds to D1 and I1: both are Unity qua Continuity. (20) As a matter of fact, in D1, Aristotle explicitly mentions the parts of bodies, such as the leg or the arm, (21) as instances of what is one by being continuous by nature (1016a3). In I 1, although he does not mention parts as such, they are contrasted with the whole, that is I 2--Unity qua Whole, which is unity in a higher degree ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) by having a certain shape and form and has it in itself something which is the cause of continuity (1052a22-5). Thus, we can also eliminate D1 and I1 as well.

Let us now examine the higher unity that is said to be enjoyed by the whole but is denied to the parts. According to the Z 16 passage we have been examining, the parts of living things are excluded from being substances because they are incapable of separate existence. The standard interpretation (22) (which I accept) is that a part of an animal, like a hand, is capable of performing its function, such as to grasp and squeeze, (23) only when it exists as a part of the whole organism. If a hand is severed, since it is no longer able to perform its function, it is a hand only homonymously. (24) Furthermore, this homonymy principle applies to the whole organism (25) as well. For example, Parts of Animals I 1, 640b34-1a5 states that a corpse, although it has the same shape in configuration ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) of a living human being, is nevertheless not a human being, just as the parts of a corpse are no longer, for example, an eye or a hand, except homonymously, since each cannot perform its function. (26) Thus, both in the case of parts and the whole, ultimately what unifies them is the function that they are capable of performing, for without such capability both the parts and the whole are only so homonymously.

Now, in the case of the parts of animals, in Z 16, Aristotle also identifies two conditions under which the unity of naturally continuous parts is compromised: when the parts are unified by force and when they are unified by 'growing together'. Without providing us with any example (27) of what he means by these conditions, he gives the reason why they fail to unify the parts: because they are instances of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], (28) 'abnormality' or 'deformity'.

Given that the homonymy principle applies both to the whole and to the parts and that Aristotle himself draws a close analogy between the whole and the parts of an organism, (29) it is reasonable to assume that the unity of the whole animal is also compromised by any deformity. Thus, I will now examine a deformity that affects the whole animal rather than its parts per se. I emphasize parts per se, because if any part of the organism fails to perform its function, whether by deformity or any other cause, (30) the unity of the whole organism is also threatened. This is so because the parts exist for the sake of the whole (31) such that the function of the whole depends on the functions performed by each of the parts. For example, a paralyzed limb of an animal is incapable of performing its function and as a result fails to be unified with the whole; but such a failure does not seem to threaten the substantiality of the animal. Since we are examining unity as the criterion of substantiality, the affliction in which we are interested is one that affects the substantiality of the whole animal in virtue of its deformity (if there is one). Thus, although Aristotle speaks of different kinds of abnormality or deformity of animals, (32) a deformity that applies to the whole animal must be one that affects the unity of the whole animal such that it threatens its substantiality.

In view of this, there are two interesting cases Aristotle discusses in the Generation of Animals. The first one is castrated organisms (including eunuchs). When an animal is castrated, the whole constitution of the animal changes greatly in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), such that it will resemble the female. (33) The reason is that some parts of an animal are 'principles' (34) (IV 1, 766a24-30). And this change from the male to the female state, for Aristotle, is a kind of deformity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (V 2, 784a11-12). The second case is mules. First, their formation in some respect is described as deformed ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (35) Secondly, although sterility, which is a deformity of reproductive capacity, can occur in any given specimen of any animal, this deformity occurs in the whole race of mules. (36) What these two cases indicate is that a reproductive incapacity, a kind of deformity, somehow affects not only the whole organism (37) but in some cases the whole race of animals. Let us, therefore, examine how such deformity affects the unity of an organism and, thereby, its substantiality.

In Generation of Animals II 7, Aristotle lists a number of causes of sterility: deformity in the regions and parts employed for copulation (746b22-5); old age (746b25-6); being overweight (746b26-9); and sickness (746b29-31). Of the four causes listed, it is not immediately obvious why being overweight as such would result in infertility. The reason given is that, instead of forming semen or menstrual discharge (for men and women, respectively), those who are too fat use up the seminal residue ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) for their own body. (38) In Aristotle's view, there is a close connection between nutrition and generation. (39) Semen, (40) in his analysis, is not a part of a body, but rather is a residue derived from useful nourishment in the final form that is distributed to the whole body. (41) As a matter of fact, the origin of nutrition and generation lies in the same part of the soul--in the nutritive part. (42)

I shall, henceforth, refer to these two (43) faculties, the nutritive ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and the generative ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), as the threptic and the gennetic faculties, respectively. The function of the threptic faculty is to provide ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) being ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) both to the whole and to the parts ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (Generation of Animals II 6, 744b34-5) and preserves the substance ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (de Anima II 4, 416b14). The threptic faculty of the soul is, thus, responsible for maintaining the unity of the whole organism by preserving its substantiality. And since the gennetic faculty is also located in this part of the soul, any damage or deformity caused to this part of the soul will have an adverse effect on the generative power of an animal, either on a particular specimen or on a whole class of animals--such as mules. The cause of the infertility of mules, according to Aristotle, is a combination of the two conditions: having a cold nature (44) (just like the ass) (45) and having been produced contrary to nature. (46)

Sterility then is a kind of deformity that indicates a compromise in the unity of a whole organism. As a result, an organism with such a deformity will fail to perform the function appropriate to living organisms, as stated in the celebrated passage of de Anima: 'For it is the most natural function ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) in living things, such as are perfect and not deformed ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) or do not have spontaneous generation, to produce another thing like themselves, (47) (II 4, 415a26-8). (48) Note that the most natural function of a living organism is not merely to reproduce offspring but to reproduce offspring like itself ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (415a28). In Generation of Animals IV 3, Aristotle goes so far as to claim that any animal that fails to resemble its parents is in fact in a way ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) a monstrosity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (767b6-7), which is a kind of deformity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (769b30). And the first step to such a monstrosity occurs when a female (which is as it were a deformed male ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) [II 3, 737a28-9]) is formed (767b89). We shall examine the gender difference shortly, but the reason why offspring resemble their parents goes back to the fact that the threptic and gennetic faculties are found in the same part of the soul. Children are formed from the residue, that is, what is left over from the ultimate useful nourishment that is distributed to the various parts of the body of their parents (I 19, 726b13-15), hence they resemble parents just as the paint left over on the palette of an artist resembles what is used in the painting (I 18, 725a24-7).

Any defectiveness, then, in the nutritive part of the soul (which preserves the whole organism) threatens both the unity and the substantiality of an organism. Mules are an obvious example. But there are other suspicious living creatures as well, such as spontaneously generated organisms, which are mentioned in the de Anima passage. They are generated from natural residues, such as mud and putrefying materials, (49) which certainly do not resemble their cause at all. The cause, of course, is the heat generated by the Sun. (50) There are also hybrids other than mules that Aristotle mentions which are capable of reproduction. But eventually with subsequent generations the offspring resulting from different species reverts back to the species to which mother belongs, (51) with the implication that hybrids would eventually die out. A similar point is made about spontaneously generated organisms; for some of them do generate offspring, but unlike themselves. (52) But an infinite series of the reproduction of dissimilar offspring is not possible in nature, since, while nature seeks completion ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), what is infinite is incomplete ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (53)

Before we proceed further, it would be helpful at this point to summarize briefly the finding of this section. Out of the eight essential senses of unity, we have eliminated D2--Unity qua Substratum as well as D1 and I1, both are Unity qua Continuity, as a criterion of substantiality. In contrast to them, however, I2- Unity qua Whole is indeed a unity that pertains to the substantiality of an organism. What is left unclear is to what extent an organism must be unified in this sense before it fails to be a substance. Does it begin at the first stage of monstrosity, the formation of the female? Does it begin when an organism, although capable of reproduction, fails to generate offspring like itself, like hybrids. Does it begin when an organism is produced from non-living matter, like spontaneously generated organisms? Or does it begin when an organism is infertile, like mules? Or are they all substances, despite the fact that their unity qua Whole is compromised in a varying degree? To answer these questions, we need to examine other senses of essential unity, to which we will now turn.

IV

In our analysis of I2--Unity qua Whole, we found that the functioning of the nutritive part of the soul is crucial in an organism preserving its unity and its substantiality. Furthermore, since the gennetic faculty is situated in the nutritive part of the soul, we took it as a sign that any infertility implies a defect in this part of the soul and as a result the substantial unity of an organism was questioned. In the course of our analysis, we referred to the celebrated passage of de Anima II 4. If we return to this passage again, and read it in full, we find that Aristotle explicitly mentions the two senses of essential unity which we have yet to examine:
 For it is the most natural function in living things, such as are
 perfect and not deformed or do not have spontaneous generation, to
 produce another thing like themselves--an animal to produce an
 animal, a plant a plant--in order that they may partake of the
 eternal and the divine in so far as they can; for all desire that,
 and for the sake of that they do whatever they do in accordance
 with nature. (But that for the sake of which is twofold--the
 purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom.) Since, then, they
 cannot share in the eternal and the divine by continuous existence,
 because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the
 same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some
 less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like
 itself, not one in number ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), but
 one in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (54) (415a26-b7)


The two senses of essential unity mentioned in this passage are I3--Unity qua Number and I4--Unity qua Form. I shall turn to I3 in the next section. In this section, I shall examine I4. To understand this sense of unity, let us take an example where formal unity fails to obtain. In Metaphysics Z 8, Aristotle illustrates it using the generation of mules. The text reads:
 In some cases, indeed, it is perfectly clear that the creator is
 such as the created (not the same, or numerically one ([TEXT NOT
 REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) but one in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
 ASCII.])), for man begets man, and the same is true of natural
 things ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) generally--unless what
 is generated is contrary to nature ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
 ASCII.]), as when a horse begets a mule. (Yet even here the case is
 similar ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]); for the nearest genus
 ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) of horse and ass, what is
 common to both, is nameless ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]),
 but it would presumably be both, like the mule.). (55)
 (1033b29-4a2)


In natural generation, the generator and the generated are unified by form. In the case of generation contrary to nature, however, such a unity fails to obtain. But there is a similarity. For example, in the case of the generation of mules, the generator (a horse) and the offspring (a mule) are united by the nearest and the nameless genus; that is, the unity in question is an example of D3--Unity qua Genus.

In Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, which is one of our sources of the list of the different senses of essential unity, Aristotle describes D3--Unity qua Genus as follows: what are one in genus are in fact distinguished by opposite differentiae, such as, in the case of horse, man and dog. But they are one in genus because they are all animals (1016a24-8). In Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 28, however, we discover that there are in fact three senses of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]: 1) 'in respect of the continuous coming to be of the same form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])'; 2) 'in respect of the first thing, having the same form, to effect change in thing ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])'; and 3) 'as matter ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), (56) (1024b6-8). The example of the first sense is the human race ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1024a29-31); the second sense refers to a certain people from different regions, such as the Hellenes or Ionians (1024a31-6); and the third sense is understood as the subject of differentiae (an example from geometry is given at 1024a36b3) or qualities (1024a36-b6). (57) I shall refer to the three senses of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] as follows: 1) 'race' or the genesis sense; 2) 'family' or 'clan'; (58) and 3) 'genus' or the logical sense, (59) respectively.

Of the three senses of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (all of which can be said to be unified), it is the third one that corresponds to D3--Unity qua Genus. From the standpoint of this logical sense of genos, an organism that could only be unified at the level of genus does not seem to enjoy substantial unity; for not only is genus declared to be not a substance (for example, Metaphysics H 1, 1042a21-2), but also genus is by nature divisible. Thus, although all the senses of essential unity are said to be one because they are indivisible ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) both in [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6 (60) and I 1 (61) and thereby genus is in some sense indivisible (or unified), it is always divisible (62) into a number of differentiae, in contrast to a specific form.

The fragmentation of D3--Unity qua Genus, in contrast to the indivisibility of I4--Unity qua Form, can be seen clearly also from the standpoint of D4--Unity qua Formula. Let us contrast mules and horses. The formula that expresses the essence of mule must include references to the essence of horse (as well as the essence of ass); otherwise, one fails to understand the nature of mule as a hybrid between two different species. In contrast, the formula that expresses the essence of horse has no reference to any other species. In fact, not only mules, but all hybrids that are capable of reproduction (albeit of dissimilar offspring) all fail to be truly unified, for in their formulae they must all refer to the different species from which they are generated. Similarly, in the case of spontaneously generated organisms, their formulae must refer to heat generated by the Sun, which is for Aristotle a living substance. Unlike the hybrids, however, it is not the nearest genus, but perhaps the furthest genus (qua en-souled), in virtue of which the generator and the offspring are united.

Since the nature of I4--Unity qua Form in question is found in the context of coming to be, this sense of I4 can be made clearer if we examine it also from the standpoint of efficient causality. Most of the scholarly discussion on the problem of unity has been focused exclusively on how the form and matter of a composite can be understood to be one. (63) Some scholars have even denied the importance of the role that efficient causality plays in the unity problem. (64) This is so despite the fact that in the celebrated passage of Metaphysics H 6, Aristotle twice (65) mentions that it is the efficient cause that is responsible for unifying the form and matter. (66) Aristotle, however, does not elaborate on the importance, if there is any, of the role that efficient causality plays in the unity problem. This is most likely because he is interested in explaining the unity of an individual. (67) In contrast, we are interested in explicating Aristotle's conception of a formal unity. Is there a way in which we can understand such a unity that involves an efficient cause?

A clue is found in Physics II 7, where Aristotle mentions a unique sense of unity that occurs in the context of coming to be, which is: that, in some cases, the unity of causes occurs among the formal, efficient and final causes: 'The last three often coincide ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). What a thing is, and what it is for, are one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), and that from which the change originates is the same in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) as these. Thus a man gives birth to a man (68) ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) ... ' (198a25-7). (69)

Here Aristotle identifies a kind of unity obtained by the three causes, such that while the formal cause and the final cause are one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), (70) the efficient cause is the same ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) in form as the other two causes. Since sameness is a kind of unity, (71) in this passage, Aristotle points out a unique kind of unity enjoyed by the three causes that revolves around the unity and the sameness of the form. Thus, according to this passage, I4--Unity qua Form means not only that the generator and the offspring are same in form, that is, one in form, but also that this unity is obtained by means of a unity that occurs among the three different causes. In de Anima II 4, immediately after the quoted passage where Aristotle points out that living organisms share in the eternal and divine not one in number but one in form, he argues that the soul is the cause of a living body in three different senses: as a substance that causes its existence (415b12-15); as a final cause, for bodies exist for the sake of the soul (415b15-21); and as an efficient cause (415b21-8).

The unity of these three causes, then, originates in the soul. Now although the soul is the cause in these three senses (formal, efficient, and final), their unification qua form does not occur in all living organisms--both the hybrids and spontaneously generated organisms are excluded. And hence they fail to participate in the eternal and the divine. (72)

To clarify further the nature of this specific sense of I4--Unity qua Form, it is helpful to draw a distinction between the Platonic and the Aristotelian conception of 'participation' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (73) In the Metaphysics, one of the criticisms against Platonic Forms is that they are supposed to account for the comings-to-be of sensible objects and yet, according to Aristotle, they fail to explain how they could be such causes. To say that the sensible things 'participate' and 'share' in the eternal Forms are empty words and poetic metaphor. (74) In contrast, although Aristotle himself uses these Platonic sounding expressions, they are not vacuous because for Aristotle forms are not merely the patterns ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (75) but are the souls of animals and their souls are endowed with the capacities of both efficient and final causes.

Let me illustrate the Aristotelian conception of 'participation' using again horses and mules as examples. I shall do so, furthermore, by appealing to the first sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] ('race' or the genesis sense). Recall that it is defined as 'the continuous coming to be of the same form'. Horses, of course, always existed for Aristotle. They are one of those 'races' of animals that have resulted, are resulting, and will result from 'a continuous generation of things which have the same form'; hence, they participate in the eternal and the divine. Now let us also suppose that mules have always existed (and will always exist); that is, they were and will be always produced, either by art or by chance, (76) and as a result they were and will be always 'instantiated' (another Platonic sounding expression). Even if this obtains, the mules would not participate in the eternal and the divine, because their forms are not the causes of their coming-into-being. (77) Thus, an eternal instantiation is not a sufficient condition for any species of organism (or for that matter any kind of objects, including artifacts) to participate in the eternal and the divine. The form of an animal must play the causal role that is responsible for the eternal existence of its species.

I4--Unity qua Form (which in turn can be formulated by D4--Unity qua Formula) understood in the unique way as described in Physics II 7, then, turns out to be a crucial criterion of substantiality, for the soul of an organism is its substantial form which is also its efficient and final causes. To recognize this Unity's prominence, I shall refer to it as formal substantial unity, which will be defined as 'the unity that obtains among the efficient, the formal, and the final causes such that they exist as one and the same form universally across time.' It, thus, provides us with the standard to judge the degree of unity (in the sense of I2- Unity qua Whole) required for an organism to be a [substance.sub.c]. Recall that the various degrees of unity enjoyed by an organism depend on the unity of the threptic and gennetic faculties in the soul of an animal. Thus, the degree of unity enjoyed by an organism via its threptic faculty will reflect the degree of unity enjoyed by its form via its gennetic faculty and vice versa. Since any soul of an animal which has a defective gennetic faculty fails to enjoy the formal substantial unity, if formal substantial unity (as the name implies) is indeed a criterion of substantiality, then any soul of an organism that fails to satisfy the formal substantial unity is not a [substance.sub.f] and the organism in question fails to be a [substance.sub.c] as well.

To defend the view that what I call formal substantial unity is indeed a criterion of substantiality, however, requires the resolution of the following problem. When we turned to the discussion of D3--Unity qua Genus, we eliminated it (that is, the logical sense of genos) as the criterion of substantiality, because Aristotle denies that genus is a substance. But in the very same sentence we referred to, (78) he also denies that the universal is a substance. The problem is that I4--Unity qua Form is identified by Aristotle as a universal (1052a35-6). It would seem, then, that as a universal, we are forced to eliminate I4 as the criterion of substantiality as well. To resolve this problem, we now need to examine the last and the remaining sense of essential unity, I3--Unity qua Number and how it is related to I4.

V

The contrast between I3--Unity qua Number and I4--Unity qua Form is also the contrast between individual ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a31-2) and universal ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a35-6). (79) Our understanding of I4--Unity qua Form is situated in the context of the generation of animals such that the celebrated formula, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], captures the unity of three causes. Thus, to examine the contrast between individual and universal, it is instructive to turn to Generation of Animals IV 3, where Aristotle explains their role in the formation of an organism. According to Aristotle both the genus ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and the individual ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) 'generate' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) an offspring, but the individual generates 'more' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). The reason is that it is the individual which is a substance ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). And the offspring, which is a certain sort ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), is also at the same time a this ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and a substance ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (767b33-6). And by individual he means, for example, Coriscus or Socrates (768a2). Here, Aristotle is explicit in claiming that a substance is an individual composite. I3--Unity qua Number, understood as individual, then, is also a criterion of substantiality. (80)

Furthermore, the distinction that Aristotle draws between a this ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and a certain sort ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) can also be found in his Categories, where what he calls 'the primary substance', such as the individual man or the individual horse ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (2a13-14) signifies a this ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) because 'the thing revealed is individual ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (81) and numerically one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' (3b12-13), while 'the secondary substance', such as man and animal, signifies a certain sort ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (3b13-16). In the Metaphysics, this unity enjoyed by the individual substances, which is understood as having a hylomorphic structure, is explained in terms of the unity that is obtained between what is actuality and what is potentiality (H 6, 1045b17-21). This unity in turn implies the unity of the soul and body that Aristotle explicitly states in de Anima II 1, 412b4-9. Now, there is no dispute about the fact that, according to Aristotle, an individual composite enjoys a kind of unity that is obtained between the form and the matter, although there is a controversy as to how they are said to be unified. (82) In light of this fact, in contrast to formal substantial unity defined in the last section, I shall refer to I3 as numerical substantial unity, which is the unity of a composite substance, and it will be defined as 'the intrinsic unity that obtains between the soul and the body of an organism such that it exists as an individual at any given time'. (83)

In Generation of Animals IV 3, although Aristotle identifies Coriscus as an individual, which is a substance, he is not merely an individual male, but also a human being as well as an animal (768a13-14), which are universals (767b14); that is, substance implies an organism that can be described as both individual and universal. (84) In the semen, both individual and different levels of universals are described as powers that exert influences on the formation of an organism (767b36-8a1). In an ideal condition, the male's semen masters ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) the well-concocted menstrual fluid of the female resulting in an offspring taking after the father's shape ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (767b16-18); that is, a male offspring will look identical to his father. (85) When the failure of such a mastery occurs (and it always occurs since no son is ever identical to his father), an offspring will take after any combination of influences exerted both by the father's and mother's individual and universal factors, including the traits from their ancestors (768a3-23).

In some cases, the semen fails to master the menstrual fluid such that the result is merely an animal, which Aristotle refers to as the universal most of all ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (769b11-13). Note that Aristotle does not refer to it as an individual. It is, rather, classified among the things that are called monstrosities ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (769b10). Since the features of an embryo are progressively developed from the more universal to the individual ones, (86) here we have an example of living things that have not reached the formation to the level of individual, which Aristotle identifies as a substance. (87)

What about the female offspring? Are they individuals? According to Aristotle, as we saw earlier, the first stage of monstrosity occurs when an offspring is female instead of male (767b6-8). But the first deviation to monstrosity notwithstanding, the mother is identified as an individual (768b15) and male and female have the same form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (730b34-5). Thus, they are individuals that are also one in form. (88)

So, from the list of living things that are said to be deformed in one sense or another, we have two extreme examples: monstrosities that are described as universal most of all, implying that they are not individual (hence, are not substances); and the female organisms that can be described as both individual and universal (hence, they are substances). What about the other deformed animals, hybrids and spontaneously generated organisms?

We can begin to answer this question by first turning to the passage of Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, where Aristotle gives the priority to one in number, in contrast to one in form and one in genus (1016b31-17a3). While one in number implies the other two (one in form and one in genus), one in form implies only one in genus and not one in number. One in genus, in turn, does not imply the other two. This standard logical distinction of unities of number, form and genus that Aristotle outlines here should be kept separate from the sense of unities that we have been examining. (89)

Recall once again the genesis sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], which is defined as 'a continuous generation of things which have the same form'. Note that this sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (which we contrasted with D3--Unity qua Genus or the logical sense) does imply one in form. And the specific sense of I4--Unity qua Form that we have analyzed, in turn, does imply one in number, for the formal unity is obtained by the unity of three causes that originates in the soul of an organism that is individual. In other words, I3--Unity qua Number, I4--Unity qua Form (understood as formal substantial unity) and the genesis sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] all imply one another. Substances (in both senses of the term: [substances.sub.c] and [substances.sub.f]) exemplify this unity.

Thus, just as there are the logical and the genesis senses of genos, there are also the logical and the genesis senses of form. An illustration is helpful here. Horses enjoy a formal unity in the logical sense. By this I mean, for any given instance of horse, it is possible to identify and classify it as a certain kind of animal; that is, horses all fall under the same form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) as described in Topics I 7, 103a13. Furthermore, horses enjoy a formal unity in the genesis sense. By this I mean, for any given instance of horse, it is possible to identify and classify it as a kind of 'race', which is defined as 'a continuous generation of things which have the same form'. But such unification depends on individuals capable of reproducing the same form, which only non-deformed nonspontaneously generated organisms are capable of doing. In contrast, although mules also enjoy a formal unity in the logical sense (that is, all mules fall under the same form), they cannot be classified as 'race'; hence, their form is not unified from the stand point of the genesis sense; for mules are incapable of reproducing the same form; that is, mules (and of course spontaneously generated organisms) are not individuals--hence, they fail to be substances. (90)

In other words, hybrids and spontaneously generated organism are only D3--Unity qua Genus and not unified as a 'race', their genus does not imply I3--Unity qua Number; that is, they are not individuals and hence are not substances.

VI

In conclusion, I would like to refer to Metaphysics [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, where Aristotle declares that the things that are primarily one are those whose substance is one, either in terms of continuity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), or in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), or in formula ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (91) In light of our discussion we can understand the three senses of unity that are enjoyed by substances as follows: I2--Unity qua Whole (which is a kind of unity by continuity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) applied specifically to the whole and excluding parts (92)) comes in various degrees and I3--Unity qua Number identifies the things that are unified most of all in a continuous way; and I4--Unity qua Form and D4--Unity qua Formula (as indicated by the same name), correspond to the last two senses of unity: in form ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and in formula ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), respectively.

In sum, all living organisms enjoy I2--Unity qua Whole in various degrees. But only those organisms that are capable of reproducing their own form are unified in terms of I3--Unity qua Number and their forms in turn are unified in terms of I4--Unity qua Form (or are unified in terms of numerical substantial unity and formal substantial unity, respectively), and, as a result, the formulae that express their essences are unified as well (i.e., they are unified in terms of D4--Unity qua Formula); hence, such organisms are substances. They are substances because they are especially unified most of all ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), since in thought it is not possible to separate their essence ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) in time ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) or in place ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) or in account ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (93) The indivisibility in terms of these three senses once again corresponds, respectively, to formal substantial unity (I-3), numerical substantial unity (I-4), and D4--Unity qua Formula.

All organisms that fail to meet these three (94) essential senses of unity, such as hybrids and spontaneously generated organisms (which are unified essentially only in the sense of D3--Unity qua Genus or only in the logical sense of genos) are not substances. More formally, my view is as follows: Necessarily, x is a [substance.sub.c], if and only if x is an individual; and necessarily, x is an individual, if and only if x belongs to a genos in the genesis sense.

Thus, from the standpoint of unity as the criterion of substantiality, not all living things turn out to be substances after all. (95)

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(1) See Metaph Z 7, 1032a18-19. See also Z 8, 1034a3-4; Z 17, 1041b28-31; H 3, 1043b22-3; [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 1, 1069a30-2; and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 3, 1070a17-19. Cf. Frede 1985, 21; Kosman 1987, 360; Kosman 1994, 206 and 209; Lloyd 1992, 164 and 1996, 61 and 71; Lewis 1994, 257 and 268; and Wedin 2000, 435 and 443.

(2) See Metaph Z 16, 1040b8-10.

(3) See Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, 1016a4 and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 26, 1023b34-6. Cf. Lewis 1995, 264 n70.

(4) See, for example, Gill 1989, 242. Cf. Furth 1988; Scaltsas 1994, 109-10 and 122 n35; Loux 1995, 276; Burnyeat 2001, 56.

(5) Without appealing to unity as the criterion of substantiality, I argued in Katayama 1999 that not all living things are substances. In this paper, I shall argue that the criterion of unity will pick out exactly the same list of living organisms as substances that I defended in Katayama 1999, while denying this status to other living things (as well as artifacts). This paper does not presuppose any of the arguments that I presented there but stands on its own as an independent supplement that endorses and reinforces them.

(6) This view, which Furth ascribes to Aristotle, is that 'the substantial form of a substantial individual is something it can neither change nor lose without ceasing to exist' (1987, 53). It is derived from the view of the Categories that the most distinctive characteristic of substance is to remain numerically one and the same while receiving contraries (4a10-11) (ibid.).

(7) I am grateful to Devin Henry for pointing this out to me.

(8) See I 1, 487a10-11.

(9) Most notably, see Metaph Z 7-9.

(10) For the relation of being and unity, see Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 2, 1003b22-4 and 33-4; Top IV 1, 121b7-8; de An II 1, 412b5-9; Metaph Z 4, 1030b10-12; and I 2, 1053b25 and 1054a1319.

(11) I shall not refer to the list of 'unity' found in Ph I 2, 185b7-9, since they will all be dealt with in our discussion of the lists from Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6 and I 1.

(12) Aristotle draws a distinction between 1) 'what sort of things are said to be one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' and 2) 'what it is to be one ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' (1052b1-3). 1) is further subdivided into a) accidental ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and b) essential ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). In [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6, Aristotle discusses all three, but in I 1 only 1b) and 2). 1a) does not concern us for the obvious reason that it deals only with accidental unity and we shall set it aside 2) because 'to be first' is to be the first measure which primarily belongs to the category of quantity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and only derivatively to other categories, including substance (1052b18-20). Cf. Elders 1960, 80. Thus, we shall be concerned only with 1b), since our task is not to analyze the nature of unity as such but to examine the nature of essential unity in virtue of which most (but not all) living things are said to be substances.

(13) In this paper, I shall not deal with the discrepancies of these two lists and how they might correspond to each other or to be reduced to one another (see, for example, Ross 1924, I 301 and Ross 1924, II 281). Nor will I be concerned with a possible developmental thesis, for example, the one defended by Elders 1960, 59-61 and 79. Even if there is a development from [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 6 to I 1, or even if one of the lists can be reduced to the other, having both lists (that emphasize different senses of unity) at our disposal will be useful in selecting the pertinent senses of unity as the criteria of substantiality and see why some fail while others succeed. Thus, I will simply list them as eight different senses of essential unity.

(14) The difference between D1 and I1 is that in I1, Aristotle focuses exclusively on what is continuous by nature (1052a20), hence he excludes both what is continuous by contact ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) and by bond ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (1052a20) but in D1, Aristotle includes what is continuous by art as well, hence, he uses 'a bundle from its tie ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' (1016a1) as an example of what is continuous, although he does mention that what is continuous by nature is one to a higher degree than what is continuous by art (1016a4). Cf. Halper 1989, 267 n45; Kirwan 1993, 136 and Apostle 1979, 301.

(15) Elsewhere, though, they are called substances: for the parts of living things, see Cat 5, 3a28-32; 7, 8a15-16 and 8b15; Ph II 1, 192b9; Cael III 1, 298a32-3; Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 8, 1017b12-13; Z 2, 1028b9-10; and H 1, 1042a9-10; and for elements, see Ph II 1, 192b10-11; Cael III 1, 298a29-30; Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 8, 1017b10-11; Z 2, 1028b10-11; and H 1, 1042a8.

(16) See also Metaph Z 17, 1041b12-14; H 3, 1044a4; H 6, 1045a9; and M 8, 1084b22.

(17) Frede and Patzig, however, disagree. According to their reading of 1040b8-9, elements as well as the parts of animals are potentialities because they both failed to be unified (1988, II 298-9). Even if this reading is correct, it would not affect our thesis, since the unity in question that Frede and Patzig II (1988) are referring to at 299 is D1 and I1, which will be eliminated as the pertinent sense of unity we are seeking.

(18) See also Metaph H 2, 1042b31, where parts of animals, such as hands and feet, are listed among the things that are analogous to substances (1043a4-5).

(19) Bostock's translation (1994).

(20) Since the parts of animals that we are concerned with are continuous by nature (and not by art), the discrepancy pointed out in note 14 between D1 and I1 does not concern us and, thus, I shall simply refer to both of them as Unity qua Continuity (understood as referring only to what is continuous by nature).

(21) Shin and thigh are also mentioned (1016a11).

(22) See, for example, Ross 1924, II 218-19; Frede and Patzig 1988, II 298; Bostock 1994, 224-5; Scaltsas 1994, 123; and Burnyeat 2001, 17 n15.

(23) See PA IV 10, 690a32.

(24) Cf. Metaph Z 10, 1035b23-5; I 1, 1036b30-2; and PA II 9, 654b4-5.

(25) Cf., for example, Kosman 1987, 379; Whiting 1992, 77; Shields 1993, 169 and Shields 1999, 31, 46 and 135.

(26) See also PA I 1, 641a18-20 and GA II 5, 741a10-13. Cf. Int I 1, 21a22-3; Mete IV 7, 389b31-90a1; and Pol I 2, 1253a20-5.

(27) The examples of abnormal unions by [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] are Siamese twins and other unnatural growths that Aristotle discusses at GA IV 4, 773a2ff. See Ross 1924, II 220; Apostle 1979, 345; Frede and Patzig 1988, II 302; and Bostock 1994, 227.

(28) Liddell and Scott (1940) gives 'maiming' and 'disabling' for this term. Ross' gloss is 'malformation' (1924, II). Shields (1999) translates it as 'mutants' (182). And Rorty (1973) refers to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] as 'freaks' (412) (see also Halper 1989, 113, 139 and 182) and J. A. Smith translates it at de An II 4, 415a27 in Barnes (1984) as 'mutilated' or more accurately, he translates [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] as 'unmutilated'.

(29) See, for example, de An II 1, 412b18-25.

(30) For example, if any bone in the body is separated, not only it will fail to perform its function, but it could also be harmful to the whole organism, since it is 'like a sort of thorn or sting imbedded in the flesh' (PA II 9, 654b4-9; Lennox' translation, 2001).

(31) See PA I 1, 642a11-12; I 5, 645a31-6; and 645b15-20.

(32) For example, lobsters' claws that are used for locomotion instead of catching and holding (PA IV 8, 684a32-b1); a seal's not having ears (PA II 13, 657a22-4); and moles' eyes (HA IV 8, 533a11-12); etc. Cf. Gotthelf 1985b, 39-40 and Granger 1978.

(33) See, also, I 3, 716b3-12. Cf. V 7, 787b20-2 and 788a7-15.

(34) The principles in question are the parts that pertain to the male (and the female) in virtue of which they are the principle of generation. See GA I 2, 716a11-14; I 3, 716b10-12; and II 1, 731b18-19.

(35) I 20, 728b11-12

(36) II 8, 747a25-6. See also II 7, 746b20.

(37) This is so even if an animal is male or female not in respect to the whole animal but only with respect to a particular part. See GA I 2, 716a28-31.

(38) See also GA I 18, 726a3-5 and GA I 19, 727a33-b2. Cf. PA II 5, 651b13-17.

(39) See, for example, PA II 7, 653b13-18; II 9, 655b23-7; III 14, 674a20; and IV 4, 678a1920. Cf. Lloyd 1996, 42 and Lennox 2001, 279-80.

(40) Similarly as in the case with the menstrual discharge. See GA I 19, 726b35-7a4.

(41) See GA I 18, 724b28-31; 725a11-13; 725a23-4; 726a26-7; and IV 1, 766b8-9. Of course, the final form of the useful nourishment is blood. See, for example, PA II 3, 650a34 and GA I 19, 726b1.

(42) See GA II 1, 735a16-19 and II 4, 740b38. Hence, they are the most basic activities of all animals. See also HA VII 1, 589a2-5.

(43) In fact, there are three faculties (in the nutritive part of the soul) identified by Aristotle. The third one is that which promotes growth ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) or auxetic faculty. See GA II 6, 744b33-6; GA II 1, 735a16-19; and de An II 4, 416b9-20. Cf. EN I 6, 1098a1 and I 13, 1102a33. Our concern in this paper is with the two identified in the main text.

(44) Cold semen is not generative. See GA I 7, 718a24-5.

(45) See GA II 8, 748a32-3. See also II 7, 747a1-2.

(46) See GA II 8, 748b14-19

(47) Hamlyn's translation (1993) with slight modification.

(48) See also de An III 9, 432b21-6 and GA I 23, 731a30-1. Cf. Pol I 2, 1252a27-30.

(49) See GA I 1, 715a24-5; 715b3-6; 715b26-8; and II 3, 737a1-7. In HA V 19, 550b32-1a10, Aristotle lists a wide variety of materials, including dew, wood, hair and flesh; and in HA V 32, 557b1-10, he even includes wool, clothes and books. Cf. Lloyd 1996, 94 n6 and 116-17.

(50) See GA II 3, 737a1-7 and II 6, 743a32-5.

(51) See GA II 4, 738b27-36.

(52) See GA I 1, 715a23 and 715b3-6.

(53) See GA I 1, 715b8-16.

(54) See note 47.

(55) Bostock's translation (1994).

(56) Kirwan's translation (1993).

(57) The two passages, 1024a36-b4 and 1024b4-6, are grouped together as one sense--see Ross 1924, I 343 and Kirwan 1993, 177.

(58) I shall set aside from our discussion this second sense. In contrast, as we shall see, the distinction that is drawn between the other two senses will be crucial.

(59) In Metaphysics I 8, this sense of genos is distinguished from the first sense at 1058a23-6. Cf. Wedin 2000, 239.

(60) 1016b23-4

(61) 1052a36

(62) Cf. Furth 1988, 100.

(63) See, for example, in the Introduction to Scaltsas, Charles, and Gill 1994, 1.

(64) See, for example, Charles 1994, 97; Frede 1994, 187-8; Wedin 2000, 416; and Burnyeat 2001, 58 and 58 n116.

(65) [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] at 1045a31 and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] at 1045b22.

(66) Those who deny the involvement of efficient causality in Aristotle's discussion of unity in H 6 read these passages as Aristotle bracketing or excluding the efficient causality. See, for example, Lewis 1995, 237-8.

(67) See, however, the contrary view of Harte 1996, 278.

(68) Charlton's translation (1970) with a slight modification.

(69) See also PA I 1, 641a27. Cf. Lennox 2001, 125 and 142.

(70) See also Metaph H 4, 1044a36-b1 and GC II 9, 335b6; cf. Ross 1924, II 235.

(71) See Metaph [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] 9, 1018a7 and I 3, 1054a29-32. Cf. Top I 7, 103a11-13.

(72) Cf. Lennox 1985, 89.

(73) In de An II 4, Aristotle himself uses this term at 415a29 and b5 but in Metaph A 6, 987b10 and A 9, 991a21, he criticizes Plato for using it.

(74) See Metaph A 9, 991a8-22 and M 5, 1079b26.

(75) The criticism at 991a20-2 is that to posit forms as merely 'patterns' and to appeal to the expression, 'participation', results in a vacuous statement.

(76) See HA VI 23, 577b15-18; HA VII 28, 606b19-23; and GA II 7, 746b8-12.

(77) Thus, the 'genos of mules ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.])' found in GA II 8, 747a25-6 is not the genesis sense.

(78) It is Metaph H 1, 1042a21-2. And, of course, in Z 13-14 Aristotle denies that universal (along with genus) are substances. Cf. Ross 1924, II 164; and Burnyeat 2001, 9, 15 and 62-3.

(79) Cf. Metaph B 4, 999b33-1000a1.

(80) Cf. Elders 1960, 65 and 67.

(81) Cf. Shields 1999, 252 n78.

(82) Roughly, the two main approaches are as follows: 1) the form, as an actuality, is taken as an explanatory cause of what unifies a composite substance; and 2) the basic notions of the form and the matter, understood as actuality and potentiality, are taken as abstractions from the unified composite that requires no further explanation of its unity. Charles calls 1) an explanatory interpretation and 2) a dissolutionist or a non-explanatory interpretation (2000, 296-300 and 306).

(83) The formulation of numerical substantial unity is neutral as regards the two approaches distinguished in the previous note.

(84) One of the most controversial issues in the literature on Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine is whether or not form is individual or universal. I have canvassed the debate in Katayama 1999, 62-5. The view that I am sketching here should be distinguished from this controversy. My view is as follows: when I say that a substance can be described as both individual and universal, I simply mean that a [substance.sub.c] is an individual that belongs to a natural kind (universal) G.

(85) Cf. Gill 1994, 67.

(86) See GA II 3, 736a32-b5.

(87) Cf. Furth 1988, 129 and Rorty 1973, 413-14.

(88) See also Metaph I 9, 1058a29-34 and 1058b21-5.

(89) Furthermore, in this passage, Aristotle equates one in number with one in matter and one in form with one in formula (1016b32-3).

(90) A similar view has been defended by Rorty about mules (1973, 414).

(91) 1016b8-9

(92) See Ross 1924, II 281 and Elders 1960, 61.

(93) 1016b1-3

(94) Although I have identified four essential senses of unity (i] the Unity qua Number, ii] the Unity qua Form in the genesis sense, iii] the Unity of Genus in the genesis sense, and iv] the Unity qua Formula), since iii] picks out a unique way in which ii] is unified, formal substantial unity implies both ii] and iii].

(95) I would like to acknowledge the support I received from the National Endowment for the Humanities when I participated in the 2004 NEH Summer Seminar: Soul and Substance in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition at University of Colorado, Boulder, and to thank the two co-directors, Robert Pasnau but especially Chris Shields for his helpful feedback, as well as comments I got from all the participants when I read the remote ancestor of this paper. I would like also to thank John Mouracade for organizing the Conference on Aristotle and Life at University of Alaska, Anchorage, in the summer of 2007, where I read the earlier version of the paper and to thank the comments I received from all the participants; but especially my commentator Devin Henry for his detail helpful suggestions he gave me not only for the read paper at the Workshop but also for the revised version. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support I received from Ohio Northern University for supplementing my trip to Boulder, Colorado, in the form of Summer Faculty Development Grant (2004) and granting me a year sabbatical leave 2006-7 where I did the bulk of my research and writing; and to thank Pat Croskery for his editorial assistance.
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