Stoic logic as handmaid to exegesis and theology in Origen's commentary on the Gospel of John.
Origen's advice to Gregory shows that he took the study of philosophy seriously, both for himself and for his students. It also suggests that he was not committed to any one philosophical school, but ranged through them all looking for that which he could use as a Christian scholar. One of the philosophical schools in which Origen found much that was helpful, as a few modern studies have shown, was that of Stoicism.
In 1947 H. Chadwick called attention to Origen's extensive knowledge of Stoicism in an article dealing primarily with Origen's polemic against the Stoic doctrines of fate and the corporeality of God in the Contra Celsum.(3) In 1962 H. Crouzel commented on Origen's familiarity with |le milleu de la Stoa', but noted that his Stoicism had not yet been thoroughly studied.(4) In 1970 L. Roberts complained that the extent of Origen's debt to Stoicism had |not yet been determined', and that his use of Stoic logic had been |almost entirely ignored'.(5) J. M. Rist published an article in 1981, largely in response to some of the points in Roberts's article, which confirms Origen's extensive knowledge of Stoic logic.(6) Rist comments, however, that
a reader of almost any modern study of Origen ... would get the impression that Stoic logic was not one of Origen's main concerns and that nothing fundamental about Origen could be discovered in this quarter. He might even get the impression that ... Origen took virtually no interest in questions of logic and knew little about them.
The studies of Roberts and Rist have established unquestionably that Origen had a thorough knowledge of Stoic logic. This should come as no surprise, since, in his delineation of Origen's school curriculum at Caesarea, Gregory Thaumaturgus describes dialectic as the first stage of his education with Origen,(8) and the logical part of philosophy, for the Stoics, consisted of rhetoric and dialectic.(9) Since Origen considered the study of logic to be of fundamental importance for his students, he must have been well versed in it himself. Furthermore, as Rist has pointed out, in antiquity |it was generally Chrysippus, not Aristotle, who was regarded as the prince of logicians'.(10) Rist thinks Origen probably knew the works of Chrysippus on logic at first hand, and suggests that he may even have studied with Stoic teachers during his youth at Alexandria.(11)
Despite the significance and helpfulness of the works of Roberts and Rist, our knowledge of the extent of the influence of Stoic logic on Origen's thought and works is only in its beginning stages. Both Roberts and Rist, as indeed nearly everyone who has worked on Stoicism in Origen's thought, have focused almost exclusively on the Contra Celsum.(12) It is in this treatise that Origen's explicit discussions of certain points of Stoic logic occur, and where various Stoics, including Chrysippus, are named.(13) I shall attempt in this essay to take our understanding of the influence of Stoic logic on Origen a step further by showing that and how he employs aspects of Stoic logic in his exegetical work on the Gospel of John.
There is no mention of Chrysippus nor of the Stoics in general in the commentary on John,(14) nor are there any formal discussions of logic in the commentary. Origen's knowledge of Stoic logic is never brandished, even in the Contra Celsum. What we find in the commentary on John is that Origen sometimes thinks and works as one trained in Stoic logic.
1. The Relationship Between God and the Word: Commentary on John 1: 90-2. 69 on John 1: 1-2
Origen considers John 1: 1-2 to consist of four propositions.
Perhaps John, seeing some such order in the argument, did not place |the Word was God' before |the Word was with God', so that we might not be hindered in seeing the individual meaning of each of the propositions [[alpha][zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha][tau][omega][nu]] in the affirmations of the series. For the first proposition [[alpha][zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha]] is this: |In the beginning was the Word'; and the second: |The Word was with God'; and the next: |And the Word was God.'(15)
The fourth proposition is in John 1: 2.
After the evangelist has taught us the three orders through the three propositions [[pi][rho][omicron][tau][alpha][sigma][epsilon][omega][nu]] which were previously mentioned, he sums up the three under one head, saving, This one was in the beginning with God.' ... t is as if ... he indicates the previously mentioned God the Word by the expression |this one', and gathers the three ... into a fourth proposition [[pi][rho][omicron][tau][alpha][sigma][iota][nu]] and says: |This one was in the beginning with God.'(16)
Origen uses the terms [alpha][zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha] and [pi][rho][omicron][tau][alpha] [sigma][iota] as synonyms. He states this explicitly a little later, when he says that there are |four [alpha][zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha][tau][alpha] here, which some call [pi][rho][omicron][tau] [alpha][sigma][epsilon][iota]'.(17) His more usual term in the Commentary is [pi][rho][omicron][tau][alpha][sigma][iota] ; that of the Stoics was [alpha] [zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha].(18)
The [alpha][zeta][iota][omega][mu][alpha] was |the basic material of Stoic logic'.(19) t consists of |a complete expression which can be asserted in and of itself'.(20) Chrysippus asserted, in addition, that every proposition is either true or false.(12) To be true, the predicate ascribed to the subject must correspond to the actual state of affairs in the world,(22) i.e. the proposition, |Dion is walking', is true whenever Dion is, in fact, walking. The proposition could also be either simple or non-simple.(23) Origen treats both kinds in the Commentary, though he never so designates them. The four propositions he discusses here fall under the Stoic category of simple propositions. The first three are assertoric propositions; the fourth is a demonstrative proposition. An assertoric proposition consists of |a nominative case and a predicate, e.g. "Dion is walking"'; |a demonstrative proposition consists of a nominative demonstrative case and a predicate, e.g. "This one is walking."'(24) The four propositions Origen perceives in John 1: 1-2 would then be analysed as follows:
Subject Predicate P1: The Word was in the beginning. P2: The Word was with God. P3: The Word was God. P4: This one was in the beginning with God.
P1-P3 each ascribe a different predicate to the Word. Before proceeding to show what Origen concludes from this analysis of John 1: 1-2, we must note another aspect of Stoic thought which affects the way in which Origen works on these verses.
The Stoics divided dialectic into subjects of discourse and language. Subjects of discourse included such things as propositions, arguments, and syllogisms. Language included, among other things, verbal ambiguity.(25) The Stoics held that words are capable of having several meanings. |Chrysippus said that every word is ambiguous by nature, since two or more meanings can be understood from it.'(26) He is reported to have written seven treatises on ambiguity [[alpha][mu][phi][iota][beta][omicron][lambda][iota][alpha]], none of which have survived.(27) Origen seems to have been well-versed in Stoic teaching on this subject. For example, in Book 6 he complains that Heracleon has misinterpreted Luke 7: 28 because he does not know how to treat an ambiguity [[alpha][mu][phi][iota][beta][omicron][lambda][iota][alpha][nu].(28) Again, in Book 32, Origen asserts that the |testimony' referred to in John 13: 21 is ambiguous [[omicron][mu][omega][nu][upsilon][mu] [omicron] ] because the verb |to testify' must have a different meaning when it is used in reference to the statement made of Judas, |One of you will betray me', and when it is used in general of testifying and dying on behalf of religion. |O[mu][omega][nu][upsilon][mu][iota][alpha], or ambiguity arising from individual words, was one of the kinds of ambiguity recognized by the Stoics.(29)
Origen begins his exposition of John 1: 1-2 with the statement, |t is not only the Greeks who say that the noun "beginning" has many meanings.'(30) Most of the space in the Commentary devoted to John 1: 1-2 is taken up with examining the possible meanings, not only of |beginning', but of each significant term in the four propositions.(31)
Origen discusses six possible meanings of the noun [alpha][rho][chi][eta].(32) He is not so clear, however, on which meaning of |beginning' he thinks is applicable to John 1: 1. What he ultimately settles on, though it is not very explicit until much later in the Book, is that the beginning in John 1: 1 must be understood in relation to Prov. 8: 22, where Wisdom is called |the beginning' of God's ways. |Since, then', he says,
our purpose is to perceive clearly the statement, |n the beginning was the Word', and wisdom, with the aid of testimonies from the Proverbs, has been explained to be called |beginning', and wisdom has been conceived as preceding the Word which announces her, we must understand that the Word is always in the beginning, that is, in wisdom.(33)
He equivocates later, however, and adopts a temporal meaning for beginning in relation to the rest of the cosmos.(34)
After examining the possible meanings of |beginning', Origen turns to |the Word', the subject of the first three propositions. He examines this noun from three perspectives. First, he wants to show that those who treat this term as the only, or even most important, designation of the Christ are in error. He does this by citing and discussing, in a lengthy section which we shall pass over (1. 125-266), the many titles applied to Christ in the Bible. Second, he examines what the noun Word means when applied to Christ, and third, he shows why John 1: 1-2 uses the expression |the Word', and not the phrase, |the Word of God'.
n examining what |the Word' means in these propositions (1. 266-92) Origen stresses the rational aspect of the term.
He is called |Word' [[lambda][omicron][gamma][omicron] ], because he removes everything irrational [[alpha][lambda][omicron][gamma][omicron][nu] from us and makes us truly rational [[lambda][omicron] [gamma][iota][kappa][omicron][nu] ] beings who do all things for the glory of God ... so that we perform both the more common and the more perfect works of life to the glory of God because of reason [[lambda][omicron][gamma][omicron][nu].(35)
This is the meaning Origen wants to be understood in these verses. The meaning of |Word' which he wants to eliminate is that based on Ps. 44: 2, |My heart has uttered a good word', which other interpreters had used to show what |Word' means in John 1: 1.(36) These other interpreters had taken Ps. 44: 2 in a literal sense,(37) and applied it to John 1: 1 as though the Son of God were |an expression of the Father occurring in syllables'. Consequently, then, failed to ascribe a separate substance to the Son, and to acknowledge any real separation of the Son from the Father.(38) Origen recognizes that his own analogy between the |Word', meaning Reason, being with God, and the reason that is in us, breaks down in that the reason in us |has no individuality apart from us' and does not possess substance, both of which he takes to be true of |the Word' which |was in the beginning'.(39)
The final perspective from which Origen attempts to define the meaning of |the Word' in John 1: 1 is that of contrasting it with the fuller phrase, |the Word of God', which appears as a designation of the Christ in Rev. 19: 13. He assumes that someone will raise the question, |Why it was not said, "n the beginning was the Word" of God, "and the Word" of God "was with God and the Word" of God "was God".'(40)
What Origen wants to establish at this point is that |the Word' of John 1: 1 is unique and that there are no other similar Words.(41) To have used the phrase, |the Word of God', he argues, would have left open the possibility that there might be other such Words, for example, |the word of angels', or |the word of men'. Origen makes his point by using the first and second non-demonstrable arguments of the Stoics.(42) He begins with the second, which, according to Sextus Empiricus, |deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent, as for example "f it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day."'(43) Origen argues that if there is a plurality of Words, then there may also be a plurality of wisdoms and justices. But to think the second is absurd, therefore, there is not a plurality of Words.(44) He repeats the same form of argument in relation to truth and wisdom.(45) Finally, he concludes by using the form of the first non-demonstrable argument of the Stoics, which |deduces the consequent from the major premiss and the antecedent, as for example "f it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light."'(46) |If truth is one and wisdom is one,' Origen argues, |the Word also, who announces the truth and wisdom ... would be one.'(47)
Next Origen considers the meaning of the verb |was' [[eta][nu]] which occurs in the predicate of each of the four propositions in John 1: 1-2. He contrasts the meaning of this verb with that of [gamma][iota][nu][epsilon][sigma][theta] [alpha][iota], |to come to be'. The latter verb implies a time of |not being' followed by |being'; the former implies a continuous state of |being', without an understood beginning point. Origen shows the contrast between the two verbs by choosing three examples from the LXX which parallel the second proposition in John 1: 1, except that the verb in each case is [gamma][iota][nu][epsilon][sigma][theta][alpha][iota].(48) He concludes the following from this comparison.
The Word comes to be ... with men who could not previously receive the sojourn of the Son of God who is the Word. On the other hand, he does not come to be |with God' as though previously he were not with him, but because he is always with the Father, it is said, |And the Word was with God', for he did not |come to be with God'. And the same verb, |was', is predicated of the Word when he |was in the beginning' and when he |was with God'. He is neither separated from the beginning nor does he depart from the Father. And again, he does not come to be |in the beginning' from not being |in the beginning', nor does he pass from not being |with God' to coming to be |with God,' for before all time and eternity |the Word was in the beginning,' and |the Word was with God'.(49)
Finally, Origen discusses the ambiguity in the term God in the second and third propositions (2. 12-8). He shows that there are four possible meanings of the noun God, and that it is used with two different meanings in these propositions. He notes that God is used with the article in the second and fourth propositions, when the Word is said to |be with the God', and that it appears without the article in the third proposition, when it is said that |the Word was God'. He takes |the God' to mean |the uncreated cause of the universe' (2. 14), or |the very God' (2. 17), or |the true God' (2. 18), all of which are equated with |the Father' (2. 19). On the other hand, all those beings, of whom the Word is the highest, who are made God by participation in the divinity of |the God' are properly termed |God' without the article.(50)
Having surveyed Origen's discussions of the meanings of the terms used in John 1: 1-2, we are now ready to consider the conclusions he draws from his observation that these verses consist of four propositions. He considers the order of the four propositions to be significant. |Perhaps John, seeing some such order [[tau][alpha][zeta][iota][nu]] in the argument did not place "the Word was God" before "the Word was with God."'(51) And again, |Since the proposition, "In the beginning was the Word", has been placed first, perhaps it indicates some order [[tau][alpha][zeta][iota][nu]].(52) T[alpha][zeta][iota] , |order' or |arrangement', was more important as a rhetorical term than as a logical term.(53) One might question, then, whether Origen was thinking as a logician or a rhetorician in his analysis. On the other hand, since rhetoric and dialectic were joined by the Stoics as the two branches of the logical part of philosophy, one might best say that he was thinking as a Stoic.(54)
What Origen makes of the order of the propositions is this. P1 establishes that the Word always was, and that He always was in Wisdom (1. 289; 2. 9, 36). P2 distinguishes the Word from God the Father, while at the same time establishing that the Word was always with God the Father (1. 289; 2. 12). Because P3 follows P2, it shows that the reason the Word is God is because He is with the God (2. 12, 18). The first three propositions teach, then, |in what the Word was, namely |in the beginning", and with whom he was, namely "with the God", and who the Word was, namely "God".'(55) P4 combines the previous three propositions into one. The demonstrative pronoun, |this one', which is the subject of P4, sums up P3. A demonstrative pronoun is the equivalent of pointing to something. Origen takes the demonstrative in P4 to point to the immediately preceding proposition (P3), so that |this one' is equivalent to saying |God the Word'.(56) The predicates of Pi (|was in the beginning') and P2 (|was with God') are then ascribed to the demonstrative in P4. Origen describes the significance of P4 as follows.
Insofar as |the Word was in the beginning', we had not learned that he was |with the God', and insofar as the Word was |with the God', we could not have known clearly that he was in the beginning with the God, and insofar as |the Word was God', it could not be revealed that he was |in the beginning' nor that he was |with the God'. But in the statement, This one was in the beginning with the God', the expression |this one' being considered with reference to the Word and God, and the phrase |in the beginning' being thus attached, and the phrase |with the God' being added, nothing is lacking of the things in the three propositions which is not summed up when they are gathered into one."
The point of Origen's lengthy exegesis of John 1: 1-2 seems to have been primarily to refute the Monarchian view of God, especially that called the modalistic view, which did not hold to any real distinction or separation between God the Father and God the Son. Origen sets forth their view clearly when he refers to those who |are afraid that they may proclaim two Gods', and consequently |deny that the individual nature of the Son is other than that of the Father'. He proceeds then to those commonly called the dynamic Monarchians in his statement that others |deny the divinity of the Son and make his individual nature and essence as an individual to be different from the Father'.(58) The latter usually held some form of adoptionist Christology. The modalistic Monarchians appear to have been more on Origen's mind than the dynamic Monarchians. He expressly attempts to answer the former by his analysis of the use of the article with God in John 1: 1.(59) Nevertheless, it is possible to see P1 as a refutation of the views of the dynamic Monarchians, P2 - P3 as a refutation of the views of the modalists, and P4 as a refutation of both Monarchian positions.
Origen's methodology in this section of the Commentary owes much to Stoic logic. He has spoken of simple propositions and ambiguity, and used undemonstrated argument forms. This is not to suggest that Origen has written in the compact style of a logician. His style is discursive and digressive, as he himself admits. Nevertheless, there is a structure beneath the discursiveness, and the structure comes from Stoic logic. He perceives all his work in this section to be related to the elucidation of the four propositions he finds in John 1: 1-2.
II. The Gnostic Doctrine of Natures: Commentary on John 20
Book 20 of the Commentary covers John 8: 37-53. There are four sections in this Book in which Origen employs aspects of Stoic logic. Common to all four sections is the fact that in each he is arguing against some form of the doctrine of |natures' put forward by Heracleon, i.e. that some beings have been created with different natures than others, and these natures determine what the particular beings are capable of doing.
Commentary on John 20: 96-127 on John 8: 41a
"You do the works of your father."
Origen's purpose in this section is to refute |those who think they can prove from this source that some are sons of the devil as the result of creation'.(60) He joins John 8: 44a and 1 John 3: 8-10 with John 8: 41a and interprets the latter in conjunction with the former two passages.
Origen begins by noting that it is not clear who is meant by the word father in John 8: 41a.(61) He is here again working with the Stoic principle of ambiguity, though the technical terminology does not appear in the passage.(62) The fourth kind of ambiguity recognized by the Stoics was that which arises from ellipsis or omission.(63) The identification of father in John 8: 41a has been omitted. In the context the word father is used of Abraham, God, and the devil. Origen takes John 8: 44a to identify who is meant by |your father' in John 8: 41a, i.e. |the devil'.
After establishing the meaning of father, Origen turns to 1 John 3: 8-10 to prove that John 8: 41a does not support the gnostic doctrine that some are children of the devil by their nature from creation. He considers 1 John 3: 8-10 to contain two propositions. |Give careful attention to the differences in the propositions [[pi][rho][omicron][tau][alpha][sigma][epsilon][omega][nu]]' he says, |and note how John has proposed them very precisely [[mu][epsilon][tau][alpha][phi][alpha][sigma][eta] [alpha][kappa][rho][iota][beta] [epsilon][iota][alpha] ] so that one might marvel at how accurately and, as some would say, dialectically [[delta][iota][alpha][lambda][epsilon][kappa][tau] [iota][kappa][omega] , he has set them forth.'(64) The two propositions, found in 1 John 3: 8-9, are simple assertoric propositions, consisting of a nominative case and a predicate.(65)
Subject Predicate P1: He who commits sin is of the devil.
P2: Everyone who has
been born of God does not commit sin.
Prior to this specific reference to the propositions in the Biblical text, Origen has himself constructed several non-simple propositions from the statements in 1 John 3: 8-10 in his argument against the doctrine of natures. He has, for example, used the conditional proposition repeatedly. Chrysippus defined a conditional proposition as |one linked by the conditional connective "if". This connective declares that the second follows from the first. For example, "If it is day, it is light."'(66) P1, which Origen takes to mean that it is committing sin that causes one to belong to the devil, is the basis for his argument, but he amplifies this by means of conditional propositions. He argues, for example, |If everyone "who commits sin is of the devil", everyone who is not of the devil does not commit sin.'(67) On the basis of 1 John 3: 8b, |the reason that the Son of God appeared was that he might destroy the works of the devil', Origen argues by means of another conditional proposition: If 1 John 3: 8b is true, |to the extent that he has not yet destroyed the works of the devil in us, because we have not presented ourselves to him who destroys the works of the devil, we have not as yet put aside being children of the devil'.(68) Underlying both of these propositions is Origen's assumption that one becomes a child of the devil or of God by one's own choice and deeds. He then adduces Matt. 5: 45 to prove that one who was not a son of God may become such.
He carries his argument further by means of two disjunctive propositions. The Stoics defined a disjunctive proposition as |one which is disjoined by the disjunctive connective "either". For example, "Either it is day, or it is night." This connective declares that one or other of the propositions is false.'(69) Origen argues, |Every person, on attaining the age of reason, is either a child of God or a child of the devil.' And again, |One either commits sin or does not commit sin.'(70) The latter, of course, he assumes is what makes one either a child of God or a child of the devil.
After the disjunctive propositions, Origen returns to a series of conditional propositions. |If one commits sin, he is of the devil.' |If one does not commit sin, he has been born of God.'(71) Then, on the basis of 1 John 3: 6, he argues, |If ... everyone who abides in him does not sin, he who sins does not abide in the Son.' |If everyone who sins has not seen him, he who has seen him does not sin.'(72)
At this point Origen sees the possibility that someone may object that he has proven too much in his argument that being sons of the devil or sons of God is dependent on whether one commits sin or not. Might not one then be both a child of God and a child of the devil because he does good and bad alternately? To answer this objection Origen calls attention to the precise way in which John has stated P1 and P2. He emphasizes the differences between the two propositions. John has not said |the same things concerning those who are of the devil, and those who are of God'.(73) He did not write, |He who does justice is of God' on the pattern of P1, nor did he write, |Everyone who has been born of the devil does not do justice' on the pattern of P2.(74) Origen notes that two different verbs have been used in the two propositions. To say |has been born' of the one who is of God exalts this person, but to say this of the one who is of the devil would mean something worse than saying |he is of the devil'.(75) On the other hand, |to have been born of God is much better than to be of God',(76) presumably because the former involves one's personal choice.
Origen then provides two reasons why the one born of God does not commit sin. The first, based on 1 John 3: 8, is that he has God's seed within him, and this seed makes it possible for him no longer to sin.(77) The second, based on 1 John 5: 18, is that such a person guards himself so that the wicked one may not touch him.(78)
Origen rounds off his argument by combining a conditional proposition with a conjunctive proposition, a combination which he himself later describes in his analysis of John 13: 32.(79) For the Stoics, |a conjunctive proposition is one which is conjoined by certain conjunctive connectives. For example, "Both it is day, and it is light."'(80) Origen's argument is as follows (A = the conditional proposition; B = the conjunctive proposition).
(A) |If the one who is born of God guards himself and the wicked one does not touch him', (B) the one who does not guard himself that the wicked one may not touch him has not been born of God, and everyone whom the wicked one touches has not been born of God, but the wicked one touches those who do not guard themselves.'(81)
Origen has answered the objection that he assumed someone might raise, that one might, by doing good and bad alternately, be both a child of God and a child of the devil, by constructing an argument from Scripture with the tools of Stoic logic. His conclusion is that the one who has been born of God does not sin, and, therefore, cannot be also a child of the devil.
Commentary on John 20: 135-140 on John 8: 42a
|If God were your Father, you would love me.'
Origen asserts that |those who introduce the natures use this saying, and explain it to mean that if God were your Father you would have recognized me as one of your family ... and furthermore you would have loved me as your own'.(82) He wants to prove that one is not a child of God by nature, but becomes one when he keeps his commandments.(83) He takes Paul as an example, and by three successive questions, all of which, on the basis of the account about Paul in the Bible, must be answered in the affirmative, establishes that there was a time when Paul hated Jesus. He then builds his case concerning Paul by using a series of Stoic arguments. Sextus defines the Stoic concept of an argument as |a system composed of premisses and an inference. The premisses of it are ... the propositions adopted by consent [emphasis mine] for the establishment of the inference, and the inference is the proposition established by the premisses.'(84)
There are several terms in the section which are derived from Stoic logic. He uses [upsilon][gamma][iota][eta] and [alpha][lambda][eta][theta][eta] interchangeably of the truth or correctness of propositions;(85) he uses [tau][omicron] [alpha][kappa][omicron][lambda] [omicron][upsilon][theta][omicron][nu] for the consequent which follows from the antecedent in the [sigma][upsilon][nu][eta][mu][mu][epsilon][nu][omicron][nu] (conditional proposition);(87) he uses [alpha][rho][alpha] in the conclusions of arguments;(87) and he uses [alpha][lambda][lambda][alpha][mu][eta][nu] twice to introduce either the acceptance or denial of one of the premisses in a demonstrative argument.(88)
Because the reasoning in this section is very tight, and the section is not so long, I offer the following translation of the passage before analysing it.
If, therefore, (the conditional proposition) is true [[alpha][lambda][eta][theta][epsilon] ], |If God were your Father, you would love me', it is clear that the (conditional) contrary to this is also true [[upsilon][gamma][iota][epsilon]] , |If you do not love me, God is not your Father.' Therefore, God is not Father of those who do not love Jesus, and there was a time when Paul did not love Jesus. Therefore [[alpha][rho][alpha]] there was a time when God was not Paul's Father. Therefore [[alpha][rho][alpha]] Paul was not a son of God by nature, but he later became a son of God, since we would also consider true [[upsilon][gamma][iota][omega] the consequent [[tau][omicron][alpha][kappa] [omicron][lambda][omicron][upsilon][theta][omicron][nu]] which is derived from the conditional proposition [[tau][omicron][upsilon][sigma][upsilon][nu][eta][mu][mu][epsilon] [nu][omicron][upsilon]], namely,(89) |But in truth [[alpha][lambda][lambda][alpha][mu][eta][nu]] God is your Father, Paul, therefore [[alpha] [rho][alpha]] you love Jesus.' But since the (conditional), |If God were your Father, you would love me', was true [[upsilon][gamma][iota][omega] ] also prior to Paul's faith, it is fitting to admit that Jesus said (then) as it were, |But in truth [[alpha] [lambda] [lambda] [alpha] [mu] [eta] v]] you do not love me, Paul, therefore [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] God is not your Father.'(90)
Origen begins with the first non-demonstrable argument.(91) Both he and the Gnostics would have agreed, though on different bases, on the truth of the two premisses in this argument and the conclusion derived from them. This argument takes the form: If the first, the second. The first. Therefore, the second. Origen argues:
First: (P1) |If ... the statement is true [[alpha] [lambda] [eta] [theta] [epsilon] ], "If God were your Father, you would love me,'"
Second: (P2) |it is clear that the converse to this is also true [ [lambda]
[epsilon] ], If you do not love me, God is not your Father.' The first. Therefore, the second: |God is not the Father, therefore, of those who do not love Jesus.'"
Next, Origen builds a chain of syllogisms using the conclusion from each preceeding syllogism as the implicit premise for the next.(93) The pattern may be diagramed as follows, where P* = the implicit premiss which was the conclusion of the preceding argument, and (+) = a proposition Origen joins to the implicit premiss with |and'.
P1 and P2 in the first non-demonstrable argument described above yield the conclusion P*, God is not the Father ... of those who do not love Jesus.' This conclusion is then joined by |and' to the conclusion he reached earlier about Paul hating Jesus at one time, and the two so joined form the premiss for the next argument in the chain. The type of arguments used in the chain are what the Stoics called a demonstrative argument, i.e. an argument which from pre-evident premisses deduces something nonevident. Sextus illustrates this as, |If sweat pours through the surface, there are insensible pores; but in fact [[alpha] [lambda] [lambda] [alpha] [mu] [eta] ] sweat does pour through the surface; therefore [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] there are insensible pores.'(94)
The argument, with the implicit premiss, is in the form of the first non-demonstrable argument again.
First: (P* +) [(If) |God is not the Father of those who do not love Jesus'] |and there was a time when Paul did not love Jesus,'
Second: (P3) |Then [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] there was a time when God was not Paul's Father.'
Therefore, the second.
This conclusion then becomes the implicit premiss of the next demonstrative argument, which takes the same form as the previous.
First: (P**) [(If) |there was a time when God was not Paul's Father']
Second: (P4) |Then [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] Paul was not a son of God by nature, but later became a son of God.'
Therefore, the second. |Paul was not a son of God by nature, but later became a son of God.'
The basis for asserting that Paul later became a son of God is then shown in two additional demonstrative arguments, both of which take the words of the biblical text used in the first argument in the series as their premisses, the first implicitly, the second explicitly.
First: [|If God were your Father,'
Second: |you would love me.']
The first:| But in fact [[alpha] [lambda] [lambda] [alpha] [mu] [eta] ] God is your Father, Paul,'
Therefore the second: |therefore [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] you love Jesus.'
Nevertheless, there was a time when the contrary was also true.
First: |If God were your Father',
Second: |you would love me'.
Not the second: |But in fact [[alpha] [lambda] [lambda] [alpha] [mu] [eta] ] you do not love me.'
Therefore not the first: |Therefore [[alpha] [rho] [alpha]] God is not your Father, Paul.'
C. Blanc refers these last two arguments to the Stoic argument from two conditionals discussed by Origen in Cels. 7.15, whereby contrary conclusions are deduced from the same condition thereby rendering the condition false or meaningless.(95) Origen gives the formula for this argument as: |If the first, also the second. If the first, not the second. Therefore, not the first.' He also provides the example the Stoics used, |If you know that you are dead, you are dead. If you know that you are dead, you are not dead. Therefore you do not know that you are dead.' There are, however, some important differences between the arguments here, and that of two conditionals. Here the |first' and the |second' are identical in both arguments. In Cels. 7. 15 |the second' is different in the two propositions, i.e. |you are dead', and |you are not dead'. Here Origen switches argument forms between the two. The first argument is in the form of the first non-demonstrable, which affirms the first, and, therefore also the second. The second argument has the form of the second non-demonstrable argument, which denies the second and thereby denies also the first. Origen definitely does not intend to render the premiss false in both arguments, which is what the argument from two conditionals would do. He wants the premiss to be false only prior to the time of Paul's faith. Had he used the argument from two conditionals, he would have established thereby that God was never Paul's Father.
Commentary on John 20: 237-255 on John 8: 44b
|He did not stand in the truth, because truth is not in him.'
Heracleon had said of these words,
For his nature is not of the truth, but is of the opposite to the truth, namely of error and ignorance. For this reason ... he can neither stand in the truth nor have truth in himself, because he possesses falsehood as his own from his own nature and is unable by nature ever to speak truth.(96)
In his argument to show that the devil is not, by nature, incapable of having truth in himself, Origen asks what the statement, |Truth is not in him', means. He offers three possible answers. (a) He never holds a true opinion, but everything he ever thinks is false. (b) He does not participate in Christ, since those who participate in Christ participate in the one who said, |I am the truth'. As a final alternative, he says, (c) Some will wonder if it is necessarily to say that truth is not in one who admits a lie at any time, even if he should hold the lie along with many things that are true.'(97)
The third suggestion is based on the Stoic criterium for a conjunctive proposition [[sigma] [mu] [pi] [epsilon] [pi] [lambda] [epsilon] [gamma] [mu] [epsilon] [mu] ov]. Such a proposition consisted of several propositions joined together by the conjunction |and'. Gellius defined the criterium for the truthfulness of such a proposition as follows: |If in the whole conjunctive proposition there is one falsehood, even if the others are true, the whole is said to be false.'(98) Origen is clearly aware of such a definition when he says of the third option which he lists, |For as that which consists of countless things which are true is false if even one falsehood is combined [[sigma] [mu] [pi] [epsilon] [pi] [lambda] [epsilon] [gamma] [mu] [epsilon] vou], so in the case of him who holds one false opinion along with many true ones, as if such is combined [[sigma] [mu] [pi] [epsilon] [pi] [lambda] [epsilon] [gamma] [mu] epsilon] vov], one would say, consequently that truth is not in this person.'(99)
Origen thinks any of the three possible answers he has provided may be the correct one, and that any one of them or a combination of the first and second is sufficient to disprove Heracleon's interpretation. He does note that some might not find the third suggestion convincing.(100)
Commentary on John 20:287-309 on John 8:47
|He who is of God hears the words of God; you do not hear them because you are not of God.'
|Those who introduce the fable concerning different natures', Origen says, |and say that there are sons of God by nature who also ... are uniquely capable of receiving the words of God because of their kinship with God, appear to prove their point from this passage too.'(101)
Origen begins his interpretation of John 8:48 by constructing a demonstrative argument (102) in the form of a first non-demonstrable argument, i.e. If the first, the second. The first. Therefore the second. His argument is as follows.
First: |If indeed [[epsilon] [pi] [epsilon] [rho]] as many as received "the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world" [John 1:91 have not received it because they are of God,...'
Second: |then it is clear that [[delta] [eta] [lambda] ov o [tau] ] those who are not of God do not have any power at all to become children of God before they have received the true light, and [[delta] [epsilon]] once they receive it, do not yet become children of God, but receive power to become children of God because they have received the light.
The premiss in this argument is, of course, not something that is self-evident, nor is it something someone would necessarily agree to without further proof. Origen realizes this, and supplies the proof for the truth of his premiss in a parenthetical contrary-to-fact conditional sentence. |For if they have received it [i.e. the light] because they are of God [emphasis mine], it would not have been written of them, "But as many as received him, he gave them power to become children of God ...'" (John 1:12). The fact that it has been so written proves for Origen that |they have not received it because they are of God'. Whether Origen could justly assume that Heracleon would also admit the truth of this assertion based on John 1:12 is difficult to say. Heracleon had, it seems, written a commentary on the Gospel of John, and therefore, must have held its words in esteem. Origen could, nevertheless, assume that his own students and Ambrose, at whose instigation he was writing the commentary, would have been convinced by this argument, and would, therefore, have agreed with the premiss. Origen then joins a conjunctive proposition to the conditional as the conclusion to the argument.(104)
Origen assumes that every man qua man receives the true light, and that this reception is the precondition for becoming a child of God. All, however, do not |aspire to be such', and therefore, |do not become children of God, nor do they come to be of God, and this is why they do not hear his words'.(105) Consequently, John 8:48 cannot be used to prove that there are sons of God by nature, who because of this special kinship with God, are capable of hearing his words. Origen repeats the same form of argument to the same effect a little later, but uses Matt. 5:44-5 as the basis for the premiss.(106)
Next Origen asks, perhaps again using the Stoic principle of ambiguity arising from, homonymy,(107) what it means |to hear the words of God'. He suggests three possibilities which he immediately rejects,'(108) and then, on the basis of a proof from contraries, argues for a fourth meaning.
Origen's proof from contraries may have been derived from Aristotle, and not the Stoics.(109) Aristotle states that |one topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites'.(110) It is perhaps important to note, however, that Origen uses the word paradox twice when speaking of this argument.(111) While no example of a Stoic argument like that used by Origen here has been preserved, we do know, on the basis of several brief fragments, that Chrysippus was interested in opposites and paradoxes.(112) It is not impossible, therefore, that Origen knew this argument from the Stoics.
What Origen wants to prove with this argument is that the words |to hear the words of God' in John 8: 48 refer to a graduated hearing. One advances in the capacity to hear until finally he can |receive all the words of God, or as many, at least, as it is possible for those considered worthy of the spirit of adoption to receive both now and later'.(113) |The paradox', he says, |is this, that someone is more a son of God than is another son of God, and that someone is twice as much a son of God as another.'(114) He begins by citing Matt. 23:15, where Jesus accuses the scribes and Pharisees of making their converts |twice as much a son of hell as' themselves. This shows, Origen asserts, (a) that there are no sons of hell by nature, and (b) that all the sons of hell are not equally sons of hell. But if one can be twice as much a son of hell as another, why not also twice as much a son of light, or life, or son of God? This can be the case, Origen argues, and the reason one is more a son of God than another is that one hears more words of God than another. He has also shown that |more' has a qualitative as well as a quantitative meaning, i.e. one hears the secret words of God as well as |those which have been recorded'.(115) Heracleon cannot, therefore, use John 8:48 to prove that it is because some are sons of God by nature that they hear the words of God.
III. The Glorification of the Son and the Father
in the Economy of Suffering:
Commentary on John 32:318-367 on John 13:31-2
Origen sees the departure of Judas to betray Jesus as the beginning of the economy of suffering of the Son of man.(116) This economy [oi [kappa] ovo [mu] i [alpha]] results in the glorification of the Son of man, and in the glorification of the Father in him. John 13:31-2 are important verses for Origen, and he treats them accordingly. A cluster of scriptural texts are brought to bear on their interpretation. He reads the verses themselves as Stoic propositions, and makes a sophisticated analysis of one of the propositions in the technical vocabulary of the Stoics.(117)
The discussion in this section revolves around three figures whom Origen manages, usually, to keep distinct. First is the human Jesus. This is always the meaning of the phrase |the Son of man' (John 13:31) in this section, who is also identified as the one |born of the seed of David according to the flesh' (Rom. 1:3), the |man' whom some were seeking to kill (John 8:48), and the one whom God highly exalted |when he became obedient unto death' (Phil. 2:8). Origen's use of the term |Son', however, in this section is not consistent, and is not always completely clear. It usually refers to God the Word, but sometimes seems to mean the human Jesus.
The second key figure in the discussion is God the Word. Origen makes a clear distinction between the Word and the human Jesus. The former |by nature, does not die', nor is he |capable of being highly exalted', both of which the man Jesus experiences.(118)
The third figure in the discussion is God the Father. God with the article [ [theta] [epsilon] ] in John 13:31-2 is taken to mean the Father. This is consistent with Origen's earlier discussion of God with the article.(119) This identification is made explicit in his comment on John 13:31b, |And God [ [theta] [epsilon] ] is glorified in him', when he says of these words, |It is not possible that the Christ be glorified if the Father is not glorified in him.'(120)
Origen analyses John 13:312 with the tools of Stoic logic in the following manner.
Now for the sake of clarity, let us give careful attention to what is said in the first proposition, |Now is the Son of man glorified'; and in the second, |And God is glorified in him'; and in the third, which is a conditional proposition [[sigma] v [eta] [mu] [mu] [epsilon] v [omega]], as follows, |If God is glorified in him, God will also glorify him in himself'; and in the fourth, |And he will glorify him immediately.'(121)
One might perhaps construe this latter proposition as a conjunctive proposition [[sigma] [mu] [pi] [lambda] o [kappa] [eta] v] which is the consequent [[tau] [eta] v [epsilon]v [tau][omega] [lambda] [eta] [gamma] ov [tau] ] of the conditional [[sigma] v [eta] [mu] [mu] [epsilon] vo ], so that the conditional [[tau] o [sigma] v [eta] [mu] [mu] [epsilon] vpv] begins after the proposition, |God is glorified in him', and concludes [[lambda] [eta] [gamma] [eta]] with the conjunctive proposition, |And God will glorify him in himself, and he will glorify him immediately."(121)
Origen has suggested two possible ways of reading John 13:31-2. The first takes the text to contain four propositions. Propositions one, two, and four are simple assertoric propositions.(122)
Subject Predicate P1 The Son of man is glorified now. P2 God is glorified in him. P4 He [i.e. God] will glorify him immediately.
The third proposition is a conditional proposition.(123) Sextus Empiricus describes the parts of a conditional as follows: |Of the propositions in the conditional [[sigma] v [eta] [mu] [mu] [epsilon] [omega]],) , the one that immediately follows the connective "if" is called "the antecedent" and "the first," and the other one is called "the consequent" [[tau] o [lambda] [eta] [gamma] ov] and "the second".' Origen's vocabulary, noted above in his description of the third proposition, reveals his knowledge of such a description. Sextus goes on to say, |Such a proposition seems to announce that the second part of it follows from the first: that is, if the antecedent holds, so will the consequent. Hence, if this sort of announcement is fulfilled, that is, if the consequent does follow from the antecedent, then the conditional is true; otherwise it is false.'(124) The third proposition, according to Origen's first suggestion for reading the text, then, is as follows.
Condition Consequent P3 If God be glorified in him God will also glorify him in himself.
The other way Origen proposes for reading the text affects only, P3 and P4. He suggests that one might consider the consequent of the conditional to be a conjunctive proposition, i.e. two propositions joined by |and',(125) so that P4 becomes a part of the consequent of P3. The text would then consist of only three propositions.
Condition Consequent P3 If God be glorified in him God will also glorify him in himself, and he will glorify him immediately.
Origen does not say explicitly which way he himself reads the text, but it appears to be in the second way, as we will note later in our discussion.
We shall now examine what Origen takes these propositions to mean. The |now' in P1 refers to the beginning of the |economy' in which Jesus was to die, and this beginning is activated by Judas' departure |to transact his business against Jesus'.(126) |The Son of man', as I have shown above, means the human Jesus. The glorification of the Son of man in P1 is taken to be virtually equivalent to the exaltation referred to in Phil. 2:9, |Wherefore [i.e. because he became obedient unto death] God has highly exalted him.'(127) This exaltation (= glorification) of the Son of man |consisted in the fact that he was no longer different from the Word, but was the same with him', i.e. |the humanity of Jesus became one with the Word'.(128)
P2 follows P1 |because it is not possible that the Christ be glorified if the Father is not glorified in him'. Origen joins John 12:32 and 2I:19 to show that the Son of Man |glorified God in dying'.(129) Col. 1:15 and 1:20 are also quoted to show that Jesus |glorified God in death' by his victory over the principalities and powers.(130)
Origen interrupts his discussion of the propositions to investigate the meaning of the noun glory. This investigation may reflect the Stoic principle of ambiguity by homonymy. The investigation is prompted by what he considers to be the inadequate definition of glory held by |some of the Greeks'.(131) He considers the meaning of glory in several Biblical passages,(132) from which he concludes that it means, anagogically, that which can be known of God by that mind which has been purified so that it can contemplate the God, i.e. the Father. This contemplation of the God in turn makes the one who contemplates Him divine.(133)
Origen then returns to P1 and P2(134) and attempts to flesh out the meaning of |glorified' in these propositions on the basis of this understanding of glory. |The Son', he says, is glorified (a) by knowing the Father, (b) by knowing himself, which |does not fall far short of the former', and (c) by knowing the universe, which may be what it means |for the so-called very Son of man to be made one with wisdom.' The latter, of course, is inseparable from the Word in Origen's mind.(135) The Son of man is glorified when the Father bestows all this glory on him.
The Father, in turn, is glorified (a) not only |by being known by the Son, but ... in the Son', and (b) by contemplating himself. The latter provides a greater glorification for God than the former.
Origen is concerned especially with how God is glorified in the economy of suffering. Heb. and play significant roles in his understanding. |The Son' (Heb. 1:2), he says, |is the reflection of the total glory of God himself' [[tau] ov [theta] [epsilon] ov [alpha] [tau] ov, Heb. 1:3). No one but the Son |can contain the whole reflection of the full glory of God'.(138) On this basis, then, when the economy of the suffering of the Son of man for all men occurs, it is not without God' Heb. 9, emphasis mine). Origen has here used the variant reading of Heb. 9, which he often uses, though he knows the other reading as well. R. A. Greer has noted that Origen usually takes Heb. 9, with the variant reading, to mean: |"He tasted death for all rational beings except God."'(140) He obviously does not take it to mean that here. The negative clearly points the phrase away from meaning that God is an exception. He means that God is involved in the economy of suffering of the Son of man. But how? There is certainly no Patripassianism here.
The vbv ouv with which the sentence begins makes it dependent on the preceding sentence in which Origen has asserted, on the basis of Heb. 1:3, that the Son alone contains |the whole reflection of the full glory of God'. In this statement Origen uses the noun God with the article, and consequently, means God the Father.(141) In the statement that the economy of suffering does not occur |without God', there is no article with the noun God. The article is absent in the biblical text. Given Origen's understanding of the distinction indicated by the presence or absence of the article with the noun God, he must have understood this phrase to mean God the Word who is God because he is "with the God",'(142) and who alone, consequently, can be a reflection of |the full glory of God'. It is on this basis that Origen says the economy of suffering does not occur |without God'. It is God the Father, however, whose glorv is reflected in the Son, who is glorified in the suffering of the Son of Man. This conclusion is based on the juxtaposition of P1 and P2, for Origen says, |It does not say "the Son of man is glorified", alone, for indeed "the God is glorified in him."'(143)
Origen then suggests two possible ways of understanding how the Son of man is glorified and how the Father is glorified in him in P1 and P2. The alternatives are introduced by nearly parallel statements. |One might interpret the matters in this passage as
follows' [[kappa] [alpha] [tau] [omega] [delta]' [alpha] v [tau] [alpha] [k appa] [alpha] [tau] [alpha] [tau] ov [tau] [pi] ov [tau] [delta] [eta] [gamma] [eta] [sigma] [alp ha] [tau] o],(144)
and, |But the matters in this passage might be understood even more clearly as follows' [[epsilon] [tau] [delta] [epsilon] [kappa] [alpha] ob [tau] [omega] [sigma] [alpha] [phi] [epsilon] [sigma] [tau] epsilon] [rho] ov [alpha] v [tau] [alpha] [kappa] [alpha] [tau] [alpha] [tau] ov [tau] o [pi] ov [lambda] [alpha] [mu] [beta] [alpha] vo [tau] o].(145)
Origen's first suggestion uses Matt. 11:27a and 16:17 to show that on) the Father knows the Son. The world, therefore, did not know the Son (John 1:10) and, consequently, did not glorify him. Those from the world to whom the Father revealed |knowledge of Jesus' did glorify him, which brought about a consequent glory for them also, for they were transformed into the same image (2 Cor. 3:18). It is, however, because Jesus knows that in the economy of suffering he will be glorified by the Father over and above |the glory of those glorifying him, that he said, "Now is the Son of man glorified."'(146)
Origen then uses Matt. 11:27b to show that only the Son knows the Father, |and he to whom the Son may reveal him'. On this basis, when the Son was about to reveal the Father by means of the economy of suffering [[epsilon] [kappa] [tau] [eta] oi[kappa] o [mu] i [alpha] ], he said, |And God is glorified in him'.(147) Or, P2 can be compared with the words, |He who has seen me has seen the Father who sent me' (John 14:9; 12:45). Origen's thought has shifted, however, from the human Jesus to God the Word, for he says, |For he who begot him is contemplated in the Word, since the Word is God [ov [tau] [theta] [epsilon] [omega]]and the image of the invisible God [[tau] ov [theta][epsilon] ov], and he who beholds the image of the invisible God is able to behold the Father directly too.'(148)
The second approach that Origen offers to understanding these first two propositions is a moral approach. He begins with another argument from contraries, although he calls no attention to it.(149) |Just as the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of some (Rom. 2:24), so because of the saints whose good works are seen ... before men, the name of the Father ... is glorified' (Matt. 5:16).(150) Approached in this way, no other has glorified God to the extent that Jesus has, |since he committed no sin'.(151) Consequently, |the Son is glorified [P1], and God is glorified in him [P2].'(152)
Origen then takes up the conditional in P3: |But if God is glorified in him.' He argues that what the Son of Man receives from the Father is greater than what the Father receives from the Son of Man. This is based on the consequent of P3, i.e. that |the Son of man is glorified in God, the lesser in the greater'.(153)
Finally, Origen takes up [P.sub.3] in its entirety, i.e. the conditional with the conjunctive consequent, and shows how the Father is the source of all the glorification discussed in the proposition. |It is fitting indeed that the one who is greater ... grants to the Son what he said, namely, to glorify him in himself [[P.sub3]a], that the Son might be glorified in God [P.sub.3]b]. Since, then, these things were not yet to take place (I mean for the Son to be glorified in God), he adds, "And he will glorify him immediately [[P.sub.3]c]"'.(154)
The significance of [P.sub.3]c, for Origen, appears to lie in the Stoic concept of the truth of a proposition. For example, the proposition, |Dion is walking' is true only if Dion is walking at the time the proposition is uttered.(155) On this basis, the proposition, |God will glorify him in himself', alone might have been considered false when Jesus uttered it, since God was not then glorifying him. It is true that the verb in John 13:3 is future: [theta] [epsilon]o [delta] o [zeta] [alpha] [sigma] [epsilon] [alpha] v [tau] ov [tau]ov ov [tau]ov [alpha] v [theta] [rho] [omega] [pi] ov [epsilon] v [tau][omega] [theta] [epsilon] [omega] (32:363). The phrase, [ttau]o [delta[ o [zeta] [alpha] [sigma] [alpha] [alpha] [tau]ov [epsilon]v [alpha] [tau] omega], is another reference to [P.sub.3]b, again with an aorist infinitive (32:365). This latter reference is then explained by a purpose clause with the verb in the present subjunctive, iv' o vio [eta] [epsilon] v [tau] [omega] [theta] [epsilon] [omega] [delta] o [zeta] [alpha] o [mu] [epsilon] vo . But, Origen says, |these things' were not yet to occur. To clarify what he means by |these things', he refers parenthetically once more to [P.sub.3]b, using a present infinitive: [lambda] [epsilon] [gamma] [omega] [delta] [epsilon] [tau] o [delta] o [zeta] [alpha] [epsilon] [sigma] [theta] [alpha] [tau] ov viov [epsilon] v [tau] [omega] [theta] [epsilon] [omega]. It is [P.sub.3] c, then, which shows that the glorification of the Son in the Father ([P.sub.3]b) would be subsequent to the time the proposition was uttered, and which, therefore, allows the conjunctive proposition to be true.(156)
Stoic logic plays a significant role in Origen's exegesis of the Gospel of John. It is particularly evident in connection with theological points that are made in the commentary. It provides the structure for his reputation of the Monarchian view of God in Books 1 and 2, and also for his attempt to explain the relation between the Father and the Son in the economy of suffering in Book 32. It is an important tool as well in his reputation of Heracleon's doctrine of natures, and the establishment of his own doctrine of freedom and choice.
In his use of Stoic logic, Origen has employed some of the most sophisticated tools of his day for the analysis of thought. The unobtrusive way in which he uses it shows that he has internalized the subject so thoroughly that it shapes the way he thinks about texts and about the way others have interpreted those texts.
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|Author:||Heine, Ronald E.|
|Publication:||The Journal of Theological Studies|
|Date:||Apr 1, 1993|
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