Sovereignty regimes and the norm of noninterference in the global South: regional and temporal variation.
State sovereignty is a fundamental organizing principle of international relations. Although always imperfectly respected, the sovereignty norm-set--most essentially territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and noninterference--carries enormous weight. It is not, however, static. In fact, the current status of state sovereignty is the subject of some debate. Have globalization, democratization, transnational legalization, and other processes significantly eroded sovereignty? Have emerging norms such as the Responsibility to Protect redefined sovereignty in important ways? Studies addressing these and related questions respond to an increasing recognition of the essentially constructed nature of state sovereignty and of the need for scholarship that historicizes and contextualizes it, illuminating the dynamics and texture of global order. (1)
In this article, I examine an essential component of sovereignty, the norm of noninterference, arguing that--yes--sovereignty has evolved over time and especially since the end of the Cold War, but that this evolution has been uneven. In fact, we can observe distinct regional patterns of shared understandings and practices of sovereignty. Furthermore, this regional variation is not simply defined by divergence between the Global North and Global South, but in fact exists across regions in the Global South. Specifically, the norm of noninterference, a watchword in Southern regions during the postdecolonization era, has over time, and especially since the end of the Cold War, eroded in important ways in Africa and Latin America. Noninterference has meanwhile been upheld and protected to a much greater degree in Southeast Asia. In what follows, I provide evidence for the existence of these divergent normative trajectories and conclude by offering an explanation based on the history of shared ideas.
The end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations carried important implications for state sovereignty. These events ushered in a wave of decolonization resulting in the creation of eighty new formally sovereign states over the next several decades, drastically altering the international landscape. (2) Furthermore, states in the Global South have, at least in the wake of decolonization, been more enthusiastic in their promotion of strict sovereignty than their Northern counterparts. Amitav Acharya and A. I. Johnston conclude in their 2007 edited volume on comparative regionalism that "the design of regional institutions in the developing world has been more consistently sovereignty-preserving than sovereignty-eroding," relative to their counterparts in Europe and North America, and that "the more insecure the regimes, the less intrusive are their regional institutions." (3) In other words, regionalism in the Global South has not failed at European Union-style regionalism, but rather functions for different purposes, supporting newly developing states as they face internal instability and external intervention and other forms of neocolonialism. Amitav Acharya explains in a separate article that, while regionalism in Europe in part responded to "the declining legitimacy of nationalism" in the wake of a devastating war, postcolonial nationalism and regionalism were in fact mutually reinforcing. (4)
As asserted above, though, sovereignty norms are not static. Although the postcolonial world is often characterized as a space where Westphalian logics continue to carry the day, sovereignty has not remained unchanged in the South, and a range of interference practices--from public condemnation to fact-finding missions to economic sanctions and peacekeeping missions--have, over time and especially since the end of the Cold War, been increasingly legitimized, institutionalized, and put into practice by regional actors as part of state monitoring regimes or in response to domestic political and military crises. Furthermore, just as normative orders in the postcolonial world are not static, neither are they monolithic. This is the case despite an important common history of colonization and decolonization. As stated above and demonstrated below, the norm of noninterference has eroded to a much greater degree in Latin America and (especially) Africa than in Southeast Asia.
Before I present evidence of this regional and temporal variation, I briefly clarify my cases and dependent variable. I compare the status of the norm of noninterference over time in three regions, which together make up a large portion of the Global South: Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Since regions are not natural units, I use regional organizations (ROs) to define their boundaries. Africa is defined as those states currently composing the African Union (AU); membership in the Organization of American States (OAS) defines Latin America; and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) membership defines Southeast Asia. The one exception I made to this rule is that I excluded the United States and Canada from my definition of Latin America despite their membership in OAS. In addition to serving as proxy for the purposes of defining the cases themselves, these ROs are also important arenas and actors. That said, in this project I was interested in regional norms more generally, not just RO norms, and so the practices of other actors--states, coalitions of states, and subregional organizations--were also within the scope.
Again, my variable of interest is the status of the norm of noninterference. A "norm" is a "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity." (5) It is not only a pattern of behavior, then, but a "prescribed pattern of behavior which gives rise to normative expectations as to what ought to be done." (6) But how does one measure the strength or status of an international norm? First, and perhaps obviously, claims about norm strength make more sense in relative rather than absolute terms. That is, asserting that the norm of noninterference is strong or weak only makes sense if we are also specifying "compared to what?" Or, "compared to where or when?" Second, in order to make comparisons across time or space and support claims about the relative strength and meaning of that norm, it is useful to think about evidence falling into three (overlapping) categories relevant to a norm's status: discourse, law, and practice. First, how do relevant interpretive communities talk about the norm? Second, what is the legal status of the norm or practices that violate the norm? Finally, how often and to what degree do relevant actors' practices comply with or violate the norm? Since the norm that I examine is a prohibition (noninterference), and I argue that it has eroded over time, key pieces of evidence in this study include speech, laws, and actions that violate the norm or promote practices that violate the norm.
Specifically, I am interested in the affirmation, legalization, and execution of regional interference practices: actions carried out by states and ROs--located in the same region as the target state--that encroach on domestic political or security matters. To qualify as interference, these practices are to some degree intrusive or critical of or materially costly to the target state, seeking to monitor or alter state action in some way or affect the outcome of a domestic crisis. I examine activities in two categories: regional monitoring regimes and regional responses to intrastate crisis. The former refers to RO election observation and human rights monitoring. The latter refers to a range of actions (e.g., condemnation, mediation, sanctions, peacekeeping missions) carried out by ROs or regional states in response to domestic political and military crises, especially unconstitutional changes in government (UCGs), episodes of political violence, and civil conflict.
My definition and operationalization of interference, then, follows scholars who have conceptualized noninterference as a principle of "exclusive domestic jurisdiction." (7) That is, states have exclusive jurisdiction over their domestic affairs, and it therefore is inappropriate for outside actors to concern themselves with these affairs. When outside actors do inquire about, take positions on, or attempt to affect the course of domestic events and political processes, this is interference. An important category of exception to the prohibition includes interference activities taking place at the behest of, or in the explicit support of, the regime in power (of the target state). Although these activities have been considered by some to qualify as interference--African states have at times decried proregime foreign forces on the continent as violators of noninterference because they affect the outcome of domestic disputes--more widely accepted understandings of noninterference exclude these activities from the prohibition and consider it within the rights of a sovereign state to request and receive assistance in this way. Violations of noninterference need not be coercive, though, to qualify as interference (although regional interference practices have become more coercive over time, as I demonstrate below). Interference occurs when outside actors assume jurisdiction over domestic affairs in some way.
In the following section, I examine the norm of noninterference in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia from the mid-twentieth century to the present, highlighting key developments at the level of discourse and law and therefore paying special attention to ROs. Next, I demonstrate that changes in actual practices have accompanied the legal regimes outlined below; that is, regional actors have, since the end of the Cold War, increasingly engaged in interference activities--monitoring state practices and responding to domestic political and military crises--that challenge state sovereignty by assuming partial jurisdiction over domestic concerns.
The Rise of Interference: Shifts in Discourse and Law
The Organization of American States is the oldest RO that I examine here. The United States and twenty Latin American states established it in 1948 when they adopted the OAS Charter in Bogota, culminating decades of pan-American regionalist activities. It currently counts as members all nations in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba. Although the 1948 Bogota Charter affirms democracy, human rights, and noninterference as fundamental regional norms, the latter largely trumped the others during the Cold War period. (8) Regarding democracy norms, a discursive shift took place beginning in the 1980s, embodied by a 1985 amendment to the OAS Charter (the Cartagena Protocol) that established democracy promotion as "an explicit purpose of the organization." (9) In 1989, the OAS General Assembly adopted a resolution mandating the secretary general to direct the development of election monitoring missions. (10) According to Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, "During this time, a consensus was emerging in the OAS that the rights of democracy went hand in hand with rights to intervention; the former could not flourish without resort to the latter." (11) Regional law adopted in the early 1990s further institutionalized these emerging norms by establishing regional protocols for responding to UCGs. The 1991 Declaration of Santiago (Resolution 1080) created an automatic mechanism by which the OAS secretary general is required to convene the Permanent Council within ten days of a coup d'etat in a member state, investigate the event, and "adopt any decisions deemed appropriate." (12) The following year (1992), the organization adopted the Washington Protocol (ratified in 1997), which established an anticoup sanctions regime through which an offending member state may be suspended from the organization. (13) The 1990s also saw the creation of bodies dedicated to democracy promotion (14) and the rise of a regional election-monitoring regime. (15) These efforts culminated in the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), (16) which further institutionalized regional responses to UCGs including various diplomatic actions and mandatory membership suspension after a set period of time. Compared to earlier instruments, the IADC provides for a wider range of democracy-promotion tools including preventive diplomacy in addition to crisis response. (17) Regional human rights promotion has a longer history in Latin America. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was formed in 1959 and functioned in a state monitoring capacity throughout the Cold War. As described below, however, the body's activities expanded greatly in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 in the midst of decolonization, and the language of its charter reflects newly independent African states' logical preoccupation with state sovereignty and the elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism on the continent. (18) Over time, though, African leaders began to publicly question the cherished principle of strict sovereignty, and especially the norm of noninterference. By the early 1990s, prominent African statesmen and former statesmen began frequently making explicit calls in various forums for a regional redefinition of sovereignty and a shift away from noninterference on the part of the African community in response to intrastate violence and political instability. (19) While the Constitutive Act (20) of the African Union (which replaced the OAU in 2002) affirms the principle of noninterference, legal regimes authorizing or mandating outside interference in response to unconstitutional UCGs and internal conflict have emerged in the post-Cold War era and have demoted noninterference within the region's legal norm hierarchy, as Paul D. Williams details in a 2007 study. (21)
Regarding democracy promotion and the anti-UCG regime, Thomas Legler and Thomas Kwasi Tieku point to the OAU's adoption of the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (22) as an important discursive shift. (23) It was not until 1997, though, that a series of regional legal instruments appeared condemning UCGs and outlining steps to be taken in response to them. (24) The May 1997 Harare Declaration condemned a coup d'etat in Sierra Leone and called on the international community to refuse diplomatic recognition to the de facto regime. (25) The July 2000 Lome Declaration generalized the Harare move by outlining anti-UCG interference mechanisms including OAU and AU membership suspension, nonrecognition of the de facto government, fact-finding missions, targeted sanctions, and multilateral mediation efforts. (26) These mechanisms were most strongly institutionalized in the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which was partially modeled after the IADC. (27) Some have made the case, however, that the OAU and AU democracy-promotion regime now goes further than that of the OAS because it does not formally require invitation by the targeted country to deploy fact-finding missions and election observers. (28) As for human rights promotion, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was formed with the coming into force of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1986. (29) Its investigatory activities are outlined in the next section.
Concerning institutionalized responses to internal armed conflict, hard law on the regional and subregional levels sets Africa apart from other regions in the Global South and Global North. Both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU have adopted treaties (in 1999 and 2000, respectively) including articles allowing for nonconsensual military intervention pursuant to grave circumstances. (30) The transformation of the OAU into the AU set in motion the spawning of a regional peace and security architecture, the most important body of which is the AU Peace and Security Council, which is mandated to carry out a range of interference actions in response to political and military crises.
Five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) established ASEAN in 1967, and the organization now includes ten member states due to the accession of Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN's founding document, emphasizes sovereignty-reinforcing norms in a way similar to those of the OAS and OAU. (31) The organization's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation further institutionalized noninterference and the principles of what is known as the "ASEAN Way," a set of procedural norms emphasizing informality and consensus as opposed to legalistic, majority vote, confrontational regionalism. (32) Although some scholars of Southeast Asia have made the case that strict noninterference is on the decline in the post-Cold War period (and especially since the 1997 financial crisis), when we compare the cited policy developments to those in Africa and Latin America, we see that noninterference has been maintained in Southeast Asia to a much greater degree.
ASEAN member states have proposed policy changes that, if accepted by the group, might have constituted important moves away from noninterference, but these were either rejected or adopted in a diluted form. For example, a 1998 proposal put forward by Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan challenged ASEAN's long-standing rule against the public criticism of a member state's internal affairs. In the first formal and direct challenge to ASEAN's discursive noninterference, Pitsuwan advocated a new policy of "flexible engagement," which would give ASEAN members permission to publicly raise and "collectively discuss" concerns about domestic policies if these policies could be shown to have regional implications. (33) Flexible engagement would not allow for unsolicited comment about domestic policies or situations without clear regional implications and would not allow for other kinds of interference in domestic affairs. Still, the policy proposal was rejected by ASEAN and, instead of "flexible engagement," the grouping agreed to a watered-down policy of "enhanced interaction" which, according to Alex Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, "permitted individual states to comment on their neighbors' domestic activities if they affected regional concerns but reaffirmed the Association's commitment to non-interference." (34)
Another initiative surfaced several years later during the drafting of plans for the ASEAN Security Community (ASC). In 2004, ASEAN established the ASC as a way to formalize management of security matters and disputes. In the negotiation of the community's configuration and mandate, the Indonesian delegate proposed provisions for an ASEAN peacekeeping force, (35) but this did not make it into the final ASC Draft Plan adopted at the 2004 ASEAN summit. (36) According to statements made to the press, the other ASEAN members rejected the establishment of such a force as an affront to sovereignty. (37)
Another policy development relevant to noninterference was the adoption of the 2007 ASEAN Charter, which espouses a strong commitment to democracy and human rights and formally conditions ASEAN membership on adherence to charter standards. (38) While this might qualify as discursive movement away from noninterference, it does not, in fact, establish concrete mechanisms of enforcement that would qualify as interference. Southeast Asia has not developed a democracy-promotion regime like those in Africa and Latin America; the ASEAN Charter does not provide for election monitoring, fact-finding missions, or an anti-UCG sanctions regime. It does provide for a human rights body, the Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009, but this commission lacks investigative powers, (39) setting it apart in an important way from African and Latin American human rights institutions.
Overall, while individual member states have introduced failed or minor challenges to ASEAN's long-running noninterference policy and we see some discursive shifts around this norm, the erosion of noninterference at the discursive and policy levels in Africa and Latin America has been much more profound. I next examine actual practices--acts of interference carried out by states, groups of states, and ROs--through RO monitoring regimes or in response to domestic political and military crises.
The Rise of Interference: Shifts in Practice
In what follows, I provide qualitative and descriptive quantitative evidence for the rise in two types of regional interference practices: (1) elections and human rights monitoring; and (2) domestic crisis management.
During the post-Cold War period, regional institutions in Africa and Latin America advanced their encroachment into member states' domestic affairs by increasing their monitoring of and reporting on member states' human rights situations and elections. These practices already existed in Latin America (and in Africa to a much lesser extent) during the Cold War, but they were expanded in the 1990s and 2000s. Before 1989, OAS observation missions were rare, small, and short term. Today, missions are dispatched systematically and are larger, more sophisticated, and of longer duration. Although these missions are formally invited, the fact that it has become the norm for states to invite monitors arguably indicates that sovereignty has been partially redefined. (40) Outside actors are assuming jurisdiction over domestic political processes.
The OAU did not monitor member state elections before the 1990s. Although some diplomats involved in the OAU's dispatch of a small consensual observation mission to the 1991 Zambian elections expressed strong reservations about what they understood to be a violation of noninterference, the move set a precedent for routine (invited) election monitoring missions on the continent throughout the 1990s. (41) Over time, the organization shifted away from the "invitation only" policy, and it now regularly deploys election monitors without the "express consent" of its member states. As Legler and Tieku note, this willingness to get involved in member states' internal affairs without express consent also extends to other interference activities, including fact-finding missions and mediation missions. (42)
Latin America's human rights monitoring body, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, has been operating since 1960. Although this commission conducted monitoring of state practices throughout the Cold War, it became a more prominent organ in the 1980s and its monitoring activities underwent a significant expansion in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the Inter-American Commission investigated a great deal more individual petitions and made findings on the violations claimed by them, an activity making up only a small part of its work before the 1990s. Furthermore, the body greatly increased its submission of cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its appointment of special thematic rapporteurships in the 1990s. Finally, it "began to closely monitor those countries with the most fragile democratic institutions and/or which were still experiencing political violence" during this period. (43)
The regional body tasked with monitoring human rights in Africa, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, began functioning in 1987. Its primary monitoring function involves the investigation of individual complaints of human rights violations; the investigations result in findings and recommendations by the commission.This commission began publishing its findings under the individual complaints procedure in 1994. (44) Although the African human rights system by most accounts is considerably weaker than its inter-American counterpart, its state monitoring practices have, since the early 1990s, constituted a challenge to the noninterference norm.
ASEAN has only recently (since 2012) begun to coordinate election observers, and it is unclear whether this will become a more regular practice. At this point, its human rights body does not monitor individual state practices.
In this subsection, I analyze patterns of activity in a second category of interference--regional responses to intrastate crises--over five decades in the three regions (see Tables 1-3 for categories of activity). (45) In order to systematically assess patterns, I compare regional interference practices over time with reference to regional interference opportunities; that is, intrastate disputes rising to a crisis level. To generate my list of crisis-level disputes for each decade, I rely on intrastate dispute narratives (IDN) produced by the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) project (directed by Mark Mullenbach). (46) These narratives contain information "collected from hundreds of different primary and secondary sources" and chronicle domestic-level disputes and attempts by external actors to manage these disputes. (47) The IDN disaggregates disputes into five phases of which preconflict, conflict, and postconflict phases constitute the most serious levels of domestic crisis, and so I code disputes in these phases as "crisis-level." I use the same source (the IDN) to code regional responses to these crisis-level disputes. Although the DADM is one of many existing data projects interested in interference and intervention, (48) it is uniquely suited to this inquiry since it offers data on intrastate crises not necessarily rising to the level of armed conflict as well as a wide range of outsider responses. Although the DADM narratives do not capture every instance of interference, they are comprehensive enough to provide a good indication of the shape of patterns of interference practices over time and space. To analyze trends in the rate of regional interference in response to intrastate crisis (RIRC), I draw on qualitative data found in the IDN and secondary sources, as indicated. (49)
According to the DADM data presented in Figure 1, the RIRC was much greater in the 1990s and 2000s than during the Cold War period. In light of post-Cold War developments in regional law (outlined above), this suggests that the norm of noninterference has eroded. In what follows, I present qualitative evidence differentiating among types of interference (with reference to Table 1) and provide contextual information (drawing on secondary sources) in order to further refine this point. Unless a citation is provided, this contextual information is found in the IDN themselves.
Contestation around the meaning and inviolability of noninterference featured prominently in debates among African leaders in the 1960s. This manifested itself in the OAU's approach to the Congo crisis (1960-1965) since some heads of state considered the regime in power to be a "neocolonialist puppet" installed by outside powers and therefore undeserving of freedom from noninterference. (50) The OAU established an ad hoc commission that has been described as "bold" for the time since its final report recommended, against the wishes of the Congolese head of state, that a rebel group be given a seat at the negotiation table. (51) Although this did not come to pass, the recommendation itself was a violation of noninterference and controversial. Some African leaders also accused coup makers in Ghana (1966) of coming to power through interference by extraregional powers and in response imposed diplomatic sanctions against the new regime, calling for similar actions to be taken by the OAU. In the end, though, those African states in favor of diplomatic recognition (and corresponding observance of noninterference) based on control of territory alone won the day, cementing the noninterference norm and its application to any formally independent African state. (52) The OAU's response to the Biafran war (1967-1970) in Nigeria reflected the consensus, as the OAU commission charged with supporting its settlement was explicitly mandated to support the Nigerian government and did not even acknowledge the Biafran side by name. (53)
We see an increase in the RIRC in the 1970s compared to the 1960s, but much of this activity involved clandestine aid to rebels carried out by a state acting alone. Over half of these subversive acts were carried out by one state that emerged with an interventionist foreign policy beginning in 1969--Libya. Although Muammar Qaddafi's relationship with other African leaders was certainly complicated, it is telling that following Libya's military involvement in Chad during the 1970s and 1980s, sometimes in support of the government and sometimes in support of the opposition, many African states cut off diplomatic ties with Libya. (54) Furthermore, no regional law lent support to these subversive activities, and they do not constitute evidence of a competing norm. The norm of noninterference was arguably principally motivated by African states' desire to prevent this type of subversion or irredentism.
Two cases of regional interference in the late 1970s and early 1980s presented more important challenges to noninterference, suggesting that the norm's legitimacy was waning. First, Tanzania's 1979 military intervention in Uganda--which resulted in regime change--received a more muted response from the regional community than one might expect. (55) Second, the OAU's peacekeeping activities in Chad (1981-1982) were at the time unprecedented. They were considered rather unsuccessful, in part because the government of Chad objected to the neutrality of the forces, despite its consent to their deployment, claiming that an OAU force should serve the interests of the government explicitly. (56) The RIRC in the 1980s was, however, overall quite low. We might attribute this to the perceived failure of OAU peacekeeping in Chad and the organization's shifting focus toward regional economic development efforts during this decade.
The RIRC in the 1990s and 2000s increased substantially and moved toward more multilateral activities in promotion of democracy and conflict resolution, reflecting shifts in (sub)regional law and discourse. Other qualitative changes in regional interference practices included a decrease in rebel support activities and an increase in diplomatic and material sanctions directed at governments and a variety of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities including mediation missions, civilian deployments, and military deployments. Regional interference in the post-Cold War period has been more critical, intrusive, and coercive than that taking place during the first three decades under examination. Condemnation and diplomatic nonrecognition or membership suspension have been imposed by states, groups of states, or the OAU and AU in response to UCGs. These activities are critical of the government and to some degree coercive, as they may entail costs to it. In 1996 seven regional states imposed economic and military sanctions against the government of Burundi in response to its killing of civilians, and in 2005 ECOWAS imposed diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions against Togo following a coup d'etat. These sanctions are more coercive than the diplomatic variety.
Mediation missions and civilian or military peace operations generally require the formal consent of the target state to function. These activities are, however, intrusive (typically involving feet or boots on the ground), and can entail varying degrees of coerciveness. Mediation activities have increased more than any other activity type. This trend constitutes an important challenge to noninterference because of the history of states' aversion to third-party mediation. As Mohammed Omar Maundi and colleagues explain, governments resist mediation because "in one way, it undermines [their] authority and in another, legitimizes the insurgency." (57) The Congolese state's objection in 1965 to the prospect of its opposition's involvement in OAU-led negotiations is evidence of this. In 1971 Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie agreed to host negotiations between Sudanese rebels and the Sudanese government, but initially he refused to participate in said negotiations in order to not be seen as legitimizing the rebels, and so nonstate actors mediated the negotiations. According to Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, he may have been motivated by a desire to avoid his own secessionists insisting on mediations. (58)
Civilian and military peace operations generally require consent from all parties on the ground, including the state. Diplomatic pressure is often required, though, to achieve this consent since these missions pose the threat of greater exposure of a state's internal problems and may constrain the state's conduct vis-a-vis armed groups as well as civilians. For example, the 1993 OAU peace operation in Burundi was originally rejected by the state and allowed to deploy only after extensive negotiations between outside actors and the government. (59) The Sudanese government opposed the deployment of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and II) peacekeeping forces, and a 2004 UN Security Council resolution threatening sanctions against Sudan was necessary to secure consent for AMIS II. (60) Finally, some cases included in the DADM data have involved even greater coercion. In 1998, ECOWAS's ECOMOG-Sierra Leone mission achieved regime change through force (it reinstalled a deposed leader). These activities were simply unthinkable during the Cold War period.
According to the DADM data presented in Figure 2, the number of crisislevel disputes in Latin America has decreased over time while the RIRC has increased. This suggests that the norm of noninterference has eroded, beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s and 2000s. The trend, however, is not as striking as in the African case.
The Cold War period was one of high US intervention in the region, a reversal of President Franklin Roosevelt's 1933 Good Neighbor Policy, and this interventionism created a stronger resolve among Latin American states to protect state sovereignty and promote noninterference at the expense of other prominent regional norms like democracy and human rights promotion (and multilateralism more generally). The Dominican crisis of the early 1960s was an important moment with respect to the complicated relationship between the United States and Latin American states. While the United States invaded the Dominican Republic unilaterally, OAS actions--especially the eventual establishment of an Inter-American Peace Force--created a perception that the OAS functioned as a tool of US interests. According to L. Ronald Scheman, "The resurgence of U.S. unilateralism in the Dominican Republic in 1965 broke fall growing consensus and spawned a period of aimlessness" in pan-American regionalism. (61) The norms of democracy and human rights promotion that now compete with noninterference in the regional normative order were, according to Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "stalled and subordinated to anti-communism and the logic of national security doctrines" during the Cold War, as coups d'etat were "part of the standard political repertoire" and international human rights pressure consistently provoked accusations of sovereignty violation. (62) Latin American states feared that the institutionalized promotion of human rights and democracy would only create opportunities for abuse by the United States. (63)
Accordingly, the DADM data displayed in Figure 2 indicate that the RIRC was relatively low in the 1960s and 1970s. Apart from the OAS response to the Dominican crisis, interference activities consisted of diplomatic nonrecognition imposed by individual states in response to regime change. Although the 1962 coup in Peru provoked diplomatic sanctions by several states, the OAS Council voted not to hold a meeting to discuss the matter following Peru's invocation of its right to noninterference.
By the late 1970s, however, we start to see a shift in the relative strength of the regional democracy-promotion and noninterference norms. An important event here was the OAS response to the domestic situation in Nicaragua in 1978-1979, involving mediation, fact-finding, and, most importantly, a call for the "immediate and definite replacement of the Somoza government" in response to an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report on the human rights conditions in the country. According to Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, this 1979 resolution "demonstrated a marked sense of collective will by the OAS membership" and was "the first sign of a substantial commitment to some form of prodemocracy doctrine." (64) The DADM data from the 1980s show an increase in the RIRC, in part due to an increase in multilateral democracy-promotion activities (OAS anti-UCG activities), but equally due to clandestine subversive activities that did not enjoy regional consensus or legal backing. In the first category of activity, we see condemnation, investigation, and diplomatic pressure leading to regime change in Bolivia after a coup (1980) and condemnation of the Panamanian government after an election annulment (1989). In the second category, we see the provision of military assistance to rebel groups in El Salvador (by Nicaragua) and in Nicaragua (by Argentina and Honduras) (1981). Finally, US military interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) involved some cooperation by regional actors (individual states and a subregional organization), but these invasions were more broadly condemned in the hemisphere and cannot be said to reflect regional norms.
In the 1990s and 2000s, we see both an increase in the RIRC and a qualitative change--while interference in the 1980s could be described as a "mixed bag" including rebel support and US intervention support (neither of which was governed by regional law or enjoyed vocal support by other regional actors), the post-Cold War period saw a convergence on multilateral, democracy-promoting, and human rights-promoting modes of interference. This trend reflects changes in regional law and occurred in parallel to the rise of monitoring regimes (both outlined above). As democracy and human rights norms rose, they demoted noninterference within the regional normative hierarchy, as democracy, peacebuilding, and human rights (to a lesser extent) norms did in Africa. Much of this activity involved diplomatic and some material sanctions imposed by the OAS in response to UCGs (e.g., Suriname in 1990, Haiti in 1991, Peru in 1992, Ecuador in 2000, Venezuela in 2002). Again, these activities were nonconsensual and critical or punitive. The OAS also deployed mediation teams and civilian missions at a greater rate than in previous decades, usually in support of democracy or human rights (e.g., Haiti in 1991 and 2000), but sometimes as a peace operation (e.g., Colombia in 2004). All of these deployments were consented to by the government although, as in the African cases, diplomatic pressure was surely applied at times (e.g., Haiti in 1993, Peru in 1992). Overall, regional interference activities in Latin American during the post-Cold War period have not been as frequent or coercive as those taking place in Africa during the same decades, but change over time is apparent and this change can be contrasted with Southeast Asia's relatively steady RIRC over time.
According the DADM data, the number of crisis-level disputes in Southeast Asia has remained fairly consistent over the decades, and the RIRC has actually decreased. Interference practices during the Cold War period were largely structured around the communist-capitalist divide, although many military deployments were regime supportive and therefore were not coded. Laos was the target of interference from North Vietnam which, together with Pathet Lao rebels, captured Na Kay in 1964. Malaysia allegedly provided military assistance to a Philippines secessionist movement from 1968-1972, although the Malaysian government did not admit to this. (65) Cambodia's decision to suspend diplomatic relations with South Vietnam in 1963 was justified "on the grounds that the Khmer minority in the ROV suffered from oppressive policies implemented by the Vietnamese authorities," but border disputes were also a major factor in this decision. (66) (See Figure 3.)
In the 1970s, we see the continued military involvement of North Vietnam in Indochina. In 1970, North Vietnamese troops, together with troops loyal to Cambodia's deposed leader, attacked Cambodian government troops. In the same year, North Vietnamese troops launched a military offensive with Pathet Lao rebels against the government of Laos. In the late 1970s, Vietnamese troops intervened in support of Cambodian rebels and helped overthrow Pol Pot in 1979. North Vietnamese activities, although quite interventionist, cannot really be said to reflect regional norms and certainly not ASEAN norms.
ASEAN and its member states responded sharply to Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, lobbying states and international organizations to pressure Vietnam to withdraw. Its involvement in Cambodia's internal affairs can therefore be seen as pushback against interference more so than interference itself (it is technically coded as interference). These include ASEAN's call for an international conference to settle the Cambodian conflict, Thailand's accusation that Cambodia used chemical weapons against Khmer Rouge rebels (1981), and Thailand's attempt to mediate negotiations between the parties (1989). The DADM narratives reveal no instances of regional interference in the 1990s. In 2004, a Malaysia-led international monitoring group was set up to observe a cease-fire in the Philippines--Moro Islamic Liberation Front conflict and Malaysia has mediated negotiations in the conflict. This type of regional intrastate conflict management activity is exceptional in Southeast Asia, but it may indicate a gradual erosion of noninterference.
An Explanation for Divergent Trajectories
In the preceding analysis, I have made a case for the existence of divergent normative trajectories across regions in the Global South. Specifically, noninterference, a basic sovereignty norm associated in its strongest form with postcolonial states, has eroded in Africa and Latin America in the post-Cold War period to a much greater degree than it has in Southeast Asia. Latin America s human rights monitoring regime is more extensive and intrusive than Africa's while Africa's election monitoring regime matches that of Latin America. Africa's legalization and implementation of human rights-, democracy-, and peace-promoting responses to intrastate crises are more frequent, intrusive, and coercive than Latin America's. Southeast Asia lacks law and practice that challenge noninterference in these ways. While the decline of intrastate conflict in Latin America may well account for differences between Latin America and Africa regarding crisis response, Southeast Asia remains a region of many violent conflicts, and so this functional account is unsatisfactory. This variation is therefore puzzling, and I close this article by advocating for the importance of one explanatory factor--the history of shared ideas.
In his 2007 article on the security culture of the OAU/AU, Paul D. Williams argues that "contradictions within the OAU's own principles" in part constituted "the most important motors of development" toward the partial embrace of the norms of UCG condemnation and the Responsibility to Protect. (67) One such contradiction involved the norm of noninterference because the OAU was willing to condemn colonial and racist regimes on the continent while remaining silent on the internal affairs of independent African states. I find this persuasive and I suspect that contradictions in the OAU's security culture did create opportunities for actors inside and outside the organization (and continent) to push for change, and that this contributed to the erosion of the norm of noninterference. However, one might make the case that any institutional culture or normative order holds contradictions and that states acting hypocritically is not a special case--why did security culture contradictions lead to the erosion of noninterference in Africa but not Southeast Asia? Can the argument be extended to the Latin American case? Building on Williams's insights, I argue that we should examine one critical juncture, the establishment of regional organizations, analyzing the ways in which the norm of noninterference was justified, framed, and linked to other ideas by RO founders. The content of this discursive packaging had path dependent effects on the viability of noninterference over time.
In the African case, the OAU was the culmination of the efforts of the pan-Africanist movement. Modern pan-Africanism originated in the African diaspora with a series of congresses taking place between 1900 and 1945, the last of which served as an important springboard for the international African independence movement, followed by the African (interstate) unity movement. Although those leaders and activists involved in the pan-Africanist movement were divided along lines of language, ethnicity, and disagreements about the ideal extent of African integration, the formation of the OAU in 1963 is seen by many as a victory of the movement to unify various factions that had begun to form. Pan-Africanism is multifaceted and has been deployed in different ways for different purposes. As a whole, it is an ideology that contains both statist/nationalist elements (solidarity among African nation-states) and universalist elements (solidarity among African persons). (68) At the time of the OAU founding, noninterference was justified in terms of pan-Africanism: statist solidarity requires African states to refrain from "judging" one another (69) in order to allow each other time and space to recover from the destructiveness of colonialism and build nations, ultimately achieving greater well-being, freedom, and dignity for African persons. While noninterference supports statist solidarity, it came to be seen as injurious to universalist solidarity since the leaders of nation-states were enabled to do violence to their own citizens through the practice of noninterference by outside actors. (70) Strict noninterference was therefore unsustainable over time, and it became delegitimized.
Amitav Acharya, a leading expert on the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism, identifies common concerns about communist insurgency as a key interest or ideology motivating political cooperation among the states that would eventually found ASEAN. (71) Although a variety of pan-Asian and even Southeast Asian regionalist ideologies and movements were part of the political landscape throughout decolonization and during the period of ASEAN's founding, previous attempts at establishing a Southeast Asian regional organization had failed. It was not until the region became sufficiently polarized along Cold War lines that ASEAN emerged. Along with concerns over communist insurgency, a common "shift to authoritarianism" actually helped create a basis for cooperation, according to Acharya. Upon independence, these states had first attempted democratic governance. Subsequently, the authoritarian shift was justified in similar ways "in terms of communist threat, ethnic unrest and a belief that economic development required a certain amount of authoritarian control," creating a basis for cooperation. (72) In the ASEAN case, noninterference was justified in order to allow states to most effectively combat communist insurgency and promote economic development. (73) Because of the way it was justified, the norm of noninterference was more viable in the ASEAN case.
In the case of Latin America, the history of pan-American legal thought helps us understand the erosion of noninterference in the post-Cold War period. Noninterference was enshrined in the OAS Charter in 1948, as it would be in the founding documents of the OAU and later ASEAN, but noninterference has a longer legal history in the Americas due to the relatively early decolonization of many Latin American states. However, the way in which noninterference fit into the conception of sovereignty that developed in the Western Hemisphere beginning in the nineteenth century had important implications for the viability of strict noninterference over time. According to Arturo Santa-Cruz, even before the formation of the OAS, the normative structure termed "the Western Hemisphere Idea" produced a continental understanding of sovereignty with two elements: nonintervention and representative government. (74) Although Cold War politics created little space for the second side of the sovereignty coin (democracy), the end of this period removed a strategic layer and allowed this dormant legal tradition to resurface in the form of democracy- and human rights-promotion regimes involving legitimate interference. This analysis echoes that of Kathryn Sikkink, who traces pan-American legal thought on sovereignty and nonintervention, arguing that "the doctrine of non-intervention was originally seen as a vehicle to promote human progress and not as a shield to justify the violations of rights." (75)
None of this is to say that Southeast Asia's normative order is static. As some of the evidence I have presented in this article indicates, the region is slowly moving away from its strictest interpretation of noninterference, and this trend may accelerate over the next decade. It is clear, however, that noninterference has been much more stubborn in the ASEAN region than in the other regions that I examined, where remarkable change has occurred in a rather short space of time. Foundational ideologies of regional organizations have had important path dependent effects on these normative trajectories, and further research tracing the process of norm delegitimation (or affirmation) over time would help us to better understand the mechanisms at work.
Brooke Coe is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. She wishes to thank the University of Minnesota for supporting this study through its Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship program.
(1.) See Thomas J. Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty and Territory," in Walter Carlsnaes et al., The Sage Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2012), pp. 245-272; Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 2.
(2.) United Nations, "Global Issues: Decolonization," https://www.un.org/en/globalissues/decolonization.
(3.) Amitav Acharya and A. I. Johnston, "Conclusion: The Agenda for Future Research," in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds., Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 262.
(4.) Amitav Acharya, "The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics," World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 633.
(5.) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 54, no. 2 (1998): 891.
(6.) Andrew Hurrell and Terry Macdonald, "Ethics and Norms in International Relations," in Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds., Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), p. 69.
(7.) See, for example, U. O. Umozurike, "The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter," African Affairs 78, no. 311 (April 1979): 197-209.
(8.) Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America," International Organization 54, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 657.
(9.) Thomas Legler and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, "What Difference Can a Path Make? Regional Democracy Promotion Regimes in the Americas and Africa," Democratization 17, no. 3 (June 2010): 469.
(10.) Organization of American States, "Human Rights and Democracy: Electoral Monitoring," Resolution 991 adopted by the General Assembly, 18 November 1989, www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03803E01.pdf.
(11.) Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," Latin American Politics and Society 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 4.
(12.) Organization of American States, "Representative Democracy," Resolution 1080 adopted by the General Assembly, 5 June 1991, www.oas.org/juridico/english /agres 1080.htm.
(13.) Organization of American States, "Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (Protocol of Washington)," adopted by the General Assembly, 14 December 1992, www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-56_Protocol _of_Washington.htm.
(14.) Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats, and Institutions," p. 4.
(15.) Arturo Santa-Cruz, "Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms: The Case of International Election Monitoring, " International Organization 59, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 685.
(16.) Organization of American States, "Inter-American Democratic Charter," adopted by the General Assembly, 11 September 2001, www.oas.org/charter/docs /resolution1_en_p4.htm.
(17.) Legler and Tieku, "What Difference Can a Path Make?" p. 466.
(18.) Organization of African Unity, "Organization of African Unity Charter," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 25 May 1963, www.au.int/en /sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf.
(19.) See, for example, Olusegun Obasanjo and Felix Mosha, eds., Africa Rise to the Challenge: Conference Report on the Kampala Forum (New York: Africa Leadership Forum, 1993); Council of Ministers, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, CMI1710 (L. VI) (Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity, June 1992), pp. 12-13, cited in Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), p. 17.
(20.) Organization of African Unity, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 11 July 2000, www.africa-union ,org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm.
(21.) Paul D. Williams, "From Non-intervention to Non-indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture," African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 253-279.
(22.) Organization of African Unity, "African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 16 February 1990, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/file4239ac8e921ed.pdf.
(23.) Legler and Tieku, "What Difference Can a Path Make?" p. 469.
(24.) Relevant law includes: Harare Declaration (1997); Algiers Declaration (1999); Lome Declaration (2000) on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government; Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 2000, entered into force 2001); African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Government (adopted 2007, entered into force 2012).
(25.) Stacy-Ann Elvy, "Towards a New Democratic Africa: The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance," Emory International Law Review 27, no. 1 (2013): 59.
(26.) Organization of African Unity, " Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 12 July 2000, www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation _democracy/lomedec.htm.
(27.) African Union, "African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance," adopted by the Assembly, 30 January 2007, www.au.int/en/sites/default/files /african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf. See Edward R. McMahon, "The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A Positive Step on a Long Path," Working Paper (Open Society Institute and African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, May 2007), pp. 3-4, www.afrimap.org /english/images/paper/ACDEG&IADC_McMahon.pdf.
(28.) Legler and Tieku, "What Difference Can a Path Make?" p. 480; Elvy, "Towards a New Democratic Africa," p. 100.
(29.) Organization of African Unity, "African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 27 June 1981, www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf.
(30.) Organization of African Unity, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 11 July 2000, www.africa-union.org /root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm; Economic Community of West African States, "Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security," adopted by the Heads of State and Government, 10 December 1999, www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en.
(31.) Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)," adopted by member states, 8 August 1967, www.asean.org/news/item /the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration.
(32.) Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," adopted by member states, 24 February 1976, www.asean.org/news /item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-febru ary-1976-3.
(33.) Jurgen Haacke, "Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 188-189.
(34.) Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility," Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (May 2011): 187 (emphasis added).
(35.) "Indonesia Modifies Peacekeeping Proposal After ASEAN Reservations," Agence-France Presse, 15 June 2004.
(36.) Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 230.
(37.) Adianto P. Simamora, "ASEAN Finishes Draft Regional Security Plan," Jakarta Post, 28 June 2004, p. 1.
(38.) Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations," adopted by member states, 20 November 2007, www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/asean-charter.
(39.) Robin Ramcharan, "ASEAN's Human Rights Commission: Policy Considerations for Enhancing Its Capacity to Protect Human Rights," University College London Human Rights Review 3 (2010): 204, www.ucl.ac.uk/human-rights/ucl-hrr /docs/hrrevie wissue3/ramcharan.
(40.) Santa-Cruz, "Constitutional Structures," p. 684.
(41.) Larry Garber, "The OAU and Elections," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993): 55-56.
(42.) Legler and Tieku, "What Difference Can a Path Make?" p. 480.
(43.) Robert K. Goldman, "History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 4 (2009): 874-875, at 881.
(44.) Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw, "State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1994-2004," American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 2-4.
(45.) Diplomatic sanctions include official condemnation, suspension of diplomatic relations, or suspension of membership in a (sub)regional organization (targeting a regime in power). Material sanctions target a regime in power and include economic and military sanctions. Mediation includes mediation, conciliation commissions, facilitation of negotiations, and special envoys. Rebel support includes military assistance to rebels, training of rebels, and deployment of troops in support of rebels. Civilian deployment includes fact-finding missions and cease-fire monitoring missions. Military deployment includes any military deployment not in exclusive and explicit support of the regime in power.
(46.) The Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) project is housed at the University of Central Arkansas and directed by Mark Mullenbach. The project website can be accessed at http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project.
(47.) University of Central Arkansas, "Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management-- Intrastate Dispute Narratives," http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-intrat state-dispute-narratives.
(48.) See Karl DeRouen Jr., Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna, "Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 5 (September 2011): 663-672; Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 1 (January 2009): 135-146; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779-801.
(49.) I used secondary (non-IDN) sources to more accurately code regional responses to intrastate crises found in the IDN and to provide context for the qualitative analysis. I did not use secondary sources to find regional responses to intrastate crises that were not already mentioned in the IDN (i.e., new cases).
(50.) P. Mweti Munya, "The Organization of African Unity and Its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement," Boston College Third World Law Journal 19, no. 2 (1999): 575.
(51.) B. David Meyers, "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity," International Organization 28, no. 3 (1974): 364.
(52.) Kofi Oteng Kufuor, "The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analyzing Its Practice and Proposals for the Future," American University International Law Review 17, no. 2 (2002): 375.
(53.) Gemuh E. Akuchu, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Unsolved Problem for the OAU (A Case Study of the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict)," Africa Today 24, no. 4 (October-December 1977): 45.
(54.) Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart, "Libya's Foreign Policy in Flux," African Affairs 104, no. 416 (July 2005): 474.
(55.) Olajide Aluko, "African Response to External Intervention in Africa Since Angola," African Affairs 80, no. 319 (April 1981): 171.
(56.) Roy May and Simon Massey, "The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?" International Peacekeeping 5, no. 1 (1998): 52-53.
(57.) Mohammed Omar Maundi et al., Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institutes for Peace, 2006), p. 7.'
(58.) Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Peace Process in the Sudan, 1971-1972," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 84.
(59.) Annemarie Peen Rodt, "The African Mission in Burundi: The Successful Management of Violent Ethno-political Conflict?" Ethnopolitics Paper Series 1, no. 10 (Exeter: Exeter Centre for Ethnopolical Studies, 2011), pp. 7-8, www.ethno politics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/ethnopoliticspapers--volume01--2010.htm.
(60.) UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1564 (18 September 2004), www.un.org /Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1564.
(61.) L. Ronald Scheman, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Inter-American System's Second Century," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1987): 8.
(62.) Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America," International Organization 54, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 657.
(63.) Kathryn Sikkink, "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices," Houston Journal of International Law 19, no. 705 (1996-1997): 727.
(64.) Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership," Latin American Politics and Society 43, no. 1 (April 2001): 105.
(65.) Paridah Abd. Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of Sabah," Asian Survey 32, no. 6 (June 1992): 559.
(66.) Ramses Amer, "Border Conflicts Between Cambodia and Vietnam," Boundary and Security Bulletin 5, no. 2 (1997): 1, https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru /publications/full/bsb5-2_amer.pdf?origin=publication_detail.
(67.) Williams, "From Non-interference to Non-indifference," p. 266.
(68.) I borrow the statist/universalist distinction from Amitav Acharya who distinguishes between universalist regionalism, which is society centric rather than state centric and emphasizes cultural and spiritual affinities among peoples, and nationalist regionalism, which is state centric. Amitav Acharya, "Asia Is Not One," Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 4 (2010): 1004-1005.
(69.) Ibid., p. 265.
(70.) See Timothy Murithi, The African Union, Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding, and Development (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).
(71.) Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 58-59.
(73.) According to Bellamy and Drummond, today noninterference "is often credited with establishing the context that permitted rapid economic deployment in parts of the region." Bellamy and Drummond, "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia," p. 185.
(74.) Santa-Cruz, "Constitutional Structures," p. 674.
(75.) Sikkink, "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas," p. 729.
Table 1 Types of Regional Crisis Response: Africa 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total crisis-level disputes 32 42 43 52 41 Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: Diplomatic sanctions 1 2 0 5 7 Material sanctions 0 0 0 2 1 Rebel support (troops) 2(0) 6(3) 4(2) 3(2) 0(0) Mediation 2 4 3 19 18 Civilian deployment 0 0 0 3 3 Military deployment 0 1 1 6 4 Table 2 Types of Regional Crisis Response: Latin America 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total crisis- 20 22 18 16 10 level disputes Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: Diplomatic sanctions 3 2 3 4 2 Material sanctions 1 0 0 2 0 Rebel support (troops) 0 0 2(1) 0 0 Mediation 1 1 2 1 3 Civilian deployment 1 I 1 3 4 Military deployment 1 0 0 0 0 Table 3 Types of Regional Crisis Response: Southeast Asia 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total crisis-level 14 16 15 15 15 disputes Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: Diplomatic sanctions 1 0 0 0 0 Material sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 Rebel support (troops) 2(1) 0(2) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) Mediation 0 0 1 0 1 Civilian deployment 0 0 0 0 0 Military deployment 0 0 0 0 1 Figure 1 Rate of Regional Interference as Response to Crisis: Africa No response Response 1960s 28 4 1970s 33 9 1980s 37 6 1990s 31 21 2000s 20 21 Note: Table made from bar graph. Figure 2 Rate of Regional Interference as Response to Crisis: Latin America No response Response 1960s 17 3 1970s 20 2 1980s 13 5 1990s 11 5 2000s 6 4 Note: Table made from bar graph. Figure 3 Rate of Regional Inteference as Response to Crisis: Southeast Asia No response Response 1960s 11 3 1970s 13 3 1980s 14 1 1990s 15 0 2000s 14 1 Note: Table made from bar graph.
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