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South Atlantic wars: the episode of Palmares.

MOST OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY of the Brazilian colonial context confines its analysis within the borders of the modern national space. Such an approach presumes that Portuguese America's factories and villages advanced under the premonition of the modern nation. This territorial reductionism also had an impact on the archival organization.

In fact, after the Independence of Brazil in 1822, the demand for historical documents related to the provinces of the nineteenth-century empire, and later to the states of the federal republic, led the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, in Lisbon to classify its documents based on the political geography of the nineteenth century. This cataloging generated subdivisions that arbitrarily ranked earlier minor and major Brazilian captaincies at the same level with larger and more influential ones. Eventually, the South Atlantic data were scattered through a new cataloguing in boxes concerning Portugal and its African and Asian possessions. This modern distribution introduced a fragmented vision of the past and a misleading perception of the present.

As a result, documents about the quilombos of Palmares in modern Alagoas in northeastern Brazil--and many "Brasilicos" (2) and other Brazilian topics--can be found in boxes of documents labeled 'Angola," as well as in boxes ostensibly focused on other African and Asian possessions. And yet, dozens of ordens regias ("royal orders") sent to Brazilian general government in Bahia remark: "it was written this way for Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Maranhao and Angola." In other words, the documents themselves constantly emphasize that the history now narrowed to modern Brazil is an artificial segment of a historical process that operated in the South Atlantic on a trans-oceanic scale.

Despite that separation, the Atlantic dimension and the African significance of Palmares have always been underlined in the modern historiography, usually by seeing these settlements of slaves who had fled the sugar plantations of Pernambuco as "African kingdoms'. However, few authors have observed the further trans-Atlantic dimension of the story that many of the troops who fought the Palmares War in Brazil were familiar with warfare in Angola and with African cultures. (3) Hence, the African experience in the Palmares wars was not just inside the palisades of the quilombo: it also infused the anti-Palmarista militias of the planters and local authorities of Brazil. (4)

In fact, during the second quarter of the 17th century two major regional armed forces emerged in Portuguese America: the bandeirantes, or paulistas, generally mestizo militias from Sao Paulo captaincy in the south, who launched slave hunting expeditions against the southern Indian tribes, and the Pernambuco and Paraiba volunteer forces who fought the Dutch occupation of Northeast Brazil from 1630 to 1654. In Africa, the main Portuguese military activity centered in Angola, a region successively connected to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco. A bilateral trade across the southern Atlantic linked plantation enclaves in Brazil to slaving wars in Angola, and later--though more commercially in tone--to the ports of the Gulf of Guinea, generating a colonial spatial matrix in the South Atlantic that lasted until 1850, at the end of the slave traffic. Seventeenth-century colonists of both shores of the South Atlantic shared military experiences in the African and American wars, a unique phenomenon in the greater Atlantic System. Aside from the exports of Brazilian products like cowries (zimbos), manioc flour, jeribita (sugarcane spirits, or cachaca), troops, horses, and militiamen left Brazil to expand colonial domination and slave trade networks in West-Central Africa.

"Live War" and "Coata-coata War" (5)

Unlike the Portuguese conflicts in Morocco or Asia, sometimes exalted in Lisbon as stages of a global and glorious war against Islam, the battles against the natives on both sides of the South Atlantic were often deprecated. Albeit situated at a level lower than Portugal's frontier battles with Spain during the War of Restoration (1640-1668), (6) the campaign against the Dutch in Brazil--also known as the Brasilica War (1630-1654)--was considered a "live war" (guerra viva, or active combat in modern English), entitling combatants to privileges from the Crown. (7) Thus Joao Fernandes Vieira and Andre de Vidal Negreiros, commanders of the Brazilian rebellion against the Dutch, emerged from the ranks of the irregular troops to head governments in Brazil and Angola, an exceptional rise to the honorable positions of captains-general in the Portuguese administration overseas. They also received military distinctions from the Crown. (8)

Nevertheless, the Crown underplayed the role of the captains in other, less noble Brazilian fronts. In 1656, Pereira de Azevedo, a leader among the bandeirante raiders of Sao Paulo, who fought against the Dutch and was later the second-in-command of the famous and wide-ranging " bandeira de limites" (1648-1651), a wide-ranging raid to the borders of Spanish Peru led by Raposo Tavares, petitioned for appointment to a royal office in Brazil. Eventually, he obtained the position. However, Salvador de Sa, an influential member of the Overseas Council (the Conselho Ultramarino, the council advisory to the king in Lisbon on matters overseas), objected. For him, Azevedo deserved the position only because he fought the Brasilica War, as his role as a bandeira commander brought him neither "merit nor entitlement" (9)

Yet, Lisbon's views on the battles in the Brazilian backlands became less dismissive. Indeed, during the Thirty Years War (1618-48) the losses in the overseas--including the Dutch occupation of Angola and Pernambuco, the definitive loss of Sao Jorge da Mina on the Gold Coast in 1637, as well as the fall of the key trading fortress at Malacca in southeast Asia in 1641, and Colombo (Ceylon, modern Sri Lanka) in 1656--left Lisbon's global strategy concentrated in the southern Atlantic. From then on, it was necessary to prevent native communities in Brazil or Angola from making alliances with European rivals. (10) Truces were negotiated with Native Americans of Amazonia and Bahia and in Angola also with their long-time nemesis, Queen Njinga of Matamba. In other places, Portuguese forces simply decimated native communities. With the support of the Paulista bandeirantes from southern Brazil and militiamen from the North recruited by the planters and ranchers, a front was opened through the remote hinterland of the northeast from Bahia north to Para. These campaigns, known as the "Barbarian Wars" (1651-1704), marked a rupture: for the first time; the colonial offensive aimed at the extermination rather than enslavement of the Indians in the region.

An instruction from Matias da Cunha, governor general of Brazil (16871688), to Abreu Soares--captain-major of a troop of Pernambucans who joined the Paulistas of Domingos Jorge Velho against the native Americans of Rio Grande--stated that all captured adult males should be decapitated. Only the women and children of the Tapuia were to be spared for enslavement. (11)

The Paulistas and other militia groups dramatically increased the violence of the anti-native offensive in the region, providing the campaign against Palmares with experienced fighters. The anonymous author of the Relacao das guerras feitas says that the "bravery and the experience" of the Paulista captain-major Fernao Carrilho, in battles against the Tapuia tribes and quilombolas (maroons) in Bahia, led the governor of Pernambuco to appoint him to command the troops sent against Palmares in 1686, an extension of this general campaign to clear the interior regions (sertoes, or backlands) of the coastal captaincies. (12) Despite the opposition of the Jesuits and the prohibition in the Regimento das Missoes (1686) forbidding attacks against Indians north to Ceara, Lisbon started to endorse the raids of the "Barbarian Wars".

The reasoning behind two decisions of the Overseas Council illustrated this new orientation. The first was a petition of 1673, from the priest Antonio da Costa da Cruz, who lived in Brazil. Cruz requested the Habit of Christ (the primary decoration of nobility in Portugal) and appointment as canon of the cathedral in Sao Salvador in Kongo, claiming his knowledge of the languages of the Congo. He also reminded the king of his services in the expeditions against Indians and quilombos in Bahia, and he cited the precedent that the Habit of Christ had already been granted to Matheus Dias, captain of the Mulattos' regiment in those wars, and to Diogo Pinheiro Camarao, "governor" of the regiment of Native Americans. Councilor Feliciano Dourado voted against Cruz's petition, stating that the aforementioned captains had been qualified only as veterans "of a 'live war' like the War of Pernambuco" against the Dutch. He disqualified Cruz's service against mere natives and the quilombolas. But Salvador de Sa supported the request, arguing that Cruz would help to keep Kongo under Luanda's authority. For him, the usefulness of the priest in Central Africa was more important than doubts about his military merits in Brazil. The majority of the Council followed Salvador de Sa. (13) In 1696, the Council further honored the informal Paulista militia in a vote to grant the Habit of Christ to the Paulista field-coronel Moraes Navarro, who had fought in Palmares and against Rio Grande Indians. (14)

Aware of the royal support for the wars against the natives in northern Brazil, Domingos Jorge, during his final siege of Palmares, pledged the rehabilitation of the bandeiras led in the South by his ancestors and companions of Sao Paulo. (15) The victory over Palmares (1694), the extension of cattle ranching into the backlands, and the "Barbarian Wars" against the Indians thus showed the convergence of the interests of the settlers and the metropolitan authorities.

The status of the military campaigns in Africa was also elevated. The alliances of Queen Njinga and the King of Kongo Garcia II with the Dutch in the 1640s made them targets of Salvador de Sa, governor of the colony retaken from the Dutch in 1648. With the temporary cessation of hostilities against Njinga's Matamba in 1657, Kongo became the main enemy. An army of European Portuguese, Angolistas, Angolan and Brasilico troops sent from Luanda by the governor Vidal de Negreiros, defeated the Kongo army and killed the King Antonio I in the Battle of Mbwila in 1665. The commander of the Luanda troops, who became the most famous Angolista captain, was Luis Lopes Sequeira, a Luso-Ambundu mulatto. (16)

The dangerous alliance between African chiefdoms and Portugal's European rivals materialized again in 1670 in the battle of Kitombo, when the Count of Soyo, a strategic coastal province of Kongo, empowered by trade with the Dutch at the port of Mpinda, defeated an army sent from Luanda. Recognizing the danger, the governor of Angola, Francisco de Tavora, requested support directly from authorities in Recife, Pernambuco, and Salvador da Bahia. In Recife, the committee called to examine the matter consulted commanders experienced in South Atlantic warfare. Among them there were two former governors of Angola, Joao Fernandes Vieira (1658-1661) and Andre Vidal de Negreiros (1661-1666); also present were Cristovao de Barros Rego, a former governor of Sao Tome; Zenobio Acioli de Vasconcelos, and Antonio Jacome Bezerra. All five of these honored soldiers were veterans of the war against the Dutch in Brazil. Vasconcelos and Bezerra, colonels in Recife and Olinda (the old capital and seat of the Catholic diocese in Pernambuco), later became commanders also in the campaign against Palmares. (17) Vidal de Negreiros, in addition of his governorship in Angola, was former governor of Maranhao (1654-1656), where he had directed attacks against the Indians, as well as twice former governor of Pernambuco (1657-1661, and between January and June 1667). In these gubernatorial activities, he also dealt with the War of Palmares. Fernandes Vieira, besides his responsibilities in Angola, had been former governor of Paraiba (1655-1657). Later, Joao Fernandes Vieira wrote at least two reports about Palmares to the Overseas Council, in Lisbon. (18)

Following the Battle of Kitombo (1670), Tavora wrote to the Court in Lisbon that, before any royal order, the governor of Pernambuco and Joao Fernandes Vieira, with "his own resources," had sent 400 men and horses from Brazil in four frigates to support the troops in Angola. (19) Fernandes Vieira was rewarded with appointment as director of royal fortifications at the North of Brazil. Sustained by the Brasilico platoons, the Portuguese and Angolan troops in Angola were successful in 1671 in taking control of Pungo-Andongo, the last independent capital of the Kingdom of Ndongo, dominant in the region at the arrival of Portuguese forces a century previous.

These African battles were appreciated in Portugal in diverse ways. After the victory at Mbwila, Vidal de Negreiros attempted to obtain royal subsidies of 400 escudos to compensate his corporals. The Overseas Council considered the requeste amount excessive for victories on the Angolan front. As one councilor stated, their "[participation] in the war of Angola was not worth 400 escudos of remuneration ..." Despite the favorable votes on the request by counselor Feliciano Dourado--a native of Paraiba (like Negreiros) and constant defender in Lisbon of Brasilico commanders--and by the President of the Council, Jorge de Albuquerque--a veteran of the Ceylon wars--the Crown reduced the compensation to 50 escudos, paid only five years later. (20)

By that time, Souza de Macedo had published an account on the battle of Mbwila in the July 1666 issue of the Lisbon newspaper Mercurio Portuguez. The report described the "Miraculous victory" obtained against Kongo forces. Confirming the preemptive character of this war, Macedo interpreted the death of the King of Kongo and the destruction of his large army as revenge against the Spanish maneuvers to incite a Kongo uprising against the Portuguese. (21)

That issue of the Mercurio also headlined a successful Portuguese counteroffensive against the Spanish in the Restoration War in Iberia. Hence, the newspaper associated the Mbwila victory with the patriotic war against Spain. The qualifier "miraculous" was related to the numerical advantage of the Kongo troops, alleged to have involved colossal numbers. While Vidal de Negreiros mentioned "100.000 enemy archers" in Mbwila, an unlikely number, the missionary Diogini Carli, at the time in Angola, referred to 400 Portuguese soldiers who crushed "900,000" Kongo warriors. (22) On the one hand, hundreds of African combatants in the "guerra preta" or African auxiliaries who reinforced the Portuguese troops were excluded from this count. On the other hand, the astronomical figure attributed to the enemy soldiers was a clear, and extreme, exaggeration.

The "miraculous victory" also referred to protection offered by Our Lady of Nazareth. Negreiros had been devoted to this saint since the Brasilica War and built a church dedicated to her at Luanda beach in 1664. In this church, well preserved up to the present day, the head of King Antonio I was stuffed into a wall. Subsequently Negreiros' favorite saint became the protector of all Angolistas during the Brasilica War. The eighteenth-century decorative tiles (azulejos) displayed in the church depict the saint hovering over the field of battle at Mbwila. Prefiguring a representation used later in other paintings of European battles in Africa, the tiles show a horde of African warriors encircling one of the few lines of Portuguese soldiers, well drawn up in a tight square: the African chaos besieges the European order, with futility.

The 1671 conquest of Pungo Andongo was celebrated in another account, the Relacam do felice successo (1672). (23) The text narrates the thirteen-month siege of the "almost impregnable" mountainous capital of the Ndongo kingdom, led by Portuguese, Brasilico, and Angolan troops. It also describes the brave death of the king of Ndongo, Joao Hary. Captured by a chief allied with Luanda, he closed his eyes, refusing to look at the Portuguese, and asked to be decapitated so as not to fall prisoner to them. The account narrates the combat in the black stone outcroppings of Pungo Andongo in terms similar to the saga of events in Palmares: the siege to the Macaco palisade, Zumbi's resistance, and the final battle in "crags and precipices" of the Serra da Barriga. (24) Another version, registered in the 19th century, gives an epical dimension to the suicide of Joao Hary by stating that the king of Ndongo "jumped off the cliff" when he saw himself defeated. (25) The story brings the narrative closer to the legend of the suicide of Zumbi and his warriors. (26)

Besides, the Crown worried about connections between Palmares and the Ndongo wars. When the captured family of Joao Hary was sent to Maranhao in slavery, the Overseas Council stated that their deportation to Pernambuco should be avoided. They reasoned that not only was it easier to escape to Angola from there but also because in Pernambuco the Ndongo royal family could flee to join, and doubtless incite, the nearby "Blacks of Palmares." (27)

Nevertheless, the Relacam do felice successo expands the rhetorical scope of the African wars, underlining the courage of African enemies in Kitombo (1670) and their ability, allegedly acquired from the Dutch, to use four pieces of field artillery on the battlefield. (28) By the same token, the Relacao das guerras against Palmares mentions the "singular value, the great courage and rare constancy" of Zambi, Palmares' artillery commander, whereas the Rellacao verdadeyra says that Camuanga, a Palmarista commander, was a "brave captain." The emphasis on the enemy's courage highlighted the bravery of the commanders of the Portuguese troops. (29)

Unlike the "Barbarian Wars," in which captured adult male Indians had been decapitated, in the Angolan Wars the human trophies of the battlefield (presas) were shared among the governor, as commander, and the corporals leading his companies. They were then sold to slave merchants in Luanda, taxed by the Crown, and put on the ships plying the southern Atlantic. Previously, the capture and sale of the few "prizes" taken at Mbwila had led to the putsch that expelled the governor and commander, Tristao da Cunha, from Luanda in 1667. (30) The militias surrounding Palmares, where the distribution of prisoners of war was also foreseen, were involved in a similar incident. After the final attack in 1694, some troops rebelled, asking for their "immediate share" of the captured Palmaristas. The veteran Paulista commander, Jorge Velho, calmed his soldiers down without acceding to their de mand. As we will see, his main goal was the cultivable lands around Palmares and not the enslavement of the Palmaristas. (31)

Typically, the colonial victories in Africa were less well known than their Brazilian counterparts, and rewarded much less richly than military service in Asia. It was because of this discrimination that the Angolan veteran Antonio de Oliveira Cadornega decided to write his famous three-volume Historia (1680) of the Angolan wars. In the prologue, he explains that he wanted to give the importance accorded the overseas great episodes to the Angolan Wars, and in particular, to the battles of the Brasilicos against the Dutch in Pernambuco. As is known, the Luso-Dutch conflict in Brazil generated historical narratives that shaped the Pernambucano identity. (32) Similarly, Cadornega defines an Angolista identity in a "general history" associating the Atlantic slave trade to the Angolistas' patriotic exploits against the Dutch and the Africans.

The Paulista commander Jorge Velho pointed to the Amerindians as cannibals in order to justify the slaving that saved them from savagery and brought them to the blessings of colonial society and Christianity, if also at the personal expense of enslavement. Cadornega referred similarly to the alleged cannibalism of Africans in Angola to justify their enslavement. Aware of the interests involved in enslaving Africans, which, unlike the local trade in enslaved Amerindians, generated a chain of trans-Atlantic exchanges endorsed and taxed by the Crown, Cadornega underlined the mercantile gains of that trade: the "rescue of the 'pieces' [slaves] used for the trade, and with these rescues we avoid the existence of so many slaughterhouses of human flesh. Instructed in the Faith of Our Lord Jesus Christ, they are baptized and evangelized to be embarked to Brazil or to other Catholic places."

Agreeing that the traffic in slaves was the main objective of the military campaigns in Angola, Cadornega praises "the war of the Luso-Angolan people (gente portuguesa angolana), which some people contemptuously also call "war of Blacks," and of coata-coata ["catch-catch"], but this is because they have not seen or experienced it. Indeed, these wars are more arduous and of greater risk than other wars in the world [...]." (33)

In their quest for benefits from the Court, the colonists and the regional authorities also promoted the military honor to be won in plundering expeditions. Just after Mbwila, the municipal council of Luanda reported to the Portuguese King Afonso VI: "The great success that the weapons of Your Majesty had against the king of Kongo ..., serves ... also to terrorize the whole of Mauritania," referring to the longstanding, sacred crusades against dangerous North African Muslims. (34)

"Mauritania" stands for North Africa, where Portugal had suffered the traumatic defeat of Alcacer-Quibir (1578) and the death of their revered King Sebastiao. In other words, the Luanda municipal council celebrated the victory of Mbwila also as suitable as revenge for Alcacer-Quibir. At the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the governor of Pernambuco, Caetano de Melo e Castro ennobled wars in the southern Atlantic in similar fashion. In a letter sent to the Crown in 1694, he compared the victory in Palmares to the expulsion of the Dutch from Pernambuco, accomplished forty years earlier. (35)

Out of Zumbi's Palisade: The African Experiences of the Militias' Captains

The documents also reveal frequent movements of the government's troops in the southern Atlantic between Brazil and Angola. From the second quarter of the seventeenth century until the first decades of the eighteenth century, about 4,000 soldiers crossed the ocean, bringing their experiences in South America's wars to expand the raiding for slaves in Central Africa. In the opposite direction, the great majority of these military and militiamen returned to Brazil more skilled in attacking the quilombos of escaped slaves there and the Indians of the backlands. (36)

Moreover, those troops were decisive in winning some Angolan battles, such as the 1648 reconquest of Luanda from the Dutch, the 1665 defeat of Kongo at Mbwila, and the final elimination of the Ngola a Kiluanuje at Pungo Andongo in 1671. It is also noteworthy that the imports of horses from Brazil expanded Luso-Brasilica slaving in Angola. (37) In the same way, tactics and strategies from colonial Brazil strengthened the Portuguese domination in Central Africa. Hence, the use of manioc flour--which the TupiGuarani tribes called ui-anta, "war flour"--as troop's rations in Portuguese America--was introduced by the Brasilicos in Angola under a designation in Portuguese---farinha da guerra--that was a direct translation, fostering their mobility in Central African. The "cotton armor" (armadura de algodao), commonly known as gibao), doublets light in weight and resistant to the Amerindians' arrows, made and worn by the Paulistas in their bandeiras, were imported from Sao Paulo by the governors of Angola from 1612 onwards. (38) The doublets seemed effective: Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, an important military writer and an aggressive Angola governor (1617-1621), went as far as stating to the Crown that the general use of the "cotton armor" by the American Portuguese rendered the conquest of Brazil easier than that of Angola. (39)

Along with the dispatch of troops from Brazil, some royal decrees redirected the flows of degredados (convicts and others sentenced to penal transportation) to Angola, because of the "lack of people there." (40) As Ferreira observes, Portuguese military raiding in Central Africa declined in the eighteenth century. At the same time, the absence of European military threats in Africa diminished the transfers of military personnel from Brazil to Luanda and to Benguela.

Except for Henrique Dias' regiment--whose companies fought several times in Palmares, in Benguela in 1645 and at Mbwila in 1665--there are no indications of regular units operating on both sides of the South Atlantic. Usually the troops were irregulars, "volunteering" to fight in Angola in the hope of escaping punishments elsewhere. However, officers were also posted to Angola, as well royal officials and even churchmen who had gained experience in South American battles against the Dutch, the Indians, and the quilombolas. The careers of four individuals illustrate the trans-oceanic mobility of military life in the southern Atlantic.

Paulo Pereira was an Afro-Brasilico who was captain of the musketeers in Henrique Dias' regiment. He belonged to the contingent of 200 soldiers sent from Bahia to Angola in 1645. Eventually he escaped from the slaughter of the Portuguese troops by the "Jagas," close to the Kikombo River south of Luanda. (41) In 1648, Salvador de Sa, leading the expedition closing in on the Dutch at Luanda, designated Paulo Pereira sergeant-major of the African auxiliaries of Benguela. In Pernambuco he had commanded Afro-Brasilicos and Africans, and in Benguela Afro-Brasilicos and Angolans. This Pernambucan, a legendary character of the African Wars, died in the savanna fighting a lion. (42)

Bento Correa de Figueiredo served between 1656 and 1683 in various military capacities on three continents. Enlisted in Ceara, he was sent to Portugal and in 1658 participated in the unsuccessful siege of Badajoz. Returning to Recife, he then traveled to Luanda in 1661 with Vidal de Negreiros. There he was promoted as captain of the governor's guards and fought at sea as well against a Dutch corsair. Later, he returned to Pernambuco, where he commanded a company in the attack on Palmares. In 1687, he became captain-major of Ceara, renowned for "destroying the Tapuia who disobeyed." (43)

Jorge de Barros Leite, a native of Portugal, participated in the battle of Ameixial (1663) against Castile, an important victory for Lisbon in the Restoration War. In 1676, he traveled to Angola, where he received a commission as captain-major of Pungo Andongo after its conquest in 1671 and helped to transform it into the most easterly Portuguese military outpost in Angola. Later he went to Brazil to become captain in Bahia and captain-major in Sergipe, where he became lieutenant of the militia and fought against the Indians and the maroon communities in the region. In 1699, he was promoted to captain-major on Ceara's anti-Indian front, replacing Fernao Carrilho, the anti-Palmarista who was promoted lieutenant to the governor in Maranhao. (44)

Finally, there is the case of Manoel de Inojosa (Hinojosa or Nojoza). As a soldier, Inojosa embarked from Recife to Luanda in 1661. On his way back to Pernambuco in 1662, he stopped over in Bahia and participated in the war of the same year against the maroon communities in the region. From 1671 to 1673, he joined the Paulista Baiao Parente in a raid that destroyed Indians' villages in the Paraguacu valley in Bahia. In 1673, he received appointment as "captain of the conquest of the barbaric heathens" of Santo Antonio da Conquista (Bahia). With orders to settle those lands with Portuguese, he formed another company to expel the Tapuia there. In 1676, he traveled to Lisbon to ask for renewal of his patent as captain. (45) An officer from Bahia endorsed this request, specifying that Inojosa's company was "very important in conquering the natives and the blacks of the maroon communities." The Overseas Council approved the captain's promotion, not only because of his valor in fighting the Indians of Bahia but also because "of his value and experience" that "will be necessary for Pernambuco's Palmares." (46) He may have presented his alleged report to the Overseas Council about Palmares, containing information obtained by one of his slaves who had infiltrated among the quilombolas. (47)

Inojosa participated in expeditions sent against Palmares in 1679, 1680 and 1681 as a corporal. In 1680, he killed Majojo, one of the Palmares commanders. (48) And in 1681, he claimed to have killed Zumbi himself. In 1682, he brought assistance and provisions to the troops besieging the Palmaristas. (49) Then, in 1683, he was back in Lisbon, where he presented his candidacy for captain-major of Ceara. (50) This petition was rejected, but he was promoted to captain-major of Benguela from 1685 to 1687. (51) There is also a report that refers to his presence in a later raid against Palmares, dated 1689. (52)

Inojosa's successor in Benguela was Joao Pereira Lago, who had also fought in Bahia and Palmares and who probably had been his predecessor's militia companion on both sides of the Atlantic. (53) After Lago, the position was awarded to Angelo da Cruz, who had been transferred to Angola in 1667 with the troops sent from Rio de Janeiro. (54) Therefore, in this crucial period in South Angola, two, or perhaps three, of the Portuguese captains-major came from Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. Ultimately, the Benguela slave trade route was dominated by slave merchants from Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco: up to 1850, 500.000 individuals were deported from Benguela to Brazil. (55) In addition to Inojosa's participation in the battles of Angola and Brazil, he made two trips to Lisbon, where he made reports about Palmares and shared information with many veterans of South Atlantic battles. In three decades, he met Vidal de Negreiros' officers experienced in the Dutch Wars; the Paulistas familiar with raids against Indians in the South; the Africans, Angolistas, Brasilicos, and Portuguese captains with whom he had lived and fought in Luanda and Benguela.

Inojosa did not occupy a key command in Brazil. He had no official appointment in Lisbon, and we do not know much about his activities in Angola. His wide-ranging importance in the building of the South Atlantic system can be evaluated only when the documents of Portuguese, Angolan, and Brazilian archives are read in conjunction. In fact, the growth of the Atlantic slave trade reduced the importance of enslaved Indians in the Brazilian captaincies connected to the Atlantic networks. But it favored extermination of the natives living in the pioneer zones of the ranching and plantation captaincies of the Brazilian northeast: the plundering of the African villages accelerated the extinction of the Indians. This process repopulated the Sao Francisco River valley and the backlands of Ceara with cattle, colonists, mestizos and enslaved Africans.

Although not all combatants travelling in the South Atlantic participated in these varied battles, they all contributed to disseminate strategies and tactics of war in the tropics. They also helped to popularize the Amerindian-Brasilico ration, composed of manioc, corn, and rum made from sugarcane, or cachaca, as well as slave trading practices and the cultural customs that became the heart of the formation of Brazil.

Within the Palisade: The Emergence of Palmaristas Families

During the period 1670-1680, the Overseas Council in Lisbon decided to eliminate the large maroon colony at Palmares, insisting "on extinguishing those Blacks at once." It was then planned to give the command of the operations against Palmares to Joao Fernandes Vieira, the veteran commander with long experience on the front lines of the era on both sides of the Atlantic. (56) The example of Palmares caused unrest amongst the slave populations of the entire Northeast, where the disturbances of the Brasilica War against the Dutch still resounded. A letter from the wary Crown, dated 1683, requested information about the Catholic lay brotherhood of Nossa Senhora de Guadalupe dos Homens Pardos (Mulattos of the Our Lady of Guadalupe), based in Olinda, which collected donations to manumit all mulatto men and women who "could not bear their enslavement" because their fathers were veterans who had fought against the Dutch. Those mulattos, sons of "honored men" of the Brasilica War and of enslaved women, revolted. The letter explains: "because their masters did not allow them to be free, although they (the members of the brotherhood) had the means to rescue them, many escaped to join the blacks of Palmares and recently one killed himself with his own hands." (57)

In a collective petition for freedom based on the unfulfilled promises made during the Dutch War, the free persons and manumitted mulattos threatened that if they did not obtain a favorable response, they had only two alternatives: suicide or escape to Palmares. On the horizon was the prospect of subversion of the slavers' discipline. As the Relacao das guerras stated, Palmares created "two monstrosities ... : first, an uprising of enslaved blacks, who dominated the best captaincies of Pernambuco; second, the slaves' domination of their own masters."

In fact, after the expulsion of the Dutch from northeastern Brazil (1654), the quilombos of the region were transformed from temporary camps to permanent settlements. It is known that the maroons were initially predominantly male, and they commonly mounted raids on the plantations to kidnap women. By then, Pernambucan colonists complained about "the hostilities, deaths and kidnappings of women by the black rebels." (58) Rocha Pita even drew an analogy with the kidnapping of the Sabine women at the foundation of Rome. (59)

Also, the Dutch attacks on Pernambuco and the flight of colonists' there to Bahia left the Pernambuco area disorganized, facilitating the slaves' escapes to Palmares. In its first paragraphs, the Relacao das guerras indicates the shift: "When the Netherlands occupied these regions, that number (of Palmaristas) increased, because the masters' troubles made it easy for the slaves to run away." (60) Females and slave families were able to flee to Palmares, generating greater demographic growth among the quilombolas. Accordingly, the strengthening of the kinship ties and the presence of more women and children later made retreats and tactical displacements more difficult during the attacks of the colonists. Brito Freyre, former governor of Pernambuco (1661-1664), stated that the raids against Palmares captured mainly "women and children, less capable of following [the men] in their retreat." (61) In fact, the expulsion of the Dutch from Pernambuco (1654) made more colonial troops available to attack the quilombolas: at least 25 raids were launched against Palmares between 1654 and 1678. One of the most important of these expeditions, including 1400 men, was ordered by the Pernambuco's governor Bernardo de Miranda Henriques (1667-70), a former captain who fought aside the Brasilicos in Angola in the 1650s. (62)

These events forced the Palmaristas to agree on a pact with the Pernambuco governor in 1677 after capture of the family of Gangazumba, the leader of the maroons, and of the families of other quilombola chiefs. (63) Emphasizing kinship relations among the quilombola commanders, the Relacao das guerras mentions the names of Zumbi's mother, brother, son, and nephews. Indeed, the agreement proposed to Gangazumba by the governor Souza de Castro in 1678 guaranteed freedom for individuals born in Palmares and the manumission of the Palmaristas' chiefs and families who moved to the Cucau region. (64) Two years later, in the attempt to remove Zumbi and his followers to Cucau, along with Gangazumba, the same governor promised protection and freedom to the "captain Zumbi," but also "to all his family." (65)

During the siege, the displacement of the leading families revealed the points where the quilombolas concentrated their forces to the Paulista troops. (66) Later, the Rellacao verdadeyra indicates that the families hindered the combatants and Zumbi himself during the final attack in February 1694. (67)

The Count of Ericeira and the Soldier Zebedeu

The book Portugal Restaurado (1679) by the Count of Ericeira became the reference work on the restoration of the Portuguese monarchy from Spanish control during the Union of the Two Crowns (1580-1640). Emphasizing battles and achievements in both Europe and in the overseas, Ericeira cites the North African enclaves such as Tangier and Mazagao, but he refers to sub-Saharan Africa only when he narrates the reconquest of Angola from the Dutch in 1648. Inscribed in the context of the global war against the Netherlands, this expedition of Salvador de Sa was presented as a praiseworthy answer to several challenges: regaining control of the slave trade, putting down "the heresy sowed" by the Dutch, and finally insuring Lisbon's domination of Angola and Kongo. Ericeira also mentions Njinga, who at the time was one of the most important African curiosities in Europe, on account of the "extravagancy of her life." But he did not refer to the battle of Mbwila, to which the Mercurio thirteen years earlier had given prominence. (68) Ericeira preferred to emphasize the Angolan feats of Salvador de Sa and Francisco de Tavora, an aristocrat with whom he was friendly and alongside whom he had fought the Alentejo War.

On the other side of the Atlantic, and on a lower plane of the literary art, a poem of a poor Brasilico soldier also claimed his part of the glory to be gained in the overseas wars. The poem describes the petition addressed to the Overseas Council by a lower ranking soldier who fought as private in the final attack against Palmares. (69) The poem is a variant of the decima espinela, a literary form associated with the Iberian baroque. Hence, the decima gives to the poem the tone of a picaresque complaint that in Pernambuco could have been read, recited, or chanted, giving a large reach to the verses.

In the poem Zebedeu, a name of Biblical origin that became legendary in Pernambuco and elsewhere, "son of Braz Vitorino" (to rime with Conselho Ultramarino), does not refer here to a precise person but instead to poor soldiers neglected by the distribution of spoils and prizes after the fall of Palmares. The poet portrays the private recruited when "almost a boy," dispatched ill equipped and barefoot to the cold climate of Serra da Barriga (also mentioned in Relacao das guerras). Another verse about the flight of the "boaster" Felix Jose refers to the Azorean peasants who were victims of forced recruitment and inexperienced in overseas combat. Instead, Zebedeu and his companions went to the front, fighting ferociously against the Palmaristas, "vile slaves" whom they treated likes animals as they deserved (not "as human beings"). With no rewards from the Crown, these "Zebedeus" asked the protection of Saint Anthony, whose medal they had brought and who was officially declared patron and paid member of the troops who attacked Palmares. (70) Toward the end, the poem addresses the claim: Zebedeu wanted to be a captain, a title that should give him the approval of the Crown to gather armed men to plunder Indians and quilombolas. As ranchers' mercenaries in South America or as militiamen in Africa, these irregular combatants--captains, corporals, and other "zebedeus"--offered their skills as hunters of Indians and slaves on both sides of the South Atlantic.

Eventually, the documents show the exchanges of experience among these tricontinental and multiethnic troops--a "New Colonial Army"--whose common feature was the trans-oceanic culture of the South Atlantic and not either Brazil or Angola alone. In the European expansion overseas there is no other example of military units of this diverse composition and with such a vast range of battlefield experience. It is possible that militiamen from Bahia and Pernambuco fought in East Africa as well, as their presence there had been requested. In fact, describing the disastrous state of Portuguese interests in Mozambique, Friar Antonio da Conceicao states in his Tratado dos Rios de Cuama (1696) that the solution to dominate that colony was to bring a governor or captain general along "with three hundred European or Brazilian soldiers, gunpowder and bullets ..." Most likely, this reference to soldiers from Brazil was the first time that the word "Brazilian" appeared with the clear meaning of "native of Brazil," in contrast to the word "European", i.e. European Portuguese. The independent collective identity of the lusophone colonists in South America thus comes to light first in connection with their military expertise. (71)

Except for pernambucanos and paulistas, names based on regions were barely used to designate the colonists of the Brazilian captaincies. Yet, in the seventeen pages of Rellacao verdadeyra (ca. 1694)the first narrative of the final attack against Palmares--the words "Paulista" and "Paulistas" appear thirty-nine times. In this regard, it is interesting to note an incident that occurred in the beginning of 1691, when the Paulistas were approaching the Serra da Barriga to join in the assault on Palmares. At that moment, Jorge Velho raised concerns about the plans of some militiamen who were in favor of reaching a pact with the quilombolas. Velho feared that an agreement could lead to Palmares' peaceful surrender, depriving him and his men of the booty they had come there to claim. He warned the governor: "If the Blacks ask or if they will ask peace, it is just because of their terror of the Paulistas. So, I shall occupy Palmares and will settle there." (72)

The depiction of the Paulistas in Brazil and in Paraguay derives from their rapacious violence, put into practice perfectly here by Jorge Velho. (73) In this same perspective, the Marquis of Montalvao, governor of Pernambuco, also expressed the anger against the Palmaristas that was common at the time. Referring to Palmares, he wrote to Jorge Velho: "... I have the genuine hope that you will perform ... a service so particular and important, that is to devour and extinguish ("devorar e extinguir") these barbarians ..." (74) As previously observed, the discourse and the practice of violence present in the Barbarian Wars extended to the War of Palmares.

(1) A longer version of this text was published in Portuguese in Flavio Gomes, ed., Mocambos de Palmares. Historia, historiografia e fontes (Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras Editora, 2010): 61-89. I am very grateful to Ana Lucia Araujo for her translation of the original text.

(2) 1 define as "Brasilicos" the settlers of the Portuguese Americas, even those who were born in Portugal, who manifested a regional identity but who did not have yet the sense of belonging to a broader protonational entity. In his celebrated book Francisco de Brito Freyre, uses the word Brasilico to designate the colonists and objects pertaining to Brazil see Nova Lusitania, historia da guerra brasilica (1675), (Sao Paulo: Beca Producoes Culturais, 2001). The word Brazilian (brasileiro), in its modern day meaning appeared only in 1696 or later in 1706. See note 71.

(3) Although the Palmares maroons' villages had been attacked by colonists since their early development, in the beginning of the 17th century, the Palmares War commonly refers to the last decades of the century, when the expeditions against the quilombolas became more frequent. During the 1694 attack, led by the Paulista troops of Domingos Jorge Velho, the quilombos of Palmares were destroyed. Their leader, Zumbi, escaped but was killed a year later. A small group of combatants, led by Camoanga, Zumbfs brother, pursued the fight until their defeat in 1700. For new research and historiographical debates on Palmares see Flavio Gomes, ed., Mocambos de Palmares.

(4) "Palmaristas," i.e. the inhabitants of Palmares, was a term that appeared in the documents of the period, see "Relacao das guerras feitas aos Palmares de Pernambuco no tempo do governador D. Pedro de Almeida, de 1675 a 1678," c.1680," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 22 (1859), 303-29: 312.

(5) Coata-coata = kuata-kuata, from the Kimbundu verb kikuata = to catch, in this context conveys the chaos of "grad-grab" or "snatch-snatch" in English; see Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega. Historia geral das guerras angolanas (1680) (3 vols., Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1972), 2: 105-06, note 2.

(6) The armed struggle in which Portugal broke free from the Union of the Two (Iberian) Crowns established in 1580 after the death of the king Sebastiao and end of the ruling House of Avis. The dynastic union brought Angola and Brazil into the ongoing conflict between Dutch rebels and their Hapsburg rulers in Spain.

(7) Tengwall defines guerra viva merely as 'combat experience'. As we will see bellow, there were different ways to reward and evaluate the combat experience; David Tengwall, "A Study in Military Leadership: The Sargento Mor in the Portuguese South Atlantic Empire," The Americas 40 (1) (1983): 73-94.

(8) Mafalda Soares da Cunha and Nuno G. F. Monteiro, "Governadores e capitaes-mores do imperio atlantico portugues nos seculos XVII e XVIII," in Mafalda Soares da Cunha, Nuno G. F. Monteiro, and Pedro Cardim, eds., Optima Pars: Elites Ibero-americanas do Antigo Regime (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais, 2005), 191-252. No other military action in Portuguese America was so prestigious as the "guerra viva" against the Dutch.

(9) Jaime Cortesao (ed.), Pauliceae lusitana monumenta historica (2 vols., Lisbon: Publicacoes do Real Gabinete Portugues de Leitura do Rio de Janeiro, 1956-1961), 2: 520-1.

(10) The Jesuit Bettendorf, a skillful observer of the Portuguese Amazon, summarized this shift: "Since the war against the Dutch (1657-1661) was announced, it was intended to make the peace with all these [native] nations or to engage the State forces to destroy them, given the risk that any rival [European] nation join these barbarians to take possession of these captaincies." Joao Felipe Bettendorf, Cronica dos padres da Companhia de Jesus no Estado do Maranhao (Belem: Fundacao Cultural do Para, 1990), 91.

(11)"You must not consent the adult barbarians to be spared from decapitation just to enslave them, only women and children must be spared, as there is no danger of them to escape or rebel." Pedro Puntoni, A guerra dos barbaros--povos indigenas e a colonizacao do sertao nordeste do Brasil 1650-1720 (Sao Paulo: Editora da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 2000), 136-7.

(12) '"Relacao das guerras feitas," 312-13.

(13) Doc. 09/12/1673, Arquivo Historico Ultramarino--Lisbon (hereafter AHU), Angola, cx. 10/135.

(14)"Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino," December 15, 1696, Barao Studart, "Documentos para a historia do Brasil e especialmente a do Ceara," Revista Trimensal do Instituto do Ceara (hereafter RTIC) 36 (1922), 67-8.

(15)"The troops with whom we went to conquer the brave heathen of this vast backcountry are neither registered in the books of Your Majesty, nor do they receive a pay or bread or munitions. They are gathered by us, [...] not to enslave, as some hypochondriacs want to make Your Majesty believe, but to acquire the brave heathen Tapuias (Indians), who eat human flesh, to reduce them to the knowledge of the urban humanity and human society, ... in order to allow them ... a great help, teaching them to cultivate, to sow, to harvest and work for their livelihood," Autographed letter from D. Jorge Velho, 15/7/1694, in Ernesto Ennes, Os Palmares: Subsidios para a sua historia (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), pp. 66-9.

(16) Following Jose Mathias Delgado, I call Angolistas' the Luso-African settlers in Angola, to differentiate them from the natives, the Angolans, and to emphasize their own interests with regard to the Portuguese Europeans and the Brasilicos." See Cadornega. Historia geral, 1: 3224, note I.

(17) Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos (10 vols., Recife: Arquivo Publico, 1951-1966), 4: 44-5; "Relacao das guerras feitas," 309-10; D. Loreto do Couto, "Desagravos do Brazil e Glorias de Pernambuco," Annaes da Bibliotheca Nacional, no. 25 (Rio de Janeiro, 1905), 87-8.

(18) Vieira wrote his first report in 1677; see document dated 28/06/1677, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisbon, Secao de Manuscritos, Cod. II-33, 4, 32, and in 1679, Pernambuco, 20/08/1679, AHU, ACL [Administracao Central], CU [Conselho Ultramarino] 015, cx. 12, doc. 1150.

(19) "Carta de Fco. de Tavora a El-Rei," Luanda, 27/7/1671, AHU, Angola, cx. 10/43; J. A. Gonsalves de Mello. Joao Fernandes Vieira 1613-1681 (2 vols., Recife: Universidade do. Recife, 1967), 2: 226; Stuart B. Schwartz, A Governor and his Image in Baroque Brazil: The Funeral Eulogy of Afonso Furtado de Castro do Rio de Mendonca by Juan Lopes Sierra (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 44.

(20) AHU, Angola, cx. 9/55, document dated 10/10/1666; Antonio Brasio, ed., Monumenta missionaria africana (11 serie--Africa Ocidental central) (15 vols., Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1953-1988) (hereafter MMA), 13: 44-5.

(21) The Mercurio was the Portugal's first printed periodical of political propaganda, "Milagrosa victoria que as armas portuguesas alcancaram nas partes de Angola, do poderoso rey do Congo, que foy morto em huma batalha," Mercurio Portuguez, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Res., 111-12 (V), MMA, 12: 575-81: 581.

(22) Michelangelo Guattini and Diogini Carli, La mission au Kongo des peres Michelangelo Quattini et Dionigi Carli: 1668 (Preface: John K. Thornton) (Paris: Chandeigne, 2006), 129. Friar Carli, who wrote this section of the book, states that he talked with the Portuguese soldier who cut off the head of the king of Kongo at Mbwila.

(23)"Relacam do felice successo, que conseguirao as armas ... governadas por Francisco de Tavora, Governador, e Capitao General do Reyno de Angola contra a Rebelliao de Dom Joao Rey das Pedras & Dongo no mez de Dezembro de 1671," Lisbon, n/d but printed in 1672, MMA, 13: 143-52.

(24) See "Rellacao verdadeyra da guerra que se fez aos negros leuantados do Palmar, governando estas Capitanias de Pernambuco o senhor Gouernador e Capitam-Geral Cayetano de Mello de Castro no anno de 1694: da felliz vitoria que vontra o ditto jnimigo de alcanssou," edited and commented by Maria Leda Oliveira, "A primeira Rellacao do ultimo assalto a Palmares," Afro-Asia 33 (2005): 251-324: 318.

(25) Miguel E. Lobo de Bulhoes, Les colonies portugaises (Lisbon: Imprimerie Nationale, 1878), 19.

(26) As Maria Leda Oliveira states, the Luso-Brazilian historian Rocha Pitta in his Historia da America Portuguesa (1730) spread the erroneous information that Zumbi and his warriors committed suicide, jumping off the cliffs of Palmares in 1694, to avoid their capture and enslavement, "A primeira Rellacao," 262.

(27)"Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, July 18, 1679," MMA, 13: 507-8.

(28)"Relacam do felice successo," MMA, 13: 143-52.

(29)"Relacao das guerras feitas," 312, and "Rellacao verdadeyra," 305.

(30) L. F. de Alencastro, O Trato dos viventes: Formacao do Brasil no Atlantico Sul, seculos XVI e XVII (Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), 297-300.

(31)"Rellacao verdadeyra," 321-2.

(32) See for instance, Manuel Calado, O valeroso Lucideno (1648) (2 vols., Sao Paulo: Editora Itatiaia, 1987); Brito Freyre, Nova Lusitania. For a discussion on the Pernambucano regional identity and the war against the Dutch, see Evaldo Cabral de Mello, Olinda restaurada (2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: Toopbooks, 1998), and Cabral de Mello, Rubro Veio: o imaginario da Restauracao pernambucana (2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: Toopbooks, 1996).

(33) Cadornega, Historia geral, 1: 8-14, and 2: 105-06, note 2. In my knowledge, this is the first time an author in Angola defined the local colonists as "gente portuguesa angolana," giving the same importance to both nationalities.

(34) AHU, Angola, cx. 8/128, "Carta da camara de Luanda," December 7, 1665.

(35) "Rellacao verdadeyra," 268, and note 47.

(36) In April 1645, troops were embarked in Bahia for Angola. The troops included 200 Portuguese; some Angolistas, who were refugees in Bahia, and Brasilicos, among them 32 musketeers from Henrique Dias' famous regiment of Mulattos and Blacks in Brazil. Three hundred soldiers and some dozens of Indians were embarked to Angola from Rio de Janeiro in May 1645; in 1648, 1,000 soldiers from Portugal and another 750 from Rio de Janeiro embarked from there with Salvador de Sa; in 1657, 200 veterans of the Dutch Wars in Pernambuco were embarked from Recife for Angola with Fernandes Vieira; in 1660, 200 veterans left with Vidal de Negreiros from Recife; in 1664 and 1665, rescue troops were sent from Bahia and Pernambuco; in 1667, an unknown number of soldiers were embarked in Rio; in 1671, 400 soldiers left Bahia and Pernambuco; troops were sent again from Pernambuco in 1674; in 1681, two vessels with soldiers sailed from Bahia and Pernambuco; in 1690, 50 soldiers from Bahia took to the sea en route to Angola; in 1703, 100 soldiers from Pernambuco; in 1704, 195 soldiers from Pernambuco were embarked as well. Dispatches of smaller contingents continued during the first decades of the eighteenth century, when a royal order determined the embarkation of 8 to 10 recruits in each ship leaving Pernambuco for Angola; see Alencastro, Trato dos viventes, 262-306, 338-40, 369-70; Roquinaldo Ferreira, "O Brasil e a arte da guerra em Angola (secs. XVII e XVIII)," Estudos Historicos 39 (2007): 1-24.

(37) Although most soldiers settled in Luanda could ride a horse, not all of them adapted to Brazil's horses, which were accustomed to be mounted without saddles or horseshoes, as in Brazil horseshoes started being employed only during the eighteenth century. After that, the knights of Pernambuco and Bahia gained importance in Angola. The regular trade of horses in exchange for slaves never worked because only the government military forces in Angola could ride horses. With so few eligible, demand was not comparable to the demand for slaves in Brazil. See also Ferreira, "O Brasil e a arte da guerra," especially 7.

(38) Commissioned by Governor Cerveira in 1612 for the conquest of Benguela, and by governor Vasconcelos in 1616, MMA, 1: 78 and 267. The Sao Paulo doublets were exported again to Angola at least twice thereafter, in 1684 and 1688, AHU, Angola, codice 545, fl. 28, and cx. 13/84.

(39) Letter to the King, Doc. of November 1, 1617, AHU, Angola, cx. 1/50.

(40) Royal decrees of: June 21, 1675; July 10, 1675; March 10, 1680; March 16, 1680; February 2, 1684; February 26, 1684; March 22, 1688; March 7, 1691; January 26, 1694. See Jose Justino de Andrade e Silva, Colleccao chronologica da legislacao portugueza (Lisbon: Imprensa de J. J. A. Silva, 1854-59).

(41) MMA, 9: 335-7 and 15: 517. Following Joseph C. Miller's pioneer work, I consider that the "Jaga" were Imbangala warriors. However, I continue using "Jaga" to define the nomadic combatants warriors designated as such in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For Cadornega, the "Jaga" were not a people but rather described as a "profession" of nomadic raiders; Historia Ceral, 2: 179. Silva Correa confirms a century later "The Jaga ... warriors and nomads comprise various nations, under the same name one finds the governors and the subjects that form this body.," Elias Alexandre da Silva Correa, Historia de Angola (1782) (2 vols., Lisbon: Editorial Atica, 1937), 2: 50.

(42) Arquivos de Angola, 2nd serie, I (3-6) (1943-1944), 136-7, 193-4; and Carlos Dias Coimbra, Livro de patentes do tempo do senhor Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides (Luanda: Arquivo Historico de Angola, 1969), 95.

(43) Studart, "Documentos," documents dated June 15 and September 26, 1684.

(44) Studart, "Documentos," RTIC 37 (1923), 134-6. RTIC 42 (1928), 103-05.

(45)"Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino sobre Manoel de Inojosa," September 18, 1677; AHU, ACL, N, BAHIA, doc. 34576, Conselho Ultramarino, codice 245 (1675-1695), doc. 52, November 17, 1677.

(46) Borges da Fonseca wrongly wrote that Manoel Inojosa was the grand-grandson of Sargento-Mor Jeronimo de Inojosa, AHU, ACL, N, BAHIA, doc. 34576, Conselho Ultramarino, codice 245, doc. 52, November 17, 1677, and AHU, ACL, CU 015, cx. 13, doc. 1312, September 7, 1684; A. J. V. Borges da Fonseca, "Nobiliarchia pernambucana (1748)," Annaes da Bibliotheca Nacional 47 (1935), 1: 80.

(47) Document dated June 28, 1677, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Manuscritos, codice II-33, 4, 32.

(48) Studart, "Documentos," RTIC 36 (1922), 112-13; Loreto do Couto, "Desagravos do Brazil," 107-08. Assuming that this is the correct spelling, Majojo is an intriguing name. In Mozambique there is a city designated "Majojo," and "mujojo" or "majojo," was the name given to the Muslim slave traders from Comoro Islands. Although is improbable that there were people in Palmares from East Africa, it is not impossible. At least three slaves ships arrived from Mozambique in Bahia: one in 1620, one in 1643, and another in 1644; Alencastro, Trato dos viventes, 198, note 60. Large vessels coming from India that sometimes called at Bahia could also have brought Africans from Mozambique or from the Indian Ocean's islands

(49) In fact, in 1681, Inojosa might have killed a chief thought to be Zumbi. Indeed, Loureto do Couto, mentions the death of Zumbi on three different dates, the first in 1680 and the second in 1681. The third date is not precise, but the facts coincide with the death of Zumbi in 1695, Couto, "Desagravos do Brazil," 98-9, 106, 108. These claims contributed to spread the idea that Zumbi had several lifes. For a discussion about the name Zumbi, see Robert N. Anderson," The Quilombo of Palmares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in SeventeenthCentury Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (3) (1996): 545-66, especially 560-2.

(50) Studart, "Documentos," RTIC 36 (1922), 112-13.

(51) AHU, Angola, cx. 13/3 and cx. 14/27, documents dated January 26, 1685, and July 18, 1690.

(52) The report of 1677 was published by Decio Freitas, Republica de Palmares: Pesquisa e comentarios em documentos historicos do seculo XVI (Maceio: Editora da Universidade Federal de Alagoas, 2004), and was transcribed among others by John K. Thornton, "Les Etats de l'Angola et la formation de Palmares (Bresil)," Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 63 (4) (2008), 776-8. The only reference to the report of 1689 is an article published in the Brazilian on line edition of the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, zumbi_15.htm. Apparently, this document has not yet been fully transcribed.

(53) Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino em March 22 1688, AHU, codice 18, fls. 135-35v. I am grateful to Roquinaldo Ferreira for this reference.

(54) Angelo Cruz arrived in Luanda with the troops brought from Rio de Janeiro by Antonio Juzarte de Almeida. He participated in the battles in the Angolan backlands with Luis Lopes Siqueira and was captain-major of Pungo Andongo. AHU, Angola, cx. 10/67, document dated May 13, 1672, and cx. 14/27, document dated July 1690.

(55) See Jose C. Curto, "Luso-Brazilian Alcohol and the Legal Slave Trade at Benguela and its Hinterland, c. 1617-1830," in H. Bonin and M. Cahen, eds., Negoce blanc en Afrique Noire: Levolution du 18e au 20e siecles (Paris: Publications de la Societe Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 2001): 351-69; Mariana P. Candido, "Enslaving Frontiers: Slavery, Trade and Identity in Benguela, 1780-1850," Ph.D. diss., York University (2006).

(56) Recognizing Joao Fernandes Vieira's "experience and possibilities," the Council decided to grant him the command of a great expedition against Palmares. Eventually, because of the conflicts between Fernandes Vieira and the governor of Pernambuco, Pedro de Almeida, he did not execute the commission. Doc. of June 28, 1677, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Secao de Manuscritos, Codice II-33, 4, 32. The conflict between Vieira and the governor is described in "Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, October 19, 1677," AHU, ACL, CU 015, cx. II, doc. 1093.

(57) AHU, CU, codice 256, Letter to the governor of Pernambuco of November 17, 1683.

(58) Carta para a Camara da Capitania do Rio Grande, March 24, 1681, in "Dezenove documentos sobre os Palmares pertencentes a Collecao Studart," RTIC 20 (1906), 270.

(59) Sebastiao da Rocha Pita, Historia da America Portuguesa (1730) (Sao Paulo: EDUSP/Itatiaia, 1976), 213-19.

(60) "Relacao das guerras feitas," 305. Thornton underlines also the massive escapes during the Dutch occupation; "Les Etats de l'Angola et la formation de Palmares (Bresil)," 775.

(61) Brito Freyre, Nova Lusitania, 284.

(62) Bernardo de Miranda Henriques was captain in Luanda when his uncle Rodrigo de Miranda Henriques succeeded Salvador de Sa as governor of Angola (1652-1653). Rodrigo de Miranda Henriques was close to the Salvador de Sa family and had been also governor of Rio de Janeiro (1633-1637); Alencastro, Trato dos viventes, 270 and 343.

(63) See Silvia Hunod Lara, "Palmares & Cucau, o aprendizado da dominacao," dissertation for promotion to full professor in the discipline of History of Brazil, UNICAMP, Sao Paulo (2008): 41-64.

(64) Documents dated February 4, 1678, June 22, 1678 and July 19, 1678; transcriptions in Lara, "Palmares & Cucau," 237-39. I am grateful to Paul Lovejoy and Jose Curto for the discussion we had about this topic in April 2009, when I was Visiting Professor at the Harriet Tubman Institute at York University in Toronto.

(65) Document date March 26, 1680, "Dezenove documentos," 268-9.

(66) Letter of November 27, 1692, "Dezenove documentos," 284-6.

(67)"Rellacao verdadeyra," 318.

(68) Conde da Ericeira, Historia de Portugal restaurado (1679-1698), Ia parte (Lisbon, 1751), 2956.

(69) Pereira da Costa published the poem in his Anais Pernambucanos but indicated neither from where it was taken nor if there were any documents attached to it. He transcribes the poem, separating the verses without stanza breaks. See, Anais Pernambucanos, 4: 27-30. Unlike Mott and Moura, I think that the poem parodies a petition and is certainly not a "request" to the Overseas Council. See Luiz Mott, "Santo Antonio, o Divino Capitao do Mato," in Joao Jose Reis and Flavio dos Santos Gomes, eds., Liberdade por um fio: historia dos quilombos no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996): 110-38, and Clovis Moura, Dicionario da escravidao negra no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Editora da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 2004), 423-4.

(70) Following the order of September 13, 1685, from the governor of Pernambuco, Joao da Cunha Souto Maior, the position of private was officially given to Saint Anthony in order to bring him to the War of Palmares. The pay and the uniform of the "soldier" Saint Anthony was regularly delivered at the convent of Sao Francisco in Olinda. Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos, 4: 27-30. Saint Anthony was also the patron saint of the bandeirantes militias and the militia led by Manoel de Inojosa that massacred the natives of the river Paraguacu.

(71) Frei Antonio da Conceicao, "Tratado dos Rios de Cuama (1696)," in J. H. da Cunha Rivara, ed., O Chronista de Tissuary (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 84. According to the Dicionario Houaiss da Lingua Portuguesa, the first time the word brasileiro, or "Brazilian," appeared in Lisbon with its modern day meaning was 1706.

(72) Letter of November 10, 1691, "Dezenove documentos," 273-5.

(73) Still today in Paraguay, the word "bandeirante" is a synonym for bandit.

(74) Letter of December 19, 1691, "Dezenove documentos," 278-80.

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro

Universite de Paris Sorbonne

Translated by Ana Lucia Araujo

LUIZ FELIPE DE ALENCASTRO is professor of Brazilian History and Director of the Centre du Bresil et de l'Atlantique Sud de l'Universite de Paris Sorbonne. His monograph O Trato dos Viventes. Formacao do Brasil no Atlantico do Sul (Companhia das Letras, Sao Paulo, 2000) studied the connections between Portuguese America and Angola in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. An English translation will be published by the University of Texas Press.
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Author:de Alencastro, Luiz Felipe
Publication:Portuguese Studies Review
Article Type:Author abstract
Date:Jan 1, 2011
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