Since feeling is first: teaching royal ethics through managing the emotions in the Late Middle Ages.
since feeling is first who pays any attention to the syntax of things will never wholly kiss you (1)
To fully engage in a kiss, e. e. cummings playfully contends, we must feel, not think of the rules. Intimacy is a bodily thing: the 'blood approves, | and kisses are a better fate | than wisdom'. (2) Although the binary of a sterile, syntax-ruled wisdom and the felt, participatory enjoyment of intimate connection is a worn-out cliche of romantic love, its ability to hold our attention reminds us that we tend to think of the need for human closeness and its felt expression in language as essential or natural. In part at least, this naturalisation is an illusion created by the apparent solidity of a well-oiled set of scientific and cultural paradigms which themselves change over time. If we rewind the clock far enough, past the language of the Enlightenment and the Renaissance to the Middle Ages, we encounter a discourse on the emotions that immediately challenges our assumptions. The difference is especially apparent in the medieval literature on the formation of the person whose authors refer to what we see as emotions--referred to as passions (passiones) and affections (affectiones)--not in terms of experiencing and enjoying the present world but as part of the pursuit of wisdom in preparation for the afterlife. Rather than relying on the body and its emotions as a guide to the good life, medieval didactic writers developed extensive frameworks of ethical syntax, dominated by virtues, vices, and commendable or blameworthy kinds of behaviour. In the course of the thirteenth century, however, these frameworks were transformed in a momentous turn after the writings of Aristotle and his commentators established themselves in academic discourse and opened a path for describing the emotions with more complexity than ever before. (3)
Recent studies in the history of emotions have brought out the importance of the Middle Ages for a deeper understanding of human psychology. (4) Approaching emotions through 'emotional communities', 'emotional navigation', and 'emotionology', the historians Barbara Rosenwein, William Reddy, and Peter Stearns have contributed new methods that cross the disciplinary boundaries between history, philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. (5) At the same time, philosophers like Martha Nussbaum and Simo Knuuttila have provided conceptual tools to recognise layers in medieval thinkers' work invisible to the post-Freudian mind. (6) These studies have alerted us to the presence of multiple streams of sources, contexts, and applications of discussing emotions and their role in human life. But the recognition of multiplicity brought with it a new set of challenges. Since the discursive categories framing the emotions are not chronologically stable, it is tempting to reduce them--particularly in texts that combine themes relevant to education, philosophy, psychology, and ethics--to their modern equivalents and miss unfamiliar but telling traces of fundamental difference.
In this article, I explore the transformation of the discourse on the emotions through an analysis of three thirteenth-century specula principum, mirrors or didactic guidebooks for the nobility, composed by Vincent of Beauvais, Giles of Rome, and Durand of Champagne. As they outline the elements that make a good king or queen, the three specula propose ways of becoming one through a process in which, as I show, the emotions play an increasingly important part. While Vincent's De eruditione filiorum nobilium provided a model for later manuals of instruction, it subsumed the emotions within the discussion of virtues, vices, and mores. With Giles of Rome's De regimine principum and Durand of Champagne's Speculum dominarum, on the other hand, the emotions acquired unprecedented prominence. Influenced by Aquinas's 'Treatise on the Emotions' of the Summa theologiae, Giles and Durand made the emotions agents in the moral process of the same standing as virtues and more prominent than the mores. Their very different solutions to the didactic challenge, in which continuities and new departures coexist, reveal the flexibility and inter-penetrability of different modes of dealing with the emotions, and help us better understand how medieval teachers understood and taught to manage them.
I. Vincent of Beauvais and the Discourses on the Passions
The efforts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century French kings to encourage and protect scholars and students were crucial in establishing Paris as the leading centre of Western learning. (7) But royal attention to education was also focused on matters closer to home. Louis XlV's declaration 'I am the state' may reflect a later ideology of governance, but it is founded on royal rhetoric developed and reinforced through the Middle Ages, in which the success of the state was seen as depending on the success of the monarch and the continuity of the family line. Because the person of the king was an essential part of the machinery of the res publica, the education of royal children--potential future kings and queens--was an investment worthy of employing talented teachers and commissioning elaborate, custom-made manuals of instruction. (8)
In the course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the golden age of scholasticism, a remarkable series of specula principum came into being to address this task. The renowned Dominican scholar Vincent of Beauvais (c. 1190--c. 1264) dedicated his De eruditionefiliorum nobilium (c. 1246-47) to Louis IX's wife Margueritte as a guide for their son Philippe, born in 1445, (9) and the De morali principis institutione (before 1264), to Louis IX and Thibaud, King of Navarre; (10) the Franciscan Gilbert of Tournai (d. 1284) dedicated his Eruditio regum et principum also to Louis IX in 1259; (11) Laurent of Orleans his Somme le roi to Philip III, Louis's son, around 1279; (12) the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome (c. 1243-1316) his De regimine principum to Philip III's son Philip IV (the Fair); (13) and the Franciscan Durand of Champagne (fl. 1285-1305) composed his Speculum dominarum for Philip IV's wife Jeanne of Navarre. (14) Durand's Speculum was in turn used as the foundation of the De informatione principum, probably composed by a follower of Durand for one of Philip IV's sons. (15)
Vincent of Beauvais stands out among these authors not only because his specula, in particular the De eruditione, served as models for later writers. As the author and editor of the largest encyclopaedic enterprise of the Middle Ages, the Speculum maius, he had access to a vast treasury of material from which he composed a mirror of history (Speculum historiale), nature (Speculum naturale), and knowledge (Speculum doctrinale). (16) Admired and consulted by Louis IX, Vincent also had privileged access to the royal family. His works on the education of royal children are thus far from abstract exercises: they mark how he understood and interpreted recent developments in knowledge of the soul and human behaviour, but also how he envisioned their application. (17) When discussing the emotions, Vincent had at his disposal an extensive tradition that fused classical, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian sources across a range of genres and contexts. (18) It was a tradition strongly influenced by Augustine who criticised the Stoics' view of passions (passiones) in terms of perturbations of the soul as too negative and deficient, and shifted attention to their positive role in spiritual life. (19) Rather than striving to extricate themselves from their passions, Christians ought to cultivate them properly:
... the citizens of the Holy City of God, as they live by God's standards in the pilgrimage of this present life, feel fear and desire, pain and gladness in conformity with the holy Scriptures and sound doctrine; and because their love is right, all these feelings are right in them. (20)
Augustine's reinterpretation of the Stoics' four basic emotions of joy/ gladness, fear, desire/hope, and pain provided an incentive for the study of the passions, but did not eliminate the ingrained suspicion towards them. While Vincent acknowledged Augustine in his Speculum doctrinale he did so alongside the equally influential account from the Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius, which maintained Stoicism's sombreness and encouragement to free oneself from the passions:
Rid yourself Of joy and fear, Put hope to flight, And banish grief. (21)
Vincent's encyclopaedias also reflect the new, inchoative terminological frameworks for discussing the soul and its passions through which scholars like John Blund and Jean de la Rochelle explored recently translated Aristotelian and Arabic texts and their commentaries. (22) Jean de la Rochelle's Summa de anima in particular offered a complex account of the soul's faculties and their relation to the body, along with an impressive attempt to align the disparate paradigms offered by Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna--an ideal source for Vincent's wide-ranging Speculum naturale. (23)
Juxtaposing the new literature with theological, natural-philosophical, and literary sources, Vincent produced a kaleidoscopic portrayal of the passions that easily confounds today's reader. His passions or affections relate not only to what we would call emotions; they exist in a space that includes anything receptive or passive imposed upon a body, applies to human, animal, and demonic bodies, and relates as much to ethics as to physiology and medicine. Thus Vincent can report on a discussion of whether sleep is a passion, but also of whether the rejoicing of the devils at the suffering of the damned should be discussed in terms of affections since they lack a physical body. (24)
Considering the range of descriptions of the passions, it may be surprising to find that when it came to ethics and ethical behaviour in the Speculum naturale Vincent was content with Augustine's and the Stoics' focus on the four major passions. 'Therefore the soul has affections', he writes, citing the Pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima, 'through which it is trained towards virtues, because the pain of sins, the fear of punishments, the desire of promised things, and the enjoyment of rewards, are exercises of virtue'.25 In the Speculum doctrinale, which contains an entire section devoted to the scientia monastica or the science of transforming one's moral behaviour, the Stoic bias is even more overt. Instead of elaborating on the potential impact of the passions on one's life, Vincent lists the four principal passions and fills the chapters with brief extracts drawn overwhelmingly from pagan poets, among whom cummings's ruminations would not be entirely out of place. Love, hope, joy, pain, and fear are in turn followed by suspicion, credulity, error, stupidity, natural desire, and self-love, until the list progresses to pride, which is unambiguously a vice rather than a passion. (26)
The smooth linking of four easily identifiable passions with the more ambiguous categories of suspicion, credulity, and stupidity, and finally with pride, gives us a sense of the complexity and fluidity of scholarly discourse on the emotions in the middle of the thirteenth century, but also its boundaries. Although a range of texts, including recently discussed works of natural philosophy and medicine, could be used to address the passions in the context of ethics, Vincent's scientia monastica confines the role of the passions to a brief segment, a bridge between an extended section on the virtues on one hand, and the vices on the other. The constraint is a useful indicator of the different modes of discussing the passions depending on context. When referring to the body as part of nature, Vincent draws on works of natural philosophy, but when discussing the moral formation of the person he turns to poets and moralists, whose descriptions of the passions focused on their problematic connection with the body as a natural pathway to sin.
A passage very telling of how Vincent conceived of the larger scheme of things occurs at the beginning of Book 5 of the Speculum doctrinale, which succeeds his discussion of virtues and vices:
Having gathered excerpts from the statements of various authors on the individual kinds of virtues and vices, due to the length of the previous volume we will now begin another and go into more detail, describing the mores pertaining to each condition, sex, and age. (27)
As he justifies the division of the subject matter into two separate books, Vincent surveys the preceding passages simply by mentioning virtues and vices. Although we have seen that passions are included, they are part of a larger ethical debate and do not merit special attention. What does merit attention are mores, manners, or behaviours as performed and observed in everyday life. The first chapter of Book 5 of the Speculum doctrinale bears the title 'On the good mores of princes and magnates', and introduces us to what is very much an art of living well divided along gender and class lines, and illustrated by citations from pagan philosophers.
Vincent's treatment of ethics (virtues and vices) and mores in a broader performative sense is consistent with the developmental arc of medieval education outlined by C. Stephen Jaeger, in which an earlier medieval focus on forming a person through the charismatic imitation of the teacher's external behaviour, supported by references to literature and poetry (litterae et mores), was replaced by a more analytical approach. Jaeger argues that works like Hugh of St Victor's guide to reading and study, Didascalicon, rather than looking optimistically forward, can be seen as the last, nostalgic expressions of a system of a charismatic education associated with the cathedral schools, giving way to the dynamic, disputative manner of the universities, and transforming itself into the courtly literature and mirrors of princes. (28)
Vincent is by most counts a representative of this new way of education, yet his valuation of the mores suggests the break from old ways was by no means absolute, and strands of 'old' learning happily coexisted with the new. Although framed within the increasingly more sophisticated discourse on virtues and vices, mores are still portrayed as the aim of moral teaching of the nobility. Even the passions, about which Vincent knows quite a lot, take a secondary place in comparison, a characteristic his encyclopaedias share with his more personal didactic works.
II. De eruditioneJiliorum nobilium: Passions between Virtues and Mores
One of the better illustrated manuscripts of Vincent of Beauvais's De eruditione filiorum nobilium opens with the image of a dead body in a grave, signalling that the work is not a celebration of education as a felicitous union of body and soul. (29) 'Freshly poured into the body', Vincent notes early in the treatise, 'the soul of the infant contracts from its corruption the darkness of ignorance with respect to the intellect, as well as the festering of carnal desire with respect to the affections, and so is made brutish in understanding and acting well'. (30) The message is dark but does not lack an appropriate remedy. On one hand, Vincent encourages royal children to follow knowledge divided into the Aristotelian spheres of ethics, economics, and politics. (31) The real focus, though, is on double education anchored in the Scriptures, an education consisting of learning (doctrina) through which the teacher imparts knowledge and illuminates the intellect, and discipline (disciplina) or ordered correction of behaviour to rule the emotions (affectus). (32)
The interaction between learning and discipline is not dissimilar to the concept of litterae et mores. In fact, Vincent's major sources for the passages in which he discusses the mechanics of education depend on texts explored by Jaeger: Hugh of St Victor's Didascalicon, the sermons of St Bernard, and the De instructione novitiorum by Gerard Ithier, which Vincent attributes to Hugh of St Victor. (33) A trace of charismatic education, too, makes its presence. Apart from reading and imbuing themselves with the contents of texts, the students ought to obey and emulate their teachers in a slow, transformative process that requires the student's full participation and the teacher to be the embodiment of virtues he tries to imbue--which may explain the extent to which the treatise dwells on the qualities expected of teachers.Yet the prize is worth it: when transformed into everyday behaviour, virtue and knowledge can ultimately lead to wisdom. (34)
Although Vincent does mention specific affections or passions in the De eruditione, just as in his encyclopaedic works, they do not play a role in the pupil's transformation on their own. As problematic reminders of the fallen nature of the body, affections are but impediments in a programme where the important agents are virtues or vices against the broader background of mores, which in his works refer to sets of behavioural characteristics, appropriate to each age and station, liable to being upset by passions and vices and restored through virtues. Anger, for instance, is presented not as a passion but as one of seven vices that constitute impediments to learning, and is countered with an appropriate selection of virtues. (35) Similarly, when Vincent points out that boys and girls in puberty are more excitable, unstable, and responsive to stimuli, he notes that the mores of youths (adolescentes) are challenged by proud impetuousness, desire, and mischievousness. To counter them, Vincent recommends the virtues of humility, chastity, and maturity. (36) Each virtue is in turn the foundation for a mechanism of transformation of the person with its own divisions supported by authoritative texts:
Against the three vices of youth mentioned above, three virtues in particular should be formed in them, namely humility against proud impetuousness, chastity against desire, and maturity against mischievousness. Humility is to be formed through casting out with respect to affect, through consultation with respect to the intellect, and through submission which he ought to show towards parents, masters, and elders, as Peter says in the first, number five: "Young ones, be subject to seniors." Thus Cyprian the martyr in the book On the twelve abuses of the world presents as one of them a youth without obedience and says, "Just as sobriety and perfection of mores is required among elders, so obedience and submission ought to be followed by the young" ... And blessed Bernard in the sermon on the circumcision of the Lord: "The faithful man", he says, "chooses to submit to a master". (37)
The reference to the formation of humility 'through casting out with respect to affect' is one of the few occasions where Vincent addresses something that could be read as manipulation of emotional states. But the recommendation is more similar to Boethius's banishing of the passions than to Augustine's recommendation to embrace some of them. In the context of ethics, passions are not distinguished in much detail, and bodily behaviour and mores are linked directly to virtues and vices. Children are either disciplined or undisciplined, and lack of discipline is to be remedied with appropriate virtues and exempla, along with coercion. (38) In that, girls are the same as boys--that is, until their roles significantly diverge. (39) Youths, as they mature, become men and strive to become wise. Girls, on the other hand, must ready themselves to play their role as wives and potential widows. Their value depends on their virginity, which needs to be protected by restricting opportunities for temptation: tria predicta vicia adolescencie tres virtutes precipue in eis sunt formande videl. contra superbam animositatem humilitas, contra libidinem castitas, contra lasciuiam maturitas. Humilitas formanda est per abiectionem quantum ad affectum, per consultacionem quantum ad intellectum, per subiectionem, quam parentibus et magistris ac senioribus debet exhibere, sicut dicit petrus in prima v: "Adolescentes, subditi estote senioribus." Hinc et cyprianus martyr in libro de XII abusionibus seculi inter illa ponit adolescentem sine obediencia et dicit: "Sicut in senibus sobrietas et morum perfectio requiritur, sic ab adolescentibus obsequium et subiectio ... rite debetur." ... Hinc et beatus bernardus in sermone de circoncisione domini: "Eligat", inquit, "... homo fidelis subiectus esse magistro".'
I say, guard their body in their age of maidenhood, which is inclined to wantonness, so that they do not wander off on their own to dances, performances or parties, but are watched over at home, so that they are not desiring or desired as they wander about. (40)
Although his later work, De morali principis institutione, is aimed at a more mature audience, its treatment of the emotions is compatible with that of the De eruditione. As in the former, the focus is on mores or aspects of behaviour, and it is discussed through the prism of virtues and vices. (41) After identifying a relevant virtue or vice, Vincent draws together examples, gathered primarily from biblical and patristic sources, in order to move his readers to change their ways. No references are made to affectiones, and the word passio is mentioned only twice, in the discussion of envy, the 'mother of detraction'. Even there, though, it is limited to a quotation from Jerome on how the envious person is torn by a double passion ('in duplicem passionem scinditur'). (42) Rather than analysing the process through its causes, Vincent explains it through elaborations on quotations, in this case Stultus ... comedit carnes suas in Ecclesiastes:
For the envious [person] eats his soul and flesh, because the more he sees him whom he envies to be happy, the more he wastes away and is distracted and little by little is eaten away through zeal and envy. (43)
Medieval texts on education and moral transformation, as Jaeger and others have pointed out, give us little sense of the richness and drama of teaching and learning as performed in real life. (44) Vincent's chapters in the De eruditione on coercion, discipline, and physical exercise of boys, and on avoidance of tooelaborate dress and make-up for girls, do suggest that at least some teaching relied on threats, fear, and corporal punishment, and probably resulted in scenes that were very 'emotional' in the modern sense. Yet when writing about the emotions, Vincent delimits his discourse to authoritative sources in which passions or affections, if they appear at all, are subsumed in the biblical and patristic language of virtues and vices. The choice reminds us we need to be cautious, when looking for medieval emotions, not to project modern assumptions on the medieval text. It also reminds us different modes of discussing the passions were coexisting together and applicable in different contexts.
When writing about nature in the Speculum naturale, Vincent described the passions in the context of the body as part of the physical world, and for that purpose chose texts describing the 'anatomy of the soul'.When discussing human knowledge in the Speculum doctrinale, he described the passions in the language of the twelfth-century tradition of mores with their quotations from classical poets and philosophers. When he wrote to educate the children of Louis IX, on the other hand, he drew on the Bible and predominantly Christian sources--much of the misogynistic tone, for example, is the result of extensive quotations from Jerome. In continuity with earlier pedagogical practice, Vincent's text outlines a charismatic education in which the teacher himself is an essential part of the didactic process: his knowledge, bodily appearance, and gestures, and his own maturity as a human being and as a Christian are essential components of the technique.Yet the voice is distinctly that of a thirteenth-century friar trained in preaching. Although he was aware of newly available and discussed texts--the Nicomachean Ethics is briefly cited in the De eruditione--his mode is homiletic and hortatory, and his manner of explaining the sources is essentially that of scriptural exegesis. (45)
Another Dominican, William Peraldus (c. 1190-1271), whose De eruditione principum was written shortly after his confrere's De morali principis institutione and was perhaps also written for Thibaud, King of Navarre, uses a similar mode of describing the passions. Peraldus wrote with an awareness of Vincent's earlier work De eruditione, but also borrowed extensively from his own Speculum Religiosorum and SummaVirtutum etVitiorum, which deal with virtues and vices in opposing pairs. (46) Yet although the work's structure, as Michiel Verveij has observed, is built on scholastic principles, Peraldus masks them to convey a book of advice fortified by the gravitas of a tradition in which passions are presented in connection with vices. (47) When Peraldus does refer to the passions directly, it is as something from which one should be liberated. Above all, the soul needs to be decorated with mores, defined in terms analogous to Vincent's and corroborated by overwhelmingly biblical and patristic sources, along with references to Bernard, Gregory, Seneca, Cicero, and Horace. (48)
An analogous hortatory-homiletic approach was used by the Franciscan Gilbert of Tournai in his 1159 work Eruditio regum et principum, and as late as in 1279 by Laurent, the author of the Somme le roi composed during the reign of Philip III (r. 1270-85). (49) More tightly structured than the De eruditione principum of Peraldus, the Somme educates princes by enumerating and commenting on vices to avoid and virtues to be practiced. As in Peraldus, the vast bulk of references are drawn from the Bible (roughly 500 citations), with Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard or pseudo-Bernard following far below. (50) The Sommes methodical exposition with numerous citations and vivid exempla from everyday life speaks of an author familiar with preaching and with a tradition in which the passions were of secondary importance to virtues and vices. (51)
The De eruditione principum, the Eruditio regum et principum, and the Somme le roi confirm the impression given by the works of Vincent of Beauvais that when talking about passions in the ethical context, writers of thirteenthcentury specula relied predominantly on a biblical-patristic tradition which assimilated and transformed classical authorities and constructed moral education in terms of mores. That Vincent, a Dominican, was still referring to mores in the middle of the thirteenth century suggests that the twelfth-century paradigm of litterae et mores did not so much vanish as evolve by incorporating more recent treatment of virtues and vices and--albeit surreptitiously -scholastic material. Contemporaries by no means saw such an approach as deficient. Vincent's De eruditione, which itself builds on Hugh of St Victor s Didascalicon, was copied well into the fourteenth century, and was adopted by Giles of Rome whose very different take on the passions did not preclude a respect for Vincent's works.
III. De regimine principum:The Passions of Aquinas
Although Vincent and his contemporaries did not directly engage with the writings on the passions by Jean de la Rochelle, Avicenna, and Damascene in ethical works written for the royal family, it was only a matter of time before the different modes of talking about passions crossed paths. With Giles of Rome's De regimine principum (c. 1281), roughly contemporary with the Somme le roi, we enter a very different territory. Giles was trained as a scholastic theologian and was influenced by Thomas Aquinas, under whom he studied. The impact of Aquinas and an intimate knowledge of Aristotle reverberate through the De regimine which, rather than referring to the Bible, cites almost exclusively Aristotle--often indirectly via Aquinas's commentaries--as the supreme authority. (52) But this is not the only remarkable thing about Giles's work. For the first time in a didactic tract written for the French royal family, the passions are explicitly discussed, classified, and analysed in a separate section which fuses elements of the earlier tradition but presents them in an innovative way.
Parallels between the specula of Giles and Vincent of Beauvais suggest that Giles was familiar with the De eruditione filiorum nobilium. Both works use the division of knowledge into ethics, economics, and politics, and Giles borrowed from Vincent elements on the education of children. (53) Yet during the years separating the composition of De eruditione and the De regimine, Western scholars made great progress in assimilating Aristotle's treatment of the passions and connecting it with the existing tradition. Following Jean de la Rochelle, consecutive scholastic commentaries paid increasing attention to the role of the passions in moral life, and with the appearance of Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae, in particular questions 1-21 of the Prima secundae, the 'treatise on the passions', the discussion of the passions along Aristotelian lines was given a brilliant and sophisticated platform. (54) In the aftermath of discussions made explicit in the Summa, there was no question that passions could, and should, be openly discussed in the context of ethics. The question was to what extent and how, and Giles's solution provided an influential model.
In order to become a good ruler, Giles argues, the king needs to learn to rule himself through the science of ethics, rule his family through the science of economics, and rule the urban communities and the entire kingdom through the science of politics. (55) Of the three sciences, which correspond to the three books of the treatise, ethics is the first. As the foundation of the didactic process it receives extensive treatment, which is divided into four aspects of royal self-rule: the goal of royal majesty; the virtues a king should possess; the passions he should follow; and mores he ought to imitate. Located between virtues (habitus) and mores, the passions pose a connecting link between those aspects of the person that need to be built up through collaboration of grace and moral effort, and those aspects that are perceptible as the person's outward conduct:
These four seem to have an analogous relationship to each other. For different kinds of mores give rise to different passions, from different passions arise different habits (habitus), and different habits predetermine different goals or ends. (56)
The scheme in which passions are placed between mores and virtues is familiar from Vincent. Yet Giles's explanation of the relationship between the four aspects of self-rule seems to indicate a different process. Although Vincent understood virtues as the goal of moral striving, he also treated them as the building blocks of the composite mores that were in turn directed towards wisdom. The relationship between mores and virtues is a back-and-forth dialectic of mutual influence, in which the passions have propinquity for the vices and need to be reined in and disciplined with virtue. Giles observes a similar, but more ordered process. To him, the mores function as the initiators of different passions, which in turn lead to different habitus--a word also used to describe virtues and vices. In order to become virtuous, Giles seems to imply, one must first master the different mores and then pay attention to the passions so that the good habitus can flourish. Before one can begin the ascent in moral matters, one has to control one's emotions.
Like Aquinas, Giles discusses the passions' place in the structure of the soul and treats them in opposing couples. (57) As part of the sensitive appetite, passions are divided into concupiscible (love, hate, desire, loathing, enjoyment, and sadness) and irascible (hope, despair, fear, daring, anger, and clemency). The last, mansuetudo or clemency, is Giles's emendation of Aquinas, who had limited his list to eleven items and declared that anger lacked a contrary. In an insightful analysis into the impact of this powerful passion, Aquinas followed Aristotle in declaring that clemency is not a natural component of human behaviour but must be arduously nourished into a habit. Giles, attracted by the call to moral symmetry, followed other medieval scholars who placed clemency among the passions. (58) As a result, clemency is both a virtue and a passion, an effective counterweight to anger for the seeker of moral improvement who needs to know 'which passions are to be fled and which to be followed'. (59)
The overlap between passions and virtues in the case of clemency is in part the result of the use of the same word to signify different things -Giles himself challenged the readers to propose a better term if they felt like belabouring the point. (60) But in the case of the interrelationship between virtues and passions, the things which words are supposed to signify are not all that different either, as Giles shows in the description of clemency as a virtue:
It is not difficult to show that it is proper for kings and princes to be clement. For since anger overturns the judgement of reason, it is not appropriate for kings and princes to be angry, because they should be strong in reason and intellect. Just as we see that when the tongue is infected with yellow bile or other humours we do not make a correct judgement of taste, in the same way when the appetite is infected through immoderate anger or other immoderate passions, the judgement of our reason is overturned. (61)
It is true that Giles discusses mansuetudo as a virtue, and describes anger's blocking of reason in terms that imply moral consequences. But the analogy to illustrate the action of anger is medical, and the process through which anger and the body interact resembles the movement of the body through its passions. In fact, there is very little difference between Giles's description of mansuetudo as a virtue and of it as a passion. In the latter sense, clemency is a certain feeling of absence of anger, which can presumably be used to counter it. In that, the person exhibiting clemency is not entirely different from the continent person who conquers the passions through withdrawal. (62)
The occasional permeability between virtues and passions does not seem to trouble Giles, who is after all interested in the moral improvement of the prince. He carefully divides the passions and orders them in classes beginning with love and hate (from which all other passions originate) and ending with pleasure or sorrow (which are the conclusion of all passions). After describing each passion, he identifies its positive and negative elements, and encourages the reader to follow the latter. The language and the references are Aristotelian. Still, even as Giles's explanations are much more analytical than those of Vincent, the use of authoritative passages to exhort his readers reveals a process akin to the imbuing of mores in which even 'modern' texts could be used as hortatory exempla to bring about the desired change in the passions:
It would perhaps appear to some that kings and princes ought to be timid in nothing, because such things are said to diminish royal majesty. Kings are accustomed to having many people who incite them thus, persuading them to dare to do all things and avoid nothing: but such people are flatterers, not true--they teach kings not to be strong, because he who dares to do all things and fears nothing, as is said in I Magna moralia, is not strong but foolish. It is therefore proper to see how they are to be timid and daring.63
Conspicuously absent in Giles's treatment of the passions is any reference to women. Vincent (via Jerome) may have been misogynistic in tone, but he at least outlined mores relevant to both girls and boys. For Giles matrimony may be a natural state, but woman's place is quite low on the ladder of importance, being part of the household, the domus (oikos as in economics) of the king. (64) The woman needs to be overseen and her counsel is not to be followed except for rare cases, as the softness of her flesh produces so much phlegm she lacks rational power. (65) Giles's recommendations on the matter of the passions are those of a man's world in which the male rules and the female complies. (66)
With Giles's De regimine, the most popular of medieval specula principum and used well into the sixteenth century, the passions made an appearance that would be difficult to avoid. The new discourse introduced the genre to new ways of identifying the passions and involving them in ethical discourse on the education of princes. Passions not only served to create closer links between mores and virtues, but also opened another channel for empowering the kings and confirming their dominant status in the state and at home. The obverse side of the assimilation of Aristotle's ethical writings by his Christian commentators was the gain of another justification for the subjection of women. Overall, the focus on the passions in the works of Jean de la Rochelle, Aquinas, and Giles of Rome resulted in an important transformation regarding their function in the moral transformation of a person: it reified them.
IV. Speculum dominarum: Feeling Modified by Reason
There is some irony in the fact that the spouse of Philip IV, to whom Giles dedicated the De regimine, maintained her own household. Evidence suggests that Jeanne de Navarre was very much an equal partner to Philip, who treated her with respect and consulted her on important matters. (67) The outlines of the queen sketched in the Speculum dominarum, composed by her Franciscan confessor Durand of Champagne, are certainly consistent with a strong person exercising a significant degree of autonomy. Using a theme from Proverbs, 'A wise woman builds her house', Durand develops a treatise on behaviour in which the queen, considering her natural condition (Part 1) and wisdom (Part 2) proceeds to build her own house, a symbolic quadriform entity consisting of exterior, interior, inferior, and superior houses (Part 3). (68) In striking contrast to Giles's insistence on women's diminished rational capacity, Durand gives the queen full agency when it comes to the control of her passions. Using the image of the queen in the book of Revelation, he portrays her standing with her feet over the inconstant moon of the evershifting passions, and dressed in the light of the sun, representing their conquest through virtue. Unmoved, she has modified her passions and brought them back to the rule of reason:
For just as the moon is continuously changed and never remains in the same state--now horned, now gibbous, now halved, now full-- thus the soul continuously and variously fluctuates in its affections. It grows hot with love and wastes away in hate; it rejoices in success and is made sad in adversity; it twists in anguish and relaxes with delight; it grows alarmed in fear and becomes cheerful with confidence of hope; and similarly in other ways the soul is changed from one affection to another as it experiences something in itself.... In the soul of a foolish and impious person those affections are in charge to a remarkable degree, because they follow the movement and impetus of their affections.Yet in the soul of the wise they do not rule because [the wise person] does not follow their movement but rather modifies and reduces them to the rule of reason. (69)
The metaphor of the queen is appropriate in a very literal sense. Besides representing the soul's conquest of its passions it also stands for royal glory --glory burdened with power and concomitant responsibility. As a noble leader, the queen must be in control of her passions; otherwise the light of her wisdom fades away and she may end up running in circles like a horse tied to the axle of a mill wheel. (70)
Durand discusses the passions in the first part of the Speculum dominarum, dedicated to the condition of women. (71) After dealing with the state of women with respect to nature and fortune, he proceeds to treat their condition with respect to the infusion of grace and divides the subject into four sections: grace, mores, passions (which are equivalently referred to as passiones or affectiones), and virtues. Together, these four thematic categories constitute more than half of the bulk of the treatise, with sections on the passions (c. 51 folios) and the virtues (c. 57 folios) each accounting for roughly one quarter of the entire text (c. 190 folios). The surprisingly balanced attention to passions and virtues by Durand makes the discussion of the passions more extensive than that of mores (c. 9 folios) as well as of the pinnacle of striving, wisdom (c. 19 folios)--and significantly more prominent than the discussion of the passions in Giles's De regimine principum. Although the physical extent of the treatment of a subject is hardly an indicator of its meaningfulness, the attention given to the passions is consistent with their prominent role in the Speculum's overall didactic programme. As an essential component of personal as well as communal life they must be controlled so that they do not upset the balance of the entire society. (72)
In his choice of sources to describe the passions, Durand resembles the author of the Somme le roi or Vincent of Beauvais. Aristotle is mentioned by name only once, in a reference to the pseudo-Aristotelian letter to Alexander, and as the Philosopher twice, in connection to the soul and justice. (73) Durand's authorities are overwhelmingly biblical, patristic, and those of the established auctoritates like Gregory the Great and Bernard of Clairvaux, and his style is hortatory, rather than analytical. But the framework of discussing individual passions is very similar to that of Giles. After describing a passion, Durand divides it into more detailed aspects, usually the binary of licit or praiseworthy, and illicit or condemnable. Thus love can be licit (of God, of neighbours, friends, family) and illicit (excessive love of wealth or lust); a good kind of hate is against sin and things detrimental to spiritual health, and a bad kind is that encouraged by flatterers. Finally, each aspect of the passion is illustrated with an authoritative citation. Individual elements are often 'itemised' into lists of distinctions that resemble the tone of medieval sermons, as in the example of the passion of loathing:
Now the passion of loathing is to be considered. Just as desire follows the affection of love, because when something commences to be loved it is immediately desired in possession, so after the passion or affection of hatred follows loathing, because when something commences to be hated, the heart immediately begins to loathe and flee it. It should be known that we only should loathe sin: the falseness of hypocrisy, the depravity of simony, iniquity and injustice, the cruelty of detractors, vanity of adornment, and the filthiness of lust. The soul should especially loathe the falseness of hypocrisy, and most of all among the regular [clergy], because God also loathes it, as is said in Luke 16:You are the ones who justify yourselves in the eyes of others, but God knows your hearts. What people value highly is detestable in God's sight. Also, the depravity of simony among clerics, Daniel 9: And in the temple there will be an abomination that will cause desolation. Also, Ezekiel 8: I saw from the northern gate of the altar, an idol of jealousy introduced. And he said to me: son of man, do you see what they are doing, the great abominations that the house of Israel is committing here, to make me leave my sanctuary far behind? Also, iniquity and injustice among princes ... (74)
In effect Durand provides the reader with a sizeable map, complete with a legend, to the human passions. They are divided into aspects one should follow or avoid and provided with authoritative passages that illustrate and reinforce every component to allow readers to translate the exhortations into practice and move their passions in appropriate directions corresponding to the situation and feeling that arises. When we consider the treatment of the passions in the broader context, which begins with the description of the queen in terms of her body and her social rank, continues with her composition in terms of grace, mores, passions, and virtues, and finally moves to a discussion of wisdom, we realise that Durand's work is also a guide to psychological transformation in which the passions play a crucial connecting role between the outward performance of a person and the formation of interior habits or virtues which, aided by grace, can lead to wisdom. Though written in a homiletic style and heavily reinforced by quotations from relatively conventional sources, the passions in Durand's map of the human soul fit into a programme very similar--but more keenly attuned to the soul's intimate mechanics--to Giles's De regimine.
In fact, the homiletic surface of the Speculum dominarum covers a structure that is indebted to more recent developments in the scholastic milieu. Like many medieval scholars, and like Peraldus and Giles before him, Durand was eager to cover up the traces of some of his immediate sources. When it came to the emotions, one signature in particular has left its mark on the Speculum dominarum: the 'treatise on the passions' of Thomas Aquinas. Durand's reference, at the very beginning of the section on the passions, to the need to subject the passions to the rule of reason is worded in language identical to the definition of moral virtue, which 'reduces passion to the rule of reason', in Aquinas's Summa. (75) Similarly, the discussion of joy (gaudium) contains what appears to be a paraphrase of Aquinas's account. (76) Other hints, such as the reference to Augustine traceable uniquely to the Summa, point to a familiarity with the Dominican's most famous work. (77) An important corroboration of the kinship between the Speculum dominarum and the Summa is also provided by the pseudo-Vincentian Speculum morale, whose author considered Durand's discourse on the passions so compatible he grafted it seamlessly onto a verbatim extract from the Summa. (78)
Durand's familiarity with Aquinas could have been facilitated by Giles of Rome's De regimine. Like Giles, Durand agrees that the passions are a fundamental element of human behaviour that need to be recognised and nurtured in proper ways, and the wording of the division of passions into praiseworthy and blameable is nearly identical in the two specula. (79) Durand likewise places the passions between mores and virtues in an ascending order whose mechanics are identical to Giles's. Moreover, in the discussion of love, both Durand and Giles expand on the political aspects of love, in language that addresses the same issues, including abuse of power by tyrants.
If Durand wrote with Giles's work in mind, his description of the passions would gain another interesting dimension. Giles, as we have seen, adopted Aquinas's scheme of eleven passions and amended it with a twelfth, clemency, to counter anger. Durand not only accepted the modified list of twelve passions but also added the passions of joy (gaudium), pain (dolor), envy (invidia), zeal (zelum), shame (verecundia), and compassion (misericordia), raising their number to an impressive eighteen. (80) The choice is remarkable, because Giles himself was aware of the latter group of passions--they are mentioned in Aristotle's Rhetoric--and decided not to deal with them separately, considering them sub-species of the major twelve. (81) Durand, too, could have been informed by the Rhetoric directly, yet the possibility he is offering a counterpoint to Giles makes just as much sense. The more extensive treatment of the passions and of their orderly, rational rule by a woman, whom Giles considered innately incapable of rationality, would offer an elegant contra to his masculine argument. In this light, Durand's ekphrasis of the house built by the wise woman could be read as a brilliantly subtle rejoinder to Durand's extensive treatment of the domus as an almost exclusively male domain--all constructed with a keen sensitivity to the scholastic discussion of the passions but presented in the language of the Scriptures and authorities considered traditionally more suitable for ethical discourse in the Christian context.
The expanded discourse on the passions is set within a scheme of moral development that builds on, but modifies, the tradition of royal specula. On one hand, Durand strengthened the element of grace, which prefaces the sections on mores, passions, and virtues. We move from the outward behaviour to the interior of the body, and then continue to the virtues and their crown, wisdom. The hierarchy he creates--external behaviour, internal behaviour, virtues, and wisdom--is reinforced by the image of the queen in Revelation. In this scheme, moderation of the passions is essential to spiritual growth and the reign of an ordered mind. (82) On the other hand, the traditional discourse of mores--the outward expression of behaviour--is diminished. Bashfulness (verecundia), for instance, merits a lapidary description as a mos but an involved discussion as a passion. (83) With its extensive framework of the passions, Durand's 'spiritual psychology' acknowledges the importance of the exterior--an essential part of the approach of litterae et mores and Vincent's De eruditione--but moves towards a more engaged and keener insight into the interior of the soul.
The Latin version of Durand's work survives in a single manuscript, but a French translation commissioned soon after its composition gained considerable popularity and provided a means--though by no means as influential as that of Giles--of distributing Durand's conceptualisation of the passions among the French nobility. (84) Where Giles disparaged the role of the woman, Durand offered a discourse in which she possesses a sphere of her own. Her house may not be the oikos of the economy of man, but of a spiritual economy whose house is built by wisdom, and in which the passions, ruled by reason that she is fully capable of mastering, play an essential role. In their management, Durand grants the woman at least as much agency as a man. More extensively treated than in any speculum dedicated to a member of the French royal family, the passions help carry through the voice of Durand's sensitivity to matters of the interior. In that, he has managed the remarkable feat of applying a framework, influenced by Aristotle and synthesised by the Dominican Aquinas, to behaviour, regardless of gender and in language consistent with the Franciscan spirit exemplified by Bonaventure's call for the return of the arts to theology. (85)
V. Conclusion: Since Feeling is (almost) First
The specula of Vincent, Giles, and Durand are by no means representative of the wealth of medieval genres and contexts in which the passions were discussed. They do, nevertheless, demonstrate that in the course of the second half of the thirteenth century, the portrayal of passions and their role in ethical education underwent a noticeable turn. On one hand, the passions maintain their role as a link between external behaviour, mores, and the virtues and vices, along with ambiguities when establishing boundaries between each sphere. But where Vincent's passions are ambiguous, Giles's and Durand's are clearly and strongly defined and--thanks above all to Aquinas's 'treatise on the passions', fully engaged as a vital part of the discourse of ethics to such an extent that they are able to supersede, as in Durand, the mores themselves in relative importance.
While evolutionary, the transformation was not necessarily absolute or universally applied. Vincent's choice of describing the passions through biblical and patristic sources in ethical context even when he was aware of other relevant texts; Giles's decision to avoid biblical and patristic references altogether to pursue an overtly Aristotelian message; Durand's furnishing of a novel framework with ostensibly conventional sources; and finally the consistent reference to the fading concept of mores suggest that medieval writers had access to different expressive registers when discussing the passions, and that those registers could be used interchangeably although they were not necessarily evolving at the same rate. This observation, reflecting aspects of medieval performance in practice, provides a useful counterpoint to the work of Knuuttila or King, whose analyses may be misleadingly read as relatively straightforward progress narratives.
The specula of Giles and Durand do not in themselves comprise a radically new approach to the emotions and their management in royal behaviour. Exemplary illustration and vivid analogy--staples of medieval preaching and didacticism--appear to have remained the main channel of moving the readers' passions. But the more engaged analysis of the passions, together with Aquinas's structural framework, resulted in a discursive reification of the emotions, a powerful tool for invigorating the discourse of ethics and moral progress and expanding it along the themes of gender or intellectual capacity. With Giles, and definitely with Durand, feelings come, if not quite first, at least before a detailed engagement with virtues and vices. Their syntax of things may be a bit too involved and uninspiring to the modern eye. The distant wisdom whose pursuit they enjoin has a long way to come close to anything like a passionate kiss. But the acknowledgement of the passions as an unavoidable factor in managing who people are and can become, is an early step in a new direction.
(1) e. e. cummings, 'since feeling is first', in Complete Poems 1904-1962, ed. George J. Firmage (New York: Liveright, 1994), p. 291.
(2) cummings, p. 291.
(3) Istvan P. Bejczy, ed., Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Christian Schafer and Martin Thurner, eds, Passiones animae: die 'Leidenschaften der Seele'in der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie: ein Handbuch, 2nd edn (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013); Richard Newhauser and Susan J. Ridyard, eds, Sin in Medieval and Early Modern Culture: The Tradition of the Seven Deadly Sins (Woodbridge: York Medieval Press, 2012).
(4) Martin Pickave and Lisa Shapiro, eds, Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, eds, Le sujet des emotions au moyen age (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008); Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
(5) Jan Plamper, 'The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns', History and Theory, 49 (2010), 237-65.
(6) Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
(7) Steven Ferruolo, The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Ian P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, c. 1100-1330 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
(8) Istvan P. Bejczy and Cary J. Nederman, eds, Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007); Hans Hubert Anton, Furstenspiegel desfruhen und Hohen Mittelalters (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006); Ulrike Grassnick, Ratgeber des Konigs: Furstenspiegel und Herrscherideal im sp'atmittelalterliche England (Cologne: Bohlau, 2004); Isabelle Cogitore and Francis Goyet, eds, Devenir roi: essais sur la litterature addressee au prince (Grenoble: Ellug, 2001); Angela De Benedictus and Annamari Pisapia, eds, Specula principum (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1999); Laurent Smagghe, Les emotions du prince: emotion et discours politique dans l'espace bourgignon (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012).
(9) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, ed. Arpad Steiner (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1938). Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Latin are the author's own.
(10) Vincent of Beauvais, De morali principis institutione, ed. Robert J. Schneider, online edition (subscriber only), Library of Latin Texts--Series A (Centre Traditio Litterarum Occidentalium/Brepols, 2010) <http://clt.brepolis.net/llta>.
(11) Gilbert of Tournai, Eruditio regum et principum, ed. Alphonse de Poorter (Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophie de l'universite, 1914).
(12) Laurent d'Orleans, La Somme le roi par frere Laurent, eds Edith Brayer and AnneFrancoise Leurquin-Labie (Paris: Societe des textes francais modernes, 2008).
(13) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum libri III (Rome: Bartholomaeus Zannetius, 1607).
(14) Anne Dubrulle, 'Le Speculum dominarum de Durand de Champagne', 2 vols (unpublished diplome d'archiviste-paleographe thesis, Ecole Nationale des Chartes, 1987-88).
(15) Cecilia Gaposchkin, The Making of Saint Louis: Kingship, Sanctity, and Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 119.
(16) Monique Paulmier-Foucart and Marie-Christine Duchenne, Vincent de Beauvais et le Grand miroir du monde (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004); Serge Lusignan and Monique PaulmierFoucart, eds, Lector et Compilator: Vincent de Beauvais,frere precheur, un intellectuel et son milieu au XlIIe siecle (Grane: Creaphis, 1997).
(17) Paulmier-Foucart and Duchenne, pp. 130-45.
(18) Monique Paulmier-Foucart, Serge Lusignan, and Alain Nadeau, eds, Vincent de Beauvais: Intentions et receptions d'une oeuvre encyclopedique au Moyen Age (Ville Saint-Laurent: Bellarmin, 1990); Baudouin van den Abeele, 'Vincent de Beauvais naturaliste: les sources des livres d'animaux du Speculum naturale', in Lector et Compilator, eds Lusignan and PaulmierFoucart, pp. 127-51.
(19) Peter King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 167-88.
(20) Augustine, The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1984), 14. 9, p. 561.
(21) Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, ed. L. Bieler (Turnhout: Brepols, 1958), book 1, carmen 7, pp. 16-17: 'gaudia pelle, | pelle timorem | spem que fugato. nec dolor adsit'; Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale (Douai: Balthazar Bellere, 1624), 4. 108, col. 361.
(22) John Blund, Tractatus de anima. Traktat uber die Seele, trans. Dorothee Werner (Freiburg: Herder, 2005); Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna's 'De anima' in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160-1300 (London: Warburg Institute, 2000).
(23) Jean de la Rochelle, Summa de anima, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1995).
(24) Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum naturale (Douai: Balthazar Bellere, 1624), 2. 129, col. 158; 23. 58, cols 1693-94.
(25) Pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu et anima (= Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologia Latina (Paris, 1844-65), 40 col. 794), chap. 20: 'Habet anima affectiones, quibus exercetur ad virtutes. Dolor namque de peccatis, timor de suppliciis, desiderium de promissis, gaudium de praemissis quaedam exercitia sunt virtutum.' Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum naturale, 27. 74, cols 1968-69.
(26) Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale, 4. 108-22, cols 360-69.
(27) Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale, 5. 1, col. 403: 'Postquam de virtutibus et vitiis per singulas species diuersorum auctorum sententias excerpendo collegimus. Nunc propter praecedentis voluminis longitudinem ab alio capientis exordium, ad vniuscuiusque conditionis, & sexus, & aetatis mores describendos, specialiter descendamus.'
(28) C. Stephen Jaeger, The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950-1200 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 939-1210 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).
(29) Arpad Steiner, 'Introduction', in Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, ed. Steiner, pp. xi--xxxi (p. xiv).
(30) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, chap. 1, pp. 5-6: 'Anima siquidem infantis carni recenter infusa ex eius corrupcione contrahit et caliginem ignorancie quantum ad intellectum et putredinem concupiscencie quantum ad affectum, ideoque rudis efficitur et ad intelligendum et ad bene agendum.'
(31) Margaret Gibson, 'The Artes in the 11th Century', in Arts liberaux et philosophie au moyen age: Actes du Congres international de philosophie medievale (Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1967), pp. 121-26.
(32) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 1, p. 6: 'Itaque propter hanc duplicem ruditatem oportet huiusmodi animam suscipere duplicem eruditionem, uidelicet doctrine ad illuminandum intellectum et discipline ad regendum affectum. Est enim doctrina scientia doctoris uel monitoris discipulo impertita. "Disciplina" uero "est", ut dicit beatus cyprianus, "ordinata morum correpcio". Itaque pueri non solum erudiendi sunt uerbis, sed eciam, si opus est, flagellis.'
(33) Pierre Riche, 'Sources pedagogiques et traites d'education', in Les Entrees dans la vie, initiations et apprentissages, Actes du XIIe Congres de la Societe des historiens medievistes de l'enseignement superieur public, Nancy, 1981 (Nancy: P.U.N., 1982), pp. 15-30.
(34) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 23, p. 78: 'Hec autem duo inuicem coniuncta, sc. uirtus et sciencia, se iuuant inuicem et hominem faciunt sapientem.'
(35) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 4, pp. 17-18.
(36) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 36, p. 140.
(37) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 36, pp. 140-41: 'Itaque contra
(38) For example, Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 42, pp. 174-75.
(39) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 43, p. 178: 'Porro quod dictum est supra de pueris, idem quoque agendum est in etate tenera de puellis, uidel. ut instruantur in moribus et consuetudinibus bonis.'
(40) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 42, p. 173: 'Serua, inquam, corpus illarum in etate puellari que prona est lasciuie, sc. ut non passim ad choreas uel spectacula uel conuiuia euagentur, sed in domo custodiantur, ne uagantes concupiscant uel concupiscantur.'
(41) Vincent of Beauvais, De morali principis institutione, ed. R. J. Schneider (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), prologus, p. 3: 'que uos et familiam uestram diuinis eloquiis aurem pariter ac mentem prebere diligenter interdum aduerterem, michi quidem utile uisum est aliqua de multis libris quos aliquando legeram ad mores principum et curialium pertinentia summatim in unum uolumen per diuersa capitula distinguendo colligere, quatinus et ego et fratres ceteri de ista materia, de qua nimirum pauca inueniuntur scripta, speciale quid in promptu haberemus ad quod oportune possemus recurrere, si quando nobis incumberet huiuscemodi generibus hominum, uidelicet principibus, militibus, consiliariis, ministris, balliuis, prepositis, ac ceteris siue in curia residentibus siue foris rempublicam administrantibus, ea que ad uite honestatem et anime salutem spectant, unicuique, prout statui suo competit, priuatim uel publice suadere.'
(42) Vincent of Beauvais, De morali principis institutione, chapter 21.
(43) Vincent of Beauvais, De morali principis institutione, 21: 'Invidus enim animam suam et carnes comedit, quia quanto illum cui inuidet feliciorem uidet tanto amplius contabescit ac deperit et paulatim zelo ac liuore distillat.'
(44) Jaeger, The Envy of Angels, pp. 2-14; Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-5.
(45) Vincent of Beauvais, De eruditione Filiorum nobilium, 36, p. 140: ut enim ait aristotiles in libro Io ethicorum, "differt non parum sic uel sic assuesci a iuuentute".'
(46) Michiel Verweij, 'Princely Virtues or Virtues for Princes? William Peraldus and his De eruditione principum, in Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages 1200-1500, eds Istvan Bejczy and Cary J. Nederman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 51-71; Arpad Steiner, 'New Light on Guillaume Perrault', Speculum, 17 (1942), 519-48.
(47) William Peraldus, De eruditione principum, online edition: Corpus Thomisticum (Fundacion Tomas de Aquino, 2011) <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/xre0.html>, preface, unpaginated: 'In mundo frequenter sunt deformiores qui videntur esse speciosiores, intus enim igne infernali sunt exusti, igne videlicet irae, vel cupiditatis, vel luxuriae. Multum plangere debent qui habent zelum Dei, si videant caecum principem statuae Nabuchodonosor assimilatum, cujus caput fuit ex auro optimo, membra vera inferiora multum erant capiti dissimilia.'
(48) William Peraldus, De eruditione principum, online edition, Corpus Thomisticum (Fundacion Tomas de Aquino, 2011) <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/xre1.html>, book 1, chapter 5: 'Vera nobilitas animi est secundum illud, nobilitas sola est animum quae moribus ornat. Et haec duplex est: quaedam naturalis, de qua dixit sapiens: quis est generosus ad virtutem? Bene a natura compositus: item nemo altero nobilior nisi cui rectius est ingenium, et bonis artibus aptius; altera est gratuita, quae filios Dei et Christi cohaeredes facit. Ad veram principis nobilitatem pertinet ut ipse sit sine ignobilitate, sine erubescibili servitute, a nulla rusticitate superari se permittat, turpitudinem omnem abhorreat, ad largitatem bonorum bene se habeat, bona sua libenter et liberaliter tribuat, subjectis sit clemens et pius, in rebelles severus, parva despiciat, magna appetat, aggrediatur ardua, non vano timore ab eo quod aggressus est citra consummationem desistat.'
(49) Laurent d'Orleans, La somme le roi, p. 1 3.
(50) Laurent d'Orleans, La somme le roi, p. 5 0.
(51) Laurent d'Orleans, La somme le roi, pp. 20-21.
(52) Charles F. Briggs, Giles of Rome's 'De regimine principum': Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c. 1275--c. 1525 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Roberto Lambertini, 'The Prince in the Mirror of Philosophy: About the Use of Aristotle in Giles of Rome's De regimine principum', in Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Ottawa, 17-22 August 1992, eds B. C. Bazan, E. Andujar, and L. G. Sbrocchi (Ottawa: Legas, 1995), pp. 1522-34; Roberto Lambertini, 'Von der iustitia generalis zur iustitia legalis. Die Politisierung des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes im 13. Jahrhundert am Beispiel des Aegidius Romanus', in Geistesleben im 13.Jahrhundert, ed. J. A. Aertsen (Berlin: A. Speer, 2000), pp. 131-45.
(53) Steiner, 'Introduction', p. xxvi; Janet Coleman, PoliticalThought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 64-71.
(54) Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Peter King, 'Aquinas on the Emotions', in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 209-26.
(55) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 1. 1-2, pp. 1-7.
(56) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 1. 2, p. 7: 'Videntur autem haec quatuor habere aliquam analogiam adinuicem. Nam ex alijs, & alijs moribus, habent esse aliae, & aliae passiones: ex alijs, & alijs passionibus, consurgunt alij, & alij habitus: ex alijs, & alijs habitibus, praestituuntur alij, & alij fines.'
(57) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 1, p. 153: 'Accipiendo autem numerum passionum, sicut dicebamus esse duodecim virtutes, sic dicere possumus quod sunt duodecim passiones, videlicet, amor, odium, desiderium, abominatio, delectatio, tristitia, spes, desperatio, timor, audacia, ira, & mansuetudo.'
(58) Peter of Auvergne, continuator of Aquinas, also considers mansuetudo a passion. On the contrary, the Franciscan Richard of Mediavilla, who was strongly influenced by Aquinas, maintained that mansuetudo was not a passion but a virtue. For a discussion of the performance of diffusing anger, see Kiril Petkov, The Kiss of Peace: Ritual, Self, and Society in the High and Late Medieval West (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 137-236.
(59) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 2, p. 156: 'Quia nullus bene seipsum regere potest, nisi sciat quae passiones sunt fugiendae, et quae prosequendae.'
(60) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 1, p. 154: 'Erit mansuetudo aequiuocum ad virtutem, & ad passionem oppositam irae. Si quis autem laborare vellet, cuilibet posset inuenire nomen proprium.'
(61) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 2. 27, p. 130: 'Quod autem deceat Reges & Principes esse mansuetos, ostendere non est difficile. Nam cum ira peruertat iudicium rationis, non decet Reges & Principes esse iracundos, cum in eis maxime vigere debeat ratio & intellectus. Sicut enim videmus quod lingua infecta per coleram, vel per alios humores, non recte iudicamus de saporibus: sic infecto appetitu per immoderatam iram, vel per alias immoderatas passiones, peruertitur nostrum iudicium rationis.'
(62) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 2. 33, p. 149: 'Continentes enim, sunt euntes in passionibus, et pugnant contra ipsas.'
(63) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 6, p. 169: 'Videtur autem forte aliquibus Reges, & Principes in nullo debere esse timidos, quia talia regiae maiestati derogatore dicuntur, multos autem sic incitantes Reges habere consueuerunt, persuadentes eis vt omnia audeant, nihil caueant: sed tales sunt adulatores, non veridici: docent enim Reges non esse fortes, nam qui omnia audent, & nihil timent, vt dicitur I. Magnorum moralium, non est fortis, sed fatuus. Oportet ergo videre quo modo eos esse deceat timidos, & audaces.'
(64) Steiner, 'Introduction', p. xxvi.
(65) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 2. 1. 23, p. 283: 'Consilium mulierum, ut dicitur 1. Politicorum est inualidum: nam sicut puer habet consilium imperfectum, quia deficit a perfectione viri: sic etiam foemina habet inualidum consilium, quia habet complexionem inualidam, et deficit a valitudine viri. Quod autem foeminae non sint robustae corpore, non est ex bonitate complexionis, sed ex malitia, mollicies enim carnis in ipsis magis arguit abundantiam flegmatis, quam bonitatem complexionis, quia ergo sic est, oportet foeminas deficere a ratione, et habere consilium inualidum.' See also Paulette L'Hermite-Leclercq, 'La Femme dans le De regimine principum de Gilles de Rome', in Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au moyen age: melanges en l'honneur de Philippe Contamine, eds Jacques Verger and Jacques Paviot (Paris: Presses de l'Universite de Paris--Sorbonne, 2000), pp. 471-79 (p. 471).
(66) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 2. 1. 6, p. 236: 'Quare cum in communitate maris & foeminae, mas debet esse principans, & foemina obsequens: in communitate vero patris & filij, pater debet esse imperans, & filius obtemperans; in communitate quidem domini & sequi, dominus debet esse praecipiens, & seruus ministrans & seruiens, in domo perfecta (vt vult Philosophus 1. Politicorum) sunt tria regimina, vnum coniugale, secundum quod vir praeest vxori: aliud paternale, secundum quod pater praeest filio: tertio dominatiuum & despoticum, secundum quod dominus praeest seruis.'
(67) Catherine L. Mastny, 'Durand of Champagne and the "Mirror of the Queen": A Study in Medieval Didactic Literature' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1969); Elizabeth Brown, 'The Prince is Father of the King: The Character and Childhood of Philip the Fair', Mediaeval Studies, 49 (1987), 282-34.
(68) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, in 'Le Speculum dominarum', ed. Dubrulle, treatise 3. 1-4, fols 169v-208r.
(69) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 1, fols 41v-42r: 'Sicut enim luna continue mutatur et numquam in eodem statu permanet, nunc cornuta, nunc gibbosa, nunc dimidia, nunc plena, sic anima in suis affectionibus jugiter et multimode variatur. Nunc enim amore fervescit, nunc odio contabescit, nunc gaudet in prosperis, nunc tristis efficitur in adversis, nunc dolore torquetur, nunc delectacione resolvitur, nunc timore pavescit, nunc spei fiducia hylarescit et sic de aliis modis quibus [fol. 42] anima de una affectione in aliam transmutatur, sicut in seipso quilibet experitur.'
(70) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 14, fol. 80v: per iram sapiencie lumen amittitur, quia mentis oculus excecatur, sicut equo operiuntur oculi ut circueat in molendino, sicut Phylistium Sampsonis oculos eruetunt et clausum in carcere molere fecerunt.'
(71) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 1, fol. 42r: 'Sunt autem affectiones vel passiones anime amor et odium, desiderium et abhominacio, delectacio et dolor, gaudium et tristicia, spes et desperacio, timor et audacia, ira et mansuetudo, zelus et invidia, verecundia et misericordia.'
(72) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 1, fols 42r-42v: 'Ex ordinacione et modificacione affectionum istarum redditur homo mirabiliter ordinatus, ex inordinacione vero excecatur intellectus, subvertitur racio, depravatur voluntas, pervetitur judicium, fiunt diffamaciones justorum, oppressiones supplicium, mendaces commendaciones impiorum, indigne promociones non tantum inutilium verum eciam--quod perniciosum est nimis -exaltaciones dampnabilium personarum. Et si ad unum dicendum, omnis homo qui suas insequitur passiones, jam non manet homo sed efficitur bestialis, ad omne malum proclivis, non utens recte judicio racionis.'
(73) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 2. 22, fols 159r-159v: 'Unde, Alexandro nato, misit epistulam Aristotili hec et similia continentem: "Philipus Aristotili, salutem. Dedit michi Deus filium michi genitum".'
(74) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 5, fols 51r-51v: 'Nunc videndum est de passione abhominacionis. Sicut autem affectionem amoris sequitur desiderium, quia cum aliquid cepit amari, statim desideratur haberi; sic post passionem vel affectionem odii sequitur abhominacio, quia cum aliquid incipit odiri, statim cor incipit illud abhominari et refugere. Sciendum autem quod solum peccatum abhominari debemus: ypocris falsitatem, symoniacam pravitatem, iniquitatem et injusticiam, detractorum seviciam, ornatus vanitatem et luxurie feditatem'; 'Specialiter autem abhominari debet anima ypocrisis falsitatem, maxime in regularibus, quia et Deus abhominatur eam, sicut dicit Luc. XVIo [Luke 16. 15]: Vos estis qui justificatis vos coram hominibus. Deus autem novit corda, quia quod hominibus altum est abhominacio est ante Deum'; 'Item symoniacam pravitatem in clericis, Dan IX: Erit in templo abhominacio desolacionis; Item Eze. VIIIo: Vidi ab aquilone porte altaris ydolum zeli in ipso introitu. Et dixit ad me: Fili hominis, putasne, vides tu quid isti faciunt, abhominaciones magnas quas domus Israel facit hic, ut procul recedam a sanctuario meo?'; 'Item iniquitatem et injusticiam in principibus ...'.
(75) Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, online edition, Corpus Thomisticum, la 2ae, q. 64, a. 1, ad 1: 'Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad regulam rationis.' Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri ethicorum, online edition, Corpus Thomisticum, book 5, lectio 13, no. 1049; Aquinas, Summa, la 2ae, q. 24, a. 3, co.; 2a 2ae, q. 30, a. 3, co.; 2a 2ae, q. 158, a. 2, co.
(76) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 8, fol. 57v: 'Gaudium autem proprie non est nisi de hiis que secundum racione appetimus. Unde in brutis animalibus bene est delectacio, non autem gaudium. In habentibus vero racionem, de omnibus de quibus potest esse gaudium potest esse delectacio, sed non econverso. Quandoque enim aliquis sentit delectacionem secundum corpus de qua tamen non gaudet secundum racionem; et sic patet quod delectacio est in plus quam gaudium.' Cf. Aquinas, Summa, la 2ae, q. 31, a. 3, co.
(77) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 2, fol. 202; Aquinas, Summa, 2a 2ae, q. 83, a. 12, co. I thank Rina Lahav for this observation.
(78) Tomas Zahora, 'Amending Aquinas: Textual Bricolage of the Speculum dominarum as an Authorial Strategy in the Compilation Speculum morale', Cahiers de Recherches Medievales et Humanistes, 24 (2012), 505-24.
(79) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 11, p. 184: 'Praedictarum passionum quaedam videntur esse laudabiles: ut misericordia, & verecundia. nam verecundia, secundum Philosophum, licet non sit virtus est tamen laudabilis passio. Sic etiam gratia, & nemesis laudabiles passiones esse videntur. Quaedam autem sunt vituperabiles. vt inuidia, & odium, vituperabile est odium, nisi sit vitiorum. Aliae autem passiones videntur se habere ad vtrunque, quia possunt esse laudabiles, & vituperabiles. Est enim diligenter aduertendum, quod semper in moribus laudantur media, & vituperantur extrema'; Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 1, fol. [42.sup.r]: 'Harum quedam de se videntur esse laudabiles, ut misericordia, verecundia et zelus. Quedam de se vituperabiles, ut invidia et odium -vituperabile est nisi sit odium viciorum. Alie vero videntur esse ad utrumlibet, quia possunt esse laudabiles et vituperabiles, sicut in prosequendo patebit.'
(80) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 3. 1, fol. 42r: 'Sunt autem affectiones vel passiones anime amor et odium, desiderium et abhominacio, delectacio et dolor, gaudium et tristicia, spes et desperacio, timor et audacia, ira et mansuetudo, zelus et invidia, verecundia et misericordia.'
(81) Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, 1. 3. 10, p. 181.
(82) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 4. 1, fols 92v-93r: bene institutum est regnum mentis quando racio bene consulit, voluntas bene imperat et sensualitas debito modo obtemperat.'
(83) Durand of Champagne, Speculum dominarum, 1. 3. 2. 6, fol. 33v: 'Item sit verecondia in vultu. Verecondia enim signum est pudice mentis. Unde Ecclesiastici VIIIo: Gracia verecondie mulieris super aurum. Et bene dicit gracia verecundie, quia verecundia reddit mulierem mirabiliter graciosam.'
(84) Constant J. Mews, 'The Speculum dominarum (Miroir des dames) and Transformations of the Literature of Instruction for Women in the Early Fourteenth Century', in Virtue Ethics forWomen 1250-1500, eds Karen Green and ConstantJ. Mews (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 13-30.
(85) See Bonaventure, De reductione artium ad theologiam, online edition (subscriber only): Library of Latin Texts--Series A (Centre Traditio Litterarum Occidentalium/Brepols, 2010) <http://clt.brepolis.net/llta>.
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|Date:||Jan 1, 2014|
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