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Selected excerpts relating to changed threat perception in South Africa since 1994.

2.1 The global, regional and domestic strategic environments

RSA, White Paper on Intelligence 1995 (*)


A complex interplay of international, regional and domestic developments, of both a positive and negative nature impact on national security, and consequently the mission of the intelligence community in South Africa. The next section of this White Paper highlights the most critical of these developments.

8.1 International dimension

With the shifting international balance of forces, intense interest has shifted onto the successful South African transition. South Africa is perceived as an area of intense economic opportunity by foreign nations competing to achieve trade and industrial advantage in this regard. Notwithstanding this, with the demise of apartheid and the Cold War, new political and economic relationships of cooperation and support with various countries have become both desirable and possible.

On a more negative note, new global political, social and economic problems are filtering South Africa's borders. International extremists have forged links with their South African counterparts, whilst international drug cartels, use our country both as a transit route for their trade and as a market, thus corrupting our social system.

Lastly, there has been a dramatic increase in foreign intelligence activities in South Africa. Apart from classic political and military espionage, other activities of foreign/hostile intelligence services and industrial espionage agents have increased markedly in the economic, technological and scientific fields.

8.2 Regional dimension

Because of its relatively advantaged economic position, South Africa is regarded as a pivotal centre of development for Southern Africa and indeed, for the rest of Africa. The social and economic problems of the region will continue to affect South Africa. It can reasonably be argued that there will not be peace and stability in South Africa until conditions of peace prevail in the rest of Southern Africa. Indeed South Africa has a moral responsibility to contribute towards the development of the rest of Africa. It must define its relationship with the continent away from domination and destabilisation, towards a relationship of cooperation and mutual respect.

At the same time unrealistic expectations of South Africa must be tempered. The pressing socio-economic problems of our own country suggest that we must make these our first priority. The relationship we enter into with other African countries must be designed to promote political stability, regional security, and our mutual economic growth and development, as well as a lessening of dependence of the African continent on the countries of the North, in favour of the development of the South.

8.3 Internal dimension

Massive socio-economic degradation, with poverty, hunger, homelessness and unemployment being the order of the day, will render the political changes meaningless if they are not accompanied by a significant improvement in the quality of our people's lives. Whilst politically motivated violence is on the decline, there has been an increase in common criminal activities.

These socio-economic problems call for creativity and commitment in the implementation of the RDP. At the same time the government and society must be firm in dealing with crime and lawlessness.

(*.) Selected excerpts.

Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa -- (As approved by Parliament, May 1996) (*)


The global context

The following conclusions for the defence sector are drawn from this overview of the external environment.

-- The absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalise, redesign and 'rightsize' the SANDF. The details of this process will be spelt out in the Defence Review.

-- The SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability because of the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such capability cannot be created from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The maintenance and development of weapons systems is necessarily a long-term endeavour. ...

-- Within budgetary constraints, the DoD will engage in cooperative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, combined exercises and procurement of arms and equipment.

-- For political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence cooperation with other Southern African states is a priority. South Africa will seek lo strengthen the security and defence forums of SADC. The question of regional security is discussed in more detail below.

-- As a responsible member of the international community, South Africa will conduct its foreign policy, arms trade and external defence activities in accordance with international law and norms. South Africa is a member of a number of multi-lateral arms control regimes, and has recently introduced new policy on national arms control.

The regional context

The most significant strategic development over the past few years is South Africa's new status in Southern Africa, previously an arena of intense conflict. With the election of the Government of National Unity, relations with neighbouring states have changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and co-operation.

The region as a whole has undergone substantial change since the end of the Cold War. Considerable progress has been made towards the resolution of internal conflicts, the establishment of democratic political systems, and demilitarisation and disarmament. The prospects for regional peace and stability are greater today than at any other time in recent decades.

Nevertheless, much of the sub-continent is stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis; widespread disease and environmental degradation; and a proliferation of small arms. Certain states remain politically volatile. The worst case scenario, as was experienced most intensely in Angola and Mozambique, is civil war.

These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats: environmental destruction, the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms.

Regional instability and underdevelopment can only be addressed meaningfully through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-state co-operation in these spheres. Similarly, the prevention and management of inter and intra-state conflict is primarily a political and not a military matter.

Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa will encourage the development of a multi-lateral 'common security' approach in Southern Africa. In essence, the SADC states should shape their political, security and defence policies in co-operation with each other. This does not preclude the conclusion of bilateral and trilateral security agreements.

A common approach to security in Southern Africa is necessary for a number of reasons. First, many of the domestic threats to individual states are shared problems and impact negatively on the stability of neighbouring countries.

Second, it is possible that inter-state disputes could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and previously suppressed territorial claims.

Third, since the sub-continent is politically volatile and its national and regional institutions are relatively weak, internal conflicts could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities. This volatility and weakness also makes the region vulnerable to foreign interference and intervention from land, sea and air. ...

Situations may arise in Southern Africa where inter- or intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region as a whole. If political efforts to resolve the conflict are unsuccessful, it may become necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace support operations. ...

Finally, South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa. Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa's long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region.

The domestic context

From a security perspective there are three prominent trends at domestic level. First, ... there is an overwhelming need for socioeconomic development and reconstruction in order to address the root causes of much personal insecurity and social instability. This is both a moral obligation and a strategic imperative.

Secondly, South Africa is characterised by endemic crime and criminal violence which affects all sectors of society and is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms in private hands. The government is tackling this problem through efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system, community policing and crime prevention strategies. A long-term solution lies in upgrading the conditions of impoverished communities through the RDP.

Thirdly, there has been a considerable reduction in the level of public and political violence since the elections in April 1994. Nevertheless, violence in certain parts of the country remains unacceptably high and poses a serious threat to public order and the security of citizens.

Public order policing is primarily the responsibility of the South African Police Service (SAPS). However, given the relative shortage of police personnel, large numbers of troops are currently deployed to assist them. This tendency is undesirable. As motivated in Chapter 5, it is a matter of urgency that plans are formulated to allow for the withdrawal of the SANDF from a policing role.

(*.) Selected excerpts from the White Paper as reprinted in Defence in a Democracy, Department of Defence, Version Two, pp 12-15.

2.2 Defence contingencies

South African Defence Review

(As approved by Parliament, April 1998) (*)





10. A major consideration in designing the peace-time force and the capabilities it requires is the nature of the defence contingencies against which the SANDF may have to act.

11. The White Paper asserts that South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional threat and does not anticipate external aggression in the short- to medium-term (approximately five years). The longer term future cannot be determined with any certainty because international relations are inherently unpredictable.

12. The examination of defence contingencies must therefore rely on a threat-independent, as opposed to a threat-specific, approach. If a concrete threat were to emerge, the examination would naturally become more specific.

13. The threat-independent approach should be rooted in an analysis of the external environment. It should take account, in particular, of the political, strategic and geographic situation in Southern Africa. The current reality is that Southern Africa is a region of allies. South Africa is a member of SADC and the ISDSC, and participates in common security arrangements under the auspices of these bodies

14. Further, planning for defence contingencies should be based on a realistic appreciation of the probability of such contingencies occurring and the impact on South Africa should the SANDF be unable to meet a contingency. This will help to prioritise contingencies for which the Defence Force should prepare.

15. Certain contingencies may occur with little warning, but in the Southern African context other contingencies are likely to be of a longer term nature where early warning will be obtained. This will allow for timely preparation and expansion.

16. Although the SANDF must ultimately be ready to deal with a range of contingencies, it need not maintain forces at immediate readiness for the longer term contingencies. However, it must retain the core for expansion.

17. The advantage of this approach is that substantial savings will be effected. As noted above, the core force will comprise a relatively small full-time component and a sufficiently large part-time component.

18. There are inherent risks in this approach, however. The warning period required to expand the core force may not be available due to strategic or operational surprise as a result of intelligence failure or an unwillingness of decision-makers to heed the warning. After warning has been received, such expansion might be thwarted by sanctions and the inability of the defence industry to deliver equipment timeously.

19. Defence contingencies are examined below on a continuum from major contingencies such as an invasion to lesser contingencies such as threats against off-shore assets. For the sake of comprehensive analysis, all possible contingencies related to the primary function of self-defence are considered.

Analysis of Contingencies

20. Invasion. Invasion is defined as a major attack aimed at occupying the South Africa or part of it, replacing the government by force and conquering its people. This contingency is considered to be fairly remote since South Africa has no present or foreseeable enemies.

21. Further, a potential enemy does not stand to gain a major advantage from an invasion:

21.1 Although South Africa is relatively rich in resources, these do not have sufficient strategic importance given the resources available in other parts of the world.

21.2 The isolated geographic position of the Republic diminishes the possibility that it may be used by an external force as a springboard, base area or thoroughfare for military operations elsewhere. The only exception is the remote possibility of a world war where a belligerent has the capability to attack shipping on the Cape sea route. If an aggressor desires to launch an attack against a neighbouring state in Southern Africa, it would be far simpler to avoid South African territory.

21.3 The international situation would have to change considerably before an external power seeks to impose its ideology on South Africa through the use of force.

22. The probability of an invasion is therefore extremely low. However, the impact of a successful invasion would be so catastrophic that it cannot be ignored totally as a contingency.

23. From an operational perspective, an invasion can take place over the landward border, from the sea or a combination of the two.

23.1 An invasion over the landward border would require a major military build-up to the north. For a number of decades into the future, an operation of this kind could not be undertaken solely by an African state or alliance of African states. It would require the participation of a major power. It would also require coercion or invasion of one or more states to the north. The terrain to the north would present the attacker with logistic problems and restrict its mobility. These constraints provide a substantial warning period for defensive action.

23.2 An invasion from seaward would require substantial specialist resources and could be undertaken only with the involvement of a superpower or coalition of major powers. Opportunities for strategic and deep interdiction in such a case would be more restricted. Factors favouring South African defences are natural obstacles to the attacker and ocean conditions favourable to defensive counter-strikes. As in the previous scenario, these factors provide a substantial warning period for defensive action.

24. Limited neutralising attacks. In this scenario a third party, such as a major power, wants to prevent the Republic from interfering militarily in that party's designs in Southern Africa. South Africa's approach to common security implies that it would threaten a major act of aggression against a SADC state.

25. The aggressor might therefore seek to neutralise South Africa's ability to project military power. The targets of an attack might include air and naval transport assets, air and naval attack assets, and mobile ground forces. Capabilities to defend these assets should thus be provided for in the peace-time force.

26. Such a scenario would probably entail UN, OAU and SADC condemnation of the aggressor, and would obviously be preceded by diplomatic efforts to avert a crisis. The development into an attack on the South Africa is therefore unlikely, although this scenario has a higher probability than the invasion contingency. The impact would be much smaller, however, making the total risk lower than that of an invasion. Nevertheless, force design should take note of this contingency.

27. Internal military threats to the constitutional order. The SANDF may be employed to combat internal military threats to the constitutional order. Such threats could take the form of civil war or general insurrection on a national or provincial scale. Such threats might be supported by external agents or forces. While the probability of this contingency is low, the impact would be considerable if it were not met successfully. This is therefore a contingency for which the SANDF should be prepared.

28. Raids. Raids of lesser intensity may occur against the RSA for the purpose of coercion or castigation. Coercion would aim to force South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict with another state s interests or goals, and castigation would be retaliation against South African actions regarded as offensive by such a state.

29. Raids could be launched by a major or smaller power. They could take many forms, such as air raids by aircraft or missiles; landward raids by mobile or unconventional forces; and maritime raids by surface vessels, amphibious craft or clandestine forces.

30. The impact of such raids, although considerable, would be lower than that of the previous scenarios. In contrast, the probability of such actions by irresponsible and irrational governments is higher than for the contingencies of invasions and limited neutralising attacks. Since raids may also be launched by non-governmental, radical organisations, the probability must be considered as real. The SANDF should therefore plan for these contingencies in designing the core force.

31. Blockades. Blockades may be invoked to coerce South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict with the interests and goals of another power. Blockades may take the form of interference in South Africa s sea lines of communications through mining of harbours or attacks on shipping within South Africa's maritime zone; landward blockades of trade routes to neighbouring states; or the enforcement of no-fly zones.

32. Given South Africa's dependence on trade, especially maritime trade, this could have an extremely negative effect on the well-being of the country and its people. The impact would thus be considerable and should be taken into account in designing the peace-time force.

33. Attacks on embassies, ships and aircraft. South Africa has a responsibility to protect its embassies, ships and aircraft outside its national borders. The threat against these assets is mainly one of piracy and international terrorism. Protection by host nations may not always be forthcoming or effective.

34. Although the impact of such contingencies is relatively low, the probability of their occurrence is relatively high. The capability to protect and release captured embassies, ships and aircraft should therefore be provided for in the core force. This capability must be at immediate readiness since the contingency may arise with little or no warning.

35. Law enforcement of marine resources and maritime zone. Maritime law enforcement is not a primary defence task ... However, a state may use military force to back up its exploitation of South African resources. The impact of such a contingency might be significant although the probability can presently be considered as low. This contingency requires capabilities similar to those needed to protect sea lines of communication.

36. Islands. The level of threat against South African islands (the Prince Edward Island group) and the impact if this threat materialises are such that no special or additional defence capabilities are required. However, it should be noted that the South African sea areas around these islands are rich in potential food sources.

(*.) Selected excerpts from the Defence Review as reprinted in Defence in a Democracy, Department of Defence, Version Two, pp 12-14.

2.3 The impact of crime on democracy, stability human rights

RSA, National Crime Prevention Strategy, May 1996 (*)

2.3.1 It is extremely difficult to extrapolate the quantitative costs of various forms of crime, due to the unavailability of reliable statistical information. However, even if this were possible, it is very dangerous to allow such quantitative evaluation to eclipse the qualitative impact-assessment of crime in South Africa. Ultimately, the impact of crime measured in quantitative terms will only ever evaluate the costs of direct victimisation. Such quantitative evaluation therefore cannot account for the massive impact of secondary victimisation on the families, friends, colleagues and witnesses to crimes perpetrated upon direct victims. Nor can it measure the impact of crime on the social fabric. The real magnitude of the human costs of crime therefore often remain hidden from view.

2.3.2 In this regard, it is imperative to recognise the impact which burgeoning crime rates have in depressing popular confidence in the very process of democratisation in South Africa. As such, crime is sometimes viewed as being a fundamental threat to state security. However, this risks over-stating the problem. Although current crime rates contribute to high levels of popular insecurity and to a loss of stability, it would be wrong to equate the fight against crime with the broader concerns of national security.

2.3.3 However, it is important to recognise the danger that the crime problem -- through the widespread insecurity which it gives rise to, as well as through the sheer magnitude of victimisation which it generates -- may breed popular contempt for human rights and, therefore, for the new constitutional dispensation which enshrines these rights. There is a danger that many South Africans may come to perceive the Bill of rights as providing greater protection for criminals than it does for the victims of crime. As a result, the crime problem may generate a reaction against the concept of human rights for all. The political pressure on government to retreat from its commitment to the building of a human rights culture obviously cannot be entertained. However, the onus is on government to deliver a crime prevention approach which places the rights and needs of victims' at the centre of the strategy. It is also essential that a human rights culture is built which recognises that rights and obligations are opposite sides of the same coin -- and that the rights of offenders may therefore be curtailed only when they impinge on the rights of victims.

2.3.4 It is recognised that women's experience of violence is not well captured by existing research and that insufficient information exists for the South African context. The ability of women to achieve social, economic, legal and personal equality by participating fully in private and public life is severely inhibited by the prevalence of widespread violence against women. Such violence affects every aspect of women's lives and, although the extent of the costs to society still need to be quantified in order for the severity of the problem to be recognised, it is clear that violence against women exacts high human costs in terms of the physical and mental health of women and children. For women it often results in serious physical injuries, psychological and emotional trauma and death. Economic costs are also incurred by medical expenditure and loss of work hours. Furthermore, children who witness the assault of their mothers are adversely affected and suffer consequences. They are at high risk of perpetua ting violence and victimisation themselves in the future. Women denied the basic right to security of the person, cannot participate equally in South African society.

2.3.5 Ultimately, it is precisely because of the inherent threat to both democracy and to human rights, that a "sense of safety" has been incorporated as a basic need within the Reconstruction and Development Programme. It is in this context that the role and importance of the NCPS must be viewed.

(*.) Selected excerpts.

White Paper on Safety and Security In Service of Safety, 1999-2004 -- September 1998 (*)



Focus areas

-- Crime and policing in the new democracy.

-- Government anti-crime initiatives.

-- Developing new policy.

-- Strategic areas for intervention.

Reducing crime is one of the leading challenges of South Africa's democratic government. Some success has been achieved in this regard with most categories of recorded crime stabilising from 1996. Appropriate law enforcement and social crime prevention interventions are urgently required to reduce crime from current levels.

Recorded crime statistics, while they do not always reflect the true extent of crime in any society, are still useful in presenting broad crime trends. In turn, victim surveys -- an independent means of verifying police statistics through questioning a representative sample of the population -- also provide useful insights into the extent of crime. In South Africa, recent victim surveys suggest that police statistics may be more accurate than has been generally assumed. Much effort is being directed within the Department to ensure that the quality and reliability of crime statistics is further enhanced. A Committee of Inquiry into the collection, processing and interpretation of crime statistics has just completed its work and several of its recommendations are being implemented. However, data key to ensuring effective crime prevention on issues such as domestic violence, the relationship between alcohol and offending, and the role of youth in crime, is currently not available.


SAPS statistics suggest that crime in the country increased from 1985. This began to change in 1996 when most categories of crime showed a stabilisation. Despite this trend, current levels of crime remain high and continue to breed insecurity in the country. Crime has severe implications through the costs of victimisation which undermine economic and social development. Also, fear of crime often changes lifestyles, negatively affecting the quality of living.

The causes of crime were analysed in some detail in the NCPS. Among others, the NCPS identified these as being: gender inequality; proliferation of arms; social-psychological factors; vigilantism; inadequate support to victims of crime; youth marginalisation; economic underdevelopment and inequality; poverty and unemployment; institutionalised violence in the society; and, the encroachment of international criminal groups. Given that these have already been covered in the NCPS, which frames the content of the White Paper, this analysis will not be repeated here.

It should be noted, however, that high levels of crime often accompany transitions to democracy. This is not to say that crime is necessarily a feature of democracy. Instead, dramatic changes in societies which move from authoritarian rule to democratic governance often weaken state and social controls, generating increased levels of crime. In addition, as experience from other societies in transition suggest, this enhances opportunities for more sophisticated and organised criminal operations which must be countered by equally sophisticated government responses. This implies improving technological systems and human resource capabilities.

Organised criminal activity, while present before 1994, was not recognised as a concern. Countering organised crime has now become a key goal of government. Police statistics suggest a large number of organised crime syndicates operate in the country. These groups, many of whom have regional and international links, engage in a number of illegal activities including the trafficking of drugs and arms, vehicle theft and armed robbery. Government is therefore required to respond to the regional and international character of crime by strengthening regional and international co-operation.

Despite these challenges, international evidence suggests that states in transition to democracy are seldom immediately able to counter crime. On the one hand, authoritarian governance is usually accompanied by policing methods inappropriate for crime prevention in a democratic environment. On the other hand, the new state is often faced with the dilemma that it is required to govern the society with the same instruments which were used to enforce authoritarian rule.

(*.) Selected excerpts.

2.4 Terrorism

Hansard, 27 August 1998 (*)


The MINISTER: The recent bomb explosion has indeed brought the Waterfront, which is one of our important tourist destinations, into negative focus. As I said before, this bombing could only be done by people who have utter disregard for the sanctity of human life. It needs to be deplored primarily because of the suffering it has caused.

The other motivation for these acts is the desire to destabilise the constitutional order which so many of our people worked so hard to bring about. These elements are contemptuous of the will of the people. They ignore democratic institutions and seed to impose their will on the people, rather than presenting their case to the people and allowing the people to decide.

Since this particular incident, the topic of terrorism has received increasing attention in the country. As lawmakers and practitioners, our participation in the discussion must be directed at designing appropriate and effective countermeasures. For those measures to be effective they must be based on a comprehensive analysis of all the trends that are relevant to the concept of terrorism.

It is common cause amongst people of goodwill that the Waterfront incident is part of a pattern of terrorism which has been taking place in our country. One only has to recall the incidents in Worcester, Rustenburg, Bellville, the Cape Flats, the theft of weapons at the Tempe army base and the Faure police stores, as well as the murder of women and children at Shoba-shobane, Richmond and the N1 highway near Pietersburg.

In instances where people were killed, both basic variants of terrorist crimes have been present, namely focused as well as diffused victimisation. Focused victimisation, as in the case of Richmond, is intended to dissuade people from exercising their right to choose. Diffused victimisation targets noncombatant targets such as the people who were enjoying themselves at Planet Hollywood.

Who are the perpetrators? Some of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism in our country are people who retain a nostalgic longing for the past. ...

The other brand of terrorism which is evident in our situation is that practised by criminal syndicates that use terrorist tactics to intimidate the general population. Some of the masquerade as anticrime activists, and they exploit public sentiment as a cover behind which they seek to deter law-enforcement agencies. The recent attack on the investigation unit in Bellville is a case in point.

When huge quantities of weapons are stolen from an army base, or a mosque is bombed, a black child is killed on the highway or a restaurant is bombed at the Waterfront, this must waken the heart to the necessity for a serious debate in this House.

As elected representatives, we should not discuss these problems selectively, even if some of them may have been perpetrated by people whose sentiments find resonance in us.

Recently, Government adopted a policy on terrorism and the management of incidents of terrorism. A ministerial committee was charged with the responsibility of ensuring effective implementation of this policy. It is our steadfast belief that the successes we had against terrorist acts before, can be sustained by an effective implementation of the existing policy. If we respond to this act in panic, or we respond irresponsibly, or without regard to the big picture, we will be playing into the hands of the terrorists. Our words in this debate must be measured and considered. Having talked to those who are investigating this incident, I have no doubt that they know what they are doing. I want to assure the victims, their relatives and the South African public at large that we will make no concessions to terrorists. We will bring them to justice. ...

(*.) Selected excerpts. Source: RSA, Debates of the National Assembly, 25-27 August 1998, Cols 5475-5477.

Press Statement: Department of Foreign Affairs 21 December 1999 (*)


Ambassador Kumalo, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, in New York today (21 December 1999) signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings on behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

The purpose of the Convention is to criminalise acts of terrorist bombings and in so doing further strengthen the international legal framework for combating and eliminating international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

"South Africa's signature of this important Convention further emphasises our willingness to co-operate with the international community in eliminating the scourge of international terrorism". ...

(*.) Selected excerpts. Source:

2.5 National intelligence priorities

Statement from the Ministry for Intelligence Services Intelligence Programme 2000 --- 7 February 2000 (**)


The key National Intelligence Priorities for the year 2000 are aimed at combating:

-- Attempts to destabilise the Constitutional Order, Subversion, Sabotage and Terrorism, and in particular urban terrorism;

-- Corruption;

-- Crime;

-- Espionage;

-- Poor protective security within the State;

-- Regional Security Dynamics;

-- Continental Stability Issues;

-- International economic and technological threats and opportunities as they relate to South Africa;

-- Ensuring an environment conducive for free and fair local government elections;

-- Extremism and terrorism;

-- Addressing arms smuggling with a special focus on drug dealers;

-- Taxi violence; and

-- Involvement of foreign and South African Security Companies in African conflicts.

(**.) Selected excerpts. Source:
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Publication:Institute for Strategic Studies
Article Type:Topic Overview
Geographic Code:6SOUT
Date:Nov 1, 2000
Previous Article:The concept of threat analysis. (Part III: Changing Threat Perception).
Next Article:Conceptual framework. (Part IV: Defence Policy and Military Doctrine and Strategy).

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