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Salvation from the Sky: Airlift in the Korean War, 1950.

Before dawn on June 25, 1950, Soviet-built T-34 tanks spearheading North Korean infantry columns invaded South Korea, plunging the three-year-old U.S. Air Force into its first war. The Korean War demanded all of the kinds of missions that air power could offer, including counterair, strategic bombardment, interdiction, close air support, reconnaissance, and airlift. Of these, airlift played a pivotal role, especially in the war's crucial first year, when ground forces moved spectacularly down and up the peninsula. Sometimes the airlift role is overshadowed by the flashier fighter and bomber missions. Yet the ability of transport and troop carrier aircraft to move men, equipment, and supplies rapidly from place to place contributed as much to the successful defense of South Korea as bombing, strafing, or shooting down enemy aircraft.

The demand for airlift erupted on the first day of the invasion. John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, requested a sea and air evacuation of American civilians from Korea. Most of the evacuees were in the Seoul area, and had to leave through the port of Inchon or nearby Kimpo and Suwon airfields. The Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and its 374th Troop Carrier Group mustered 7 four- engine C--54s, and 14 two-engine C--47s and C--46s at Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases in Japan for the airlift. Between June 27 and 29, the Air Force evacuated about 850 civilians from Korea to Japan. Fifth Air Force F--80 jets and F--82 Twin Mustang fighters covered the evacuation and shot down seven enemy aircraft. At the same time 905 evacuees departed by sea. [1]

On June 28, the same day the North Koreans took Seoul and Kimpo, the Air Force began airlifting ammunition to Suwon for the South Korean defenders. FEAF delivered 150 tons from Tachikawa Air Base (AB) in Japan that day Despite Fifth Air Force fighter cover, enemy strafers caught one C--54 on the ground and left it a burning wreck. On July 1, Suwon also fell to the enemy, depriving the United States of the last large airfield in the Seoul area. [2]

President Harry S. Truman was not content merely to evacuate U.S. civilians from the South Korean capital or to haul ammunition to the South Korean defenders. He was determined to send U.S. troops from Japan to Korea as quickly as possible to help stem the invasion in the name of the United Nations. For this he turned again to the Air Force. On July 1, seven C--54s airlifted the first U.S. troops from Japan to South Korea. Between July 1 and 4, the 374th Troop Carrier Group (TCG) airlifted 24th Infantry Division troops and their equipment and supplies from Itazuke AB, Japan, to Pusan, at the southeastern tip of the Korea. Proceeding quickly by land northwestward, the airlifted troops first engaged the North Koreans in combat near Osan on July 5. [3]

The heavy four-engine C--54s that landed at Pusan had threatened to damage the fragile runways there, forcing the use of smaller two-engine transports. The ability of C--47s to land more easily on small and poorly surfaced airstrips in Korea persuaded the Air Force to expand the number of Skytrains in the theater. Eventually, the number of C--47s available to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Ashiya rose to forty, and Greece sent a detachment of the Skytrains to augment the squadron.

The entrance of U.S. troops into the war failed to turn the tide, and the North Koreans, armed with tanks, continued to advance rapidly and relentlessly into South Korea. To help destroy the tanks, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) moved rocket launchers, popularly known as bazookas, and shaped charges from the United States to Japan in July. FEAF moved the bazookas from Japan to Korea, but some of the shaped charges went to the Navy's Task Force 77. [4]

Despite domination of the air by Fifth Air Force and U.S. Navy carriers, the North Koreans continued to advance, and more and more South Korean cities fell. The territory available for U.S. airfields in South Korea decreased almost daily. Engineer aviation battalions built, repaired, or extended airstrips still in friendly territory such as the ones at Pusan, Pohang, and Taegu. Despite having to compete with Fifth Air Force fighters for the use of these airfields, FEAF cargo deliveries to Korea increased in August. On August 2, the Eighth Army in Korea asked for an airlift of 300,000 pounds of military cargo from Japan to Korea, and the 374th TCG accomplished the mission in 24 hours. [5]

That same month, the 314th TCG and its C--119 Flying Boxcars began moving from the U.S. to Japan. MATS C--54 transports also helped move two additional B--29 bombardment groups from the U.S. to the Far East. FEAF cargo sorties per day also rose significantly during August, going from 42 on August 1, to 105 on August 14, to 130 on August 25. Airlifted tonnage within the theater also increased sharply, from 60 tons on August. 1, to 203 on August 7, and 458 tons on August 27. [6]

At the end of the month, FEAF organized the 1st Troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), the nucleus of what on September 10 became the provisional Combat Cargo Command. It included the 1st TCG (Provisional) and the 314th and 374th TCGs, that were equipped with C--46s, C--47s, C--119s, and C--54s. The new organization, headquartered at Ashiya AB, Japan, was charged with airlifting men and materiel within Korea and between Korea and Japan. Its first commander was Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, the famous airlift veteran, who had masterminded the Hump airlift over the Himalaya Mountains between India and China during World War II, and the Berlin Airlift, which had concluded successfully the previous year. [7]

UN demands for airlift increased during September, as the allied forces prepared to go on the offensive. By then the North Koreans held all of South Korea except for a small perimeter around Taegu and Pusan. When General Douglas MacArthur launched his dramatic invasion of Inchon near Seoul on September 15, Tunner's Combat Cargo Command prepared to airlift materiel and men both to the Inchon invaders and to the Eighth Army which was poised to break out from the Pusan perimeter. Tunner had available an armada of C--54s, C--47s. and C--46s to land troops and equipment and for air evacuation from soon-to-be-captured airfields, and C--119s for air-dropping supplies to advancing UN troops.

Tunner did not have to wait long for his opportunity On September 17, U.S. Marines captured Kimpo airfield near Seoul. Two days later thirty-two C--54s landed there with more troops, supplies and night lighting equipment. Using this equipment, the next day Combat Cargo Command transformed the airlift into an around-the-clock operation. With C--54s landing at all hours of the day and night before long the command was delivering more than 800 tons per day at Kimpo. Skymasters unloaded fuel and ammunition, much of it for Marine Aircraft Group 33. On return trips to Japan, the C--54s evacuated battle casualties. [8]

On September 21, still less than a week after the Inchon invasion, C--54s began airlifting rations and ammunition to newly captured Suwon airfield south of Seoul. As at Kimpo, the Skymasters returned to Japan with wounded casual ties. On September 24, eight C--54s transported 65 tons of ammunition and food from Japan to Suwon. The next day Tunner's air transports began landing soldiers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team at Kimpo. That troop airlift lasted three days. [9]

Ships could not deliver as much military cargo at Inchon as planners had hoped. Surface lines of transportation also failed to deliver enough war materiel from Inchon to the front line troops. To keep the advancing Marines and Army troops supplied, Generals MacArthur and Edward Almond, who led X Corps, depended on airlift. It included not only the landing of cargo at the Kimpo and Suwon airfields, but also the airdropping of food and ammunition directly to the front, usually by Combat Cargo Command C-119s. Airlift helped supply both X Corps at Inchon and the Eighth Army advancing from the Pusan perimeter. As these forces approached each other to link up, North Korean troops fled northward to escape being cut off. [10] Some of them dispersed into the South Korean mountains to live off the land.

In October, sixty-six Flying Boxcar sorties airlifted components of a 600-ton treadway bridge from Asbiya AB in Japan to Kimpo to allow U.S. ground troops spreading out from Inchon and Seoul to cross the Han River. This was the first time that airlift had delivered an entire bridge. Once it was assembled, General MacArthur himself crossed it to lead the offensive northward. His troops not only reached the 38th parallel, but, with the approval of President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, moved into North Korea. What had been an effort to defend South Korea now became an attempt to liberate all of Korea from communism."

During October 1950, General Tunner's airlift from Japan to Korea and within Korea broke its previous records. USAF transports dropped food to 150 former POWs on October 7. [12] Five days later, Combat Cargo Command began airlifting supplies to Wonsan, that Republic of Korea (ROK) forces had just captured in eastern North Korea. Tunner's airplanes also transported an entire base unit to Wonsan to operate the airfield there. [13] After Eighth Army troops captured Sinmak airfield, between Seoul and Pyongyang, Combat Cargo Command began airlifting fuel and food there for the UN troops advancing toward the North Korean capital. On October 17, air transports delivered 235 tons of gasoline and rations to Sinmak and returned to Japan with aeromedical evacuees. [14]

On October 20, General MacArthur launched the first airborne operation of the Korean War. Tunner's transports, including more than seventy C-119s and forty C-47s, dropped over 2,300 paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and 300 tons of their equipment behind enemy lines at Sukchon and Sunchon, about 30 miles north of Pyongyang. H-S helicopters evacuated injured paratroops from the drop zone. That same day, Pyongyang fell to UN forces, and Combat Cargo Command began airlifting supplies to the airfields there. Forty C-119s dropped about 1,000 additional paratroops in the Sukchon and Sunchon areas on October 21 to reinforce the airborne troops dropped the day before. Between October 20 and 22, the Flying Boxcars and C-47s had dropped well over 3,000 troops behind enemy lines north of Pyongyang. To resupply the paratroopers until surface supply routes from the Pyongyang area could reach them, Tunner's C-119s air-dropped 290 tons, including jeeps, trucks, and howitzers. [15]

Within a day of the airborne operation, UN forces from Pyongyang linked up with the paratroopers. [16] On October 24, Combat Cargo Command delivered 1,182 tons of freight to Pyongyang, the largest one-day airlift into any airfield thus far in the Korean War. The next day the command broke its record again. [17] At tthe same time, C-119 airdrops continued. To relieve a group of friendly ground troops cut off temporarily at Unsan, nine Flying Boxcars dropped 28.5 tons of ammunition, fuel, and oil on October 26. [18] During October, FEAF airlifted 2,840 patients within Korea and 3,025 patients from Korea to Japan. By early November, C-47s were flying cargo in and casualties out of newly captured airfields at Sinanju and Anju, deep in North Korea, well north of Pyongyang. [19] By then, the number of transport sorties outnumbered sorties devoted to strategic bombardment, interdiction, or close air support. With the help of airlift, the Eighth Army advanced from the Pusan perimeter all the way to the vicinity of C hina in just a few weeks. Enemy guerillas continued to throw up roadblocks on surface supply lines, but UN supplies could bypass them. C-47s and C-46s landed freight at forward airfields, and C-119s dropped cargo from overhead. [20]

By November, although UN troops had taken over most of North Korea and were approaching the Yalu River border with China, the war was not yet over, and airlift would have an even more important role to play. The Eighth Army, which had advanced beyond the ability of surface supply lines to sustain it, required additional airlifts of food and ammunition. [21] On November 10, less than 36 hours after its arrival in Japan, the 437th TCG began airlifting cargo in C-46s from Japan to Korea. [22] On November 12, FEAF commander, General Stratemeyer, requested additional C-46 and C-54 air and ground crews. [23] Combat Cargo Command dropped rations and gasoline at Kapsan on November 20 to resupply rear echelons of a UN unit that had just reached the Yalu River. [24] When overwhelming numbers of Communist Chinese troops entered the conflict during the month, UN troops began a retreat. Even with airlift to supplement stretched land and sea supply routes, MacArthur could not deliver enough cargo and reinforcements to all ow his troops to hold their advanced positions. [25]

Eighth Army forces in western North Korea fell back to Pyongyang and then retreated to new more defensible lines nearer the 38th parallel. X Corps and ROK troops in eastern North Korea withdrew toward Wonsan and Hungnam on the coast, from which they could be evacuated by sea to South Korea. FEAF Combat Cargo Command facilitated the orderly retreats with a "reverse airlift" that removed tons of supplies that advancing enemy troops might otherwise have captured. For example, during December 1950, Fifth Air Force moved three fighter groups from North to South Korea, using the airlift resources of Combat Cargo Command. On December 1, the command also airlifted some 1,500 wounded personnel from the Pyongyong area. Transport planes evacuated men and materiel that could not be removed expeditiously by land or sea. [26]

At the end of November, the Communist forces in northeastern Korea surrounded troops of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th U.S. Infantry Division in the area of the frozen Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir. Threatened by terribly cold weather and hoping to escape total annihilation or capture, the Americans fought their way to the tiny village of Hagaru, about four miles south of the reservoir, where they set up a defensive perimeter protected in part by Marine Corps and Navy close air support missions. [27]

Almost immediately, Combat Cargo Command began dropping supplies to the encircled U.S. troops. On November 28, 29 and 30, at least thirty-seven C-119 flights and twenty-two C-47 sorties air-dropped 247 tons of ammunition, rations, gasoline, and medical supplies to a relatively small drop zone within the Hagaru perimeter. Some of the initial C-119 loads landed beyond the perimeter in enemy-held territory. U.S. Marine Corps observation airplanes and helicopters landed to take out wounded, but there were far too many casualties to be evacuated that way. X Corps commanders decided they needed to supplement the USMC airlift from Hagaru with C-47s of Combat Cargo Command. [28]

By December 1, the Marines had carved a larger airstrip in the frozen ground. Although not yet complete, it was ready enough for the first cargo airplanes to land. On that day, seven USAF C-47s and four USMC R4Ds (virtually identical to the C-47s) evacuated more than 1,000 wounded and sick soldiers from Hagaru to Yonpo, about 40 miles to the south, within the X Corps defensive perimeter around Hamhung and Hungnam. In the next several days, the aircraft evacuated an average of 34 men per flight. On December 5, the biggest aeromedical airlift day for Hagaru, 1,580 patients flew from Hagaru to Yonpo. [29]

The C--47s and R4D airplanes that carried out the wounded and sick did not arrive at Hagaru empty. Many of them carried ammunition, rations, and gasoline, but these were only a small fraction of the supplies that C--119s continued to drop over the besieged village. On December 1, for example, the Flying Boxcars dropped more than 66 tons of supplies, mostly ammunition, to UN forces at Hagaru. [30]

Other U.S. Marines and Army troops from X Corps had been encircled by Communist Chinese forces at the village of Koto, about seven miles south of Hagaru. On December 6, thirty-one Flying Boxcars dropped 150 tons of ammunition and rations over Koto. American forces abandoned Hagaru and fought their way to join the men at Koto on December 7. By then, Combat Cargo Command had flown 221 airdrop and airland missions to Hagaru and had evacuated over 4,300 casualties from there. [31]

The crisis was not yet over. Koto needed the same kind of airlift that had supported Hagaru the previous week. On December 7, Skytrains began landing at a newly constructed airstrip at Koto to evacuate the wounded, while Flying Boxcars continued to airdrop supplies. By the end of December 9, when the airdrops to Koto ceased, C--47s had carried 312 casualties from the village to safety behind UN lines. The ground troops at Koto were determined to join the rest of X Corps at Hamhung and Hungnam to the south, but a 1,500-foot-deep gorge blocked their way. The Chinese had destroyed the bridge over the chasm. Without a bridge, the Marines would have to abandon their tanks, other vehicles, and artillery; Airlift provided a solution. On December 7, each of eight C--119s of the 3 14th Troop Carrier Group dropped a span of an M-2 treadway bridge from an altitude of 800 feet. Each span descended with the help of a pair of huge G-5 parachutes. One span fell into enemy-held territory and another one was damaged, but the other six were enough to span the gorge. On December 8, troops of the 1st Marine Division from Koto linked up with a 3d Infantry Division relief column north of Hamhung. With the help of the first air-dropped bridge in history, U.S. forces had at last broken the encirclement. [32]

In the thirteen days since the original encirclement at the end of November, Combat Cargo Command airplanes dropped 1,580 tons of equipment and supplies to the Marines and U.S. Army troops at the Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru, and Koto. Since November 28, the airlift involved 313 C--119 and 37 C--47 flights. Between December 1 and 9, USAF and USMC airplanes evacuated more than 4,680 wounded and sick Americans from Hagaru and Koto. The Air Force subsequently awarded its first Korean War Distinguished Unit Citations to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, the 3 14th Troop Carrier Group, and the 801st Medical Air Evacuation Squadron, for their parts in the emergency airlift. [33]

X Corps itself was still not out of danger, despite its recovery of major elements of the formerly encircled 1st Marine and 7th U.S. Infantry Divisions. Chinese Communist pressure still required the evacuation of the Hamhung/ Hungnam perimeter on the northeastern Korean coast that December. UN Task Force 90 accomplished the bulk of this evacuation by sea, but airlift played a major role again. Even while the sea evacuation was under way, 61st Troop Carrier Wing C--54s airlifted ammunition and other supplies from Japan to the perimeter. On December 14, the air evacuation of Yonpo airfield began. It continued for four days, during which time FEAF Combat Cargo Command, in 393 flights, evacuated more than 4,000 personnel and transported over 2,000 tons of cargo. Most of the passengers were U.S. Marine and Army troops, many of whom were wounded. [34]

While airlift was helping to evacuate the X Corps from northeastern Korea, it was also airlifting Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force personnel, equipment, and supplies from northwestern Korea. Between December 1 and 4, Combat Cargo Command air-evacuated the combat echelons of the 8th and 18th Fighter-Bomber Wings from Pyongyang and Pyongyang East airfields to Seoul and Suwon in South Korea. The provisional 1st and the 437th TCGs, using C-46s and C-47s, flew emergency air evacuations of UN forces from Sinanju and Pyongyang. During that terrible month of December, 1950, they transported thousands of wounded troops from Korea to Japan. [35]

As Chinese Communist troops approached the South Korean capital of Seoul, managers of orphanages there began gathering children for a sealift to safety on Cheju Do, an island off the South Korean coast. Sealift could not immediately transport the children, some of whom died from malnutrition or exposure while they waited. Airlift responded again. On December 20, twelve C-54 Skymasters from the 61st TCG air-evacuated more than 800 orphans from Kimpo Airfield to Cheju Do. The operation was called "Christmas kidlife". [36]

As the year ended, UN forces were withdrawing into northern South Korea, hoping to stop the Chinese and North Korea Communists before they reached the gates of Pusan again. Mobility continued to characterize the Korean War for the first three months of 1951, with Seoul changing hands two more times. Airlift continued to play a major role in the conflict, even after it became a war of little movement.

In the crucial months of 1950, airlift had already demonstrated its ability to influence the outcome of battles and thereby shape the war itself. Without airlift, American civilians would have been captured at Seoul in June 1950, and U.S. forces would not have been able to enter the conflict as early as July 5. Without airlift, UN forces could not have hoped to advance nearly as rapidly as they did from the Pusan perimeter and Inchon into North Korea, and many more would have died surrounded by Chinese Communist forces in North Korea. In 1950, airlift contributed greatly to the successful defense of South Korea, to the near liberation of North Korea, and to the deliverance of U.S. forces from that country As much as strategic bombing, interdiction, close air support, counterair missions, and reconnaissance, airlift demonstrated the tremendous influence of air power on the Korean War during its critical first year. Military airlift grew up during World War II and the Berlin airlift, but it matured in Korea.

Dr. Daniel L. Haulman has been a historian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, since 1984. He earned a Ph.D in history from Auburn University in 1983, and has taught as an adjunct professor at Huntingdon College and at Auburn University in Montgomery. He has authored two books, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, 1947-1994 and Air Force Aerial Victory Credits: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Additionally, Dr Haulman has written several official U.S. Air Force historical pamphlets, and published several journal articles.

(1.) ATC Pamphlet 190-1 (History of the USAF), Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force ROTC, 1961, pp. 25-1, 25-2. 374th TCG lineage and honors history at AFHRA, 11 Nov 1974, p. 12. Bruce D. Callander, "The Evolution of Air Mobility," Air Force Magazine, vol. 81, no. 2 (Feb 1998), p. 71. Maurer Maurer, Air Force Combat Units of World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983, p. 262. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 5-9, 11-12. A Day by Day History of Far East Air Forces Operations (K720.302A at AFHRA), vol. I, 25 Jun-31 Oct 1950, pp. 17-19. History of Far East Air Forces (K720.01 at AFHRA), 25 Jun-31 Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 29-31. Annis G. Thompson, The Greatest Airlift; The Story of Combat Cargo. Tokyo, Japan: Dai-Nippon Printing, 1954. An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the United States Air Force in the Korean Campaign (K168.041-1 at AFHRA), 25 Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 3, 5. Daniel L. Haulman and W illiam C. Stancik, Air Force Aerial Victory Credits: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam (Gunter AFB, Aim.: 1988), p. 767.

(2.) Futrell, pp. 25, 28. 374 TCG L&H, 11 Nov 1974, p. 12. Lee Hyung Suk, editor, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1972, p. 707. Day by Day, 28 Jun 1950. Evaluation, p. 5. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 34.

(3.) Futrell, p. 77. 374 TCG L&H, 11 Nov 1974, p. 12. Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 29-30. FEAF History, p. 39. Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970), p.4. Francis H. Heller, The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, p. xviii. Evaluation, Jul 5, 1950.

(4.) Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 46-47. Futrell, p. 97. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p. 260.

(5.) Futrell, p. 110. Evaluation, 19 Jul 1950. Day by Day, vol. I, (2 Aug 1950). FEAR History, p. 48. Callander, p. 71.

(6.) Day by Day, vol. I, (3 Aug, 14 Aug, 25 Aug, 1950). Futrell, p. 75. Appleman, p. 380. FEAF History (1 and 27 Aug 1950). Maurer, p. 191. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-5.

(7.) Day by Day, vol. I (26 Aug 1950). Futrell, pp. 154-155, 773. FEAF History, pp. 18, 23, 24. 314th Operations Group lineage and honors history at AFHRA.

(8.) Robert Jackson, Air War Korea (New York: Scribner, 1973), pp. 38-39. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday; 1967), p.253. FEAF History, p. 62. Futrell, pp. 160-161. USAF Historical Study no. 71, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1952), p. 66. Evaluation, p. 173. FEAF Combat Cargo Command History (K714.01 at AFHRA), Sep 1950-Jan 1951, vol. I, p. 33.

(9.) Jackson, p. 40. Futrell, p. 161. USAF Historical Study no. 71, p. 66. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-6.

(10.) Futrell, pp. 160-161, 215. A. Timothy Warnock, Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), p. 195.

(11.) USAF Historical Study 71, p. 101. Thompson, pp. 18, 20. Evaluation, vol. I, p. 224. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, 15-21 Oct 1950, p. 3.

(12.) Day by Day, vol. I, p. 210.

(13.) Futrell, p. 212.

(14.) Ibid., p. 215. USAF Historical Study 71, pp. 103, 110.

(15.) Futrell, pp. 209, 211, 215. Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 232, 236. 314th Operation Group lineage and honors history, prepared 10 May 1995. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-8. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, 15-21 Oct 1950, pp. 6-8. Evaluation, vol. I, p. 240. USAF Historical Study 71, p. 77. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 72, 223. John L. Vandegrift, editor, A History of the Air Rescue Service, 1959 (K318.2 at AFHRA).

(16.) Futrell, p. 211. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 72.

(17.) FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, 22-28 Oct 1950, p. 6. FEAF Korean Operations 1950 (K720.3069A at AFHRA), p. 15. USAF Historical Study 71, p. 103.

(18.) Evaluation, vol. I, p. 246.

(19.) USAF Historical Study 71, p. 110. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 10, 5-11 Nov 1950, p. 3; no. 11, 12-18 Nov 1950, p. 2.

(20.) FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A at AFHRA). FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 10, 5-11 Nov 1950, p. 3; and no. 11, 12-18 Nov 1950, p. 2. Futrell, p. 215.

(21.) FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 84.

(22.) Futrell, p. 232.

(23.) FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 84.

(24.) FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A at AFHRA), p. 25.

(25.) Futrell, p. 230.

(26.) FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A at AFHRA). Futrell, pp. 232, 258, 268. Warnock, p. 200. Day by Day, vol. II, pp. 96-97. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 91-94.

(27.) Suk, p. 709. Ridgway, p. 254. Gugeler, pp. 58-59, 62. Benjamin F. Blackmon, "One Way Out," Air Force Magazine vol. 34, no. 1 (Jan 1951), p. 21. Futrell, p. 258.

(28.) FEAF Korean Operations 1950 K720.3069A at AFHRA), p. 35. Day by Day, vol. II, pp. 86-88, 90,93, 100. Futrell, pp. 255-258. Gugeler, pp. 65, 68-78. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 91-93. Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953. Vol. III The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington DC: HQ, USMC, 1957), pp. 245-246. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) K714.01 at AFHRA), 10 Sep 1950-24 Jan 1951, vol. I, p. 112.

(29.) Montross and Canzona, p. 246. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, p. 112. Blackman, pp. 22-25.

(30.) Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, vol. I, p. 112. Futrell, p. 258. Blackman, pp. 22-23.

(31.) Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, vol. I, pp. 112-113. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 14, 3-9 Dec 1950, p. 6; no. 15, 10-16 Dec 1950, pp. 3,4. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720-3069A at AFHRA, p. 34.

(32.) Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, vol. I, p. 112. Blackman, p. 25. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 14, 3-9 Dec 1950, p. 3. Warnock, p. 199. Futrell, p. 259. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950, p. 35. Thompson, p. 73. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 96- 97. Day by Day, vol. II, p. 116. Suk, pp. 131, 709, Ridgway, p. 254.

(33.) Historical Report, vol. I, pp. 113-114. Blackman, p. 25. Warnock, p. 199. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950, p. 34. Futrell pp. 259-260.

(34.) Futrell, p. 260. Frederick J. Shaw, Jr., and A. Timothy Warnock, The Cold War and Beyond, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program and AU Press, 1997, p. 9. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950, p. 41. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-11. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup no. 15, 10-16 Dec 1950, p. 6; no. 16, 17-23 Dec 1950, pp. 2-3. 61st TOG lineage and honors notes in Endicott working papers for Korean War unit data at AFHRA.

(35.) 437 TCG lineage and honors history; 61st Troop Carrier Group lineage and honors history, and 1st Troop Carrier Group (Provisional) lineage and honors history, in Endicott working papers on Korean War units at AFHRA. Futrell, p. 266.

(36.) FEAF Korean Operations 1950, p. 41. Futrell, p. 269. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 16, 17-23 Dec 1950, p. 3.
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Author:Haulman, Daniel L.
Publication:Air Power History
Geographic Code:9SOUT
Date:Jun 22, 2001
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