SPROUTS OF THE ANCIENTS: THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE GREATER MEDITERRANEAN REGION FROM THE HITTITES TO ROME.
Keywords: republic; regime; ancient history; formal representation
1. Introduction. Studying Representation in the Ancient Western World
Representation is not a modern phenomenon and this article will study it historically, entirely focusing on part of the ancient period, roughly 1330 BC to 90 BC. I will also use comparative methods, in which various areas of the ancient Mediterranean are compared, so that a geographic context is added to the strictly linear historical context. I will compare points in time of the same state, the same points in time in different states, and also different points in time in different places. Each section focuses on a different chronological period and often a different geographic area.
In trying to apply the above historical political comparative analysis methodology to the problems of representation, particularly its historical development in the ancient Western world, I needed to understand what other people have said about representation. Many authors have dealt with the problem of representation, but my theory of representation takes into account two primary theorists more than any others. Ferdinand A. Hermens (1906-1998) wrote in the mid-20th century about the ideal of the representative republic, by which he meant a state, either monarchical or what we call republican, that has formal representative bodies. He tended to focus on deliberative, legislative assemblies, but this model also included formal executive representation, such as an elective presidency. (1)
This notion of formal representation is clearly part of the story of representation, but it is too limiting. Hanna Pitkin (1931-present), the most famous theorist on representation adds to this schematic backbone. She discusses a myriad of possible options for what representation means, but her two primary contributions to the theory of representation are substantive and descriptive representation. Descriptive representation is the idea that government, not necessarily just formal deliberative bodies of elective offices, should roughly look like, or describe the demographics of the state or area over which the government rules. For example, the United States Supreme Court, a non-elective institution, and the civil bureaucracy, should have some ethnic minorities in them. The idea is that this helps represent those minorities. (2)
However, Pitkin is keenly aware that descriptive representation is insufficient, as both a minority representative may not represent the interests of that group, or a non-minority might do a better job. Instead, she advocates that a system also substantively represent its constituents. Essentially, substantive representation is the notion that a representative regardless of the institution in which in they dwell, represents the people of his or her constituency (admittedly the definition of this is a major issue) on actual issues or problems, regardless of their own demographic information. These two concepts taken together therefore must both be added onto the barebones of Hermens' theory to approach what this thesis understands as its theory of representation. (3)
The basic premise of this article, which goes beyond Hermens and Pitkin, is that representation, its theory, its concepts on the ground, and its institutions evolved over time through a demonstrable historical process. A direct line can be traced between our institutions through the Roman Republic back to the Hittite Empire. The Hittites influenced Sama'al, which influenced and was influenced by Phoenicia, which led to the rise of the republic of Carthage, which influenced the development of the classic Roman Republic.
2. The Hittite Roots of Representationalism
It is difficult at the outset to imagine the Hittite Empire, a large, superficially autocratic Middle and Late Bronze Age empire as a primary early catalyst for representationalist principles. Its ruler, the Great King claimed a divine prerogative to rule not unlike Louis XIV or other more modern absolute rulers and ideologically, saw the empire as centralized and unified, except perhaps at the geo-political margins. Yet, the empire was unique among its peers in some important ways that truly laid down the roots of representationalism, though true representationalism did not develop until later. This first substantive section serves to show how the historical process of representational development works, where preconditions for the roots of representation develop, then transform into the roots, and as we shall see in later sections, the base and branches of the tree of representationalism develop from the roots.
What are the necessary, though not necessarily sufficient preconditions for even the roots of representation to develop and grow? The whole thesis itself deals with this issue more broadly, but this section deals with it more specifically, as the case of the Hittite Empire really is the earliest comprehensive case available for study. The Levantine causal chain of representation that is developed in future sections starts here with fairly modest beginnings.
The Hittite Empire's future in the period before 1400 BC looked bleak. A hodgepodge of ethnicities, the Indo-European tribal groupings of the Palaics, Luwians, and the Hittites themselves as well as Hattics had formed a strange core in the center of Anatolia, but now they had to absorb another people, the Hurrians, who challenged central authority but also often aligned with the ethnically-Hurrian empire of Mitanni. As a result, the Hittite Empire almost died out before it truly rose to prominence. To survive, the Hittite Empire could not rely just on one ethnicity or core sub-region to survive. It needed manpower in wars of survival and this meant mobilizing support from the regime across demographic boundaries. While the empire had a central bureaucracy and archives in Hattusa and an ideology of centralization, the actual policies used were always more flexible than this and that political and institutional flexibility saved the early Empire. (4)
One fascinating little document from around 1400 BC was a treaty between Arnuwanda I and the men of Ismerika, a region or province already loyal to the Hittite ruler. They were established as colonists in Kizzuwatna, an area of conflict between Mitanni and Hatti (the Hittite Empire's name for itself as a nation-state). The Land of Kizzuwatna was just being overtaken by the Hittites, and may still have had a semi-autonomous king, though soon it would be officially taken in as an incorporated province of Hatti. Having colonists from a loyal province settled in this region was invaluable to a regime fighting for survival. However, these were not necessarily ethnic Hittites or persons from the core region around Hattusa. They had their own identity as Ismerikans as well as being loyal to the king and sought to preserve their semi-autonomy in Kizzuwatna. So the king had to sign a treaty with all of the individual settlers guaranteeing them certain rights and guaranteeing their continued loyalty to him in their new home. (5)
What is important with the Ismerika charter, despite the fact that it looks like a charter of colonies more than a treaty between states, is that power in Kizzuwatna was divided among a multitude of individuals, who were not necessarily nobles and were of different ethnic backgrounds. By dividing up power within the new province, no one person could challenge the king on his own, but at the same time, the king had, almost certainly unintentionally, laid down a few roots of representation in this area.
First of all, the division of power in a region is an important necessity in any representationalist system, though not representationalist in and of itself. Also, openness, though non-systematic, towards power-sharing across economic, ethnic and other demographic lines creates a culture of political inclusion that is vital in any representationalist system where class and demographics are diverse rather than homogenous. These two roots, cultural openness and division of power are part of a series of roots of representation, caused as we saw by historical preconditions, that is the need of the Hittite Empire for loyal men to defend its new borders.
As time went on the Hittite Empire continued to struggle with its powerful neighbors, but it did gradually get stronger. In the period of 1344-1322 BC, the Hittite Empire under Suppiluliuma I finally became a preponderant power in the Near East, rivaled only by Babylon and Egypt. Suppiluliuma was very practical, though his methods were also often extreme. He defeated Mitanni in war, and in order to hold Mitanni and its former Syrian vassals, he came up with a very interesting system of government. Mitanni continued to be ruled by a legitimate king of the old dynasty, who also was a puppet king to Hatti.
As for the Syrian states, they were divided into two classes of state; most of the states remained semi-independent under their own laws and rulers, though bound by treaty obligations to the Great King. However, vassal states had a tendency to revolt or defect to other great powers at their first opportunity. Therefore, in order to ward off Egyptian imperial ambitions in the area, as Egypt was the one power that Hatti still feared by 1330 BC (Babylon was an ally by then), Suppiluliuma took away two states, Carchemish and Aleppo from the native dynasties and gave them to two of his sons. Telepinu was given Aleppo and Piyassili was given Carchemish. (6)
Of course given territories to be directly ruled by one's sons appears to be straight out of the textbook of an autocrat, however this is deceiving. Both men become kings and are charged with ruling these lands as nativized kings according the laws of the nations over which they rule. They cannot inherit the throne as they are kings of other kingdoms. They thus have multiple roles; they do triple duty in fact as royals of the central Hittite dynasty, as local rulers of important Syrian vassal states and they also have supervisory authority over the other non-dynastic Syrian states. Trevor Bryce, the leading historian on the Hittites, speculates that at least initially Telepinu was the spiritual and religious authority in Syria while Piyassili was the judicial and military supervisor. (7)
A division of roles, such as the above, is another root of representation as no one supervisor had full direct authority over Syria, and there was a top-down division of power whereby the federating units of the new Syrian sub-polity had local powers reserved unto themselves. Therefore both a division of power horizontally based on roles and vertically based on localism, necessitated by Hittite imperial needs laid down a framework for the roots of representation.
One more aspect of the Syro-Hittite system needs to be analyzed before moving on. The Viceroy of Carchemish, as Bryce calls him, was the king of kings for the Syrian region and served a bureaucratic function as the go between for the Great King with his subjects. Judicial matters worked very similarly to a modern appeals system. The local rulers and court systems handled local matters, but in matters concerning multiple vassal states or even appeals from local authority were handled at the viceregal level in Carchemish. However, the Carchemian court was like a circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court was the Great King who could overrule the Viceroy-King of Carchemish. Therefore, a multi-layered and somewhat diffuse system of judicial administration incorporated proto-federalist principles and offered yet another root of representation, as appeals by local authority historically have been an important procedural aspect of representation. (8)
Moving on to the hypothetically centralized provinces of the Hittite Empire, at least in special cases, provinces were given concessions that belied centralizing policies and rhetoric. Kizzuwatna is a key example of this. We have discussed how Kizzuwatna was settled by pro-Hittite settlers and incorporated into a province sometime around 1400 BC, though it may have gone back and forth between a vassal state and province. Either way, Kizzuwatna was vital province and its loyalty was essential to the entire Hittite imperial system. Telepinu of Aleppo, before he became a king in Syria was a high priest in Kizzuwatna. Having a key royal member was a sort of priestgovernor for the province shows the religious importance of Kizzuwatna to the Empire. Until much later in Hittite history, the religious center of the Hittite Empire was not in Hattusa but in the outer province of Kizzuwatna, where Hurrian religion deeply affected Hittite culture. The religious institutions in Kizzuwatna were highly organized and families controlled the various priesthoods other than the top priesthood often reserved to a royal. Dealing with the deeply religious people of Kizzuwatna, a multi-ethnic people of combined Luwian and Hurrian descent involved dealing with the theocratic aristocracy of the region. If in theory Kizzuwatna was ruled like any other province, in practice it never was and had semi-autonomy at least in all but name. (9)
The roots of representation described above, such as local autonomy, a federalized system of governance, at least in Syria, the preservation and even elevation of religious interest groups in Kizzuwatna and elsewhere, the division of power in various ways, and cultural and political inclusion across various demographics, including ethnic ones, are by no means the only ones possible or even necessary to cause representation to form, but they did set the stage for representation to develop in Anatolia and the Levant after the fall of the Hittite Empire. I would dare to call the Hittite Empire a protorepresentational state, in that it would be folly to call it truly representational, but the roots are in place and some features of representation, as to be described in other sections, existed in some form early on here. One clear feature of representational development becomes obvious in the Hittite Empire not at its height but in its decline and (partial) death. And thus the story of the Late Bronze Age Collapse must be told here in summary form.
The Late Bronze Age Collapse is the term for a series of relatively rapid events in the late 13th century BC and the early 12th century BC that brought down the Mycenaean Greeks, most of the Hittite Empire, and deeply challenged Egypt and the few surviving states in the western half of the Near Eastern international system of the Late Bronze Age. The causes of this collapse are complex, but in summary, it was not just one event or cause that brought down seemingly powerful and stable states. It also was not as sudden or spontaneous as it often appears to the historian. In Hittite Empire at least, you can see signs of instability as early as the mid-1200s BC, where a devastating civil war occurred in which Hattusili III (ruled mid-late 13th century BC) overthrew the legitimate heir of the Empire, his nephew. This led to an intra-dynastic struggle that continued almost to the end of the Empire, causing a variety of weakening effects that were enough for both outside and inside forces of chaos to prevail. (10)
Among these effects, the constant tension and occasional outright civil wars stopped the central government from tending to the needs of the people. For the first time in its history, the people faced famine toward the end of the Empire, which cause popular unrest and uprisings. Massed movements of people within Anatolia almost certainly were counted as part of the Sea Peoples of Late Bronze age literature. Also some of these Anatolians started to go overseas and cause trouble as they had to migrate to survive in difficult economic and political times. The Empire started to break down and the crisis snowballed as the needs of the people, especially in western Anatolia were ignored by the central authorities in Hattusa and their rivals in Tarhuntassa. These two cities in the center of the Empire expended all the imperial resources that the western provinces and vassal states needed and almost constant wars of conquest, defense, and civil struggle did not help the famine and poverty and other problems of these regions, leading to a breakdown in civil order due to neglect and abuse by the central regime. (11)
The result of not representing the interest of the people, who had a reasonable expectation of some sort of representation due to the protorepresentationalist roots described above, was the collapse of the state in the center and west during the Late Bronze Age Collapse. This is not to say that this type of crisis, which I term a crisis of representation, is caused only when individuals having a reasonable expectation of representation, but only that this expectation increases the probability that such as crisis will occur. The people were accustomed to a reasonable level of competent governance that fairly quickly went away and so everything good in the Empire collapsed and the state did not last much longer.
However, the theory of the crisis of representation works both ways. If the representationalist or in this case protorepresentationalist state of sub-national authority does its job at least fairly well, then it becomes more likely to survive than other states. Of the major Western states in the ancient Near East, only two survived with any kind of central power left in them, as opposed to just barely surviving. One of them is Egypt and my theory is difficult to apply to Egypt as it was nationalism more than representationalism that saved it, although the laws of good governance promulgated here would generally apply there too. In Carchemish we have a case in which the odds of survival around 1200 BC were low but they not only survived but experienced two centuries of a renaissance during the darkest times in the history of that part of the world. In a literal Armageddon, where the city of Megiddo was sacked by invaders and most of the western part of the Near East was thoroughly trashed and civilization there looked as if it would simply cease to exist, Carchemish survived, where the more sophisticated and well-entrenched central Hittite bureaucracy did not.
The primary reason why this is so is not that the pressure in this area of the world was less than in Anatolia. Ugarit and several major cities under Hittite rule fell and Carchemish was under so much pressure than the Egyptians wrote that it fell to the invaders. However, historical and archaeological evidence makes it clear that the city at the core of the realm never fell and remained relatively stable throughout what was still very much a challenging crisis. Carchemish survived because the roots of representation and the protorepresentationalist regime as described above in all of Hatti remained true in Carchemish and much of the subject territory in Syria. There is no evidence of a widespread, long-lasting famine here, the civil wars never affected this region, and the administration of justice and business continued as normal. There are numerous documents where the king of Carchemish, up until the crisis, was able to continue the rule of law, business, and the distribution of public goods. In short good governance and the roots of representation continued in Carchemish and thus the state survived; in the rest of the Empire this is not the case and so state survival did not occur. (12)
To sum up this section, the crisis of representation affects state survival and thus some protorepresentationalist states survive and other do not. The most successful and advanced ones survive and thus pass on their practices and ideologies to future states and generations, which we should call political evolution. Political evolution is very similar to biological evolution as the traits of states can be passed on to other states over time simply through state survival. In the next section, we will examine how processes of political evolution begin the development of early representationalism in southern Anatolia and the Levant, and how these processes related to both Carchemian survival and Hittite traditions.
3. Sama'al, Phoenicia, and Carthage
The state survival of Carchemish affects the story of the roots and rise of representation in the rest of the ancient West in several profound ways, but none more importantly than its impact on the cultural scene at the start of the first millennium BC. The political geography had changed much by 900 BC from 1200 BC. Egypt was still extant, but it was no longer powerful in the Levant. The Hittite Empire was gone and Carchemish's brief regional ascendancy around 1100 BC was gone and it would be a small though important kingdom for the next two centuries until the Assyrian conquest. Much of Carchemish's former kingdom had become small, independent kingdoms, though still acknowledging the Hittite and Carchemian heritage. These early Iron Age Luwian states were ethno-linguistically different but similar to the earlier Luwian and Hittite settlers in Cilicia and the northern Levant of the Middle and Late Bronze Age. One of the most important Luwian states was Sama'al, which commanded the area between Cilicia in southern Anatolia and northern Syria. This area was the base of the Luwians in the Levant and guarded the flank of the Cilicians, centered by the 9th century BC in and around Tarsus and Karatepe. This network of independent but interconnected Luwian states was threatened by the migration of the Aramaeans. (13)
The Aramaeans may have been part of the Sea Peoples that had destroyed the Late Bronze Age West but they also may have migrated from the Syrian and Arabian deserts in the period of Carchemian ascendancy that straddled the Bronze Age and early Iron Age periods. They were initially a force of chaos and anarchy in the region as wandering, well-armed tribes tended to be in the Middle East throughout its long history. They harassed the Canaanites and forced ethno-cultural change upon many of them. Some of Canaan was thoroughly colonized by Aramaeans and a good portion of Syria became Aram, the new homeland of this people. Others were pressed in by them and formed new states to confront them. This is the origin of the Israelite kingdom of the early Iron Age. But a few areas remained similar to the earlier Canaanite city states and these people became known as the Phoenicians. The Luwian states around them were closely associated with them in this period. (14)
As the Aramaeans began to migrate in force and even settle in the territories of well-established states such as Sama'al, they continued to be a force of disruption, especially as they demanded more and more control of the regions in which they lived. They slowly became culturally dominant in northern Syria and some cities, such as Hamath, would become Aramaean speaking by 800 BC where before they were Luwian. The kings of Sama'al, starting with Kilamuwa in the late 9th century BC, were wise enough to attempt to at least mediate the unstoppable ethno-cultural ascendancy of the Aramaeans in Luwian lands. Thus he brought the Aramaeans into the political system and encouraged them to integrate with the native Luwian population. In his famous royal inscription, Kilamuwa, writing in Phoenician, details how he reconciled the Aramaeans with the Luwians. He does not use these ethnic terms, but it seems fairly clear whom he meant by each term. The baririm, or fierce ones, are clearly the recently-nomadic Aramaeans and the muskabim, the people laid low, are the Luwians. Kilamuwa's name and the name of one his more important successors, Panamu (a semitized form of Panamuwa probably) are clearly Luwian names, as they have the Hittite-Luwian-Hurrian flavor of names in the region of an earlier period. Some of his predecessors, such as Gabbar, seem to be of Semitic origin. (15)
This ethnic complexity implies the following facts. First, Gabbar and other predecessors other than Haya, Kilamuwa's father, as well as his brother, may have been of another, possibly Aramaean dynasty. Secondly, all of the predecessors are described as having "done nothing." Is this just a rhetorical device rendering them illegitimate or is it actually more specific than saying simply that they have accomplished nothing? I interpret this phrase as signifying that they have done nothing about something particular. The answer to the question "about what" seems to be answered by the rest of the inscription. For example, the baririrm and muskabim are set up in potential conflict at the end of the inscription, where the civil peace he has established will be disrupted if any ruler does not respect his inscription and by analogy, his political arrangements. He calmed the muskabim, the original settlers of the land, who lived like "dogs," either because they were angry at the favors kings had made to the Aramaeans or because they were impoverished by the ethno-cultural shifts of the last century in city. He says cryptically that he clothed in fine cloth those who had no good clothing before him and gave sheep to those who had never seen any. These provisions seem to be connected to the previous discourse on mollifying the muskabim but I think they actually are connected to the baririm, who were nomads of the desert and not used to the more sedentary culture of the shepherd. Sheep are a symbol of civilization in this context and so he gave civilization to the poor, aggressive Aramaeans and otherwise compensated the embittered Luwians. He essentially divided public goods amongst the two groups and achieved internal unity and consensus as a result. (16)
The inscription also provides the external situation of the period as well as the internal conflict. Outside kings, among them assumedly both Aramaean tribal kings and sedentary Luwian states began making demands on the weakened state of Sama'al. Kilamuwa was able to defeat all except the Danunans (of Adana in Cilicia) a Luwian kingdom that did not face the Aramaean incursions that Sama'al did. He was forced to call a favor from the Assyrians, which he represents as making the Assyrian king his tool or mercenary but which inevitably led to Sama'al's gradual enslavement to Assyria. Still, with Assyria's aid, he put the Danunans back in their place. The implication is that these external events forced him to clean house and put the two ethno-political factions at ease. (17)
This whole elaborate case at first may appear to have little to do the story of representation; however its irrelevance to formal representation belies the subtle representational principles that underlie most of the representational institutions in the ancient Western world. In the last section, I outlined the roots of representation in the Hittite Empire. One of those roots of representation was a division of power both vertically and horizontally. Here, we see the vertical division of power and goods between two distinct groups of people in an effort to unite them. Kilamuwa's program seems to have had the effect eventually, if not the intent, of creating one ethnic group in Sama'al, the Sama'ali Aramaics who developed a dialect heavily influenced by Phoenician and Luwian elements and whose culture was Syro-Hittite (Luwian) as well as Aramaic. In matters of ethno-genesis it is customary to assume that the substratum (i.e. the Luwians) was assimilated into the newly dominant ethnic group, the Aramaeans. However, the case of Sama'al shows that the Aramaeans were as assimilated by the Luwians as vice versa. Aramaean religion especially in Sama'al evolved from the tribal traditions of the newcomers and the Syro-Hittite traditions preserved by Carchemish and the later Syro-Hittite states. The tribal Aramaean ethnicity is not the same ethnic group as the civilized Aramaic identity of the period immediately preceding the Assyrian conquest of the mid to late 8th century BC, especially in this region of cultural mixing. (18)
The purposeful mixing of cultures, the initial division of power and the general usage of central authority to fix social problems, as opposed to a laissez-faire policy, are all roots of representation. Representation as a political process is usually also a social process, in which central government changes as a continuous evolution of the mediation of political demands by various interest groups, changing socio-economic conditions, and the evolving institutions negotiated by this process. Panamuwa (or Panamu) II seems to have been in the same vein in terms of policy and he was an early user of Sama'ali Aramaic an important consequence of ethnic bargaining strategy of these kings. There was strife again in his lands and again he called upon the Assyrians, which would have big consequences for Sama'al later, but he seems to manage to maintain the peace. This struggle seems to not have been ethnic but a battle for succession, though in a multi-ethnic city, such a struggle could have been related to an ethnic one. He again distributed public goods to the people to keep them happy, which indicates a strong command economy and also redistribution of goods as an important precursor to representation, where public-goods sharing was important. (19)
Throughout all of these developments, Phoenician influence was felt. Kilamuwa wrote in Phoenician and the Aramaic alphabet is essentially a modification of the Phoenician alphabet. Sama'ali Aramaic is so mixed with Phoenician words and influence that is almost a creole. Even as late as the late 8th century BC, Azatiwada an important official of Adana, the old enemy of Kilamuwa, was writing in both Luwian and Phoenician. Of course the influence was likely both ways, as the Phoenicians acquired many goods and probably also ideas as well from the direct descendants of the Hittite Empire. Phoenician was the lingua franca of the region until Aramaic gained that role in the 600s BC, due to the centralizing policies of the Assyrians in all things, especially language. Kilamuwa wrote in Phoenician as a unifying factor and that early date the Aramaean language would have been written in Phoenician letters anyway. Phoenician was the language of culture and civilization at that time and this prestige lasted for some time. The Phoenicians dominated writing, they dominated trade, and they dominated masonry and other physical material culture industries. The Assyrians eventually came to control all of these things except for trade, but for a time, the Phoenicians controlled the goods of civilization in this part of the world in a truly stunning way. It spread the alphabetic system through trade and it gave rise to the literate cultures of the Greater Mediterranean region, Aramaeans, Greeks, Hebrews, and others. (20)
Obviously, ideas and people follow the trade routes. Phoenician religious ideas, not just literacy spread from the 800s BC onward in not earlier, throughout the Mediterranean. Also, the Phoenician merchant class spread ideas and institutions with it. The merchant quarter as a physical institution in non-Phoenician, even Greek cities, became a staple during the period of 800s BC and 700s BC, when Phoenician trade systems had to expand and evolve wildly as Phoenicia and its markets in the Levant and southern Anatolia became squeezed by the Assyrians. The concept of a merchant class was not new per se, but the Phoenicians perfected and spread it with an effectiveness not surpassed until the 19th century AD. The merchant was to be differentiated from the great ship owners, who formed with the landowners an aristocratic or oligarchical class between the merchants and the royals and higher aristocrats entrenched in traditional Phoenician religion. The development and exportation of a sophisticated social stratification system in Phoenician territories is an important part of the story of representation. It was not just a yawning gap between rich and poor, but the fact that Phoenician society had a diverse series of rings or layers of socio-economic status that were far enough from each other to resent and recognize each other but close enough to each other to allow for social mobility and conflict. (21)
Of course, literacy as always was a means to power and more Phoenicians could read than their predecessors, though not necessarily a majority of the people. This made possible for merchants to form a literate middle class and artisans and others below them formed perhaps a lower middle class, also still largely literate. Literacy allowed people to understand and interpret laws themselves and this was an inherent root of representation in the sense that the middle classes, plural, would tend to resist arbitrary power. Of course the oligarchy saw themselves as champions against arbitrary power from the royal class just as the middle classes often saw them as tyrannical. This complex historical dynamic helped shape Phoenician, especially Tyrian, politics, and it also helped colonize the Punic colonies.
The founding myth of Carthage says Dido; whose real name was Elissa or Alashiya (the ancient name of Cyprus in Hittite documents) fled Tyre in 814 BC because her husband, the high priest of Melchart the chief god of Tyre was murdered by Pygmalion the king of Tyre, her brother. They fled with their supporters, mostly high aristocrats from Tyre, such as an admiral and Barcas, the ancestor of Hannibal Barca. They went to Cyprus and received more supporters there, including the high priestess of Astarte in Kition, the primary Phoenician colony in Cyprus. They went to Libya (North Africa) and received some land from the Berbers there. (22)
There's more to the myth, but this is what was politically important. Despite being derided as counter factual, especially the early date of its founding, recent historical and archaeological work has led to the conclusion of many scholars that the 814 BC date may not be off by much. There was a king whose Hellenized name would have been Pygmalion who is recorded by contemporary documents of that time. Second of all, the names of most of the major players of the myth are either clearly Phoenician or Cypriot and since the two peoples were closely connected for centuries before this period, the ethnic mixture of the original group of Carthaginian settlers is not ridiculous. Of course, the prevailing theory was once that Carthage was just another settlement for commercial purposes, but again, archaeology, historical documents of the time, and the myth itself, all indicate that in fact Carthage was a unique colony. The current analysis of the event of the foundation of Carthage is that the exiles were political refugees, victims of a revolt against the upper aristocracy and royal class by the lower aristocracy and perhaps also the merchant class. A lack of representation led the people to conspire with the power hungry king to purge the upper aristocracy of the city. They founded a colony in resistance, but soon they reconciled with Tyre and formed a strong coexistence. Carthage was not truly independent of Tyre for many years to come, but instead was more like an early modern American colony than a Greek colony. (23)
Greek writers wrote of kings of Carthage but the evidence does not seem to support true kings of Carthage. There were true kings of Phoenicia but even these were not the absolute monarchs of Assyria or France but more like the kings of England after the Magna Carta, strong but subject to some limitations. Documents as ancient as early as the 14th century BC speak of a Council of Elders. This seems to have been a consultative body, like the early Roman Senate, but an influential one, and this body reminds one of the term gerousia, a Greek term for a senate-like body. Carthage is said to have had a gerousia later and by the Romans to have had a Senate. This body is best understood as an evolution of the Phoenician Council of Elders. Scholars have often argued that the gerousia was not present in early Carthage, but the tradition is an old one and thus the only conditions under which it would not exist is if it remained an autonomous colony within the Tyrian state.
We start to hear rumblings of this institution around the mid-6th century, around when Carthage becomes a true independent state in its own right. It is also here when we first hear about "kings." One of these "kings" was named Malchus (approximate ruling dates 580-550 BC), which means king if we accept that this is a variation of Malik or mlk. However, just because the name is not a real name does not mean the person was not real. Further, many of these kings, although belonging to dynasties or at least familial factions, ruled in pairs. The evidence seems to point to the possibility that these men were suffetes or shoftim in Old Phoenician and Hebrew. (24)
Suffetes are strong executive persons, much like Roman consuls who developed somewhat later. They evolved from judges in the Biblical sense but some of their function may have been judicial at some point. By judges in the Biblical sense, I mean that they were the chief judiciary officers in their society, but also had executive authority, like the shoftim of the Bible. (25) They were not kings and if the post was hereditary it was not strictly so but subject to some electoral process. The office was usually collegial, not absolute, and subject to legislative or consultative scrutiny by the Council of Elders and eventually other bodies. In Carthage, we have more evidence of representational bodies than in Tyre itself, because Aristotle fell in love with the Carthaginian constitution. He wrongly confuses the suffetes with kings but speaks of the gerousia, as well as the One Hundred and Four, a form of judicial body, as well as the assembly, representing the people and probably heavily dominated by merchants, artisans, and more middle class interest groups. (26)
The One Hundred and Four seem to have developed after the gerousia, and they are not a Council of Elders or Council of State (another type of body found in Phoenicia), but seemingly a corps of aristocratic judges. The Punic gerousia seems to have been a fairly broad oligarchical but the One Hundred and Four was narrower group. It is this group that became a political football after the Second Punic War and whose power was vastly reduced by the democratic revolution of Hannibal Barca. However the late Punic political developments are best discussed with Rome in Section Five. Suffice to say, a crisis of representation occurred where the people, long enjoying a reasonable expectation of representation were dealing with a narrow oligarchical institution that was superimposed on the traditional institutions and concepts that Carthage was developed from the Phoenician roots of representation. (27)
One further note on Tyre: the monarchy fell in the 560 s after trying to ride out a disastrous 13-year siege by the Neo-Babylonians. Suffetes replaced the kings and retained power for some time. By the time kings were placed back in power by Persia, the notion of constitutional monarchs had been more entrenched in Phoenicia than even before. Therefore, Tyrian and Carthaginian developments paralleled each other to an extent, especially in terms of executive power, up to the Persian period. We will get to Persia in Section Four. (28)
Before we get there, let us quickly review and summarize the findings of this section. The Hittite Empire was the forefather of the Luwian states, such as Karkamish, Karatepe, and Sama'al. These states were inheritors of serious governance problems and in order to survive, they began to sprout institutions and concepts of representation from the previously-laid down roots. Sama'al made peace within its borders by sharing power between its ethnic groups and eventually developing into a unique culture, which was unfortunately ended by Assyrian policies. Phoenicia was affected by the Luwian states and in turn impacted them. Older structures were adapted to new conditions and then these ideas and institutions were spread by trade and the diffusion of the Phoenician alphabet. Representational roots were laid down in North Africa when Carthage was founded in difficult political circumstances. Early institutions had developed by Aristotle's time into a mixed form of government, what might be called a proto-republic. These processes furthered the historical evolution begun during the Late Bronze Age collapse.
4. Rome, Carthage, and the Idea of the Republic
Republics were not new in the mid-Republican period Rome or Late Carthage. Both of the later iterations of the states stemmed from Republican (capitalization intentional) institutions that developed previously. In Section Three, we saw how Carthage took the roots of representation and early institutions developed in the post-Hittite world, particularly Phoenician Tyre, and turned them into an early mixed-constitution republic, in Aristotelian terms. The Greeks liked the fact that the oligarchs were largely in control, though they also admired that some elements of popular democracy existed as well, thus justifying the term mixed government. However, this is precisely why this thesis has little to do with the Greeks, other than Aristotle's theoretical works and Herodotus' historical works. We as modern westerns descend primarily, though not exclusively, from a Republican tradition that is more directly relevant to the Punico-Phoenician tradition of Tyre and Carthage then the Greek system of politics with its dual obsession of oligarchical rule and democracy. This Republican tradition, long in developing, accepted the concept of mixed government, but stemmed conceptually from a different, more natural conception of governance. Dueling ideologies were not as dominant as in Greece in places such as Carthage and Rome, but instead competing interests were. Often, a common ideal of the Republic was shared by both sides, but they dueled tremendously due to their own interests and the policies they proposed. (29)
In other words, these republics might be seen as a form of mixed government and Aristotle, who would have been seen as strange in Greek society, would have found his ideas of mixed government or polity well accepted in the republics of Carthage and Rome. (30) More importantly, the republic itself is both reality and ideal. The Tyrian republic of the 560s was probably more the result of popular embitterment due to the use of arbitrary power to keep the people fighting a hopeless war in the legendary thirteen-year siege by Babylon and practical necessity once the royalty was removed than an ideological state. However, the ideals followed the realities of the institution, at least in areas influenced by Tyre, again Carthage and Rome. A careful note must be made to distinguish our modern term "republic" meaning a non-monarchy with the ancient idea and institution. The Tyrian experiment with the modern idea of republic ended, but its form of government resembled more of a constitutional monarchy of the early modern period than previously, and we could easily see this as a continuation of republican government. Another term could be commonwealth, as res publica means the public thing in classical Latin. (31)
A little more needs to be said about what defines the ancient republic, at least in the present theory of representation. In ancient republics, and dare I say, true modern republics, strong executive power can exist but it is neither absolute nor arbitrary. States that claim to be a republic but violate the prohibitions on the arbitrariness or absoluteness of executive power are not true republics, at least if this is more than a temporary circumstance. Secondly, rule of law matters greatly in these states, for example the Twelve Tables of the early Roman Republic or the more natural common law of Near Eastern-inspired states such as Carthage. There is more than one way to observe the rule of law but its enforcement is essential in both the modern and ancient republic. Thirdly, laws must be administered in a somewhat inclusive way, whether they are justly appointed magistrates or elected officials or combination of both. A fourth major component is that the people, not just a closed oligarchy be involved in the process. The tribal assembly of the Romans is a classical example, but the centuriate assembly is a good one, though more mixed in nature, as it was controlled by the oligarchs to a large extent. (32)
Republics need not be democratic, and neither Rome nor Carthage was truly democratic, despite a few attempts at democratization. Elected representatives of the people or the people themselves represented the interests of the commons and middle class, even in systems where policy was always largely defined by the aristocracy. A popular check on the power of the aristocrats and oligarchs is always necessary; more importantly it must be institutional or systemic, that is non-violent.
Republics evolved, as we have seen representation itself evolve over the centuries and sections of this thesis. Rome was an oligarchy in the beginning and it had a strict caste system. A narrow, hereditary oligarchy is the least representative of all non-monarchical governments and the people of Rome did not tolerate this well. The people were primarily the Roman army as they were the conscripts required to muster to defend the city. So they simply went on a general strike. They left Rome and camped on a nearby hill, if ancient historians are to be believed. They struck and demanded their civil rights. They received, over time (this process was repeated several times over the course of Roman history) political rights and the recognition of more and more political deliberative bodies and elective offices that vindicated the rights of their caste, the plebeians or plebs. The patricians eventually renounced their complete monopoly on executive power and one of the two chief executives, or consuls, had to be plebeian after one point. The plebeian tribunes, elected tribal and socio-economic class leaders, had real executive and legislative power as representatives as well. (33)
Power always remained concentrated in Rome in a relatively small number of important families, plebeian and patrician, but the ruling class was not absolute, at least until the mid-first century BC. The people's votes for elected officers, even the consuls themselves, actually mattered and the people's various assemblies had the right of declaring were among other important powers. The ruling class was also broader than most states previous to it, except perhaps its rival Carthage. The broad oligarchy is more representative than the earlier, more primitive narrow one. Also, social mobility even in political terms was much greater in the later Republic than in the earlier one. You can see the Roman Republic as one state in different states of evolution as fundamentally different things, as the nature of the Republic varied a great deal.
Carthage changed over time as well and its development mirrors Rome's to an extent. Its narrow oligarchy had broadened over time. The "kings" of Carthage became the more Republican suffetes and the Magonid "dynasty" soon had competition from more than one oligarchical faction. Due to representative and even democratic features in the Carthaginian constitution, factions such as the aristocratic Barcids had to compete for votes and favor with the people, not just members of the expanding elite class. The gerousia or Senate of Carthage developed, as we saw in Section Three before the Roman senate and its early treaties and trade with Rome imply that it shared this part of its governmental system with the early Romans. The Roman senate was a broad-based though aristocratic body, working within a representative system approved by consensus of the various classes and interest groups in Roman society. To an extent, Carthage seems to have the same situation. However, the institution of the One Hundred and Four had no equivalent in Rome and was not approved by a public consensus. In a struggle not dissimilar to the battle between optimates and populares in the late Republic in Rome, the oligarchs split in Carthage on the idea of whether to support this body, an anti-representative body in their view, or to democratize the political institutions of Carthage. The great family of the Barcids supported the democrats, or perhaps we should call them the prorepresentationalist party. (34)
Now the Barcids were generals, though usually elected by the people in representative elections much like the Roman consuls, and it might seem strange that this ancient, aristocratic family of military men, whose soldiers were usually non-citizens of the Republic, would support a broadening of the representationalist institutions of Carthage. It is important to see that most of the mercenaries of Carthage were more like allies, auxiliaries, and subjects, than actual mercenaries and that many of them in basic representationalist theory would have had a claim to being citizens and having a right to vote and participate in the Republic. For example, many of the soldiers and perhaps some of the lesser officers were from North Africa, like the Carthaginians themselves. Some came from Libyan tribes or even Libyan states like two we read about in Roman sources in Numidia. Soldiers also came for Punico-Libyan cities, with mixed native Berber and Phoenician roots. These Libyco-Phoenicians were very similar to the Carthaginians themselves and they must have wondered why they, as far we can tell, were not represented by an otherwise enlightened (for the time) political system. In other words, there were rumblings and demands in the background and a simmering crisis of representation, not just inside the city's walls. (35)
Now, Hannibal and his faction knew of this rumbling crisis better than anyone else in Carthaginian society; however, it is far too cynical to conclude that they were just using the dissident feelings of the auxiliaries and the metropolitan population to gain power vis-a-vis other factions, because they often chose the side of the representationalist against their own self-interest. It is sufficient to say here that the military was not the bulwark of repression in either major state studied here but instead a laboratory of representationalist republicanism. One good example is that Hannibal offered his non-citizen troops Carthaginian citizenship if they helped him win in Italy. Hannibal also supported democratic reforms at home in the only true democratic revolution in Punic history.
It was after the Second Punic War; Hannibal had become a suffetes and quickly eroded the power of the One Hundred and Four, as I alluded to earlier. He was opposed to its power, as they had supreme judicial power, they were in charge of the administrative magistrates, and even may have had legislative power. Division of powers is important to representationalism, as I have said before, and Hannibal dealt with the concentration of wealth and power in politics by leading a democratic revolution by(largely) non-violent means. The people demanded perhaps in the streets the reduction of the oligarchs' power and the relaxation of strict judicial rules. They battled the justices' power to return the rule of law to its rightful balance of interests. They may have enacted other measures, such as expanding the franchise to non-citizens and the poor, and they probably made the popular assembly the supreme legislative body of the land. If the Revolution of 197-196 BC had not been largely reversed by the intervention of Rome at the request of the oligarchical party in Carthage, then the history of representation and even Rome itself would have been radically different. However, sadly, this bright moment in Punic history did not last long. (36)
Without the leadership of Hannibal, the democrats continued to agitate but the state never returned to their hands. Instead the representationalist and anti-representationalist forces paralyzed the state and eventually they tore it apart as they failed to unite until it was too late against the aggression of the Romans. The crisis of representation destroyed the state as the legitimate demands of the people were ignored and the people refused to stand by the oligarchy until the last possible moment which stopped the Republic from surviving the Third Punic War. The great irony is that the Romans had destroyed a state not dissimilar from themselves and they too suffered from a crisis of representation from the period just after 146 BC, the year of the fall the Republic of Carthage.
Two major problems contributed to the crisis in Rome: the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the wealthy and powerful families of Rome and the lack of empowerment of the non-Latin peoples of the Republic. Both problems are representationalist challenges of a dire nature, one class-based and one ethnically-based, not unlike the two primary problems in Carthage. Rome had incorporated the territories of many peoples, Etruscans, Greeks and various Italic peoples; most notably Oscan-speakers such as Samnites, into their state, and for a while had an even military alliance with them. By the time of the Second Punic War and afterwards, however, they began to see their Republic as expanding territorially, which meant they had to have effective control of the territory of their allies. This is a problem because did not grant citizenship to these individuals at the same time that they reduced local autonomy and decision-making powers. This led to a Roman domination or second conquest that was not agreed to in the highly legalistic way in which the Italics and Romans had done business before. In other words, the Italic peoples and others under Roman rule had a reasonable expectation of either autonomy or representation with in the state and as they lost one and did not gain the other, they became increasingly angered. (37)
This severe crisis of representation led to the great Social War with Rome, in which once-loyal allies, such as the Samnites and the Etruscans battle for their civil rights within the Roman Republic. They attempted to secede and become their own Republic, which they importantly named Italia. They were defeated, but Rome did not act as a conqueror. In fact, Roman leaders had largely gotten the message politically and gave full citizenship and civil rights to the rebels as well as to the Latin allies who had remained loyal during the war. The result was a multi-ethnic representationalist Republic with a strong rule of law tradition. Our closest ancient ancestor was born in the early 1st century BC. (38)
However, the Roman Republic ultimately failed and became the Roman Empire. This process is largely outside of the mandate of this thesis; however, the clash of the various factions within the republic, fighting for different socio-economic interest groups destroyed formal representation in the state, despite the fact that the same system had survived ethnic conflict. The important part here is not the end of the Roman Republic but the fact that the multi-ethnic nature of the state was largely a non-issue in the last conflicts of the Republic.
With the end of the Roman Social War, the ancient representationalist state had become as advanced as it would ever get. Medieval republics struggled even to meet the stringent levels of quality set by the most advanced states-Rome and Carthage. Only in the modern era have we gone past the politics of the ancient world. However, many of the same problems of representation exist even today, such as ethno-political conflicts, socio-economic clashes, and even issues of the division and distribution of power, all present in those ancient states that best bear a resemblance to modern Western states, particularly America. In the last section, we will examine the parallels of modern and ancient representationalist states, more closely and try to see what can be said about modern democracies today from the wisdom of the ancients recounted in the first four sections of this section.
5. Conclusions. Representation: Sprouts and All
To sum up what I have said previously, representation does not just come out of a box fully formed. It develops in a specific historical, geographic, and cultural context and develops over time very slowly. Representative institutions, both legislative and consultative deliberative bodies and representative executive officers evolve after certain prerequisites develop. A division of power, usually both vertically and horizontally must occur before or during the process of institutional "representalization." Additionally, other roots of representation, such as a socio-economic or ethno-religiously diverse population must develop before or at the same time as representationalist institutions develop. Further external and internal pressures must be brought to bear to transform these roots into developing sprouts of representation. A series of crises of representation succeed one another, gradually changing the attitudes of the local people and their institutions. The ideas and institutions are then spread through cultural contact, trade, and even immigration.
What we Westerns often think of as an exclusively European, Roman, Greek, or just "Western" idea, exclusive of the Near East, namely representation demonstrably evolved in the Near East. The republic in its classic Roman form and the representative institutions and norms that supported it can be traced back to the Hittites through Carthage, Phoenicia and Sama'al. The Hittites laid down the roots, Sama'al sprinkled the fertilizer, Phoenicia showed sprouts, which the settlers of Carthage uprooted and replanted in North Africa and Carthage cross-fertilized Rome, which benefitted from its own native Italo-Etruscan representationalist foliage. There is a clear line of reception to Rome, from which we in America received representationalist and republican ideas.
The evolutionary processes of representalization, aided by the key mechanism of the crisis of representation, determines whether a society will survive long enough to develop more advanced representational procedures, institutions, and ideas, or whether that society and the state dependent upon it, crumbles or fragments. America has been a great, shining example of democracy, and thus, representation in the modern, political sense. It has the greatest potential to spread the sprouts of representation to other nations whose own representationalist experiments have long since withered the vine. However, America also proves that the lessons of the past still matter, even over two thousand years after the Social War, because the problems of representation, just like its ideals, are eternal. America will constantly need to evolve and deal with these eternal problems in order to become itself eternal.
(1.) Hermens, F. A., The Representative Republic. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958, the whole book, specifically, 41-59, 144-158, and 241-263, where he discusses Aristotle's Politics and the history of democracy in modern states.
(2.) Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967, 60-111, particularly her discussion on descriptive representation.
(3.) Ibid, 112-143.
(4.) Bryce, Trevor, The Kingdom of the Hittites. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 16-19 and 64-130.
(5.) Beckman, Gary, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 2nd edn. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, Ismerika Treaty, 13-17, and Bryce, 150-151, and 157.
(6.) The following reference is for the last two preceding paragraphs: Bryce, 174-192 and 199-203.
(7.) Bryce, 203-205, and Beckman, 5.
(8.) Bryce, 203-204, 220-221, and 346-347 and Beckman, 169-180 (primary documents concerning legal verdicts by both Viceroys of Carchemish and Great Kings of Hattusa).
(9.) Beckman, 11-13 and 17-26, and Bryce, 173-174, 190-191, 219, and 273-274.
(10.) Bryce, 285-291, 354-355, and 376-377.
(11.) Bryce, 361-379 and 382-383.
(12.) The preceding two paragraphs have the following references: Hawkins, J. David, "Karkamish and Karatepe: Neo-Hittite City-States in North Syria," in Civilizations of the Ancient Near East Volumes I & II, ed. by Jack Sasson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2000, 1300-1302, and Bryce, 379-389, especially 384-385.
(13.) Hawkins, 1295-1302.
(14.) Moscati, Sabatino, ed. The Phoenicians, New York, NY: Rizzoli International, 1999, 18-19 and Dion, Paul E., "Aramaean Tribes and Nations of First-Millennium Western Asia," in Civilizations of the Ancient Near East Volumes I & II, ed. by Jack Sasson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2000, 1281-1282.
(15.) Dion, 1282-1284, and Kilamuwa, "King Kilamuwa," in The Ancients in Their Own Words, by Michael Kerrigan, 2009, Fall River Press, 154-155.
(16.) Hamilton, Mark W., "The Past as Destiny: Historical Visions in Sam'al and Judah under Assyrian Hegemony," The Harvard Theological Review, 1998, 221-224; Kilamuwa Inscription; and Dion, 1283-1284.
(17.) Hamilton, 224-225; Hawkins, 1299 and 1304; Dion, 1282-1284, and Kila-muwa Inscription.
(18.) Hamilton 1998, 221-222, and Dion, 1286-1292 and Kilamuwa Inscription.
(19.) Hamilton, 224-228.
(20.) Greenstein, Edward L. "Autobiographies is Ancient Western Asia," in Civilizations of the Ancient Near East Volumes III & IV, ed. by Jack Sasson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2000, 2428-2430; and Kilamuwa Inscription.
(21.) Aubet, Maria Eugenia, The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies, and Trade, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 3, 70-90 and 111-126; and Moscati, 19.
(22.) The reference for the previous two paragraphs is: Aubet, 113-114 and 214-218 and Lancel, Serge, Carthage: A History, trans. Antonia Nevill. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995; Lancel 1995, 23-24 and 351-356.
(23.) Aubet, 217-218 and 226-228.
(24.) The preceding two paragraphs share the following reference: Lancel, 111-120 and Aubet 145-147; also "Malchus," in Oxford Reference, online at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100128464 on 8/28/2017.
(25.) Chabad.org, Shoftim-Judges, online at http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/15809/jewish/Chapter-1.htm, accessed on 8/23/2017.
(26.) Lancel 112-117, and Aristotle, Politics, H. W. C. Davis (introduction, notes, and analysis), translated by Benjamin Jowett. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2000, 92-95.
(27.) Lancel, 116, and Aristotle, 93-94.
(28.) Bondi, Sandro Filippo, "The Course of History," in The Phoenicians, ed. by Sabatino Moscati. New York, NY: Rizzoli International, 1999, 44, and Aubet, 59-60.
(29.) Aristotle, 112-124, Lancel, 115-118, and Boatwright, Mary T., Gargola, Daniel J., and Talbert, Richard J. A, The Romans: From Village to Empire. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 58-67.
(30.) Aristotle, 112-124.
(31.) Lancel, 114-17, Boatwright, 48-51, and Bondi, 44.
(32.) Boatwright, 50, and 67-71.
(33.) Boatwright, 48-56, 59-75, 98-104, and 136-140.
(34.) Lancel, 115-120, Aristotle, 92-95, and Boatwright, 165 and 234.
(35.) Lancel, 258-259 and 298-300, Aubet, 226-230, and Boatwright, 104, 109, and 116.
(36.) The past two paragraphs use the following references: Livy (Livius),Titus, Ab Urbe Condita (in Latin), edited by Wilhelm Weissenborn, Part IV, 1866 Edition, Book 33:45-49, 120-124 Livy; and Lancel, 119-121.
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(38.) Boatwright, 180-183, 189-190, and Montagu, John Drogo, Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Chronological Compendium of 667 Battles to 31 BC, from the Historians of the Ancient World. London and Mechanicsburg, PA: Green Hill Books and Stackpole Books, 2000, 209 and 210.
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How to cite: Binetti, Christopher (2017). "Sprouts of the Ancients: The Ancient Roots of Representation in the Greater Mediterranean Region from the Hittites to Rome," Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 9(2): 174-198.
Received 30 July 2017 * Received in revised form 1 September 2017
Accepted 25 September 2017 * Available online 15 October 2017
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|Publication:||Geopolitics, History, and International Relations|
|Date:||Oct 1, 2017|
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