SEEKING SANCTUARY ACROSS THE SEA: WHY THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS TO GREECE REQUIRES MAJOR POLICY CHANGES.
The Mediterranean countries on the periphery of Europe, such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, have received more than 300,000 persons seeking international protection by sea in 2016. (1) Currently, Greece is host to approximately 57,000 of these individuals who have fled their homeland in the hopes of a better, safer life in the European Union. (2) Unfortunately, these refugees and asylum seekers have not found the haven they were expecting; instead, they are perpetually waiting in interim camps for official documentation of their status while Greece faces criticisms for the deplored conditions of these temporary "homes." (3) The influx of refugees into the European Union, particularly to border countries such as Greece, is straining the asylum systems meant to assist those individuals fleeing countries torn apart by war and political instability. (4) The European Union's Schengen Agreement, which permits free travel between ratifying European countries, and the Dublin Regulation, which determines the country responsible for an asylum applicant, are under criticism from world leaders and policy makers who question the sustainability of these protocols. (5)
This Note will examine how the economic crisis in Greece is contributing to the country's inefficient response and escalation of its refugee crisis. (6) It will evaluate the application of E.U. laws and regulations in Greece and argue for the implementation of new action to better address the needs of the refugees who wait indefinitely in Greece's interim camps. (7) Part II will explore Greece's financial history and examine how its inability to avoid debt left the country unprepared to manage the subsequent mass migration, fueled by global unrest and violence. (8) Part III will examine Greece's current economic instability and the effects that has on the nation's response to the refugee crisis. (9) Part IV will analyze the European Union's current asylum regulation systems and propose that the regulations' ineffectiveness requires the termination of current systems, or at the very least, creation of new policies, rather than reimplementation of failed protocols. (10) Finally, Part V shall conclude that the resolution to the immigration crisis depends on existing regulations understanding the financial burden levied on countries already experiencing economic instability. (11)
The migration crisis, though occurring throughout Europe, is substantially impacting Greece, whose geographical proximity to the Middle East and Africa makes it the country of first contact for those asylum seekers and refugees fleeing war and socio-political unrest in their home countries. (12) Greece is criticized for inadequately managing the migration surge, and its recent financial crises calls into question the country's capacity to make an effective, substantial response. (13) The refugee crisis in Greece is compounded by the nation's failed infrastructure systems, legislative challenges, and uncertainty as to how to respond to this broad global problem. (14)
A. Greece's Economic Crisis
1. Lead Up to the Economic Crisis
The state of Greece's economy during the past twenty years is marked by quick growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and productivity, followed by an equally rapid breakdown of this financial progress. (15) Initially, Greece experienced both an efficient credit market and macroeconomic stability from its inclusion in the Eurozone. (16) The Eurozone, a bloc of nineteen E.U. States who use the euro as their common currency, is a defining feature of European integration. (17) As a smaller state with a relatively-sized global economy, Greece was highly reliant upon the European Union for financial support to stave off high inflation rates and currency devaluations, the unavoidable consequences of joining the Eurozone. (18)
Before the Eurozone became a reality in 1999, economists already expressed concerns about Greece's desire to participate in the eventual convergence of the European economy when the country joined the European Union in 1981. (19) Certain features of the Greek economy and its social organization, such as "inefficient public administration, endemic tax evasion, and widespread political clientelism," gave rise to serious concerns that Greece would be unable to resolve these systemic issues in order to meet E.U. regulations for joining the Eurozone. (20) Greece appeared to triumph these reservations by meeting the Eurozone requisite that government deficits could not exceed 3% of a Eurozone country's GDP.21 Even though Greece seemingly accomplished this goal and joined the Eurozone in 2001, the European Central Bank (ECB) and other European countries were wary about the lack of transparency in the Hellenic government. (22) Official signs of Greece's impending financial crisis came to light in November 2004 when the government admitted to inaccurately filing its deficit budget and concealing the reality that its deficit was never below the 3% requirement. (23)
Greece's apparent initial economic success was unsustainable due to its own faulty governmental and economic organizations, which favored interest groups and excessive market regulations. (24) Some of the most problematic features of the Greek economy were its heavy regulation and widespread corruption conducted and condoned by its own government. (25) Political control in Greece has long relied on party-favoritism and pandering to voters to gain support. (26) Throughout the years, this has led various Greek leaderships to use continual augmentation of the public sector to build voter support and secure power in between elections. (27) Tense competition between parties, often played out in attempts to "purchase" party support by flooding the public sector with funding, has significantly contributed to Greece's high sovereign debt crisis. (28) The expenditures designated to the public sector cost significantly more than what the government could afford to sustain. (29)
This clientelism culture has permitted the now-common profuse tax evasion in Greece and contributed to the nation's economic downfall. (30) Ironically, though Greece has progressive income tax legislation, its progressiveness is precisely what permits widespread tax avoidance. (31) The government's finance sector condoned tax evasion through its lax enforcement of tax law and poor supervision of the economy. (32) Tax avoidance easily proliferated under policies that did not require service employees or professionals to write receipts for their clients. (33) Greece was, however, able to minimize some of it financial weaknesses, by relying on value inflows from tourism and other service-related sources of market income. (34) This predicament, briefly suspended in a volatile balance, would eventually be outweighed by a lack of market competition, a preference for a closed market, and weak institutional infrastructures. (35)
Greece's integration into the European Union and its participation in the Eurozone undoubtedly prevented its economic collapse in the late 2000s, and is saving it from complete failure today. (36) Economists, who doubted whether a single currency bloc could be successful among even economically strong nations, found the case of Greece entirely disastrous and doubted its capacity to make a recovery. (37) The situation in Greece has led some to propose a "Grexit," which would be, by choice or by mandate, an expulsion from the Eurozone. (38) In 2010, foreign investors quickly withdraw their assets from the Mediterranean country once it was undeniably clear that its economic situation was beyond self-repair; the consequence of this abandonment hastened the collapse of the economy. (39)
2. What the European Union Has Done in Response to Greece's Economic Crisis
Greece received an initial bailout of EUR110 billion, the equivalency of USD 122 billion, from the European Union in 2010 to assist with its payments on its high deficits. (40) By accepting the aid from the European Union, Greece was required to in turn implement highly unpopular austerity packages to help reduce its own deficit. (41) Economic reform proposals included privatization and reduction of the nation's social security system and labor market regulations. (42) The reform proposals, and the involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB, and the European Commission, gave some confidence to other E.U. states who feared Greece's future in the European Union meant the payment of endless bailouts. (43)
B. Legislative Initiatives
1. Greece as a Schengen State
The economic struggles Greece endured did not prevent it from pursuing its goal of complete integration into the European Union, in particular, its accession into the Schengen Area. (44) This bloc of nearly all European states and some non-European countries, such as Liechtenstein and Switzerland, was formed in 1985 as part of the Schengen Agreement. (45) The Agreement relies on harmonized regulations and procedures in lieu of internal border checks, permitting free travel between signatory States. (46) Special visas allow both E.U. citizens and third-party nationals to readily cross internal borders, emblematically signaling the Union's goal of unifying Europe's exchange of culture, persons, and economy. (47) The arrangement requires strong border protection in countries marking the outer perimeter of the Schengen Area; among these States are Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. (48) The security for the Schengen Area greatly depends upon the cooperation and solidarity of Schengen States. (49) State efforts at security and control are supported by the European Union's Home Affairs' decentralized agencies. (50)
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member-States of the European Union (Frontex) assists E.U. States with the application of existing E.U. laws and regulations "relating to the management of external borders." (51) In conjunction with Frontex, the European Police Office (Europol) helps E.U. countries' police forces efficiently coordinate efforts to prevent and combat high risk international crimes, such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and criminal organizations. (52) One of the most important organizations is the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which ensures the security of European countries by coordinating with asylum integration and application efforts to manage irregular migration. (53) Funding for these agencies is in part provided by the Internal Security Fund, which committed over EUR2 billion for the period of 2014 to 2020. (54)
2. Dublin Regulation
The Dublin Regulation, which has undergone three reforms in an attempt to accommodate ever-changing global conditions, is the European Union's chief asylum system for processing asylum applications and assigning states responsible for housing-approved applicants. (55) The Regulation's goal is to ensure a uniform process for beneficiaries seeking international protection as third-country nationals or stateless persons. (56) The function of the Dublin Regulation is intended to assist receiving countries with integrating asylum or refugee applicants into the respective societies, while ensuring that those applicants receive the humanitarian and international protection they seek. (57) The Dublin Regulation provides states with common criteria to determine which E.U. state is responsible for receiving applicants. (58) Even if they are not the receiving country, an individual state can examine claims on its own under Article 17 of the Regulation; the "discretionary clause." (59)
By its intended purposes, the Dublin Regulation is an integral part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the European Union's unified objective of creating "an area of freedom, security and justice" for individuals who have legitimate claims for seeking protection in the Union due to their particular circumstances. (60) One of the Regulation's most critical provisions is the principle of non-refoulement, which means that asylees and refugees cannot be sent back to the nation they came from if doing so will result in their persecution. (61) An equally important obligation of the Dublin Regulation is the requirement that Member-States adhere to the CEAS by following essential steps (62) First, applicants should be made aware of what the Dublin Regulation entails, particularly consequences of whatever status is designated to that person. (63) Second, states must accept responsibility of an applicant if the individual meets the requisite criteria. (64) Third, an interview of the applicant must be conducted to gather necessary information for processing claims. (65) Fourth, states must make applicants aware of the possibility that they could be transferred to another state for protection. (66) Fifth, the applicant should be aware their information is being shared among E.U. states for the purpose of determining states' responsibilities. (67) Last, the applicant should have access to their data in order to have the ability and opportunity to correct mistakes or lodge a legal complaint. (68)
A highly controversial component of the Dublin Regulation is the requirement that applicants file for protection in the state of first contact or the country in which they first arrive. (69) These nations, Greece among them, tend to be located on the external fringes of Europe and are marked by weaker economies and inadequate reception infrastructures. (70) When an individual files a claim in a country of first contact, their fingerprints are taken and stored in a computer system called Eurodac where they can be examined by other countries at different stages of the asylum process, thereby reducing the potential for exploitation of the system. (71) Another mechanism for ensuring the efficiency of the Dublin Regulation is its built-in early warning system which relies on coordinated communications among states to alert officials to the first signs of large volumes of irregular migration. (72)
The Dublin Regulation criteria is intended to be carried out in proportional uniformity throughout Member-States, taking into consideration each individual nation's ability to provide the required provisions. (73) The criteria have varying degrees of importance when applied, an example being family reunification which should be prioritized whenever possible during the transfer process. (74) Aspects of the Dublin Regulation are criticized for being too costly, impractical in times of enormous volumes of applications, and inefficient as carried out by individual nations. (75) Opponents of the system posit that the recent refugee crisis in Europe, specifically in Greece, is the result of the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation's "country of first arrival" rule. (76) Irrespective of its faults, if the CEAS is to function as intended, E.U. Member-States must work together to find a solution to the backlog of asylum applications and the disproportionate burden levied on the European Union's peripheral countries. (77) The current migration crisis is unprecedented and there are genuine reservations as to whether the Dublin system can reduce, rather than magnify, the situation in Europe. (78) An example of Dublin's major shortfalls are the reports of superfluous transfers conducted by the top transfer-receiving states, who request nearly as many transfers as they receive. (79) In 2013, Germany transferred 32,796 applicants and took back 30,053, while France sent back 5,903 applicants and took in 5,038. (80) Adding to the extraordinary burdens already experienced by the system is the fact that some states, (one being Greece), cannot accept transfers because their reception facilities fail to comply with human rights laws. (81) In the 2011 Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (82) the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) indefinitely suspended all transfers to Greece because its asylum procedures put individuals in danger of impermissible refoulement; additionally, its implementation of CEAS protocols failed to meet standards sufficient to allow other E.U. states to transfer applicants to the country. (83) The future of the Dublin Regulation and of Europe's management of the refugee crisis requires significant reforms. (84)
C. The Migration Crisis in Greece
Against the backdrop of Greece's financial struggles loomed the migration crisis. (85) The political unrest and violence in the Middle East, particularly during the early part of the 2000s, drove thousands of citizens from their home nations to wards Europe in the search of safety and relief from war. (86) The mass migration of asylum seekers from the Middle East was unprecedented and Greece, as a nation on the frontier of the European Union, bore the brunt of the effects. (87)
At the time of the first surge of migration in 2010, Greece was facing staggering debt and could not respond effectively to the crisis with requisite personnel and reception facilities. (88) Due to the Dublin Regulation's protocols, however, if asylees had not already filed for stay in Greece and were attempting to file for stay elsewhere, many of those applicants were sent back to Greece from another E.U. nation. (89) The concurrence of economic failure and mass migration led to the 2011 halt on transfers to Greece and the findings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that Greece's asylum system resulted in clear violations of global human rights laws. (90)
Greece's financial crisis is hardly coming to an end. (91) The country has required bailouts to prevent it from defaulting entirely on its debts, or worse still, having to leave the Eurozone by means of a Grexit. (92) At the start of 2016, Greece received a combined EUR86 billion from the IMF, the E.U., and the EBC as part of the bailout initiatives to save the struggling country. (93) The nation's unemployment rate continues to rise, however, and at the start of 2016, the rate was 30%. (94) The austerity measures, while highly unfavorable to Greek citizens, are projected to make positive impacts on Greece's deficit levels within in the next couple of years. (95) Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras approved a financial package for low-income pensioners to receive EUR380 as part of a one-time bonus, in addition to lowering VAT on the Aegean islands, as part of an effort to alleviate a portion of the burden of the austerity measures the government was required to pass to receive bailout funds. (96)
The migration influx is showing some signs of slowing down after nearly 170,000 migrants arrived in Greece in 2016. (97) Some cite the E.U.-Turkey Agreement of March 2016 for this decrease in asylum applications. (98) The Agreement permits Greece to make transfers of applicants exclusively from its islands, to Turkey, and in exchange, the European Union will resettle a Syrian applicant from Turkey directly. (99) The European Union also made an additional pledge of EUR3 billion and intends to prioritize Turkey's application to become a part of the Schengen Area. (100) The transfers from the Greek islands to Turkey will continue in spite of the growing global community concern that Turkey, like Greece, is unfit to accept transferred applicants. (101)
In Greece, the in-take process of applications is still slow and expensive; over EUR500 million are pledged for the upcoming decade. (102) Despite funding and loan setups, Greece is still struggling to address the crisis effectively and faces criticisms over the deplorable conditions of some of its camps. (103) In 2016, Greece was overwhelmed by a total of 182,500 asylee and refugee arrivals to its shores, having little in the way of infrastructure or funding to adequately provide even basic shelter to those individuals. (104) During the winter of 2016, approximately EUR90 million of jointly controlled funds, intended to be used to "winterize" the sordid camps, were squandered among the European Union, the UNHCR, and the Greek government, each avoiding responsibility for the blunder. (105) The debacle illustrates the vast challenges Greece and the institutions it works with face in the battle to control the migration crisis and revive what is left of the Hellenic economy. (106)
In spite of these gross difficulties and limitations, the European Union calls for renewed implementation of the Dublin Regulation. (107) The European Union intended for gradual returns of Dublin transfers to Greece to begin in March 2017, but complete resumption is yet to be seen. (108) The current ban on Dublin transfers to Greece will remain in effect for unaccompanied children and other vulnerable groups. (109) Despite the announcement of this specious goal, the European Union is struggling to relocate the promised 160,000 refugees stuck in Greece and Italy, and relocated only 8,162 by the end of 2016. (110) Some suggestions for mitigating the migration influx include bringing a temporary end to the European Union's esteemed Schengen Area. (111) While suspending the Schengen Area may be a legal possibility, like a Grexit, most experts believe it is unlikely to occur because of the reality that the negative consequences would far outweigh any positive impacts. (112)
A. Economic Limitations
Solutions for the future must take into consideration the reality of Greece's financial limitations which will inevitably stand as a barrier to expensive, though perhaps sensible, policies. (113) The refugee crisis on Greece's shores, along with its sorely damaged economy, must be considered together when policy makers formulate future proposals to fix either sector, because the two are now emphatically related. (114) Greece is currently being kept afloat by the rest of the European Union, the ECB, and the IMF. (115) The bailouts Greece received following its first major economic crash prevented the country from falling to complete disaster when it took a second plunge in 2010. (116) While the bailouts have kept Greece a functioning state, some call for a Grexit as a means to put an end to seemingly endless bailout packages and defaults on soaring sovereign debt. (117) The charge is that Greece's situation will entice other economically weak countries, like Spain or Portugal, to seek bailouts and that Greece's fragility stands to corrupt the rest of the Eurozone. (118) Expelling Greece from the Eurozone, though a tempting short-term solution, is not a viable permanent resolution for re-strengthening Europe's economy, given the enormity of the migration crisis coming through its borders and the unfair repercussions on Greek citizens. (119) Extensive literature on Greece's financial history reveals the country has demonstrated that it is not prepared to take full control and management of its self-inflicted crisis. (120) Given that Greece required ultimatum-type incentivizing to implement much needed austerity packages beginning in 2010 and continuing through 2016, it is unlikely that the nation will be able to make the difficult but necessary policy decisions on its own in the future. (121) Greece will struggle to take control of its own affairs if it continually tolerates systemic political corruption and vested interests: rather than vying for power, political leaders should work to resolve the nation's most pressing problems. (122)
The maintenance of the solidarity emphasized in the European Union's protocols should be continued. (123) The Eurozone and the single market economy shared between European states is an impressive accomplishment, and expelling Greece from the bloc could destabilize the entire system. (124) There can be no further debates about Greece's bungled entry into the Eurozone in 2001. (125) The massive commitments made by the IMF, the ECB, and the European Union to assist alleviation of Greece's debts should not be squandered in an attempt to find a quick solution to the debt crisis. (126) A Grexit will not resolve the nation's quandaries; rather, continued support and guidance from the European Union is precisely what Greece needs if it is ever going to rebuild itself. (127)
Given Greece's speculative capacity to come to an economic recovery in the near future, state and E.U. officials must be realistic and mindful of the country's encumbrance when considering immigration reforms and policies. (128) The nation struggles to provide desirable wages and living conditions for its own citizens. (129) Its large public sector has already been dwindled down to a bare skeletal structure. (130) The living conditions for asylum and refugee applicants in the interim camps still is far worse. (131) Greece desperately needs IMF, ECB, and E.U. funding in order to provide quality housing and services for these individuals seeking international protection. (132) Cutting the nation off from funding could mean the commission of further human rights violations against these asylees and refugees, since Greece alone cannot adequately provide for them. (133)
B. Schengen Must Remain
Greece's financial crisis will not be resolved in the near future, and this has broad-reaching effects on the European Union's vision of a cohesive Europe. (134) One of the European Union's paramount systems for achieving its goal of unification of laws, economy, and its citizens is the Schengen Area. (135) The migration crisis is prompting some leaders to consider a removal or a suspension of this zone for free movement. (136) The idea behind the push to remove the Schengen Area is that doing so would help stop the perpetuation of irregular movement of unregistered asylees and refugees across Europe's borders. (137) Idealistically, suspension of the Schengen Area would reduce incentives for asylum seekers to avoid fingerprinting and registering in Eurodac, and travelling north to a wealthier nation of their preference. (138)
Shutdown of the Schengen Area, however, will not solve, nor significantly reduce, mass volumes of irregular migration while the impetuses driving so many from their homes, such as war, political corruption, and civil unrest, continue. (139) Removal of the zone will only place increasing pressure on countries' border control systems and personnel, because it would require heightened checks on even routine visitors, driving up the costs of the already-expensive CEAS. (140) It will also be harmful to European citizens who benefit from the ability to move freely for business, employment, and social purposes; if the Schengen Area is dissolved, it is likely there will be a reduction of these types of travel due to feasibility obstacles. (141) It will also harm Member-States' economies, because Europe as a whole has become reliant upon a common, single market since adopting the euro. (142) This has allowed each state to develop its own individual, niche market; for example, Germany's market is primarily in manufacturing. (143) Without the ability to readily trade goods and services with neighboring states, all countries in the Union stand to suffer because they have not developed in a manner which encourages self-sufficiency. (144)
C. Remedies for Dublin Regulation
The CEAS and the Dublin Regulation significantly impact Greece's refugee crisis, but the CEAS can only function as intended if all state actors participate in full and genuine implementation of the outlined protocols. (145) Countries must ensure that their asylum application officials are applying the correct criteria and understand the recourse of their decisions for applicants in order to maintain the harmonized objectives of the CEAS and minimize inefficiencies resulting from varied imple mentation of E.U. regulations. (146) Despite its flaws, the CEAS should not be removed because the system has the potential to meet the European Union's harmonized humanitarian objectives; logistical shortcomings can be resolved through renewed efforts at coherency and consistency, as well as greater instruction and directives. (147) At its core, the CEAS is concerned with the safety and security of both countries and asylum applicants alike. (148) Internal improvements should be made as E.U. leaders receive more information and feedback regarding the application of the CEAS. (149) These adjustments should be published and made readily available for officials in each country; the main pillars of the CEAS could remain, ensuring that updates do not mislead or confuse local personnel. (150)
The requirement that applicants must file for protection in the country in which they first arrive was created as a practical way to keep track of individuals. (151) It should theoretically eliminate, or at least reduce, the potential for multiple applications filed by one person, since once filed, an application would be available for review by other countries. (152) The issue of inefficiency arises when the application is lodged in a country such as Greece, who cannot accommodate the applicant for reasons such as a lack of resources or overpopulation. (153) Backlogs and delays arise as the volume of applications increases. (154) It is broadly agreed among nation leaders and European commentators that the system is overburdened because it was not formed anticipating the extraordinary numbers of requests for protection as is seen today. (155)
It is controversial as to whether the Dublin Regulation, part of the CEAS's effort to minimize the possibility of one country processing a disproportionate amount of applications, is successful. (156) Northern European nations do, to a degree, benefit from the ability to transfer applicants back to a country of first arrival, while southern states are undeniably overwhelmed with a massive volume of applications they cannot readily process; however, northern nations do take in their share of applicants. (157) Northern states take back nearly as many applicants as they transfer, and while this exposes the system's inefficiencies, it also counters the popular rhetoric that only southern states are impacted by Dublin transfers. (158) Even if data reveals universal stress on Europe, it is obvious that wealthier nations are better prepared to process applications, while southern states suffer from a lack of trained personnel, supplies, and accommodations. (159)
The return of even limited Dublin transfers to Greece is a dodgy and desperate attempt to find some way to expedite the processing of valid asylum claims. (160) It may even come at the cost of legality and human rights if Greek officials send transfers back to their home counties, in violation of the law against refoulement. (161) If the transfers are not made however, the European Union's goal of relocating some 160,000 refugees in Greece will not be achieved. (162) The current conditions of the camps in Greece should raise serious apprehension about the already daunting task of accommodating those individuals awaiting decisions regarding their applications. (163)
Instead of mandating a renewal of Dublin transfers to Greece, the focus should be on processing the backlog of claims and securing the external borders. (164) E.U., IMF, and Greek officials must improve their communication with each other to ensure that they coordinate their efforts and see that money is not needlessly wasted. (165) Focus should also be placed on continued efforts to gather data and reports from personnel to better understand where funding and other resources are needed, which will help the CEAS operate efficiently. (166) Dublin transfers should not be reinstated in Greece when the country is struggling to provide for the many refugees already in its territory. (167) Efforts to strengthen Greece's external borders must be redoubled in order to reduce the number of arrivals who do not qualify for asylum, and whose attempted entry into the asylum system creates substantial inefficiencies through needlessly spent resources. (168) While Frontex may not be ideal because of claims that its focus on state security puts human rights at risk, the agency is currently a critical force for maintaining the security of Europe, especially within the Schengen Area. (169) Better coordination within states' police forces and these external agencies will ensure that policies are carried out as governing bodies intended, and will minimize abuses of discretion. (170) Active coordination with aid groups will also ensure that the safety and wellbeing of refugees is a primary focus. (171)
The situation in Greece does not reveal all that is wrong with the European Union, but rather the awful results of poor management at both the level of an individual sovereign and the Union. (172) Still, Greece demonstrates a remarkable ability to continue functioning as a state, even it does so painstakingly in the face of enormous obstacles on the financial front and with its refugee crisis. (173) Solutions will require long-term efforts and must take into consideration Greece's existing position. (174) A Grexit or the termination of the Schengen Area are not practical answers. (175) The resolution for Greece lies in the unity and solidary at the core of the European vision. (176) Burden-sharing, rather than burden-shifting, is required to revive a weary European Union and re-instill global confidence in Europe. (177)
The situation is dismal, but there is still hope for Greece's future. (178) If anything, Greece acts as an important lesson for the European Union going forward. (179) The patience and the hope of the refugees already in Greece are not wholly in vain. (180) As Greece and the European Union together become more conscious of shortcomings, implementation of the CEAS with a greater efficacy will lead to an improved state for refugees in Europe. (181)
(1.) See Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response-Mediterranean: Regional Overview, Unhcr, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Regional Overview] (listing statistical information regarding arrivals of refugees). In 2015, there were 1,015,078 arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Northern Africa coming by sea. Id. October of 2015 was a peak month for arrivals, with approximately 221,374 arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers by sea. Id. In comparison, there were only 30,354 refugee and asylum seekers in October of 2016. Id. The escalation of refugee and asylum seeker arrivals began in April of 2015. Id. Scholars also refer to asylum seekers as "asylees." Definition of Asylee, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/asylee (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
(2.) See Liz Alderman, Aid and Attention Dwindling, Migrant Crisis Intensifies in Greece, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/world/europe/migrant-crisis-greece.html?_r=0 (reporting on refugee situation in Greece). At the time of writing this piece, Greece was housing nearly 60,000 refugees. Id. While, as a whole, Europe is an attractive destination for fleeing refugees and asylum seekers, Greece in particular faces insurmountable waves of arrivals as a nation of "first contact." Id. The geographical positioning of Greece metaphorically makes the country a gateway to the rest of the European Union, especially to the wealthier nations in the northern portions of the continent. Id. Many refugees and asylees arrive in Greece hoping to continue through to other European nations. Id. The Greek asylum systems are overburdened; the nation struggles to process each application as per the laws of the European Union. Id.
(3.) See id. (describing conditions of camps). The delays in the processing of asylum applications and refugee status protections have led to overcrowding in the temporary housing camps. Id. Greek officials initially promised a deadline of a few weeks to complete applications of refugees staying in a camp in Idomeni, but those weeks have turned into months, and there is little optimism for expediting the process. Id. Food provisions and healthcare resources are scarce, the living conditions are "squalid," and there is little those migrants can do except to wait for what will hopefully be grants of refugee status. Id. See also Niki Kitsantonis, Greek Appeal for Aid After Fire Damages Refugee Camp, N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2016), www.nytimes .com/2016/09/21/world/europe/refugee-camp-greece-fire.html (detailing dastard conditions of camp on "Aegan island of Lesbos"). At a camp in Moria, a" fire destroyed the temporary shelter for 4,400 migrants, forcing them to gather in a nearby field. Id. Some 100 unaccompanied minors were resettled in a hostel; temporary accommodations would be provided for about 1,000 others by means of an anchored vessel dispatched by the Shipping Ministry. Id. Nikos Toskas, an Interior Ministry official, criticized the apparent lack of sincere support from the rest of the European Union' Id. Toskas noted that sending supplies makes little impact on the entirety of the situation, and he alluded to nations like the Balkan states, which have put increasing pressure on Greece, rather than alleviating it, via their own management of the refugee influx. Id. In March of 2016, "Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia ... closed their borders" to incoming asylees and refugees. Sewell Chan, Balkan Nations Shut Down March of Migrants, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 03/10/world/europe/europe-refugee-crisis.html (reporting on recent unilateral action by E.U. States). See also Kitsantonis, supra note 3 (explaining tension between government and citizens). Tension is felt by government officials and citizens alike: in Moria, the fire was set to the camp allegedly in protest of the rumor that many migrants would be returned to Turkey. Id. Nine camp residents were detained and "two police riot units [were] sent" to contain the situation and placate island residents "calling for the migrants to leave the island." Id.
(4.) Jesse Rosenfeld, This is What Greece's Refugee Crisis Really Looks Like, The Nation (Sept. 1, 2015). http://thenation.com/article/this-is-what-greeces-refugee-crisis-really-looks-like/ (sharing stories of refugees from Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Syria). The war in the Middle East and conflicts in Northern Africa have driven thousands from their homes, hoping to find refuge in European countries which seem to have better prospects. Id. The numbers that come through Greece, however, are overwhelming the country's resources and ability to manage effectively the large volumes of applications for refugee or asylee status. Id. See also Scott Anderson, Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart, N.Y. Times (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/ll/ magazine/isis-middle-east-arab-spring-fractured-lands.html (describing events culminating into surge of mass migration from Middle Eastern countries). The mass migration from the Middle East is but a part of "the catastrophe that has fractured "the Arab world." Id. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the consequential rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and political dissolution and instability in the Middle East have compounded into the cause for the exodus of so many from the region. Id. See also Reinoud Leenders, Iraqi Refugees in Syria: Causing a Spillover of the Iraqi Conflict?, Third World Quarterly (2008), available at www.http:jstor.org.library.law. suffolk/stable/pdf/20455150.pdf (relating Iraqi refugee crisis in Syria, starting in early 1990s); Syrian Civil War Fast Facts, Cnn.com (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:38 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/Syria-civil-war-fast-facts/ (forming timeline of events in Syria beginning March 2011, ending September 2016); Michael Crowley, How the Fate of One Holy Site Could Plunge Iraq Back Into Civil War, Time.com (June 26, 2014), time.com/2920692/iraq-isis-samaria-al-askan-mosque/ (last accessed Nov. 23, 2016) (describing bombing of mosque leading to massacre of Iraqis, millions flee); Thessa Lageman, Mohamed Bouazizi: Was the Arab Spring Worth Dying For?, Aljazeera, (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/mohamed-bouazi zi-arab-spring-worth-dying-151228093743375.html (writing about purported catalyst for sociopolitical uprisings against dictatorial governments in Middle East). But see Richard Nieva & Ben Fox Rubin, Refugees and Tech: Scenes from a Greek Tragedy, Cnet (Sept. 9, 2016 1:05 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/europe-refugee-crisisgreece-stories/ (detailing life for refugees in Greece). Despite the tragedies faced by so many migrants from the Middle East, some maintain hope that their situation, and those of their family left behind, can be improved. Id. It is that hope which leads thousands to make the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, seeking a new life in Europe and freedom from the violence and despair plaguing their home country. Id.
(5.) See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, 133020-EN, Eur-Lex (Aug. 8, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3A13 3020 (laying out parameters of Schengen Area). The Schengen Agreement of 1985 created an area that "represents a territory [in Europe] where the free movement of persons is guaranteed." Id. Between signatory states, the agreement, in practice, removes all internal borders among the states "in lieu of a single external border." Id. Within the Area, the countries share common rules and procedures concerning visa applications and asylum requests. Id. The principles of the Schengen Agreement have been incorporated into the rest of the European Union's legal paradigms, as by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Id. Cooperation in the Schengen protocols does not itself make a particular European country party to the Schengen Area; some states, either by choice or by not meeting required conditions, still have internal border controls. Id. See also Ben Antenore, Can the Schengen Agreement Survive the EU Refugee Crisis?, The European Institute (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.europeanin stitute.org/index.php/ei-blog/276-february-2016/2129-can-the-schengen-agreementsurvive-the-eu-refugee-crisis-2-18 (explaining not all E.U. States participate; some non-E.U. countries participate). Only by signing and becoming a party do States participate in the dissolution of internal borders in the Schengen Area. The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 5. The Schengen Area was originally formed between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. The Area received its name from the town in Luxembourg where the first forms of the agreement were signed. Id. While there are no internal border controls within the Area, the Schengen Agreement has provisions that allocate certain resources and personnel, as through police and judicial authorities, to ensure internal security and stability of the Area. Id. Greece joined the Area in 1992. Id. (listing all nations party to Schengen Agreement). But see Conor Gaffey, Five Things You Need to Know About the Schengen Agreement, Newsweek (Sept. 14, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://europe.news week.com/five-things-you-need-know-about-schengen-agreement-332976?rx=us (reporting on refugee crisis' impact on Schengen Agreement). Given the high volume of asylum seekers and refugees entering the European Union, some countries seek to close their borders, in violation of the Schengen Agreement, in an attempt to halt further illegal migration. Id. Tensions are high between E.U. States that are members, and those that are not, over who is responsible for controlling the borders and what should be done to that end. Id. See also Lillian Langford, Note, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, 26 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 217, (Spring 2013) (criticizing European Union's asylum system for neglecting human rights). The Dublin Regulation is another critical system at the center of the European Union's refugee crisis. Id. at 218. The Dublin Regulation provides that asylees must be processed in the country they first arrive in, making the states in southern Europe almost automatically "receiving countries" because they are positioned along the route where most asylees and refugees are currently traversing. Id. This places a "disproportionate burden" on the southern, peripheral countries, such as Italy, Malta, and Greece, that are not only countries of first reception, but also recipients of "transferees," or asylum applicants who have managed to travel on to another Member-State and attempted to file an application for asylum there instead, contrary to the Union's laws on asylum grants. Id. at 217, 224. The unity and solidarity that the European Union has envisioned for itself, based on such protocols as the Schengen Area and the Dublin Regulation, is threatened by the inequality in processing asylum applications. Id. at 218. The Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation should be read together as their relationship impacts the ability for free movement of not only citizens of the European Union, but also of the asylees and refugees who are now also seeking residency in Europe. Id. The refugee crisis has prompted some countries to close their borders, in violation of the Schengen Agreement, as an attempt to combat the influx of refugees. Id. at 276. France closed its borders for a time in 2011 in reaction to Italy's grant of free movement to some 22,000 migrants who would have otherwise been denied free travel because of the Dublin Regulation. Id. See also Devorah Lauter, France Blocks Italian Train Carrying Tunisian Migrants, Los Angeles Times (Apr. 19, 2011), http://articles.latimes. com/2011/apr/l 9/world/Ia-fg-tunisia-refugees-20110419 (reporting on contentions between countries over obligations). The French government resisted accepting a train boarded by sixty Tunisian migrants from Italy, citing economic uncertainty and an inability to support the arrivals. Id. Italy at that time had received approximately 22,000 migrants and could not maintain accommodations for all of them. Id. This incident was only one of several indications of a breakdown of trust and good relations between European countries, as well as the "strengthening popularity of extreme-right groups" who oppose immigration. Id.
(6.) See infra Part II.A-C (discussing Greece's financial struggles combined with weakened state infrastructure).
(7.) See infra Part II.B, Part III, Part IV (explaining how continuation of Greece's current situation cannot endure much longer without irreversible consequences).
(8.) See infra Part II.A.1-2 (laying out historical events culminating in economical frustration of resources).
(9.) See infra Part III (examining current events in Greece, status of laws, regulations).
(10.) See infra Part IV (proposing solutions, recommendations for future of Greece, European Union).
(11.) See infra Part V (suggesting Greece, along with European Union, must strategically think through policies).
(12.) See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration, at 2, COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015) [hereinafter European Agenda on Migration] (positing reasons for seeking haven in Europe). The war in the Middle East, in particular, has brought thousands of migrants to Europe seeking better living conditions and a safer future. Id. "Frontline" countries, or countries of first contact, face the brunt of the mass migration movement coming to Europe from the Middle East and Africa. Id. at 4. See generally Theresa Papademetriou, Refugee Law and Policy: Greece, Library of Congress (last updated June 21, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/ greece.php (discussing Greece's history in European Union, process for asylum or refugee application in Greece). "Greece has always experienced a large number of migrants attempting to enter the EU illegally due to its geographic location and because it is a first country of entry pursuant to Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the Dublin Regulation)." Id. See infra Part II.B.1-2 (explaining Schengen Area, Dublin Regulation); see also Anderson, supra note 4 (detailing breakout of war in Middle East causing global refugee crisis). The events following the American invasion of Iraq have prompted "the series of revolutions and insurrections that have collectively become known ... as the Arab Spring. They continue today with the depredations of ISIS, with terrorist attacks and with failing states." Anderson, supra note 4. See also Alderman, supra note 2 (reporting on 57,000 refugees trapped in Greece); Liz Alderman, Greek Villagers Rescued Migrant. Now They Are the Ones Suffering, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/europe/greece-lesbos-refugees .html (illustrating suffering of not only migrants, but also of Greek citizens).
(13.) See Larry Elliot, The 'No' Vote Means Both Economic and Political Chaos for Greece, The Guardian (July 5, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ the-no-vote-means-both-economic-and-political-chaos-for-greece-2015-7 (reporting on economic collapse in Greece). The situation is apparently so dismal that some say the only viable solution is for Greece to leave the European Monetary Union (EMU), in a so-called "Grexit." Id. Supporters of a Grexit claim that if Greece were no longer in the EMU, it could issue its own currency and oversee its own borrowing plans and interest rates. Id. That course of action, however, would also require Greece to default on its current exorbitant debts and it could not to continue to receive emergency funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Id. The evident shortcomings in the Hellenic government, ranging from the misallocation of state finances to the mismanagement of governance and policy implementation, have created a rift between Greece and the rest of the Union, with some countries strongly supporting a Grexit. Id. Still, the situation is unlikely to unfold in that manner: even though Greece's economy is'in a "freefall," a Grexit threatens the entire stability of the European Union since it undermines the strength and reliability of the Union's single currency, the euro. Id. See also Helena Smith, Greece's Economic Crisis Goes On, Like an Odyssey Without End. The Guardian (Jan. 4, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ jan/04/greeces-economic-crisis-goes-on-odessy-without-end (analyzing Greece's economic woes in respect to political parties' power struggles). A critical problem in Greece has been the government's resistance to external oversight even though its own inability to manage the economic crisis suggests that the country cannot alone repair and rebuild its state governance systems. Id. Pessimism hangs over the nation's citizens as they struggle to accept any words of encouragement from their leaders. Id. The looming refugee crisis swelling on Greece's shores desperately requires economic recovery if Greece is to effectively and efficiently manage the asylee and refugee influx. Id.
(14.) See Michael Mitsopoulos, Understanding The Crisis In Greece: From Boom To Bust (2011) (reviewing economic history of Greece precipitating its deterioration). Internal shortcomings have weakened Greece's overall profile. Id. at 7. "[T]he political establishment, powerful rent-seeking groups and a society that has been trained to be suspicious of free markets and to intuitively trust ... rhetoric that favors government interventions" are factors that have crystallized into the downfall of the nation. Id.
(15.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 3 (illustrating economic situation in Greece). After its initial success, Greece experienced a degradation of its economic developments because of factors such as poor market competition, a persistent government deficit, and a general "unattractiveness" that kept skeptical foreign investors away. Id. at 109-10. At first, Greece stayed within zones relative to other Eurozone countries, but its economic progress began to slow as government debt and GDP numbers began to decline. Id. at 113-15. Private sector credit had slower growth rates because, concurrently, the government's debt, as a percentage of the GDP, was rising. Id. at 115. Much of the state infrastructure investments were provided by the European Union, by way of structural funds, to support the newly joined E.U. country. Id. at 118. Those funds created new jobs and bolstered economic productivity. Id. The expansion of credit to private households created a rise in domestic consumption, even when there was a "gradual slowdown of the explosive growth of private sector spending" in 2004, around the time of the Olympic Games, which Greece hosted. Id. Eventually, the rise in domestic demand of goods exceeded the domestic supply of goods and services, resulting in the need to rely on imported goods to fulfill increasing demands. Id. at 121-24 (depicting charts displaying demand-supply statistics). What was particularly damning for domestic goods' competitiveness was the fact that imported goods were more desirable, despite their higher cost and distribution expenses. Id. at 125. Furthermore, the allocation of resources and decisions on pricing in crucial industries, combined with low standards of regulation of professional services indicates that Greece's infrastructure systems began to corrode against the backdrop of its initial progress. Id. at 126, 127-29 (showing charts illustrating Greece's comparative global competitiveness). Greece ranked 109 out of 183 countries for "Doing Business in 2010." Id. at 126. It was 71 out of 133 for "World Economic Forum (WEF), Global Competitive Index, 2009-2010;" 57 out 180 for "Transparency International (TI), Corruption Perceptions Index 2008" and was 39 out of 213 for "UN, per capita GDP $, 2007." Id. Greece's "Administrative cost share in GDP (in %)," based on data collected in 2005, was 6.8%. Id. at 129. This percent was based on the "[i]ntra-EU differences in regulation-caused administrative burden for companies." Id. For perspective, France's administrative cost share percentage was 3.7%, the United Kingdom's was 1.5%, and Italy's was 4.6%. Id.
(16.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 109 (explaining Greece's quick growth unique from other European countries). The country's inclusion in the Eurozone bloc and its adherence to the EMU polices led to its unprecedented success in comparison to other E.U. nations. Id. After Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001 until approximately 2009, the country was able to survive despite its low global competitive performance, shortcomings in governance, and growing deficits, because it relied on support funding from other E.U. nations. Id. at 111, 189. By 2009, however, the international community, particularly other European countries, could no longer ignore Greece's situation. Id. at 189. The global economic crisis exacerbated its existing troubles. Id. See also Crash Course, The Economist (Sept. 7, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-erisis-are still-being-felt-five-years-article (explicating causes of global economic crisis of 2008). The widening chasm between the debt of southern European countries and the economic expansion of economies in the north led to imbalances that needed to be offset by crediting-lending. Id. Countries like Greece were not in the position to partake in as much borrowing as they did to balance their deficits. Id. The ECB should have restricted the periphery countries from such excessive borrowing and forced reliance on credit. Id. If the ECB had done so, some financial experts believe countries like Greece could have salvaged their financial situations. Id. See also Mike Bird, Absolutely Everything You Need to Know About Greece's Bailout Crisis, Business Insider (June 29, 2015, 4:28 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/absolutely-everything-youneed-to-know-about-greeces-bailout- crisis-2015-6 (explaining Greece's somewhat deceptive entry into Eurozone). The fact that Greece did not actually qualify to enter the Eurozone in 2000, because the country had, at that time, a deficit greater than the 3% threshold for entry into the bloc, supports the claim that perhaps Greece was not ready to enter the Eurozone at all. Id.
(17.) See The Euro, Europa, http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/money/ euro_en (defining Eurozone). The euro is a defining feature of European integration; (he common currency is used in nineteen of twenty-eight E.U. countries today. Id. The EMU coordinates "economic and fiscal polices, a common monetary policy and the euro as the common currency." Id. The euro was launched on January 1, 1999, and its use in participating countries fosters economic exchange between countries in the Eurozone. Id. It also gives the European Union global strength, as the euro is the second most important international currency: the first being the US dollar. Id.
(18.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 124 (stating E.U. funding would paradoxically hurt Greece's financial future). Once Greece was a part of the European Union, it could participate more readily in the transfer of goods and services with other European nations. Id. The imports became problematic for Greece when they quickly overtook Greece's domestic supply of goods, which could not compete with high domestic demands. Id.
(19.) See Konstantine Gatsios & Dimitrios Ioannou, The Way Out for Greece, Bloomberg (May 21, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-05-21/reform-not-stimulus-is-the-way-out-for- greece (describing Greece's place in European Union as wishful fantasy which could not fully come into fruition). See Hellenic Republic: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's Course in the EU (Oct. 14, 2016), http:// www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greece-in-the-eu/greeces-course-in-the-eu.html [hereinafter Hellenic Republic] (explaining Greece's participation in European community as three-part process). When Greece first entered the European Union, there were some doubts as to its capacity to transition smoothly into the European institutions and regulations. Id. The second phase of Greece's integration into the European Union involved the adoption of federal policies and political structuring. Id. The third phrase "was characterized by even further support for the idea and process of European integration, deepening integration in every sector, in line with the federal model." Id. The Treaty of Lisbon, essentially the constitution for the European Union, and Greece's full participation in the EMU solidified the country's social and economic European integration. Id. Greece's adoption of the euro on January 1, 2002, further supported the integration. Id.
(20.) See Rebecca Nelson et. al., Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ row/ R41167pdf (offering background history of Greece, highlighting its shortcomings).
(21.) See id. at 3 (describing requirements of Stability Growth Pact). The Stability and Growth Pact is a set of fiscal rules created to ensure the sustainability of a single, common currency. Id. In order to even join the Eurozone, countries had to show that their government deficits were no greater than 3% of their GDPs and that their public debt levels were no greater than 60% of their GDPs. Id.
(22.) See Graeme Wearden, Greece Debt Crisis: Timeline, The Guardian (May 5, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/05/greece-debt-crisis-timeline (explaining Greece's economic crisis). While Greece celebrated its accession into the Eurozone "after dramatically cutting inflation and interest rates," the president of the ECB in 2001. Wim Duisenberg, rightly warned the nation that it needed to continue to "improve its economy." Id. See also Duienberg Steps Down, Economist (Feb. 2, 2002), www.economist.com/topics/wim-duisenberg (follow "Duisenberg Steps Down" hyperlink) (noting acquiescence of power as president of European Central Bank); Jean-Claude Trichet: Relaxed, Economist (June 19, 2003), www.economist.com/topics/wim-duisenberg (follow "Jean-Claude Trichet: Relaxed" hyperlink) (announcing Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of Bank of France, as new president of ECB).
(23.) See Wearden, supra note 22 (reporting on Greece's cover-up of its national debt). Greece initially celebrated its own success, but in 2005 the "right-wing New Democracy party" initiated a new budget to cut the deficit. Id. Taxes increased on items like alcohol and tobacco. Id. By 2009, the situation in Greece required major overhauls that the Mediterranean nation was slow to make. Id. The cost of borrowing went up for Greece, as it grew less able to make repayments on borrowed monies. Id. The cutbacks the Hellenic government made, and had to make, resulted in increased frustrations of Greek citizens. Id. Large-scale protests took place in late 2009. Id.
(24.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 4-5 (highlighting main causes for collapse of Greek economy). The Greek government favored the creation of pockets of rent, or excess value production, which in turn diminished transparency and accountability surrounding the management of public funds. Id. at 8. Furthermore, this type of rent creation allowed the "proliferation of pork-barreling" and small but powerful interest groups. Id. at 8-9. These strong interest groups encouraged the maintenance of the status quo and opposed reforms that compromised coveted pools of rent. Id. at 9. Rent acquisition can be legal, such as through unchecked legislation and distribution of privileges to interest groups, or illegal, if rents are acquired through mere corruption. Id. at 9. The problem in Greece was, and to a large extent still is, the acceptance of this system of corruption and appeals to interest groups by the general public. Id. at 10-11. Rather than objecting to these flagrancies, Greek citizens accepted their integration into government and politics, and similarly feared "the loss they [stood] to incur should the rule of law suddenly apply." Id. at 11.
(25.) See Nelson, supra note 20 (stating problematic features of Greek economy leading up to crisis). The Greek government controlled a majority of all business assets and it enforced heavy oversight of the economy until as recently as 2008, when the state reduced its stake in national business assets from approximately 75% to 50%. Id. at 2. See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 109-113 (describing "institutional rigidities"). This tight economic control prevented domestic growth, which would be possible in a more open market. Id.
(26.) See George Kaloudis, Transnational Democratic Politics in Greece, Int'l J. on World Peace (Mar. 2000), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753241 at 51 (detailing political history and democratic transition in Greece). Economic expansion began under dictatorial leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 37-38. The nation was not insulated by an adequate infrastructure, that could handle the quick growth of the economy and participation in a global market. Id. at 38. This resulted in large gaps between the laboring class and the middle class. Id. This fission continued, despite a transition to a democratic state. Id. at 53-55.
(27.) See Kaloudis, supra note 26, at 53 (noting climbing national debt and increased spending in public sector). In the 1980s, the center-left party, PASOK (Pan hellenic Socialist Movement), increased pension packages for the elderly and farmers to maintain party support. Id.
(28.) See Iosif Kovras & Neophytos Loizides, The Greek Debt Crisis and Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?, Comparative Politics (Oct. 2014), http://www.jstor .org/ stable/43664340, at 5 (providing context to Greece's debt crisis). In comparison with other southern European countries, these being Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, Greece is ranked lowest in government effectiveness and economy management. Id. at 4.
(29.) See id. at 6 (revealing damaging effect of creating constituency in increasingly costly public sector). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2008, Greece had the largest percent of an active workforce employed in public corporations. Id. Since the 1980s, the public sector has more than doubled as political parties continually rely on incentivizing electoral support by pouring funds into civil services. Id. Despite this "generosity," the OECD stated there is no evidence that it has produced superior quality of services. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 2 (declaiming wasteful government expenditures to pay for public sector wages and social benefits).
(30.) See Nelson, supra note 20, at 2 (describing tax evasion as mainstay of Greek society). Just before the debt crisis in 2008, Greece taxed only one third of declared incomes. Id. See also Bird, supra note 16 (reporting on lead-up to Greece's economic collapse). The excessive tax avoidance by middle-class professionals, coupled with the government's own overspending and interest group favoritism, forced Greece into a position that required "radical" changes to try to resolve years of systemic problems. Id.
(31.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14 (detailing tax establishment in Greece). Despite its low market competiveness to maintain such progressive policies, Greece has one of the largest levels of tax-free income in Europe. Id. at 147. The progressive tax legislation is one feature of the Greek economy that gave rise to detrimental outcomes. Id.
(32.) See Costas Simitis, The European Debt Crisis 59 (2014) (explaining "black holes" in tax revenues). The blatant refusal to pay taxes on the part of citizens was permitted by tax officials. Id. Even after the government established a new tax system to remedy some of the ailments that caused the loss of revenue that should have gone to the state, the effort was not enough to recover depleted resources. Id. at 138-39.
(33.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14 (writing about accepted customs in Greek society). The practice of professionals, and those in service jobs not to write receipts for their work, creates an environment where it is easy and temptingly profitable to one's self-interest to avoid payment of taxes. Id. at 11. "The chances that a trusted plumber or doctor will provide a receipt is often low, which makes the exchange of undeclared sums of money for services provided less of an option and more of a necessity." Id. See also Simitis, supra note 32, at 138 (signaling government inadequacies as reasons for failure of attempted overhaul program). Eventually, the Hellenic government introduced a new system in 2012 that required taxpayers to submit receipts. Id. This was intended to keep better track of tax rebates. Id. Unfortunately, "the system was not calculated correctly and resulted in the loss of tax receipts amounting to EUR1.4 billion." Id. The government also reduced the size of the tax-free income bracket and added new taxes to collect as much value added taxes (VAT) as possible to offset deficits. Id. This too did little to rectify the tax vacuum Id at 138-39.
(34.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 154 (examining tax avoidance contribution to Greece's financial crisis). There are more self-employed workers in Greece than there are salaried workers, resulting in a disproportional amount of workers claiming incomes that are exempt from income taxes. Id. In the late 2000s, out of 8.2 million individuals with taxable incomes, only 5.5 million filed tax returns, making the undeclared tax income in excess of 20%. Id. at 158. It was highly possible for the self-employed to evade taxes even though their incomes were, as a whole, higher than the average income of salaried workers. Id. at 160. The introduction of policies requiring the collection of receipts from the self-employed and service positions only minimally reduced the number of individuals not paying taxes. Id. at 162. Mitsopoulos cites to, as examples of the self-employed who do not use receipts, taxi drivers and gas station owners. Id. These types of workers have a high potential to claim income amounts far lower than what they are making. Id. at 162. On the other hand, Greece's tourism market experienced healthy levels of income production. Id. at 124-25. This masked some of Greece's financial turmoil. Id. The tourism sector remained outside of most of the excessive market and administrative regulations that harmed the competiveness of Greece's domestic production capabilities. Id. at 125. Overregulation of sectors, such as transportation, made the nation reliant upon imports. Id. Despite the high costs, imported goods remained more cost-effective than domestic supplies, as domestic production was incapable of meeting high demands. Id.
(35.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 110 (explaining how structural rigidities in Greece's economy kept market stagnant despite appearance of growth); supra note 15 (discussing why economic expansion could not prevent downward spiral of market); Landon Thomas, Greek Crisis, the Book. Or Actually Several of Them, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/business/dealbook/greek-crisisthe-book-or-actually-several-of- them.html (remarking on Greece's financial shortcomings and governmental waste); Nelson, supra note 20, at "Summary" (describing Greece's economic crisis in wake of Eurozone's own debt crisis). Greece seemingly had all it needed to be an economically successful nation. Nelson, supra note 20, at "Summary." "Greece had abundant access to cheap capital, fueled by flush capital markets ... after adopting the euro in 2001. Capital flows were not used to increase the competitiveness of the economy, however.... By early 2010, Greece risked defaulting on its public debt." See also Greece's Debt Crisis Odyssey, BBC News (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-14977728?print=true (forecasting Greece's economic future). Greece eventually became dependent upon the bailout funds from the "Troika," the central organization of European lenders made up by the European Union itself, the IMF, and the ECB. Id. Greece's borrowing was already reduced before it approached its second economic crash in 2010. Id. Predictions reflected concern over whether Greece could to meet the requirement that it limit its borrowing. Id.
(36.) See Simitis, supra note 32 (describing inception of euro without necessary framework for managing economic struggles). Participation in the Eurozone did not automatically resolve the imbalances in European economies, which Simitis sees as a problem of shortsightedness. Id. at 9. While periphery countries in the European Union managed to produce some high levels of growth, their growth did not last long enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south. Id. at 11. As Greece started to experience economic troubles, some predicted that in the event of a complete crisis, such as what Greece is currently experiencing, the collapse of one nation, even one with a small economy, could have disastrous effects on the whole Eurozone. Id. See also Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 121-23 (explaining how Greece staved off collapse). The support funding from the European Union prevented Greece from experiencing the expected inflation rates that should have accompanied economic expansion. Id. at 123. Part of Greece's early success came from the fiscal stimulus of hosting the 2004 Olympic Games and from funds from the European Union. Id. at 112. "[T]he expansion of private credit ... after the beginning of the 1990s ... [became] the main way to finance expansion of consumption in Greece." Id. at 113. While being a part of the Eurozone helped deflect some of the expected economic troubles, Greece's trade and services deficit and increased domestic demand, without much in the way of domestic production, led to what some predicted as inevitable: a total market collapse. Id. at 124.
(37.) See Miroslav N. Jovanovi, The Economics Of European Integration 84-88 (2nd ed. 2013) (stating concerns of economists in 1998 about whether Eurozone could function successfully). Many German economists suggested the creation of the Eurozone should be postponed until "the economic grounds were right for the project." Id. at 85. At the time of inception of the Eurozone, several nations escaped the imposition of sanctions for not meeting certain criteria. Id. The goal of European integration superseded fiscal qualifications: because the interest charged on government bonds was issued at the same rate across the European Union, nations with "relatively weaker economies rose faster than their national productivity," such as was true in Greece. Id. Over time, this resulted in a high trade deficit. Id. Countries like Greece that relied on borrowing experienced higher costs for borrowing funds, while at the same time, "their output became uncompetitive in relation to other countries." Id. Since devaluation of the euro in a single country was not possible, nations that needed to borrow large amounts of money to support their economies ironically damned themselves into inevitable wage and price cuts to keep their costs as close as possible to their competitors. Id. In 2010, Greece was charged at 10% for loans, three times higher than was the rate of interest in Germany, which had a stable, low-risk economy. Id. The strict loan requirements imposed on these nations with weaker economies made growth difficult: their economies experienced years "[of] uncompetitive production structure" in order to lower rates of expenditure. Id. at 86. The precarious situation Greece and other similar economy-weak states experienced then, and still are today, was the possibility of devaluation of the euro. Id. at 87.
(38.) See Jens Dammann, Article, Paradise Lost: Can the European Union Expel Countries from the Eurozone?, 49 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 693 (May 2016) (acknowledging legal possibility of Grexit). The situation in Greece has escalated to the point where there are threats of a "Grexit" by not only economists, but also by other European countries who fear Greece's situation is pulling the whole Eurozone towards the brinks of collapse. Id. at 713-16. While a Grexit could theoretically occur, at either the level of the Eurozone or the European Union, it is not a likely result, since Greece's removal from either would have severe consequences on Greek citizens and for other European nations with stakes in Greece's economy. Id. at 716-17, 731-32.
(39.) See Explaining Greece's Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2016), http://www .nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro .html?_r=0 (describing basic setup of eurozone bloc). At the apex of Greece's debt crisis in 2010, many international banks and foreign investors liquidated their Greek bonds in anticipation of Greece's impending inability to recover its economy. Id. See also Helena Smith, A Year After the Crisis was Declared Over, Greece is Still Spiraling Down, The Guardian (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ aug/13/greek-economy-still-spiralling-down-year-after-crisis-declared-over (reporting on economic impact of Greece's situation). Though a small fragment of the European economy, Greece could cause significant fallout effects in Italy, Portugal, and Spain if it left the Eurozone or the European Union. Id.
(40.) See Bird, supra note 16 (detailing Greece's history of botching important financial reports). It was revealed in 2009 that Greece had once again falsified its figures, claiming a deficit of 6% when in reality, it was 15%. Id. See also Wearden, supra note 22 (describing government attempt to salvage economy). The then Prime Minister, George Papandreou, described Greece's economic situation as being in " 'intensive care.'" Id. The swelling debt led the Greek government to announce its plan to reduce the deficit by a proposal of "four percentage points, as a proportion of GDP, in 2010-2011." Id. In December 2009, thousands of Greek laborers protested the cutbacks. Id. Protests continued through 2010. Id.
(41.) See Jovanovi, supra note 37, at 86 (discussing European Union rules for receiving loans). The European Financial Stability Facility was created in 2010 as a mechanism for granting loans to countries in need. Id. Loans came with strict conditions, such as reducing expenditures, but not devaluing the euro, and maintaining an open market. Id. See also Wearden, supra note 22 (clarifying bailout conditional on Papandreou's push for reforms). Greece needed reforms of its own infrastructure in order to receive bailout funding. Id. The austerity measures included lower bonuses and higher taxes. Id. The Eurozone also granted its own "rescue package" of EUR30 billion. Id. More funds were needed to deflate the ballooning debt Greece incurred from overspending and failing to internally regulate; in May 2010, Greece was granted EUR110 billion, as part of the three-year package proposal drawn up by the IMF, the European Commission, and the EBC. Id. See also N. Gregory Mankiw, They Told You So: Economists Were Right to Doubt the Euro, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2016), http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/business/history-echoes-through-greek-debt-crisis .html?_r=0 (criticizing Greece's pattern of excessive borrowing).
(42.) See Bird, supra note 16 (illustrating measures necessary for solving debt crisis). In the bailout agreement negotiated between Greece and the EMU, ECB, IMF, and other E.U. finance ministries, terms on the table included "pension cuts, value-added tax increases and other austerity measures." See also Nektaria Stamouli & Stelios Bouras, In Rebuke to Europe, Greeks Vote Resounding 'No' to Bailout Terms, The Wall Street Journal (last updated July 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ polls-close-in-greek-referendum-1436113280 (relating results of referendum). A majority of Greeks, 60%, voted "no" in a referendum on whether to proceed with those austerity terms in a meeting between Greece and its creditors to determine the terms of the country's much needed bailout. Id. See Suzanne Daley, Greeks Reject Bailout Terms in Rebuff to European Leaders, The N.Y. Times (July 5, 2015), http://www .nytimes.com/2015/07/06/world/europe/greek-referendum-debt-crisis-vote.html?_r=0 (describing Greek attitudes after referendum). Once the results of the referendum were released, revealing that Greeks did not support further conservative debt restructuring, there were celebrations "in Syntagma Square in central Athens." Id. Negotiations would still be held with Greece's creditors, but Greece's Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras hoped the referendum would function to bolster Greece's negotiation power against accepting any more austerity measures. Id.
(43.) See Bird, supra note 16 (relating early skepticism about Greece's place in Eurozone). The meeting between Greece and E.U. finance leaders to determine the restructuring of Greece's debt was, to some nation heads, a step in a positive direction. Id. Still others, such as Germany's Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schauble, held fast to the conviction that Greece's "recalcitrance" in the wake of its financial crisis demanded its expulsion from the Eurozone. Id. See also Nektaria Stamouli & Stelios Bouras, supra note 42 (suggesting Greece may become "example" for other weak European economies). The expulsion would purportedly re-strengthen the Eurozone, act as a deterrent for other "economically underperforming countries--including Italy and France--to reform," and encourage underperforming countries to not default on their debts. Id. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, on the other hand, expressed concern that a Grexit "could make the currency union chronically brittle, inviting speculation against other Eurozone members in future financial crises." Id. In order for Greece to rectify its "economic meltdown," its creditors demanded the nation be more flexible, even in the face of drastic changes to its debt repayment plans. Id. Creditors were unwilling to grant anymore bailout funds without also imposing restrictions on governmental expenditures which are necessary in order "to achieve the fiscal surpluses that [they] are insisting on." Id. Greece needed to be solvent, but other European countries, who helped fund Greece's bailout packages, were concerned about placing burdens on their own taxpayers; further embroiling all parties involved. Id. In the summer of 2015, Greece owed EUR3.5 billion (or USD3.9 billion) in the form of a bond to the ECB. Id. The failure of Greek banks, lacking finances to back Greece's debts, made it appear more probable than not that the Hellenic banking system would entirely collapse. Id. See also Matt O'Brien, 7 Key Things to Know About Greece's Debt and What Happens Next, Wash. Post (July 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/wonk/wp/2015/07/05/as-greece-votesheres-everything-you-need-to-know-about- the-nations-crisis/(writing on how Greece initially tried to reject austerity packages). These tensions fueled the desire for a Grexit, especially if it meant financial recovery for the rest of the euro bloc. Id.
(44.) See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J (C202) 59, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9e8d52el-2c70-lle6-b497-01a a75ed71al.0006.01 /DOC_l&format=PDF [hereinafter Treaty on European Union] (outlining structural functions, laws of European Union and adopting Schengen cooperation). The "gradual abolition of checks at common borders" was signed by a number of E.U. Member-States to form the Schengen Area on June 14, 1895 and on June 19, 1990. Id. at 290. The objective of the agreement among those states was to form "an area of freedom, security and justice without internal border." Id. As previously mentioned, the Schengen cooperation does not apply to all E.U. countries. Id. Some countries, including the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, have opted out of the cooperation. Id. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) Preamble (laying out vision of European Union); EU Law, Europa (2016), http://europa.eu/european-union/law_en (including hyperlinks for additional information on E.U. treaties, decision-making processes, regulations, acts, application of law); Sources and Scope of European Union Law, Europa, www.euro parl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_l.2.1.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (outlining hierarchical structuring of E.U. law). See also Greece's Courses in the EU, Hellenic Republic: Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greecein-the-eu/greeces-course-in-the-eu.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (explaining Greece's desire for further European integration). A particularly motivating factor for Greece was the ability to "reinforce its independence and position with the regional and international system as well as its 'power to negotiate,'" in relation to Turkey. Id. Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974 and this posed a threat to Greece's sovereignty. Id. Integration into Europe gave Greece the ability to partake in "the configuration of the European model" and additional security. Id.
(45.) See Schengen Area, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and- visas/schengen_en (last updated Jan. 17, 2017) (detailing Schengen Area). Countries within the bloc abide by the Schengen acquis, a set of common laws and procedures that aim to harmonize proceedings within the zone. Id.
(46.) See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 5 (describing formation of area and its purpose). Key provisions that allow for this type of cooperation across a broad spectrum of state control include: removing checks on persons crossing internal borders, applying common rules to persons crossing E.U. Member-States' external borders, harmonizing the terms of entry and visa rules for short-term stays, building cooperation among Member-States' police forces (which permits cross-border surveillance and pursuit), strengthening judicial cooperation to expedite judgments and necessary transfers, and establishing and developing the Schengen Information System (SIS), a mechanism for requisite information sharing between Member-States. Id. See Crossing the EU Borders, European Commission: EU Immigration Portal, http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/what-should-i-avoid/how-to-enter-the-eu/crossing the-eu-borders_en (last updated Sept. 15, 2016) (laying out basic provisions of border crossing). The laws and regulations applying to E.U. citizens as they cross Member-States' borders also apply to non-E.U. citizens. Id. Non-citizens of the European Union must present documents proving their identity, their country of origin, the purpose of their stay, and should have, or will be given, "the border control rules in the E.U. country [they] are going to." Id. For legal entry, an individual must present a valid travel document, typically a passport, a visa (if and where applicable), and other documents supporting the validity of the traveler's intent to enter the European Union. Id. These types of border controls stand in place of border checkpoints and allow the Schengen Area to exist as a "border-free travel zone." Id. Countries within the Union rely on border control agencies such as Frontex, to apply uniform protocols across Member-States' provinces. Id. Frontex is an agency that uses a common training program to ensure all Member-States coordinate their efforts in a unified manner. Id. See also Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook) Secretary General of the European Commission (2006) available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015010%202006%20INIT [hereinafter Schengen Handbook] (providing common law for implementation at E.U. states' borders), The Schengen Handbook "lays down Community Rules for carrying out the control of persons, covering both border checks and surveillance." Id. at 2. The document ensures continuity and uniformity across the Union and maintains internal security by offering Member-States "common guidelines, best practices and recommendations on border control needs." Id. See also Europe Without Borders: The Schengen Area, European Commission, at 2, available at https://ec.europa .eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_ brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2006) (listing signatory nations, including Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands). Greece signed the agreement in 1992, and in January 2000, border controls were abolished. Id. at 14. The removal of border checks on the internal borders of Schengen States permits free movement. Id. at 4. Checks are only conducted at the external borders in nations such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. Id. While free travel between E.U. States is a right for E.U. citizens in principle, minimum border checks are in place for travels to non-Schengen states, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Id. See also supra note 32 (stating descriptions of border control agencies).
(47.) See Treaty on European Union, supra note 44, [paragraph][paragraph] 4-5 (affording certain rights to asylees and refugees). The ability to move freely between Schengen countries applies to asylum seekers and refugees, but there may be limitations depending upon their status and rewarded visas. Id. See also Stephen Gallagher, Towards a Common European Asylum System: Fortress Europe Redesigns the Ramparts, 57 Int'l J. 375, 390-91, (2002), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203674 (commenting on harmonization). The ability for refugees to also freely travel once inside the Schengen Area is concerning to some who believe that this compromises the security of the bloc. Id. at 382. The ability for asylees and refugees to move freely enables some to bypass official asylum protocols and reach destination countries of their choosing, rather than by procedural assignment. Id. at 382-83.
(48.) See Schengen Area, supra note 5 (emphasizing importance of police control within bloc and strong border control in periphery countries). The police checks that can occur at internal borders functions as an additional safety measure to ensure that threats which may have entered at the external borders of the Schengen Area do not continue to penetrate the bloc. Id. Police may ask questions concerning the nature of one's visit. Id.
(49.) See Border Crossing, European Commission: Home Affairs (Apr. 7, 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/bordersand-visas/ border-crossing/index_en.htm (discussing importance of consistent and coherent application of laws). "All EU States have to make investments to protect their external borders in the interest of the entire Schengen Area. For some States, notably those situated at the external frontiers of the Union, these investments" are of particular importance. Id. See also Schengen Information System, European Commission: Home Affairs (Dec. 16, 2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/ what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system/index_en.htm (proffering purpose of Schengen Information System). "The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a highly efficient large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States." Id. The SIS preserves the integrity of the internal borders of the Schengen States in lieu of border checks by allowing police and border personnel to create alerts and instructions to be shared among other Member-States. Id. The SIS also helps countries share information regarding the issuance of visas and determine whether third-country nationals have a valid purpose for remaining within the Schengen Area. Id. See also Travel Documents for Non-EU Nationals, Europa, available at http://europa.eu/ youreurope/citizens/travel/entry-exit/non-eu-nationals/index_en.htm, (last updated Oct. 27, 2014) (stating when non-E.U. nationals need passport and possible visa application). Non-E.U. nationals need a valid passport to be issued a visa. Id. If a valid visa is issued from a Schengen Area country, then it "automatically allows [free] travel to the other Schengen countries as well." Id. See also Travel Documents for Non-EU Family Members, Europa, http://europa.eu/youreurope/ citizens/travel/entry-exit/non-eu-family/index_en.htm (last updated June 29, 2016) (listing countries in "[b]order free Schengen Area"). Depending upon the circumstances, it may be possible for a non-E.U. citizen to enter the Area without a visa if, for example, they have an E.U. family member's residence card because their family member is an E.U. national. Id. When the Schengen system is operating effectively, it takes approximately fifteen days for a visa to be issued after applying for one. Id.
(50.) See Agencies, European Commission: Home Affairs, (Oct. 21, 2015), http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/agencies/index_en.htm (enumerating relevant agencies). The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) assists E.U. States with the application of existing E.U. laws and regulations "relating to the management of external borders." Id. In conjunction with individual states' border management systems, Frontex acts as a coordinator for training, education, and research regarding border patrol agents, technical and operational support, and joint operations. Id. The European Police Office (Europol) "assists E.U. States' police forces in improving their cooperation on the prevention and fight against the most serious forms of international crime, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and people smuggling, focusing on the targeting of criminal organizations." Id. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) assists States' with maintaining security through coordination with asylum integration and application efforts. Id. EASO trains asylum officials, helps with relocating persons in need of international protection, and assists States under particular pressure by managing areas such as an early warning system. Id. See Europe Without Borders: The Schengen Area, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing funding for border security agencies). The Internal Security Fund has committed over EUR2 billion for the period of 2014 to 2020 for:
Enhance[ing] the management of ... the external border in order to better tackle irregular migration and to improve the processing of Schengen visa applications. Moreover, to increase police cooperation and information exchange in the Schengen area itself, the EU provides EUR1 billion through the 'Police' part of the Internal Security Fund.
Id. But see Antenore, supra note 5 (commenting on future of Schengen Area). The current refugee crisis in Greece and other E.U. countries threatens to cause "the dissolution of the Schengen Agreement" which would be, as European Parliament's Migration Commissioner Dimitiris Avamopoulous has stated, the end of the European vision of unification. Id.
(51.) See Agencies, supra note 50 (explaining importance of regulatory body in place of border checks). In conjunction with individual states" border management systems, Frontex acts as a coordinator for training, education, and research regarding border patrol agents, technical and operational support, and joint operations. Id. Frontex's ability to coordinate with other internal security bodies within each country, in theory, should result in cohesive implementation of E.U. regulatory policies and procedures. Id.
(52.) See id. (highlighting coordination of various countries as critical factor to success of Europol). Without cooperation and integrated practices, the Schengen Area cannot function successfully. Id.
(53.) See id. (reiterating necessity of cooperation between and among agencies). The EASO trains asylum officials, helps with relocating persons in need of international protection, and assists States under particular pressure. Id. Irregular migration refers to a broad category of migration which is done without documentation, or specifically in the context of this Note, migration of individuals seeking international protection. Id.
(54.) See Europe Without Borders: The Schengen Area, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing funding for border agencies). The funding will go towards the enhancement and management of control of the Schengen Area's external border. Id. The financial support will also help countries efficiently oversee irregular migration and improve the time it takes to file and process Schengen visa applications. Id. EUR1 billion is designated specifically for cooperation among police forces and the exchange of information within the Schengen Area. Id. This is intended to reduce inefficiencies and financial waste caused by a lack of communication between various departments. Id.
(55.) See Commission Regulation 604/213 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisims for Determing the Member-State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Logged in One of the Member-States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), 2013 O.J. (L 180) [paragraph][paragraph] 22-25 [hereinafter Dublin III] (stating process for relocating beneficiary of international protection). States should look to familial ties, the age of the asylee, and whether the individual is fit for travel. Id. at [paragraph]35.
(56.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 10 (describing purpose of Dublin Regulation). The Dublin Regulation ensures that all European states treat asylum seekers of the like age, health, and circumstance in the same manner to maintain consistent and fair treatment of applicants. Id. See also Sheila Maas et al., Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation: Final Report, European Commission (2015), available at http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants/ docs/evaluation_of_the_dublin_ iii_regulation_en.pdf (reviewing success of Dublin Regulation, noting areas for improvement). Burden sharing is not accounted for in the Dublin Regulation, an area of focus that requires additional attentional to manage unfair distribution of applicant transfers. Id. at 4.
(57.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 17 (clarifying receiving states must understand and apply regulation's criteria). States must be proactive, to the point of conducting reviews even where the Regulation does not mandate a particular state to act. Id. See also The Dublin Regulation, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/4a9dl3d59.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (stressing importance of harmonized application of Regulation). The chief purpose of the Dublin Regulation is to protect persons seeking relief from persecution, while also meeting the needs of states who have the responsibility of housing those asylum applicants. Id. It is necessary that states implement the Regulation as intended by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Id. The section providing the ability to transfer applicants to another responsible state should not be abused, nor should states automatically detain applicants prior to or after their transfer. Id. Common standards must be maintained to ensure mismanagement within the Union does not continue. Id. See also Reception Conditions, European Commission: Migration And Home Affairs, (June 23, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/reception-conditions /index_ en.htm (addressing new aims for reception facilities). To the extent that it is possible, countries should follow a uniform directive for how reception facilities should be set up. Id. "Asylum seekers waiting for a decision on their application must be provided with certain necessities that guarantee them a dignified standard of living." Id. The Reception Conditions Directive seeks to fulfill that principle by creating "common standards of conditions of living of asylum applicants." Id. In July 2015, a new Directive was made applicable, containing updates on provisions as was deemed necessary. Id. The Directive makes sure that asylum and refugee applicants have access to employment, food, healthcare, housing, medical care, and psychological care as well. Id. Asylum seekers must have access to employment for a maximum period of nine months. Id. In its effort to create "more harmonized standards of reception conditions throughout the Union," the Directive has established a set of detailed common rules for states to follow. Id. The rules make sure that vulnerable persons, such as minors, are given particular care and attention. Id. Arbitrary detentions shall be generally avoided, but where necessary, the length of detention will be as short as possible. Id. The rules state that free legal services must be provided to applicants who seek to appeal a decision. Id. Arguably of the utmost importance is the specification that the conditions of reception facilities must meet humane standards. Id. "[A]ccess to fresh air and communications with lawyers, NGOs and family members" are some of those standards. Id.
(58.) See Dublin III. supra note 55, c.3 (indicating process). The country where "the applicant first lodged his or her application for international protection" is the responsible state. Id. But see Duncan Robinson, How the EU Plans to Overhaul Dublin Regulation' On Asylum Claims, Financial Times (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www .ft.com/content/d08dc262-bedl-lle5-9fdb-87b8dl5baec2 (pointing out perceived flaw in Dublin system). The "nation of first contact" rule has been criticized for its inability to support instances when the asylum system is flooded with applicants. Id. Accordingly, the very functions of the Dublin Regulation arguably create negative unforeseen consequences. Id. See also Susan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe's Dublin System, Migration Policy Institute (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/not-adding-fading-promiseeuropes-dublin-system (follow "Download Report" hyperlink) (critiquing efficiency of Dublin Regulation). Despite reforms to the Regulation and adoption of new provisions to meet the changing global environment, some E.U. states believe the system lacks the capacity to positively impact the migration crisis situation. Id. at 3. Actual rates of successful transfers are relatively low. Id. at 11. In 2013, Germany had 24,847 outgoing requests for transfers; only 4,316 transfers were successfully made. Id at 12. Fratzke finds the future of the Dublin Regulation uncertain given its shortcomings Id. at 23-24.
(59.) See Dublin III, art. 17.1 (proscribing authority to individual Member-States). Even if the Regulation does not make a particular country responsible for conducting an examination of the status of an asylee, it gives authority to the state to conduct its own review. Id. See also Elena Jurato, et. al., Evaluation of the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation, European Commission (Mar. 2016), available at https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants/docs/evalua- tion_of_theJmplementation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf (explicating discretionary clause of art. 17, SI). Member-States can take responsibility of applicants by their own initiative if they so choose. Id. at 35. See Frazke, supra note 58, at 17-18 (explaining provision). This authority is intended to assist with efficient assignment of responsibility; however, it conversely also contributes to a backlog of cases in instances where countries fail to communicate and coordinate their efforts. Id.
(60.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 2 (assuring international protection for those who meet criteria). Individuals who meet the criteria of requiring international protection must be afforded sanctuary. Id. [paragraph] 10. See also Satvinder S. Juss, The Decline and Decay of European Refugee Policy, Oxford J. of Legal Studies (2005), available at http://jstor.org/stable/3600616 (challenging internal contradictions within European asylum policies broadly). While the main objective is protecting persons who are being persecuted within their home country, there is concern that human rights may not be the chief purpose of Europe's asylum procedures. Id. at 752. Some worry that security is the focus. Id. See Morten Kjaerum, The Right to a Future: Human Rights, Armed Conflict and Mass Migration--The Raoul Wallenberg Legacy, 38 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 591, 594-96 (2016) (pointing out "human rights" concerns when establishing early warning signs for migration "crises"). It may be less of a security crisis and more a reflection of the unwillingness of European countries to share responsibility. Id. at 595.
(61.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 3 (stating important protocol applicable to all European states). This strict requirement adheres to the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees signed July 28, 1951, also known as the 1951 Convention. Id.
(62.) See id. [paragraph] 5 (urging need for "objective, fair criteria"). Dublin III calls for cohesive and mutual application of laws and regulations so as "not to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection." Id.
(63.) See id. at art. 4, [paragraph] 1 (verifying "right to information"). States inform applicants throughout the process of their filing for asylum of their rights and make clear what is the state of their status. Id. This information must be provided to applicants in a language they can understand. Id. [paragraph] 2.
(64.) See id. at ch. 3, art. 7 (entrusting Member-States with duty to accept applicants who meet qualifications). States will take into consideration a person's family status and situation, such as whether they have a relative already in the European Union or whether they are trying to be relocated with family members. Id. H 3. Countries should also determine whether the applicant has not already "been the subject of a first decision" in another country. Id.
(65.) See id. at ch. 2, art. 5 (granting right to interview). States should "conduct personal interviews" with applicants in order to establish all the requisite facts necessary for adequately processing and filing their claim for asylum. Id. The interview gives countries the ability to build a profile for applicants, and that information can then be provided to officials in other states if a transfer is possible. Id.
(66.) See Dublin III, supra note 55 (assuring open communication). The interview also allows for open communication between authorities and asylees. Id. Communications are conducted in the language of the applicant to assure that no information is misunderstood. Id.
(67.) See id. [paragraph] 6 (laying out channels of communication). The applicant's information should be shared with relevant authorities and in instances where it is necessary either to determine where a transfer should be made or to fulfill a known transfer. Id.
(68.) See id. at ch. 2, art. 3 (listing balance of requirements owed by states and rights of individuals seeking international protection). This criteria is centralized on humane treatment of asylum applicants. Id.
(69.) See id. at ch. 6, art. 20 (mandating that applicants cannot apply for asylum in more than one country). This requirement is meant to minimize false or unsubstantiated claims for protection. Id. See Gallagher, supra note 47 (bringing to light problems with Dublin Regulation). Problematically, the provision places a heavy burden on countries on the periphery of Europe, such as Greece and other Mediterranean countries. Id. at 385. Most entry points into Europe are located in the south or east of the continent. Id. See also Dublin III, supra note 55, at ch. 6, art. 20 (prescribing rules to reduce abuse of system). Provisions in the document aim to ensure that applicants do not misuse the Regulation and apply for asylum in a state other than their state of first contact. Id. See generally Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nikolas Feith Tan, Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm in Global Refugee Policy, 39 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 591, 640-42 (2015) (suggesting countries themselves resist international legal intentions by attempting to deter applicants). European nations can misuse asylum systems by establishing "procedural barriers ... on state territory [thus] maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while at the same time largely being spared the associated burdens." Id. at 640-41.
(70.) See Gallagher, supra note 47, at 385 (remarking on popular criticism of Dublin Regulation). In the past, these border countries were merely temporary transit sites; now they are the destination. Id. Transfers are permitted where the receiving state is under exceptional burden and cannot meet requirements as called for in the Regulation. See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 6 (allowing alleviation of burden on countries experiencing large volumes of applications). See also Michele Nicoletti, After Dublin--the Urgent Need for a Real European Asylum System, Parliamentary Assembly (Oct. 3,2014), http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/1278654/20150909AfterDublin-EN.pdf/755eb5b6-3bdl-4d99- af22-0bl8fdb5a513 (offering draft resolution to take place of Dublin Regulation). The proposal points out that the Dublin Regulation is no longer working as it was envisioned, and changes in the global environment make it outdated and obsolete. Id. at 6. One of the proposals suggests doing away with requirement that applicants be processed in the state of first contact, thereby allowing applicants to choose which Member-State they wish to be processed in. Id. at 13. The proposal purports that its recommended changes would not "result in an extreme concentration of asylum applicants at the EU's southern external borders" because applicants are already finding ways to circumvent protocols and seek out preferential states to lodge their complaint. Id.
(71.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph] 29 (creating check on CEAS and asylum applicants). But see Robinson, supra note 58 (critiquing Dublin Regulation). The system is not without internal flaws. Id. Notably, some migrants try to avoid being fingerprinted in an undesirable country such as Greece, and attempt to travel on further north into Europe before lodging a claim for asylum in order to receive protection in what they determine to be a more preferable, and usually wealthier, state. Id. See also Fratzke, supra note 58, at 15 (remarking on internal weakness of Dublin Regulation). Reports reveal that the requirement that asylum applicants be recorded in Eurodac have caused some individuals to try to avoid fingerprinting in countries of first arrival, and instead seek out wealthier countries to file claims there. Id. Recent efforts to reduce the number of permitted applicants are counterintuitively leading others to avoid fingerprinting altogether out of fear that their claims for protection will be denied. Id.
(72.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph][paragraph] 21-22 (laying out basic procedure for preventing full-scale migration crisis). The early warning system relies on coordinated action by states leading up to and during the time of asylum crises, noting that deficiencies in one nation's asylum system can "jeopardise [sic] the smooth functioning of the [whole] system." Id. [paragraph][paragraph] 21-22.
(73.) See id. [paragraph][paragraph] 18, 29-31, 34-35 (stating shared protocols for Member-States). Continuity of implementation of the Dublin Regulation is the chief objective. Id. [paragraph] 2.
(74.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, [paragraph][paragraph] 13-15,18 (emphasizing family unification as key objective). Emphasis is placed on the protection of children and mindfulness of making sure family members are not separated. Id. [paragraph][paragraph] 11-15.
[R]espect for family should be a primary consideration ... when applying this Regulation. (15) The processing together of the applications for international protection of the members of one family by a single Member State makes it possible to ensure that the applications are examined thoroughly, the decisions ... are consistent and the members of one family are not separated.
Id. [paragraph][paragraph] 14-15.
(75.) See Maas, supra note 56, at 2 (noting issues of cost and implementation of CEAS and Dublin Regulation). The Dublin Regulation must continue to discourage excess expenditure of valuable resources which occurs when there is misuse of the asylum system by applicants who make multiple claims in different states. Id.
(76.) See Jennifer Fraczek, Criticism of EU Asylum Policy Grows, Deutsche Welle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.dw.com/en/criticism-of-eu-asylum-policy-grows/a16757632 (commenting on Dublin procedures leading to human rights violations). Particularly in countries with inadequate receiving measures and interim camps, asylum and refugee applicants can become stranded in the states of first contact. Id. The Dublin procedures permit human rights violations, as some asylees are detained as law violators rather than persecuted persons. Id. Fraczek reports that in Greece, some refugees were detained in jail for weeks. Id. But see Dublin III, supra note 55' ch. 6 art. 28, [paragraph] 3 (limiting detainment procedures to specific instances). Detainment is meant to prevent delays caused by individuals who file faulty claims or who seek to "frustrate the enforcement of [an asylum application] return decision." Id at ch 6 art. 28, % 3.
(77.) See Maas, supra note 56, at 2 (charging Member-States with shared responsibility of finding solutions). E.U. countries must be more diligent in their application of the CEAS's rules and regulations. Id. at 3. The disproportionate share of applications, which countries such as Greece must process, is not addressed in the Dublin Regulation. Id.
(78.) See id. (mentioning current backlog issues and low success rates of transfers). See also Fratzke, supra note 58, at 13 (reporting on inefficiencies resulting from redundant and unnecessary transfers).
(79.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 12 (displaying data from 2013 of Dublin transfer sending states and receiving states). In 2013, Germany transferred at total of 4,316 applicants and accepted 4,136--nearly the same amount of applications. Id. This example demonstrates only a portion of the inefficiencies that occur within the Dublin system. Id. at 12-13. See Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin), European Commission, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/ policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en (last updated Sept. 23, 2017) (reviewing Dublin III's purported success). In May 2016, a draft proposal for Dublin IV Regulation was offered as part of the efforts to address the necessary reforms to Dublin III. Id. Dublin IV would include a "corrective allocation mechanism ... which takes into account settlement efforts made by a Member State to resettle those in need of international protection direct from a third country." Id. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establish the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM (2016) 270 final (May 4, 2016), available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda- migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/2016 0504/dublin_reform_proposal_en.pdf [hereinafter Dublin IV] (forecasting suggesting revisions). The revised system would factor in any disproportionality concerns by examining the size and wealth of the receiving nation. Id. at 7. If a country were in the predicament of taking in transfers "above and beyond" its own size and wealth, defined as over 150% of that reference number, then the applicants would be relocated elsewhere until the numbers within that nation fell below the aforementioned level. Id. at 18-19. This proposal would allow a nation to be temporarily exempted from this corrective mechanism for a period of twelve months; though in doing so, that country would need to make a "solidarity contribution of EUR250 thousand per applicant to the Member States that were determined as responsible for examining those applications." Id. at 19.
(80.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 8 (showing chart of total outgoing and incoming requests). The data does tend to dispel the common belief that the Dublin Regulation results in burden-shifting of northern E.U. countries to the southern-border states; the data shows the top destination countries like Germany accept as many transfers as they send back. Id. at 8-9. This revelation merely demonstrates the circular nature of the transfer system, rather than its success. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the data fails to take into account Member-States' ability to accept applicants and does not factor in the reality that some nations, particularly those with weaker economies, do not have adequate reception facilities. Id.
(81.) See id. at 10-11 (presenting legal challenges of Dublin Regulation). Inadequate reception conditions in Greece lack the necessary personnel and resources to meet the needs of asylum applicants and the requirements of European human rights laws. Id.
(82.) See M.S.S. v. Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (holding deplorable conditions of receiving camps constituted violation of individuals' human rights). The case revealed to the international community the foul conditions of the camps where refugees awaited official stay in Greece, and ultimately, made it a violation of human rights law to send transfers to Greece. Id.
(83.) See Patricia Mallia, Introductory Note to the European Court of Human Rights: M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, Int'l Legal Materials (2011), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/intelegamate.50.3.0364 (explaining background to accompanying ECtHR case). The Treaty on the European Union, amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, assures certain basic rights to individuals within the Union. Id. at 365. In the case, the court ruled that Greece subjected M.S.S. to "inhumane and degrading treatment" and denied the applicant of his rights to proper due process of law. Id. at 365-66. Reception centers were overcrowded and dirty. Id. at 388. Applicants had little access to proper care and legal services. Id. The judgment of the case resulted in suspension of transfers to Greece. Id. at 366.
(84.) See id. at 370-71 (describing reception conditions); Robinson, supra note 58 (critiquing Dublin system); Gallagher, supra note 47 (remarking on internal shortfalls of Dublin Regulation must be resolved). See also Fratzke, supra note 58 (analyzing status of Dublin Regulation's successes and shortcomings).
(85.) See Timeline, Migration Policy Center: European University Institute (Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu/timeline/ (depicting interactive timeline). The war in the Middle East caused thousands of Syrians to flee from their homes; many attempted to reach Europe in search of haven. Id. The United Nations reported that the region faced the "largest refugee outflow" since the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Id. In the summer of 2013, approximately 6,000 Syrians fled the country daily. Id. In October 2013, Turkey built a wall on the Syrian border and ensued protests. Id. In spite of growing xenophobic tensions and social apprehension, the then E.U. Home Affairs Minister, Cecilia Malmstrom, called for Europe to accept more refugees from Syria. Id. By November 2015, resettlement of Syrian refugees started in Greece. Id.
(86.) See Greg Botelho, What's Happening in the Middle East and Why It Matters, CNN (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/middleeast/middle-east-countrybreakdown/ (reporting on situation in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Iran); see also Michael Dougherty, How America Has Waged an Eternal War in the Middle East, The Week (Apr. 12, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/617673/how-america-waged-eternal-warmiddle-east (arguing America's contribution to escalating war in Middle East); Regional Overview, supra note 1 (depicting chart of migration crisis). The majority of migrants come from Syria and the Arab Republic, but they also come from Nigeria, Guinea, and Gambia. Regional Overview, supra note 1. See European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12 (detailing war in Middle East causing mass migration from region); Rosenfeld, supra note 4 (describing war in Iraq, Syria).
(87.) See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2182, Commission Adapts Second Recommendation Identifying Steps to Restore Dublin Transfers to Greece (June 15, 2016), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2182_en.htm [hereinafter Steps to Restore Dublin Transfers to Greece] (calling for return of Dublin transfers). Greece's situation had been so dire after its economic collapse, that the state lacked adequate resources and funding to be able to receive transfers under the Dublin Regulation. Id. Since 2011, Greece has been unable to receive transfers, though the European Commission was confident that by the end of 2016, those transfers may resume. Id. The focus in Greece has been on:
Establishing appropriate permanent and temporary open reception facilities and ensuring that all these facilities offer adequate reception conditions, including by ensuring minors have access to education; allowing effective access to the asylum procedure, including by ensuring that the Greek asylum service is adequately staffed and organised [sic]; instituting the new Appeals Authority without delay and ensuring that it is adequately staffed to deal with all pending and future appeals; ensuring access to free legal aid is effective in practice; establishing structures for vulnerable applicants, including unaccompanied minors, including by urgently putting in place a suitable guardianship procedure.
Id. (emphasis removed).
(88.) See Marcus Bensasson, Greece's Financial Odyssey, Bloomberg.com (updated Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/greece (giving context for Greek financial crisis). In 2009, the socialist Pasok party won the elections for control of the government, replacing the conservative New Democracy party. Id. This power transition revealed that the New Democracy government had been less than forthright with its own citizens and the greater European community. Id. The Pasok government found the deficit was more than three times what was permitted by the rules of the Eurozone. Id. European countries and the IMF provided funds of EUR100 billion to Greece to prevent it from defaulting on its debts. Id. See supra notes 15-17 (describing collapse of Greece's economy).
(89.) See Steps to Restore Dublin Transfers to Greece, supra note 87 (commenting on remarkable pressure on Greece because of its geographical, institutional location). See also Francis J. Conte, Article, Spaces of Freedom, 18 U. Miami Int'l & Rev. 1, 43-44 (2010) (mentioning Dublin transfer process). Equitable burden sharing should be a focus of an asylum system, while taking into consideration transfer protocols, like Dublin's requirement emphasizing family reunification. Id.
(90.) See Steps to Restore Dublin Transfers to Greece, supra note 87 (detailing lack of funding resulting in inadequate reception facilities). See also Mary Harris, EC's Recommendation for Greece to Implement Dublin Regulation and Take Refugees Back, Greek Reporter (Sept. 28, 2016), http://greece.greekreporter.com/2016/09/28/ ecs-recommendations-for-greece-to-implement-dublin-regulation-and-take-refugees back/ (mentioning Berlin's suspension of deportations to Greece since 2011); Langford, supra note 5 (criticizing European Union asylum system for neglecting human rights).
(91.) See Philip Chrysopoulos, Oppostion Parties Criticize Greek Government Handouts, Greek Reporter (Dec. 9, 2016), http://greece.greekreporter.com/2016/ 12/09/ opposition-parties-criticize-greek-government-handouts/ (reporting on recent efforts of Hellenic government to improve morale of its citizens). See also Kevin Mead, The Odyssey: Battered and Adrift an Ocean Apart, Puerto Rico and Greece Search for Solid Ground, Forbes (July 10, 2015) https://www.forbes.com/sites/max frumes/2015/07/10/the-odyssey-battered-and-adrift-an-ocean-apart-puerto-rico-and greece-search-for-solid-ground/ (comparing Greece with Puerto Rico). Both Puerto Rico and Greece face similar dire financial situations, but Greece may have a more hopeful future because of the support and aid of the European Union. Id.
(92.) See Helena Smith, Alexis Tsipras Claims Creditors Are Making Greek Crisis Worse, The Guardian (commenting on frustrations in Greece towards austerity measures). Prime Minister Tsipras wants the European Union and IMF to consider allowing private investors to balance off Greece's debts. Id. The Greek Prime Minister declaims continued austerity measures, which, in his opinion, prevent a quicker return to growth. Id. See also Rohit, Soverign Debt Crisis in Greece: Is There a Way Forward?, Economic and Political Weekly (July 2010), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40736733 (suggesting Grexit as Greece's only solution).
(93.) See Smith, supra note 13 (reviewing ongoing efforts to keep Greece's economy from reaching position of complete shutdown). Despite the efforts to salvage the economy, the Hellenic government's reluctance to make use of oversight and regulations impedes its ability to repair its economy. Id.
(94.) See Smith, supra note 13 (finding effects most severe on middle class citizens). Sectors of the economy where workers are most needed are experiencing the significant effects of the attempts to save money where possible. Id. "[T]rapped in a vicious cycle of austerity and debt, salvation will not be easy as [Greece] copes with the effects of spending cuts, including hospitals and schools operating on skeletal staff." Id.
(95.) See Smith, supra note 13 (describing perpetual struggles of Greek economy). Remaining optimistic has been challenging for Greek citizens who saw their nation plummet into an economic black hole. Id. The threat of a Grexit, and concerns over what the new conditions of bailouts will be, have left many citizens in a state of despair. Id.
(96.) See Chrysopoulos, supra note 91 (voicing opinions of opposition party). The total amount of the package is EUR617 million, but the New Democracy is still highly critical of Tsipras's management of the financial crisis. Id. The party calls Tsipras's move a "campaign trick," while the Greek Communist Party (KKE) called it a "provocative mockery of distributing crumbs." Id. The KKE suggests that the bonuses come from tax revenues, when the money should come from funds saved by reducing government waste and eliminating party politics. Id.
(97.) See Regional Overview, supra note 1 (showing statistical data on migrant arrivals to Europe). Approximately 42% of arrivals in 2016 are men, while 21% are women. Id. Children are a clear vulnerable group, accounting for 37% of the arrivals since 2015. Id. See also Weekly Report, UNHCR (Nov. 17, 2016), http://data.unhcr .org/mediterranean/ documents.php?page=l&view=grid (follow "Weekly Report-Europe" hyperlink) (reporting on recent data in Greece). As of November 13, 2016, there were 792 arrivals by sea to Greece. Id. at 1. In the week of November 7 to November 13, there were 375 refugee and migrant arrivals; the week prior, there had been 570 arrivals by sea. Id. In October 2015, there were 2,991 arrivals, compared to 792 in November 2016 (as of November 13). Id. Italy, another periphery country also experienced a decrease in arrivals, from 28,377 in August 2016 to 5,385 in November of the same year. Id. The daily averages of arrivals to Greece by sea in August had been 130 per day at its peak. Id. at 2. In November 2016, the daily average of arrivals was eighty-one at its peak. Id. Since the target plan of 66,400 in November 2015, Greece has relocated 5,654 asylum seekers. Id. at 4. Pledges remain low, but the projected plan for Greece is to relocate the full 66,400 asylees as originally planned. Id. See also Highlights of the Month, UNHCR (Nov. 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/ mediterranean/documents.php?page=l&view=grid (follow "Greece Fact Sheet 01-30 October 2016" hyperlink) (summarizing data collected in October 2016).
(98.) See Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the European EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Policy Institute (Mar. 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ print/15595 (expressing concern over agreement's validity). The E.U.-Turkey Agreement, made on March 18, 2016, allows Greece to send transfers of asylees and refugees back to Turkey. Id. See also Therese Raphael, Europe Tries to Wish Away Its Next Refugee Crisis, Bloomberg (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/ articles/2016-12-14/europe-tries-to-wish-away-its-next-refugree-crisis (commenting on Agreement's alleged success). There is data to show that reductions in asylum applications began before the deal was made, but many still believe that the E.U.-Turkey Agreement is vital to reducing the number of applications Greece must process. Id.
(99.) See Raphael, supra note 98 (positing Agreement's "sweetener" may result in future problems). The E.U.-Turkey Agreement raises concerns that Europe's human rights laws may be violated in this exchange. Id. There are concerns that the Agreement, made during a precipitous moment for the European Union, was not intended to, and should not, continue as permanent policy. Id.
(100.) See id. (citing incentives for both European Union and Turkey). The Agreement has not been nearly as effective as was hoped; return and resettlement figures reveal that the European Union has only resettled 2,761 refugees from Turkey. Id. Turkey received only 748 migrants from Greece since the formation of the Agreement. Id.
(101.) See Collett, supra note 98 (expressing reservations over legitimacy of Agreement). Turkey, like Greece, is also experiencing a backlog of cases. Id. Recent reviews of its reception centers have determined the facilities lack proper supplies, management, and resources. Id. The Agreement may limit the number of unchecked arrivals, but it does so at the cost of legality and human rights. Id.
(102.) See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2182, supra note 87 (citing EUR509 million allocated to Greece for 2014-2020). Since 2015, EUR262 million of emergency money were awarded to Greece by the Home Affairs Fund. Id. These funds will help "increase the capacities of the Greek authorities to register migrants and to process their asylum claims, create better conditions for vulnerable migrants, strengthen the registration and asylum process with additional human resources, ensure better IT infrastructure and increase ... access to information." Id.
(103.) See Amelia Gentleman, Charity Takes Legal Action Against Home Office Over Child Refugees, The Guardian (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/oct/08/charity-takes-legal-action-against-home-office-over-child-refugees (reporting on human rights violations). Many of the camps in Greece are not up to living standard, and for one camp in Calais, home to "several hundred unaccompanied refugee children," its destruction would mean their immediate displacement. Id. Help Refugees, a charity organization, filed a claim against Home Secretary Amber Rudd for breaching her relocation duties "by misconstruing or misapplying the May Immigration Act under which the government was obliged to take some children into the UK." Id. See also Kitsantonis, supra note 3 (relating fire at Moria camp). The camps, despite their poor conditions, are still home to so many asylees and refugees. Id. "Thousands of people were left homeless after a fire tore through a refugee camp ... on the Aegean island of Lesbos, and the Greek authorities appealed on Tuesday to the European Union for more support in managing the migration crisis." Id. See also Nick Squires, Refugee Camps On Greek Islands *Bursting At The Seams' As Crossings From Turkey Begin To Pick Up, The Telegraph (Aug. 6, 2016), http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/16/refugee-camps-on-greek-islands-bursting-at the-seams-as-crossing/ (writing on many refugees stuck in Greece). After making the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, hundreds of migrants are stuck living in camps, unable to continue their journey to other parts of Europe. Id. The conditions of the camps are appalling, with shortages on basic necessities, such as water, food, and blankets. Id. Greek authorities are overwhelmed by the number of applicants they must process, along with the practical difficulties of language barriers and proper recording of information. Id. Asylees and refugees still are waiting for months to be resettled into an E.U. Member-State. Id. In May, there were approximate 50,000 refugees in Greece. Id. See also Philip Chrysopoulos, Greek Police Continue Idomeni Refugee Evacuation, Only 1,500 Left, Greek Reporter (May 26, 2016), http://greece.greekreporter. com/2016/05/26/greek-police-continue-idomenirefugee-evacuation-only-1500-left/ (reporting on damaged camp). In Idomeni, Greece, refugees were evacuated from a makeshift refugee camp. Id. Approximately 3,000 had been removed out of the estimated 8,200 who resided there for temporary shelter. Id.
(104.) See Bethan McKernan, Refugees in Greece 'Could Freeze to Death' in Snow Due to Inadequate Winter Preparation, Warn Aid Groups, The Independent (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/refugees-greece-freezing-weathersnow-winter-preparations-middle-east- syria-charities-unhcr-doctors-a7517491.html (reporting on Moria camp on island of Lesbos). Many of the camps in Greece are still overcrowded and lack necessary provisions. Id. In the Moria camp, housing nearly 15,000 refugees, applicants live in thin, summer tents while they await the decision on their application for asylum. Id. Some parts of Greece saw over three feet of snow during December 2016, along with frigid temperatures. Id. The UNHCR distributed thermal blankets, heating fuel, and electrical heaters to the camps the Greek government failed to provide. Id. See also Fahrinisa Oswald, The Struggle of Refugee Mothers Stranded in Greece, Middle East Eye (Dec. 28, 2016), http://middleeasteye .net/in-depth/features/mothers-refugee-crisis-Greece-19966145228 (illuminating plight of women, particularly young mothers in Greek refugee camps). After making the treacherous journey, and miraculously surviving, young mothers must now also survive the long interim period for their applications to be processed. Id. The psychological effects of living in these camps are only recently being given attention by authorities, who now provide psychologists along with legal and interpretation services. Id.
(105.) See McKernan, supra note 104 (exposing consequences for funding management error). The missing or wasted funds would have been used to give refugee winter necessities, such as insulated tents and fuel for heating. Id. Two thousand one hundred of the most at risk residents of the camp, including the elderly, sick, pregnant women, and young children, were relocated to apartments with host families. Id. An additional 700 places are reserved for unaccompanied minors, but there is still overcrowding in the camps. Id.
(106.) See Patrick Kingsley, Thousands of Refugees Left in Cold, as UN and EU Accused of Mismanagement, The Guardian (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2016/dec/22/thousands-of-refugees-left-in-cold-as-un-and-eu-accused-of-mismanagement (exposing failed coordination between E.U., U.N., and Greek government and impact of refugees). In a video made in early December, the U.N. praised the success of its efforts to winterize the camps, and the E.U. boldly announced that reception conditions in Greece were acceptable enough to begin to receive transfers again. Id. These statements entirely disregarded the reality of the conditions in Greece. Id.
(107.) See High Comm'n for Refugees, Rep. Initial Response Plan for the Refugee Crisis in Europe, June 2015-December 2016, (Sept. 9, 2015) (laying out initiative for managing refugee crisis). The reinstitution of the Dublin Regulation was intended to continue building cooperation and consolidation of efforts among E.U. Member-States. Id. at 39. The joint strategies laid out in the Initial Response Plan focus on coordinating existing laws and border control resources. Id. But see Jonathan Stearns, Europe's Refugee Crisis, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.bloomberg .com/quicktake/europe-refugees (summarizing situation in Greece). Many refugees are stuck in Greece, unable to move on, perpetually waiting for the Dublin protocols to take charge of their application. Id.
(108.) See Jennifer Rankin, EU Met Only 5% of Target for Relocating Refugees from Greece and Italy, The Guardian (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/ dec/08/eu-met-only-5-of-target-for-relocating-refugees-from-greece-anditaly (reporting on European Union's optimistic, albeit lofty, goals for relocating refugees in Greece).
(109.) See id. (stating theme of "solidarity" underpinned European Union's recent decision). The European Union hopes to persuade European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, to accept refugees from Greece and Italy. Id. Thus far, the countries have taken no applicants. Id. Slovakia has taken only nine persons, and the Czech Republic has taken only twelve. Id.
(110.) See id. (citing only 5% achievement of goal European Union set in 2015). European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos claimed it was possible to reach the target goal by September 2017. Id. The goal was somewhat unrealistic, given the fact that thus far, proposed goals have not been met. Id. The hopefulness on the part of Greece's leaders is, to some international onlookers, shallow. Id.
(111.) See Jess McHugh, EU Refugee Crisis: Here's What a Breakdown of Free Travel Means for Europe's Economy, International Business Times (Mar. 12, 2016), www.ibtimes.com/eu-refugee-crisis-heres-what-breakdown-free-travel-means europes-economy-2333310 (applauding integrated European economy). While it could be possible to close the free travel among E.U. states, this would have damaging effects on not only the European Union's economy, but also on the exchange of cultures. Id. The closing of the Schengen Area would be a dramatic, symbolic display of a loss of faith in Europe's vision of unification and harmony. Id.
(112.) See id. (emphasizing importance of free travel). Restrictions on free travel will have a significant impact on the movement of goods and services between European countries. Id. The integration of European economies allows each nation to specialize their own economies. Id. The system relies on imports from fellow neighbors to supplement what one country cannot produce itself. Id. Even Germany, the wealthiest, market-strong E.U. nation, relies on imports to thrive. Id. The specialization of each countries' economic market is part of the great advantages of a single market economy. Id. To close currently open borders would be irreparably harmful to all participating countries. Id. It is doubtful any European country could, at this point, have an entirely self-sufficient economy. Id.
(113.) See Nelson, supra note 20 (laying out Greece's financial circumstances in 2011). Greece's "long history ... [of] deeply entrenched [problematic] features" of its economy cannot be ignored. Id. at 2. While the bailouts gave Greece some "flexibility," they are only temporary reforms. Id. at 7. There has been overall limited success with the financial plans, and this makes it challenging for Greece to participate in the European Union's whole vision. Id. at 10-12. See Dublin III, supra note 55 (reemphasizing importance of unity). But see Langford, supra note 5 (calling into question ability of common asylum system to protect human rights). Human right obligations should make leaders consider carefully the procedure of refoulement. Langford, supra note 5, at 226-27. It may be the case that established protocols simply cannot continue. Id. at 241-42.
(114.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 15-16 (breaking down costs of Dublin Regulation). While there is clear discrepancies as to where exactly some funds are seemingly being wasted or misused, what is certain is that Dublin transfers are the most costly feature of the asylum system. Id. at 15. This suggests that the procedure as a whole may not be a successful, worthy expense to maintain. Id.
(115.) See Dammann, supra note 38, at 704-07 (chronologizing Greece's debt history). Greece reached the verges of insolvency when investors withdrew their assets out of fear that Greece's economy would collapse beyond the point where it could be resurrected. Id. at 705. When investors withdrew their funds, this accelerated Greece's financial woes, since the nation's banks soon found themselves drawn dry of funds. Id. at 704.
(116.) See Dummann, supra note 38, at 707 (showing how bailouts made debt crisis more manageable). The liquidation of assets and withdrawal of funds from Greece's banks nearly threw the country into an economic blackout in 2012, but bailout money from the Troika, the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission, kept Greece afloat long enough for it to implement austerity packages and cut back on government spending. Id. at 707-08. These actions stayed off the crash of Athen's Stock Market until 2015. Id. at 710-711.
(117.) See Dammann, supra note 38, at 700 (acknowledging proponents for Grexit, but not supporting their plan). See also Kaloudis, supra note 26, at 51-54 (remarking on Greece's practice of political parties pandering to votes and interest groups). The faction calling for Greece's exit from the Eurozone, if not also the European Union, cite Greece's political corruption as one of the major wastes of the government. Id. The political corruption stands as a plague to any efforts to resolve the financial crisis. Id. If political corruption is not extinguished there is little hope that fiscal plans will be actualized. Id.
(118.) See Kovras and Loizides, supra note 28, at 1 (introducing Greece's particular vulnerabilities). While other southern European nations are also experiencing extreme socioeconomic problems, Greece seems to stand as a case in its own category. Id. Unlike Spain and Portugal whose economic crises were brought on by mismanagement within their banking systems, Greece's economic failings are mainly attributable to the "state and its budgetary policy." Id. at 4. While Greece may have fared better in its management of its banks, its inefficiencies and ineptitudes within its governance stand far more problematic than treasury concerns. Id.
(119.) See Rohit, supra note 92, at 78 (suggesting positive future after Grexit). The suggestion for a Grexit focuses on Greece's ability to free itself of "overregulation" found within the European Union. Id. The harsh conditions imposed by IMF would also no longer apply. Id. Proponents of a Grexit do acknowledge that leaving the helm of the financial stronghold of the Eurozone would result in an acceleration of the economic crisis. Id. This would be an inevitable result, and the forecasted long-term outcome would be that Greece could eventually resurrect its economy on its own. Id. The immediate financial difficulties might be worth the tradeoff for financial freedom, according to some opinions. Id.
(120.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14 (breaking down build-up of Greece's economy and eventual collapse). See also Simitis, supra note 32 (explaining political culture in Greece fueling wasteful spending and poor fiscal policies). The political sphere controlling Greece's destiny focused too much on power plays and ignored the financial crisis that grew significantly worse each year. Id. at 18-20. The average Greek citizen was unaware of how dire the situation had become. Id. at 20.
(121.) See Smith, supra note 92 (reporting on clashing politics in Greece). Prime Minister Tsipras campaigned on a platform of strengthening the public sector, the very area where external E.U. finance ministers determined received too much excess funding. Id. Tsipras fought against the packages, but ultimately, the IMF's threat of withholding emergency bailout funds caused Greece to surrender and accept the strict regulatory conditions that accompanied the more than EUR30Q billion. Id.
(122.) See Smith, supra note 92 (explaining Tsipras's attempt to rebuild Greece by 2021). See also Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 8-11 (commenting on internal barriers Greece must overcome). The expansive issue of rent building practiced by state officials and interest groups has become a norm that citizens accept as part of their economy. Id. at 9. See also Kovras and Loizides, supra note 28, at 13 (reviewing Greece's political culture). This corruption within the system makes government leaders reliant on clientelistic networks to secure their power through the next election cycle. Id. at 13.
(123.) See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 44, at Preamble (stating continuous goal of "ever closer union" among European states).
(124.) See Nelson, supra note 20, at 11-12 (suggesting Greece functions as template for proceeding with other weak European nations). Greece did not fail on its own; the lack of a swift response of E.U. institution and financial ministers allowed the economy's troubles to grow to a daunting size. Id. at 11. It is important now to keep Greece within the Eurozone because its continued membership defies the doubts that a single currency could ever exist across so many different cultures. Id. If Greece leaves the Eurozone, weaknesses of the bloc will start to unravel. Id. at 12.
(125.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 109 (writing about Greece's entrance into Eurozone); see also Wearden,supra note 22, at 1-4 (offering timeline of Greece's course in Eurozone); Bensasson, supra note 88 (displaying graphs showing Greece's shrinking economy after joining Eurozone).
(126.) See Mitsopoulos, at 11 (showing chart of commitments). The IMF gave Greece EUR30 billion in 2010, while E.U. states contributed EUR80 billion. Id.
(127.) See Rohit, supra note 92, at 79 (proposing solutions revolving around independent Greece). Some suggest that if Greece did in fact leave the Eurozone, it could keep interest rates low because along with an independent currency, the country would have an independent central bank to oversee finance expenditures. Id. The claims also suggest that Greece's competitiveness could flourish without hefty burdens of fiscal consolidation. Id. But see Mitsopoulos, supra note 14, at 124 (positing Greece's dependence on external funding); Nelson, supra note 20, at 3 (finding Greece's history never demonstrating high international competiveness).
(128.) See Rohit, supra note 92, at 77 (warning situation in Greece merely reflects dire reality of whole European Union). The magnitude of Greece's situation is playing out in similar economic weakness across Europe. Id. While spending cuts are favored in the current policy implementations, economists on the other side of the argument urge for reductions in austerity measures. Id. They claim that growth in the economy is not possible under heavy spending restrictions. Id. See also Nelson, supra note 20, at 1-2 (citing poor fiscal policy and control in Greece leading to crisis). Other opinions demonstrate that unregulated and broadly practiced government spending and borrowing is precisely what has caused this economic debt crisis in Europe, particularly in the states with pre-existing economies. Id. See Thomas, supra note 35 (pointing out multiple actors at fault for economic crisis). Excessively borrowing from international investors and markets alike should have been checked, but the oversight that was the responsibility of the IMF and the ECB permitted the borrowing. Id. See also Greece's Debt Crisis Odyssey, supra note 35 (showing chart of Greece's potential outcomes). To some reviews, it seems clear that Greece itself sent the nation spiraling into unmanageable debt, regardless of whether it should or should not have been allowed to borrow as much it had. Id.
(129.) See Alderman, supra note 12 (reporting on burdens Greek citizens now bear). At the start of the refugee crisis, Greece lost a large portion of its tourism sector as visitors were turned off by "a place now associated with human desperation." Id. The tourism sector makes up a significant portion of Greece's service sector, and many were left unemployed, particular residents living on the coastline and islands. Id. See also Dammann, supra note 38, at 708 (noting rising unemployment levels). In 2014, the unemployment rate in Greece rose to 26%, up from the 20% it had been only three years prior. Id. See also Bird, supra note 16 (writing that Greece nearly lost its credit economy in 2011-2012). Greece narrowly avoided becoming a cash economy in 2012 when bank deposits and investments decreased, but the circulation of cash increased exponentially. Id. Permitted withdrawals went from a limit of EUR100 in 2013 to only EUR60 in 2015. Id.
(130.) See Bird, supra note 16 (remarking on austerity measures and cuts to Greece's infrastructure). For a society that has grown to favor a large public sector and generous pension system, the government's cutbacks have deeply affected the citizens. Id.
(131.) See Squires, supra 103 (stating rising numbers in already overcrowded camps). In the summer of 2016, approximately 57,000 refugees were "living in limbo" in Greece, sheltered in flimsy tents set up in abandoned former military airfields and former Olympic sites. Id. Ten thousand three hundred of those refugees were living on the Aegean islands. Id. Countless aid organizations reported back that the camps were in "'demoralizing and unsafe conditions.'" Id. See also Nieva and Rubin, supra note 4 (interviewing refugee residents). Makeshift camps had to be set up as a result of overcrowding. Id. Any spaces available, even old gas stations, were converted into temporary shelter. Id. See McKernan, supra note 104 (revealing plans to winterization camps failed). Currently, the camps of asylees and refugees are not adequately equipped for inclement weather. Id. Initiatives and funding meant to assist their safety and survival through the winter of 2016 came up short. Id.
(132.) See Bird, supra note 16 (explaining Greece's need for bailouts). Greece's economic future depends on the continued support and bailout money from the Troika and investments made by foreign state and private lenders. Id. Greece cannot survive on its own. Id. See also Mallia, supra note 83 (summarizing human rights case against Greece). The human rights violations exposed in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece show that without financial assistance, Greece was and will be unable to provide adequate accommodations and resources as required by the CEAS. Id. at 365-66.
(133.) See Kitsantonis, supra note 3 (expressing Greece's dependence on external supplemental funding). An Interior Ministry official stated disappointment at perceived lack of assistance from other European countries in September 2016. Id. Greece's desperation evidences its reliance on the European Union and other European finance groups to assist the country with supplying and accommodating refugees with necessary supplies and lodging. Id.
(134.) See also Langford, supra note 5, at 247-48 (arguing refugee crisis harmed European unity). The CEAS was intended to renew solidarity among European countries, but sentiments now express a belief that some nations are not bearing their fair share of the burden of the refugee crisis. Id. In states, such as Greece, who face extreme financial hardship, the migration crisis is made worse because these nations are unable to respond when they are experience a dearth of monetary resources Id at 262.
(135.) See Treaty on European Union, supra note 44, at art. 3, (2)-(3) (expressing zone of free travel as vital to European Union's vision). The Treaty on European Union is clear that the ability to free move through Europe, without being blocked by "internal frontiers" is critical to the Union's mission of solidary among its states. Id. Furthermore, the zone also encourages economic stability and cooperation. Id. See also McHugh, supra note 111 (arguing importance of ability to freely travel). A borderless Europe fosters unity and encourages economic development in a system of specialized economies. Id.
(136.) See Antenore, supra note 5 (posing suggestion of suspension of Schengen Area). Those calling for the shutdown of the Schengen Area believe that doing so might put a halt to massive volumes of asylees and refugees traveling without documentation through Greece to northern Europe. Id. See also Langford, supra note 5, at 248 (stating security concerns within Schengen Area). There is a call from others to, at a minimum, tighten security and visa checks within the Schengen Area. Id.
(137.) See Gaffey, supra note 5 (voicing criticisms of Schengen Area). Hungary and Germany have expressed beliefs that the Schengen Area makes it easy for asylees and refugees to slip through official documentation in asylum systems as they seek out their own nation of preference to stay in. Id. In 2015, Germany increased policing on its borders to slow the number of irregular migration entering the country. Id. See also The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 5 (describing protocols based in cooperation of nations' police forces). Police forces are meant to work together to ensure security. Id. But see Langford, supra note 5, at 249 (stating early concerns over interior security in Europe after formation of Schengen Area). Frontex's function as a security management agency is questionable in light of some reports that show the "watchdog" has little overhead regulation and is not focused on protecting human rights. Id.
(138.) See Dublin III, supra note 55,1 29 (requiring applicants to have fingerprints registered in Eurodac). Part of the process of an application is recording their fingerprints in the Eurodac database. Id. This ensures that applicants are properly kept accounted for. Id. But see Gaffey, supra note 5 (noting potentials for abuse of free travel). While Eurodac is intended to ensure that applicants only apply for asylum in one country, the country of first contact, some applicants try to avoid being fingerprinted all together. Id. This causes inefficiencies for the whole system, since it makes it difficult for officials to track applicants properly. Id.
(139.) See Rosenfeld, supra note 4 (stating reasons for seeking international protection). So long as the perceived benefits of living in Europe compared to the traumas and dangers of remaining in their home countries exist, asylum and refugee seekers will continue to make the journey. Id. When the situation in the home country is as traumatic and violent as it is, even risking one's life at sea for the hopes of a better future in Europe seems worth the ensuing hardships. Id. The incentives to move to Europe are evident. Id.
(140.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 15-16 (writing on costs of CEAS). It is difficult to determine where exactly funds are being lost or misused, but what is clear is that it is costly to manage the CEAS, the Dublin system, and border control generally is expensive. Id. It is expensive to fund the system and provide resources. Id. The requirement of extensive personnel requires a large portion of financial resources to cover all necessary costs. Id.
(141.) See Antenore, supra note 5 (remarking on signature feature of Europe). Without the ability to travel freely, workers will be deterred from trying to cross borders to reach their places of work. Id. The whole notion of a single currency could fall if Europe's workforce is prevented from the free travel, which has allowed the euro to exist at all. Id. The consequences on Europe's economy would be disastrous. Id. Europe is built upon the premise of a unified, cohesive, interchanging body. Id. To take away the ability to travel freely would be in complete contrast to the vision of Europe. Id. European citizens and structural institutions are founded around the ideology of a cohesive, merged body. Id. Removing the economic liberties that have, until now, been enjoyed will not bode well for Europe's economy. Id. Businesses will suffer from the loss of workers, and of course workers will suffer from restrictions on places of employment. Id.
(142.) See Simitis, supra note 32, at 10-11 (writing about reliance on system of single currency). The formation of the Eurozone rescued weaker economies who benefited from a system that allowed integration and mutual support. Id. Some economists remain critical of an economic system that does not permit devaluation as a means to combat inflation and debt, and which instead relies on self-adjustment. Id. at 9. They see it as problematic that each nation cannot have the ability to devalue their currency in order to react to internal, as well as external, market reactions. Id. For those proponents against the euro, the inability to self-regulate to the extent where each country can be responsible for its own markets is precisely what has led to the economic crises in many European nations. Id.
(143.) See McHugh, supra note 111 (explaining how Eurozone created individual economies in European nations). The specialized markets that exist in the various European nations have helped some nations to flourish. Id. Germany for instance accounted for EUR632 billion worth of exports to the European Union in 2013, while France, with the second largest economy, had only one third of that amount. Id. Since each nation is able to rely on the European system as a whole, they are able to take advantage of the opportunity to develop a single market, while other non-European countries cannot. Id. This creates unique opportunities available only to European nations. Id. The interrelatedness of the various countries allows each to develop their own markets while still benefitting from the developed markets of neighboring countries. Id.
(144.) See McHugh, supra note 111 (remarking favorably on Europe's common economy). See also Simitis, supra note 32, at 11 (describing significance of Eurozone). More than merely a shared currency, the Eurozone represented the shared political goal of Europe "to promote convergence and cooperation across member states in varying stages of development." Id.
(145.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 1-2 (suggesting Dublin system too ineffective to resolve migration crisis). The Dublin system is meant to "swiftly" assign responsibility, but its transfer feature has resulted in delays and unnecessary movement of applicants seeking asylum. Id. at 1. Applicants returned to countries like Greece may be put at risk in inadequate reception conditions. Id. See Mallia, supra note 83 (writing on Greece's case of human rights violations in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece). Living conditions that are as awful as those cited in the ECtHR case are entirely unfit for occupancy; no asylum or refugee applicant should be subjected to the like. See also Langford, supra note 5, at 219 (mentioning issues with Dublin protocols). One significant problem with the Dublin Regulation is that regardless of intentions to create greater unity among European states, the CEAS's Dublin protocols have broken down trust between states. Id. Countries struggle to trust one another and implement policy in a uniform manner. Id. at 224, 240-42. The protocols of the CEAS are intended to be transposed onto individual states' own asylum procedures, but the radical differences practiced in various countries reveals the endemic failure of the CEAS. Id. at 240.
(146.) See Spaces of Freedom, supra note 89, at 27-29 (reflecting on European Union's CEAS). Despite efforts to create uniformity, there still exists great discrepancies in the implementation of laws. Id. at 27. Greater efforts at unification are required to ensure the system functions as intended. Id. at 30-31. The author(s) of Spaces of Freedom argue that there is a universal obligation
to offer [asylum seekers] asylum, and hospitality, ensuring their right to reside and work and to be accorded many of the rights and protections of national citizens. These rights and responsibilities include basic social benefits, freedom and security, in our sovereign states, even though they are not, of course, national citizens.
(147.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 2-3 (iterating need for reforms on already existing systems). While the CEAS contains gaps, it still remains vital to ensuring the unity and continuity of protocols and regulations in the European Union. Id. See also Langford, supra note 5, at 233 (stating political obstacles to finding agreed-upon asylum system). Even recast versions of the original system are fraught with objections, making it challenging to find replacements. Id.
(148.) See European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12, at 12-13 (proffering "Europe's duty to protect" both European citizens and irregular migrants). Security of Europe is an essential and undeniable part of the CEAS, but the system does not completely exclude concerns over the safety and wellbeing of asylum seekers. Id at 2 12.
(149.) See id. at 4 (expressing openness for proposals to improve CEAS).
(150.) See Dublin III, supra note 55, 1 9 (stating evaluations of success of CEAS and Dublin influence "necessary improvements"). See also European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12, at 17-18 (emphasizing how working together enables states to find improvements).
(151.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 4 (accepting Dublin as "necessary" in European system without internal borders). While the Dublin system has its faults, its function as a mechanism for determining which state shall be responsible for an applicant is an integral part of the CEAS. Id. The requirement of filing for asylum in the country of first arrival gives some form of organization and allows states to keep track of applicants. Id. at 5-6. But see Gallagher, supra note 47, at 385 (rejecting first arrival rule). Some believe the requirement forces too great a burden on receiving states, which are typically southern countries with weaker economies and poor reception facilities. Id.
(152.) See Dublin III, supra note 55,1 29 (requiring registration in Eurodac). Registration assures that all applications will be processed uniformly and fairly. Id.
(153.) See Harris, supra note 90 (noting reception facilities in Greece still inadequate). Major reforms are necessary before Dublin transfers should return. Id. Preservation of the Schengen area will require doubled efforts to reduce backlog in Greece's reception facilities which are overwhelmed by the numbers of applicants it must process. Id.
(154.) See Alderman, supra note 2 (interviewing several refugees). Many applicants who arrived in early 2016 expecting delays to last only weeks for receiving a decision on their application. Id. With over 55,000 applicants to process however, Greek official were unable to give decisions. Id. One young mother of four children revealed she was still, after several months, waiting for a decision. Id.
(155.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 1 (stating Dublin unable to handle volumes currently experienced). "In truth, the Dublin system was not designed to equalise [sic] or share asylum burdens." Id. The Dublin system has not met its goals of alleviating the asylum crisis. Id. at 24.
(156.) See id. (breaking down efficacy of Dublin Regulation and finding minimum results).
(157.) See European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12, at 1-4 (acknowledging burden placed on Mediterranean nations). Countries on Europe's fringes face the overwhelming task of being the first actors in Europe's asylum system. Id.
(158.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 13-15 (revealing transfers from northern states balanced out by "take back" transfers). Despite the concerns that the northern countries are being unfair to their southern neighbors, the data reveals that northern countries take in nearly the same amount of applicants as they transfer out. Id. Of course, this also reveals areas of potential redundancy and inefficiency. Id.
(159.) See Langford, supra note 5, at 248 (stating begrudging efforts by northern states to share the southern countries' burden). Southern nations by far bear the brunt of the migration crisis, but it is still surprising to some observers that northern nations do not, or at least seem to not, fairly share the burden. Id.
(160.) See Robinson, supra note 58 (reporting return of Dublin transfers to Greece). The return of Dublin transfers to Greece was intended to assist with the relocation quota to relocate 160,000 in Greece and Italy. Id. Currently, those individuals await in interim camps until their applications are filed. Id.
(161.) See Mallia, supra note 76, at 364-66 (reviewing Greece's human rights violation in 2011 while using Dublin Regulation).
(162.) See Rankin, supra note 108 (positing European Commissioner's goal for 2017). Avrampoulos was confident the goal would be achieved by autumn of 2017 Id.
(163.) See Gentleman, supra note 103 (reporting on legal proceedings taken against Home Office). Help Refugees, a charity organization operating in Greece, says that Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, failed to meet obligations to find a haven for thousands of unaccompanied, asylum-seeking children. Id. Various aid groups and non-government organizations have expressed alarm at the conditions of the camps. Id. The makeshift shelters are in poor conditions. Id. There are inadequate supplies and provisions at many camps as well. Id.
(164.) See European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12, at 9-10 (urging necessity of shared cooperation and action of all states). The CEAS's protocols only function when there is a consolidated effort by all states to implement the regulations as outlined in their official documentation. Id. If all Member-States fail to work together, the entire cohesion of the CEAS will break down. Id. The system is highly dependent upon shared participation by all European countries. Id.
(165.) See Kingsley, supra note 106 (writing about EUR90 million worth of funding wasted by E.U., IMF, and Greek officials). Failure to communicate between regulating bodies leads to massive inefficiencies and general waste. Id. The onus must be put on all governing bodies to share the obligation to communicate and relate to one another relevant information necessary for carrying out E.U. policies. Id. These coalitions cannot continue finger-pointing or blaming one another for lack of communications and mistakes. Id.
(166.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 6 (supporting Dublin as necessary). Without the Dublin Regulation, E.U. states will have "ad hoc negotiations" to determine responsibility. Id. That type of "freedom" is not ideal, since this will cause confusion between nations over who has responsibility for an applicant. Id. Some form of shared protocols is mandated. Id. at 7. While the Dublin system is far from perfect, it is currently the best system the European Union has at its disposal. Id.
(167.) See supra note 3 and accompanying text (expressing dire situation in Greece many refugees face). While the current conditions are substandard, Dublin transfers should not continue. Id. The potential for the perpetuation of human rights violations is not acceptable, and the dignity of human life should not come at the cost of efficient system management. Id.
(168.) See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Greece's inability to provide habitable spaces for its refugees). For the winter of 2016-2017, Greek officials underestimated the amount of funding and resources it required to provide suitable winter living conditions for asylees and refugees. McKernan, supra note 104 (citing lack of accurate information as cause of failure in addressing refugees' needs). Along with underestimating how much supplies the camps required, the governing bodies of Greece, the European Union, and the United Nations miscalculated the difficulties they would each face trying to coordinate their efforts. Kingsley, supra note 106 (admonishing administrative bodies' failure of meeting their responsibilities).
(169.) See Langford, supra note 5, at 218-19 (describing Frontex). Frontex is meant to unify European states by instilling confidence in their shared security. Id. Human rights are not a focus of Frontex, and in the agency's efforts to pursue security, it may be committing more harm than help. Id. at 254-56. In its most ideal state, Frontex should foster solidarity and trust. Id. at 251.
(170.) See European Agenda on Migration, supra note 12, at 9-10 (calling for shared efforts among E.U. countries).
(171.) See Maas, supra note 56, at 4 (admitting Dublin system not intended for volume of applicants processed today). Supplemental support from aid groups can help this daunting task. Id.
(172.) See Mitsopoulos, supra note 14 (evaluating management flaws in European Union and Greece).
(173.) See Nelson, supra note 20, at 12-13 (detailing importance of keeping Greece in European Union). Greece's continued place in the European Union is important for the future of Europe. Id. at 12. See also Alderman, supra note 12 (highlighting residents' generosity in Skala Sikaminias, Greece). In spite of some xenophobic sentiments and misdirected anger about Greece's financial crisis, residents of a small fishing village worked together to rescue thousands from death at sea. Id.
(174.) See Simitis, supra note 32 (explaining Greece's financial collapse).
(175.) See Dammann, supra note 38, at 69 (noting opinion of some believing Grexit should occur). To some, a Grexit would lead to the eventual recovery of Greece and would re-strengthen the Eurozone. Id.
(176.) See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 44, Preamble (expressing goal of European Union).
(177.) See Mead, supra note 91 (analyzing Greece's situation in comparison with Puerto Rico). Puerto Rico is likened to Greece, as both nations have failing economies where the downfalls went apparently unnoticed until it was too late. Id. The silver lining for Greece however, is that Greece has the financial support of the European Union; the two are bound in the solidarity vision of Greece. Id.
(178.) See Bensasson, supra note 88 (describing Greece's predicament with other European countries). Despite push from some nations to expel Greece from the Eurozone, Greece has managed to defend itself and remind Europe of the importance of maintaining unity. Id.
(179.) See Nelson, supra note 20, at 12 (metaphorizing Greece as blueprint for Europe). Greece stands as an example for the rest of Europe proceeding into the future. Id.
(180.) See Greece Fact Sheet, supra note 97, at 4 (listing mainland response). With more information, better initiatives can be implemented. Id. Focus should be aimed at ensuring the safety and wellbeing of children, the sick, elderly, and other vulnerable persons. Id.
(181.) See Fratzke, supra note 58, at 22-23 (projecting improvements if states and organizations work together). The situation will require significant changes, including reforms for the Dublin Regulation. Id. at 3-4. See also Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin), supra note 79 (introducing new revisions under consideration). Proposals are already being considered, and changes are under review as leaders and governing bodies become more enlightened as to how to resolve institutional deficiencies. See also Dublin IV (building on previous legislation and policy for purposes of addressing areas in need of reform).
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|Author:||De Orio, Rachael E.|
|Publication:||Suffolk Transnational Law Review|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2018|
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