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Russian Military Intelligence, July 1914: what St. Petersburg perceived and why it mattered.

THE JULY CRISIS

After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 15/28 June 1914, midterm memory loomed large in the subsequent Russian response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum against Serbia. A sense of resolution ("Never again!") flowed from earlier humiliations, especially the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9. (110) Thus, as Dominic Lieven has indicated, once the tsar on 12/25 July concurred at a Crown Council session of his ministers with the previous day's recommendation from the Common Council to support Serbia against Austro-Hungarian demands, a European war became probable, given Vienna's intransigence and Berlin's support of that intransigence. (111)

As the drama unfolded during the last week (N.S.) of July 1914, several key military concerns leapt into prominent relief. Despite improvements in readiness measures, there was again, as in late 1912, a paucity of military options to signal resolution and to deter. At the above mentioned Crown Council session, the tsar also sanctioned resolutions to invoke the Period Preparatory to War, beginning at midnight the following day, 13/26 July, and in principle to approve partial mobilization (within the Moscow, Kiev, Kazan, and Odessa military districts) against Austria-Hungary, should the situation so require. Interestingly, the tsar penciled an addendum to the list, to include the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. (112) Since these naval forces had no anti-Austrian mission, except perhaps at the Turkish Straits, inclusion on the list perhaps reflected even at this early stage tsarist apprehension that the matter of peace or war would boil down to what posture Germany might adopt. Or, inclusion of naval forces might simply have reflected the peculiarities of naval vulnerabilities, readiness rates, and anticipated security missions.

In light of various allegations dating to the 1920s, it is important to note that the Period Preparatory to War equated with neither covert nor partial mobilization. Whether partial or full, formal troop mobilization required an imperial ukaz countersigned by the ministers of war, navy, and internal affairs. The emperor's approval for either variant, along with the required ministerial signatures, would not be forthcoming until 15/28-16/29 July. True, the Period Preparatory to War empowered frontier district commanders to initiate limited local reservist call-ups, but at least one major eyewitness account indicates that units along the state frontier failed to vary from the standard mobilization regime. (113) Even if limited call-ups did occur in frontier districts, the established principle was that no unit might draw more than thirty percent of its complement from the local population. (114) Since there was no provision for inter-district troop transits during the Period Preparatory to War, and since a substantial portion of the accepted thirty-percent figure was already on active service with various reserve classes, the number of additional local call-ups would not have been great. (115) Moreover, there were no indications that the Moscow and Kazan districts in the interior conducted any kind of covert mobilization under guise of the Period Preparatory to War. For example, upon return to Moscow on 14/27 July from the annual imperial review at Krasnoe Selo, the commander of the 12th Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment found General Pavel Adamovich Pleve (1850-1916), the Moscow district commander, observing routine troop exercises at the Khodynka field. Pleve expressed surprise that the possibility of impending mobilization had occasioned the grenadiers' early return from St. Petersburg to their quarters. When formal mobilization declaration actually ensued on 17/30 July, the grenadiers observed the standard mobilization routine. (116) If only on the basis of the Moscow district, it is difficult to agree with a recent historian, who alleges that, "in fact considerably more than 1.1 million men were by now being made mobile--if not officially mobilized--according to the regulations of the Period Preparatory to War." (117)

There was a substantial practical impediment militating against covert mobilization: infrastructure. Large-scale troop transit to assembly and concentration required railroad assets, and the railroads themselves required 12 days for mobilization and the re-positioning of locomotives and rolling stock. (118) During the initial week of mobilization there was no capacity to accept military serials. Thus, the historian Anthony Heywood has recently and not surprisingly observed that there is no evidence the railroads engaged in extraordinary troop transits during the Period Preparatory to War. (119) In addition, the organizational infrastructure for troop mobilization had to be put in place. Troop muster points had to be established, and they had to be staffed by officers, non-commissioned officers, physicians, and veterinarians (in the event of war one million horses also had to be mobilized). Without this infrastructure, there was no place for call-ups to report. For example, when the imperial ukaz of 17/30 July for full mobilization supplanted a decree issued only hours earlier for partial mobilization, no one informed a group of reservists in the Kazan district that the correct date for the first day of mobilization was now 16/29 July and not 15/28 July. With no place to report early, the call-ups languished at a local railroad station for more than a day, before a local landowner took pity on them and provided 55 rubles out of pocket to defray expenses for food. (120) These troops from the Kazan military district were among the 1.1 million supposedly "being made mobile."

In fact, Russian military authorities clearly differentiated between miscellaneous readiness measures and formal mobilization. Movement and mass were keys to their understanding of troop mobilization. In early 1913, these criteria figured prominently in a response from Quartermaster General Danilov to a query from Lieutenant General Kliuev about the constituent components of mobilization. Danilov answered that, when implementing a mobilization telegram, "it is necessary to effect all movements of troops for their concentration." (121) Therefore, in GUGSh perspective, anything short of inter-district troop transit to concentration would not have been construed as "mobilization." This understanding was militarily correct, since without mass and without movement to concentration at the state frontier, scattered call-ups in scattered locales generated little or no combat power. As the sad history of troop mobilization during the Russo-Japanese War had indicated, call-ups without an immediate mission and without the means for transit to that mission constituted a more substantial threat to local shop keepers and tavern owners than to any potential military adversaries. (122)

It is easier to dismiss allegations of covert mobilization than to discern the military rationale for leaving partial mobilization on the Crown Council table. There was a clear differentiation between full mobilization and partial mobilization, and the two did not relate well to one another in pre-1914 Russian context. The blunt fact was that partial mobilization against one or another of the major possible adversaries posed a near-insurmountable obstacle for district commanders and GUGSh planners. During the crisis of late-1912, the Warsaw and Kiev district commanders had tried to fashion a stop-gap partial mobilization scheme against Austria-Hungary only, but their hasty solution drew ten army corps from five of the eight military districts of European Russia, not just the four districts (Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan) slated in 1914 to field the bulk of forces against Austria-Hungary. (123) Proximity to Germany excluded the Warsaw district, but even in 1912, the conclusion had been that the Kiev district lacked sufficient infrastructure to accommodate all troops from the interior with an anti-Austrian mission. (124) Mobilization Schedule no. 19 remained a seamless whole, an all-or-nothing proposition. In the collective wisdom of GUGSh, any partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary according to the prevailing schedule would amount to an act of military suicide in the event Germany later joined its ally against Russia. Germany was always the elephant in the wings, and the correct GUGSh understanding was that mobilization of only four military districts would so fracture the railroad transit graphic that the larger schedule would lose its follow-on coherence and viability against the anticipated and much greater German threat. (125) Or, as Major General Sergei Konstantinovich Dobrorol'skii (1860-C.1930), the 1914-chief of the GUGSh mobilization section, put it, "given the slowness of our operational work and the difficulty of any changes in mass railroad transits, the partial mobilization of four districts was in general staff perspective completely impermissible and threatened catastrophe should general mobilization follow partial mobilization." (126) Yet, at the outset of the July Crisis, War Minister Sukhomlinov interposed no objection to partial mobilization. At his elbow, the newly-minted GUGSh Chief, General Nicholas Nikolaevich Ianushkevich (1868-1918), a specialist in military administration, was still learning from Doborol'skii the complexities and peculiarities of Russian troop mobilization.

The insistence on retention of partial mobilization as an option appeared to have come directly from the Russian emperor. (127) In professional military terms, Nicholas II was an educated amateur, but he had a good memory, and he was--unlike his Habsburg and Hohenzollern counterparts--conversant with war plans and troop deployments. Both the war plan of 1912 and the "Considerations" of September 1913 retained "G" variants that relied on variable railroad transit regimes to reinforce strategic deployments against Germany, should Berlin elect to turn east with the majority of its forces at the outset of a possible European war. According to these variants, between the eighth and tenth days of mobilization the bulk of the corps from the Moscow and Kazan districts might be directed against Germany, and not Austria-Hungary. The emperor had read and endorsed the pertinent documents. Meanwhile, during the crisis of late 1912, War Minister Sukhomlinov had informed the tsar that a partial mobilization might be implemented only within separate military districts. (128) It seemed likely that the tsar might conclude under extenuating circumstances that he could order partial mobilization of two frontier districts (Kiev and Odessa) and two interior districts (Moscow and Kazan) for perhaps a week, until the railroad transit graphic dictated a decision for troop destinations from the interior. In the interim, Germany would remain unprovoked, and in a worst case scenario for a general European war, troop transits to concentration from Moscow and Kazan might be halted in the vicinity of Brest-Litovsk and the Western Bug. The resulting dispositions would not vary much from those that the district commanders had suggested in 1912 as a fall-back option. Whatever the tsar's rationale for partial mobilization, he clearly wanted to retain a degree of flexibility in military-technical matters.

War Minister Sukhomlinov later argued for a different kind of flexibility, one that would seem especially appropriate to the last several days of the July Crisis. In general, he was no advocate of partial mobilization as deterrent because he viewed any kind of formal mobilization as prelude to armed conflict. Moreover, he had even advised the tsar in November 1912, "it should never be assumed that mobilization declaration alone can force Austria to implement all the demands presented to her." (129) Why then had Sukhomlinov not objected to partial mobilization at the Crown Council Session of 12/25 July? There are perhaps four explanations for his conduct. First, and most likely, he would not voice opposition to a measure the tsar favored. Second, he may have harbored a sense of fatalism over the likelihood that war would ensue no matter Russia's stance. Third, he understood that the measure had been accepted "in principle," thus leaving room for maneuver and amendment. And, fourth, the war minister understood that partial mobilization might be employed as a stop-gap measure until Germany's posture crystallized. Indeed, his memoirs record an exception to his distaste for partial mobilization: when it might serve as an adjunct to diplomacy for clarifying a political situation that held seeds of potential armed conflict. (130) The events of 15/28-17/30 July would seem to indicate that Nicholas II and Foreign Minister Sazonov at least implicitly shared this conviction.

Crisis-driven posturing aside, there were serious issues of a strictly military nature that affected the decision for mobilization. As the intensity of the July Crisis escalated, an increasingly important concern was Russian vulnerability to strategic preemption. Even if Serbia constituted Vienna's primary objective, residual Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization capabilities in Galicia remained an important threat to Russia, especially in the event that the German army suddenly entered the calculus. (131) The Liublin-Kholm-Kovel' railroad corridor remained as vulnerable in July 1914 as it had been in November-December 1912. A second important military concern--as in 1912--was the sheer complexity of perceiving and interpreting troop mobilization processes that revealed themselves only in fragments and then only episodically. Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Serbia on the evening of 12/25 July, followed by war declaration on 15/28 July, introduced many worrisome parts into Vienna's side of the military equation. (132) And this time, unlike in 1912, there would be no help from Agent no. 25 to discern how they fit together.

Even without its crown jewel, the intelligence edifice was far from helpless. In several capacities it played a significant role in identifying, monitoring, and assessing the worrisome parts. Sources and analyses conditioned what decision-makers saw, when, and with what military implications. There were always distinct limitations. For example, first news of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia came not through conventional intelligence channels, but from routine contact with a councilor at the Italian embassy in St. Petersburg. (133) Meanwhile, the vaunted "Black Chamber" at the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency was at times silent and at other times little more than a source of corroborative information. (134) In some instances, reports from consular and military officials within key legations outside Russia, and even military officers traveling while on leave, provided crucial pieces of information within the larger intelligence picture. (135) As in 1912, military and diplomatic functionaries routinely shared information. (136) And, again as in 1912, after 14/27 July, the GUGSh Special Office compiled military intelligence materials into daily summaries for the GUGSh chief and the war minister. These summaries General Sukhomlinov forwarded to Nicholas II, whose personal mark indicates familiarity with their contents. (137)

Counterintelligence reports also constituted an important source on warnings and indicators of war imminence. The Russians maintained 24-hour surveillance on the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, and evidence indicates that there was at least one Russian agent inside the embassy itself. In addition to monitoring the volume and frequency of message traffic, various counterintelligence sources enabled the GUGSh Special Office to observe the comings and goings of embassy personnel. Counterintelligence agents even knew when the Austro-Hungarian ambassador spent the night nervously pacing his quarters. (138) More important, agents at various Habsburg legations in Russia and elsewhere knew when these legations distributed call-up notices to reserve officers and soldiers residing abroad. (139) Thanks to a painstaking analysis of these notices after the crisis of late-1912, Russian intelligence specialists understood whether they indicated partial or full mobilization. Specialists also understood that an Austro-Hungarian call-up of reserve officers from overseas represented something more ominous than usual, since local legations recompensed the expense of steamship passage to Trieste. (140)

Because of these and related considerations, amidst all the sources, influences, perceptions, and assertions that fed the apprehensions and fears of official St. Petersburg, perhaps none figured more prominently than Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization. Intelligence on its timing, pace, and scope ran like the proverbial Russian "red thread" from initial deliberations over the Austrian ultimatum through the tsar's final decision for full mobilization. At the Crown Council session of the Council of Ministers on 12/25 July, War Minister Sukhomlinov had not objected to retention of partial mobilization as a policy option. For a time he might acquiesce to reliance on this thin reed because he understood the danger emanating from Austria-Hungary, which he exaggeratedly held was in full readiness to attack Serbia. Such action he firmly believed would produce complications on the Russian frontier with Austria-Hungary. (141) Five days later, on the afternoon of 17/30 July, Nicholas II referred explicitly to Austro-Hungarian mobilization as the factor of overriding significance in his decision for full Russian mobilization. As recorded by Foreign Minister Sazonov, the only reporting eyewitness to this momentous decision, the tsar's words were, "If I agreed to Germany's demands [for cessation of military preparations] now, we should find ourselves unarmed against the Austrian Army which is mobilized already [italics added]." (142) Justifying the tsar's decision a decade later, Sazonov wrote that "Austria's mobilization was in full swing." (143)

Affirmation for Sazonov's emphasis on Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization in tsarist decision-making comes from two unlikely sources, the wartime "Orange" and "Yellow" books. These were collections of official documents published early in the war respectively by the Russian and French governments both to justify the decisions that led to war and to seize the high ground in assigning responsibility. (144) Each slender volume contains at least one telegram of dubious authenticity, and each of these telegrams refers to Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization. Document no. 47 in the Orange Book reproduces an alleged communique of 15/28 July to Sazonov from Nicholas Nikolaevich Shebeko (d. 1946), the Russian ambassador in Vienna, to the effect that "The order for general mobilization has been signed." (145) In reality, it was only on 16/29 July that Shebeko wired, "Tomorrow is anticipated the order for general mobilization." (146) Interestingly, this latter document does not figure in the Orange Book. Meanwhile, document no. 118 in the French Yellow Book reproduces the following alleged communique of 31 July (N.S) from the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg: "As a result of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures for mobilization taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the past six days, the order for the general mobilization of the Russian army has been given...." (147) In reality, the order for general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army appeared only on 31 July 1914 (N.S.), one day after the analogous Russian order. (148)

The historian might dismiss these two questionable documents as clumsy ex post facto attempts to blame Vienna for war initiation, except for another curious but authentic document that remains an anomaly in the general pre-war flow of Russian military message traffic. On the evening of 15/28 July, General Ianushkevich, Chief of GUGSh, wired the chiefs of all the Russian military districts that "17 [30] July will be declared the first day of a full mobilization, except in Primor'e [the Far Eastern maritime province]." (149) This telegram went out a full day before the onset of the tsar's well-known bout (from the evening of 16/29 July until the afternoon of 17/30 July) with indecision, during which he vacillated between declarations of full and partial mobilization. Ianushkevich's telegram remains all the more curious because thus far full mobilization had garnered little high-level attention outside the military-technical confines of GUGSb. It is true, however, that Ianushkevich and Sukhomlinov had jointly reported to the tsar on the morning of 15/28 July. (150) For the military-technical reasons cited earlier, neither officer any longer believed in the efficacy of partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary, but Ianushkevich came equipped with paperwork for at least two proposed mobilization regimes, partial and full, and possibly a third, a partial followed by a full. (151) It seems highly probable that the tsar approved the first two in principle, with the proviso to implement one or the other in accordance with evolving circumstances. The time lag between the morning audience and Ianushkevich's evening dispatch of the actual warning order likely meant two things: Perceptions had changed in the interim and there had been an additional consultation with the tsar (Ianushkevich had a direct secure phone line to the imperial residence at Peterhof). Whatever the details, Major General Dobrorol'skii would later write, "From Ianushkevich's aforementioned telegram of 15 [28] July to the military district chiefs it follows that the decision on mobilization was definitively settled on that day." (152)

In light of the timing of Ianushkevich's telegram, an important question arises: What circumstance or indicators had suddenly become so overwhelmingly significant that the GUGSb chief might suddenly garner tsarist approval for full mobilization? One obvious answer is that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia at noon on 15/28 July. (153) Official St. Petersburg received word about mid-afternoon. (154) If explicit Russian concerns for the autonomy and territorial integrity of Serbia were to be taken seriously, then St. Petersburg had few options short of either capitulation or mobilization, especially if Berlin backed Vienna. Sazonov's role in the initial run-up to full mobilization was important, but at times curious and at other times convoluted. Eyewitnesses reported that the declaration of war against Serbia left him visibly shaken. (155) The clockwork-like succession of actions against Serbia precluded dramatic diplomatic maneuver, and, worse, there was the element of speed. He would later write that "the attack upon Serbia had been prepared with a striking rapidity." (156) He was to meet with the tsar on the evening of 15/28 July at 1835 hours, but before the automobile trip to Peterhof, he first received Maurice Paleologue (1859-1944), the French Ambassador, and then conferred at some length with General Ianushkevich, beginning at approximately 1700 hours. (157) Paleologue assured the foreign minister of "the complete readiness of France to fulfill her obligations as an ally in case of necessity." (158) Major General Dobrorol'skii subsequently remembered that in the follow-on session with Ianushkevich, Sazonov had by now abandoned his previous optimism for a fixation on "inescapable general war." (159) The foreign minister no longer saw the need to delay Russian mobilization. In fact, Ianushkevich reported Sazonov's surprise that mobilization had not commenced earlier. Nevertheless, Ianushkevich (as detailed by Dobrorol'skii) did not specify which version of mobilization that Sazonov had in mind, and that same evening the GUGSh mobilization section dutifully prepared two decrees for imperial signature the next morning, one for full mobilization and a second for partial. (160) Yet, later the very same evening the GUGSh chief would issue the warning order for full mobilization, with the first day set for 17/30 July. Ianushkevich's telegram likely came on the heels of Sazonov's audience with the tsar, and it would be logical to conclude that these three principals were at least for now speaking the same mobilization language. (161)

THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE

Consensus derived at least in part from a common intelligence picture. In his book-length treatment of Russian mobilization, Major General Dobrorol'skii would write, "Designation of 17 [30] July [as the first day of full mobilization] was prompted by the consideration that on 16 [29] July the tsar would have been definitively informed of the entire current situation, in consequence of which would follow affirmation of the war minister's proposal for full mobilization." (162) Although unnoticed by historians (the book was declassified only in 1991), this assertion remains significant for several reasons. First, it provides a logical foundation to argue that a formal updated intelligence assessment played an important role in the tsar's initial decision. And, second, the update probably would have required the presence of General Ianushkevich. Indeed, records from the archives indicate that on the morning of 16 (29) July the GUGSh chief personally briefed the tsar. (163) Later that day, Sazonov would say as much to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. (164) It is likely that Ianushkevich returned around noon to his office on Palace Square with the signed mobilization decrees in his pocket.

Dobrorol'skii's testimony thus brings to near center stage an intelligence-based rationale for action. Apart from the abruptness of the Austro-Hungarian war declaration, there appeared precious few justifications for a radical departure in decision making--save perhaps a shared situational awareness based on current intelligence digests and threat assessments. Since Vienna's ultimatum to Serbia, there had been a steady stream of all-source and strictly military intelligence on the nature and course of Austro-Hungarian military preparations. As early as 11/24 July, Consul Mikhail Grigor'evich Priklonskii in Budapest had wired, "at night all the monitors [gunboats] had passed through Budapest to the south." (165) He also noted that military trains were headed the same direction. On 12/25 July, Charge Nicholas Aleksandrovich Kudashev reported from Vienna that, "in Czechia preparatory measures for mobilization have already been undertaken, they are preparing the German regiments." (166) On 12/25 July, Acting Consul Mikhail Vasil'evich Kazanskii in Prague reported, "five corps in the south are being mobilized." (167) He also cited the preparation of reserve call-up notices for VIII Corps (in Prague). The evening of the same day the "Black Chamber" intercepted and decoded message traffic indicating that Austria-Hungary considered Serbia's response to the ultimatum unsatisfactory. (168) The next morning, Colonel Alexander Georgievich Vineken, the Russian military attache in Vienna, reported the public declaration of partial mobilization against Serbia, including five full corps (XVI, XV, XIII, IV, and VII), and elements of two others (II and III), with an additional corps (XII) for deployment against Romania. (169) Still the same day, 13/26 July, Kazanskii from Prague telegraphed the onset of mobilization, adding that, "Yesterday twelve field gun batteries and one howitzer battery had been dispatched south." (170) Plus, he noted that, "Cavalry is being dispatched from the provinces." (171) Also on 13/26 July, General Staff Colonel Boris Mikhailovich Stakhovich, on leave in Karlsbad, telegraphed news that mobilization notices for VIII Corps had been posted at 0600 hours. (172) The next day, 14/27 July, the Prague Acting Consul ominously remarked, "Troops are being dispatched from here to Galicia," while "German regiments from southern Austria are arriving here." (173)

By 14/27 July, GUGSb intelligence summaries had duly catalogued these indicators, while adding several unsettling observations. One was that Berlin was recalling German reserve officers located in Russia. (174) The second was that in Austria-Hungary "exceptional measures thoroughly prepared in peacetime enter into force either upon mobilization or before it, if the political situation so requires." (175) That same day a supplementary report from the Special Office of the Quartermaster General Section outlined the significance of these "exceptional measures," especially within the context of secret instructions in GUGSh possession for Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization. These measures meant that "in general the actual conduct of mobilization is possible before its declaration, and in frontier corps districts such will transpire without any doubt, as the experience of the 1912 conflict indicates" [italics added]. (176) At this point, it is significant to note that Colonel Samoilo's earlier memorandum on Conrad's concept for sequential operations against Serbia and Russia lies in close proximity among archival files to the report from General Danilov's section. (177) Thus, the experience of late 1912 seems to have provided strong grounds for military intelligence specialists within GUGSh to assume that Austria-Hungary was in the initial throes of something more than preparation for a knock-out blow against Serbia. Already on 14/27 July, Major General Dobrorol'skii was alerting Major General Sergei Aleksandrovich Ronzhin, Chief of Military Transportation, to the possibility that "further political complications" could entail the mobilization of all Russian troops slated for deployment to the western state frontier in the event of war. (178)

The next day, 15/28 July, witnessed a heightening of apprehensions. Russian intelligence summaries noted that Austria-Hungary was recalling reserve officers located in the United States. (179) At the same time, elements of the British fleet remained concentrated following completion of periodic readiness exercises. (180) Sources within French military intelligence forwarded to GUGSh recorded the mobilization against Serbia of six Austro-Hungarian corps (IV, VI, VII, XIII, XV, and XVI) and elements of two others (II and III), with an additional corps (XII) against Romania. According to the French, the plan was to invade along the entire state frontier and then advance through Belgrade to Kragujevac (nearly 100 kilometers southeast of the Serbian capital). (181) Ambassador Shebeko reported from Vienna that, "thus far in all eight corps are undergoing mobilization, that is, half of the Austro-Hungarian army, and also a portion of the navy." (182) His military attache, Colonel Vineken, was more circumspect in his calculations, citing five corps and elements of two others, with the possibility of adding two or three more, depending upon confirmation. (183) For intelligence analysts within GUGSh these figures--even with discrepancies--were troubling. Eight corps far exceeded the five-six that the comprehensive intelligence estimate of 1 March 1914 (O.S.) had considered necessary to subdue Serbia, even if allied with Montenegro. (184) Worse, eight corps even exceeded the seven corps that secret materials obtained the previous year from "the late Agent no. 25" had stipulated for a war in the Balkans. (185) Still worse, there were ominous fragmentary reports of additional mobilizations and deployments, now including both Czech Corps (VIII and IX respectively at Prague and Josefstadt/Leitmeritz) and possibly III Corps (at Graz) in its entirety. Many of these corps-level formations matched intelligence materials for Fall R, the Austro-Hungarian strategic deployment scheme for war against Russia. (186)

Once reports from various sources confirmed the fact that the designations of mobilizing corps were beginning to match corps-level dispositions for Fall R, the natural conclusion within GUGSh would have been that Austria-Hungary was mobilizing for war against Russia, and not just against Serbia. Distinctions between Fall B and Fall R would fade as apprehensions blossomed over the "sum of all fears" scenario. (187) As noted above--and now even more poignantly--GUGSh analysts would simply assume on the basis of previous experience and Habsburg military doctrine that the three Austro-Hungarian corps I, X, and XI with peacetime deployments in Galicia were undergoing covert mobilization and even augmentation. (188) In such a case, the number of Austro-Hungarian corps approaching wartime strength--including the two mobilizing Czech corps--would not have been the openly-announced eight, but thirteen! (189) Under the circumstances of an on-going crisis situation, and on the basis of very strong circumstantial evidence, it seems entirely plausible that as early as the evening of 15/28 July not only General Ianushkevich but also the tsar and probably Sazonov perceived they were witnessing an ominous variation on the 1912 theme. That is, recent experience would suggest that the Russians now confronted the beginning of a covert shift to full or near-full Austro-Hungarian mobilization.

With some reservations to permit flexibility for diplomatic maneuver, Sazonov at least initially seemed to endorse these convictions. In post-revolutionary emigration, he would refer to Shebeko's fictional telegram of 15/28 July and the dangers inherent in Austro-Hungarian mobilization measures of a magnitude disproportionate to the Serbian threat. Perhaps more importantly, by the morning of 16/29 July, Sazonov would later comment that, "at the Army Headquarters news was continually arriving about the mobilization on the Russian frontier in Galicia; we heard that the mobilization there had begun a few days earlier and, so far as we knew, must have been completed." (190) The foreign minister was only testifying to what key Russian decision-makers thought they saw and understood, especially in light of direct experience and intelligence-informed perceptions. Still, despite the emphasis on full mobilization, neither the tsar nor Sazonov would discard partial Russian mobilization as a fall-back option. The rationale: Except indirectly, Germany had not yet figured in the military picture. Thus, although full mobilization was clearly the main line of advance for the next 24 hours, on the morning of 16/29 July the tsar would nonetheless sign decrees for both mobilization variants, reserving for himself the final word on implementation.

THE VAGARIES OF IMPLEMENTATION

These postulations help make sense of seemingly contradictory Russian assertions and actions from the evening of 15/28 July until approximately 1700 hours on 17/30 July, when the tsar made his final decision for full mobilization. Short of that decision, the Russians, especially Sazonov, might cloak themselves in ambiguity, the better to test Austro-Hungarian resolve, but better still to test German backing for that resolve. In effect, the preliminary decision on the evening of 15/28 July for full mobilization--but without taking partial mobilization off the table-- bought the Russians one and possibly two days, during which they might clarify information, and more importantly, assess the postures of the major players. If diplomatic efforts succeeded either in defusing the crisis or remanding its resolution to a larger European venue, then the still unimplemented order for full mobilization might be either rescinded or supplanted by partial mobilization. Meanwhile, to counter the perceived Austro-Hungarian threat and to prepare for possible German augmentation of that threat, the precautionary machinery had been set in motion. As much as two days' latitude flowed from the understanding that the full mobilization decree required the tsar's signature the next morning, followed by the necessity to garner the signatures of the three ministers and to file the decree with the Ruling Senate, all before the dispatch of encrypted telegrams to the military district chiefs. (191) These errands required the better part of a full working day. If at any time during this process partial mobilization became the new order of the day, then the signed fail-back decree for that regime might be implemented. As both Quartermaster General Danilov and General Ronzhin, the military transportation specialist, later testified, a partial mobilization regime might remain in effect for approximately a day before it fatally impaired the capacity for transition to full mobilization. (192) And, lest there be no misunderstanding, none of the principals--save perhaps the newly tenured and inexperienced General Ianushkevich--was ignorant of military technical considerations, and even he was fast becoming knowledgeable. With the exception of the GUGSh chief, the major actors had all occupied front-row seats during the crisis of late 1912.

Meanwhile, ambiguity left room for dissimulation and demarche. Upon return to the Foreign Ministry from Peterhof on the evening of 15/28 July, Sazonov might telegraph the European capitals that Russia was mobilizing four military districts (13 corps) in response to Vienna's declaration of war against Serbia. He was not lying, he was just not telling the whole truth. (193) Similarly, on the afternoon of 16/29 July, he might tell the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Frigyes Szapary von Szapar (1869-1935), that a decree was being signed for "mobilization on a considerable scale." (194) For his part, Szapary had gotten wind that, "Russia was alarmed at our having mobilized eight corps for the [conduct of] war against Serbia." (195) He was now calling on the foreign minister to disabuse him of the idea that "the supposed mobilization of Austria-Hungary" had exceeded the necessary limits and "seem[ed] therefore directed against Russia." (196) Sazonov feigned ignorance of military-technical questions, asserting that the tsar, "on the strength of information received from the Chief of the General Staff had expressed alarm." (197) Accordingly, the tsarist decree constituted only a "precautionary measure." With no progress on substantive issues, the talks broke off when Sazonov received a telephone message that monitors had bombarded Belgrade on the previous day. For the second time within the space of 24 hours, he appeared shaken. (198)

Now it was Germany's turn, and now was the time to gauge whether the pachyderm's politico-military weight precluded diplomatic dexterity. (199) Although Russian military intelligence had scored important pre-1914 successes against Berlin, they were primarily of an operational-tactical nature, with special reference to means and methods for the defense of East Prussia and adjacent borderlands. There was nothing like the treasure trove of strategic intelligence that flowed from Vienna. In fact, for a time in the contest for intelligence the Germans actually held the upper hand. In 1908, there was suspicion that a long-term minor German clerical functionary at the Russian legation in Berlin was an important intelligence source for Germany. (200) More recently, a second secretary within the Russian legation in London had compromised important information on the impending Anglo-Russian naval convention. (201) St. Petersburg had no such well-placed informants in Berlin, and it was only on the basis of raw deductive-analytical work that, as early as 1910, Russian military intelligence had concluded the Germans would likely first turn west with the bulk of their forces against France in the event of a European war. (202) During the July Crisis, useful information on Germany flowed from the intelligence section of the French General Staff through the Russian military attache in Paris to GUGSh and the Russian Foreign Ministry. In the main this and scattered information from other sources remained either benign or indefinite almost to the end. Indeed, the Russian intelligence estimate for 17/30 July pointedly noted, "According to information from France of 15 [28] July, in Germany negligible preparatory measures are proceeding on the railroads and at border-crossing points, those [military personnel] on leave are returning to their units, and private orders are forbidden for military flour millers." (203) This report indicated there was little new in the west, and a still quiescent Germany might, after all, serve as a mollifying influence on its Austro-Hungarian ally. At the same time, the Russians were not naive. They understood that German mobilization was lightning fast and that major components might easily lie hidden from outside view. (204)

Other perceptions, including possible German responses to Russian readiness measures, also figured prominently in the diplomatic equation. The GUGSb intelligence digest for 15/28-16/29 July noted that, "partial mobilization in Russia will not elicit German mobilization." (205) The German Secretary of State, Gottlieb von Jagow (1863-1935), had said as much in Berlin on 14/27 July to the French and British ambassadors, and his assertion found its way into both diplomatic and intelligence channels. From this understanding probably flowed a major justification for cloaking the Russian shift to full mobilization in ambiguity, while simultaneously retaining the option for partial mobilization. The same day, War Minister Sukhomlinov assured Major Bernhard Friedrich von Eggeling (1872-1949), the German military attache in St. Petersburg, that "no order for mobilization had been issued as yet." (206) The War Minister added that, "If Austria crosses the Serbian frontier, there will be mobilization in the districts facing Austria ... but in no circumstances on [the] German front." (207) Around noon on 16/29 July, General Ianushkevich might technically inform the same German military attache that there had yet been no mobilization declaration (the signed decree was still in his pocket). (208), at 1100 hours, during the first of three conversations the same day with the German Ambassador, Count Friedrich von Pourtales (1853-1928), Sazonov was by comparison more forthcoming (as he would be later with Szapary), referring to Russian mobilization only within the military districts opposite the Austro-Hungarian frontier. As justification, he cited Vienna's mobilization of eight army corps, adding that, "in Russia, unlike western European states, mobilization is far from being the same as war." (209) Although Pourtales expressed uneasiness, he reported that his government was endeavoring to persuade Vienna to engage in frank discussions with St. Petersburg for resolution of the Serbian question on terms acceptable to Russia. At the same time, the ambassador reminded the foreign minister of the dangers inherent even in partial mobilization, asserting by way of a "friendly warning" that, "our obligations to Austria" are "well known." (210) Still, there were some grounds for optimism, not only in light of Pourtales' reference to mediation, but also in light of the tsar's earlier opening of direct telegraphic communication with Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Optimism was short-lived, although more so for Sazonov than the tsar. By mid-afternoon the former learned that Vienna had rejected a proposal for direct conversations, thus leaving the British alternative for their ambassadorial-level equivalent as perhaps the last shred of hope for peaceful crisis resolution. Around 1500 hours a second visit from Pourtales proved inconclusive and even ominous, with the ambassador declaring that, "my Government ... could not regard the order for Russian mobilization if it were imminent, as other than a grave mistake." (211) There followed the audience with Szapary and news of the bombardment of Belgrade. Worse, at about 1900 hours, Pourtales reappeared to read a telegram from Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856-1921), the German Imperial Chancellor, to the effect that, "if Russia continued her military preparations, even though she did not proceed to mobilize, Germany would find herself compelled to mobilize, in which case she would immediately proceed to take the offensive." (212) This assertion signaled a hardening in Berlin's position that rendered von Jagow's assertion two days earlier a dead letter and the partial mobilization option dead before arrival (although on the next day the tsar would require more persuading). (213) More immediately, Pourtales' reversal of course was so stunning and his latter remarks so apparently reminiscent of the German ultimatum during the Bosnian annexation crisis that Sazonov queried the tsar by telephone to ascertain why Pourtales was at such variance with an earlier more pacific telegram from the kaiser. The tsar, meanwhile, authorized Sazonov to consult with the war minister and the GUGSh chief, probably to share updated intelligence assessments and more likely to reaffirm common agreement for the on-going implementation of full mobilization. In fact, the discussion no longer centered on AustroHungarian mobilization, but on the common threat from both potential adversaries and the necessity on military-technical grounds to proceed with full mobilization. Ironically, in view of the tsar's own imminent reversal of course, the assemblage at GUGSh agreed that any fail-back to partial mobilization would invite military disaster. This counsel they communicated to the tsar, who agreed to go forward with full mobilization. (214)

However, the tsar still had not abandoned hope that he might accomplish a breakthrough with the kaiser. Late in the evening of 16/29 July, the kaiser telegraphed that, "I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable and ... my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it." (215) He closed on a note of warning, but also with words that might nourish hope: "Of course military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked on by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid, and jeopardize my position as mediator, which (1) readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help." (216) The tsar understood this message to mean that the kaiser had given his word of honor that, "relations between Russia and Germany would remain friendly if general mobilization were not decreed." (217) It was reading between the lines of the kaiser's seemingly conciliatory telegram that prompted the tsar at literally the eleventh hour in the evening of 16/29 July to revert to the fall-back option for partial mobilization. (218) The appropriate decree went out, and now was the time for nail biting.

However, uncertainty was short-lived. On 17/30 July, the picture darkened decisively, but only partly because of intelligence and more significantly because of direct perception and failed diplomacy. Three factors appeared to have weighed heavily against the last-gasp decree for partial mobilization. The first included unmistakable indications of a stirring German military elephant. Colonel Pavel Pavlovich Gudim-Levkovich, the military attache accredited to Athens, was transiting that day through Germany to his posting. He reported through the Russian legation in Berlin that he had observed heavy military traffic on the German railroads, including the transit of reservists. (219) Reinforcement for this observation came from Colonel Aleksei Alekseevich Ignat'ev (1877-1954), the military attache accredited to Paris. He reported via wireless that troop formations in Poznan and East Prussia were gradually mobilizing. Via conventional telegraph he added that German frontier defenses were being strengthened, fortresses placed on a military footing, railroads secured, border crossings barricaded, and travelers subjected to interrogation. All reservists younger than the class of 1902 were being recalled from France. (220) A report of the previous day from Ambassador Shebeko in Vienna fanned the flames, citing rumors that, should Russia mobilize, it had been decided to respond immediately with an Austro-Hungarian declaration of war. (221) The second major factor involved what appeared to have been happenstance: A quasi-official German newspaper, the Berliner Lokaleinziger, anticipated events, publishing a declaration of mobilization. This item found its way into both diplomatic and intelligence channels, and although German authorities confiscated the newspapers and issued a retraction, the precautions came too late. (222)

Third--and perhaps the most significant factor--Sazonov perceived a terminal case of German intransigence that signified Berlin's full support for Vienna. At 2030 hours on 16/29 July, in accordance with Sazonov's request, the tsar had queried the kaiser about the apparent variance in tone between his earlier telegraphic correspondence and the chancellor's official message as conveyed by Pourtales. (223) This query crossed with the above-mentioned telegram from the kaiser that had prompted the tsar to cancel full mobilization. When the kaiser's answer finally arrived at 1530 hours on 17/30 July--too late to affect the tsar's final decision for mobilization--the response was that, "it is quite out of the question that my ambassador's language could have been in contradiction with the tenor of my telegram." (224) However, there was no need to await this clarification, as Sazonov would discern the very same message much sooner from Pourtales during a 90-minute audience early in the morning (beginning about 0100 hours) on the day of decision. After the two officials failed to agree on a formula to assure Serbian sovereignty, the German ambassador responded to Sazonov's query about inconsistency between telegrams from the kaiser and the imperial chancellor, and then returned to the question of Russian mobilization. Pourtales "decidedly denied" any inconsistency and reiterated the earlier "friendly warning" from the chancellor's telegram, but with an even harder edge. Pourtales now pointedly referred "to the automatic effect that the mobilization would have to have on us in consequence of the German-Austrian alliance." (225) Sazonov responded that, "the order for mobilization could no longer possibly be retracted," and then returned to the well-worn refrain that, "Austrian mobilization was to blame for it." (226)

Much later that morning, when Sazonov called at GUGSh headquarters, he found War Minister Sukhomlinov and General Ianushkevich in a state of agitation that verged on desperation and even panic. Fearing now for the integrity of the troop mobilization process, not to mention the security of the empire, they were unsuccessfully imploring the tsar by telephone to reinstate the order for full mobilization. Met with refusal, they implored Sazonov to intercede on the spot, but the tsar agreed only to receive his foreign minister for an audience at 1500 hours. (227) At the appointed time, Sazonov briefed the tsar for more than an hour, pointing out that war was becoming inevitable, that Germany was set on a collision course, and that the best recourse was "to meet war fully armed and under the most favorable circumstances for ourselves." (228) Along with Sazonov, the tsar was acutely aware of staunch French support. Although assurances from London were far more circumspect, the Russians were also aware of British concerns for the continental balance of power. After some hesitation, the tsar approved a return to full mobilization, citing as justification the already mobilized Austro-Hungarian army. The order went out almost immediately, with 18/31 July designated as the first day of full mobilization. (229) On 19 July/1 August, Germany declared war on Russia. Ironically, in light of everything that had gone before, the Austro-Hungarian declaration would come only on 24 July/6 August. (230)

CONCLUSION

Like concerns over the nature and scale of Austro-Hungarian mobilization, intelligence during the July Crisis was a "red thread" that ran through Russian perceptions of the threat and how to contend with it. It was only natural for the two threads to be interwoven, since a primary intelligence function was to discover and highlight indicators and warnings, to use modern military parlance. So it was that Russian military intelligence, augmented by other sources and means, conditioned decision-making perceptions in at least two ways: with its ability to track and report events across the state frontier with Austria-Hungary, and with its analysis of Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization processes in their recent and on-going contexts. To a much lesser extent, the same assertions held true with regard to Germany, in which case the Russians were more reliant on the French for strategic intelligence.

From the significance and impact of intelligence-informed observations and analysis flow several larger conclusions. First, the experience of late 1912 heightened Russian suspicions, informed Russian assessment, and put future Russian responses to Austro-Hungarian mobilization measures on the proverbial "hair trigger." In July 1914, Vienna's open declaration for the mobilization of eight corps against Serbia, when coupled with the probable covert mobilization of the three corps in Austrian Galicia and the open mobilization of two additional corps in Czechia, posed an unambiguous threat of strategic preemption for Russia. More than just Serbia's fate was at stake. Or, as General Nicholas Nikolaevich Golovin (1875-1934) would write in emigration--without benefit of intelligence materials to inform his commentary--the mobilization of eight army corps "constituted such a disturbance of strategical equilibrium that Russia could not but take precautionary measures." (231) In consonance with this observation, perhaps the primary fault with Russian intelligence assessment was to view the situation in dire terms and to "worst case" the threat rather than offer a small menu of likely greater and lesser probabilities and explanations. In fact, to borrow with license from a phrase that would gain currency a century later, the historian might argue that Russian analysts and observers "connected the dots too well."

Second, as Dominic Lieven has noted elsewhere, the military professionals who had to make sense of intelligence and its implications for mobilization were not "warmongers." (232) Nor, as they are sometimes labeled, did they constitute "a war party." Their task was to provide decision makers with information, counsel, and options. Only with regard to the latter did military professionals seem to lag, but one might argue that circumstances afforded St. Petersburg precious little choice, except to capitulate or gird for war. Pursuit of the latter course left only the slim hope that neither Berlin nor Vienna would equate Russian mobilization with either a declaration of war or the onset of military operations. Even as the July Crisis raged, Nicholas II found his freedom of action so constrained that he would charge Major General Dobrorol'skii with developing better mobilization options. (233) Ironically, the real answer to the challenge probably lay outside the military-technical realm.

Third, there is the requirement to view the impact of intelligence on the July Crisis in full historical context. As Williamson and May assert, intelligence collection and assessment, along with other major factors ranging from assumptions to alliances, "were elements in the environment of decision makers in 1914." (234) Both published and newly-accessible archival materials strongly suggest that military intelligence--at least for the Russians--held implications for the July Crisis analogous to the impact of signals intelligence during the Second World War. That is, the sources and fresh insight based on them challenge the historian to revisit and reassess perceptions and decisions--and perhaps even to revise conventional interpretations and "identities of opinion."

Bruce W. Menning is a private scholar, affiliated with the University of Kansas as Adjunct Professor of History and Russian and East European Studies, and a specialist in the military history of modern Russia and the Soviet Union. Before retirement in 2 Oil, he was Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. His publications include Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992 and 2000) and an edited volume, "At the Threshold of War: The Soviet High Command in 1941," Russian Studies in History, vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 1997-98).

(1.) Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Ernest R. May, "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914," Journal of Modern History 2, 2007, 345-50. A recent supplement to this survey is Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised: The Erosion of the German Paradigm," in Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez, eds, The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014, 30-62. Within the following text, "N.S." denotes New Style, or the Gregorian calendar generally in use in the West, while "O.S." denotes Old Style, or the Julian calendar, then in use in Imperial Russia. At the time, the Julian calendar lagged the Gregorian by 13 days. Dual citation applies to dates of international significance, especially during July 1914, while the absence of designators indicates O.S. in original documents.

(2.) An exception is Mikhail Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaia II, 3 vols. in 4 bks., Moscow: Russkaia razvedka, 1998-2001, in which an entire section (vol. 2, 360M40) is devoted to the July Crisis, but for which only 12 of 254 source citations are from archival materials. Other works of relevance for the period are N.S. Batiushin, Tainaia voennaia razvedka i bor'ba's nei, reprint ed., Moscow: X-History, 2002; K.K. Zvonarev, Agenturnaia razvedka: Russkaia agenturnaia razvedka do i vo vremia voiny 1914-1918 gg., reprint ed. as bk. 1, vol. 3 in series "Arkhiv kontrrazvedki", Moscow: BDTS-press, 2003; E.Iu. Sergeev and A.A. Ulunian, Ne podlezhit' oglasheniiu. Voennye agenty Rossiiskoi imperii v Europe i na Balkanakh 1900-1914 gg., Moscow: IVI-RAN, 1999; E.M. Primakov, ed., Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, 6 vols, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996-2006, vol. 1, 214-25; A.Iu. Shelukhin, "Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia Rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914 gg.)," Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriia 8: Istoriia 3, 1996, 17-31; V.M. Gilensen, "Germanskaia voennaia razvedka protiv Rossii (1871-1917 gg.)," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 2, 1991, 153-177; Heinz Hohne, Der Krieg im Dunkeln: Macht und Einfluss des deutschen und russiscben Geheimdienstes, Munich: Bertelsmann, 1985, 55-135; William J. Fuller, Jr., "The Russian Empire," in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985, 98-126; and Alex Marshall, "Russian Military Intelligence, 1905-1917: The Untold Story behind Tsarist Russia in the First World War," War in History 4, 2004, 393-423.

(3.) Ulrich Trumpener, "War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914," Central European History 1, 1976, 58-85.

(4.) Although mostly limited to materials from the Foreign Ministry, there are many pertinent documents in Komissiia pri TsIK SSSR po izdaniiu dokumentov iz epokhi imperializma, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stva, 1879-1917 [from here: MOE/], ed. M.N. Pokrovskii, Seriia 3, 14 vols, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1931-8, especially vol. 5; examples of memoir literature include A.A. Samoilo, Dve zhizni, Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1958, 110-26; and A.A. Ignat'ev, Piat'desiat let v stroiu, reprint ed., Moscow: Zakharov, 2002, 280-340.

(5.) David Alan Rich, The Tsar's Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998, 2-3, 8, 19, 43-5, 52-4, 61-4, 73-81, 112-14.

(6.) See David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, "Reforming Military Intelligence," in Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution, eds David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning, Washington, DC, and Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge UP, 2004, 133-50; Gudrun Persson, "Russian Military Attaches and the Wars of the 1860s," in ibid., 151-167; and David Alan Rich, "Building Foundations for Effective Intelligence: Military Geography and Statistics in Russian Perspective, 1845-1905," in ibid., 168-85.

(7.) Alex Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800-1917, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 6-10, 18-30, 136-41, 157-9; and David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 2001, 25, 28, 31, 40.

(8.) Bruce W. Menning, "Miscalculating One's Enemies: Russian Military Intelligence before the Russo-Japanese War," War in History 2, 2006, 141-170: 146-7, 153-4, 162. 9 10 11

(9.) Evgeny Sergeev, Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904-05, London: Routledge, 2007, 66-88 and 102-15; and Wada Haruki, "Study Your Enemy: Russian Military and Naval Attaches in Japan," in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, eds John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Wolff, et al., 2 vols, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005 and 2007, vol. 2, 13-43.

(10.) Batiushin, Tainaia voennaia razvedka, 42.

(11.) For an overview of the GUGSh reforms, see A. G. Kavtaradze, "Iz istorii russkogo general'nogo shtaba," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7, 1972, 87-92.

(12.) Vasilii Borisovich Kashirin, "Pokhititeli sekretov bolgarskogo l'va: Iz istorii deiatel'nosti russkoi razvedki v Bolgarii nakanune i v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny. Pervaia chast'," Etudes Balkaniques 1, 2009, 101.

(13.) Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, 175-88; see also Samoilo, Dve zhizni, 75-9, 83-92.

(14.) Samoilo, Dve zhizni, 114-16.

(15.) For a summary of the characteristics of various personnel, see Manuscript, Chernavin, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [from here: GARFfi fond [from here: f.] 5956 (Chernavin, V.V.), opis' [from here: op.] 1, delo [from here: d.[ 50, listy [from here: 11.] 46-9.

(16.) Notebook, Von Raukh, ibid., f. 6249 (Fon Raukh, G.O.), op. 1, d. 1, 11. Mobratnaia [obverse, from here: ob.]-65ob.

(17.) Samoilo, Dve zhizni, 75.

(18.) Marshall, "Russian Military Intelligence," 397; see also Shelukhin, "Razvedivatel'nye organy," 24-6; Sergeev and Ulunian, Ne podlezbit' oglasheniiu, 27-8; and Marshall, Russian General Staff and Asia, 99-100. At the time, one US dollar was approximately equivalent to 1.94 rubles.

(19.) A recent treatment of the "Black Chamber" is A.A. Zdanovich and V.S. Izmozik, Sorok let na sekretnoi sluzhbe: Zhizn' i prikliucheniia Vladimira Krivosha, Moscow: Iks-Khistori, Kuchkovo Pole, 2007, 40-56; see also, Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, 72-4.

(20.) T.A. Soboleva, Talnopis' v istorii Rossii, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994, 233.

(21.) See the academic courses under the rubric of "statistics" in John W. Steinberg, All the Tsar's Men: Russia's General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914, Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010, 223-5; see also, Marshall, Russian General Staff and Asia, 170-1. On curricular changes after 1911 to stress intelligence-related instruction, see Manuscript, Riabikov, GARF, f. 5793 (Riabikov, P.F.), op. 1, d. 31, II. 31ob.-32ob.

(22.) Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, 110-15; see also Voennaia Entsiklopediia, 18 vols incomplete, St. Petersburg/Petrograd: Tovarichestvo I.V. Sytina, 1911-15, s.v. "Agent voennyi (voennyi attashe)." For selection and training in comparative perspective, see, Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform: British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006, especially 16-18, 61-4, 69-74. 23

(23.) For example, Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba, Vooruzhennye sily Avstro-Vengrii (po dannym k 1-mu dekabria 1912 g.), 2 vols, St. Petersburg: n.p., 1912, and Glavnoe

Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba, Vooruzhennye sily Germanii, 2 vols, St. Petersburg: n.p., 1912, 1914. For a comparison, see Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, 217-23.

(24.) Some 62 issues appeared between 1909 and 1914 (see Fuller, "Russian Empire," 107).

(25.) Two impressive examples, some years in compilation, are Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba, Kreposti vostochnogo fronta Germanii, St. Petersburg: n.p, 1914, and Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba, Avstro-Vengriia. Voenno-statisticheskoe opisanie, ed. A.A. Samoilo, 2 vols, St. Petersburg: n.p., 1912.

(26.) For the 1914-comprehensive intelligence estimate on potential western adversaries and their plans, see, Memorandum, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv [from here: RGVIA], f. 2003 (Shtab verkhovogo glavnokomanduiushchego [Stavka]), op. 1, d. 1118,11. 106-52; the 1910 antecedent is Memorandum, RGVIA, f. 2000 (Glavnoe upravlenie General'nogo shtaba), op. 1, d. 172,11. 1-66. For an overview, see Bruce W. Menning, "The Russian Threat Calculation, 1910-1914," in Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose, eds, The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015, 151-75.

(27.) For example, the adoption of a new strategic-operational concept in early 1912. See Conference Decisions, 21 February 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1811, 1. 5.

(28.) Materials supporting the identity of Colonel Redi as Agent no. 25 remain ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a Report, Danilov and Monkevits, 15 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 31, with a pointed reference to "the late Agent 25," whose demise would have roughly corresponded with Redl's. On the other hand, important gaps and anomalies persist in the evidence chain, as indicated in V.I. Vinokurov, Istoriia voennoi diplomatii, 4 vols, Moscow: Inzhener-Svetlitsa, 2009-11, vol. 1, 131-4; Alekseev, Voettnaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, 188-98, and Samoilo, Dve zhizni, 110. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian officials compiled a list of materials that Redi purportedly turned over to the Russians, but it does not correspond fully with the list of Agent no. 25's materials in GUGSh files; see Albert Petho, "Oberst Redi," in Wolfgang Krieger, ed., Geheimdienste in der Weltgeschichte, Munich: Beck, 2003, 145-6; List of Documents, date inexact, but likely fall 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2857, 11. 402-03; and Verena Moritz and Hannes Leidinger, Oberst Redi. Der Spionagefall, der Skandal, die Fakten, St. Polten-Salzburg-Vienna: Residenz Verlag, 2012, 138-42.

(29.) Zvonarev, Agenturnaia razvedka, 143-4.

(30.) E. Adamov, comp., "K voprosu o podgotovke mirovoi voiny," Krasnyi arkhiv 64, 1934, 88-93; for an example from the archives, see Conference Proceedings, 22 May 1913 (N.S.), Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii [from here: AVPRI\, f. 133 (Kantseleriia ministra), op. 470 (1913), d. 10, 11. 10-12. Batiushin, Tainaia voennaia razvedka, 79-80, discounted the credibility of these materials, which appear to have originated within the military chancery of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Their coverage and usefulness varied widely, but apparently at least some elements within GUGSh, and probably also the tsar, judged them authentic.

(31.) Mikhail Svechin, Zapiski starogo generala o bylom, Nice: n.p., 1964, 99.

(32.) For additional details on Redi, see Fuller, "Russian Empire," 115-16; Petho, "Oberst Redi," 138-50; and John R. Schindler, "Redi--Spy of the Century?," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, 2005, 483-507. An enlightening account with jour nalistic embellishment is Harold B. Segal, comp., Egon Erwin Kisch, The Raging Reporter: A Bio-Anthology, West Fafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 1997, especially 192-6, and 202-3.

(33.) On Jandric and Redi, see Giinther Kronenbitter, "Krieg im Frieden": Die Fuhrung der k.u.k. Armee und die Grofhnachpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns 1906-1914, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003, 236-7. See also Conference Proceedings, 18 May (N.S.), AVPR1, f. 133, op. 470 (1913), d. 10,11. 8-10; this is a rendition of a conference of high-ranking Austro-Hungarian functionaries, including Conrad and War Minister Alexander Krobatin (1849-1933), over counterintelligence matters: Following acknowledgement that "a significant amount of secret data" had been sold to the Italian government, and that an unknown portion of the data had been transferred to the Russian government, the discussion turned to Conrad's son. As reported in the conference summary, "the son of the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant von Hotzendorf, as precisely established by investigation, is guilty of withholding information about some criminal actions of his comrades and a woman close to him, out of thoughtlessness and feelings of camaraderie." After speaking in favor of the strictest punishment, Conrad felt faint, surrendered chairmanship of the session to the war minister, and briefly departed. In his absence, there was a heated exchange of views, followed by a vote of "full confidence and sympathy" for Conrad.

(34.) Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse, Boston, MA: Brill, 2000, 127-28; for the Russian perceptions, see Kudashev to Sazonov, 15/28 August 1913, AVPR1, f. 133, op. 470 (1913), d. 8, 11. 5-6.

(35.) For example, see Report, Danilov, 27 November 1909, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1886, 11. 295-300ob.; Report, Monkevits to Danilov, 20 January 1911, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, II. 66-75; and Index of Intelligence Materials, Danilov, Monkevits, and Samoilo to Zhilinskii, 28 January 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 11. 139-ob.

(36.) At least partly on the basis of intelligence materials, Alekseev in late 1908 was already advocating a shift away from Germany to a main offensive effort against Austria-Hungary at the outset of a future European war. Tellingly, he wrote, "Here [Galicia] the situation is more definite: almost with exactitude we will know the forces we face, the regions of their concentration, and the theater of battle...." (see Memorandum, Alekseev, 17 December 1908 [O.S.], quoted in A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine, Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926, 351).

(37.) [V.E. Borisov,] Kratkii strategicheskii ocherk voiny 1914-1918 g.g., 2 vols, Moscow: Voennoe dielo, 1918-1919, vol. 1, 34-5.

(38.) Modifications to the concept in September 1913 created a fourth army, the Eighth, from Third Army's Proskurov grouping. However, there were few changes in overall force allocations or readiness rates (see Ia.K. Tsikhovich, comp., Strategicheskii ocherk voiny 1914-1918 g.g., Moscow: Vyshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1920-1922, Sketch no. 2 after p. 240).

(39.) Bruce W. Menning, "War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context," in War Planning 1914, eds Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010, 120-6; see also Oleg Alpeev, "Strategicheskie imperativy dvenatsatogo goda," Rodina 8, 2014, 3-7.

(40.) Until the last week of October 1912 (O.S.), there is no archival-based evidence to support various assertions about extraordinary troop mobilization activities in European Russia. During 31 August-2 October (O.S.), records for the Kiev military district indicate routine trial mobilizations for only three infantry and two cavalry regiments, while records for the Warsaw military district during the same period record only one trial mobilization for the garrison of the Osowiec fortress (see Report, Trial Mobilizations, 1911-12, Undated, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 3, d. 332, 11. 119-137ob., and d. 836, 11. 124-29). Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian military attache in St. Petersburg reported no unusual activities, a lacuna that frustrated both the Evidenzbiiro within the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and the military chancery of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. There is some evidence to indicate that the Evidenzburo then "cooked the books" by soliciting intelligence from Polish agents in Galicia, who would have been less than credible sources (see the accounts by Kronenbitter in "Krieg im Ereiden", 389-90, and by Giinther Kronenbitter, "Austria-Hungary," in Hamilton and Herwig, eds, War Planning 1914, 25-6. See as well Graydon A. Tunstall, Jr., Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 18711914, New York: Columbia UP, 1993, 111-13).

(41.) Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Era of the Balkan Wars," in East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars, eds Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic, New York: Columbia UP, 1987, 317-37: 318. For Russian perceptions, see Report, Svatkovskii, 30 August 1912, AVPRI, f. 151 (Politarkhiv), op. 482 (1912), d. 3717, 11. 13-14.

(42.) The most complete account is Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1938, 157-62; perhaps the best recent account is David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-191S, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 233-40.

(43.) Williamson, "Military Dimensions," 319-21; see also the call-ups cited in Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 1976, 166-7.

(44.) Zhilinskii to Sazonov, 26 October 1912, AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482 (1912), d. 3717, 1. 47.

(45.) The Proceedings of the Imperial Russian Council of Ministers for 29 November/12 December 1912 and 5/18 December 1912 officially put the number of reservists held on active service at "about 350,000" (see Sovet Ministrov, Osobye zhurnaly Soveta Ministrov Rossiiskoi Imperii. 1909-1917 gg., 9 vols, ed. B. D. Gal'perina, Moscow: Rosspen, 2001-9, vol. 4 (1912 god]: 388n). On dispositions, see Dale C. Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," in Levy and Vasquez, eds, The Outbreak of the First World War, 167-198: 178. Copeland puts 220,000 Russian troops along the Galician border. A corps was an infantry-heavy combined arms formation, numbering about 35,000 troops, usually in two infantry divisions, with additional troops in combat and combat service support units. Two-to-four corps under a unified command comprised a field army.

(46.) Dragomirov to Zhilinskii, and Skalon to Zhilinskii, 29 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7148, 11. 58-59, and 69.

(47.) Report, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 2 January 1909, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 11. 1-2.

(48.) In military parlance, the function of a covering force is to screen and protect formations to its rear or flanks. Because a covering force lacks the combat power to engage in major offensive operations, the objective is to delay and disrupt an enemy advance.

(49.) For example, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov (1882-1945), later chief of the Soviet General Staff, was serving in 1912 as adjutant to a front-line cavalry division. He recalled in his memoirs that only the 14th Cavalry Division and two under-strength rifle brigades covered the immense 200-kilometer expanse between Czestochowa and Liublin (see B.M. Shaposhnikov, Vospominaniia o sluzhbe, reprint ed., Moscow: Veche, 2013, 207-8).

(50.) These messages are treated in detail in Brius U. Menning, "Nasledie Agenta 15[degrees] 25," Rodina 8, 2014: 32-5. 51

(51.) Report, Samoilo, 1 February 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2979, 1. 23.

(52.) For example, see Summary for 24-30 November 1912, Sukhomlinov to Kokovtsov, 1 December 1912, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi lstoricheskii Arkhiv [from here: RGIA], f. 1276 (Sovet Ministrov [1905-1917]), op. 8, d. 454, 11. 474-75.

(53.) Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 133.

(54.) Intelligence Summary, 6 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2856, 11. 80-80ob.

(55.) Stogov to Doboshinskii, ca. 15 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7148, 1. 110.

(56.) Agent no. 25, Typewritten Copy of Letter, dated not later than 26 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2851, 1. 20.

(57.) Intelligence Summary, 22 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 112ob.

(58.) Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii, 259.

(59.) Kliuev to Zhilinskii, 29 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1819, 1. 9.

(60.) Report, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas 11, 8 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 1. 620b.

(61.) Ibid.

(62.) A detailed analysis of the impact of strategic withdrawal appears in Memorandum, Alekseev to Ivanov, 24 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2067 (Shtab Glavnokomanduiushchego lugo-zapadnogo fronta), op. 1, d. 125, 11. 9-12.

(63.) Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 12 November 1912, ibid., f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 1. 84.

(64.) Zustand der drohenden Kriegsgefahr was actually stage 3 of the multi-step German troop transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing. For a detailed description, see Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (New York/Oxford, 1991), 300-2, and Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009, 56-7.

(65.) Report, Danilov, 13 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1796, 11. 8ob.-9ob.

(66.) Dobryshin to Danilov, 21 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1796, 11. 15-15ob.

(67.) For an overview of Russian assessments, see Bruce W. Menning, "The Russian Threat Calculation, 1910-1914," in The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War, eds Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015, 151-175.

(68.) Report, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 8 December 1912, RGV1A, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 11. 64-64ob., and 67ob. Quartermaster General Iu.N. Danilov would later write that neither GUGSh in general nor military intelligence officials in particular ever conceived that Austria-Hungary and Germany would act in isolation from each other in a go-to-war scenario (see Iu.N. Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine, Berlin: Slovo, 1924, 13-14).

(69.) Report, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 8 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 11. 62-62ob.

(70.) V.N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo (1909-1919): Vospominaniia. Memuari, reprint ed. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004, 545-8; on the larger ministerial context, see David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900-1914, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992, 183-7.

(71.) Notes, Sukhomlinov, 4 Dec. 1912, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 465, 1. 93.

(72.) The appropriate minutes for the two sessions of the Council of Ministers are at AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1912), d. 218, 11. 2-28. The minutes have been published in Sovet Ministrov, Osobye zhurnaly Soveta Ministrov Rossiiskoi Imperii. 1909-1917 gg., vol. 4 (1912 god), 386-91. Archival materials related to these sessions (Notes, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 465,11. 76ob.-93 and passim) differ in significant ways from the treatment of the late-1912 crisis in V.N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo, 542-7. Kokovtsov fails to mention the two sessions of the Council of Ministers and endeavors to depict War Minister Sukhomlinov in the worst possible light. Meanwhile, the abridged English version of Kokovtsov's memoirs, V.N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, ed. H.H. Fisher, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1935, 345-8, heavily influenced subsequent treatments such as L.C.F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilisation in 1914," in The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, ed. Paul M. Kennedy, Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1981, 253-6; and Ernest R. May, "Cabinet, Tsar, Kaiser: Three Approaches to Assessment," in Knowing One's Enemies, ed. Ernest R. May, 17-26. For the Austro-Hungarian perspective, see Kronenbitter, "Krieg im Freiden", 389-98.

(73.) Probably in a fit of pique against War Minister Sukhomlinov, Prime Minister Kokovtsov appears to have deliberately falsified the date of Nicholas IPs decision (along with a rump gathering of the Council of Ministers) as 10/23 November 1912 (see Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo, 543). The correct date (11/24 December 1912) appears in Visitor Register, RGIA, f. 516 (Kamer-Fur'eskie zhurnaly), op. 1 (219/2728), d. 35, 11. 495-ob., and 596-ob. The recent publication of the emperor's diaries in their entirety, Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaia II (1894-1918), 2 vols in 3 bks, ed. S.V. Mironenko, Moscow: Rosspen, 2011, 2013, vol. 2, bk. 1: 710-11, confirms the correct date as 11/24 December 1912.

(74.) Report, Zhilinskii, 20 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 38ob.

(75.) Report, Zhilinskii, 20 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 1. 103ob.

(76.) Intelligence Summary, 12 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2852, 1. 28.

(77.) On Prince Hohenlohe's mission, see Kronenbitter, "Krieg im Freiden", 409 and 413, and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 262-5. The emissary's proposals are at Sazonov to Kokovtsov, 29 January 1913, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1913), d. 7,11. 1-4, while the published version of the mutual demobilization agreement is at Government Communique, 27 February 1913, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1913), d. 7, 1. 20.

(78.) Telegram, Bazarov to Zhilinskii, 9 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7255,1, 125.

(79.) John C.G. Rohl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile 1900-1941, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014, 908-16.

(80.) Williamson, "Military Dimensions," 323-4.

(81.) Letter, Agent no. 25, 4 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2850, 1. 201.

(82.) Zankevich to Danilov, 28 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2851, 1. 465; this report is repeated in RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 454, 1. 465.

(83.) Transcribed Copy of Letter, Agent no. 25,26 November 1912, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 454, 1. 447.

(84.) Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 133.

(85.) Report, Samoilo, June 1909, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 679, 1. 21ob.

(86.) Samoilo to Monkevits, 10 May 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2840, 11. 5-6.

(87.) Vineken to Monkevits, 18 February 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2840, 1. 39.

(88.) Intelligence Summary, 6 December 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2856, 11, 80-800b.

(89.) Memorandum, Samoilo, undated, likely spring of 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2869, 1. 156n: "There are definite indicators that an implemented covert partial mobilization of the Galician corps (I, X, and XI) will precede full mobilization."

(90.) Journal, 6 and 7 November 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 3, d. 207, 1. 64.

(91.) Addendum to Report, Monkevits, 30 May 1913, ibid., op. 1, d. 2869, 1. 287.

(92.) Report, 1 Mar. 1914, ibid., f. 2003, op. 1, d. 1118, II. 1330b.-134.

(93.) Bundesministerium fur Heereswesen, Osterreicb-Ungarns letzter Krieg, 1914-1918, 8 vols (Vienna: Verlag der Militarwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1930-38, vol. 1, 6-7; see also Tunstall, Planning for War, 60.

(94.) See Conference Proceedings, Zhilinskii Commentary, 8/11 March 1914, AVPRI, f. 138 (Sekretnyi arkkiv ministra), op. 467, d. 462/481,1. 72. Five to seven of the entire 16 available Austro-Hungarian corps would deploy in two or three armies against Serbia (and possibly Montenegro), while at least eight of the remaining nine to 11 would initially deploy in four armies against Russia.

(95.) Report, Monkevits, 30 May 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2869, 1. 286.

(96.) Ibid.

(97.) Worse, Germany's speed of mobilization exceeded the Austro-Hungarian by three days, leaving the Russians with a 7-10 day disadvantage respectively against the two potential adversaries (see Memorandum, RGVIA, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 1118, 11. 116-116ob.).

(98.) Telegram, Zankevich, 30 October 1912, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 454, I. 348.

(99.) Undated Report (likely November 1912), Samoilo, and Intelligence Summary, 16 January 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, respectively at d. 2827, 1. 109, and d. 2852, I. 107.

(100.) Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 9; Hew Strachan notes that between 1 January 1913 and 1 January 1914, Conrad proposed a Serbian war some 25 times! (Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. 1: To Arms, New York: Penguin, 2003, 69).

(101.) On the elaboration of Conrad's scheme, see Kronenbitter, "Krieg im Freiden", 398-9. The larger terms are laid out in Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, 5 vols, Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922, vol. 2, 335-9, and vol. 3, 12-14, 275, 333-4. See also Tunstall, Planning for War, 118-20, 124, and 130-1.

(102.) This exact turn of events during August 1914 is described by Norman Stone, "Die Mobilmachung der osterreichisch-ungarischen Armee 1914," Militdrgeschichte Mitteilungen, 16, no. 2 (1974), 67-95; see also, Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 159.

(103.) Maksimilian Ronge, Voina i industriia shpionazha, reprint ed., Moscow: Pravovoe proveshchenie, 2000, 56-7; see, also, F.K. Gershel'man and D.I. Gurko, Generalami rozhdaiutsia. Vospominaniia russkikh voenachal'nikov XIX-nachala XX vekov, Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2002, 358-60.

(104.) En route to concentration, Lieutenant General Alekseev clearly expressed this apprehension (see Memorandum, Alekseev to Ivanov, 24 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 125,1. 9).

(105.) Pierre Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (28th June-4,h August 1914), New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1928, 139-40.

(106.) The legislation appears in AVPRI, f. 134 (Arkhiv "Voina"), op. 1, d. 473, II. 3-10, and in MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 97-113; a German translation can be found in Gunther Frantz, Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte, 1924, 189-93; an English-language summary appears in David Alan Rich, "Russia," in The Origins of World War I, eds Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003, 188-226: 222.

(107.) Michael T. Florinsky was among the first scholars to delineate differences between the two (see M.T. Florinsky, "The Russian Mobilization of 1914," Political Science Quarterly 2, 1927, 201-28: 204-6). Among commentators confusing the two are Frantz (see Frantz, Russlands Eintritt, 62-3), and more recently, Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War, New York: Basic Books, 2013, 192-4, 207-9, and 214-15.

(108.) A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine v mezbdunarodnom otnoshenii Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo voennoi tipografii Upravl. delami Narkomvoenmor i RVS SSSR, 1926, 299-300.

(109.) For a useful summary of the Grand Program, see A.P. Zhilin, "Bol'shaia programma po usileniiu russkoi armii," Voenno-istoricheskii zburna! 7, 1974: 90-7.

(110.) Failure to support Serbia would have amounted to a "third diplomatic Tsushima," in the words of Pertti Luntinen, French Information on Russian War Plans, 1880-1914, Helsinki: SHS, 1984, 138. The Bosnian annexation crisis had been the first, while less than full support for Serbian aspirations during the conflicts of 1912-13 had constituted the second.

(111.) D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, 146-7; for affirmation from an important eyewitness to the flow of events, see Baron M.F. Schilling's commentary in How the War Began in 1914, Being the Diary of the Russian Foreign Office from the 3rd to the 20th (Old Style) of July, 1914, tr. W. Cyprian Bridge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, 15-17.

(112.) Sovet Ministrov, Osobye zhurnaly, vol. 6 (1914 god), 197.

(113.) Shaposhnikov, Vospominaniia o sluzhbe, 250-7. Still serving during July 1914 in southwestern Russian Poland, Shaposhnikov did acknowledge that his 14th Cavalry Division mobilized a day early, on receipt of a mobilization warning order. Since the division's readiness rate as part of the local covering force was one day, the difference was negligible within larger mobilization context. In fact, as of 1600 hours on 29 July, the German General Staff reported, "Mobilization declaration in the Warsaw and Vilnius military districts has thus far not been confirmed. Reservists in large numbers have not been called up." See Anscar Jansen, Der Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg: Das deutsche Militar in der Julikrise 1914, Marburg, 2005, 293.

(114.) Report, Skalon to Zhilinskii, 31 May 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7148, I. 203ob.

(115.) For example, in the key Warsaw district, there were five resident corps, each with an expected average wartime complement of about 35,000. Thirty percent of these corps' entire wartime complement would have been roughly 52,500. Once the contingent of local reservists already on active service with their age classes was subtracted from this figure, the residual number would probably have been sufficient only to relieve first-line troops of some security and support functions. It is likely that any local reserve call-ups detected by German or Austrian observers would have been reporting for garrison duty at fortresses--in accordance with provisions of the Period Preparatory to War for elevating fortresses to wartime readiness--rather than reporting to widely-scattered field units.

(116.) M.I. Pestrzhetskii, Vospominaniia komandira 12-go grenaderskogo Astrakhanskogo imperatora Aleksandra 111 polka, Moscow: Dom russkogo zarubezh'ia, im. Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, 2011, 43-4.

(117.) McMeekin, July 1914, 215.

(118.) N.G. Vasil'ev, Transport Rossii v voine 1914-1918 gg., Moscow: Voenizdat, 1939, 34; and compare K.P. Ushakov, Podgotovka voennykh soobshchenii Rossii k mirovoi voine. Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, otdel voennoi literatury, 1928, 55, 96, and 118; Ushakov cites a 5-11 day requirement, which extended to as many as 14 days in the frontier military districts.

(119.) Entoni Kheivud, "IiuP 1914-go: 'Sekretnaia mobilizatsna' v Rossii," Rodina 8, 2014, 24-5.

(120.) Penzenskaia guberniia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voine 1914-Mart 1918, eds V.V. Kondrashin, T.A. Evnevich, S.V. Belousov, et al., 2 vols, Prague: Vedecko vydavatelske centrum "Sociosfera-CZ", 2014, vol. 1,73-4. Officials in Saratov province (also in the Kazan district) received successive directives for partial and full mobilization at 1040 and 1845 hours on the same day, 17/30 July; see Khrestianstvo vo vseobshchei mobilizatsii armii i flota 1914 goda (po materialam Saratovskoi guberrtii), A. V. Posadskii, ed., Saratov, 2002, 17.

(121.) Memorandum, Danilov to Kliuev, 16 January 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1819, 11. 15ob.-16.

(122.) John Bushneli, "The Specter of Mutinous Reserves: How the War Produced the October Manifesto," in Steinberg, Menning, Wolff, et al., eds, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, vol. 1, 334-9.

(123.) Skalon et al. to Zhilinskii, 6 Dec. 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140,11. 52-3. This was probably the scheme to which the former chief of the GUGSh mobilization section referred in S.K. Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii v 1914 godu. Podgotovka i vypolnenie po materialam Voenno-istoricheskogo arkhiva, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatei'stvo, otdel voennoi literatury, 1929, 94.

(124.) Report, Skalon et al., 6 Dec. 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1740, 1. 53ob.

(125.) Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi army, 94-5, 98; see also N.N. Golovin, The Russian Campaign of 1914: The Beginning of the War and Operations in East Prussia, tr. A.G.S. Muntz, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1933, 8, and Iu.N. Danilov, Na puti k krusheniiu, ed. V.A. Avdeev, Moscow: XXI vek, 2000, 279-80.

(126.) Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 95.

(127.) Major General Dobrorol'skii laid responsibility either with the tsar or Foreign Minister Sazonov. In light of the concept's importance and military content, the source was more likely Nicholas II (see Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 95).

(128.) Report, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 8 Dec. 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 11. 61-61ob. and 66-66ob.

(129.) Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 12 Nov. 1912, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7140, 1. 84.

(130.) Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, 267 and 276.

(131.) See, for example, War Minister Sukhomlinov's commentary in P.L. Bark, "Iiul'skie dni 1914 goda," Vozrozhdenie 91, July 1959: 25-6.

(132.) For the complexities, see A.S. Beloi, Galitsiiskaia bitva, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, otdel voennoi literatury, 1929, 51-2.

(133.) Excerpt, Foreign Office Diary, 10/23 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 467, d. 728/790, 1. 16, and MOEI, Seriia 3, 5: 6.

(134.) The intercept file on Austria-Hungary for the period 7 July-5 August 1914 (N.S.), containing more than 30 telegrams--many annotated as having been read by the tsar--is located in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 123, II. 147-237ob.

(135.) In addition to the legation in Vienna, the Russian consulates in Budapest and Prague were important sources of information. Meanwhile, Colonel Boris Mikhailovich Stakhovich of GUGSh was on leave in Karlsbad, whence he reported on Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization.

(136.) Sazonov to Grigorovich, 14/27 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 470 (1914), d. 380, II. 14-15.

(137.) These summaries begin with Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 14 July 1914, and conclude with Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 18 July 1914, respectively at RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, II. 26-28, and 11. 50-53ob.; the intelligence summaries forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are at AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 372, 11. 22-24, and 47-9.

(138.) Surveillance Notes, Austro-Hungarian Embassy, 13, 16, and 17 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, II. 262-ob., 310-11, and 312-13.

(139.) For example, Miller to Ogenkvar, 16 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 296.

(140.) Report, Samoilo, 6 Aug. 1913, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 248.

(141.) Bark, "Iiul'skie dni 1914 goda," 25-6.

(142.) Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years, 1909-1916, New York: F.A. Stokes, 1928, 203.

(143.) How the War Began in 1914, 9.

(144.) On the "colored books," see John W. Langdon, July 1914: The Long Debate, 1918-1990, New York/Oxford: Berg, 1991, 17; these books were translated and reprinted in their entirety in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, London: Harrison and Sons, 1915, 121-534.

(145.) Rossiia, Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, Oranzhevaia kniga (do voiny): Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov, St. Petersburg: Aktsionernoe obshchestvo tipografskogo dela, 1915, 40; General Danilov repeats the assertion in Danilov, Na puti k krusheniiu, 280; however, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5: 192n, states "no such telegram was found in the papers of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

(146.) Shebeko to Sazonov, 29/16 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, 1. 24, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 229.

(147.) Paleologue to Viviani, 18/31 July 1914, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, 223; see also Jean Stengers, "1914: The Safety of Ciphers and the Outbreak of the First World War," in Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, eds Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, Exeter: U. of Exeter P., 1987, 29-48: 29.

(148.) Shebeko to Sazonov, 18/31 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, 1. 30.

(149.) Ianushkevich to military district chiefs, Don Cossack Ataman, and Generals Pleve, Zhilinskii, Zal'tsa, Rennenkampf, Ivanov, Nikitin, and Evert, 15/28 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 202; V.A. Zolotarev, Iu.V. Kudrina et al., eds, Mirovye voiny XX veka, 4 vols, Moscow: Nauka, 2002, vol. 2, 64; and Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 99.

(150.) As recorded in the tsar's diary, Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaia II, vol. 2, bk. 2, 46. The visitor register at Peterhof indicates that Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich arrived at 1015 hours for a session lasting less than two hours. The tsar usually began audiences at 1110 hours, so reception of the two War Ministry officials nearly an hour in advance was anomalous. See Kamer-fur'erskii zburnal, GARF, f. 601 (Nikolai II), op. 1, d. 1594, 1. 101. Curiously, Sukhomlinov failed to enter this session in his diary, "Dnevnik generala Sukhomlinova," Dela i dni: Istorichesku zhurnal, bk. 1 (1920), 220, but did mention it in his memoirs, V.A. Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, Berlin: Russkoe universal'noe izdatel'stvo 1924, 287. Sukhomlinov's diary has been reprinted in E. G. Machikin, ed., General V. A. Sukhomlinov, Dnevnik. Pis'ma. Dokumenty: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 2014), 22-104.

(151.) Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 99; see also Dobrorol'skii to Ianushkevich, 13/26 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 139-40.

(152.) Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 99.

(153.) Shebeko to Sazonov, 15/28 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, 1. 19, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 192.

(154.) Spaliakovitch to Sazonof, and Sazonof to Spaliakovitch, 15/28 July 1914 and 17/30 July 1914 respectively, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, 392-3.

(155.) Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, tr. Isabella M. Massey, 3 vols, New York: Oxford UP, 1952-7, vol. 2, 538, 540.

(156.) Sazonov, Fateful Years, 189.

(157.) Albertini puts the time of Sazonov's meeting with the tsar at 1800 hours, but the visitor register at Peterhof indicates that the foreign minister arrived at 1835, thus leaving him sufficient time beforehand, even calculating travel, to confer with Ianushkevich (Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 537; Kamer-fur'erskii zhurnal, GARF, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1594, 1. 104ob). In contrast, the tsar's diary records the meeting with Sazonov at 8 Vi hours (2030), suggesting either a mistake or a memory lapse by the tsar (see Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaia II, vol. 2, bk. 2, 46).

(158.) Declaration of French Ambassador, 15/28 July, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 467, d. 728/790, 1. 54; and How the War Began in 1914, 43.

(159.) Sergei Dobrorol'skii, "O mobilizatsii russkoi armii v 1914 godu," Voennyi sbornik [Belgrade] 1, 1922, 91-116: 104. Schilling corroborates this account in his introduction to How the War Began in 1914, 16. In contrast with Dobrorol'skii and Schilling, Raymond Recouly held that the meeting occurred in the presence of War Minister Sukhomlinov,
   Quartermaster General Danilov, and several other officials (see
   Raymond Recouly, Les Heures Tragiques d'Avant Guerre, Paris: La
   renaissance du livre, 1922, 158). No doubt Recouly confused the
   session of 15/ 28 July with a similar but larger conference on the
   following day.


(160.) Dobrorol'skii, "O mobilizatsii russkoi armii," 104.

(161.) A fourth principal, War Minister Sukhomlinov, figured in high-level decision-making only episodically, a handicap he attributed in his memoirs to behind-the-scenes manipulation by Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich (see Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, 288 and 297-98). Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely, as Albertini asserts, that Sazonov "ordered" Ianushkevich to compose two decrees (see Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 544). It is more likely, as would be the case on 17/30 July, that the tsar at the conclusion of the evening audience on 15/28 July instructed Sazonov to convey such instructions by telephone to the GUGSh chief, at which time Ianushkevich dispatched the warning order.

(162.) Dobrorol'skii, Mobilizatsiia russkoi armii, 99.

(163.) In violation of the chain of command and War Ministry protocol, Sukhomlinov was absent from General Ianushkevich's briefing on the morning of 16/29 July; therefore, the war minister's signature on the mobilization decrees was necessary later in the day. On 16/29 July 1914, according to the visitor register at Peterhof, General Ianushkevich and Prime Minister Ivan Logginovich Goremykin (1839-1917) delivered reports to the tsar for approximately an hour, commencing at 1110 hours (see Kamer-fur'erskii zhurnal, GARF, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1594, 1. 104ob.). In contrast, the tsar's diary records only Goremykin's presence (see Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaia II, 2, bk. 2, 46). Dobrorol'skii's reference, above, to the "war minister's proposal for full mobilization" probably refers to the previous morning's discussion, or perhaps even a phone conversation.

(164.) Szapary to Berchtold, 16/29 July 1914, in July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War. Selected Documents, ed. Imanuel Geiss, London: Batsford, 1967, 278.

(165.) Priklonskii to Political Section, 11/24 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 4, 1. 5.

(166.) Kudashev to Sazonov, 12/25 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3,1. 7. Reference to "German regiments" would indicate the beginning of extra-territorial unit transfers to backfill local Czech contingents departing for assembly and concentration. The objective was to guard against subversion within the local Czech population (see Intelligence Summary, 16 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 2319, 1. 4).

(167.) Kazanskii to Political Section, 12/25 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 4, 1. 6, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 81.

(168.) Intercept, St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, 12/25 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 2, 1. 78.

(169.) Vineken to GUGSh, 13/26 July 1914, ibid., d. 3, 1. 12, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 134.

(170.) Kazanskii to Schilling, 13/26 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 4, 1. 7.

(171.) Ibid.

(172.) Stakhovich to Ogenkvar, 13 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 4, 11. 5, and 7.

Stakhovich would return immediately to St. Petersburg to file a complete account of his observations; Stakhovich to Monkevits, 15 July 1914, RCVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 11. 224-26.

(173.) Kazanskii to Schilling, 14/27 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 4, 1. 10, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 161.

(174.) The recall of officers from abroad was a measure associated with Kriegsgefahrzustand, which the Germans would not formally declare until 31 July. 175 *

(175.) Quartermaster General Section to GUGSh Chief, 14 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 27.

(176.) Quartermaster General Section to GUGSh Chief, 14 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2840.1. 50. Even before the crisis of 1912-13, Colonel Samoilo had already made much the same observation: "As before, all the Galician corps will be mobilized earlier than the declaration of full mobilization, during the 'alarm' period intended for securing the Galician frontier and for covering mobilization and concentration" (see Report, Samoilo, 3 June 1911, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2826, 1. 96).

(177.) Key reference/working materials on the Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization regime are in RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, dd. 2827, 2840, and 2871. Samoilo's report is at RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, 1. 109-ob.

(178.) Dobrorol'skii to Ronzhin, 14/27 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 171-2.

(179.) Goleevskii to Ogenkvar, 15 July 1914, same-day annotation by Monkevits, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 236.

(180.) Ermolov to Quartermaster General Section, 15/28 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 184; Intelligence Summary, GUGSh, 15/28 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871.1. 29; and V.A. Avdeev, "Prolog istoricheskoi tragedii," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7, 1994, 39-46: 42.

(181.) Ignat'ev to Danilov, 15/28 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 187.

(182.) Shebeko to Sazonov, 15 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 5, 11. 20, 22, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 192; Shebeko appeared more accurate than the later quasi-official Austrian history, which asserts that only two-fifths of the Austro-Hungarian army was undergoing mobilization (see Osterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918, vol. 1, 18).

(183.) Vineken to Quartermaster General Section, 15 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, 1. 20, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 193.

(184.) Danilov and Monkevits, Memorandum (Intelligence Summary), 1 March 1914, RGVIA, f. 2003, op. 1,d. 1118, 11. 133ob.-34and 134n; an extract appears in 10-i otdel General'nogo shtaba RKKA, Vostochno-Prusskaia operatsiia. Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1939, 62.

(185.) Report, Danilov, Monkevits, and Samoilo, 15 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 31ob.

(186.) Report, Danilov and Monkevits, 15 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 1. 31; in addition, the intelligence update to 18/31 July would show by the previous day that IX Corps (from Josefstadt/Leitmeritz) was already transiting to Krakow. See "Svodka svedenii o protivnike (po dannym general'nogo shtaba polkovnika Skalona) k 31 iiulia 1914 goda," Voennoe delo 11, 17 August 1918, 8.

(187.) On the comparison between reports and potential deployments in Galicia, see Vineken to GUGSh, 13/26 July 1914, Ignat'ev to Quartermaster General Section, 15/28 July 1914, and Vineken to Quartermaster General Section, 15/28 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, respectively 134, 187, 193; and the intelligence-based maps in RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1825,1. 5, and f. 1759 (Shtab Kievskogo voennogo okruga), op. 3, d. 1239,1. 1. Five--and possibly six--mobilizing Austro-Hungarian corps matched Russian intelligence on potential Fall R deployments for Galicia. The coincidences might easily seem too numerous to account only for implementation of Fall B. Compare as well von Hotzendorf, A us meiner Dienstzeit, vol. 4, Anlage 12.

(188.) On the one hand, as early as 14/27 July, the British military attache in Vienna reported only that, "All cavalry regiments of 2nd corps leaving for Galicia now" (see Bunsen to Grey, 14/27 July 1914, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, The Outbreak of War, eds G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, vol. 11 in series British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1926, 140). On the other hand, the French military attache in Vienna reported not only the transit of cavalry from Vienna and Budapest to the Russian frontier, but also the call up of reservists in Galicia since 14/27 July (see Emile Bourgeois and Georges Pages, Les Origines et les Responsabilites de la grande Guerre, Paris: Hachette, 1921, 41). Colonel Vladimir Evstaf'evich Skalon, GUGSh intelligence officer, in the estimate updated to 18/31 July cited above, note 184, listed all three (I, X, and XI) Galician corps as mobilized. Meanwhile, the Intelligence Summary, Kiev military district, 17 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 2511, 1. 1, indicated that thus far only V and XIV Corps and residual elements of II and III Corps had not been mobilized.

(189.) Indeed, subsequent documentation indicates that Major General Monkevits, now GUGSh First Over-Quartermaster, simply assumed that the Austro-Hungarian army would have completed its mobilization by 25 July/6 August; this assumption meant that Monkevits dated the onset of Austro-Hungarian general mobilization roughly to the time of partial mobilization against Serbia (see Memorandum, Alekseev to Ivanov, 24 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 125, 1. 9).

(190.) Sazonov, Fateful Years, 193.

(191.) On the procedural complexities, see Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, 286-7; and Dobrorol'skii, "O mobilizatsii russkoi armii," 105-7.

(192.) Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voitte, 21; compare as well S.A. Ronzhin, "Voennye soobshcheniia i upravlenie imi," typescript, "Sbornik zapisok, otnosiashchikhsia k russkomu snabzheniiu," San Francisco: Finansovoe Agenstvo v SShA, 1925, 140.

(193.) As noted in Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 548; see Sazonov's telegram to Bronevskii et ai, 15/28 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 180.

(194.) Szapary to Berchtold, 16/29 July 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 278.

(195.) Ibid., 277.

(196.) Ibid.

(197.) Quotes in ibid., 278 and 279. Reference to General Ianushkevich's "information" was likely a euphemism for military intelligence, and also an acknowledgment of the GUGSh chief's meeting that morning with the tsar.

(198.) Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 553. For the bombardment telegram from the Russian charge, already transferred to Nis, see, Shtrandtman to Sazonov, 16/29 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 236. Although the monitors returned on a near-daily basis to shell Belgrade, until the Russian consulate lay half in ruins, the impact of the initial bombardment was likely more psychological and political rather than physical.

(199.) For additional background on pre-war relations between Russia and Germany, see Ronald P. Bobroff, "War Accepted but Unsought: Russia's Growing Militancy and the July Crisis, 1914," in Levy and Vasquez, eds, Outbreak, 227, 232-8, and 246-51.

(200.) Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, 102-4.

(201.) Hohne, Der Krieg im Dunkeln, 113-21.

(202.) Manuscript, Chernavin, GARF, f. 5956, op. 1, d. 50, 1. 63.

(203.) Intelligence Summary, GUGSh, 17 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, 11. 45-45ob. Like the recall of officers from abroad, these measures were associated with the German pre-mobilization period and the as yet undeclared Kriegsgefahrzustand. For a catalog of these measures and their premature implementation dates, see V.F. Novitskii, Mirovaia voina 1914-1918 gg. Kampaniia 1914 goda v Belgii i Frantsii, 2 vols, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938, vol. 1, 85-6.

(204.) Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba, Vooruzhennye sily Germanii, vol. 1, 164, 185-6.

(205.) Report, GUGSh, 16 July 1914, RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871,1. 41ob.; see also Cambon to Viviani and Goschen to Grey, both 14/27 July 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 245, 253.

(206.) Quoted in Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 529; see also Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, 286.

(207.) Ibid.

(208.) Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 547.

(209.) Pourtales to Jagow, 16/29 July 1914, in Geiss, edJuly 1914, 281.

(210.) Quoted in Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 550.

(211.) Quoted in Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, 551.

(212.) This is the exact verbiage as recorded by Schilling and archival excerpts from his diary (see Excerpt, Foreign Office Diary, 16/29 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 467, d. 728/790, 1. 64ob.; and MOEJ, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 213). However, in citing the original instructions from Bethmann, the German official records indicate a softer concluding phrase, "... and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented" (see Bethmann Hollweg to Pourtales, 29 July 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 285).

(213.) Von Jagow's reversal was confirmed the same day by the Russian ambassador in Berlin. See Sverbeev to Sazonov, 16/29 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 229.

(214.) Excerpt, Foreign Office Diary, 16/29 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 467, d. 728/790,1. 65, and MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 213-14.'

(215.) How the War Began in 1914, 55.

(216.) Ibid.

(217.) Renouvin, Immediate Origins, 158.

(218.) How the War Began in 1914, 55.

(219.) Nicolas de Basily, Memoirs, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973, 98n; repeated in Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 20.

(220.) Ignat'ev to Quartermaster General Section, 17/30 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 264-5.

(221.) Shebeko to Sazonov, 16 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, 1. 26.

(222.) There is some controversy over whether this information reached St. Petersburg in time to affect the final decision for full mobilization. On the basis of analysis from the early 1920s, Renouvin argues that the news could not have arrived in time (Renouvin, Immediate Origins, 200-3, and 209-10). Yet, he ignores Danilov's assertion that the news first came not through cumbersome official channels, but directly to the Russian Press Agency in St. Petersburg, which then informed Sazonov by telephone Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 20). Meanwhile, Sazonov would assert that he received the news two hours after the newspaper's appearance (Sazonov, Fateful Years, 198), while Sukhomlinov would record in his diary, "At 1300 a dispatch about German mobilization was received from our ambassador in Berlin" (Michikin, ed., General Sukhomlinov, 23).

(223.) How the War Began in 1914, 54.

(224.) Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, 17/30 July 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 304.

(225.) Pourtales to Jagow, 17/30 July 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 294.

(226.) Ibid.

(227.) Excerpt, Foreign Office Diary, 17/30 July 1914, MOEI, Seriia 3, vol. 5, 256; How the War Began in 1914, 63-4; Danilov, Na puti k krusheniiu, 283.

(228.) How the War Began in 1914, 65.

(229.) The actual decree appears in Ianushkevich and Dobrorol'skii to Sukhomlinov and Sazonov, 17 July 1914, AVPR1, f. 134, op. 473, d. 8, 1. 20.

(230.) There was military justification, since the absence of a formal war declaration caused the tsar--always a gentleman (except, inter alia, for reading others' mail)--to prohibit Russian cavalry detachments from conducting cross-border reconnaissance.

(231.) Golovin, Russian Campaign of 1914, 4.

(232.) Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 149.

(233.) Renouvin, Immediate Origins, 210n.

(234.) Williamson and May, "An Identity of Opinion," 350.
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