Rhetoric and Truth: Tacitus's Percennius and Democratic Historiography.
The democratic man is a being who speaks, which is also to say a poetic being, a being capable of embracing the distance between words and things... which is not deception, not trickery, but humanity; a being capable of embracing the unreality of representation. Jacques RanciAaAaAeA?re, On the Shores of Politi Democracy is not the parliamentary system or the legitimate State. It is not a state of the social either, the reign of individualism or the masses... Democracy is the name of a singular interruption of this order of the distribution of bodies in a community that I have suggested should be conceptualised as police. It is the name of that which interrupts the smooth functioning of this order through a singular process of subjectivization. Jacques RanciAaAaAeA?re, Disagreeme
In the political thought of Jacques RanciAaAaAeA?re, the term democracy used to denote a type of activity that challenges the organization of role and place within a given hierarchy. For RanciAaAaAeA?re such hierarchi are governed by the police, a term used to refer to "all the activities which create order by distributing places, names and functions" (RanciAaAaAeA?r cited in Nash 1996, 173). Rather than being a constitutional mechanism, RanciAaAaAeA?rian democracy is an act of political "subjectivization," a proce of declassification and equality that challenges the way in which regimes organize their citizens. (1)
RanciAaAaAeA?re argues that political cultures operate so as to enforce system of social division that defines those who are political subjects, that is, those who are enabled to take political action, such as speaking within political contexts. This regime is, in RanciAaAaAeA?re's terms, a poli order. That order not only governs our social reality but also prescribes our perception of that reality through the distribution of ways of seeing, hearing, and thinking. In this way, the police order determines how seditious acts are to be perceived, whose words should be heard as legitimate "discourse" and whose as illegitimate "noise" (RanciAaAaAeA? 1999, 30-33). For RanciAaAaAeA?re, our perception of reality is tied to t realm of aesthetics, the name he gives to a historically-determined regime for artistic representation; this regime determines what should be made visible, audible, and, most importantly, meaningful. (2)
In this paper, I apply RanciAaAaAeA?re's concepts of democracy and aestheti to Tacitus's writing of history in order to test the traditional perception of the exclusive (elitist) nature of Tacitus's political thought. I see in Tacitus a form of democratic historiography, which, following RanciAaAaAeA?re's formulation of democracy, may be understood as historic writing that breaks with established modes of representation and by doing so allows previously invisible or inaudible actors to be seen or heard. (3) The ways in which Tacitean historiography does or does not account for those normatively marginalized have attracted considerable attention, notably from Eric Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re himself. (4) their analyses of the speech Tacitus gives to Percennius, the rebellious soldier who provoked the Pannonian mutiny in 14 CE (Ann. 1.16.3-1.17.6), Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re raise issues of who speaks, how, and why, a address the role of rhetoric in making the past speak and the relationship between rhetoric, historiography, and truth. (3)
In the first half of the paper, I reconsider Auerbach's treatment of Percennius's speech to argue that the ambiguity of speaker and perspective in this speech provides a notable instance of democratic representation. While Tacitus employs tropes associated with madness and disease, which imply that there were no 'valid' motives behind the soldiers' mutiny, I argue, contra Auerbach, that the soldiers are also presented as aggrieved, reasoned, and fully conscious political agents. The social distinction between soldiers and senators is not employed to suggest that only the senators possessed political significance and legitimacy.
In the second half, I consider RanciAaAaAeA?re's treatment of the episo by paying particular attention to his analysis of Tacitus's blurring of legitimate and illegitimate speakers. I argue that this blurring can also be read in Tacitus's writing of misrecognition. For RanciAaAaAeA?r democratic writing works from an assumption of equality whereby all individuals, irrespective of social standing, are fully equal in their capacity to recognize the meaning of their actions. This assumption is presumed by RanciAaAaAeA?re to be decisively modern, since authors writi before the "Modern Age" (that is, before the nineteenth century) attributed the capacity to know to the ruling classes alone, and not to those "destined to be ruled." (6) Yet in my view, Tacitus problematizes such a reading since his writing of history shows that senators and emperors are as susceptible to misrecognize as soldiers and barbarians. This embeds within Tacitus's narrative a different kind of democratic potential: by equalizing ignorance across social groups and therefore presupposing a democratic incapacity to recognize the meaning of actions, Tacitus undermines the pedagogical power of the elite, a power that ordinarily privileges the intellect of the Roman aristocratic male above that of Rome's socially marginalized.
Auerbach's Mimesis, though published over sixty years ago, remains a work of seminal importance in the field of modern literary criticism. The philosophy of Jacques RanciAaAaAeA?re has also received increasing critic attention over the past two decades, generating debate in a diverse range of disciplines such as social history, pedagogical theory, and political philosophy. Yet Auerbach's and RanciAaAaAeA?re's readings of Tacitu which play crucial roles in their respective works, deserve re-assessment. Tacitean historiography is not as straightforwardly ethical and conservative as Auerbach deemed and nor does it necessarily deny the legitimacy of the 'Other,' as RanciAaAaAeA?re presumes. This raises implications concerni the two scholars' understanding of the 'antique,' the distinction between ancient and modern literature, and their historicist conceptions of politics and aesthetics.
Tacitus is a paradigmatic example of an 'elite' individual, living in a society that illustrates the 'normalizing' and 'distributing' activities of a police regime. Nevertheless, his narrative does not always reveal nor support a poetics that reflect elitist ethics. Rather, his writing of the past, as well as the roles played by the marginal in that past, displays an ambiguity of representation and supplies a multiplicity of voices that mirror the complexity of social experience under empire. (7) While this ambiguity cannot be extended to argue that Tacitus's political thought is liberal or organized according to a principle of equality, it does suggest an inclusive dimension to his thought that, as I shall argue, renders democratic representation latent within his histories.
In section one I start by analyzing Percennius's speech before turning directly to the commentaries of Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re, which will fo the basis of the discussions in sections two and three. In the final section, I return to the Tacitean passage in order to locate the democratic features of his political thought.
I. Writing Insurgency
Two mutinies occurred in 14 CE. Once the news of Augustus's death was communicated and an official period of mourning declared, the soldiers on the Danube and Rhine rebelled against their commanders for the purpose of service reform. The mutinies are given due attention by Tacitus: after the account of Tiberius's accession, Tacitus immediately moves on to a description of events in Pannonia (1.16-30) and next to a longer description of events in Germany (1.31-49).
Tacitus's initial description of the outbreak in Pannonia, which involved three legions under command of Q. Iunius Blaesus, tells that there existed no new causes of the soldiers' discordant behavior except that the change of emperor created the opportunity to riot and collect the profits of war (1.16.1). After Tacitus relates Blaesus's declaration of the iustitium and the suspension of normal duties, he introduces Percennius. Formerly the leader of a theatrical claque, Percennius had "bold speech" (procax lingua), an "actorish enthusiasm" (histrionale stadium), and was practiced in stirring up crowds (1.16.3). His speech to the troops is reported by Tacitus as follows (1.16.3-1.17.6):
postremo promptis iam et aliis seditionis ministris velut contionabundus interrogabat, cur paucis centurionibus, paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent. quando ausuros exposcere remedia, nisi novum et nutantem adhuc principem precibus vel armis adirent? satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut quadragena stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne dimissis quidem finem esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentes alio vocabulo eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita superaverit, trahi adhuc diversas in terras, ubi per nomen agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium accipiant. enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera, duram hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox aut sterilem pacem sempiterna. nec aliud levamentum, quam si certis sub legibus militia iniretur: ut singulos denarios mererent, sextus decumus stipendii annus finem adferret, ne ultra sub vexillis tenerentur, sed isdem in castris praemium pecunia solveretur. an praetorias cohortes, quae binos denarios acceperint, quae post sedecim annos penatibus suis reddantur, plus periculorum suscipere? (8) With others ready to serve the rebellion his questions took on the form of a public meeting--why like slaves were they obedient to a few centurions and fewer tribunes? When would they ever be bold enough to ask for remedies, if they were not even going with arms or pleas to a new and still apprehensive princeps? Enough wrong had been done through the cowardice of so many years. Old men with bodies crippled by wounds were enduring thirty to forty years of service. Even dismissal did not see the end of their soldiering, but, pitched by a legion's standard, they suffered the same hardships under another title. And any soldiers who may have survived so many risks would still be dragged off to remote and other regions only to be given soaked swamps or neglected mountain. Indeed, military service itself was oppressive and unprofitable; soul and body to be valued at ten asses a day; out of this, clothing, arms, tents, as well as the savagery of centurions and exemptions from duty have to be purchased. But indeed of floggings and wounds, hard winters, wearisome summers, terrible war, or barren peace, there was no end. Relief could only come if military life was entered on under fixed conditions: they should earn each the pay of a denarius a day and the sixteenth year terminating their service. They should be retained no longer under a standard, but in the same camp a reward in cash must be paid to them. Did the praetorian cohorts, who received two denarii each per day, and who after sixteen years are returned to their homes, really take on more dangers?
Tacitus's remark about Percennius's theatrical past and "actorish" zeal signal unreality and unreliability that would, one imagines, suggest to the elite reader the disreputable nature of what will follow. The other markers of the speech, however, question any immediate condemnatory response. For example, Tacitus describes Percennius's style of speaking with the adjective contionabundus, compounded from the term used for an official public speech or meeting (contio). Though the parallel is drawn contemptuously (velut contionabundus), the mutiny is set within a political discursive frame: Percennius attempts to constitute himself as a political speaker and the speech itself is equally well-composed and persuasive. (9) It is also notable that Percennius's views are represented indirectly, via oratio obliqua, which blurs Tacitus's and Percennius's voices. While Tacitus does insert a critical, top-down view, the inclusion of speech enables Tacitus to implicate the reader in the perspective of the rebellious soldiers through a presentation that has a reliable factual content (as the narrative account confirms) and a reasonable (just) argumentation. This rationality becomes more obvious when we compare the Tacitean version with Velleius's parallel condemnatory account, which emphasizes the extremity, madness, and revolutionary ardor of the soldiers (2.125.1-3):
quippe exercitus, qui in Germania militabat praesentisque Germanici imperio regebatur, simulque legiones, quae in Illyrico erant, rabie quadam et profunda confudendi omnia cupiditate novum ducem, novum statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam; quin etiam ausi sunt minari daturos se senatui, daturos principi leges; modum stipendii, finem militiae sibi ipsi constituere conati sunt, processum etiam in arma ferrumque strictum est et paene in ultima gladiorum erupit impunitas, defuitque, qui contra rem publicam duceret, non qui sequerentur. The army that was on campaign in Germany under the command of Germanicus, who was present there, and along with it the legions in Illyricum fell prey to some kind of madness and a profound desire to create general chaos. They were demanding a new commander, a new order of things, a new state. They even had the audacity to threaten to lay down the law to the senate and to the emperor as well, and they tried to establish their own level of pay and length of service. They went as far as taking up arms and sword and their impunity almost erupted into every extreme of murder. What was missing was someone to lead the men against the state, not those who would follow him.
Velleius describes both the mutiny in Pannonia and in Germany in the same chapter. There is an emphasis on the soldiers' madness and chaos. His outline of their motives includes a desire for a new leader, government, and state, as well as new terms of pay and service. There is stress on the extremity of the soldiers' acts: they went as far as taking up arms and they were bold enough to threaten the senate and emperor--the same acts that Tacitus's Percennius had incited them to commit. But Velleius's description of the events is critical in tone because it is expressed purely from his perspective. Velleius makes no reference to the soldiers' hardships, and as a result the insurgency emerges as unjustified. Velleius not only excludes the reasons for the soldiers' sedition, (10) but refers to madness (rabies) and confusion (confusio). This suggests no thoughtful incentive behind the soldiers' acts but rather violence for the sake of violence, again erasing any sense of aggrievement and reason. (11)
The soldiers' reasonableness is a central issue in the commentaries of Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re. As we turn our attention to their reading I should begin with a few prefatory remarks regarding the wider aims of their works. In Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Auerbach argues that literature written from antiquity through to the twentieth century progressively reveals more naturalistic forms of representation. Auerbach uses mimesis as a term to describe a practice of representation that imitates something "realistically." Writing within a Marxist tradition, Auerbach offers a realism that is an artistic form taking the life of the common people with absolute seriousness and furthermore one that accounts for the social forces that underlie historical movement. It is, then, "seriousness" (as a mode of representation) and "everydayness" (as the subject of representation) which constitute the two primary features of what Auerbach terms realism. (12)
The Percennius passage was a key and difficult case study in Auerbach's work since the passage appeared to be an obvious moment in which historiography precisely captured that everydayness and enabled a realistic imaginative reconstruction of the lives of the lower classes. Yet, for Auerbach, Tacitus's writing of the passage rendered that moment unreal due to an "excess of rhetorical devices" that present Percennius and his fellow insurgent Vibulenus as "mere scoundrels and swindlers" (Auerbach 2003, 39). (13) Auerbach extends this to argue that ancient historiography serves to perpetuate elite ideologies, thereby preventing any true or serious representation of the thoughts, actions, and tragedies of the common person:
If the literature of antiquity was unable to represent everyday life seriously, that is, in full appreciation of its problems and with an eye for its historical background; if it could represent it only in the low style, comically or at best idyllically, statically and ahistorically, the implication is that these things mark the limits not only of the realism of antiquity but of its historical consciousness as well. (2003, 39)
Since elite writers could not imagine the lives of the lower classes realistically, they could not critique the social bases of their society, a democratic function of literature that would in Auerbach's analysis appear to be decisively modern. Accordingly, those less worthy were relegated to satire and comedy, represented through a "low" or "comic" style, as appropriate to their social status. In his commentary on Tacitus's writing of the Pannonian mutiny, Auerbach is disposed to conclude that Percennius is not represented realistically or through recognition of the everyday struggle of his position, but through tropes and rhetoric that render Percennius silent, or rather force him to speak Tacitean.
RanciAaAaAeA?re owes much to Auerbach's understanding, yet his reading focus not on the "effect of exclusion," as stressed by Auerbach, but rather on the "power of inclusion" (1994, 28) since, though Percennius is not among those whose speech counts, Tacitus makes him speak and in the same mode as his counterparts--the centurions, Germanicus, and Tacitus himself. RanciAaAaAeA?re (1994, 29) argues that the Tacitean narrati attests the inclusivity of literature, which "is always susceptible of allowing entry into its community of those excluded when its circle is drawn."
RanciAaAaAeA?re's wider aim in The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowled is to trace the ways in which historians employ literary techniques to construct knowledge that appears truthful. For RanciAaAaAeA?re it is on through literary means that history (facts, statistics, material), as well as the methods of historical analysis (measuring, classifying, objectifying), are rendered as a discourse of truth (1994, 51). RanciAaAaAeA? argues that the speech given to Percennius constitutes part of the "literary pre-history" of modern social-scientific historiography, since Tacitus not only gives Percennius an historical identity but provides a "model of subversive eloquence" for later orators, soldiers, historians, and students to imitate (1994, 29).
Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re take opposing positions in relation to the natu of the relationship between rhetoric and truth. As a result, their readings of Tacitus constitute the two extreme poles on the spectrum of democratic representation. For Auerbach, Tacitus's narrative is exclusive because it is elitist, conservative, and normative. RanciAaAaAeA? views the narrative as inclusive because by allowing a member of the poor access to the words of the elite through the indirect style, Tacitus breaks the hierarchical distinction between the Roman elite male and the common soldier. (14)
In the following two sections, I analyze both commentaries in further detail, starting with Auerbach. I follow RanciAaAaAeA?re in arguing for t inclusivity of Tacitus's narrative, but while the narrative of the mutinies attests the violence and immoderation of the soldiers, these acts are juxtaposed in Tacitus with other voices (not just Tacitus's), which struggle for a place to speak but find that space and speak with reason. The result is not mimesis but polyphony, a "multi-voicedness," which counters the Romano-centric discourse that Auerbach criticizes and RanciAaAaAeA?re presupposes. (15) The issue in reading Tacitus is n so much to find the voice that speaks truth, but to hear the various voices that speak various truths.
II. Auerbach on the Limitations of Speaking Tacitean
I now turn to Auerbach's commentary on the Tacitean passage. Key to Auerbach's reading of Percennius's speech is Tacitus's introduction in which he tells us that there existed "no new motives" for the soldiers' discordant behavior (1.16.1). Auerbach (2003, 37) argues that Tacitus invalidates Percennius's speech "in purely ethical terms" before it is actually made since the phrase nullis novis causis strips the rebellion of any real cause and a priori such condemnation reflects Tacitus's lack of understanding and interest in the soldiers' plight.
From this initial observation, Auerbach offers a more general critique of ancient historiography which "does not see forces" but merely "vices and virtues, successes and mistakes" and fails to escape a fixed system of categorization. (16) The result is that ancient historiography offers a static and ahistorical understanding of a society whose values are "of an absolute validity in themselves" rather than historically determined (2003, 39). The Tacitean narrative, however, is not so simple or "absolute."
Tacitus's introductory phrase (nullis novis causis) influences our reading of the subsequent narrative, but it does not nullify Percennius's long list of grievances nor does it erase, as Auerbach claims, any sense of grief or tragedy behind the soldiers' revolt. In fact, one could read the events of the mutinies in general as a universal tragedy, concomitant upon the continuation of the imperial regime, thus associating the elite perspective and the soldiers' perspective. Moreover, in this precise instance, the speech may be viewed as generating ambivalence with regard to the authorial, elite intervention with which the mutiny is introduced. The absence of new causes points to 'old' causes, embedded in the Augustan regime and its repressive frameworks from which the soldiers were seeking liberty. (17) Such liberty would enable the soldiers to profit and would introduce disorder and indiscipline. These would appear to be a 'cost' of a democratic revival. Making that cost obvious problematizes an episode in which, lest we forget, the Tiberian regime (despised on most readings of the Annales) is seemingly threatened by military mutiny. Further, the 'old' causes that Percennius relates can be read as providing commentary on the prefatory remarks: despite the status of the speaker, the grievances concerning a corrupt and brutal regime are justified. (18) Commentary and passage do not deny each other, but establish ambivalence, one that perhaps is also reflected in the blurred voice (Tacitus/Percennius) in which the demands are made.
Such ambivalence sits uncomfortably with the absolute (timeless) moral-political conceptions that Auerbach identifies as characteristic of ancient historiography. Such normative conceptions are certainly a feature of ancient thought. (19) Nevertheless, Tacitus appears to test the validity of absolute concepts. In the mutiny episode, Percennius describes the discipline of military life as oppressive (gravis) and unprofitable (infructuosa), whereas in Roman social and political thought discipline (disciplina) and associated concepts such as moderation (moderatio) are fundamental to moral propriety and also integral to the stability of the state. (20) The characterization of Germanicus, who is initially presented as the embodiment of "absolute" virtue (Ann. 1.33), also calls into question timeless moral concepts like pietas. When Germanicus is first confronted by the seditious soldiers in Germany, he attempts to restore order through a moralizing speech that evokes the qualities that prevent disorder in the camp (fides, modestia), and the dignity of old-fashioned discAaAaAeA plina (1.34-35). Germanicus's speech represents the tradition (ethical) Roman voice and Germanicus himself is presented, initially, in an exemplary light. Yet such words ultimately fail to calm the troops, and in the end Germanicus has no choice but to resort to deception, forging a letter in Tiberius's name that promises demobilization after twenty years, immediate discharge to soldiers who have served sixteen years, and double payment of requested legacies (1.36.3). Although Tacitus employs ethical/normative models in giving characters moral words, such ethics are not stable and by so doing Tacitus draws our attention to the frailty of virtue. (21)
Despite such ambivalence, Auerbach concludes that Tacitus's writing of Percennius's speech is purely aesthetic. By this he means that although Tacitus's speeches capture the character and situation of the person who was supposed to have delivered them, they remain primarily rhetoric: "Percennius does not speak his own language; he speaks Tacitean" (2003, 39). Auerbach's critique of Tacitus's narrative in terms of its mimetic limit recognizes that written representations of the 'everyday' where they have survived, are naturally created from an elite consciousness and thus inevitably embedded in a certain degree of falsity, that is, in represented form. This reveals an obvious problem of Tacitean historiography (Tacitus is not Percennius and subsequently cannot present Percennius realistically) and historiography/ethnography in general (can the plebeian or 'Other' speak?). Yet Tacitus does offer a narrative that escapes his own class-located discourse, and the Percennius passage (though an invention), along with other narrations of enemy speech (also inventions), are specific examples of moments in Tacitean historiography which oppose a specifically Roman or imperial ideology. Though Percennius is inevitably speaking Tacitean, the way he speaks and what he says is not necessarily 'elitist.' Such representations, though fictitious, nonetheless adhere to the spirit of the truth, especially because both senators and soldiers shared the experience of subjection under the empire.
III. RanciAaAaAeA?re and the Poetic Detours of Histo
In order to locate the democratic aspects of Tacitus's writing, let us now examine closely RanciAaAaAeA?re's analysis in The Names of Histor On the Poetics of Knowledge. RanciAaAaAeA?re undertakes to trace the poet structures that have governed the writing of the past from antiquity to the present. Taking short excerpts from historians such as Tacitus, Fernand Braudel, E. P. Thompson, and Jules Michelet, RanciAaAaAeA?re unpac the way in which the study of history has been constructed as a discipline. The book is, as Hayden White summarizes in the preface, a collection of reflections on historical discourse, on the ways in which we speak about the past, and on "the ways in which it speaks, fails to speak, or is prohibited from speaking to us" (1994, vii).
As discussed above, Auerbach's reading of Tacitus underlines the ways in which ancient rhetoric prohibits the past from speaking. The common person, in Auerbach's framework of mimetic realism, is entangled in a paradox: they are silenced either because they are not represented at all or because when they are represented it is through the rhetorical and elitist voice of the historian. The Other is thus doubly doomed--they are either excluded or included only in 'mute' form. RanciAaAaAeA?re offe a way out of this paradox by reading rhetoric not as antithetical to realism but rather as a literary practice that makes history possible as a discourse of truth.
RanciAaAaAeA?re's analysis of Percennius's speech forms part of the seco chapter of The Names of Histoty. RanciAaAaAeA?re begins, consciously followi Auerbach, by noting that the revolt is explained twice--"in its absence of reason and in the reasons that it gives itself"--but only Tacitus's words have "explanatory value":
[It is] not that Percennius's reasons are declared false; the historian doesn't comment on them, doesn't refute them. They are not said to be either true or false. They have, more fundamentally, no relation to the truth. Their illegitimacy is not due to their content but to the simple fact that Percennius is not in the position of legitimate speaker. A man of his rank has no business thinking and expressing his thought. And his speech is ordinarily reproduced only in the "base" genres of satire and comedy. (1994, 26)
RanciAaAaAeA?re, like Auerbach, presupposes that Tacitus would not consid the words and thoughts of a rebellious soldier such as Percennius as legitimate or meaningful: "The speech of the man of the common people is by definition without depth" (1994, 26). But RanciAaAaAeA?re then exten his analysis, somewhat subverting Auerbach's argument, by pointing to the significance of Tacitus lending Percennius a tongue. This poetic practice enables Tacitus, as the narrator, to create a relationship with Percennius whereby his inherent illegitimacy as both a speaker within the text and as a member of society not normally considered legitimate, intelligent, or serious is validated even as it appears suspicious.
RanciAaAaAeA?re (1994, 28) supports this claim with reference to Tacitus use of indirect discourse (the narrator's 'they' replacing the speaker's 'you') to present Percennius's speech, which is "the specific modality according to which [Tacitus] effects the equilibrium of narrative and discourse," (22) that is, the relationship between the story being narrated and the manner in which that story is explained by the historian:
Percennius speaks without speaking, in the infinitive mode, which is the zero-degree of the verb, expressing the value of information, without deciding on the value of this information, without situating it on the scale of the present and the past, of the objective and the subjective. The indirect style, in practice disjoining meaning and truth, in effect cancels the opposition between legitimate and illegitimate speakers. The latter are just as much validated as suspected. (1994, 28)
RanciAaAaAeA?re's discussion here moves beyond the categories of ancient poeti that concern Auerbach. RanciAaAaAeA?re deals with, not mimesis (the way which Tacitus represents or 'repeats' Percennius, which RanciAaAaAeA?re not from the start is invention not documentation), but lexis: "The way in which the poet as subject relates to the subject of the poem, identifies with it, differentiates himself from it or hides himself behind it" (2004b, 11). In this perspective, RanciAaAaAeA?re offers a framework th is especially useful for the analysis of ancient historiography. He sees the disciplines of history and literature as closely related, but does not reduce history to literature, nor does he try to assert the literary or fictitious nature of history. Rather, RanciAaAaAeA?re attemp to foreground a codependency, namely, that history (as a discourse of truth) is dependent on a particular use of literary devices, in this case indirect discourse.
The significance of indirect discourse, as RanciAaAaAeA?re conceives of i is that it establishes a level of equality between Tacitus's and Percennius's voices: "The homogeneity of the narrative-discourse" constituted by the indirect style comes to "contradict the heterogeneity of the subjects it represents" (1994, 28). (23) To underline the heterogeneity of the subjects, Tacitus would require the use of distinctions, such as those of mood, tense, and person, which would serve to differentiate between past and present, the objective and the subjective, the legitimate and the illegitimate speaker. Alternatively, Tacitus could directly cite Percennius, making the latter's voice more prominent than his own but in so doing increase the suspicious nature of those words. But the indirect, specifically the infinitive mode of expression that counters the "narrative prestige" (24) of the preterit, prevents any such distinctions, rendering indistinct the voice of the one who authorizes social divisions and the voice of the one made subject to those divisions.
What matters to RanciAaAaAeA?re, then, is the manner in which history is tol that is, how a narrative of events is framed by the discourse that comments on and explains it, and, furthermore, how that discourse privileges, among other things, the intellectual capacity of certain individuals over others. For RanciAaAaAeA?re, the historian's discourse is intricate tied to politics and aesthetics, which are governed by the "distribution of the sensible," which is a set of a priori laws that define what is possible to see, hear, say, think, and more importantly who counts as reasoned. (25) These various distributions in the social realm result in an emergence of a category of people who count as legitimate (those who have a part) and another, excluded, and illegitimate category ("the part that has no part"), which guarantees the status of the legitimate category by their exclusion (RanciAaAaAeA?re 1999, 1-14). The sans-part not a legitimate, political subject until the democratic political moment, the moment when their voice is included and becomes perceptible on the same level as those who have a part.
The distinction between those who count and those who do not forms the theoretical basis of RanciAaAaAeA?re's reading of the Percennius passag history and historiography work to make some words legitimate and others illegitimate. When RanciAaAaAeA?re refers to an "effect of exclusion" he not referring to a physical exclusion or abandonment, but to an exclusion from the (aesthetic) sensory order since Percennius's discontent cannot be perceived as meaningful. Rather, as a member of "the poor" Percennius has "an essential relation to nontruth" (1994, 28) and his voice is and can only be heard as unreasoned, un-meaningful "noise." (26)
RanciAaAaAeA?re also seems to be suggesting, on the other hand, that Tacit shifts this sensory configuration through the use of the indirect style, which serves to erase the boundary between the narrator and character. This would create a democratic possibility for all to speak, in their own terms, as opposed to one whose terms and context are defined for or dictated to them. Direct speech, in opposition, could amount to "noise" since it would make obvious the distinction between the historian's discourse and the person that discourse describes, creating a distinct disassociation between author and character, the legitimate and the illegitimate, emphasizing the suspicious nature of the Other's speech as opposed to regulating its validity.
RanciAaAaAeA?re extends the conflation of legitimate and illegitimate speake to argue for the inclusivity of Tacitus's language:
Although Percennius may well be the radical other, the one excluded from legitimate speech, his discourse is included, in a specific suspension of the relations between meaning and truth... What nonetheless remains is the gathering power of language and of the play that it authorises, the power of a discourse that is always susceptible of allowing entry into its community of those excluded when its circle is drawn. (1994, 28-29)
RanciAaAaAeA?re's particular interpretation of the indirect style as wh suspends the relations between meaning and truth helps to elucidate further the ambivalence of Tacitus's/Percennius's speech. By making Percennius perceptible in a way that is not personal to Tacitus, nor emblematic of a Roman point of view, this in turn offers a more inclusive and democratic narrative.
We may, nonetheless, want to modify some of RanciAaAaAeA?re's conclusion First, the extent to which the use of oratio obliqua can be used to infer a blurring of legitimate and illegitimate speech is a matter of debate. It is possible, as Ronald Martin (1981, 233) has noted, that Tacitus reserved reported speech for "characters of lesser importance--to avoid giving them more prominence than they deserve." (27) From this perspective, indirect speech is merely another way of presenting "noise" and emphasizing "illegitimacy." (28) Second, by focusing on Tacitus's use of the indirect, RanciAaAaAeA?re's argument implies that in passages whe Tacitus employs direct speech, thereby stressing certain distinctions of tense and person, the suspicious nature of the speech increases. Calgacus's speech (Agr. 30-32), for example, is more suspect than Percennius's since the former, presented in direct form, reinforces the distinction between historian and subject, discourse and narrative, rather than neutralize it.
It is difficult to reconcile the logic (if any) that underpins Tacitus's varying use of indirect speech and, given the extent to which Tacitus employs this particular mode of speechifying (indirect speech takes up almost twice as much space as does direct speech), it seems unlikely that such choices relate to imbuing certain characters with more or less prominence than others, or that Tacitus used direct speech for creating effects of presence and indirect speech for curbing such effects. We may suppose, instead, that where Tacitus employs indirect discourse, the effect is neutrality and ambivalence (as RanciAaAaAeA?re argues) but al interference with the speaker's words and, by extension, a level of control over the wider meaning of the episode. If so, the indirect is not a mode of democratic representation but, on the contrary, its very opposite.
IV. Inventing the Rebel: Tacitus on the Part That Has No Part
Auerbach, with his focus on mimesis, and RanciAaAaAeA?re, with his focus the stylistic, read Tacitus in a way to render the meaning of the text dependent on issues of realism and form. Both commentators, however, fail to address the specificity of Tacitus's writing of sedition in terms of its democratic effects. In what follows, I argue that Tacitus's language not only includes and attributes agency, as RanciAaAaAeA?re assert but also imbues the soldiers with reason.
As explained above, a revolt stemming from a real sense of grievance felt by the sans-part produces RanciAaAaAeA?re's democracy. Yet the polici agent (in this case the historian) enacts a form of hermeneutic oppression to turn that reason--the logical words and thought of the poor--into madness, silence, and forms of 'nonthought.' (29) The revolutionary moments are trivialized through the deployment of language associated with greed (avaritia) and madness (furor) in narrations of insurgency. (30) As a result, a narrative conforming to the representational trope of protest as 'a sign of disease' (as opposed to reason) emerges, subverting possible acts of democracy into senseless crime.
Tacitus, however, presents a nuanced picture. To be sure, furor assumes a prominent role in the mutinies, particularly the German mutiny. (31) As A. J. Woodman (2006, 329) has argued, Tacitus's descriptions of the mutinies are presented through a sustained metaphor of madness: "[T]he very legions upon whom the imperial security depended... are shown to be vulnerable to collective madness." At the same time, though, Percennius's speech makes visible injustices imposed onto the soldiers (their low pay, terrible living conditions, and physical abuse), which provide justifications for the revolt. Further, the "madness" that Woodman's reading discloses is counteracted with Tacitus's references to the soldiers' aequalitas (32) (levelness, equality) and constantia (agreement, constancy: 1.32.3). In the same chapter (1.32), Tacitus also tells us that the soldiers acted as though they were under command (regi), which suggests that the mutiny, though chaotic and violent, was also organized and measured (and recognizable as such by the elite).
Tacitus does not construct a form of Roman furor that trivializes seditious voices. Although the soldiers are violent, Tacitus does not suggest that their actions were "thoughtless." (33) Furthermore, the furor of the mutinies is not linked with a lack of political consciousness. Contrary to RanciAaAaAeA?re's commentary, the soldiers are deemed by Tacit significant and certainly capable of understanding the meaning of their actions. For example, Tacitus imbues the soldiers in Germany with a political purpose: the soldiers' hope was that Germanicus, unable to tolerate Tiberius as emperor, would surrender himself to the legions (1.31.1). The situation is not just a matter of insurgency, but a threat of usurpation. Tacitus does not, therefore, describe the soldiers as "blind" or "unthinking," and the military as a collective entity is not deemed "the part that has no part." Instead, Tacitus emphasizes what appears to be the proper and accurate awareness of the soldiers--that they held the fate of Rome in their hands (1.31.5). Although the soldiers remained inferior in the normal distribution of role and place in Roman society, the political power underpinning that organization ultimately belonged to them.
From this perspective, the nature of the relationship between rhetoric and truth, specifically the ways in which Tacitus's use of rhetorical devices enables the past to speak, seems complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, the invented lower-class speech is fictitious, an aesthetic/rhetorical representation of the experience of the marginalized which is produced from the confines of an elite imagination. On the other, the dialogue created by the invented speech between various voices of different status and opinion embeds a polyphonic aspect within the narrative. This serves to counter the homogeneity (and thus falsity or 'nontruth') that Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re associate with representations of the margin in ancient historiography.
The polyphonic narration foregrounds the democratic effects of Tacitean rhetoric since the many voices of the soldiers, juxtaposed with those of Germanicus and the other commanders, undermine the ordering activities of a police regime, which strive to define one value system for all. The values to which the soldiers adhere, however, appear to diverge from those of the centurions. For example, while we can trace the voice of the senator and the centurion in the valorization of disciplina and obsequium, the voice of the soldier represents the same qualities as violent and oppressive. The power to define the wrong or the right meaning of words does not appear to belong exclusively to the elite speaker, nor is the non-elite speaker relegated to the realm of illegitimacy. (34)
Tacitus's own structuring of the chapters also prevents any consistent or 'static' explanation from emerging: the furor that introduces the German revolt is countered with references to the soldiers' order and their political (thoughtful) motivations. Similarly, in his explanation of the cause of the Pannonian mutiny, Tacitus's references to praemia, luxus, and otium (terms that imply greed) are undermined by the subsequent speech, which by contrast is an emphatic demonstration of grievance. In this way, Tacitus invites and, more importantly, enables the reader to understand diversely. (33) In RanciAaAaAeA?re's framework, such a meth of narrating history would certainly exemplify "democratic" representation.
For RanciAaAaAeA?re and Auerbach, the truth and reality of history depen on the manner in which it is told. As I have argued, Tacitus's narration of the mutinies, particularly the speech given to Percennius, makes obvious the power and ability to voice complaints of certain persons normally not allowed to speak. In such a context, rhetoric and mimesis/realism cannot necessarily be read in opposition to one another. Rather, Tacitus's deployment of rhetorical devices--the mixing of voices and the testing of absolute moral concepts, which work against the well-ordered discourse of elite-didactic historiography--invites us to consider the democratic nature of his rhetoric. If democratic writing shifts a body from the place and voice normally assigned to it and makes legitimate those normally considered illegitimate, then Tacitean rhetoric is certainly employed to this effect. Tacitus foregrounds the conflict over the real meaning of words and in doing so points to the possibility of different realities for those of different status. The ambiguity and polyphony thereby produced undermine the elitism or "nontruth" that Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re associate with his writing of histor
Conclusion: Misrecognition and the Equivalence of Ignorance
I have argued that democracy can be traced in Tacitus's representations of the soldiers as aggrieved, reasoned, and conscious political agents. Yet this may be an aspect of Tacitus's polyphonic rhetorical-historiographical practice and not necessarily a feature of his political thought--that is, a literary device, not a political stance. A question thus remains as to how and whether we can substantiate Tacitean polyphony, as well as his inclusive writing of the marginal, beyond the matter of style.
The poetics of knowledge RanciAaAaAeA?re puts in place aims to locate momen when historians and philosophers erect boundaries between their understanding and the misunderstanding that they attribute to others. RanciAaAaAeA?re trac the attribution of such boundaries throughout his work, starting with Plato and then moving onto leftist critics such as Marx, Sartre, Althusser, Bourdieu, and Badiou. (36) For RanciAaAaAeA?re, these authors underestima the capacity of those they speak for to understand for themselves. In the attribution of ignorance, each emerges as a thinker of inequality and pedagogical privilege, assuming that the marginal need someone to think and speak for them. The "traditional way of embodying inequality" that from Plato onwards allocated different "sensory equipment" to those of differing social status is for RanciAaAaAeA?re deeply entrench in Western political philosophy (RanciAaAaAeA?re 2006
In Tacitus the significance of the sensory can be traced in his writing of misrecognition; however, Tacitus's analysis of misrecognition is not in accord with "the traditional distribution," according to social status. What seems to me a defining feature of Tacitean historiography and one that may help to locate the underlying democratic aspect of his political thought, is the notion that everyone has the capacity to not know, regardless of social status. As Tacitus writes history, even those destined to rule can suffer defects in the eyes, ears, and intellect. A failing capacity to discern afflicts both the poor and the elite. (37)
Tacitus does at times adhere to the traditional distribution; for example, the Britons misrecognize their enslavement (Agr. 21), which is obvious to those who know the truth (such as Agricola and Tacitus himself). Yet in the Annales the 'knowing' elite are aware of their own servitude and furthermore 'rush' into it (at Romae mere in servitium consules, patres, eques, Ann. 1.7). The most obvious discussion of political sensibilities comes during the digression at Annales 4.33 in which Tacitus tells us that under the principate few had the knowledge (prudentia) to discern the honorable from the worse (honesta ab detorioribus... discemunt) and the useful from the harmful (utilia ab noxiis discemunt), or alternatively, that few could wisely discern between use and harm, the honorable and the worse (4.33.2). We can read this statement in terms of a growing moral deficiency, that is, an individual inability to act according to Roman moral standards, but we are obliged to understand the problem as a deficiency in discernment that makes moral judgments impossible. Given the context of elite political decision-making, Tacitus refuses an association of discernment with normative elite behavior, but equalizes ignorance across social groups. The radical departure within this perspective can be seen by comparison with a traditional association of the patres of Rome with political wisdom. Further, whereas in the Agricola (1.2, 1.3) the senators were unable to act (unable to do good) and forced to maintain silence (unable to speak truth), in the Annales the elite are unable even to comprehend the good.
The above allows us to question RanciAaAaAeA?re's (and Auerbach's) historici positions. (38) Undeniably a social hierarchy determines a poetics of knowledge in Tacitus and elsewhere within Roman literature, and any dehierarchization of society can only be understood as belonging to a fictional realm, as both Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re argue. Yet, discussed above, in certain chapters Tacitean historiography reconfigures the normative alignment between social positions, capacities, and knowledge: in the mutiny chapters, Tacitus offers a representation of a lower-class revolt produced from reason as opposed to madness alone; at Ann. 4.33, misrecognition is equalized across social groups, generating a shared social experience of ignorance that cuts across conventional hierarchical distinctions.
We cannot conclude, therefore, that Tacitus was a thinker of pedagogical privilege, one who gave only the elite the power to know. While Tacitus certainly permits far more members of the elite to speak in his works than others, he equally does not give us a history in which the elite are presented as having a complete monopoly on knowledge. Tacitus's writing of history thus challenges the traditional distribution and to that extent his political thought can be seen as democratic. The democratic undercurrent to his political thought may be understood as that which gives rise to those moments of democratic historiography, such as the Percennius episode, which imports a legitimate and meaningful discourse to the soldiers.
Auerbach and RanciAaAaAeA?re, then, both exercise their own forms of 'policin to partition the ancient historical and literary records from the modern age. As a result each author fails to recognize the fundamental similarity between ancient and modern historiography. RanciAaAaAeA?re's wider aim to trace the literary pre-history of scientific history to discover the ways in which the modern discipline of history has escaped its literary nature and has asserted instead its "scientific dignity" (1994, 6). RanciAaAaAeA?re's notion of modern scientific history is distinctiv he does not necessarily label history 'scientific' because it is concerned with the factual but because scientific means are those through which knowledge is made plausible and dignified. But if modern history is a discipline that works not just as a process of collecting and measuring facts but as a discipline that is substantiated through 'dignity' and plausibility, then rhetoric and ancient historiography cannot wholly be read in opposition to this. The reason is that rhetoric, though closely comparable to fiction and storytelling to the modern eye, did not undermine the dignity or plausibility of an ancient historian's craft. Furthermore, the practice of rhetoric as an ars of persuasion was invested with "real, tangible social value" (Sinclair 1995, 190) since it could increase a writer's social importance. Such social importance or status must in turn be read as that which enabled one to assert or decide truth (even if that decided truth was inherently false). The use of rhetoric, in other words, did not prevent an author from asserting any claim to dignity, plausibility, or truth. Rather, rhetoric remains a fundamental part of the argumentation within the representation of ancient historians.
As much as RanciAaAaAeA?re appears to account for the conditions of possibili for truth (that is, what can count as true rather than what is objectively true or real), by aligning rhetoric strictly with fiction and the literary he fails to see the way in which the practice of the rhetorical tradition worked as part of the ancient regime of truth (the discourse of plausibility and dignity). For example, RanciAaAaAeA?re opposes the "rigors" of scien with the "charms" of literature (1994, 7), but ancient rhetorical practice cannot be wholly aligned with the latter (the charms and seductions of storytelling). Rhetorical training was a rigorous process and it was a dignified, plausible process. Therefore, while RanciAaAaAeA?re wor within the modern dichotomy of scientific history and literary history, even as he tries to diffuse it, the place of rhetoric in ancient historical narrative lies somewhere in between the literary and the scientific. As an artistic practice, rhetoric did not prevent the historian from asserting any claim to truth. It simply cannot be reduced to "charm" and "seduction." Only if we honor the differences between ancient and modern forms of history-writing can we, paradoxically, see that both ancient and modern historical discourses embed their claims to truth in the language of plausibility and dignity. If we conceive, as RanciAaAaAeA? does, of scientific history as a discourse of plausibility and dignity, then this pushes us to question whether history, through the practice of rhetoric, had already been 'scientized' in antiquity. (39)
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(1.) For a full description of RanciAaAaAeA?re's conception of democracy s RanciAaAaAeA?re 200
(2.) For RanciAaAaAeA?re 2003, 6, politics is "an aesthetic affair" becau it is not concerned with the exercise of or struggle for power but rather "the configuration of a specific world."
(3.) Throughout this paper I use the terms democracy and democratic in accordance with RanciAaAaAeA?re's formulation of the term
(4.) See also, e.g., O'Gorman 1993; Adler 201 1, 119-40; Gruen 201 1, 159-96; and Shumate 2012, 476-503.
(5.) On this relationship see, among others, Wiseman 1979, 27-40; Fornara 1983, 142-68; Woodman 1988; Moles 1993; Laird 1999, 116-52; Lendon 2009; Damon 2010; Alston 2010, 143-46; Whately 2015, 13-20; and, in the context of Tacitean historiography specifically, Haynes 2012, 282-9 and Levick 2012. See also McCloskey and Megill 1987 who argue that the deployment of rhetorical devices in history-writing (both ancient and modern) is part of "the art and science of argument" (222) and thus cannot be confined to falsehood. For an analysis of Auerbach's and RanciAaAaAeA?re's commentaries on the Tacitean passage see Parker 20 who covers much of the same ground as I do in section three below. See also Alston 2016.
(6.) RanciAaAaAeA?re 2006: "[The] traditional distribution adds that peop have different senses according to their position in society. Those who were destined to rule and those who were destined to be ruled didn't have the same sensory equipment, not the same eyes and ears, not the same intelligence."
(7.) On the ambiguous nature of Tacitean ethnography see, e.g., Whitmarsh 2006; Gruen 2011, 159-78; and Alston and Spentzou 2011, 206-24. On the ambiguous nature of Tacitus's political thought see Kapust 2012. On the plurality at the heart of Roman culture and discourses of unity see Moatti 2015, 271-319.
(8.) The edition of Tacitus's Annales used here is Borzsak 1992. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
(9.) Cf. Livy 3.47.3 where contionabundus is used to describe the manner in which the plebeian Verginius speaks to the people in an effort to save his daughter from the decemvir Appius Claudius. See also Livy 5.29.10 and 21.53.6 (for different applications). Tacitus uses the adjective only here.
(10.) Of the four extant accounts of the mutinies in 14 CE (Velleius Paterculus 2.125.1-2; Dio Cassius 57.4-6; Suetonius, Tib. 25; and Tacitus, Ann. 1.16.44-49), Tacitus is the only author who includes grievances (hardships, labores, wounds, bad weather).
(11.) This is not to say that Tacitus does not employ language associated with madness; indeed he does (on which see Woodman's  unrivalled analysis) but it is balanced with a sense of reason, orderliness, and grievance (discussed further below).
(12.) See further Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 9-15.
(13.) On classical historiography as primarily a rhetorical genre see Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.
(14.) It should be noted that when RanciAaAaAeA?re employs the term the po he is not referring to an economically disadvantaged group but to anyone who is not deemed as an equal (in terms of their sensory capacity and intellect, as well as their social status) in a given hierarchy. The term evokes Plato's description in the Republic of the three classes that make up the ideal city (workers, soldier-guardians, and philosopher-kings) and their according thinking/doing capacities, as well his discussion in Book 3 of Laws which outlines a number of qualifications for ruling. See further RanciAaAaAeA?re 200
(15.) Polyphony is of particular significance in the context of ancient historiography, given the importance of impartiality for presenting a 'true' account of the past. As Marincola (1997, 159-60) has crucially argued, ancient historians saw impartiality as a "fundamental component of historical truth" and opposed "true" not to "false" but to "biased." Polyphony by generating multiple perspectives (such as those of the historian, of his characters, and of the nameless agents of rumor) prevents a biased ("false") account of the past. This is especially the case in Tacitus's narration of the mutinies, since it is not always easy to ascertain whose words hold authoritative weight (cf. Feldherr's  reading of rumor in Tacitus's account of Drusus's death [Ann. 4.10-11] as a competing alternative historiography).
(16.) Cf. Williams 1968, 628-29: "It was because they saw the ultimate explanation of historical events in moral terms that ancient historians came to view the state, or a politically identifiable section of the state, as if it were an individual... Consequently, in ancient historiography there is little sense of the people as a political force or of popular movements and there is no conception of the importance of social mobility." On the importance of historical cause for ancient historiographers see Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 533 note 27 and references there cited.
(17.) Cf. Goodyear 1972, 198, who notes that the hardships of military service had been on the increase since 6 CE and Tacitus, Ami. 1.2.1 on Augustus's seductive measures of pacification after the civil wars (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit).
(18.) Compare Tacitus, Hist. 1.40-46, chapters that underline the violence of military sedition as well as the systemic nature of military and political corruption.
(19.) On which see Bettini 2011, 104-6 on the normative function of the mos maiorum.
(20.) On the role of moderatio in republican politics see Cicero, Leg. 3.5, 3.12, 3.40. See also Tacitus, Hist. 2.69 on the luxus of the soldiers as contra veterem disciplinam et instituta maiorum. On the pertinence of disciplina in a military context see esp. Phang 2008.
(21.) The crucial example is at Agr. 21.2; one would assume that humanitas, whether translated as "culture" or more widely "civilization," "humaneness," or "ethos," is a term of absolute validity (at least for a Roman); nonetheless it is compared to enslavement. See also Ann. 3.55.5, where Tacitus suggests that the institutions and customs of the past were not always better. As Ginsburg (1993, 87-8) notes, "Of particular interest to the historian seems to have been the question of whether the institutions and decisions handed down by the maiores possess a timeless value or whether there are circumstances that necessitate amending or changing them altogether." Cf. Marincola 2010, 287. Bettini (2011, 101-2), noting the distinction Tacitus places between the mos of obsequium and the fas of disciplina at Ann. 1.19.3, interprets fas as more absolute in terms of its validity and acceptability than mos. Yet, given Tacitus's use of fas elsewhere (e.g., Ann. 1.77) the question of whether Tacitus deemed fas or any other term signifying rightfulness as absolutely/eternally valid remains difficult to answer.
(22.) RanciAaAaAeA?re is using the terms narrative and discourse in a specif sense, following Emile Beneviste's framework, according to which narrative and discourse can be distinguished linguistically according to the uses of tense and person. Cf. RanciAaAaAeA?re 1994, 1
(23.) On the Latin use of the indirect, see Utard 2004. On direct and indirect discourse and its relationship to narrative authority/veracity, see Laird 1999, 131-52. For further bibliography on direct and indirect discourse see Foster 2012. See also Parker's (2009) discussion of RanciAaAaAeA?re use of the indirect in his own works.
(24.) For RanciAaAaAeA?re 1994, 48-49, by abandoning the use of the past tens the author is able to assert the timelessness of the event and its meaning. On the other hand, by employing the past tense, meaning is controlled by the author and his associated prestige/credibility.
(25.) In aesthetics, RanciAaAaAeA?re has analyzed three different partage (I) the ethical regime of images; (2) the representative regime of art; and (3) the aesthetic regime of art (on which see further RanciAaAaAeA? 1999, 57-60 and 2004a, 12-13). In politics, there are two partages: "politics" and "the police."
(26.) Cf. RanciAaAaAeA?re 2009, 24: "For all time, the refusal to consid certain categories of people as political beings has proceeded by means of a refusal to hear the words exiting their mouths as discourse."
(27.) Cf. Haynes's (2003, 15-19) discussion of the speeches made by Segestes and Arminius at Ann. 1.58-9: the latter's speech is reported bv Tacitus indirectly, "to highlight the fact that he is foreign, unlike the direct, and therefore Roman, perspective we receive from Segestes" (17).
(28.) Notably though, Tiberius's speeches (and letters) are often reported indirectly by Tacitus (see, e.g., Ann. 1.11.1, 3.69.2-3).
(29.) As an example, and in the context of workers' movements in contemporary France, RanciAaAaAeA?re (2006) claims that there exists "a trend in Fran to consider any kind of workers' protest as a sign of disease. Workers are seen as an outmoded part of the population who cannot grapple with modernity." Cf. Trouillot 1995 on the dismissal of the slave revolts of 1791-1804 in Haitian historiography and Guha's analysis of the representation of peasant revolts in the elite historiography of colonial India. For Guha (1994, 337), these writings erase the will and reason of the rebel through the use of metaphors that compare their actions to natural phenomena: "They break out like thunderstorms, heave like earthquakes, spread like wildfires, infect like epidemics."
(30.) On greed as a motivating factor in military mutiny, see, e.g., Livy 22.9, 22.42.7, 29.8; Sallust, Cat. 11.6-7. On imagery associated with madness and disease in Tacitus and Livy see Woodman 2006. For further references see Phang 2008, 46-48.
(31.) Furor as a kind of senseless and unreasoned rage is only mentioned once in the Pannonian mutiny (1.18.2). In his writing of the German mutiny furor and associated terms of madness appear more frequently (in rabiem prolapsus, 31.1; plurium vecordia, 32.1; repente lymphati, 32.1; etiam furentibus, 35.5; conscienta vecordes, 39.2; fatalem... rabiem, 39.6; inter furentes, 40.2; procul a furentibus, 42.1; piaculum furoris, 49.3). The contexts in which these terms are used, however, prevent any overall conclusion that the soldiers' frenzied acts are senseless and/or irrational. Also notable here are the distinctions between furor as insania, furor as immanitas, and furor as ira.
(32.) A term Tacitus associates with the political situation before the foundation of the principate (Ann. 1.4.1) and earlier (Ann.3.26.2).
(33.) Cf. Low 2011, 14.
(34.) Cf. Konstan's (1993, 11-30) discussion of the "strategies of ideological stabilization" in Cicero's Catilinarian orations.
(35.) Cf. Bartsch 2012 on doublespeak in Tacitus's Dialogus.
(36.) See further the summary in Davis 2010, 15-24.
(37.) For example, during the accession debates following the death of Augustus, Tiberius does not appear to recognize the importance of maintaining the system of one-man rule (as Sallustius Crispus emphasizes: Ann. 1.6.3). Similarly, he fails to recognize the significance of sovereign exceptionality for the maintenance of pax. Whereas Augustus absorbed the functions of the law (Ann. 1.2.1) for the purposes of security, Tiberius believes that the laws must be enforced (1.72.3-4). Corruption, in the form of legal exceptions and luxury, continue to be underlined by Tacitus as crucial to the stability of the state, yet not all are able to recognize this connection between corruption and peace and corruption and virtue (cf. the opposing views of Quintus Haterius, Octavius Fronto, and Asinius Gallus at Ann. 2.33 during the debate about the country's current luxury and Piso's speech against corrupta iudicia in the following chapter).
(38.) For RanciAaAaAeA?re, the breakdown of the poetic rules that fixed f each type of subject an appropriate mode of representation occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century, after which new poetic forms came into play and when new subjects, words, and phrases began to challenge the classical order of representation. See further RanciAaAaAeA? 2011.
(39.) My thanks to Richard Alston
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