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Revisiting humanitarian safe areas for civilian protection.

Are safe areas an effective option to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities when they are targeted by their own state? Safe areas disappeared from the international lexicon following the failures in Bosnia and Rwanda. But they are now receiving a second look as a way of responding to mass atrocities without full-scale military intervention. This article argues that the earlier generation of safe areas failed not due to their size or cost but rather because of problems inherent with their underlying logic. Safe areas were based either on logics of consent or the presence of a credible military force. Hybrid safe areas (such as in Bosnia) were based on neither of these, but instead relied on the legitimacy inherent in the UN Security Council. Crucially, in cases where civilians were being directly targeted by belligerents, both hybrid and consent-based safe areas collapsed. This has direct ramifications for present discussions around the Protection of Civilians agenda and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. KEYWORDS: safe areas, humanitarian protection, Responsibility to Protect, peacekeeping, internally displaced persons.

ARE SAFE AREAS EFFECTIVE IN PROTECTING CIVILIAN POPULATIONS FROM MASS atrocities? I use safe area as an encompassing term to refer to operations undertaken by international actors that have the primary purpose of providing direct protection to civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within a state's borders in a temporary and designated geographic area. (1) The principle underlying safe areas is that, in situations of widespread conflict and atrocities, safe areas allow threatened civilian populations to remain within their state while receiving physical protection and humanitarian assistance. This protection is achieved without full-scale military intervention in the conflict by international actors. Yet past safe areas have failed to reliably achieve these objectives.

Safe areas were a novel form of humanitarian space that emerged in the 1990s. While a number of such safe areas were created during that decade--albeit with wide variation in both form and authorization--the concept has since withered away, with one commentator noting that the UN Security Council has not designated any safe areas since 1999. (2) This is not surprising. The success of some of these areas was overshadowed by two factors. The first were fears that the use of safe areas compromised the right to seek asylum and supported a containment agenda. The second was problems in their implementation including, most notably, the fall of the Srebrenica safe area in Bosnia in 1995, which led to the genocidal massacre of 8,372 Bosnians.

Recently, however, the concept of safe areas has come back into vogue, particular among some advocates of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. In their view, safe areas are a way of responding quickly to mass atrocities and allowing would-be interveners to take action despite a lack of political will for larger-scale operations. As Gareth Evans notes, "in cases of potential or actual mass atrocity crimes, where speed of deployment is critical, the setting up of even limited safe havens can help to restore peace over a wider area and prevent genocide from taking place." (3) Sarah Sewell, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin argue that safe areas could provide both "rapid and direct protection for large numbers of vulnerable civilians" and would "require a relatively small force, concentrated in a few areas." (4) This echoes the earlier endorsement of the US-based Genocide Prevention Task Force report for operations designed to "defensively protect vulnerable civilians in fixed locations" without necessarily engaging in further offensive measures. (5)

In the recent cases of Libya and Syria, safe areas were proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, as a means of responding to refugee flows and of protecting civilians. In the case of Libya, in March 2011, the League of Arab States called on the Security Council to "take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone ... and to establish safe areas." (6) While this proposal was not acted on, the resolution is seen as a key factor in the Security Council's subsequent decision to create the Libyan no-fly zone. (7) In the case of Syria, the Turkish government, which has received some 520,000 refugees, has repeatedly suggested it would support a safe zone or buffer zone in Syria, (8) potentially acting alone if the Security Council continued "to be paralysed." (9) While the US government has been cautious of such statements, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton suggested in July 2012 that insurgent territorial gains could lead to a "safe haven inside Syria, which will then provide a base for further actions by the opposition." (10)

Particularly after the Libyan intervention, the narrower policy option of creating a safe area has been seen as a way of addressing concerns raised by Russia and China around the issue of regime change. (11) Consequently, it is likely a case of when, rather than if, the international community will authorize another safe area.

While safe areas may represent a lower-cost form of action, and be more palatable to the international community than full military intervention, I argue that they are no panacea. Apart from the failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda, four of the five other safe areas established in the 1990s had difficulties providing safety to the civilian populations inside them. I argue that this was due to three problems in the execution of the safe areas concept in that period. The first was that the safe areas had a mix of incompatible objectives: supporting civilian protection and humanitarian assistance while, at the same time, seeking to contain refugee flows within their own state. The second was their underlying logic: safe areas were based either on consent, on a credible international military presence, or on appeals to the legitimacy of the Security Council. These differing bases were not equally accepted by belligerents and, therefore, required different levels of support by the creators of the safe areas. The third problem was that the creators of the safe areas failed to take into account the goals of these belligerents; in particular, the issue of direct civilian targeting.

In mass atrocity situations, these three problems become cumulative and decrease the chances that the safe area will hold. This was the fundamental problem with both Security Council--authorized safe areas in the 1990s, in Bosnia and in Rwanda. It remains an issue with current peacekeeping operations deployed under a Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate, in which direct protection may be compromised in order to preserve ongoing state consent to the mission.

I argue that the lessons of safe areas in the 1990s are that the concept can provide protection to civilians in situations of conflict or mass atrocities, but this requires two moves. The first reflects the fact that consent can take two forms, including formal state consent for an international presence or tactical consent by belligerents. (12) In mass atrocity situations, tactical consent is unlikely by one or more belligerents. Further, in cases where the state itself is the perpetrator, formal state consent may also not be forthcoming. In cases of the former, a PoC mandate is possible. In cases of the latter, any new safe area needs to be authorized under the R2P doctrine, which allows the Security Council to take actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in circumstances when the concerned state is manifestly failing its own population. (13)

The second move is that the civilian population within the safe area must be protected by a credible international military force and, at the same time, provided with humanitarian assistance. It is this model, which was adopted in northern Iraq in 1991, that is generally considered the most successful safe area. (14) But beyond sacrificing consent, it is important to understand that any new safe area will be an expensive operation both in terms of the military forces provided and humanitarian assistance costs. It will also likely have to exist for an extended period of time with no clear results. A safe area has the potential to protect people, but it can neither solve conflict nor alter a state's motivations.

Safe Areas as a Problematic Concept

From the Gulf War to Yugoslavia to Rwanda, the major conflicts of the early 1990s posed significant new challenges to the international community. Not only did each of these conflicts lead to large-scale refugee flows, but in each the civilian population was directly targeted by belligerents. The safe area concept was developed as a way to respond to these problems. But as it was operationalized, it faced three main problems.

The first problem was that the safe areas concept was developed to address competing or even incompatible objectives: to contain potentially destabilizing refugee flows while, at the same time, protecting the civilian population. (15) As then secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger argued at the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia in 1992, "We must also funnel humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands more who are besieged inside Bosnia, so that they do not become the next wave of refugees." (16) International actors such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) also argued in favor of helping the displaced stay as close to their former homes as possible. As then UN high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata noted, "The international protection that my office, in cooperation with countries of asylum, can offer to refugees is not an adequate substitute for the protection that they should have received from their own Governments in their own countries." (17) These arguments presumed that protecting the civilian populations within countries in conflict was a laudable goal.

At the same time, however, such arguments prompted criticisms that safe areas were being used to meet other goals, particularly to contain would-be refugees to their countries of origin. (18) As James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve note, "Would-be refugees may indeed have remained within their own states, but not because they exercised a 'right to remain.' They had no option but to remain." (19) There is no question that safe areas were created in part to respond to either actual or potential refugee flows and, in some cases, were either tied to or a response to border closures. Nor can it be argued that states' strategic interests did not play a role in these decisions. But condemning the concept wholely based on this issue does neglect the fact that not all civilians or IDPs might choose asylum if given the opportunity--IDPs may instead choose to remain within their own country where they can be in "relative safety in familiar surroundings." (20)

The second problem lay in the underlying logic by which a safe area was expected to protect the civilian population within it. These safe areas were authorized and policed by international actors in different ways. Most were built around one of two fundamentally different logics. The conventional model was based on prior consent established through negotiation with the belligerents. As Karin Landgren notes, these areas "were to be established with the agreement of the parties to the conflict." Consent in such cases was a "natural corollary" to their civilian and demilitarized character, and reflected a clear doctrine of humanitarian space akin to hospital zones and demilitarized zones. (21) Thus, these safe areas were "conventional" in that they were clearly anchored in international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1. (22)

The alternative logic to this was enforcement of the area based on a credible international military presence. Such zones were neither based on consent nor did they have an exclusively civilian character. (23) This is the view embodied within the 1999 Secretary-General's report on the fall of Srebrenica, which noted that when safe areas do not have "a basis of consent and demilitarisation" they need to be "fully defended by a credible military deterrent." (24) Such a view was also echoed earlier in the 1995 General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, which noted that in Bosnia combining protection in safe areas with broader humanitarian operations and national reconciliation efforts was "not possible ... nor could they be executed without much stronger military capabilities than had been made available." (25)

Consequently, most safe areas of the 1990s had at their core one of two basic logics: they were either based on tactical consent by the belligerents or a credible international military presence established through the deployment of third-party military forces (see Figure 1). A safe area that has one of these can succeed without the other. The major problem occurs when a safe area is established without the clear consent of the belligerents and with an inadequate international presence; instead, it is presumed that international legitimacy (particularly that of the UN) could secure the safe area in the absence of both consent and a credible international military presence. (26) Such hybrid models were based not on state consent, but instead through an appeal to Security Council resolutions that were then used "as the source of authority." (27) But it was these models--in Bosnia and Rwanda--which, without a credible international military presence, were the major failures of the safe area concept.


These two problems are not disastrous in themselves however. The critical additional third problem was the goals of the belligerents. In most civil wars, tactical consent-based safe areas are effective because they allow the civilian population to remove themselves from the zone of conflict. But such consent cannot work if the belligerents are directly targeting the civilian population. Srebrenica and Rwanda represented much different situations from those in which consent-based safe areas worked: the civilians being protected were still being directly targeted. (See Figure 1.)

Conventional Safe Areas

Conventional safe areas, created with the consent of the belligerents and through the mediation either of international actors or other states, generally had a good record of providing protection and assistance to displaced populations. The earliest of these, the creation of three open relief centers (ORCs) in Sri Lanka in 1990 by UNHCR, was a success even though international involvement was limited to the agency providing assistance and monitors. (28) In this case, the safety of these ORCs was "based on verbal understanding obtained from both the government and the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] to abstain from military operations in these areas." (29) These safe areas were relatively small. The Madhu ORC, for example, was on a 400-acre site; even so Jennifer Hyndman notes that "thousands of refugees of different religious backgrounds [lived] relatively securely in the ORC, as the conflict in Sri Lanka waxed and waned." (30) Their security was relative. While they were generally provided protection from the military conflict, Madhu was shut down by government forces for a year in 1999 (31) and government forces routinely removed people from the Pesalai ORC who were then subjected to torture and disappearances. (32) The ORCs remained in operation until the 2002 cease-fire agreement, when widespread IDP returns led to their closure. (33)

Similarly, a bilateral safe area was created in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in February 1994, after 200,000 people fled fighting in Kabul. The Pakistani authorities responded to these flows by closing the border, but negotiated with the rival factions of Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to create a safe haven in Jalalabad. (34) Over the next two years, the camps around Jalalabad grew to contain almost 300,000 IDPs. (35) Assistance to the internally displaced population was provided by the UN through an interagency emergency operation with UNHCR's support. A 1994 UNHCR report noted that while a "lack of security and the hazard of landmines have been a major impediment to effective relief delivery ... UNHCR has responded adequately to the demands generated by the acute emergency situation." (36) The safe area collapsed when the city fell to the Taliban in September 1996, who had not been a party to the negotiations. (37) In both cases, these safe areas functioned successfully for a time due to their neutrality and prior tactical consent between the belligerents. (38)

Credible Presence Safe Areas

Rather than being based on consent, credible presence safe areas were protected by significant external forces. The clearest example of this was the Kurdish safe area created in northern Iraq. It was established after failed uprisings among the Kurdish and Shiite populations of Iraq were crushed by Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War in 1991. This led to at least 1.5 million refugees fleeing Iraq and an additional I million IDPs trapped within the country after Turkey closed its borders. (39) Instead of asylum, Turkey's president proposed the idea of creating a safe area within northern Iraq for the would-be refugees, a plan that was supported by the British and US governments, but which did not receive Security Council authorization or the consent of the Iraqi government. (40)

Both the US and British governments made clear that their goals for the safe area were limited--forces would be mobilized "only insofar as they would contribute to humanitarian efforts ... [the area] would only have to be large enough to provide a temporary shelter until the displaced felt secure enough to go home." (41) At its high point, Operation Provide Comfort deployed 17,000 coalition forces over an area of 21,000 square kilometers. (42) The force was large enough that, if necessary, it could fight the Iraqi military. As the US commanding officer, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, later noted, "I had no idea what [the Iraqi government] reaction would be to our insistence that we move coalition forces into Zakho [Iraq] and into the valley. ... And when we asked [the Iraqi forces] to withdraw to an arc of some 30 kilometres around Zakho, I was very encouraged when they did." (43)

The safe area was widely viewed as a success since it reversed the humanitarian crisis and facilitated the return of the displaced Kurds. (44) However, both governments endorsed Turkey's proposal primarily because they were unwilling to pressure Turkey to open its own borders. As then UN high commissioner for refugees Ogata noted in a 1996 speech, "It was the converging interests of the Coalition Forces. ... They recognized Turkey's security concerns not to allow the inflow of Kurdish refugees." (45)

The creation of the safe area also altered the position of the Iraqi government. Following it, Saddam Hussein negotiated with the UN to deploy its own security personnel to serve as human rights and assistance monitors. (46) This agreement led to relief operations being turned over to UNHCR on 7 June 1991, less than two months after the safe area was created. (47) But while the ground forces left quickly, in order to ensure continued protection of the civilian population the US maintained no-fly zones that lasted until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. (48)

A second credible presence safe area was created in Liberia, with the deployment of the Economic Organization of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was tasked with "the provision of humanitarian assistance and with the creation of a security zone around the capital city of Monrovia." (49) This zone functioned as a de facto safe haven despite that the ECOMOG force had no formal protection mandate, and it grew to include an estimated 1.2 million residents and IDPs. (50)

ECOMOG's protection role was limited in two ways. First, while ECO-MOG's presence helped to reestablish peace, "ECOMOG was in no way responsible for assessing, identifying, and providing humanitarian assis-tance." (51) Second, not only was the area inaccessible to much of the Liberian population, but the absence of consent meant the space remained "under continuous military threat." (52) These issues were accentuated by changing troop numbers--ECOMOG went from an initial deployment of 3,000 soldiers to peak at 16,000 in 1993 before declining to 8,430 in 1995. (53) Further, not only did the ECOMOG force ally itself with belligerent groups accused of human rights violations, but the force itself was also accused of human rights violations, albeit outside the safe area. These ranged from the intimidation of civilians through to bombing civilians and aid convoys indiscriminately. (54) While the safe area functioned for four years, it collapsed amid renewed fighting in Monrovia in April 1996 that saw as many as 3,000 civilians killed and over 400,000 displaced. (55) The Abuja II peace agreement, which ended the civil war, was signed four months later.

A third credible presence safe area was created in Somalia in 1992, when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked UNHCR to create "an operation to deliver food and seeds from Kenya to a preventive zone on the Somali side of the border." (56) UNHCR established a cross-border operation to provide these preventive zones within Somalia along the Kenya border, supported by peacekeepers from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the follow-on peacekeeping mission, the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The operation was "aimed at preventing new refugees and facilitating repatriation. ... UNHCR border sites and camps in Kenya were safe havens in which basic human needs and security was provided." (57) While the operation failed as a return exercise, UNHCR argued that it did succeed in "quickly stemming the flow of refugees" by providing assistance to 650,000 war-affected civilians and facilitated the voluntary repatriation of 58,000 refugees. (58)

In all three cases, international or regional forces were able to provide protection and facilitated other actors in providing assistance to the displaced and civilian populations. But, these areas were conditional on the presence of significant international forces--only in northern Iraq did the area remain safe following troop withdrawals, and that was due to the ongoing presence of a no-fly zone over the area.

Hybrid Models

Only two of the seven safe areas created during the 1990s had formal authorization by the Security Council. In Resolution 819, the Council explicitly established the Bosnian town of Srebrenica as "a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile action." (59) This concept was then extended to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac in Resolution 824. (60) At the time, Sarajevo had a population of around 380,000 civilians and IDPs; Tuzla, 250,000; Bihac, 205,000; and Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebenica, 104,000 combined--for a total of almost a million people within the safe areas. (61) When the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was consulted on safe areas the year before, it had suggested that not only would the safe areas need to have no weapons within them, but that a "muscular' deployment of UN forces was essential. The requirement of troops that was then assessed as the minimum essential to meet the commitment was about four-and-a-half divisions; 60,000 troops." By contrast, with these two resolutions, Boutros-Ghali suggested UNPROFOR in Bosnia be given just over half that amount, an additional 34,000 troops. (62) Even that goal was not met--only 7,500 troops were eventually provided. (63) Posen suggests that within the safe areas, there were 5,000 troops in Sarajevo, 3,000 in Tuzla, and only 500 each in the four other safe areas. (64)

Further, UNPROFOR had no clear protection mandate, instead operating under the traditional principles of peacekeeping, including impartiality and nonuse of force except for self-defense. This limited mandate reflected a "consensus of the UN's leadership (both political and military), as well as UNPROFOR's major troop contributors, that the force could not sustain a tougher [rules of engagement] given its equipment, physical disposition, and increasingly variegated nationality." (65) In Srebrenica, the Dutch UNPROFOR battalion had deployed in January 1995 with 600 personnel, only 300 of which were infantry. By July, the force was receiving only limited supplies due to a blockade by the Bosnian Serb army, and had declined to around 450 personne1. (66)

Coupled with this problem was that the Bosnian Serbs neither accepted Srebrenica as a neutral space nor consented to its creation. (67) Even more troubling, Bosnian Muslim forces continued to stage attacks out of Srebrenica. Thus, as Boutros-Ghali acknowledged in 1995, "certain safe areas are used by the two parties to the conflict to sustain their confrontation." (68) Consequently, the safe area was defended neither by a credible force nor by the belligerents' consent. Its weakness was its downfall. As Samantha Power notes, the Bosnian Serbs initially intended to seize only the southern section of the safe area. "But when they realized, to their amazement, that the Western powers would not resist, they opted to plow ahead to gobble the whole pocket." (69)

In Rwanda, there were two attempts to create safe areas during the genocide. Security Council Resolution 918 formally expanded the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to include contributing "to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas." (70) However, this resolution was passed on 17 May 1994, seven weeks after the start of the Rwandan genocide. Not only was the deployment of 5,500 new peacekeepers significantly delayed, but the resolution did not change the rules of engagement for the 270 troops remaining with UNAMIR following its troop reduction at the start of the genocide. This led its force commander, Romeo Dallaire, to argue that "it was clear the Security Council had once again passed a resolution that did not truly represent the intentions of its member states." (71) By contrast, informal sanctuaries at several locations in Kigali which were protected by UNAMIR forces are estimated to have saved some 15,000-20,000 Rwandans. But, as Astri Suhrke notes, "it is also clear that the UN force had little capacity, and mostly assigned lowest priority, to protecting ordinary Rwandan civilians." (72)

Due to the delayed deployment of the peacekeepers, in June 1994 France offered to lead an interim mission of 3,000 troops that protected between 1.5 million and 2 million people. (73) However, France was not an uninterested party--it had provided substantial political and military support to the Hutu-supported regime of Juvenal Habyarimana prior to the genocide. (74) Operation Turquoise's safe humanitarian zone (SHZ) was widely critiqued, both because it was seen as an effort by the French government to provide sane-wary to the retreating Hutu forces and also because of its apparent inability to protect Tutsis in the bush from ongoing massacre even within the zone. (75) And it was only a temporary solution. When French troops began to withdraw at the end of July, large numbers of Hutu refugees fled the zone across the border into Zaire. (76) In neither of these hybrid safe areas were peacekeeping missions provided with the mandate and forces necessary to protect the civilian populations within them.

The Comparative Effectiveness of Safe Areas

The safe areas of the 1990s not only were based on different underlying logics but were also significantly different sizes--the ORCs in Sri Lanka may have contained 20,000 civilians while the northern Iraq safe area assisted roughly 2.5 million. However, three comparative metrics based on new data are possible. The first is the duration of the safe area and its final outcome: whether it ended peacefully or collapsed. The second is the costs of the safe area (including military forces and humanitarian assistance), measured against the people protected and assisted. The third is whether the creation of a safe area altered displacement flows within the country.

Few of the safe areas are as well documented as Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, where 17,000 troops protected and assisted some 2.5 million people for total costs of $2.7 billion, with ongoing protection and assistance (principally, the no-fly zone) costing an additional $130 million per year. (77) It is possible, however, to estimate costs of operating all seven of the safe areas established in the 1990s. In Bosnia, for example, the total cost of UNPROFOR (1992-1995) is estimated to have been $4.617 billion while UNHCR has estimated the humanitarian assistance operation cost $2.9 billion to help 2.7 million civilians. (78) Based on an estimated cost for UN peacekeeping missions of $24,000 per soldier per year, (79) this suggests a yearly cost of $240 million per year to protect the six safe areas. They contained 40 percent of the affected population of Bosnia, suggesting further assistance costs of $530 million per year. Similar estimations have been undertaken for the other safe areas, and the figures are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 Safe Area Effectiveness

Time Country Authorization Civilians

1990-2002 Sri Lanka UNHCR MoU 20 (1998)

1991 Northern Unilateral 2.500
 Iraq intervention

1992-1995 Bosnia UN Security 939
 Council 939

1992-1994 Somalia UNHCR 708 708

1992-1996 Liberia ECOWAS 1.200 (1994)

1994 Rwanda UN Security 1,500
 Council 1.5(H)

1994-1996 Afghanistan Bilateral 300 (1996)
 (Jalalabad) 300(1996)

 Costs (US$ millions per year)

Time Outcome Military Aid Total Effectiveness

1990-2002 Peaceful n/a 7 7 2.85

1991 Peaceful 1.700 1,000 2,700 0.93

1992-1995 Collapse 240 290 530 1.77

1992-1994 Peaceful Indirect 12 12 59.0

1992-1996 Collapse 125 65 190 6.315

1994 Peaceful 200 50 250 6.0

1994-1996 Collapse n/a 106a 106 2.83

Sources: For Sri Lanka, average UNHCR assistance costs are established
in UNHCR, "Global Appeal 1999-Sri Lanka" (Geneva: UNHCR. 1998), (accessed 2ft September 2012). For
Somalia, UNHCR's direct cost for its Cross-Border Operation
over the three years of operation was $35.6 million. UNHCR.
"Review of UNHCR's Kenya-Somalia Cross-Border Operation,"
1 December 1994.
(accessed 1 February 2010). For Liberia, a 1993 estimate suggests the
ECOMOG mission cost $500 million, with the US government covering some
costs and an additional $259 million over the same period
in humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch, "Waging War
to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights'*
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 16 (accessed 1 September 2012)."
These Figures are similar to the 1995 UN Appeal. UNDPA. "United Nations
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Liberia. January-June 1995," 1
September 1995. http://reliefweb.inl/report/liberia/united-nations-
consolidated-inter-agency-appeal-liberia-0 (accessed 27
September 2012). For Rwanda, Operation Turquoise officially
cost the French military $200 million with a further $50
million for humanitarian assistance, though there are
suggestions the operation may
have been considerably more expensive. Larry Minear and Philippe
Guillot, Soldiers lo the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons front
Rwanda (Paris: OECD. 1996), p. 103.
Jalalabad has the least information available, and so the total
appeal figure for Afghanistan in 1995 has been used. UN.
"Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Emergency Humanitarian
and Rehabilitation Assistance to Afghanistan Oct 1995-Sep 1996,
" 30 September 1996,
-and-rehabilitatioii#food (accessed 21 September 2012).

Note: a. Includes costs for the country as a whole. UNHCR. UN High
Commission for Refugees; MoU. Memorandum of Understanding: ECOWAS.
Economic Community of West African States.

The effectiveness ratio in Table 1 compares direct costs (in millions of US dollars) to civilians (in thousands) protected per year. It establishes that neither population size nor monetary contributions were crucial factors in determining whether a safe area survived. This suggests that other factors--the underlying logic of the safe areas and goals of the belligerents--were critical to their success.

The third metric examines whether safe areas affected displaced person flows. It is important to bear in mind that this is a crude measure in that it reflects total displacement within the state. Increased (or decreased) numbers may reflect no causal relationship with the creation of the safe area, but rather a change in the nature or intensity of the conflict. If a safe area played a containment role, we should expect to see refugee flows overall decline after its creation.

Table 2 includes refugees and IDP numbers for each country during the life of the safe area and the year before its creation as well as the total displaced persons flows. It demonstrates that this pattern of safe areas as a means of containment does not hold in three ways. First, safe areas appear to have been a reactive rather than a proactive response to refugee flows, responding to existing mass movements.
Table 2 Safe Areas and Displacement Displacement (thousands)

Sri Lanka 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

 Refugees 8 208 209 128 92
 IDPs 500 1,000 600 600 600
 Total 508 1,208 809 728 692

Northern Irap 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

 Refugees 1,134 1,322 1,345 771 750
 IDPs 500 700 400 1,000 1,000
 Total 1,634 2,022 1,745 1,771 1,750

Bosnia 1992 (a) 1993 1994 1995 1996

 Refugees 438 618 776 770 993
 IDPs 740 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,000
 Total 1,178 1,918 2,076 2,070 1,993

Somalia 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

 Refugees 733 812 575 631 639
 IDPs 750 2,000 700 500 300
 Total 1,483 2,812 1,275 1,131 939

Liberia 1991 1992 /993 1994 1995

 Refugees 673 521 704 798 744
 IDPs 500 600 1,000 1,100 1,000
 Total 1,173 1,121 1,704 1,898 1,744

Rwanda 1993 1994 1995 /996 1997

 Refugees 450 2,258 1,819 469 68
 IDPs 300 1,200 500 0 500
 Total 750 3,458 2,319 469 568

Afghanistan 1993 1994 1995 1996 /997
(Jalalabad) Refugees 3,375 2,731 2,679 2,674 2,676
 IDPs 0 1,000 500 1,200 1,250
 Total 3,375 3,731 3,179 3,731 3,179

Source: Refugee data was provided by the UNHCR Statistical
Online Population Database,
(accessed 25 November 2013). IDP data is from estimates by
the US Committee on Refugees annual reports, compiled by Monty
Marshall at the University of Maryland.

Note: a. 1991 figures not available, IDPs, internally
displaced persons.

Second, safe areas rarely seem to affect displaced person flows overall. Only in the northern Iraq and Rwanda safe areas was there a marked decline in refugee and LDP numbers. While northern Iraq may represent a success here, in Rwanda, even as the French government claimed that it had "put an end to the massacres in Rwanda," (80) the safe area appears to have had little real effect. Numbers declined because of the invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, which seized power and stopped the genocide. Even then, large numbers of Hums remained outside the country until forced back in 1996. Declines in both Somalia and Liberia marked the introduction of peacekeeping forces that were able to stabilize the situation. However, this did not mark a permanent solution. In Somalia, once the forces were withdrawn, displaced numbers began to increase again. In Liberia, the safe area collapsed with renewed fighting.

Safe areas may have a third effect on displacement: IDP flows may increase as they seek protection in the safe areas. In only two safe areas--Jalalabad and Sri Lanka--did this pattern occur. But in both cases, this may have been driven as much by lack of asylum possibilities as the success of the safe area. In the case of Jalalabad, even after the Pakistani border was reopened, tight visa restrictions meant there was little opportunity for asylum. (81) Similarly in Sri Lanka, the ORCs were established at the same time that the Palk Strait between Sri Lanka and India was closed and heavily patrolled. (82) With respect to the population size, costs, and displacement flows associated with these safe areas, there is no clear pattern to explain their success or failure. This provides further evidence to suggest that their underlying logic is a crucial factor. As I argued, safe areas based either on consent or on a credible international military presence were less likely to fail than hybrid safe areas. However, consent-based safe areas held only as long as the combatants agreed to their presence.

Safe Areas and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine The use of safe areas did not cease because of the failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda. As late as 1999, the first Secretary-General's Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict argued in favor of safe areas in extreme circumstances, provided they had "sufficient and credible force to guarantee the safety of civilian populations making use of them." (83) It was the 2000 Brahimi Report that provided the first clear alternative to safe areas in such circumstances." (84) The report argues that peacekeepers "who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles." (85) This alternative, framed as the Protection of Civilians agenda, was endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1296. (86)

But peacekeeping forces deployed under a PoC mandate continue to have three clear limitations. The first limitation is that these missions still have an informal territorial logic as the presence of peacekeepers suggests a higher level of protection to the local population. This leaves civilians outside these areas vulnerable to atrocities and helps to encourage displacement as civilians seek safety. (87) Further, it presumes that the peacekeepers will provide direct protection to civilians in the event of attacks. Unfortunately, this does not always hold. For example, in Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeepers have been unable to respond to attacks despite having a nearby presence. In one 2008 attack in which 150 civilians were killed, peacekeepers "said they had no idea that the killings were taking place until it was all over" though they were less than a mile away. (88) In 2012 and again in 2013 one rebel group, the Mai-Mai Cheka, deliberately killed civilians in order to draw out peacekeepers from their base; in both instances, the peacekeepers did not respond. (89)

The third limitation is that PoC peacekeeping missions continue to rely on a consent-based approach. As Ian Johnstone argues, "The consent-based nature of peacekeeping means that the UN must preserve a fruitful relationship with the host government ... the need for consent, taken too far, can leave the UN in the position of conceding a great deal in order to keep that consent." (90)

"The UN is aware of these issues--the 2008 Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines report notes that consent is not necessarily required at the local level: "The need for even-handedness towards the parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behaviour that clearly works against the peace process." (91) Thus, this shift provides for operations to occur without tactical consent if formal state consent is present. The recent creation of the intervention brigade within the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) will test the durability of this split between different notions of consent. Under its mandate, the intervention brigade has the objectives of "contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security," including through "targeted offensive operations." (92) While the intervention brigade does not have particular territorial limits, this suggests one model for a new safe area in mass atrocity situations where civilians are being targeted and the state lacks the capacity to protect them. In this case, a PoC peacekeeping mission could be deployed in a designated area with a direct civilian protection mandate and with formal state consent to operate, but without tactical consent by the belligerents.

In many mass atrocity situations, however, neither tactical nor formal state consent is likely to be forthcoming. An alternative model safe area would therefore see the Security Council invoking the R2P doctrine to either alter the mandate of an existing peacekeeping mission or to trigger a new deployment. (93) As I noted in the introduction, it is here that the safe area concept is supported as a more limited alternative to regime change.

These models suggest new safe areas will lack either tactical consent or both that and formal state consent. As the safe areas of the 1990s demonstrate, removing consent as the basis for a safe area introduces three core problems. The first is that any international military force needs to have a credible presence. As northern Iraq demonstrates, in the best case scenario a safe area defended by such a force can lead to negotiations rather than conflict. But this cannot be assumed, which means the international community must be willing to support action, including a military force capable of holding the safe area, and ensure continued delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The second is that a safe area does not provide a solution to conflict or to mass atrocities. As a project independent from either regime change or negotiations, establishing a safe area offers only temporary safety to its inhabitants. Safe area proponents therefore must be prepared to accept significant long-term costs, including both ongoing military support and humanitarian assistance, and to also support alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

The third is that a safe area will likely trigger significant displacement as civilians from within the country flee into the area for protection. While previous safe areas may not have worked as containment devices, linking future safe areas to a clear means of exit through asylum will help reduce costs and increase sustainability. A successful safe area may lead to reduced refugee flows and, over the longer term, may provide an alternative for returning refugees.


There are no easy answers to the question of how the international community should provide in-country protection to civilians and the displaced targeted by their own governments. The safe areas concept evolved as one answer. In the 1990s, safe areas that adhered to traditional concepts of neutrality and consent were the most successful, provided that the government was not deliberately targeting its own population. Areas supported by credible international forces, such as northern Iraq, were generally seen as successful as well. Safe areas failed when they lacked either consent and neutrality or a strong international presence.

This past experience demonstrates that, in the absence of tactical consent by the belligerents or in the absence of formal state consent, safe areas can be an effective international response to mass atrocity situations. This is true, however, only if three criteria are present. The first criterion is that there must be a credible, long-term international military presence. The size of the required military presence will vary depending on the population size and territorial size of the safe area, and whether the safe area lacks the consent of local belligerents or also of the state. Given the defensive nature of the safe area, however, it would require significantly fewer forces than a full-scale military intervention. The second criterion is that there must be similar long-term humanitarian assistance provided to the safe area, ideally linked to an asylum option for internally displaced persons. The third criterion is that the force must have a clear mandate to intervene to protect the civilian population within the safe area over this period. In the absence of state consent, any new safe area needs to be established within the R2P doctrine. A credible international military presence based around the R2P doctrine provides a route to bypass state sovereignty and ensures that the civilian population will receive the protection it needs in mass atrocity situations.

Safe areas, in other words, do not represent an easy option. They require long-term military and humanitarian assistance commitments that are unlikely to occur except in specific circumstances. Short of this, a new safe area is all too likely to replicate the failures of the 1990s.


Phil Orchard is a lecturer in international relations and peace and conflict studies at the University of Queensland and a research associate with the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. His research focuses primarily on international efforts to protect civilians and forced migrants. He is the author of A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation and, with Alexander Betts, the coeditor of a volume entitled Implementation in World Politics: How Norms Change Practice. His work has been published in the Review of International Studies, International Affairs, and the Global Responsibility to Protect Journal.

The author would like to acknowledge the University of Queensland's Early Career Research Funding scheme and Vickie Frater's assistance with research. He also thanks Alex Bellamy, Victoria Colvin, Stephen Hopgood, Charlie Hunt, Seb Kaempf, Emily Paddon, Sarah Teitt, Erin Weir, and Paul Williams for helpful comments.

(1.) Other terms used in individual cases include safe havens in northern Iraq (1991), safe areas in Bosnia, and safe humanitarian zones in Rwanda. For a comprehensive list of the different terminologies used, see Hikaru Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics: The Creation of Safe Areas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 4. Safe areas differ from other international efforts, such as humanitarian corridors, in that the goal is to protect civilians rather than aid shipments or workers. Direct protection focuses on activities that directly protect civilians from harm by third parties. See Hugh Breakey, Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski, Charles Sampford, Michael G. Smith, and Ramesh Thakur, Enhancing Protection Capacity: A Policy Guide to the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts (Brisbane, Queensland: Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, 2012), p. 47.

(2.) Martin Barber, "Humanitarian Crises and Peace Operations: A Personal View of UN Reforms During Kofi Annan's First Term," Conflict, Security and Development 9, no. 3 (2009): 398.

(3.) Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 125.

(4.) Sarah Sewell, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin, Mass Atrocity Response Operations: Military Planning Handbook (Cambridge: Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy; Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2010), p. 78.

(5.) Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for US Policymakers (Washington, DC: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace, 2008), pp. 81-83.

(6.) Council of the League of Arab States, Res. 7360,12 March 2011, par. 1.

(7.) Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 841-843.

(8.) OCHA, "Humanitarian Bulletin: Syrian Arab Republic," 18 November 2013, (accessed 25 November 2013), p. 11; Michael Weiss, "Snapshot: What It Will Take to Intervene in Syria: First Get the Opposition to Work Together," Foreign Affairs, 6 January 2012; Ty McCormick, "Turkey Mulls Buffer Zone on Syrian Border," Foreign Policy, 17 June 2011,, accessed 18 June 2011.

(9.) "Speech Delivered by Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the UN Security Council, 30 August 2012, New York," (accessed 20 November 2012).

(10.) Rick Gladstone and Neil MacFarquhar, "Rebel-held Land Could Be Safe Haven in Syria, Clinton Says," New York Times, 24 July 2012.

(11.) See Stewart M. Patrick, "R2P in Crisis Following UN Syria Vote," Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, (accessed 6 February 2012).

(12.) Breakey et al., Enhancing Protection Capacity, p. 61.

(13.) UN General Assembly, "Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly," UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (20 September 2005), pp. 138-139; Ban Ki-moon, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. A/63/677 (12 January 2009).

(14.) Eugene Contran, "The Establishment of a Safe Haven for the Kurds in Iraq," in Najeeb Al-Nauimi and Richard Meese, eds., International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).

(15.) See Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher. "Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action," International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): 44.

(16.) Cited in B. G. Ramcharan, ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers, vol. 1 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 117.

(17.) Sadako Ogata, "Statement to the Forty-Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights" UNHCR, 2 March 1993, (accessed 7 January 2012).

(18.) Among others, see Joan Fitzpatrick, "Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary Refuge and Local Responses to Forced Migrations," Virginia Journal of International Law 35 (1994); Jennifer Hyndman, "Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive? Safe Spaces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Somalia, and Sri Lanka," Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no. 2 (2003): 169.

(19.) James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, "Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection," Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997): 136.

(20.) Roberta Cohen and Francis Mading Deng, Masses in Flight: 7'he Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 29.

(21.) Karin Landgren, "Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area," International Journal of Refugee Law 7, no. 3 (1995): 441; Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics, p. 19.

(22.) Landgren, "Safety Zones and International Protection," pp. 439-440.

(23.) Ibid., p. 441; Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics, p. 20; Barry R. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," International Security 21, no. 1(1996): 93.

(24.) UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica," UN Doc. A/54/549 (15 November 1999), p. 107.

(25.) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, General Guidelines Jr Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN, 1995), p. 18. My thanks to Paul Williams for this point.

(26.) On the Security Council as a legitimate institution, see Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

(27.) Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics, p. 187.

(28.) Hyndman, "Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive?" p. 179.

(29.) UNHCR, "Background Paper on Sri Lanka for the European Union High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration" (Geneva: UNHCR, 1999), p. 21.

(30.) Hyndman, "Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive?" p. 180.

(31.) US Committee for Refugees, "World Refugee Survey 2000: Sri Lanka," (accessed 1 October 2011).

(32.) Ahilan T. Arulanantham, "Restructured Safe Havens; A Proposal for Reform of the Refugee Protection System," Human Rights Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2000).

(33.) Centre for Policy Alternatives Sri Lanka, "Land and Property Rights of Internally Displaced Persons" (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives Sri Lanka, 2003), pp. 34-35.

(34.) BBC Monitoring Service, "Warring Factions Agree to Declare Jalalabad a 'Safe Haven," 4 February 1994; UNHCR, UNHCR's Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons (Geneva: UNHCR, 1994), p. 12; L. Franco, "An Examination of Safety Zones for Internally Displaced Persons as a Contribution Toward Prevention and Solution of Refugee Problems," in Al-Nauimi and R. Meese, eds., International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).

(35.) Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated Inter-Agency for Emergency Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance for Afghanistan Oct 1995-Sep 1996" (New York: DHA, 1996).

(36.) UNHCR, UNHCR 's Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons, p. 12.

(37.) Frahan Bokhari, "Mysterious 'Talibans' at Kabul's Gates," Financial Times, 16 February 1995, p.6.

(38.) This conclusion is drawn by a number of authors. See, for example, Langdran, "Safety Zones and International Protection"; Hyndman, "Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive?"; Quentin Outram, "Cruel Wars and Safe Havens: Humanitarian Aid in Liberia, 1989-1996," Disasters 21, no. 3 (1997).

(39.) U.S Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "Refugee Reports" (Arlington, VA: USCRI, 1991), p. 1; UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 211-212.

(40.) Both governments argued that, as Resolution 688 provided them with authority to address the safety of the Kurds, these activities fell within the resolution. Phil Orchard, "Regime-induced Displacement and Decision-making Within the Security Council: The Cases of Northern Iraq, Kosovo, and Darfur," Global Responsibility to Protect Journal 2, no 1. (2010): 11.

(41.) Hikaru Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics: The Creation of Safe Areas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 51. See also UNHCR, Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, p. 216.

(42.) Donald G. Goff, "Operation Provide Comfort," in Personal Experience Monograph (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1992), pp. 30,45.

(43.) John P. Cavanaugh, "Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), p. 17.

(44.) UNHCR, Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, pp. 216-217.

(45.) Sadako Ogata, "World Order, Internal Conflict and Refugees," 28 October 1996, (accessed 25 November 2013).

(46.) Yamashita, Humanitarian Space and International Politics, pp. 52-54.

(47.) UNHCR, Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, pp. 216-217.

(48.) Alexander Benard, "Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-fly Zones," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004). The no-fly zone was not perfect; in 1996, one Kurdish leader, Massoud Barzani, invited Iraqi troops into Iraqi Kurdistan and they occupied the town of Irbil. This triggered two years of conflict between opposing Kurdish groups. Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman, "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past," Survival 40, no. 3 (1998): 138-139.

(49.) Mark Malan, "Physical Protection in Practice: International and Regional Peacekeeping in Africa," African Security Studies 9, no. 2 (2000): 18.

(50.) Outram, "Cruel Wars and Safe Havens," p. 194; DPKO, "Liberia-UNOMIL Background," (accessed 21 September 2012).

(51.) Colin Scott, Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia, 1989-1994" (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1995), p. 10.

(52.) Outram, "Cruel Wars and Safe Havens," p. 195.

(53.) Christopher Tuck, 'Every Car or Moving Object Gone': The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia," African Studies Quarterly 4, no. 1(2000), (accessed 27 September 2012).

(54.) Human Rights Watch, "Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), (accessed 1 September 2012).

(55.) Malan, "Physical Protection in Practice," p. 19; US Department of State, US Department of State Countiy Report on Human Rights Practices I996-Liberia, 30 January 1997, (accessed 27 September 2012).

(56.) UN, "The Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. S/24480 (24 August 1992), p. 5.

(57.) Hyndman, Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive?" p. 177; John Kirkby et al., "UNHCR's Cross Border Operation in Somalia: The Value of Quick Impact Projects for Refugee Resettlement." Journal of Refugee Studies 10, no. 2 (1997): 181.

(58.) UNHCR, "Review of UNHCR's Kenya-Somalia Cross-Border Operation," 1 December 1994, (accessed 1 February 2010); Kirkby et al., "UNHCR's Cross Border Operation in Somalia," p. 182.

(59.) UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/819 (16 April 1992).

(60.) UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/824 (6 May 1993).

(61.) UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection (Geneva: UNHCR, 1993); US General Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," May 1995, (accessed 26 September 2012).

(62.) Satish Nambiar, "UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Former Yugoslavia: From UNPROFOR to Kosovo," in Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002), p. 178.

(63.) Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 121.

(64.) Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," p. 103.

(65.) William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 227.

(66.) UN General Assembly, "The Fall of Srebrenica," pp. 53-54.

(67.) Yamashita, Humanitarian Space, pp. 113-115. See also Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Perennial, 2003), p. 398.

(68.) UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 129.

(69.) Power, Problem from Hell, p. 397.

(70.) UN Security Council, Res. SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), p. 3.

(71.) Romeo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto, ON: Random House Canada, 2003), p. 374.

(72.) Astri Suhrke, "Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion," International Peacekeeping 5, no. 2 (1998): 12. See also Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil.

(73.) UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/925 (8 June 1994); Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," p. 97.

(74.) Daniela Kroslak, The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide (London: Hurst, 2007).

(75.) See Nicolas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 234-235; Alison Desforges, "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 510-520.

(76.) Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 237.

(77.) Thomas Weiss, "Multilateral Military Responses," in E. Wayne Nafziger and Raimo Vayrynen, eds., The Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), p. 216.

(78.) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR." (accessed 1 September 2012); Malcolm Chalmers, "Spending to Save: Retrospective Case Studies," CICS Working Papers, No. 2 (Bradford: Centre for International Co-operation and Security, 2005), p. 14.

(79.) William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-first-century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), p. 103.

(80.) As cited in Landgren, "Safe Zones and International Protection," p. 449.

(81.) Bokhari, "Mysterious 'Talibans' at Kabul's Gates."

(82.) Landgren, "Safe Zones and International Protection," p. 452.

(83.) UN, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," UN Doc. S/957 (8 September 1999), p. 21.

(84.) Paul Williams, "Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa," Research Paper No. 1 (Washington DC: Africa Center for Stategic Studies ), p. 17.

(85.) UN, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," UN Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (21 August 2000), p. x.

(86.) UN Security Council, Res. SIRES/1296 (19 April 2000), p. 3.

(87.) Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Protecting Civilians in Uncivil Wars," Working Paper No. 1 (Brisbane, Queensland: Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009), P. 27; Charles T. Hunt and Alex J. Bellamy, "Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Peace Operations." Civil Wars 13, no. 1 (2011): 4.

(88.) Lydia Polgreen, "A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support," New York Times, 11 December 2008, p. Al.

(89.) Jessica Hatcher and Alex Perry, "Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The UN Debacle in Eastern Congo," Time, 26 November 2012, (accessed 2 February 2013).

(90.) Ian Johnstone, "Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations," International Peacekeeping 18, no. 2 (2011): 176-177.

(91.) UN, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," pp. 31, 33. See also UN General Assembly, "Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations," UN Doc. A/64/19 (22 February-19 March 2010), p. 7.

(92.) UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013), pp. 6-7.

(93.) Breakey et al., Enhancing Protection Capacity, p. xxvii.
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