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Restructuring and women workers in Australian home care.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the effect of industry restructuring on women workers responsible for home care of the aged. Two aspects of restructuring, both initiated in the late 1980s, are considered: award restructuring which sought to place greater emphasis on skilled work and training; and the privatization of human services which amongst other things led to the contracting out of services by government to the non-profit community sector. We argue in this paper that the potentially positive impact of award restructuring on women workers was offset by the negative consequences of privatization. Our research was conducted in Western Australia amongst women workers in community agencies engaged in home care for the aged.

Le but de cet article est de discuter des effets de la restructuration sur les travailleuses responsables des soins a domicile des personnes agees. Deux aspects de la restructuration, tous deux inites vers la fin des annees 1980, sont pris en consideration, soient: la restructuration recompsnee qui tentait de mettre plus d'emphase sur la main-d'oeuvre qualifiee et la formation; et la privatisation des services humains, dont un des resultats a ete le sous-traitement de services par le secteur gouvernemental a la communaute sans but lucratif. Nous presentons donc l'argument suivant dans cet article: que l'impact positif de la restructuration recompensee sur les travailleuses a ete contrebalance par les consequences negatives de la privatisation. Notre recherche a ete menee dans l'ouest de l'Australie parmi des femmes travaillam pour des agences communautaires fournissant des soins a domicile.

Tho Context: Australia Reconstructed

In the mid-1980s Australia experienced profound changes in its employment and economic organization. The federal government--in conjunction with the trade union movement--embarked on a program of Award Restructuring (AR), meant to bring about a complete overhaul of all industrial agreements in order to enhance Australia's productivity and international competitiveness. Also, in line with many other western countries, Australian federal and state governments responded to demands for smaller and less costly government by instituting privatization and de-institutionalization.

Industrial awards and award restructuring

Australia's industrial relations system has been characterized since its inception in 1904 by centralized wage fixing and compulsory arbitration. The system involves a network of federal and state industrial relations courts and commissions responsible for the making of industrial awards. These awards are statutory, legally enforceable agreements that resolve industrial disputes between employers and trade unions, and are ratified by federal or state governments after tripartite deliberations within the commissions. They stipulate in considerable detail most aspects of work conditions and pay, including job specifications, wage rates and leave entitlements. Major modifications to minimum wages for adults, and the principles governing wage determination, have been dealt with in so-called National Wage Cases (NWCs), presided over by the full bench of the (federal) Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). Industry-specific awards can provide more, but not less, than is stipulated within the National Wage Case. Not all workers are covered by awards, but NWC principles must apply in all cases. Also, in some instances, "award-free" workplaces (where workers are not unionized) adopt pay scales commensurate with organizations within the same industry which have award coverage.(1)

In the late 1980s, a general awareness that Australia was falling behind other countries economically led to the notion that, in order to become efficient and productive, the Australian labour market would need to place greater emphasis on skills formation and training. Trade unions suggested it would also be necessary to involve workers as participants in the production process (ACTU-TDC, 1987). These ideas became the foundation for National (Minimum) Wage Cases in 1988 and 1989, which introduced various measures aiming to improve the efficiency of industry and to provide workers with more interesting and more skilled jobs (Macken, 1989). These measures included the establishment of skills-related career paths that would give workers incentives to participate in ongoing training; elimination of impediments to multi-skilling; and extension of the number of tasks workers may be required to perform (ACAC, 1988). The term Structural Efficiency Principle (SEP) was used to describe the intended changes.(2) Award restructuring, then, signifies a rewrite of every industry-specific award, describing in detail any new work conditions, wage rates and entitlements following from the Structural Efficiency Principle.

In practice, the core notion was the expectation that workers and their trade unions would negotiate wage increases and access to training and career paths by abandoning certain traditional work practices in favour of more productive ones. In the 1991 National Wage Case, the SEP was extended to an Enterprise Bargaining (EB) principle, to allow focus on improvements in efficiency and productivity at the workplace level through the negotiation of fixed-term enterprise agreements (AIRC, 1991, p. 140-41; Fox et al., 1995, p. 619). Such agreements were superimposed upon the basic award structure (Owens, 1995, p. 37). In several Australian states, EB has been followed--after a change to more conservative governments--by workplace agreements, under which workers must choose between staying in the award system or opting out to negotiate individual agreements directly with their employers.

The willingness of the trade union movement to go along with Award Restructuring was motivated by the belief that such industrial restructuring would make it possible to negotiate a post-Fordist scenario of industrial democracy driven by skilled workers (Mathews, 1989). To the federal government of the day it meant a broad attempt at changing work conditions, job classifications and training to increase productivity and thereby ultimately to improve the economy. Employers, once they realized the implications of Award Restructuring, saw it as a neo-Fordist opportunity to improve productivity while reducing labour costs. They also saw it as a chance to end industrial demarcation disputes through the notion of multi-skilling, in an industrial climate that encouraged industrial harmony rather than employer-employee confrontations (Badham and Mathews 1989; Hunt and Provis 1995).

Feminists had from the beginning recognized AR as an exciting but dangerous opportunity for women (Burton, 1991). They considered that the development of skills-related career paths would only be beneficial to women if they were given access to training and, more importantly, if the skills women already possessed were recognized and rewarded (Baldock, 1990; Cox and Leonard, 1991; Probert, 1992). They warned that employers could and would use the concept of a flexible work force to employ more workers on flexible terms, leading to increasing casualization (i.e., no fixed working hours) amongst women, who already predominated in part-time work (Pocock, 1995). AR was of little assistance to workers who were employed in award-free or non-union workplaces. The extension of EB to non-union work sites was touted by governments as a means of redressing inequities experienced by such workers, but feminists were concerned that women working in such work sites would not have the bargaining power to fight for improved wages and work conditions, let alone skills-based careerpaths (Owens, 1995; DuPlessis, 1995).

Nonetheless feminists acknowledged that the considerable emphasis on skills assessment would at least provide the possibility of genuine evaluation and recognition of women's skills (O'Donnell and Hall, 1988; Burton, 1991). In that context, the notion of Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) was applauded (Cox and Leonard, 1991), and in the early 1990s several skills audits were conducted in community service and child care industries that in some instances led to modest improvements in wages and the establishment of skills-based job classifications in awards (Kenna, 1992; Charlesworth, 1994).

Privatization and contracting-out

The notion of privatization of government services was articulated in the 1980s as part of a government agenda of administrative reform in response to demands for smaller, more efficient governments, as well as pressure for less bureaucratic service delivery and greater public participation (Evatt Research Centre, 1990; Domberger & Hall, 1996; Earles and Moon, 1998). One important outcome was the establishment of a systematic policy of contracting-out of services to nonprofit community-based organizations (Lyons, 1998). Upon application through a tendering process, governments would provide funds to eligible community agencies that would then take on the entire responsibility for the administration and delivery of services.

A prime example of such a contracting-out arrangement was the Home and Community Care (HACC) Program, developed in 1985 by the federal government in conjunction with state governments. HACC brought a range of support services to the frail aged, younger disabled and their caregivers in their own home, with the aim of preventing their premature or inappropriate admission to long term residential care. Federal and state governments provided the funding; state governments were responsible for the management and administration of the Program, but actual service delivery took place through paid workers and volunteers in non-profit community organizations or in programs under the auspices of local governments. These offered assistance to people with moderate or severe disabilities, which included "difficulty in performing any of the tasks of daily living, such as dressing, preparing meals, housecleaning, basic home maintenance, or using public transport without personal assistance or supervision" (HACC, 1991, p. 1). At the same time the growth of nursing homes was curtailed, and institutional care was used only for people with a very high degree of dependency. The HACC system applied to all states, but the services provided and the work conditions of paid workers differed from state to state depending on the historical context in which the program developed.

Individual HACC-funded agencies had a considerable amount of autonomy, and the funding authorities took an arms-length approach to the conditions under which HACC workers were employed and the nature of the training they received. As stated in the HACC Program National Guidelines (HACC, 1989, p. 23), organizations were solely responsible for:

* ensuring that all staff, whether employees or volunteers, were appropriately trained

* ensuring that staff worked under award conditions where appropriate

* providing adequate insurance cover for compensation purposes and observing other usual employer responsibilities for both employees and volunteers

* ensuring that principles of equal opportunity in the recruitment of staff were observed

The Guidelines also stated that voluntary service within agencies was an important component of many services. However, volunteers should not be used where paid professional care was more appropriate (HACC, 1989, p. 23).

Critics in the field of human services have argued that contracting-out of services to the nonprofit community services industry may entail excessive cost-cutting made possible by the use of low-paid or volunteer workers not subject to public sector wages and work conditions. As funding agreements are usually short-term, job security is limited, and contract work rather than permanent work prevails (Considine, 1988; Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Baldock & Mulligan, 1996).

Methodology

The study reported in this paper was carried out from 1992 to 1994 in Perth, the capital of Western Australia, as part of a research project on the effects of AR on disadvantaged workers. We chose to investigate the HACC Program for several reasons. It was a prime example of the growing tendency of Australian governments to privatize welfare services; the direct care workers in HACC were nearly all women; and the program, at least in Western Australia, had a large proportion of workers in award-free workplaces. HACC, then, provided an excellent avenue to explore the intersection of award restructuring and privatization, and to determine the bargaining power of women workers employed in award-free, nonprofit community organizations for increased wages and introduction of career-paths based on skills definition and training. The focus of our study was on home care workers employed as home helps, care aides or respite workers. Home helps are generally expected to provide cleaning, laundry, cooking, and social support to the frail aged and disabled in their homes, while care aides are employed to provide personal care services such as assistance with bathing, dressing, eating, toileting and mobility. Respite workers provide short periods of relief to primary caregivers, which can involve both home help and personal care services.

Data Collection

We started our investigation with interviews with three government HACC project officers, and with analysis of documents regarding the provision of HACC services. We then gathered data through semi-structured interviews with coordinators in 16 HACC agencies in metropolitan Perth. We asked these coordinators questions about the tasks, skills, award coverage, pay, working conditions, occupational health and safety of the home care workers in their employ. This was followed a year later by a skills audit amongst the workers themselves in six of these agencies, with the aim of identifying the specific skills they used, and the training and qualifications they brought to the job.

The sample

At the time of our study one large organization in Western Australia provided HACC services to around 14,400 clients state-wide, employing about 738 home helps and 259 care aides. Based on data for service provision in 1992, we estimated that at that time approximately 70 percent of all home helps and care aides worked for this organization. The remaining 30 percent of home helps, care aides and respite workers were scattered among 75 smaller organizations, most of them nonprofit community agencies working independently or under the auspices of local government. The largest of these employed about 60 respite workers, the smallest as few as one or two care aides or home helps. We included the large organization and 15 small agencies in the first stage of our study, interviewing coordinators in all of these -- thereby gaining data regarding a work force of more than 1200 paid workers (30 percent of these employed in small organizations).

The second stage of the research, a skills audit, was carried out amongst paid workers in six of the original 16 agencies, ranging in size from one employing 60 respite workers to several agencies employing as few as four care aides and/or home helps. We concentrated on the small community-based organizations in the skills audits, because we felt that they were most likely to illustrate the effects of contracting-out and privatization in Western Australia.(3) In total, 60 workers participated in the skills audit: six home helps, 17 care aides and 37 respite workers. All participants were women, except for one man employed as a care aide/driver in a small agency. Most of the organizations used volunteers, but these tended to provide assistance with transport and shopping and not be used for home help and personal care tasks. We therefore did not include volunteers in the skills audit.

Skills audits were undertaken at the offices of the agencies concerned, in all cases at regularly scheduled staff meetings. The purpose and nature of skills audits was explained to participants, who were then asked to complete a 20-page questionnaire. This questionnaire was based on a skills audit of home care workers in another Australian state (Charlesworth, 1993) and took approximately 45-60 minutes to complete. The researchers remained with the groups to answer any queries and participants were encouraged to confer, especially on questions, which required recall, for example, of in-house training undertaken by the group as a whole.

Findings

The main question we sought to answer in this study was whether home caregivers involved in an increasingly privatized service industry would be able to take advantage of Award Restructuring through training programs and skills-based career paths. In answering this question, we begin with an examination of the industrial awards and the general work conditions applicable to these workers.

Award coverage and contracts of work

As mentioned earlier, at the time of our study about 70 percent of home helps and care aides in Western Australia worked for one large organization. Two separate industrial awards, both drawn up in 1987, covered these workers. Neither of these awards included wage and classification structures based on skills or training. Under the conditions of these awards, clear demarcations existed between the tasks carried out by care aides (employed to provide personal care and personal assistance), and home helps (employed to do cleaning and home maintenance).(4) Award Restructuring, however, brought some changes to this situation. After the introduction of the Structural Efficiency Principle the awards were amended to include clauses such as:

* an employer may direct an employee to carry out such duties as are within the limits of the employee's skill competence and training provided that such duties are not designed to promote de-skilling.

*an employer may direct, pursuant to this sub-clause, an employee to carry out such duties and use such tools and equipment as may be required provided that the employee has been properly trained in the use of such tools and equipment (WAIRG, 1992).

These amendments provided the organization with greater flexibility in the use of its workers -- one of the goals of AR. For example, they gave the organization an opportunity to vary the duties of home helps to include personal care services, as this would not involve de-skilling. Variations in the duties of care aides to include cleaning and home maintenance, however, could be seen as de-skilling and were therefore not allowed under the amendments.

At the time of the study, no other agency in Western Australia employing home helps and care aides (and respite workers) had awards that specifically covered these employees. Indeed, we found that 11 of the 15 smaller community organizations in our study provided no award coverage at all to the bulk of their home care workers. Three of these were agencies that employed their home caregivers as independent contractors. Where award coverage did exist, it was under awards not specific to home care or under agreements struck with unions. Coverage of some workers (usually only those who were in permanent employment) under the local government award was one such arrangement. However, according to the government HACC project officers we interviewed, where no award coverage existed agencies were expected to be paying their home helps and care aides according to the "basic" conditions of the awards which applied to the largest provider in the state.

Work Patterns

According to information provided by program coordinators, the large organization employed most of its home helps and care aides on a part-time basis, home helps working 11 hours and care aides 14 hours per week on average. The small community agencies followed a similar pattern in that only two agencies offered full-time work to their home helps, and only one to its care aides. A significantly higher proportion of care aides than home helps were, however, employed on a permanent basis. In the large organization all home helps were casual workers; only two of the smaller organizations employed their home helps or respite workers as permanent staff. In fact, small community agencies usually employed a number of casual home helps to work a flexible number of hours (from between 10 and 25 hours), together with one or two permanent part-time care aides as core workers with guaranteed hours (between 15 and 35 hours per week). It is noteworthy that these were only the formal hours of work. Most of the participants in the skills audit, when asked how many hours they worked, responded spontaneously: real hours, or hours we are paid for?

Several coordinators we interviewed told us that workers were happy with the short and flexible hours they worked because it allowed them to meet their family commitments. However, a significant proportion of the workers in small agencies we surveyed in the skills audit (in particular the respite workers and care aides) indicated that they would prefer more hours. Virtually half of all respite workers (49 percent) worked for 15 hours or less per week, but only 13 (35 percent) were happy with these hours and 18 of them (49 percent) wanted more hours. Care aides were similarly underemployed. Ten of them (59 percent) worked 15 hours or less; however, only three actually wanted to work less than 15 hours. Five (29 percent) wanted up to 25 hours and 4 (24 percent) wanted more than 26 hours of work per week.

Tasks performed: Multi-skilling and de-skilling

As mentioned earlier, the Structural Efficiency Principle, as an important feature of AR, had been incorporated in the industrial awards of the large organization. We found in our discussions with coordinators that the SEP had indeed been used in setting the tasks of workers in this organization. For example, some home helps were employed as casual workers for the time they spent on cleaning and home maintenance tasks, but were also given personal care duties (often only for one or two hours per week). They were paid for the latter as if they were permanent care aides. In fact, they were appointed and paid under two separate contracts of employment, and could be said to have been given the opportunity for multi-skilling. Care aides, on the other hand, did not carry out any home help duties, so de-skilling did not occur.

The situation was quite different in the small community organizations. Without the delineation of duties which awards would provide, separation of home help and care aide duties was practised to a much lesser extent. Care aides were expected to perform a substantial number of home maintenance tasks in addition to their personal care duties. If counted by the number of tasks actually performed, care aides were multi-skilled: their coordinators mentioned between 22 and 32 different tasks as part of their job description. However, many of these tasks were at a lower level (at least in terms of the pay they would earn if carried out by home helps), and the care aides in these small agencies were thus clearly subject to de-skilling.

Most coordinators in small agencies expected little of home helps in terms of personal care duties, and, therefore, their job descriptions were generally limited to cleaning and home maintenance tasks. Home helps performed fewer tasks (averaging between five and 21 tasks) than care aides. However, the skills audit showed that the actual tasks home helps performed as part of their cleaning and home maintenance work included (unacknowledged) complex skills, such as grief counselling and providing general social or emotional support. Such skills would have been seen as higher level duties (with higher pay) if carried out by care aides or other para-professionals. Some respite workers were dealing with severely disabled clients, requiring skills in areas closely associated with basic nursing.

Generally speaking, it became clear from our findings that care aides as well as home helps in small community agencies were in fact multi-skilled: that is, they carried out a diversity of duties. Further, the tasks performed required considerable maturity and independence. One coordinator noted:

In home care you have to have people to roll up at the home who are highly autonomous, have a great deal of freedom in decision-making and do it all.... They cannot walk into the next room asking for advice.

Wages, training and skills development

Determining how much these home care workers earned was a complex matter. Pay rates were affected by issues such as whether home caregivers were employed in permanent or casual work, whether they were paid for travel time (none of the casual workers was), the rate at which they were paid for travel using their own vehicles, and whether they were paid special rates for working overtime (usually only the permanent workers). Only two of the small community agencies took previous nursing qualifications into account in their pay rates -- at the same time assigning care aides with such qualifications to clients requiring more complex care. Another two agencies paid differential rates based on the complexity of client needs, without reference to previous qualifications. Other qualifications or previous experience made no difference in the pay received by workers in any of the organizations we surveyed.

As mentioned earlier, where organizations had no award coverage they were advised by the state government HACC project officers responsible for funding that they should pay workers according to the award guidelines of the large organization. In other words, in their tender to government they should ask for the appropriate sums of money to pay award wages. There was no expectation, however, that those agencies should also provide the non-wage elements of an award to their workers, such as penalty rates, long-service leave, holiday pay. The actual HACC funding provided by government therefore did not stretch far enough to give these award-free workers all the benefits that workers covered by award would receive. Only agency administrators experienced enough to be very assertive in their application might receive enough funding to pay their home caregivers properly. In the words of one coordinator:

I was very angry because there was nothing structured about pays; there were huge discrepancies. I felt HACC was not living up to their responsibilities, they'd do it on the cheap.... If you were assertive enough you'd get the right wages but if you were naive you'd get next to nothing.... I have to advocate for staff all the time because the Board doesn't recommend people for pay rises ... because they are volunteers themselves.... I didn't get a pay rise for years and neither did my staff.

The common situation, therefore, was one where community agencies could not pay adequate wages, or had to limit the number of clients they could help, and reduce the number of working hours of their home caregivers (thereby, of course, reducing their earnings) in order to make ends meet.

In the case of the large organization, increments were based on years of service and satisfactory performance. In most of the smaller agencies, care aides could gain usually only one but sometimes up to four increments on the basis of seniority, although four agencies did not pay any increments at all; for home helps the most common pattern was a flat rate. None of the agencies in any way linked wages and classifications with skills development. In other words, there was no provision for a skills-based career path: the skills and experiences workers brought to the job were seldom recognized and they were not rewarded for further skills training.

This was notwithstanding our finding in the skills audit that home care workers came to the job with a range of qualifications (38 percent had technical or vocational qualifications, including nursing, and 23 percent had undertaken specific training courses in the areas of disability or community services). They also came to the job with an array of unpaid and volunteer, as well as paid work experiences. They had worked with the disabled, poor and sick, and had volunteered in transport, meals on wheels and fund raising. Nearly 30 percent had previous nursing experience. Fifteen percent spoke a language other than English; some of them used these language skills in their work.

Agencies differed in the amount of in-house training they offered. The large organization offered a systematic training program; only four of the smaller agencies provided more than 40 hours of training during the year. Some were simply unable to afford to pay their workers for their training; others saw no need because their workers were independent contractors and "already skilled enough." But where training courses were provided, workers were keen to enrol in them. The skills audit revealed that workers had taken a large number of in-house courses, not necessarily leading to formal qualifications but deemed useful in their daily tasks. These included short skills courses in grief counselling, death and dying, first aid, incontinence, health and hygiene, or care of dementia sufferers. Some coordinators showed a strong awareness of the demanding nature of caregivers' work and deliberately arranged in-house training to assist their workers with stress-management. One suggested that in-house courses strengthened workers' sense of professionalism. In her words:

There is a real temptation for a worker to say, "Well, it is all common sense. I have been doing this for two years, I know what she needs, I know what I'm doing." You need to remind them regularly that it is a professional, paid relationship they are in and they need to be able to stand back. Training helps that.

Overall, the qualifications, experiences and skill development through in-house training of these workers had little or no affect on their opportunities in paid work. They were not paid according to their level of skill; length of experience and skills training were rarely considered in their pay rates. For example, many of the respite workers who participated in the skills audit had nursing qualifications, but they earned barely more than the home helps. Only two care aides received an extra increment in recognition of their first-aid training. The potentially positive impact of AR, then--the chance to have one's skills recognized and rewarded --had not been experienced by these home caregivers.

Summary and Discussion

Processes of privatization have effectively created a new paid work force in home and community care.(5) This work force is employed in Western Australia in a plethora of small community organizations, which perform contracted-out services for government (Evatt Research Centre, 1990; Baldock & Mulligan, 1996, Earles & Moon, 1998). Traditionally such community organizations have had a number of common features. They have been run by management committees of volunteers, together with a paid or unpaid coordinator/manager, and have been characterized by an ideology of "good works" reinforced by the use of volunteers (Baldock, 1994). They have been organizations without clear distinctions between employers and employees, where the emphasis has been on the satisfaction of clients rather than the rights of workers. They have generally been award-free workplaces, and employers and employees have lacked familiarity with industrial processes (Byrne, 1990).

We believe that these various features have had a profound effect on the opportunities for women working in home care in Western Australia to negotiate improved working conditions in the context of AR. The interviews conducted with agency coordinators as well as the skills audits among workers showed that home helps, care aides and respite workers are multi-skilled, using a range of technical, organizational and communication skills to deal with complex tasks, in situations where independent decision-making was often required. Under the principles of AR, these should be grounds for the creation of new industrial award conditions, which link wage rates to skills and competencies, thereby generating a genuine career path for these workers. Yet our findings indicate that this has not happened. In the large organization, which is covered by industrial awards and had implemented some AR principles, home helps had gained the opportunity for carrying out some care aide tasks, with commensurate pay increases. However, in the small agencies care aides had been de-skilled. In only a few of the agencies had nursing qualifications been acknowledged, and all other skills were taken for granted. Most of the workers we surveyed in skills audits had gained these skills prior to taking on their duties, and had continually upgraded them through short in-house courses. They were not rewarded for this, and for the dedication they displayed in undertaking this training.

From 1987, attempts were made in Western Australia to introduce an industry-wide Home and Community Care award. These were stalled by a number of factors, including demarcation disputes between unions, obstructionist practices by employers, and the inability of unions to effectively target the ever-growing number of small community groups that tendered for HACC services. They were ultimately derailed by the introduction of Enterprise Bargaining and Workplace Agreements. At present, governments at the federal and state levels strongly advocate individual Workplace Agreements in preference to awards. Improved productivity through flexibility is now almost exclusively defined in terms of part-time and casual employment, not in terms of training and skills acquisition. The work conditions and workplace culture in small privatized community organizations, therefore, are becoming the norm rather than the exception for paid workers in home care.

The work carried out in home care is typically caring labour, which in Australia (and beyond) is generally seen to be the "natural" province of women. Processes of privatization will increasingly move this "women's work" back into nonprofit community and voluntary organizations. The workplace culture of such organizations, together with their dependence on (limited) government funding, is even less conducive than that of large enterprises to the recognition and adequate remuneration of the multiple skills involved in this women's work.

Notes

(1.) The organization and scope of the industrial relations system has changed considerably over time, and terms used to describe the relevant institutions have also changed. For a useful general overview, see Fox et al., 1995.

(2.) The Structural Efficiency Principle (SEP) as developed in the National Wage Case of 1988 states that "increases in wages and salaries or improvements in conditions shall be justified if the union(s) party to an award formally agree(s) to cooperate positively in a fundamental review of that award with a view to implementing measures to improve the efficiency of industry and provide workers with access to more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs" (Fox et al., 1995, p. 612).

(3.) Community organizations play a significant role in the delivery of HACC services in Western Australia compared with some other states. Thus community organizations receive 80 percent of HACC funding in Western Australia, but only 20 percent in New South Wales (Lyons, 1998, pp. 17).

(4.) This organization did not employ respite workers.

(5.) It has, in addition, created a work force of unpaid caregivers: volunteers in community agencies, and unpaid family members providing care in the home.

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Author:Baldock, Cora V.; Mulligan, Denise
Publication:Resources for Feminist Research
Date:Jan 1, 2000
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