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Representations of the Republic at war: Lille and Toulon, 1792-1793.

Les historiens ont toujours eu tendance a considerer les batailles de Valmy (le 20 septembre 1792) et Wattignies (du 15 au 16 octobre 1793) comme les moments decisifs de la defense de la France republicaine. Aux yeux des publicistes de l'epoque, cependant, ce sont les sieges de Lille (du 29 septembre au 8 octobre 1792) et de Toulon (du 27 aout au 19 decembre 1793) qui jouent le role le plus important dans ce domaine. Les representations, qu'ont faites ces derniers des deux sieges nous renseignent sur las place quoccupe la guerre dans l'imaginaire revolutionnaire, aussi bien que sur les relations qui existent ente la guerre et la tereur dans le discours revolutionnaire. Les deux sieges, malgre certaines differences, ont donne aux publicistes revolutionnaires l'occasion de celebrer le mythe du peuple en armes. Il faut, bein sur, reconnaire les realities - generaux suspects et soldats indisciplines et depourvus des necessites de la guerre - mais on peut quand meme soutenir le mythe de l'invincibilite republicaine en dramatisant les exploits des volontaires et des citoyens de tout age qui se sont rallies a la republique. On oppose a cet heroisme republicain la brutalite et la lachete de l'ennemi. En insistant que seule la trahison permettrait a cet ennemi inhumain de remporter des succes, les revolutionnaires justifient une conduite militaire implacable et une repression sans pitie des collaborateurs internes de l'ennemi etranger.

Des etudes recentes ont mine l'intrepretation selon laquelle la terreur serait un instrument de defense patriotique: on a demontre que les revolutionnaires eux-memes n'auraient cite que tres rarement la guerre comme justification des mesures terroristes. Mais en fait, dans leurs interpretations des sieges de Lille et de Toulon, les propagandistes revolutionnaires justifient la terreur comme moyen d'extirper la trahison, seul espoir de l'ennemi. Les sieges de Lille et de Toulon occupent une place importante dans l'imaginaire revolutionnaire parce qu'elles demonstrent si bien que tout citoyen devait choisir entre l'heroisme et la trahison.


LILLE AND TOULON, 1792-1793(*)

It has been said that the first casualty of any war is the truth.(1) The management of the media and the production of propaganda are, to a greater or lesser degree, functions of all war-time governments. The interpretation and exploitation of military events for political purposes - to mobilize the populace, discredit domestic opposition, or influence international opinion - are essential elements in this process. Interestingly, for a period that is regarded as having been of seminal importance both for giving rise to modern political journalism and for generating a military revolution,(2) the French Revolution has attracted little scholarly attention to its representation of military events by the media. This inattention is all the more remarkable given the debate on the links between war and terror. Was the Terror, as some historians have argued, an expedient of national defence, or was it inherent in the dynamic of revolutionary ideology? Mona Ozouf's analysis of revolutionary discourse suggests that, in their justifications of terrorist measures, the revolutionaries themselves gave little place to the demands of war; the requirements of patriotic defence bulked larger in the minds of historians than in those of the revolutionaries(3) Nevertheless, the rationalization of terrorist legislation represents only one side of the revolutionary discourse on war and terror. The other side consists of the contemporary representation of particular military events or circumstances. An analysis of how politicians and publicists interpreted those even$s should provide us with greater understanding of the ways in which war and terror were linked in revolutionary discourse.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the revolutionary discourse on the war by focusing on two events that appear to have had particular significance in contemporary consciousness: the sieges of Lille and Toulon. Although historians have generally represented the military history of the revolution as a series of campaigns resolved by great battles - Valmy, Jemappes, Neerwinden, Wattignies, Fleurus - it is striking that revolutionary politicians, journalists, poets, playwrights and artists devoted so much of their attention to these two sieges. At a glance, the two events appear dissimilar. Lille was a fortress successfully defended; Toulon was one that had to be retaken. The first siege occurred at the birth of the republic; the second in the midst of the Jacobin Terror. Nevertheless, both events transpired at critical moments in the military and political history of the revolution. The siege of Lille came as "la patrie en danger" sought to fend off the invading Austrian and Prussian armies; it also took place in the aftermath of that notorious precursor of the Terror, the September Massacres. The siege of Toulon was part of an even more desperate struggle against a coalition which by now, in addition to Prussia and Austria, included England, Spain, Naples, and Holland. The struggle for Toulon also coincided with a significant stage in the evolution of the Terror, as terror was made "the order of the day," the revolutionary armies set afoot, and the Law of Suspects passed. The recapture of the port city came only days after the Law of 14 Frimaire - the "constitution of the Terror" - had been passed by the National Convention. An analysis of contemporary representations of these two sieges should provide an insight into the nature of revolutionary discourse not just on the war, but also on the relationship between war and terror.

The fact that it was two sieges - as opposed to battles in the field - that figured so prominently in the revolutionary imagination invites consideration of the differences between sieges and battles. The fundamental distinction is that sieges are much more likely to involve civilians as well as soldiers, though the degree of involvement can vary enormously, according to custom or circumstance. Christopher Duffy, writing on siege warfare in early modern Europe, states: "These old sieges also have a modern relevance because they plunged settled populations into more immediate danger than did any other kind of warfare until the advent of aerial bombing."(4) Citizens of a besieged fortress might witness their homes razed by a military governor attempting to clear fields of fire, they might be expelled from the fortress as so many "useless mouths" (and quite possibly forced back in by the besieging force, as the inhabitants of Tournai were by the French in 1745), or they might be expected to bear arms alongside regular forces (as did the "valiant amazons" who served the guns of San Matheo against the French in 1649).(5) Outside the city walls, peasants suffered the depradations of the besieging force, and might be compelled to assist in the preparation of field fortifications and entrenchments. Inevitably, in such circumstances the distinction between combatant and noncombatant tended to disappear, and civilians often became victims of fire and sword. Bombardment, regarded as an admissible though distasteful practice by jurists, was particularly feared by civilian populations. The French generally refrained from bombarding towns, but other armies, lacking the resources to mount a formal siege, often had no option, and even the French suffered "lapses" (at Brussels in 1695 and at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747).(6) Most fearsome of all was the plight of civilians in a city taken by storm. Murder, rape, and pillage were the privilege of the conquering forces, in principle for three days. The most notorious examples of towns being put to the sword come from the seventeenth century, but one should not exaggerate the enlightenment of eighteenth-century armies.(7)

For civilians to insist upon their nonbelligerency was virtually impossible in such circumstances, though there were occasions when townsfolk made pleas for mercy on the grounds that the conflict did not concern them. Neutrality was hardly ever an option in sieges. It is this point that brings us back to the French Revolution. It was above all because they illustrated so well the idea that there could be no neutrals in the struggle against despotism that the sieges of Lille and Toulon appealed to the revolutionary imagination. Every man, woman, and child must choose between heroism and treason - there was no middle ground. This was the idea, of central importance in the manichean political universe inhabited by the revolutionaries, that inspired the mythologizing of the sieges of Lille and Toulon. By celebrating the heroism of the citizens and citizen-soldiers who had defended the besieged Republic, and by denigrating the "traitors" who had yielded to an atrocious and inhumane foe, revolutionary publicists justified the use of terror as a means to defend the nation-in-arms against its internal enemies.

The siege of Lille in 1792 was, from a purely military perspective, not a significant event. On this, historians are in agreement. Pierre Rocolle writes of "a siege that wasn't one," pointing out that the Austrian forces commanded by Field Marshal Browne lacked the means to do more than mask the eastern approaches to the town, which therefore maintained its ability to communicate with the outside world.(8) The garrison, secure behind the walls of Vauban's great fortress, outnumbered their assailants by nearly two to one.(9) The inhabitants of Lille were subjected to bombardment, but after only ten days the Austrian forces withdrew, leaving the Lillois to celebrate their "victory." In the words of Louis Trenard: "There was no siege in the proper sense of the term. It was a sharp attack and bombardment."(10) The confidence expressed by the deputy Gossuin when he announced the bombardment to the National Convention would appear to have been welll-founded: "At this moment Lille is being bombarded, but I beg the Assembly to be not in the least concerned." One hundred thousand men, he stated, would be necessary to take the place, and the Austrians numbered fewer than twenty thousand.(11)

The bombardment itself would appear to have been more limited than contemporary reports claimed. As early as 3 October, General Ruault, commander of the garrison, claimed that a quarter of the houses in Lille had already been burned,(12) and an oft-cited letter from the commissars sent to Lille by the National Convention claimed that five hundred houses had been destroyed by fire and another two thousand damaged. This was the effect of an estimated thirty thousand "boulets rouges" and six thousand exploding shells.(13) A correspondent of Brissot's Le Patriote Francais calculated that the enemy batteries had comprised two hundred guns. The estimates of historians are more conservative. Louis Trenard enumerates the Austrian artillery at twenty-two cannon and sixteen mortars, while Pierre Rocolle, emphasizing the technical difficulties of firing heated shot and drawing on Austrian sources, calculates a total of 13,100 balls and 2,239 mortar shells being fired.(14) Despite the claim made by the administrators of the Departement du Nord that "many roads have disappeared,"(15) the map of Lille remained unchanged in the aftermath of the bombardment.

This is not to say that no damage was done. The drawings of Hippolyte Verly, depicting the destruction of the Eglise Saint-Etienne, and showing the bombed-out houses of Line, possess an authenticity unmistakable to the twentieth-century eye. Nevertheless, it is clear that contemporaries sought to exaggerate both the scale and the importance of the Austrian attack on Lille.

That the administrators of Lille should have made the most of their city's resistance is hardly surprising. Their loyalty to the new Republic was considered doubtful and they were under considerable pressure to prove themselves. The electors of the Departement du Nord, writing to the Convention at the outset of the siege, claimed that "the administrators and the municipality, with the exception of a few members, have given the most authentic proof of aristocracy. There is everything to reproach them for. They would be cowardly enough to surrender the town." The electors promised to remain at their post until the municipal officials had been replaced by "men worthy of the revolution."(16) Furthermore, Roland, minister of the interior, had explained very clearly, in reply to requests for military assistance, what was required of the municipal authorities if they mere to prove themselves worthy of the revolution.

Oppose, Gentlemen, steadfastness and courage to the oppressor who approaches your walls, and you will render useless all his efforts. Imagine if strongholds

judged impregnable at a time when they were guarded by mercenaries trembled when soldiers of liberty watched over their defence! Let our enemies be convinced that they will only enter our towns after the inhabitants and the garrison are buried beneath their walls, and they will draw back in fear. That, gentlemen, is what administrators must inspire; you are worthy of such heroism.(17)

This challenge was answered by the citizens and garrison of Lille, echoing the very words used by Roland, in their reports of the siege. "The bombardment continues," wrote the aide-de-camp of General Ruault on 5 October, "but the garrison and all the citizens of this town have decided to be buried under the ruins rather than to weaken for even a moment."(18) The same phrase was repeated in a letter cited by Gorsas's Courrier des Departemens: "The brave people of Lille are disposed to brave every danger and to be buried under the ruins rather than surrender."(19) In fact, the general council of the district of Lille found it could only justify its patriotism by improving on the formula: "We will be buried, not beneath the ruins of the houses, but beneath those of the ramparts after not a single building is left standing."(20) Similarly, the "procureur-syndic" of Lille insisted on 2 October that "the Austrians will not take us, and if the walls are knocked down, we will fight them to the death. ... The people conduct themselves so as to avenge themselves upon their detractors."(21)

It was not just local officials and administrators, however, who sought to dramatize the siege. On 30 September 1792, the National Convention sent six of its members to the Departement du Nord, armed with unlimited powers to oversee the military authorities of the region.(22) The reports of these representatives on mission, read to the National Convention, and widely publicized in the press, provided the most effective dramatization of Lille's resistance. On 6 October, the commissars reported that "we arrived yesterday, around eight o'clock in the evening, at this town where one sees at every step the signs of the barbarity and vengefulness of the tyrants.... But this people, upon whom mere founded the vilest hopes, has proved itself a people of heroes."(23) A second letter, written the following day, was equally dramatic: "Yesterday afternoon we traversed the still-smoking ruins of the Saint-Sauveur quarter. We were followed by a crowd of citizens who, walking with us upon the ruins of their homes, upon the ashes of their furnishings, upon their goods, and upon their friends and relatives buried in the debris, by turns deplored their sorrows and cried with courage, |Vive la nation, vive la Republique, perissent les tyrans.'"(24)

The Parisian press, similarly, hastened to glorify the citizens of Lille. Prudhomme's Revolutions de Paris, for example, insisted upon the symbolic acts of defiance of the Lillois: playing "boule" with cannon balls on the main square; placing a "bonnet rouge"on a "boulet rouge;" and rescuing another liberty bonnet from the spire of the burning church (Illustration #1).(25) Gorsas, in his Courrier des Departemens, evoked the spontaneous organization of civil defence measures by the citizens,(26) and their efforts to extinguish "boulets rouges" in buckets of water, crying "Vive la Republique: here is another drowned incendiary!"(27)

This determination to publicize the resistance of Lille, manifested by politicians and journalists at the national as well as the local level, is only explicable if the broader political and military context is considered. The basic elements of this situation are well known. The war, begun with such enthusiasm in the spring, had gone very badly for the French in the summer of 1792, and the progress of the Duke of Brunswick's armies had only been arrested by the victory of Kellermann at Valmy on 20 September. In the meantime, military reverses had impinged upon the domestic political situation, intensifying the conflicts precipitated by the Revolution, and contributing to both the overthrow of the monarchy on 10 August and the September Massacres. These reverses flouted revolutionary expectations and predictions, particularly those of the Brissotin orators who had made the running in preparing France for war and who continued to assert their influence in the National Convention and in the press. According to enthusiasts such as Isnard, a free people could not help but prevail in a struggle against the slaves of tyrants: "Ten million Frenchmen, burning with the fire of liberty, armed with the sword, with the pen, with reason and with eloquence, could alone, if provoked, change the face of the world and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay."(28) The problem for revolutionary propagandists in the autumn of 1792 was to reconcile the idealized image of an invincible nation-in-arms with the reality of an army riven by internal dissension, demoralized by the emigration and desertion of its leaders, and lacking both men and materiel. And not only was the ideal threatened by the indifferent performance of the army, but also by the treason of citizens themselves. The precipitous surrender of Longwy and Verdun to the advancing Prussians was even more damning evidence of the gulf between revolutionary myth and revolutionary reality. What was desperately required was some concrete evidence with which to sustain the myth of revolutionary invincibility.

It is interesting to witness the struggle by revolutionary journalists to resolve this problem. Clearly, not aU journalists interpreted the events of the war in the same manner. Their sources of information often varied, they gave priority to different events, and their comments on those events often reflected a highly individualistic slant. Nevertheless, there mere, in the autumn of 1792, a number of common features to the representation of the war in the Parisian press.

Firstly, there was a determination to provide reassurance that the myth of revolutionary invincibility did, in spite of the setbacks sustained in the preceding months, possess some basis in reality. Journalists continued to insist that a nation of free men was more than a match for the armies composed of the slaves of tyrants, and they continued to compare the resistance of the French to the heroes of Greek and Roman antiquity, or to the more recent heroes of Switzerland. Gorsas, in the same issue of his paper that gave news of Longwy's surrender to the Prussians, sought to stiffen the resolve of his readers with such historical inspiration.

Timoleon, exiled to Tauromenium with a thousand citizens, and with hardly any provisions, took Syracuse, delivered its inhabitants, put himself at their head and defeated seventy thousand Carthaginians. ... A single Roman threw fear into the camp of the king of Etruria, and forced him to raise the siege .... Three hundred Spartans caused the defeat of all the forces of Asia .... A handful of Swiss, on the plain of St. Jacques, made thousands of Austrians bite the dust.... And me Frenchmen, enlightened and courageous, unshaken by the conspiracies that are constantly recurring, or by the hatred of all the courts of Europe, should we tremble before thirty thousand Prussians? Certainly not!(29) Reverses might be sustained, owing to the treason of generals or of cowardly citizens, said Gorsas, but eventually victory was assured. In fact, Gorsas went so far as to argue that the defeats themselves, by rousing the people to action, would help prepare the ultimate victory. On 5 September, he wrote: "We have said, and we repeat, the taking of Longwy truly was a victory; a reverse was necessary in order to prove to Parisians, and perhaps to our departments, that oaths to live free or die, cries of ca ira! and vive la Nation! would not suffice to bring down powerful enemies." What was needed was men, bayonets, cannon, and a "universal insurrection" against the enemy?(30) When news of the fall of Verdun arrived a few days later, Gorsas remained undaunted. "The cowardice of the people of Verdun," he wrote, "is a memorable conquest."(31) Two or three more such "victories," he concluded, would be necessary before the people mere thoroughly awake.

A central preoccupation of the revolutionary press, therefore, was to applaud and to stimulate the patriotic response of Frenchmen to the foreign invasion. Gorsas praised the enthusiasm of those who volunteered for military service as well as of the relatives who encouraged them to do so. Typically, he evoked the heroes of antiquity, comparing a mother who proffered her three children to the National Assembly to the women of Sparta who had exposed the bodies of their children on the field of battle.(32) The Bulletin de la Convention Nationale devoted a large proportion of its columns to describing the enthusiasm of citizens to supply men and money to the war effort. The early issues of the journal had a tripartite format, under the headings "Nouvelles des Armees," "Suite de Preparatifs contre I'Ennemi," and "Mesures de precaution et de surete generale." Terse and factual in its presentation, as befitted an official publication, the paper nonetheless sought to provide both reassurance and encouragement to the French people by demonstrating the willing response by patriotic citizens to the call to arms. The first issue of the journal, for example, cited the report of commissars at Melun who stated that "the people appeared to them to be animated by the most ardent patriotism . . . ; the roads are covered with volunteers leaving to join the army . . . . Everywhere there is but one cry: Liberty and Equality."(33)

Thus the spirit of patriotic resistance was shown to be a potent reality. But the realities of ill-discipline within the army and treason within the high command could not be ignored. Journalists were generally very frank in recognizing these unpleasant realities, at the same time as they insisted upon the will of the people to overcome any obstacle. It is clear that the forces defending Lille and the Department du Nord suffered from problems of discipline. The dispatch of the representatives on mission to the department was itself prompted by the failure of General Moreton's army (left in defence of the northern frontier when General Dumouriez and the bulk of the forces concentrated at the Camp de Maulde departed southwards to support the Army of the Centre) to consolidate its control of the village of Saint-Amand. General Moreton reported that "from the moment our troops took possession of the town, it became impossible to contain the soldiers. They disbanded, they pillaged many houses and became drunk in such a way that they would have been unable to face the enemy had he presented himself."(34) Nor was the garrison of Lille immune to such conduct. A letter from the administrators of Lille, published in the Journal du Soir, reported that a number of soldiers had been arrested for pillaging houses during the bombardment?(35)

Of course, the misconduct of the soldiers could be explained away, as it was in the case of General Moreton's forces, by blaming the officers or civil authorities. The problem of incompetent or treacherous leadership was much more vexatious. Marat had been telling his readers for months that generals were not to be trusted. In making his first judgement of Dumouriez in April 1792, Marat gave him grudging approval as an "excellent patriot:" "But I will say it endlessly, were he an angel to be watchful is the first duty of every good citizen."(36) Wary that military success might bring to the fore a "man on horseback," and scornful of militaristic display, Marat went so far as to call for the wholesale replacement of the existing officer corps.(37) Marat, in reporting on the siege of Lille, had little trouble identifying the reason for the military reverses of the revolution: "How could we not have reverses, when you consider the traitors at the head of our armies, and in our strongholds?"(38)

Other writers were more specific in criticizing the generals who mere responsible in some way for the siege of Lille. Attention focused, in particular, upon the raising of the Camp de Maulde, which had cleared the way to an Austrian invasion, as well as upon the conduct of General Duhoux, who briefly commanded the garrison of Lille on the eve of the siege, before being replaced by General Ruault. Prudhomme, in providing his account of the bombardment of Lille, was prepared to accept Dumouriez's decision to raise the Camp de Maulde, but not the adequacy of General Moreton's subsequent defence of the northern frontier against the Austrians.

Was it then physically impossible, in raising the Camp de Maulde, to prevent the irruption of the Austrians into our countryside? Could the horrors they would commit there not be foreseen; and was it necessary to give up forty communes to the ferocity of these brigands? Responsibility for the disasters in Flanders rests upon the head of General Moreton: he raised the Camp de Maulde against all the rules, with unheard of negligence; he should have done everything possible to cover the frontier that he has left unprotected and open. There is no half-way house, he is an incompetent or a traitor.(39)

Prudhomme's criticisms were echoed in other newspapers. The Chronique de Paris published several letters protesting the evacuation of the Camp de Maulde(40) nonetheless concluding that citizens should for the time being suspend judgement on the matter: "If this measure has saved Paris, are our generals guilty?"(41)

Journalists may have been ready to accept the military necessity for raising the Camp de Maulde. They were less forgiving in the affair of General Duhoux. Lieutenant-General Charles Francois Duhoux, a cavalry commander of some twenty years service, had been appointed commander of Lille in the summer of 1792. Subsequently appointed to command the army at the Camp de Soissons, and ordered to lead that army to Reims, Duhoux nevertheless returned alone to Lille, where he resumed command of the garrison on 23 September. The general's failure to heed his orders from the Ministry of War brought him under suspicion, as did the fact that he was distantly related to prominent figures in the emigre army. Accused of being a "secret enemy agitator,"(42) Duhoux was suspended from his post just as the siege of Lille got under way, and ordered to present himself at the bar of the Convention.(43) Again, Duhoux was dilatory in responding to his orders, and remained in Line throughout the siege. Not until 10 October did he arrive in Paris, where he justified the delay by arguing that in the circumstances of the bombardment, "to leave would have been a sort of cowardice."(44) Duhoux subsequently published a "Memoire justificatif" in which he explained his actions at Soissons and Reims, as well as his role in the defence of Lille. Claiming to have been ceaselessly present in the streets and at the batteries, Duhoux asserted that, through his activity, "I was happy to protect one of the keys to France by maintaining order among the sixty thousand citizens of this town."(45)

By the time Duhoux arrived in Paris, the attacks on him had already received a thorough airing in the press. On 4 October, Gorsas published a letter from Douai that accused Duhoux not only of disobeying the commands he had received from General Labourdonnaye, ordering him to Paris, but also of being "at the head of the anti-revolutionary faction" at Lille, and having made himself a demagogue to win the support of the people. Interestingly, the letter charged Duhoux with being "the supporter of Marat,"(46) a charge echoed by Le Patriote Francais, which announced the suspension of Duhoux for causing trouble at Lille, "en faisant le petit Marat." "One must observe," pointed out the paper's editor, "that he is not the only aristocrat who has made himself a demagogue; so long as the enemies of the fatherland can cause harm, what does it matter to them under which guise?"(47) On another occasion, the paper raised the question of Duhoux's fondness for drink: "This is the greatest vice for which one can reproach a general, and it would be an inexcusable folly to give an army to the command of a man who cannot command such a base passion."(48)

Prudhomme made perhaps the most devastating attacks on the generals in relation to the Duhoux affair. Representing Duhoux and Labourdonnaye as bitter personal rivals, the Revolutions de Paris charged them with prolonging needlessly the sufferings of Lille - Duhoux by refusing to give up command of the town, Labourdonnaye by coming to Lille's aid reluctantly and belatedly.

Let us say the word: Labourdonnaye and Duhoux disliked each other; they did not want anything to do with each other, they did not want to meet. The "amour propre" of Duhoux was mortified to give up his command. Labourdonnaye did not care at all to have to continue certain of Duhoux's operations. Meanwhile under their eyes Lille was falling in ruins.(49)

Hence, Prudhommes conclusion "that it is again our generals who have prolonged the agonies of that unhappy town."(50)

General Labourdonnaye sought to defend his reputation by writing letters to the National Convention as well as to Prudhomme, accusing the journalist of seeking to assassinate the generals. Prudhomme replied, with a self-righteousness worthy of Marat, that he was simply fulfilling his duty as a "watchful citizen," and that it was better to suspect a good citizen than to leave a traitor unpunished.(51)

The significant fact concerning the siege of Lille, therefore, from the point of view of revolutionary publicists, was that despite the ill-discipline of some troops, and despite the incompetent (at best) or treacherous (at worst) conduct of the generals, the citizens of Lille had nonetheless successfully resisted the invader. Here was evidence, therefore, that the patriotic spirit of the people was, after all, invincible. Writers hastened to pay tribute to the citizens of Lille who exemplified such patriotism: the citizen Ovigneur, who continued to serve his gun even though he knew his house was burning, the barber Maes, who shaved his customers using a shell fragment as a basin (Illustration #2); the Belgian volunteers who "are like lions when they are under fire."(52) And to show that patriotism was not exclusively adult and male, children mere applauded for their eagerness to extinguish the matches on shells fired at the town, as was a citizeness for helping to serve the guns on the ramparts, firing eighty cannon balls at the enemy? These and other examples were used to sustain the image of a nation-in-arms, able to prevail over any obstacle by force of will alone. By celebrating the men, women, and children of Lille as the ones responsible for victory, it was possible to discount the role of the army, whose loyalties were clearly suspect. Thus, Prudhomme and Marat both insisted that the stemming of the enemy invasion was anything but a military victory. "A war finished in this way," wrote Prudhomme," is perhaps the triumph of philosophy, but not a military triumph."(54) Marat was, predictably, even more insistent that it was not the generals who mere responsible for victory: "It is neither our ministers, nor our generals; it is events, it is nature, it is the civic spirit of the soldiers of the fatherland . . . . Voracity, drunkenness, the bloody flux have rid us of the Austrians and Prussians. There is the first cause of our triumphs."(55) It is above all this scepticism toward the line army and its commanders, at its most extreme in l'Ami du Peuple, but apparent also within the "Girondin" newspapers, that explains the relative lack of attention to the purely military victory at Valmy and the outpouring of enthusiasm for the volunteers and civilians who defended Lille.

A major theme of the writers celebrating these volunteers and civilians was how the latter's heroism contrasted with the cowardice and cruelty of the enemy forces. On 10 September, the Patriote Francais reported on the "brigandage" and "atrocities" committed at Roubaix and elsewhere in the Departement du Nord, remarking that peasants in the countryside had been forced to flee to Lille in order to escape "this horrible rapine."(56) And once the siege of Lille, was under way, reports of the bombardment compared the "murderous mercenaries" of the Austrian army to "fierce beasts," animated only by the lust for pillage. They were condemned for ignoring the conventions of war, for having "begun the siege of Lille as one ordinarily finishes sieges, that is to say with heated shot and with a bombardment."(57) A letter published in the Moniteur described this as a "new manner of making war, not only unknown among the most civilized peoples, but even among the most barbarous nations."(58) A clear double-standard was applied in order to contrast French heroism with Austrian barbarity. Catherine Chamuzard, the citizeness who served on the ramparts of Lille, was a heroine; the Archduchess Christine, sister of Marie Antoinette, who reportedly fired shots for the other side (Illustrations #3-5), was condemned as unnatural and bloodthirsty. "this act of heroism, worthy of the courtesans of the old paladins, will doubtless stand out in the memorable history of our emigres, and of the famous Duke of Brunswick," stated the Chronique de Paris, which summed up the contrast between Lille and its enemies: "Lille has covered itself with glory, and the Austrians with infamy."(59)

Emphasizing the barbarity of the enemy in this way served several functions. Firstly, as the Chronique de Paris explained, such "monstrous details" would serve to redouble the zeal of citizens anxious to avoid becoming victims of Austrian barbarity.(60) Citizens who surrendered themselves to the enemy instead of fighting to the death, it was insisted, could expect little mercy. The Gazette du Department du Nord reported that the Austrians made use of local peasants to construct their entrenchments before Lille, and that these unhappy conscripts had the choice between being shot by their captors should they seek to escape or being caught in the fire from the cannon of Lille - a dilemma caused, it was unsympathetically suggested, by their own failure to resist the invasion more vigorously.(61) Similarly, it was pointed out in the Chronique de Paris that the citizens of Verdun had gained little from their cowardliness: "Proscriptions are being exercised there with the most infamous cruelty, and the cowardly inhabitants of this town are paying dearly for their enthusiasm for Prussia."(62)

Emphasizing the barbarity of the enemy also justified the ruthless conduct of the war on the part of the French. Despite the rhetoric about liberating and enlightening the "slaves of the tyrants," the French correspondents and journalists positively revelled in the spilling of Austrian and (even better) emigre blood. Typical was a report from Lille dated 27 September: "The cannon fired all day yesterday, on both sides; ours caused great destruction; one bomb especially, which exploded in the midst of enemy workers who were building entrenchments, killed a great many and destroyed their work.(63) Another report noted with satisfaction that the Austrians required thirty-two carts to remove their casualties.(64) and the Courrier des Departemens happily reported that over thirty Austrians had been blown to bits when two mortars exploded as their operation was being demonstrated to satisfy the "bloodthirsty heart" of the Archduchess.(65) And if little compassion was reserved for Austrian soldiers, even less was expressed toward the emigres, who were charged with having committed the worst atrocities. One report claimed that during the bombardment "an army of emigre women came to be spectators at this horrible sabbat, and sent eaux de vie to the gunners."(66) Such conduct justified a ruthless response, and the Chronique de Paris reported cold-bloodedly on 9 October that "at the exits of Lille, emigre prisoners have been hacked to pieces by our soldiers."(67)

Finally, the emphasis upon the enemy's ferocity also served to justify the use of terror against cowards and traitors whose actions threatened to assist the enemy. It was endlessly reiterated that the enemy depended upon treason for his success. Longwy and Verdun had fallen only because of the cowardice of their inhabitants; the Austrians were counting upon the same response from Lille. Revolutionary publicists insisted upon the need to discourage treason by resorting to terror. Gorsas, approving measures taken by the Legislative Assembly against Longwy, stated: "It is necessary that terror hang over the heads of the guilty ones."(68) Another writer compared the destinies of Longwy and Verdun to that of Lille: "Just in its punishments as with its rewards, the Republic will know how to acquit itself toward both the one and the others."(69) Even within Lille, however, terror was used to encourage patriotism. Once the Austrian summons to surrender had been rebuffed, "upon the instant a gallows was set up on the square, to hang whoever dared speak of surrender."(70) Suspects were arrested and in the aftermath of the siege, the representatives on mission sought to punish municipal officials and citizens who had been disloyal: "The perfidious accomplices of the Austrian brigands daily pay the price for their villainy."(71) The stark contrast drawn between the Lillois and the savagery of the enemy was calculated to justify such terrorism. Citizens could choose the path of patriotism, in which case they could expect the protection of the state (the citizens of Lille were promised compensation for their losses); or they could choose the path of surrender, in which case they could expect mercy neither from the inhumane foe nor from the nation they had betrayed.

These themes, developed in the press, were echoed by other media, notably the theatre. The siege of Lille inspired several theatrical presentations. Bertin d'Antilly received particular praise from the Revolutions de Paris for his version of the Siege de Lille, when it was performed at the Theatre de la rue Feydeau. In particular, the contrast drawn between the heroism of the Lillois and the cowardice of a M. de Verdun won the journal's approval. Furthermore, art and patriotism were deemed, on this occasion, to have made a happy marriage: "The oath to resist to the death is one of the finest musical compositions that we know."(72) In contrast, the same reviewer had little good to say about de Joigny's Siege de Lille,(73) performed at the Theatre des Italiens. The effort to mix patriotism with romance (the play's subtitle was Cecile et Julien) was scorned. The public seemed to share the preferences of the Revolutions de Paris. On 19 November, it was reported by the Chronique de Paris that "the representations of the siege of Lille are drawing crowds to the theatre de la rue Feydeau."(74) The paper also reported that Felix Wimpfen, hero of the siege of Thionville, and himself soon to be the subject of a play, was one of the spectators at the theatre. Acclaimed by the crowd, Wimpfen was crowned with a laurel wreath. The general thus helped to bring representation and reality together, lending authenticity to the play, and having his own reputation enhanced by the play's idealized characterization of the defenders of the fatherland.

Plays and songs celebrating the resistance of Lille were calculated to keep the memory of the siege alive, and in the months following the siege, the example of Lille continued to be invoked as an inspiration to the defenders of the fatherland. In November 1793, Catherine Chamuzard was applauded at the Jacobin club of Paris for her role in the city's defence;(75) Also in November, Gregoire recalled the example of the "immortal people of Lille" in his report on the means to assemble an Annales du Civisme:

When posterity reads that they competed for the right to pull out the burning matches of bombs; that a wig-maker, laughing in the midst of danger, ran to collect a shell fragment which immediately served to shave fourteen citizens; that a ball fired into the meeting place of the departmental administration was declared to be "in permanence;" ancient mythology will seem to be revived in history.(76)

Gregoire's emphasis upon posterity was echoed in February 1794, when the president of the National Convention, speaking to a deputation of Lillois, assured them that the siege of Lille "is already engraved with ineffaceable characters the annals of our glorious revolution."(77) By this time, however, the Revolution had another victor to celebrate - the recapture of Toulon.

The siege of Toulon (27 August-19 December 1793.) is usually represented as a stage in the development of Napoleon Bonaparte, and it is usually Bonaparte who is credited with responsibility for the victory, rather than General Dugommier, the representatives on mission, or even the republican forces themselves. Bonaparte's plan for the conduct of the siege, adopted and successfully implemented by the republican army, is laid out in one of the first documents of his official correspondence.(78) Las Cases refers to this plan of attack in the Memorial de Ste.-Helene, saying that it was fulfilled, "word for word," in the accomplishment of the city's evacuation.(79) Nineteenth-century prints celebrating the Napoleonic legend reinforced this view of the siege, depicting the young artillery officer giving direction to officers and men, as well as actively helping to fire cannon or leading troops into the breach. One of these prints is particularly interesting. Represented in a frozen, iconic manner not unusual in Napoleonic imagery, Bonaparte confronts Barras, the representative on mission. The caption puts words in Bonaparte's mouth: "Get on with your job as representative, and leave me to do mine as artillerist. This battery will stay here, and responsibility for success will be upon my head." (Illustration #6) The image highlights Bonaparte's role at the expense of the representative on mission, and implicitly contradicts Barras's own account of the siege.(80)

No image of the siege of Toulon could be further from contemporary representations of that event. Those representations sought to interpret the siege of Toulon in accordance with the myth of the nation-in-arms; the Napoleonic myth had yet to be invented. The publicists of the Jacobin republic, therefore, echoed and amplified the same themes that had been developed during the siege of Lille. The victory at Toulon was represented as a victory for the patriotism and virtue of a free people, led by its elected representatives and its citizen-soldiers - not the victory of a professional soldier trained in the academies of the old regime.

The major contrast between the siege of Lille in 1792 and that of Toulon in 1793 was, of course, that Toulon had, instead of fending off the foreign enemy, given itself up to enemy occupation. On 28 August 1793, following intense debates involving the section assemblies, military garrison, and naval crews, Admiral Hood's squadron was permitted to enter the harbour of Toulon unopposed. Troops were disembarked and the town's forts occupied. As Malcolm Crook has demonstrated, this "great act of betrayal ... originated in an extremely haphazard fashion."" In mid-July, Toulon had joined the "federalist revolt" against the Jacobin Convention. This rejection of Jacobinism stemmed from essentially local conflicts that had been fueled by economic discontent; it was not founded upon a strongly-based anti-republican or royalist movement. The rebels initially insisted upon their commitment to the Republic and respected the laws passed by the Convention prior to 2 June. Nevertheless, growing discontent among workers at the arsenal and dockyards, combined with the threat of General Carteaux's advancing republican army, drove the Toulonnais into the arms of the enemy. Afraid of a Jacobin backlash from within the town as well as from General Carteaux's army, the rebels reluctantly accepted Admiral Hood's offer to defend Toulon on behalf of Louis XVII. Toulon's royalism was dictated by circumstances. Blockaded by land and by sea, the Toulonnais chose treason over surrender as the lesser of two evils. 82

The Jacobin authorities in Paris were not inclined to be understanding of the Toulonnais' dilemma. To the Montagnards, Toulon's betrayal was the result of a nefarious royalist conspiracy. Even as they had professed their commitment to the republic, the rebels had been conspiring to bring about counterrevolution in Toulon. Ultimately, the reaction in Toulon did gather pace; "patriots" were executed or imprisioned, liberty trees dug up, the tricolor replaced by the Bourbon flag, the guillotine supplanted by a gibbet, the revolutionary law permitting divorce abolished, and the rights of the church restored.(83) This simply confirmed, according to the Montagnards, that "federalists" were died-in-the-wool royalists. The betrayal of Toulon provided the Jacobins in Paris with a golden opportunity to brand their republican opponents as conspiratorial royalists, all the more dangerous (and hence undeserving of mercy) in that they hid their counterrevolutionary intentions behind the mask of patriotism.

The opening of Toulon to the English was represented by the Montagnards as the culmination of an act of treason begun when Toulon had set itself against the nation by repudiating the authority of the National Convention and imprisoning two representatives of the nation, the deputies Baille and Beauvais. This theme was insisted upon in a report read by Bertrand Barere to the National Convention on behalf of the committee of public safety. Marvelling that Frenchmen who called themselves republicans could commit an action that would have horrified the |slaves of a king,' Barere insisted that Toulon's treason demonstrated the, sinister motives of all opponents of the Jacobin Convention: "Frenchmen! who among you can still doubt that those who separate themselves from the National Convention are anything but traitors to the nation?" Barere's address ended with an uncompromising call for vengeance, proclaiming that the Toulonnais had lost all rights as Frenchmen, or even as men, by their actions: "Let the cowardly inhabitants of Toulon, the horror and the shame of the earth, finally disappear from the soil of free men."(84)

Saint-Andre, another member of the Committee of Public Safety who reported at length on Toulon's betrayal also insisted upon the idea of a royabst conspiracy, emphasizing once more that the repudiation of the Convention and the attacks made against its representatives Saint-Andre mentioned both the detention of Baille and Beauvais and the narrow escape of Barras and Freron at Pignans - the latter's sister, wife of General Lapoype, was apprehended, along with her daughter) constituted an attack on the nation itself. Saint-Andre claimed that the final act of treason had been prepared by deliberately repudiating the glorious example of Lilles and Thionvilles resistance the previous year, when two officers from those towns were removed from their posts at Toulon by the rebels." Barbre subsequently sought to discourage imitation of Longwy and Verdun instead of Lille and Thionville's by calling upon the Convention to reaffirm the law promising destruction to any town surrendering to the enemy without a fight; Toulon, he said, should be the first example.(86)

Toulon became the antithesis of Lille, then, in Jacobin propaganda. Nevertheless, the forces which had sufficed for the defence of Lille would suffice for the reconquest of Toulon. Billaud-Varennes, in responding to the first rumours of Toulon's betrayal, invoked the example of the previous year's resistance. If the news was true, he said, we must not fear to announce it to the people; because last year, in September, when the people were told that the enemy was advancing on our territory, they rose up and drove their foes from the land of liberty." Billaud affirmed that what was needed was both terror ("the need is to strike down counter-revolutionaries") and a national mobilization ("it is not laws that we need, but courage, weapons, soldiers, the rising up of the entire French people").(87)

The myth of the nation-in-arms had, of course, been given renewed significance by the time of the siege of Toulon, the levee en masse having been proclaimed in August. The Revolutions de Paris effectively publicized this myth, celebrating how by patriotism alone" the Republic had succeeded in defending itself against federalist and Vendean rebels, as well as against the coalition of European despots. The newspaper marvelled that "in the blink of an eye," the Republic could raise half a million men, "in the way other powers raise a battalion of 1500 slaves."(88) This force of fire men, it was stated, will suffice to change the face of the earth." An illustration depicted this "fine movement of five hundred thousand republicans." (Illustration #7) Red-bonneted sans-culottes, acting in perfect unison, strike down the disordered "slaves of all the tyrants." The illustration is highly symbolic. Among the weapons of this sans-culotte army, the pike, weapon of the free man, figures prominently; and the club-wielding figure in the foreground is evocative of the Herculean allegories of the People that were so prominent during the Year Two." The accompanying text was no more realistic:

There they are, establishing themselves upon the mountains, like eagies, and falling impetuously upon plains covered with slaves bribed by the despots.... Any weapon will do for them; their tactics are the desire and need they have to vanquish. However they always march together; their success is in their mass. They advance, destroying on their way all that recalls or upholds the ideas of servitude. Everywhere on their route, they say to the people: Rise up! and to the troops: Put down your arms! and to the kings: Die!(90) Such was the Revolutions de Paris's representation of the Republic at war.

Once again, the reality fell far short of the ideal. The representatives on mission attached to the force besieging Toulon were well aware that not only men, but also experience, munitions, and leadership were in short supply. Their letters to the Committee of Public Safety are a litany of complaints bemoaning the poor quality of General Carteaux's generalship (he was accused of incompetence rather than of treason) and the lack of arms. Saliceti, reporting the failure of the initial assault on the forts protecting Toulon, blamed Carteaux and his entourage: "None of them has the least understanding either of the men they lead, or of military machines, or of their effects."(91) A few days later, Saliceti and Gasparin reported that several battalions of reinforcements had arrived, but that many of the new troops were unarmed.(92) Another representative on mission to the Army of Italy, Ricord, reported on 8 October that "the greatest disorder" existed within the army besieging Toulon.(93) Saliceti and Gasparin provided a very down-to-earth assessment of the merits of their army in a letter dated 12 October. It was an army, they said, "with few experienced troops and composed for the rest of recruits, of which a part (especially those from Marseilles) have only come to serve under the flag of liberty in order to escape the suspicion of being attached to the cause they had defended against us." The representatives expressed grave doubts concerning the ability of such forces to overcome well-armed British and Spanish troops. They ended their letter with a plea for reinforcements from the army besieging Lyons.(94) Paul Barras, arriving at the army's headquarters at Ollioules in November, supported this view, demanding six thousand reinforcements from the Army of Italy: "We should not deceive ourselves by ignoring that within the army there are many fresh levies, scarcely recovered from their errors, and who, consequently, need to be supported, encouraged, watched over even, by soldiers accustomed to being under fire and to the fatigues of war."(95)

The representatives on mission showed a realistic appreciation, therefore, of the need for experience and leadership - numbers and patriotism, themselves in short supply, would not suffice. Interestingly, their views were echoed even within the ideologically-charged atmosphere of the Jacobin club of Paris. When a patriot from Grasse offered to raise up the Departement du Gard, and to send sixty thousand men to retake Toulon, Dubois-Crance replied that sixty thousand men were not necessary. "All that is required is lots of artillery." In the ensuing debate, Dubois-Crance was supported by another citizen who insisted that the requirements of a siege were different from those of war in the field: "What is needed is a limited number of hardened troops and a quantity of cannon." The matter was referred to the Committee of Public Safety.(96)

As time passed, the irritation of the representatives on mission at the failure of the Committee of Public Safety to answer their demands increased. On 27 October, they sent a strongly-worded letter to the committee reiterating their requests for a speedy replacement of General Carteaux and for reinforcements:

We repeat: Toulon, which could have been taken by a few men at the outset of the campaign, could become an impregnable bastion and a dangerous centre in the midst of the bad spirit of the southern departments. For mercy's sake, do not lose from sight our needs and their urgency. . . . It is not for an affair of glory or of national vanity that we are asking consideration, but for the most real and pressing interests of the Republic.(97)

Finally, on 13 November, Saliceti (his colleage, Gasparin, having died in the meantime) was able to announce the arrival of artillery, troops, and General Doppet from Lyons, and the anticipated arrival of General Dugommier: "Upon the arrival of the general, we hope to strike some great blows and to have important news for you."(98)

Military operations were not suspended, of course, while the army besieging Toulon waited for reinforcements. The first clashes between the republican army and the allied forces occurred at Ollioules on 31 August. By 7 September, the village was in republican hands and henceforth would serve as the headquarters for General Carteaux and his attendant representatives on mission. One of the first republican casualties at Ollioules was Captain Dommartin, commander of the artillery. His replacement, Napoleon Bonaparte, began the task of marshalling and deploying artillery with the purpose of driving the allied fleet from the inner harbour at Toulon. On 18 September, a long artillery duel commenced between Bonaparte's batteries (which were given ideologically charged tides such as "Batterie de la Convention" or "Batterie des Sans-Culottes") and the allied vessels and floating batteries deployed in the western end of the harbour. This contest favoured the French and it was the turn of English sailors to pursue heated shot with buckets.(99) Still, as Bonaparte was not alone to recognize, the key to tenability of the harbour for the allied fleet was the Balaguier Promontory, occupied and fortified by English troops on 21 September, but subsequently fiercely contested by Carteaux's forces. There were also bloody clashes centred upon the forts protecting Toulon itself. On 31 September-1 October, General Lapoype, commanding a detachment from the Army of Italy, temporarily occupied the heights of Mount Faron, before being driven off by allied forces.(100) Fort Malbousquet was another allied strongpoint troubled by French fire. On 30 November, Major-General O'Hara sought to relieve the pressure by launching a surprise attack on the neighbouring French batteries; unfortunately for him, O'Hara's forces lost their cohesion and the British general was taken prisoner.(101)

Eventually, the weight of numbers told against the allies. By early December forty thousand men encircled Toulon. Within the city, some eighteen thousand allied troops, including Neapolitans (who had arrived in four separate convoys) and Piedmontese as well as the original British and Spanish contingents, were weakened by illness and internal dissension. The allies mere also less and less confident of support from the Toulonnais. The local national guard was regarded with distrust and finally disarmed on 9 December, only a tiny battalion of fifteen hundred men entitled "Le Royal Louis" being permitted to assist in the town's defence. Barras, whose spies kept him informed of the situation within Toulon, wrote contemptuously of these French troops: "It is, they say, very amusing to see these scoundrels with a wide armband and a cross of St. Louis, without stockings or shoes and all in rags, trundling a wheel-barrow under the orders of an English or Spanish corporal."(102)

On 17 December, a month after Dugommier's arrival, the final assault began, with simultaneous attacks on "Fort Mulgrave," the fortifications protecting the Balaguier promontory, and on Mount Faron. Despite pouring rain and stout allied resistance, the republican army attained these objectives, and in the afternoon of 17 December an allied council of war made the decision to evacuate. During the next two days the evacuation of troops, as well as of some seventy-five hundred refugees, took place amidst great disorder, while Sir Sidney Smith set himself to burn the remaining French vessels and naval installations. In this enterprise, Smith was only partially successful, being hampered by the action of French convicts, who also prevented the blowing up of the arsenal. Still, nine French ships-of-the-line were destroyed before the evacuation was completed and republican troops entered the town.(103)

It was the representatives on mission who hastened to report the triumph to the Committee of Public Safety. Their letters make fascinating reading, and demonstrate the skill of the representatives as publicists. The army under their command, so flawed in their earlier accounts, has been transformed into something more closely resembling the invincible army of patriots imagined by the Revolutions de Paris. The assault on the fort of l'Eguilette takes on mythic proportions.

The enemy had used every means to render it impregnable and we assure you that few forts present a defence as imposing and inexpugnable as that redoubt. However, it could not withstand the ardour and courage of the brave defenders of the fatherland.(104) This emphasis upon "ardour and courage" was echoed by Augustin Robespierre, in the account of the siege which he gave to the Jacobin club on 9 Nivose. Explaining that the English had taken control of "a truly inaccessible height," he stated: "nothing resists republican valour. The free men wanted to take it, and the free men took it." Robespierre went on to describe individual acts of valour, citing wounded soldiers who urged on their comrades, or who returned to the fray in spite of their wounds. One soldier, he stated, had inquired about his pay before the battle, "because I want to eat my money before dying." When told it was unavailable, the soldier asked that it be given to the poor in the event of his death. This readiness to die was rewarded by the promise of double pay.(105) Robespierre's colleagues in Toulon also evoked the courage of their troops: "Make known to the whole of Europe," they wrote, "that an infinity of brave defenders of the fatherland said upon being wounded: |We are wounded, but we still have blood to spill to avenge the Republic. Representatives! Oh, but it is sweet to die for ones fatherland'." The representatives mentioned meeting men in hospital who had lost an arm but who proclaimed: "Let the enemies of the fatherland tremble; I still have another with which to destroy them!"(106)

In addition to celebrating the courage of the troops, the representatives on mission were far from reticent in commenting upon their own contributions to victory. Their reports all emphasized how important their presence was in sustaining the spirit of the soldiers. Freron, in a letter to Moyse Bayle which the latter read to the National Convention, explained that he, together with Saliceti, Robespierre, and Ricord, had marched with the columns of Dugommier's army (Barras remained with General La Poypes division). The column to which he and Ricord had attached themselves was seized with panic and began to fall back in disorder. At this point, said Freron: "I threw myself with Ricord into the midst of the bayonets." In the darkness and the rain, however, Freron was not easily identified and an officer threatened to shoot him. Another came to his support, however; the troops rallied, and the attack went forward.(107) Barere, in his report to the National Convention, took care to emphasize the role of the deputies: "The representatives of the people marched at the head of the republican columns. Saliceti Ricord, Freron, Barras, and Robespierre le jeune, swords bared, were the first to show the troops of the Republic the road to victory."(108) Interestingly, Barras and Freron seem to have believed that Barere neglected to mention them in his report, and the letter they wrote insisting upon the importance of their own roles gives a good sense not just of the self-importance of the representatives, but also of their awareness of the significance of the publicity deriving from their victory. "Why this absolute silence with respect to us," they moaned, in a report "which will be devoured by the whole of Europe?"(109)

It was not pride alone, however, that caused the representatives on mission to dramatize their own parts in the battle. Such dramatization was as essential to the ideology of the Montagnard Convention as the idea of free men conquering any obstacle by sheer force of will. Revolutionary propagandists insisted upon the identification of the National Convention with the nation. The legitimacy of the Convention and of the revolutionary government depended upon such an identification. It was important to demonstrate that the members of the Convention mere in the forefront of the struggle against the enemies of the nation. Attacks upon the representatives were by definition directed against the nation itself and it was incumbent upon members of the Convention to play a leading role in avenging such attacks.

The siege of Toulon provided the perfect opportunity to illustrate these themes. Two representatives on mission, Baille and Beauvais, had been imprisoned by the rebels of Toulon. Baille committed suicide in his cell and it was widely believed that Beauvais had done the same.(110) Beauvais was released from captivity by the republican forces, only to die shortly afterwards as a result of his privations. Baille and Beauvais were hailed as martyrs of liberty, therefore, and so was Gasparin, the deputy who died - some suspected from poisoning, but more probably from natural causes - while besieging Toulon. The leading role of the deputies to the National Convention in fighting and dying in the struggle for Toulon served to elevate the importance of that particular battle by identifying it with the cause of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, the harm done to the nation's representatives by the Toulonnais also served to brand the latter as avoid enemies of the fatherland, deserving only of the most severe vengeance. A funeral oration for Gasparin, delivered to the popular society of Marseilles, was an uncompromising plea for vengeance. Lepeletier had been avenged by the death of Louis XVI, Marat by the execution of the Girondins; Gasparin would be avenged when all the rebels, all the muscadins, all the English and Spanish within Toulon hide their shame in the depths of the sea, or fall crushed beneath the patriots? vengeful steel, and under the smoking ruins of their blazing town."(11l)

Not all the inhabitants of Toulon were deemed to be traitors, however, and examples of republican heroism were to be found even within the walls of that "infamous town." Most notable mere the "galeriens" or "forcats" who had extinguished the fires set by the English. Barere, reporting the role of these convicts to the Convention, pointedly contrasted their heroism with the perfidy of the Toulonnais.

The idea did not strike them of seeking their liberty by repudiating the interests of the Republic; they could not, in the midst of their torment, forget they were Frenchmen, and they hastened to extinguish the fires on the ships. One of them even burned his hands in extinguishing burning pitch which, placed on a powder trail, was about to set alight one of our most important magazines. If the convicts had been counter-revolutionaries, they would have encouraged the fires in order to escape through the flames; if these convicts had been like the people of Toulon, they would have helped the enemy, but by acting to the contrary, have they not paid a patriotic ransom?(112) Barere was keenly aware of how this incident could be represented as emblematic of the revolution's struggle against the old regime. The "forcats" of Toulon were represented as men whose rights had been denied them by a cruel and arbitrary regime, but who, upon recovering their liberty, thought only of the greater good of the nation. Barere persuaded the National Convention to bestow his freedom and a pension upon the prisoner who had saved the arsenal and to establish a commission to review the cases of other convicts at Toulon.(113)

There were women, too, whose role in the siege was commemorated. A female agent had joined the illustrious ranks of the martyrs of liberty when, discovered smuggling copies of the republican constitution into the city, she was executed by the rebels.(114) Freron also made much of the sufferings of his sister, the wife of General Lapoype, who had been imprisoned with her daughter. His sister's capture provided Freron with the opportunity to proclaim his own patriotism, by declaring his intention to pursue the siege with total commitment regardless of personal interest.(115) Once the city was recaptured, Freron wrote evocatively of the tribulations endured by Mme. Lapoype as she fled the final bombardment.

Imagine citizeness Lapoype, eight months pregnant, throwing herself into a boat with her daughter, drifting here and there amidst a rain of bullets and bombs, seeking a safe shore, and finding herself very near a mortar at the moment it exploded and made such a terrible explosion that all the windows of Toulon were broken and you will have only a feeble idea of this tragic situation.(116) Freron was adept at publicizing himself and his relations, but he also recognized that insisting upon the sufferings of the women involved in the siege served to dehumanize the enemy deemed responsible for those sufferings.

Once again, a manichean dichotomy between republican heroism and enemy villainy was established. The cruelty and barbarity of the enemy put him beyond the pale of humanity and served to justify the vengeance that was promised. Newspaper reports insisted upon the cruel treatment of patriots in Toulon, imprisoned in atrocious circumstances or executed by inhumane methods.(117) French unity was contrasted with the dissension presumed to exist between the English and their Spanish and Neapolitan allies.(118) The Revolutions de Paris condemned the enemy as perfidious, atrocious and audacious,' and resorted to bestial imagery to describe the British leopard being forced to release its prey.(119) Perhaps this contrast between French courage and enemy cowardice was most succinctly expressed by a quatrain in the Feuille du Salut Public.

Dis-moi comment peut-on acquerir une ville? Il ne faut pour cela qu'un traitre et des Anglais. Et pour la conquerir? - Oh! c'est plus difficile, Il faut un general et des soldats frangois!(120)

Contemporary prints also focused upon this opposition. Certain images concentrated upon the republican army, giving the impression of a united, remorseless, invincible force of citizen soldiers. An illustration from the Revolutions de Paris shows, beyond the cannon in the foreground, the serried and faceless ranks of the republican army mounting their assault upon the fortifications of the burning city. Simple yet effective, the image conveys the idea of an army acting in complete unity (Illustration #8). A second print, despite the general in the foreground, a conventional reference to military leadership, conveyed a similar image of the republican troops; uniformly clad in republican blue and armed with muskets, these soldiers bear little resemblance to the improvised force described in the letters of the representatives on mission (Illustration #9). Other prints insisted upon the cowardliness and rapacity of the enemy. In the "Fuite precipitee des Anglois et des infames Toulonnois" British grenadiers are shown abandoning the town, carrying off booty and women, and treating brutally those who seek to prevent them (Illustration #10). A print from the series Tableaux de la Revolution Francaise combined the themes of republican solidarity and enemy rapacity, showing revolutionary forces advancing as the enemy, encumbered by women and treasure, seeks to flee (Illustration #11). Perhaps the most interesting print of all, entitled "Fuitte et embarquement precipite des Anglais lors la Prise de Toulon par l'Armee Republicaine," again insists upon the rapacity and cowardliness of the British, who are far more interested in carrying off their booty than in fighting the French. The central message is that this is an enemy so contemptible that he deserves no mercy. Republican soldiers are shown hacking their enemies to bits in an unrepentantly bloodthirsty representation of war (Illustration #12).

The recapture of Toulon was the most enthusiastically celebrated feat of arms of the revolutionary decade. Victory at Toulon became the occasion for celebrating the accomplishment of all the revolutionary armies in repulsing the invader from French soil during the last months of 1793. In the same decree whereby it changed the name of Toulon to Port-la-Montagne and ordered the destruction of all nonpublic buildings in the town, the Convention proclaimed that a national festival would be celebrated in every commune of the republic. The plans drawn up by Jacques-Louis David for the Parisian festival provide a useful indication of how the revolutionary government sought to represent and to exploit the victory at Toulon. Above all, that victory was to be emblematic of the victories won on all fronts against the republic's enemies. Tribute would be paid to all fourteen of the nation's armies. Fourteen chariots carrying wounded veterans were to dominate the festival procession. Following them, on the chariot of Victory, a symbolic fasces bearing fourteen crowns was to be linked by tricoloured ribbons to fourteen laurel wreaths held by veterans selected from each of the preceding chariots. David succinctly defined the significance of this symbolism: "From the very heart of the national fasces come forth men-at-arms for its defence." The cortege of chariots, accompanied by delegations from the forty-eight Paris sections, detachments of cavalry, young girls dressed in white, the "vainqueurs de la Bastille," and various musicians, was to march from the Tuileries Garden to the Hotel des Invalides ("Temple of Humanity" in revolutionary parlance) and then to the Champ de Mars, where participants would join in a hymn celebrating the capture of Toulon, composed for the occasion by Chanier.(121) Chenier's hymn compared the victory to Rome's triumph over Carthage, arousing the wrath of at least one critic, who complained: "When will our poets cease to speak to us of Greeks and Romans?"(22) Stub Chenier's hymn was typical of the many tributes in verse which sought to mythologize the conquerors of Toulon.(123)

The Parisian festival to celebrate the capture of Toulon was a straight-forward tribute to the armies of the republic, honouring the men who fought in them. Over the next few months, as towns and villages throughout France hastened to fulfil the National Convention's decree that the festival be celebrated nationally, accounts of similar tributes poured into the Convention from the provinces. The precise nature of these celebrations varied considerably, ranging from complex allegorical processions, replete with classical symbolism, to the more simple planting of liberty trees, equipping of Jacobin cavaliers, or joining in fraternal banquets.

Most of the addresses reporting on these festivals conform to the official interpretation of the victory at Toulon. That is, as well as giving tribute to the soldiers, they emphasize the role of the Montagnard Convention in defeating the republic's enemies. As the citizens of Rozoy-l'Unite wrote: "Representatives, it is from the heights of the Mountain that the vengeful lightning bolts departed to exterminate our enemies; this is the sacred volcano whose burning lava must devour the tyrants leagued against us."(124) Likewise, the republican society of Saint-Remy wrote to their representatives: "Remain at your posts to direct us, because we attribute our brilliant victories only to your sublime wisdom."(125) Such tributes affirmed both the loyalty of those making them and the identity of the Convention with the cause of the Nation, playing the leading role in its struggle with the foreign enemy.

In addition to such positive tributes to soldiers and deputies, however, provincial festivals were often marked by a more negative, iconoclastic, even vengeful character that is worthy of note. David's festival had simply celebrated the heroes of the fatherland. Many local festivals went much further in contrasting republican heroism with enemy turpitude and cowardice. These festivals gave themselves over to the denigration and destruction of symbolic representations of the republic's enemies. At Rozoy, an effigy of William Pitt was dragged through the streets attached to the tail of a donkey, before being burned on a bonfire.(126) A similar ceremony took place at Fecamp, except that Pitt's effigy was joined by those of Cobourg and of the "perfidious commander who surrendered Toulon."(127) The report of another festival at Armes-Commune, stated that "the kings have been guillotined, the Pope followed them, and infamous Toulon, abominable Toulon, was not forgotten. It was dragged through the mud, and then thrown on the fire, as it merited, with its friends the kings."(128) At Gueret, a representation of Toulon was also burned, accompanying inscriptions making clear the significance of such symbolism.

Embrasons de nos mains l'image de Toulon

Pour avoir reconnu les Anglais pour leurs maitres

Et jusqu' a leur nom

Perissent ainsi tous les traitres.

Honorer nos heros et punir nos rebelles

Est le premier devoir de ceux qui sont fideles.(129)

These iconoclastic revels, which often extended to the more generalized destruction of monarchical, aristocratic, and clerical symbols, demonstrate that for many revolutionaries it was by no means enough simply "to honour our heroes;" it was also necessary "to punish our rebels."

Speeches read at these festivals could be even more forthright in insisting upon this punitive theme. Not only did the victims of Toulon's treason demand vengeance, but future treasons could only be averted by making an example of Toulon. The president of the popular society of Cany spoke out against the dangers of indulgence, denouncing "those men of great compassion, of misplaced sensibility, who never cease to weep at the execution of traitors, and who are dry-eyed while learning every day of the deaths of thousands of patriots who lose their lives in defence of the Republic.... Do they not know that to snuff out despotism it is necessary to immolate all its partisans, and to bury it beneath heaps of bodies?"(130) Similarly bloodthirsty was a demand made to the Convention by the popular society of Rodez that the traitors of Toulon be dispersed throughout the republic to be executed simultaneously, so that "all the enemies of the Republic, witnesses of the blow which shall strike them, shall learn to fear the people's vengeance."(131) The logic of such speeches was clear; the enemy depended upon treason for his success, so treason must be deterred by means of terror. Thus, citizen Marcellin, speaking at Montbrise, offered the defenders of the fatherland both an accolade and a threat: "let us give with one hand the civic crown to our liberators, and let us present to them with the other the thunderbolts of the nation, ready to crush them, if ever they become traitors."(132)

Several of the festivals celebrating the recapture of Toulon were, in essence, theatrical re-enactments of that event. More formal theatrical productions re-enacting the siege were also staged. Playwrights drew heavily upon the reports of the representatives on mission for inspiration. Two of their plays focused explicitly upon the heroic leadership of the representatives. Bertin d'Antilly (who had earlier celebrated the siege of Lille) made Freron's action in rallying republican troops the central focus of his play,(133) while Pellet Desbarreaux emphasized the roles of Dugommier, Lapoype, and Saliceti.(134) Other playwrights invented their own heroes. Citizen Picard, for example, made an American conscripted by the British and one of the Toulon convicts the heroes of his play, the latter saving the town from fire as the English flee.(135) A play by Briois gives republican heroines pride of place (Picard was criticized for neglecting the role of women)(136) and celebrates Millette, a female citizen who proudly fends off the advances of an English soldier and whose lover Trovero, released from captivity by another heroic "citoyenne," remorselessly runs the English villain through at the high-point of the action." All the plays satirized the enemy. The villains of Bertin d'Antilly's play included Milord Pudding, a corrupt and cowardly Englishman, as well as several aristocrats who represented the frivolity and folly of the emigre nobility. Picard represents English and Austrian officers accusing each other of treachery, making it clear that Toulon, as much as Longwy and Verdun, had been "bought," rather than conquered.

The representation in contemporary media of victory at Toulon developed many of the same themes used to celebrate the defence of Lillle. There were differences, to be sure. The role of the representatives on mission, who arrived late on the scene at Lille, was far greater in 1793 than in 1792. The Jacobin dictatorship ensured a much more concerted effort at celebration in 1793, and a heavy emphasis upon its own role in the organization of victory. Still, the similarities are more striking than the differences. The juxtaposition of republican heroism with enemy barbarity was a dominant theme in both cases. The convicts who extinguished the flames in the arsenal at Toulon were the counterparts of the citizens who pursued heated shot in the streets of Lille; and the Austrian soldiers who ravaged the countryside around Lille had their counterparts in the English troops who tormented Baille and Beauvais. In both cases, too, there was manifested an ambivalence toward military leadership and a determination to look for heroes at the lower end of the social and military scale. Hence, the scrutiny of Duhoux's and Labourdonnaye's conduct at Lille, and of Carteaux's and Lapoype's leadership at Toulon. General Dugommier, writing to correct published accounts of the siege of Toulon which he said had minimized the strength of the enemy resistance, himself recognized the imperative of this democratic heroization when he called for the celebration of heroes drawn from the rank and file. "We were all volunteers," he wrote; "this fraternal and heroic gathering was well worthy of victory."(138)

Most striking of all, perhaps, is the way both sieges more used to justify terror as a means to repress internal dissent. The representation of the enemy as barbarous and bestial served to facilitate the condemnation of his internal collaborators as being beyond the pale of humanity and hence also undeserving of mercy. Furthermore, by insisting that the enemy depended upon treason for his success, revolutionary propagandists elevated terror, as the essential deterrent to treason, to the front rank in the lines of revolutionary defence. Hebert, that arch-exponent of terror, celebrated the recapture of Toulon with a rapturous tribute to terror. Asking how so many victories had been won since the purge of the Convention on 2 June 1793, Hebert answered his own question: "It is only since we have put the suspects in the shade, it is only since terror has been made the order of the day, it is only by virtue of the holy guillotine that we have saved ourselves."(139) Recent scholarship, particularly that of Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf,(140) has tended to discredit the "thesis of circumstance," the explanation of the Terror favoured by "neo-Jacobin" historians of the left.(141) The point of this essay is not to deny Furet's statement that "there were no revolutionary circumstances. There was a revolution that fed on circumstances."(142) It should, however, contribute to our understanding of how particular circumstances - in this case two sieges - helped to provide the Terror with sustenance.

(1) Senator Hiram Johnson, "The first casualty when war comes is the truth." Cited in Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correpondence as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker (New York, 1975). (2) On the press, see in particular Jeremy D. Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham, 1990); On military matters, most useful is Jean-Paul Bertaud, La Revolution armee Les Soldas-citoyens et la Revolution Francaise (Paris, 1979). (3) Mona Ozouf, "War and Terror in French Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794)," in Journal of Modern History 56 (Dec. 1984): 579-97. (4) Christopher Duffy, Siege Welfare. The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660 (London, 1979), 250. (5) Ibid. (6) Ibid., 252. (7) Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society 1550-1800 (Atlantic Highlands, 1991), 52-57. (8) Pierre Rocolle, "Un siege qui n'en fut pas un: Lille, October 1792," in Revue historique des armees, no. 2 (1989): 40-49. (9) Louis Trenard, "D'un fait militaire a une imagerie glorieuse: le siege de Lille (1792)," in Le soldat la strategie, la mort melanges Andre Corvisier (Paris, 1989), 129. (10) Ibid. (11) Moniteur universel, 29 Sept. 1792. (12) Bulletin de la Convention Nationale, 5 Oct. 1792. (13) Alphonse Aulard, ed., Recueil des Actes du Comite de Salut Public (Paris, 1889-1951),I, 102. (14) Louis Trenard, "D'un fait militaire a une imagerie glorieuse," 129; Pierre Rocolle, "Un siege qui n'en fut pas un," 49. (15) Revolutions de Paris, 29 Sept.-6 Oct. 1792. (16) Le Moniteur universal, 29 Sept. 1792. (17) Archives departementales du Nord, L2120. (18) Archives departementales du Nord, L2120. (19) Courrier des Departemens, 8 Oct. 1792. (20) Archives departementales du Nord, L2121. (21) Archives departementales du Nord, L2120. (22) Alphonse Aulard, Actes du Comite de Salut Public, I, 77. (23) Ibid., 102. (24) Ibid., 105. (25) Revolutions de Paris, 13-20 Oct. 1792. (26) Courrier des Departemens, 11 Oct. 1792. (27) Ibid., 8 Oct. 1792. (28) Cited in Frank Attar, La Revolution Francaise Declare la Guerre a l'Europe: 1792 (Paris, 1992), 181-82. (29) Courrier des Departemens, 3 Sept. 1792. (30) Ibid., 5 Sept. 1792. (31) Ibid., 8 Sept. 1792. (32) Ibid., 5 Sept. 1792. (33) Bulletin de la Convention Nationale, 5 Sept. 1792. (34) Journal du Soir, 30 Sept. 1792. (35) Ibid., 4 Oct. 1792. (36) L'Ami du Peuple, 13 Apr. 1792. (37) Ibid., 18 May 1792. (38) Ibid., 1 Oct. 1792. (39) Revolutions de Paris, 29 Sept.-6 Oct. 1792. (40) Chronique de Paris, le 11 Sept. 1792. (41) Ibid., 2 Oct. 1792. (42) Moniteur Universel, 5 Oct. 1792. (43) Archives de Guerre, B1(6), Correspondance de l'Armee du Nord: letter from M. Servan, Minister of War, to M. Duhoux, dated 17 Sept. 1792. (44) Moniteur Universel, 12 Oct. 1792. (45) Charles-Francois Douhoux, Memoire justificatif a la Convention Nationale, Pour Charles-Francois Douhoux, Lieutenant-general, commandant le siege de Lille (n.p., 1792), 15. (46) Courrier des Departemens, 4 Oct. 1792. (47) Le Patriote Francais, 6 Oct. 1792. (48) Ibid., 2 Oct. 1792. (49) Revolutions de Paris, 13-20 Oct. 1792. Archives de Guerre B1(6) Correspondance de l'Armee du Nord contains several letters from Labourdonnaye justifying his conduct to the Minister of War and accusing Duhoux of treachery. A letter of 14 Oct. 1792 stated: "Duhoux was closely connected to several officers attached to the Polignac family, and who sought to mislead the troops. It was said publicly that if I entered Lille I would be sacrificed." (50) Ibid., 6-13 Oct. 1792. (51) Ibid., 20-27 Oct. 1792. (52) Le Patriote Francais, 29 Sept. 1792. (53) E. Debievre, ed., 1792: La Guerre dans les environs de Lille. Le Bombardement de Lille (Lille, 1892), 176-77. (54) Revolutions de Paris, 27 Oct.-3 Nov. 1792. (55) L'Ami du Peuple, 5 Oct. 1792. (56) Le Patriote Francais, 10 Sept. 1792. (57) Revolutions de Paris, 29 Sept.-6 Oct. 1792. (58) Cited in E. Debievre, 1792: La Guerre dans les environs de Lille, 144. (59) Chronique de Paris, 9 Oct. 1792. (60) Ibid., 2 Sept. 1792. (61) Cited in E. Debievre, ed., 1792.: La Guerre dans les environs de Lille, 145. (62) Chronique de Paris, 8 Oct. 1792. (63) Le Patriote Francais, 30 Sept. 1792 (64) Journal du Soir, 7 Oct. 1792. (65) Courrier des Departemens, 11 Oct. 1792. (66) E. Debievre, ed., 1792: La Guerre dans les environs de Lille, 169. (67) Chronique de Paris, 9 Oct. 1792. (68) Courrier des Departemens, 2 Sept. 1792. (69) Chronique de Paris, 9 Oct. 1792. (70) Ibid., 7 Oct. 1792. (71) Courrier des Departemens, 18 Oct. 1792. (72) Revolutions de Paris, 24 Nov. -1 Dec. 1792. (73) Joigny, Le Siege de Lille, ou Cecile et Julien (Paris, Year III). (74) Chronique de Paris, 19 Nov. 1792. (75) Journal de la Montagne, 23 brumaire Year II. (76) Ibid., 22 brumaire Year II. (77) Ibid., 13 pluviose Year II. (78) Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance de Napoleon Ier (Paris, 1858) I, 4-10. (79) Las Cases, Le Memorial de Sainte-Helene (Paris, 1948) I, 91. (80) See Barras, Memoirs of Barras, edited by George Duruy and translated by Charles E. Roche (London, 1895) I, 153-64. (81) Malcolm Crook, Toulon in War and Revolution (Manchester, 1991), 140. (82) Ibid., 138-139. For an insightful analysis of how the Admiral commanding the fleet at Toulon responded to this dilemma see William S. Cormack, "Royalist Traitor or Anguished Patriot? Admiral Trogoff and the Surrender of the Toulon Fleet in 1793." Paper presented to the Western Society for French History at Orcas Island, October, 1992. (83) Malcolm Crook, Toulon in War and Revolution, 142. (84) moniteur universel, 8 Sept. 1793. (85) Ibid., 10 and 12 Sept. 1793. (86) Ibid., 23 Oct. 1793. (87) Ibid., 3 Sept. 1793. (88) Revolutions de Paris, 3 Aug.-23 Oct. 1793. (89) On this theme, see Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, 1984); also J.A. Leith, "Reflections of Allegory in the French Revolution," Consortium (90) Revolutions de Paris, 3 Aug.-23 Oct. 1793. (91) Alphonse Aulard, Actes du Comite de Salut Public, VII, 78-81. (92) Ibid., 158. (93) Ibid., 319. (94) Ibid., 393. (95) Ibid., IX, 57. (96) Journal de la Montagne, 12 brumaire Year II. (97) Alphonse Aulard, Actes du Comite de Salut public, VIII, 73. See also the coffespondance of Gasparin and Saliceti at the Archives de Guerre, B3(101): Armee Devant Toulon. A letter from Saliceti, dated September 25, states: "We have established our batteries on the coast; they are troubling the fleet, and we would have forced it to leave the harbour if this general [Carteaux] had wanted to execute the plan we had proposed to him, and which was that of the Committee of Public Safety." Five days later, Saliceti and Gasparin wrote to say that Carteaux "is incapable of understanding the operations of a besieging army" and to call for a skilled engineer. (98) bid., 412. The question of command was not settled without difficulty, as Robespierre explained to the Jacobins on 3 Frimaire. General Lapoype was considered as a replacement for Carteaux, but his loyalties were suspect because his wife and daughter were in Toulon. Finally, Dugommier was settled upon, not least because of his political credentials: "It was upon Marat's recommendation that he was promoted to brigadier-general. Marat could have been wrong, but his recommendation was a factor that was very much in Dugommier's favour." Journal de la Montagne, 6 frimaire Year II. (99) J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon (Cambridge, 1922), 65. (100) Lapoype wrote an extremely sanguine letter to Bouchotte, the minister of war, on 11 September, stating that he would answer for the reduction of Toulon in eight days or less. Following his repulse from Mount Faron, Lapoype wrote "if only I had had six or eight hundred fresh troops to send up the mountain, to support those who were there, with plenty of munitions, and good weapons, the cry of |save yourselves'would never have been heard and we would have safe possession of a position that would have won us Toulon in a matter of days." Archives de Guerre B3(102): Armee Devant Toulon. (101) Paul Cottin, Toulon et Anglais en 1793, d'apris des document inedits (Paris, 1898), 274-79; J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon, 66-67. (102) Edmond Poupe, ed., Lettres de Barras et de Freron en mission dans le Midi (Draguignan, 1910), 85-86. (103) Smith's own account of this operation is to be found, in French, in the Archives de Guerre B3(102). (104) Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 260. (105) Journal de la Montagne, 12 nivose Year II. (106) Alphonse Aulard, Actes du Comite de Salut Public, IX, 618. (107) Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 262-63. (108) Ibid., 263. (109) Alphonse Aulard, Actes du Comite de Salut Public, X, 81. A letter from Barras and Freron to Moyse Bayle, written on 26 Dec. 1793, indicates that considerable resentment existed between these two representatives and their colleagues, Robespierre, Ricord and Saliceti. The latter were accused of conspiring against Barras and Freron to deny them their share of the credit for capturing Toulon and to wrest from them control of the Army of Italy. Edmond Poul)i, ed., Lettres de Barras et de Freron, 106-13. (110) See, for example, the report of the Annales Patriotiques et Litteraires, 19 vendemiaire Year II. A letter from Gasparin and Saliceti, dated "le 30 jr. du 1er mois, de l'an II" [21 Oct. 1793] states that reports they had received from prisoners and deserters indicated that the news of Beauvais's death was "entirely false." Archives de Guerre B3(101). (111) Ibid., 15 frimaire Year II. The determination to link the National Convention to the struggle for Toulon reached its most extreme tengths at the Jacobin Club of Paris on 8 nivose, when Levasseur sought to appropriate a share of the glory for the city's recapture to Marat, for having supported Dugommier. See La Feuille du Salut Public, 11 nivose Year II. (112) Moniteur universel, 15 nivose Year II. (113) Ibid. (114) Paul Cottin, Toulon et les Anglais, 293; Moniteur universel, 11 Oct. 1793. (115) Moniteur universel, 9 Sept. 1793. (116) Edmond Poupe, ed., Lettres de Barras et de Freron, 98. (117) Annales Patriotiques et Litteraires, 25 Sept. 1793; 20 vendemiaire Year II. (118) Ibid., 2 frimaire Year II. (119) Revolutions de Paris, 27 frimaire-6 nivose Year II. (120) Feuille du Salut Public, 16 nivose Year II. (121) Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 305-6. (122) Rivolutions de Paris, 6-14 nivose Year II. (123) Constant Pierre lists over sixty such musical tributes. See Constant Pierre, Les Hymnes et Chansons de la Revolution: Aperqu General et Catalogue (Paris, 1904). (124) Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 607. (125) Ibid., LXXXIII, 344. (126) Ibid., LXXXIII, 607-8. (127) Ibid., LXXXIII, 431. (128) Ibid., 159. (129) Ibid., 535. (130) Ibid., LXXXIV, 319. (131) Ibid., LXXXIII, 590.-91. (132) Ibid., 192. (133) Bertin d'Antilly, La Prise de Toulon (Paris 1793). (134) Pellet Desbarreaux, La Prise de Toulon (Toulouse, Year II). (135) Louis Benoit Picard, La Prise de Toulon (Paris, Year II). (136) Feuille du Salut Public, 12 ventose Year II. (137) Briois, dit de Belle-Roche, La Prise de Toulo (Paris, 1794). (138) Archives de Guerre B3(102). (139) Pere Duchense, no. 327. (140) Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, 1989); Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge, 1981). (141) See, for example, Albert Mathiez, La Vie Chere et le Mouvement Social Sous la Terreur (Paris, 1927); or, more recently, Marc Bouloiseau, La Republique jacobine, 10 aout 1792 - 9 thermidor an II, vol. 2 of Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine (Paris, 1972). (142) "Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 62.
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Title Annotation:France
Author:Germani, Ian
Publication:Canadian Journal of History
Date:Apr 1, 1994
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