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Remembering the War of 1812: a "hot war and unnatural war between kindred people".

In his seminal study of conflict, Canadian historian J. Mackay Hitsman called it "the incredible War of 1812." For nearly three years, American, British and Canadian land and naval forces, supported by their Native allies, were engaged in what Lieutenant John Le Couteur of the 104th Foot called a "hot war and unnatural war between kindred people." Campaigns were conducted across a vast territory, extending from the Upper Mississippi Valley in the west through the Upper Great Lakes region and along the frontiers of modern Ontario and Quebec into the district of Maine. Naval forces clashed on the high seas while Britain closed the eastern seaboard of the United States to trade and raided the coastline with near-impunity.

The bicentennial of the events of those years has created a renewed interest in the War of 1812. Across eastern Canada and the United States and in England, a number of commemorative events, symposia and reenactments are planned that will recall the events of the war, acknowledge the general peace that has existed between America, Britain and Canada since 1815 and consider the implications of the war for the development of North America. What follows is a general overview of the major events of this fascinating and complex period of North American history.


June 2012 marks 200 years since the United States declared war on Great Britain, adding a new dimension to the global struggle known as the Napoleonic Wars. Earlier in the 19th century, American merchants, taking advantage of their country's neutrality, swiftly expanded their trade with Europe, only to find it suffering from the trade restrictions imposed by both Britain and France, each seeking to strangle the other economically. While Britain eventually revoked the much-hated Orders-in-Council which inhibited this neutral trade, this came too late for U.S. President James Madison.

Madison rejected diplomacy in favour of war with Britain to resolve Anglo-American differences--including British interference with American Native policy and settlement in the Old Northwest (the territory east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio) and the impressment of American seamen on the high seas. As the summer of 1812 approached, officials in London, who until then had given American complaints little attention, made one last attempt at appeasement, while continuing with military and naval preparations in British North America. Further discussion proved meaningless and on June 18 the United States issued a proclamation declaring war with Great Britain.

As the Americans were incapable of attacking Britain directly, their forces were expected to move against the most accessible British colonies: Upper and Lower Canada. British North America was the largest contiguous group of colonies in the empire and included--apart from Upper and Lower Canada--New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward and Cape Breton islands, and their several dependencies. This was a vast territory to defend, threatened at widely distant points. Montreal, Kingston, the fortified posts from Fort George to Fort Erie on the Niagara River and Fort Amherstburg on the Detroit River were directly threatened as they lay along the best avenues of approach from the United States. The loss of any one of them would threaten the safety of the posts to their west, which once isolated, could easily fall.

Complicating the preparations for war was the priority the British gave to the war in Europe. In much of the world, or at least Europe and its overseas colonies, the period between 1793 and 1814 was dominated by war. This conflict demanded a greater mobilization of national resources, personnel, material, capital, industry and trade than any previous conflict. At a crucial moment in the titanic struggle against Napoleon Bonaparte, Britain's attention and some of its resources were diverted by another challenge that arose on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Defending the Canadas posed many challenges to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost. He had a small contingent of British regular troops with promises of few more. While it dominated the waterways, his quasinaval force known as the Provincial Marine was small and rife with problems. If faced by a determined, large-scale attack, Prevost recognized that with only 6,000 regulars in both Canadas, he would have few options and might be forced to retire to the stronghold of Quebec and await assistance from London.

But Prevost saw another possibility: that the Americans, for various reasons, might experience difficulties in raising armies, formulating strategy or in executing plans. Given a sufficiently disorganized opponent, Prevost was certain Upper Canada could be held within its present boundaries. To help ensure this development, Prevost proposed to enhance protection on the Upper St. Lawrence River, relocate the Lake Ontario naval base from Kingston to the Upper Canadian capital of York, send more troops into the interior and raise an additional provincial regiment. His commitment to Upper Canada and his employment of an active defence, based on the judicious use of the limited resources for local counteroffensives to rebalance the situation when required, would prove correct. The prewar planning ruled out invading the United States or acquiring territory, as either action would stretch the defenders' resources and the logistical system even further.

Short of troops and with no further help expected from Britain, Prevost was forced to look to the resources of the colony for reinforcements. This meant raising forces locally. British military organization placed control of the militia at the provincial level in North America. The demands of defending Canada would more than occupy the regular units of the British army, requiring an expanded role for the militia in active operations. The foundation of the militia included most adult males (exemptions were made for marital status), who were given little equipment and even less training in the years leading up to the conflict. Some improvements were made to this "sedentary" militia on the eve of the war, including the provision of additional training and equipment to a handful of units.

An even more robust contribution to the defence of Canada was provided by the formation of "embodied" or "incorporated" units that were better trained and armed and employed on active service for the duration of the war. Finally, there were the "provincial" units that were recruited in the British North American provinces as the Canadian equivalent of the British regulars. Units such as the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles (fencible meaning their employment was within a fixed geographic area, in this case British North America), the Voltigeurs Canadiens and the Royal Newfoundland Regiment of Fencible Infantry were among the most effective Canadian units to serve during the war.

The renewal of the Native alliance offered another potential solution to British manpower shortages. The United States and Britain had a shared interest in the Old Northwest (comprising modern Ohio, Indiana, illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota). Britain recognized this region as sovereign American territory, but hoped it might be possible, either through Native resistance or through a war, to create an independent Native homeland there. The Americans craved the Old Northwest for settlement, and attempted to break local Native power and halt British aid. Historians have estimated that 10,000 allied warriors lived in the Great Lakes region, 8,000 of whom were within the borders of the United States. Only a fraction of this force would ever take to the field at any one time as each nation allowed its members considerable freedom in the conflict. The number of warriors supporting the British fluctuated depending on the military situation and their own fortunes.

The war begins: 1812

During the spring of 1812, the Americans decided on four offensives against the Canadas using a mix of regular troops and state militia. The main offensive would be directed against Montreal to cut the St. Lawrence supply line to Upper Canada. A diversion would be created by sending forces against Kingston and across the Niagara and Detroit rivers into Canada, dividing the defenders in the upper province and undermining their ability to offer effective resistance at all three points.

The army that would execute this plan was small, ill-trained and poorly led. In 1811 the United States Army had 5,200 noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel in units that were scattered in posts along the western frontier and the east coast. In anticipation of war, Congress approved the expansion of the army to more than 35,000 men, but recruitment did not begin until May 1812 and had made little progress by the time war was declared, when 12,000 men had been enrolled. In general, the American navy and army's preparations during the final months of peace were made with little urgency and failed to keep pace with the aggressive foreign policy of the government. Even on the eve of war, few details, including the date when operations were to begin, were settled. This situation was in sharp contrast to widely held British fears that the Americans would strike decisively and in large numbers.

The only American field army that was concentrated and ready for operations was in the northwest. The Americans sought to settle the region and feared continued British interest there might lead to its being lost. Open warfare between the U.S. Army and Natives had been underway there since the 1790s. One thousand regulars, volunteers and militia had fought in a campaign against the Natives in 1811 known as Tecumseh's War, and the readiness of this force, renamed the North West Army under Major-General William Hull, governor of the Michigan Territory, became the focal point of American preparations.

Thus, on July 12, 1812, Hull's North West Army, the only military force of any significance ready for operations, crossed the Detroit River virtually unopposed into Canada. His immediate objective was Fort Amherstburg, after which he was to govern his campaign on the basis of the circumstances. Hull's campaign, however, was compromised by the British capture of Fort Mackinac in mid-July, the destruction of Fort Dearborn (located where modern Chicago stands) and his own lack of resolve.

The British victory at Mackinac made it impossible for Hull to form an alliance with the Wyandot nation, and he feared his army would be overwhelmed by Natives supporting the British. Hull requested reinforcements and additional supplies from Washington and from several local governors, which were only partially provided. As the American supply situation became more desperate after two actions cut his supply line, Native allies managed to seize Hull's personal and official papers from one of his schooners, revealing details about the size and state of his army. Lacking supplies, facing encirclement by British forces and with their Native allies operating to his rear, Hull concluded he could not remain in Upper Canada and began moving back to Detroit in early August.

Major-General Isaac Brock, the commander of forces in Upper Canada, had been at Fort George in the Niagara Peninsula. Late on August 13, Brock arrived at Fort Amherstburg with a strike force of 50 regular troops, 250 militiamen and Grand River warriors whose service he had recently secured. After securing further assistance from the Natives, Brock crossed the Detroit River with his army, ready to assault Fort Detroit. After first refusing an offer to surrender, Hull capitulated with barely a shot fired on August 16, 1812. The terms of capitulation included the surrender of two other detachments and the cession of the Michigan Territory to Great Britain.

The scene then shifted to the Niagara frontier, where the Americans had spent the summer preparing for an attack on Upper Canada, while Brock steadily improved defences. The final American offensive into Upper Canada in 1812, at Queenston Heights on October 13, is considered Brock's greatest victory. This is not the case. The assault on Queenston was a hastily conceived attempt to recoup the loss of Fort Detroit before the New York state militia was released for the winter. The objective was limited to seizing the village of Queenston to secure barracks and winter quarters that would provide a base for a subsequent campaign the following year. Brock had taken great care to ensure that early warning was received of an American landing, against which he would direct his forces, which were distributed among four key points along the 35-mile length of the frontier.

Brock demonstrated poor judgement during the battle. Instead of taking control of the defenders at Queenston and organizing his forces to contain the American beachhead and regain control of the river and halt the flow of reinforcements from New York state, Brock chose to act prematurely and immediately attempted to recapture a well-defended battery midway up the heights. His death during his first action under fire in more than a decade came as the British were losing the battle. The distinction for the victory goes in part to Brock's second-in-command, Major-General Roger Sheaffe, who proved less impulsive. Sheaffe instructed regular infantry, British artillery and Grand River Six Nations warriors to proceed to Queenston, where he organized the deliberate attack against the Americans on the heights later that day that secured a British victory.


As tragic as the loss of Brock was, the British victory signalled the end of major combat operations in 1812. British arms had prevailed and Upper Canada was preserved. The Americans made one final effort in Lower Canada in late November, when 2,000 regulars and 3,000 militia advanced toward Montreal. On November 20 a short, sharp battle took place at Lacolle Mill. The American advance guard of 600 men was defeated by a slightly smaller group of British regulars, Canadians and Kahnawake warriors, after which they withdrew to the United States.

The Americans did achieve one small but telling victory on November 10, 1812, when a naval flotilla chased the flagship of the Lake Ontario squadron of the Provincial Marine into Kingston harbour. Another British vessel suffered the same fate the following day and the Americans then blockaded the harbour for several days. News of these successes reached York, where the other two British warships remained at anchor. Within just 11 weeks of receiving his orders, the American naval commander on Lake Ontario, Commodore Isaac Chauncey, had created a small and effective squadron that had wrested control of Lake Ontario from the British. The Americans would exploit their naval advantage in the coming campaign season.

The British also realized that the Provincial Marine, the quasimilitary naval force that served on the lakes, was incapable of operating against the U.S. Navy. Officials in London agreed to Prevost's request that Royal Navy personnel be assigned to the Great Lakes and confirmed Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, a brave and respected naval officer, as commodore to command the naval forces in British North America, dispatching 425 sailors to man the vessels on the inland seas.

The campaigns of 1813

Meanwhile, the Americans planned to exploit their control of Lake Ontario at the opening of the spring campaign season. Three targets around Lake Ontario--Kingston, York and Fort George in the Niagara--were selected for a joint attack force of 5,000 regulars and militia that was assembled at their naval base at Sackets Harbor, New York. As intelligence indicated that the defences at Kingston were formidable, the port at York was to be attacked first. The Americans would then make a lightning move across the lake to the Niagara Peninsula, reduce Fort George and, aided by an army that would cross the Niagara River, secure the entire frontier. Afterward, a blockade was to be established at Kingston to contain the British naval force, while a portion of the land and naval forces would be detached from Lake Ontario to assist with the recovery of Detroit and wrest control of Lake Erie. This plan was complex in design and challenging in execution. And it depended on the British responding in a particular manner.

The goal at York was to destroy naval stores and damage British naval strength by capturing two naval brigs under construction at the dockyard and two Provincial Marine schooners which the Americans believed to be wintering at the provincial capital. The raid on York demonstrated the Americans' growing amphibious capabilities, which allowed them to transport 1,700 men across Lake Ontario. At York, they faced only 413 regulars, 477 militiamen, 50 Native warriors and more than 100 volunteers, while the town's main defences included a fort, four battery positions and several unarmed works. Major-General Sheaffe anticipated that a determined attack on York would likely succeed. His hope was that the Sir Isaac Brock, the sole vessel being built at the dockyard, would be completed before the Americans could sail, and he sent the Prince Regent to Kingston as soon as the ice cleared. Construction of the Sir Isaac Brock was held up, however, by supply problems and a dispute between the shipbuilder and government officials.

During the morning of April 27, the Americans began to land a large body of troops to the west of the town. Superior numbers and fire support from Chauncey's squadron overwhelmed the defenders, who began to withdraw back to York, followed by the Americans. Unable to slow the attackers, Sheaffe realized the battle was lost and ordered the Sir Isaac Brock and the naval supplies burned and then prepared to withdraw his regulars to Kingston, leaving the task of surrendering the town to the militia, who had arrived too late to influence the outcome. Sheaffe also ordered the grand magazine at Fort York to be detonated, which occurred just as the Americans approached the fort. The debris from the explosion caused 250 casualties among the Americans, including the mortal wounding of Brigadier-General Zebulon Pike, commander of the assault force. Then, contrary winds and poor weather forced the Americans to remain at York for several days. Seeing his men weakened by fatigue and illness, Army commander Henry Dearborn cancelled plans for a direct assault on Fort George in the Niagara Peninsula, and returned to Sackets Harbor to rest and refit.

It was one month later that a large force of Americans landed at the northeastern end of the Niagara Peninsula. Their goal was to encircle and capture British forces in the area of Fort George. Brigadier-General John Vincent, commanding British forces in the Niagara region, had anticipated this course of action and, faced with overwhelming American superiority, implemented a contingency plan to withdraw his command to the safety of Burlington Heights at the head of the lake. The following day, two American brigades, totalling 3,000 soldiers, followed in pursuit. The British were heavily outnumbered by American forces, which now controlled the Niagara Peninsula and the lake.

From Kingston, Prevost devised a bold plan to relieve pressure on the troops in the Niagara and damage American naval strength by attacking their base at Sackers Harbor. A combined attack force, including an 800-man assault force, 40 Native warriors and a flotilla with 700 sailors distributed between five ships and a collection of bateaux and canoes, departed Kingston on May 27. Poor winds delayed their arrival for two days, and, on landing, the attackers became bogged down just short of their objective. Fearing his force might be cut off by the arrival of the American fleet, Prevost ordered a withdrawal just as the Americans, thinking the British were about to capture the dockyard, ordered the destruction of their naval warehouses and a new ship that was under construction.

Hence, although the raid appeared to end in failure for the British, the outcome was quite different. Chauncey, following a survey of the damage to the facilities and his new ship after he returned to his base, committed himself to remaining there until his new ship was completed. This was a major turning point in the war as control of Lake Ontario, which the Americans had held with such advantage since November 1812, passed to the British. Prevost immediately sent Captain Yeo to deliver 220 reinforcements along with much-needed supplies to Brigadier-General Vincent's army at Burlington Bay. Concurrently, Vincent approved of a plan put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel John Harvey to attack the Americans' camp at nearby Stoney Creek. In this nighttime raid conducted on June 6, 1813, 700 British troops captured their two generals and left what was left of the 3,000 defenders in disarray. On the following day, the Americans withdrew; their movement was hastened by pressure from Native warriors and British infantry and bombardment by Yeo's squadron. By the second week of June, all the American forces were isolated to the immediate area of Fort George, where the campaign had started a few weeks earlier.


As the British position improved in the Niagara Peninsula, it deteriorated in the Western District around Detroit. The Americans sought to reestablish the security of their settlements in the northwest by retaking Detroit and seizing control of Lake Erie. A new northwestern army under Brigadier-General William Harrison was gathering in Ohio while a large-scale shipbuilding program to expand the Lake Erie flotilla was underway at Presque Isle (now Erie), Pennsylvania.

The expansion of the American naval presence on Lake Erie proved astonishing: within a few months, six new ships were launched. Once on the lake, this flotilla severed the supply line to the British squadron led by Commander Robert Barclay and the forces around Detroit under the command of Major-General Henry Procter. They realized that a battle for control of the lake was inevitable. It took place on September 10, 1813, and ended in victory for the Americans. The implications of total American control of Lake Erie for British land forces were disastrous.

By mid-September, with supplies dwindling to dangerous levels, sickness rampant throughout his army and Harrison approaching, Procter concluded that his situation was untenable and began withdrawing toward Burlington Heights. On October 5, with the Americans closing in, the British commander of 450 British soldiers and 600 Native warriors made a stand at Moraviantown. This defeat, following on the loss of Lake Erie and the Detroit River, shattered the British-Native alliances in these lands and crushed all hope of creating an Aboriginal homeland as a buffer between British North America and the United States.

At the end of October, the Americans threatened Montreal in their largest offensive of the war. As a 7,300-man army under Major-General James Wilkinson moved down the St. Lawrence River, a 3,500 strong division under Major-General Wade Hampton crossed the frontier into Lower Canada from eastern New York state. The two armies were to converge at Montreal. However, a composite army and naval force from Kingston pursued Wilkinson, harassing his forces until they defeated his rearguard at Crysler's Farm in November. Earlier, in October, Hampton had been forced to return to the United States following his defeat at the Chateauguay by a much smaller force of Canadians led by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles de Salaberry.


A more active British role: 1814

Napoleon's abdication in April 1814 momentarily ended the war in Europe, freed British land and naval forces--and won London's attention for the war in North America. In July, Prevost received a large detachment of troops to protect the Canadas against any attack and to begin offensive operations on the Americans' frontier. The ambitious objectives of these operations included the destruction of the Americans' base at Sackers Harbor and their naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, the reoccupation of Detroit and the Michigan Country and the reduction of a forward position on Lake Champlain to end the American threat to Lower Canada.

The Royal Navy and the forces in the Atlantic Provinces were assigned roles in support of these operations. The navy was to tighten the blockade of the American east coast, where it was to create a diversion by strikes against suitable targets. Forces from Nova Scotia were to occupy a portion of the District of Maine to improve communication between Halifax and Quebec.

In executing this strategy, London was taking on a more active role in running the American war. London was also supervising arrangements for the coming peace talks, which had first been considered in 1812 and were slated to begin some time in 1814. At no time was Prevost consulted on the possible terms to be presented to the United States, despite his victorious role, in combination with the offensives in Chesapeake Bay and against Maine.

While Prevost had no role in military operations outside of the Canadas, he did influence the fate of Washington during 1814. The burning of the city's public buildings in August 1814 is often incorrectly attributed to retaliation for the destruction of York in 1813. The actual impetus for this retaliatory measure was revenge against American actions in the Niagara Peninsula late in 1813 and raids conducted against settlements on the Lake Erie shore of Upper Canada early in 1814. Following the destruction of communities along both sides of the Niagara frontier, a temporary halt to these measures was put into effect in January 1814, only to be revoked by Prevost in May, in response to a devastating American raid on Dover in Upper Canada. Prevost reported these events to Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who led British forces operating off Chesapeake Bay, and suggested that in retaliation the Royal Navy should destroy a settlement on the bay. Cochrane agreed and selected Washington, which was occupied and burned in August 1814.

In the event, the new orders arrived too late in the season for all of the tasks to be achieved that year. The reestablishment of a presence on Lake Erie and the retaking of Detroit and Michigan would have to wait until 1815, while American supremacy on Lake Ontario ruled out an attack on Sackets Harbor for the time being. Yeo would be unable to challenge American dominance of Lake Ontario until October, which left insufficient time to conduct the attack. This left Prevost with the prospect of mounting actions to attain only two of the objectives he was assigned. These were the related goals of destroying the naval establishment on Lake Champlain and securing an advanced position on the frontier which extended toward Lake Champlain. Prevost selected Plattsburgh, New York, as the ideal position from which to materially improve the security of Lower Canada. The subsequent campaign, though it ended in the defeat of the British naval flotilla on Lake Champlain and Prevost's decision to withdraw from Plattsburgh, eliminated any immediate threat to Lower Canada.

The British also directed their attention to American operations, which were expected to begin in the spring. Having reviewed the events of the last year, the Americans began their own preparations for the coming campaign season. Their poorly executed campaigns around Lake Ontario and against Montreal during 1813 had met no appreciable success and ended with the complete devastation of the Niagara Frontier by British troops. The portion of Upper Canada they occupied offered no strategic advantage, other than in finally isolating the northwest from British interference. British control of American coastal waters was damaging commerce and the treasury was left with little money to pay for the war.

Faced with sagging national morale, the cabinet decided in June on a three-pronged attack on the Canadas designed to break up British posts on Lake Huron, disrupt British communications with their Native allies and occupy the northern tip of the Niagara Peninsula. In the Niagara the American forces would be joined by Commodore Chauncey and together they would strike at Burlington Bay, York or Kingston, and then threaten Montreal. The main offensive would take place in the Niagara and was dependent on gaining control of Lake Ontario.


The final invasion of Upper Canada began when an American division began crossing the southern end of Niagara River into Canada in early July 1814. Fort Erie fell quickly. After suffering a sobering defeat at Chippawa on July 5, 1814, British Major-General Phineas Riall withdrew his army to the northern end of the peninsula; nevertheless, the garrisons of the British forts guarding the mouth of the Niagara River held fast. The American commander, Major-General Jacob Brown, meanwhile discovered that Chauncey was unwilling to support his offensive. With his plan in tatters, Brown moved up and down the peninsula, attempting in vain to lure the British into a fight.

All the while, British strength increased as reinforcements were moved into the area, and Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, the commander of Upper Canada, then arrived to take command. The next encounter, at Lundy's Lane on July 25, 1814, was also the largest battle fought in the northern theatre. The action ended in a draw that left the Americans too weak to continue and they withdrew to Fort Erie, where Drummond established a siege. The remainder of this bloody campaign continued around the fort, with a costly assault by the British in mid-August followed by a series of skirmishes that ended with the Americans blowing up the fort and returning to Buffalo in November.

No clear winner, but one group that lost

Against the backdrop of the struggle along the frontier of the Canadas, along the Atlantic and the Chesapeake, and eventually in the Gulf of Mexico, peace negotiations had begun in Ghent, the Netherlands (Belgium did not exist at the time), in August 1814. For several months the American and British commissioners debated the issues at hand: neutral rights, the impressment of seamen, boundary disputes and navigation rights on inland waters.

The merits of the arguments put forward by each side were influenced, to a degree, by the outcomes on the fields of battle. By December both sides were anxious to conclude the conflict and the negotiations quickly moved to a settlement, which was reached on Christmas Eve. The signing of the Treaty of Ghent on December 24 has often been misinterpreted as ending the war then, which is not true. Having concluded three treaties with the United States, in 1794, 1803 and 1806, that the American government then insisted on renegotiating, the British insisted that the treaty be ratified before it could come into effect. In London, ratification came promptly four days after the document was signed; then on February 17, 1815, the diplomatic process ended in Washington.


Thus ended the War of 1812, a conflict that momentarily diverted the attention of the greatest power of the period against a minor North American state. None of the factors that caused the war were resolved by arms, and in the years thereafter, the United States and Great Britain enjoyed, on the whole, a peaceful relationship. The few periods of tension between them were resolved diplomatically, and when the Dominion of Canada was formed in 1867, that spirit continued.

Historians have debated the outcome of this war for years and while they share a wide variety of perspectives as to which side won, they are in general agreement that there was one group that lost. Whereas the Aboriginal people on the eastern half of the continent once held the balance of power between the warring European colonies, after the War of 1812 they were militarily insignificant and subject to the policies of the growing white population. Two hundred years later, we are still coming to grips with the legacy of this war. We can only hope that the occasion of its bicentennial of the War of 1812 will provide all of us with the opportunity to expand our understanding of these important events and their consequences.

John R. Grodzinski is an assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. He specializes in 18th- and 19th-century colonial North American warfare and the War of 1812. He often leads battlefield tours of sites from the Seven Years' War, the American War of Independence and the War of 1812.
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Title Annotation:WAR OF 1812 BICENTENNIAL
Author:Grodzinski, John R.
Publication:Inroads: A Journal of Opinion
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jun 22, 2012
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