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Reluctant hosts and tenacious guests: Lisbon's response to the English mercantile community in the seventeenth century.

Lisbon's municipal records for the seventeenth century describe in some detail the relations between foreign merchants and civic authorities, and the latter were not amused. In fact, Lisbon's records reveal a recurrent preoccupation with abuses by foreign merchants, and, for the most part, the merchants in question were English. The reasons for the Portuguese targeting the English were multifaceted, but the sheer volume of English trade in Lisbon, and the rate at which this trade developed in the second half of the seventeenth century, had much to do with the attention the English mercantile community received from Portuguese officials.

Although the Dutch dominated imports to Lisbon for the first half of the seventeenth century, the English caught up with and even surpassed the Dutch in the later decades. Lisbon's seventeenth-century port records have not survived, but Inquisition officials kept their own accounts of inspections of foreign ships entering Portuguese harbors, and these accounts reveal something about the maritime traffic in Lisbon. As the Portuguese historian Virginia Rau indicated in her study of these archival sources, these Visitas cannot be used as economic records because Inquisition authorities were primarily interested in ships from "heretical" parts of Europe, and often failed to note the type and volume of cargo aboard. Instead, Portuguese officials concentrated on observing articles that posed a threat to the Catholic faith, items such as books and religious relics. Still, her analysis showed that, despite the large gaps in the Lisbon entries, there is reason to believe that the number of English ships entering Lisbon grew substantially in the second half of the seventeenth century. From 1642 to 1644, for instance, the number of Dutch ships visited by Inquisition inspectors in Lisbon's harbor was 22, 54, and 32, respectively; the English numbered 19, 22, and 19 for those same years. Few records survived for the period from 1649 to 1681, but from 1682 to 1684, the Dutch numbered 56, 46, and 42, compared to the English who numbered 61, 49, and 52. (2) In addition to these records, English sources show that by the 1690s the English had a dozen principal firms in Lisbon, which controlled imports of English cloth worth approximately 200,000 [pounds sterling], and this was apparently a time of decline from the "prosperous days" following the treaty of 1654. English "factories" were also established in Viana, Porto, Coimbra, and Faro, but the English presence was especially prominent in Lisbon. (3)

A fair amount is known about Anglo-Portuguese relations in the early modern period, particularly in connection with England's textile exports to Portugal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. English and Portuguese historians alike have generally concentrated on the four major treaties signed between the two countries in that period, in 1642, 1654, 1661, and 1703, and analyzed the ways in which those peace and economic agreements helped or hindered trade in each respective country. From V. M. Shillington and Edgar Prestage, to S. Sideri and Henk Ligthart, the focus has been on the advantageous position England enjoyed during this period, at the expense of Portugal's waning economy. (4) More recent work by L. M. E. Shaw shows a radically different picture, one that highlights the plight of English merchants in Portugal, at a time when it was neither popular to be English nor Protestant. (5) One of Shaw's greatest contributions is her bringing to light English archival sources previously under-utilized, in particular correspondence and reports from English consuls and envoys stationed in Lisbon. The other side of that coin--the views of Lisbon officials toward the English--remains to be seen. The present study is a step in that direction.

The present study also focuses on a group of English merchants that have to date been neglected, by Portuguese and English historians alike. The merchants in question were those involved in the cod trade, a triangular trade that encompassed English ports as points of finance and departure, vessels loading up with cod in Newfoundland, and Portuguese (and other European) markets for that cod. As most of the studies noted above make amply clear, the greater volume of the Anglo-Portuguese trade in the early modern period consisted of English textiles and Portuguese wine, especially in the eighteenth century. Because that branch of Anglo-Portuguese relations has been well documented, including in L. M. E. Shaw's most recent book, this essay concentrates on the less-known, but still important and distinct lobby group in Portugal's capital, the English cod merchants.

More specifically, this essay aims to show how the English mercantile community in general, and in particular members of that community involved in the cod trade, was often caught between Lisbon's power struggle with the Portuguese crown. On the one hand, the city wished to protect its municipal regulatory powers to tax foreign merchants, and to protect its native merchant enclave; on the other hand, the crown had to deal with food shortages that plagued its burgeoning towns, including Lisbon. By the mid-seventeenth century, the English were able to supply Portugal with a much-needed foodstuff, cod from Newfoundland. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Portuguese crown appears to have supported the triangular traders in opposition to outcries from Lisbon's officials. (6)

Municipal council records cannot be said to reflect all the complexities of an early modern metropolis, but Lisbon's books show nonetheless that a certain vociferous segment of the population was extremely frustrated at the seemingly unfair privileges enjoyed by the English mercantile community in the Portuguese capital. Although the presence of English merchants in Portuguese soil had a long history by the mid-seventeenth century, it was at this time that relations between Lisbon authorities and English merchants became especially cantankerous. (7) England was a much-needed ally for Portugal in its war for independence from Spain in 1640. Some of the concessions that the Portuguese had to make to seal that alliance proved very unpopular to a few municipalities who saw their jurisdiction eroded in the process.

Of the four major peace and commercial treaties between England and Portugal noted above, the one signed in 1654 was the most contentious in the eyes of the Portuguese. Because Portugal supported the Royalists during the English Civil Wars in the 1640s, the Portuguese were forced to make large concessions to the victorious English Protectorate, resulting in the 1654 treaty which some dubbed the Magna Carta of English trading privileges in Portugal. (8) Shaw contends, however, that the 1654 treaty was advantageous to both nations, and that any possible advantage England might have had was frustrated by the Portuguese who continuously either "fudge[d] the meaning" of the treaty, or conveniently ignored certain articles of the agreement. (9) A look at Anglo-Portuguese relations from the point of view of Lisbon's civic authorities offers an intriguing perspective on the multidimensionality of the historical experience.

The Great Empire will be by England. Great forces will pass by land and sea, The all-powerful for more than three hundred years; The Portuguese will not be pleased with it. (10)

On 20 November 1638 Lisbon's municipal council sent a petition to the Portuguese crown requesting support in its decision to prohibit foreign merchants from selling merchandise in any other form than bulk or wholesale. (11) Lisbon officials reminded the king that this law had been in place for more than two hundred years. In fact, city officials began their petition by pointing to regulations established by previous monarchs, including D. John I (r. 1385-1433) and D. Manuel I (r. 1495-1521), who had recognized that by allowing foreign merchants the right to come into the city and sell retail, foreign merchants would bypass Portuguese intermediaries, leave with all the profits, and deny the Portuguese a chance to participate in the negotiations of such commerce. Thus, a decree was passed in 1428 restricting foreigners' access to markets, and establishing for Lisbon twelve brokers or commission agents who would negotiate with all incoming foreign merchants the purchase of their products, reserving the rights of resale to the Portuguese. The king was also reminded that only two exceptions to this general rule had been made in the past, at which time the authorities had explicitly declared that those were isolated cases. (12) At stake in 1638 was Lisbon's jurisdiction over the regulation of the city's retail sector, including licensing, taxing, and determining prices.

Lisbon's municipal council was underpressure to allow foreign merchants to set up shop in the city. The two exceptional cases noted above occurred in 1633 and 1636, at which times the council requested the crown's permission to grant retail licenses to foreigners residing in Lisbon and married to Portuguese spouses. These requests stipulated that there were not enough native Portuguese merchants in Lisbon at that time because many of them had left, although reasons for this exodus were not provided. In 1638, however, the council complained that a crown official was interfering with city business by pushing for a return of those exemptions, in order to accommodate two incoming cargoes of codfish in English ships. For his part, the exchequer maintained that in granting this favor the city would attract more fish boats into its ports, and that the English would leave if they did not get these concessions. (13)

The city feared, however, that if it conceded this privilege to English merchants, others would naturally follow with the same demands. Furthermore, as Lisbon officials pointed out, similar restrictions applied to Portuguese merchants entering English or other foreign ports. Indeed, they argued, the English wanted to do in Lisbon what in London was prohibited to the Portuguese. As for the threat that ships would turn around with their unloaded cargoes, Lisbon officials were not convinced that English merchants would chance it given the unfriendly seas in the region. Pirates had captured thirteen ships loaded with cod the previous year. (14)

The crown decided in favor of the city. Municipal officials convinced the king and ministers that restricting the sale of merchandise to Portuguese merchants would be more profitable for the crown. But the victory was short-lived. On 17 October 1645, the crown asked why Lisbon's municipal council had decided not to allow the French and English to sell certain provisions, wholesale and retail, in shops to the public. Lisbon officials failed to explain themselves to the king's satisfaction, and on 28 April 1646 the crown made certain allowances to foreign cod merchants. Despite the loss in revenue this meant to both levels of government, the Portuguese king conceded English and French cod merchants a trade deal permitting them to sell cod wholesale or retail, set their own prices, and remain exempt from local taxes. In essence, foreign cod merchants were exempted from municipal regulations. This was in effect as long as foreigners sold their merchandise aboard their ships upon arrival. In other words, they could not land the fish and sell it. Once the vessel and crew left harbor, the remaining cod was subject to city taxes and regulation. (15)

One can only speculate about the pressure put on the Portuguese king, D. John IV (r. 1640-56), and his ministers, to grant such privileges to foreign merchants, but undoubtedly the peace treaties following Portugal's liberation from the Spanish crown in 1640 had a role to play, as well as the shortage of foodstuffs in Portugal. In fact, Lisbon's municipal council was fighting against a policy that was instated by D. John IV as soon as he ascended to the throne on 1 December 1640. Already on 24 December 1640 the monarch issued a decree urging that commerce and trade be facilitated for foreign merchants, first because Portugal badly needed arms and munitions to combat Spain, and then because Portugal needed foreigners to bring in basic commodities of food and manufactures. (16) Lisbon officials, for their part, were outraged at the results of such concessions, and were still fuming on 14 November 1653 when they informed the crown of their grave concerns. Due to their unharnessed liberties, Lisbon's petition stated, foreigners were creating a public scandal by showing disrespect for city regulations, and charging excessive prices for their products. (17)

The outcry from Lisbon officials about the excessive prices charged to local citizens was politically motivated, at least in part, for essentially the city had lost control over an important group of merchants, and a sizeable source of revenue. Municipal authorities also complained that foreign merchants did not conduct business in their ships only, as required by the 1646 legislation, but rented spaces around the city, where they sold their merchandise retail. In a letter dated 12 November 1654, city authorities outlined their worries about other ships coming to Lisbon and doing the same with their merchandise. Though officials referred to "foreigners," and the 1646 decree applied to foreign merchants in general, the main source of contention was the English because they were greater in number among the foreigners present in Lisbon. In every communication to the crown, municipal officials betrayed their true nemesis, for although they resented all foreign merchants coming into port and deciding the law, as Lisbon saw it, the city was especially critical of the liberties English merchants possessed, liberties they did not enjoy in any other country, and that Portuguese merchants were not accorded abroad. Once again, city officials reminded the crown that it, too, lost in the process for the crown would receive a share of taxes ordinarily collected from retail sales. Furthermore, the foreigners' intrusion into the retail level was detrimental to the average consumer, for they sold their merchandise at higher prices than would be allowed if the city controlled the local market. (18)

Interestingly, in this petition of 1654, city officials did not request a return to the status quo of 1638, but merely asked for a reaffirmation of the terms of the 1646 declaration--that once merchandise was brought on land it was subject to municipal intervention, including taxation. The issue was left unresolved, and four years later, on 8 November 1658, the city repeated its plea to the crown to regulate the matter. Once again, Lisbon officials reminded the crown that they had always had the right to establish prices in foodstuffs and that foreigners had never been allowed to deal in the retail market. For the sake of maintaining peace, however, the English were granted the right to sell textiles and fish at wholesale or retail prices, as they chose, but only on board ship upon arrival. Foreigners took advantage of these liberties, municipal officials complained, for council was then faced with seven ships loaded with cod whose merchants were not satisfied with selling it aboard their vessels. Instead, these merchants had English agents in the city selling cod to Portuguese women who in turn sold it in shops and warehouses across the city. According to Lisbon authorities, this practice exceeded the peace agreement, robbed the city and crown of tax revenues, and resulted in unregulated prices for the public. (19)

The limits outlined in the 1646 crown decision were obviously not respected by at least some foreign merchants and not seriously upheld by the crown. The result was that Lisbon officials and foreign merchants engaged in a cat-and-mouse type of operation where one tried to outsmart the other, with each taking turns at complaining about the outcome. In 1673, for instance, Lisbon authorities closed down a number of shops in the Ribeira district after having caught some vendors selling English merchandise. The city justified its actions by claiming that it was protecting its jurisdiction over retail sales and taxes. The English merchants, for their part, contacted their consulate who filed a complaint on their behalf with the Portuguese crown on 1 December 1673.

The final outcome of this bold move by the city, and the complaint by the English consulate, remains unclear, but the following year Lisbon's council was faced with a similar problem, and it notified the crown that the dispute from the previous year remained unresolved. By 1674 city officials conveyed a sense of frustration and cynicism in their dealings with the crown over this issue, especially in connection to the retail sales of codfish from Newfoundland. That year English merchants received royal approval to sell cod at 6, 400 reis per quintal, presumably aboard ship, but once again they were caught selling it in the city and were apprehended. While Lisbon representatives were careful not to criticize the king for the generous price awarded English merchants, council was quick to point out that prices could have been lower. If the war with Holland justified the higher prices in the past, they said, that war was now over. Furthermore, they argued, the English should not be allowed to sell cod in Lisbon for a price twice as high as they sold it in Porto. (20)

Much to the city's dismay, the crown decided in favor of the English. Lisbon's response was unequivocal. How could the peace treaty give English merchants residing in Lisbon special privileges over the Portuguese themselves, municipal authorities wondered. Continuance of these privileges, they argued, would result in a loss of more than 300,000 cruzados per year to the city from retail tax revenues that the city would have collected had the merchandise been sold by Portuguese merchants.

As the century progressed, Lisbon received little relief from the crown on the controversial privileges. In fact, by the early 1700s these concessions had been expanded to include other merchandise as well as other nations, for the crown warned Lisbon's council that the English and Dutch were free to sell grain without incurring local duties. (21) Although Lisbon's municipal council fought hard against attacks on its regulatory powers, it appears that its concerns were seldom heeded. The crown had its own reasons for overruling Lisbon's objections to the English interlopers, not least of which was Portugal's dependence on northern European goods, especially manufactures and foodstuffs. Consequently, if city officials are to be trusted, Lisbon consumers paid higher prices for certain imports than they would have paid had the municipal council been allowed to regulate prices per custom; and the city and state lost tax revenues because foreigners were exempted from retail sales taxes. Without the foreign merchants, however, the same commodities might not have existed, a situation that the national government was unwilling to chance.

Lisbon officials clearly blamed the peace treaties with England for the city's loss in regulatory powers, and they were not alone in denouncing the English for exploiting the terms of the agreements. Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo, a Portuguese diplomat stationed in France from 1668-76, showed in his letters to his superiors in Portugal that he was acutely aware of the trade imbalance between Portugal and northern Europe. Although he was concerned with Portugal's policies that allowed such a situation to develop, he was especially critical of the role played by France and England in weakening Portugal's economy, and of the two, he attacked the English in particular. In fact, Ribeiro de Macedo claimed that the general belief among his colleagues, Portuguese and otherwise, was that the real cause of Portugal's poverty was the English having taken all its money. This observation was based on an awareness that Portugal had a trade imbalance in the manufacturing sector, forcing Portugal to buy much of its imports with precious coin. He cautioned the king to stop the flow of Portuguese money abroad, and that the only way to do this was to stop importing so many foreign products. He also encouraged the crown to promote emigration of trades people from France to set up shop in Portugal, a scheme which would provide the nation's needs for many goods, reduce imports, and keep currency at home. (22)

Ribeiro de Macedo blamed both the French and English for bankrupting Portugal, but he was especially bitter toward the latter. The English were favorite targets despite the fact that the French and Dutch eventually received similar trade concessions from Portugal. The English presence must have been more substantial, for the French, too, resented the privileges enjoyed by English merchants in Portuguese soil. For instance, in 1713 the French Consulate commented that the Portuguese were happy with the end of war (War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1713) and that they had never wanted to be at war with the French because the Portuguese were primarily Anglophobes. "On n'avait jamais vu ce pays si miserable; le negoce s'y est perdu, les anglais en ont emporte tout l'argent pendant la guerre; rien ne peut le remettre que la flotte du Bresil qui viendra desormais decharger dans ce port For et les marchandises." (23)

Closer to home, Lisbon's anti-English sentiments would have received a favorable nod from Dom Luis de Meneses, Count of Ericeira, who became Portugal's Vedor da Fazenda in 1675. Ericeira advocated Portugal's economic independence and introduced Sumptuary Laws in 1677 prohibiting the wearing of foreign cloth. At the same time, he encouraged immigration of artisans from northern Europe to set up factories using local wool. By the end of the seventeenth century domestic production was successful enough to upset some English textile merchants. (24) Concern over Ericeira's policies in England provoked a petition from the English cloth merchants, entitled "Whereas the Portugal Trade is very advantageous to the Nation," circa 1678. The text called for a reduction in the import duties on Portuguese wines not only because this would alleviate the trade imbalance between the two countries, but also because French wines had to be bought with English coin, whereas Portuguese wine would be traded for English manufactures. (25)

The English plan worked for a number of reasons. Ericeira died in 1690, and his protectionist policies died with him. Furthermore, with new discoveries of gold in Brazil in 1693-95, Portugal's commercial interests were once again focused overseas. By the turn of the century Portugal was open for business and the English responded with the Methuen Treaty of 1703. In return for a market for its wines, Portugal removed all barriers to English manufactures. English exports to Portugal reportedly increased 120 per-cent from 1697-1710, while Portuguese exports to England rose 40 per cent during the same period. (26) The perception that the English dominated Portuguese commerce altogether was especially acute among the French, who felt slighted by the Anglo-Portuguese treaties. By the mid-eighteenth century, their view about the English in Lisbon was unforgiving: "Ceux-ci les nourrissent, les vetissent, prennent leurs vins, leurs seis, et se payent cherement par leurs mains." (27)

The Methuen treaty was controversial from the outset. Critics of the seemingly advantageous position of the English mercantile community in Portugal were vociferous. Some suggested that John Methuen, the English ambassador and architect of the historical agreement that bears his name, could only have managed such a coup through bribery. Others complained that the treaty not only injured the Portuguese manufacturing industry; it also led to a critical shortage of com in the country because cornfields had to be used to grow vineyards. But not everyone agreed with these findings. One Portuguese historian concluded that most critics of the Methuen treaty wore French glasses, while more recent research has found no evidence to support the argument that the Methuen treaty was disastrous to Portugal. (28)

More recent research also concludes that foreign participation in the Portuguese economy was crucial to the maintenance of Portugal's vast empire. (29) Indeed, Portugal's dependence on manufactures from northern European markets was well established long before the Methuen treaty came into effect. A Flemish observer wrote in 1535 that "if there had not been so many foreigners and 'our [Flemish] countrymen' to exercize the mechanical Arts, it would have been very difficult to find a shoemaker or barber" in Portugal. (30) This might have been the exaggerated opinion of a foreign nationalist, but in 1608 a Portuguese report lamented the fact that nothing was produced in Portugal, and that the Lisbon trade was entirely dependent on importing and exporting merchandise from overseas. (31) Portuguese seventeenth-century records show that Portuguese authorities granted tax privileges to English and French merchants trading in Portugal in 1605 because of Portugal's dependence on manufactures from northern Europe. (32) English records from 1577 confirm this, showing that English ships carried into Portuguese ports an array of English manufactures, especially textiles, and picked up in return "Indews wares whate soever that cometh frome the est yndews," and possibly some Portuguese "Orrendges, lemonns and greate ynnions." (33) The English supplied Portuguese markets with much-needed merchandise, and undoubtedly there were those in Lisbon and elsewhere in Portugal and its overseas posts who appreciated and benefitted from the Anglo-Portuguese commercial treaties. English profitable enterprises in Portuguese soil led to some resentment, however, especially in Lisbon.

Deservedly or not, the English were favorite targets of Lisbon officials' attacks on the foreign encroachment in the local economy. These attacks grew more strident and more numerous in the second half of the seventeenth century when the English presence in Lisbon grew rapidly, but in fact relations between the English and the Portuguese had been strained for some time. Some Portuguese observers blamed the English for the decline of the Portuguese presence in certain Asian markets in the sixteenth century, while others argued that the British empire was built on the backs of the Portuguese. (34) Lisbon municipal officials, too, had a long tradition of wrangling with the crown about the rights of foreigners. Already in 1401 Lisbon complained to the Portuguese monarch of the unfair privileges enjoyed by English merchants in the city. (35) Admittedly, Lisbon's problems with the crown were not based solely on the influx of foreign merchants. Lisbon's complaints about English abuse of local mies and regulations was likely a not-so-subtle criticism of the crown's usurpation of municipal autonomy, a familiar cry in seventeenth-century Iberia. (36) Still, municipal council records from the second half of the seventeenth century indicate that the English were a major preoccupation for Lisbon authorities, more so than all the other foreign groups combined.

Nor was Lisbon alone in its condemnation of the English. Other Portuguese regions felt the English growing presence in their midst, and occasionally voiced their concerns. Municipal records from the coastal town of Aveiro also show that in 1685 the local government was apprehensive about the English monopoly in trade, to the detriment of native merchants. Aveiro's complaints were outlined in a long petition in which it claimed that the town could not support the crown's taxation of municipalities because of the decline of the local mercantile community, for which Aveiro officials blamed the English takeover of the cod trade. (37)

Records from the Algarve in southern Portugal also reveal an overwhelming presence of English goods entering the harbour. Between 1619-83, for instance, English ships accounted for 46 per cent of maritime traffic in Faro's port, a proportion of the import trade higher than the combined total of the other three major foreign groups in town: the Dutch and French each had 15 per cent of the harbor traffic, and the Germans had 12 per cent. (38) Unfortunately it is not known how Faro residents felt about this situation, but in the island of Madeira, where the English also dominated the maritime trade, relations were occasionally tumultuous. For instance, the English merchant William Bolton wrote in 1696 of his ill-treatment by the governor of Madeira, to no avail, as had been the case with similar problems years earlier. When English merchants complained to a Portuguese minister in Lisbon about the arbitrary decisions of the governor in Madeira in 1675, the minister is reported to have replied that "If the English did not like their proceedings they might stay at home and keep their goods to themselves." (39)

More than a love-hate relationship, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was akin to a shotgun wedding. Both parties found ample reasons to complain, but it was profitable enough to at least a few members of both sides of the equation to have the alliance last well into the nineteenth century. Conflicts between the English mercantile community and the Portuguese were more pronounced in Lisbon because the English presence in the capital was greater in scale and thus more visible. Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, the English population in Lisbon in the mid-seventeenth century is believed to have reached several thousand. (40) An Italian document from 1674 noted that in Porto there were nine English commercial houses, compared to one French, and three Dutch/Flemish. Unfortunately the document does not provide the same information for Lisbon, but it was recognizably the site of the most significant English community on Portuguese soil. (41) Not surprisingly, therefore, some of the most colorful complaints in Anglo-Portuguese relations come out of Lisbon.

On the one hand, an English observer in Lisbon noted in 1657 that "'The English, as everywhere, so here, purchase terror and honour, yet are generally hated by this nation'." On the other hand, a Lisbon native complained to a Portuguese official in 1713: "Where now is the ancient honour and truth of the Portuguese nation, that we have become favourers of strangers, of the English, the worst and the most insolent of all strangers?" (42) The records suggest that Lisbon officials were not always the most generous of hosts to their foreign, and especially English, guests. But records also show that the English were not easily deterred from what they considered to be "very advantageous to this [English] Nation," as reflected in the petition of 1678 noted above. The English mercantile community persisted because Lisbon provided a profitable market. Lisbon municipal officials fought back against what they perceived to be an attack on their traditional jurisdiction over the local trade and economy. For its part, the Portuguese crown had to balance the grievances of local or regional governments with the need to attract foreign investment. Unlike the seemingly belligerent governor of Madeira noted above, Portugal's national leaders could not afford to tell the English to stay home.

Darlene Abreu-Ferreira

University of Winnipeg

(1) This study was supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

(2) Virginia Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do movimento dos portos de Faro e Lisboa durante o seculo XVII," Anais da Academia Portuguesa da Historia 5 (241) (1954): 199-277. See also Frederic Mauro, Le Portugal et l'Atlantiqueau XVIIe siecle (1570-1670) (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), and H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770 (London: Methuen & Co., 1971).

(3) A. D. Francis, The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 20-22. The "factory" was essentially the Assembly of Merchants and Factors settled in Lisbon. See also Carl A. Hanson, Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal, 1668-1703 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), and A. R. Walford, The British Factory in Lisbon (Lisbon: The British Institute, 1940).

(4) V. M. Shillington and A. B. Wallis Chapman, The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal (New York: Burt Franklin, r. 1970 [1907]); Edgar Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland from 1640 to 1668 (Watford: Voss & Michael, 1925); S. Sideri, Trade and Power: Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1970); Henk Ligthart and Henk Reitsma, "Portugal's Semi-peripheral Middleman Role in its Relations with England, 1640-1760," Political Geography Quarterly 7 (4) (October, 1988): 353-362.

(5) L. M. E. Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and the English Merchants in Portugal, 1654-1810 (Aldershot, Hants. & Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1998).

(6) I am indebted to the helpful comments made by an anonymous reader of an earlier version of this paper for helping me to better formulate this argument.

(7) English merchants had long acknowledge the importance of the Iberian Peninsula for English trade. See, for example, John Browne [Marchant], The Marchants Avizo, ed. Patrick McGrath (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957 [1589]).

(8) L. M. E. Shaw, Trade, Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal, 1650-1690 (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1989), 65; Sir Richard Lodge, "The English Factory at Lisbon: Some Chapters in its History," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, 16 (1933): 225. See also Harold V. Livermore, "The 'Privileges of an Englishman in the Kingdoms and Dominions of Portugal Atlante 2 (1954): 57-77.

(9) Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 98.

(10) Michel Nostradamus [1555] as cited in Hanson, Economy and Society, 260. For a slightly different translation of this passage, see Edgar Leoni, ed., Nostradamus: Life and Literature (New York: Exposition Press, 1961), 443.

(11) The minutes from Lisbon's municipal council meetings from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been collected in seventeen volumes. See Eduardo Freire de Oliveira, ed., Elementos para a historia do Municipio de Lisboa (Lisbon: Typographia Universal, 1882-1911). A two-volume Index to the series, albeit incomplete, was published by the City of Lisbon in 1942-3. Henceforth this collection will be cited as Elementos, followed by volume and page number.

(12) Elementos, 4:354-355.

(13) Elementos, 4: 7-8, 200-201 and 355-356.

(14) Elementos, 4: 356-357.

(15) Elementos, 4: 362 and 618; 4: 26-27.

(16) Gustavo de Freitas, "A Companhia Geral do Comercio do Brasil (1649-1720)," Revista de Historia 6 (April-June 1951): 311-312.

(17) Elementos, 4: 457-461.

(18) Elementos, 7: xvi-xviii.

(19) Elementos, 7: xciii-xcv; Fisher, The Portugal Trade, 68,

(20) Elementos, 8: 13-14 and 54-59. In Porto in 1674, high quality cod was priced at an average of 3, 650 reis per quintal. Arquivo Distrital do Porto, Livro do Rendimento da Redizima, 1674, Cabido No. 157, fos. 90-94.

(21) Elementos, 8:67-69; 10: 343, 427 and 457; 15: 215-217 and 293.

(22) Virginia Rau, "Politica economica e mercantilismo na correspondencia de Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo (1668-1676)," Do Tempo e da Historia 2 (1968): 29 and 37-39.

(23) Cited in Frederic Mauro, "Porto et le Bresil (1500-1800)," Revista de Historia 2 (1979): 345-347.

(24) Si den, Informal Colonialism, 26-7; H. E. S. Fisher, "Lisbon, its English Merchant Community and the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth Century," in P. L. Cottrell and D. H. Aldcroft, eds., Shipping, Trade and Commerce: Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981), 24; Shillington and Chapman, The Commercial Relations, 218-219.

(25) Cited in Hanson, Economy and Society, 280-281.

(26) Sideri, Power and Trade, 24-27 and 44; Shillington and Chapman, The Commercial Relations, 220-225.

(27) Albert-Alain Bourbon, ed., "Description de Lisbonne: Extraite du Journal de la Campagne des Vaisseaux du Roy en 1755, par le Chevalier des Courtils," Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises 26 (1965): 160.

(28) A. D. Francis, "Some Reflections on the Methuen Treaties," in Actas: V Coloquio Internacional de Estudos Luso-Brasileiros 2 (Coimbra: Universidade dc Coimbra, 1965), 329-331; Diogo Pacheco de Amorim, Relacoes comerciais de Portugal com a Inglateira (Figueira da Foz: Tipografia Popular, 1937), 18; Antonio Almodovar and Jose Luis Cardoso, A History of Portuguese Economic Thought (London/New York: Routlcdge, 1998), 34.

(29) Jorge M. Pedreira, "'To Have and to Have Not': The Economic Consequences of Empire: Portugal (1415-1822)," Revista de Historia Economica 16 (1) (1998): 93-122.

(30) R. Hooykaas, Humanism and the Voyages of Discovery> in 16th Century Portuguese Science and Letters (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979), 37.

(31) David Grant Smith, "The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil in the Seventeenth Century: A Socio-Economic Study of the Merchants of Lisbon and Bahia, 1620-1690," Doctoral Thesis, University of Texas at Austin (1975), 12.

(32) Jose Justino de Andrade e Silva, ed., Colleccao chronologica da legislacao portugueza (1603-1700), 9 vols. (Lisbon: Imprensa de J. J. A. Silva, 1854), 1: 146-147.

(33) R. H. Tawney and Eileen Power, eds., Tudor Economic Documents, 3 vols. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961), 3: 202-203.

(34) Mx Laura Betttencourt Pires, "Urn problema controverso nas relacoes anglo-portuguesasno seculo XVI," Revista da Faculdade de Ciencias Sociais e Humanas (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) 2 (1988), 221; see also hex Portugal visto pelos Ingleses (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Investigacao Cientifica, 1981).

(35) Humberto Baquero Moreno, "Duas cartas de seguranca maritima concedidas a subditos estrangeiros por D. Afonso V," in Actas do II Coloquio Internacional de Historia da Madeira (Coimbra: Imprensa de Coimbra, 1990), 609.

(36) For a discussion on tensions between Lisbon's municipal government and the Portuguese crown, see Catarina Madeira Santos, "Tensions politiques et strategies administratives: La gestion financiere d'une epoque de crise: Portugal, 1620-1640," in Robert Descimon, Jean-Frederic Schaub, Bernard Vincent, eds., Les figures de l'administrateur: Institutions, reseaux, pouvoirs en Espagne, en France et au Portugal, 16e-19e siecle (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1997), 121-132; and Helena Murteira, Lisboa da Restauracao as Luzes (Lisbon: Editorial Presenca, 1999), especially chapter 3. See also James S. Amelang, "Municipal Autonomy in Early Modern Spain: Two Recents [sic] Studies of Barcelona," in Primer Congres d'Historia Moderna de Catalunya (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 1984): 19-24.

(37) Antonio Gomes da Rocha Madahil, ed., Milenario de Aveiro: Colectanea de documentos historicos, 1581-1792 (Aveiro: Camara Municipal de Aveiro, 1959), fos. 139-139v. I am indebted to Ines Amorim, Universidade do Porto, for bringing this source to my attention.

(38) Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do movimento dos portos," 236.

(39) Walter Minchiton, "British Residents and their Problems in Madeira before 1815," in Actas do II Coloquio Internacional de Historia da Madeira (Coimbra: imprensa de Coimbra, 1990), 487-488.

(40) Shaw, Inquisition, 111.

(41) Guido Battelli, "O comercio dos portos de Lisboa, Setubal e Porto nos fins do seculo XVII, conforme um documento italiano da mesma epoca," Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa 9/10 (1935): 343.

(42) Cited in Shaw, Inquisition, 69; and Shaw, Anglo-Portaguese Alliance, 100. See also Pauline Croft, "English Manners Trading to Spain and Portugal," The Mariner's Mirror 69 (1983): 263.
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Author:Abreu-Ferreira, Darlene
Publication:Portuguese Studies Review
Date:Jan 1, 2004
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