Relations between France and China: towards a Paris-Beijing axis?
After the foundation of the People's Republic of China, only a handful of neutral and Nordic Western European nations recognised the new Beijing regime. (1) Thus, General de Gaulle's decision in 1964 to set up diplomatic relations with the PRC heralded a change of policy among Western states--the recognition of the principle of reality--which later lead to China's entry into the United Nations (1971), Nixon's visit (1972) and the PRC's gradual integration into the world community.
Sino-Soviet Conflict and Sino-French Normalisation
The Sino-Soviet rift played an important role in this process. Beyond the blatant domestic political differences between France and China, de Gaulle and Mao Zedong felt that they shared a similar willingness to, at least partly, free their respective nations from the constraints of the bipolar world imposed by the Cold War context. Then, Mao made public his concept of "intermediary zones" (comprised of developed countries that can side with the Third World in order to isolate the two superpowers), an idea he developed ten years later in his Three World theory, a theory presented by Deng Xiaoping before the UN in 1974. Around the same time, France left the integrated NATO command (1966), while remaining a member of the Atlantic Alliance, and decided to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and large developing and often non-aligned nations such as Brazil, Mexico, etc.
In the 1970s and 80s, Sino-French relations developed steadily, as China went through major changes. Despite the East-West detente, Beijing's growing opposition to the Soviet Union created deeper affinities with the West and France, in particular after Deng Xiaoping launched the economic reforms and Brezhnev invaded Afghanistan (1979). France developed, as did other Western countries (e.g., the US and the UK), military relations with China and started selling small quantities of weapons and military equipment to buyers there.
After Tiananmen: An Unprecedented Sino-French Rapprochement
In 1989, the Tiananmen massacre and the suppression of the democratic movement in China put an end to this latter cooperation. France was then proactive in convincing the EU to impose an arms embargo on China. However, gradually, Western nations resumed their relations with the Beijing authorities. France was one of the first European countries to do so in the spring of 1991. (2)
Despite the development of military relations with Taiwan in the aftermath of Tiananmen (see below), France quickly renewed close cooperation with China on a number of international issues, in particular the settlement of the Cambodia question in 1991 (the Paris International Conference). The end of the Cold War in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Deng's re-invigoration of the economic reforms in 1992 and the return to power of the neo-Gaullist Party in 1993 (i.e., Edouard Balladur's appointment as Premier), all favoured an unprecedented rapprochement between both countries. In January 1994, Paris promised in a written accord to Beijing "not to authorise any more French companies to participate in the armament of Taiwan" (bu bizhun Faguo qiye canyu wuzhuang Taiwan). However, it did not put an end to the French-Taiwanese military cooperation and long-term cooperation initiated by the sale to the island-state of six La Fayette Frigates and 60 fully equipped Mirage 2000-5 in the years 1990-2. (3)
Sino-French relations were back on track and Jacques Chirac's election in 1995 confirmed France's intention to develop a close partnership with China. In May 1997, on the occasion of Chirac's first visit to China as president, France established a "comprehensive (or global) partnership" (quanmian huoban guanxi or partenariat global in French) with China. This was the second country after Russia (which in 1996 concluded a "strategic partnership" with China), and the first Western nation to sign such an agreement with China.
More than China's economic take off, the main driver of this rapprochement had been France and China's shared perception that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was unbalanced because it was overwhelmingly dominated by the United States' unipolar power.
Closely cooperating in the United Nations Security Council where both countries sit as Permanent Members, France and China have initiated a denser, multi- faced relationship, characterised by regular summit meetings, shared views on many international issues (such as the Middle East, multipolarity, cultural diversity) and rich cultural exchanges. Sino-French political and strategic dialogues have become more institutionalised and intense. In 1997 as well, France became the first democratic nation to push for abandoning attempts to condemn China in the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, opting instead for a "constructive dialogue" with the Chinese authorities on this delicate issue.
This rapprochement was not questioned when the Socialist Party came back to power between 1997 and 2002, with Premier Lionel Jospin co-habiting with President Jacques Chirac. However, the bilateral relationship was somewhat less flamboyant during this period despite Jospin's visit to China in October 1998. (4) Chirac's re-election in 2002, therefore, was openly welcomed by China.
Deepening of the Sino-French Partnership
Since Chirac's re-election in 2002, the French and Chinese Governments have continued to improve their relations, elevating their partnership into a "comprehensive (or global) strategic partnership" (quanmian zhanlue huoban guanxi or partenariat strategique global) when Hu Jintao visited France in January 2004 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries. Since then, Paris and Beijing have shared identical or similar stances on a larger number of questions, such as Iraq, disarmament, non-proliferation, North Korea, promotion of multilateralism, etc., including the highly sensitive Taiwan issue. (5)
On this latter issue for instance, the French president and his government have made several statements which have moved France closer to China than any other Western nation. For instance, in January 2004, when hosting Hu Jintao in Paris, Chirac put all the blame for the tension in the Taiwan Strait on Chen Shui-bian's referendum initiative announced in November 2003. (6) And when visiting China in April 2005, Premier Jean-Pierre Raffarin declared that the "anti-secession law" that the Chinese Parliament had adopted a month earlier was "compatible with France's 'one China' policy" and recognised that the "one country, two systems" formula was the most appropriate for solving the Taiwan issue, making public a view shared by most French diplomats posted in Beijing.
Moreover, since the autumn of 2003, acceding to Beijing's request but also under pressure from some large weapon manufacturers, Paris has tried to convince its European partners to lift the arms embargo imposed upon China after Tiananmen. In doing so, it has denied any linkage between this decision and the military tension in the Taiwan Strait, and has stressed the fact that China has dramatically changed and improved in many areas since 1989, including that of human rights abuses. (7)
Actually, there is clearly a connection between these two issues--Taiwan and the lifting of the arms embargo--in the French Government's approach, but it is a positive one. Chirac advisers, such as Jerome Monod, say in private that it is the US and Taiwan which threaten China's sovereignty and security, so France is entitled to resume arms sales to China and help it modernise its military in order to better balance the American domination of East Asia. In other words, Chirac's China policy is not mainly driven by business considerations. In developing a friendly, and what both Paris and Beijing perceive as a privileged relationship with China, the French Government is of course trying hard to promote its exports and help its large companies conclude deals with their Chinese partners. While every government does that, Chirac's rationale is more global.
The Global and Strategic Dimensions of the Sino-French Partnership
The rationale of the French Government, and in particular of Chirac, is actually multidimensional. It includes, for instance, culture: both France and China see their relationship as a way of balancing the domination of American culture, the former in promoting its culture in China and vice versa, through for instance, the organisation of "crossed years" (annees croisees)--the year of China in France and the year of France in China in 2003-5--with the latter in using culture, and its new network of Confucius institutes, to disseminate Chinese traditional and non-democratic values in order to better legitimate its political regime.
In the post Cold War environment, the global war against terrorism has contributed to strengthening the US' international role as a security guarantor. Both France and China strongly believe that economics, culture and politics are closely inter-twined and that a multipolar and culturally plural world has already taken shape. In addition, having both developed since the 1960s as independent nuclear powers, notably with second strike capability against any bigger nuclear power (Russia or the US), Paris and Beijing believe they have a regional role to play that may, on occasions, conflict with American interests.
At the same time, France and China want to make the world more multipolar and plural than it is today because they think that balancing the US' overall domination will contribute to alleviating international tensions and solving pending problems. They both also share the view that the only way to weaken the US' domination is to unite as much as possible other powers or other poles (what Jiang Zemin called big countries--daguo, be they democratic or non-democratic) in a loose front against what they perceive as American unilateralism and hegemonism.
But how far would France and China be ready to go in order to create a new bipolar world, structured around a confrontation between, on the one hand the US and its closest allies (such as Japan and the UK), and on the other hand, a coalition of secondary poles, including China, France and large countries such as Brazil? Has a Paris-Beijing axis really taken shape?
In the post Cold War context, international relations have become much more fluid and multilayered than before, allowing for example, France to remain an ally of the US, a close friend of Japan and India as well as a "comprehensive strategic partner" of China. In this new context therefore, in which everyone cooperates with everyone, one must go beyond the symbols and slogans and look more closely at the content of bilateral relations. In many respects, the Sino-French relationship is a good illustration of the limits of pro-active policies.
Limits of the Special Relationship between Paris and Beijing
The relations between France and China have witnessed a number of difficulties. Though some, such as human rights and Taiwan have been better managed than others, they still face the pressure and scrutiny of French public opinion and some politicians. Other difficulties, such as relations with the US, trade, reform of the UN, Iran, Sudan, Africa, etc., have not been solved and will probably have an enduring impact on the relationship.
In 1989, Francois Mitterand's Government, welcoming a large number of Chinese dissidents in the summer of 1989, was one of the most outspoken critics of the Tiananmen massacre and repression of the democratic movement in China. Since then, in particular since 1997, dialogue and cooperation on legal matters have replaced condemnation. But at the same time, the new approach adopted by the French Government to the human rights situation in China has been questioned by large segments of the public as well as a number of opposition leaders. In their view, this policy has not gone far enough in stopping human rights abuses and should be supplemented, when need be, with political pressure and condemnation of the Chinese Government. More precisely, they believe that French policies have not contributed in any way to the liberalisation and democratisation of the Chinese political regime, whose objective, while modernising the legal and administrative institutions, is clearly to maintain the current one party system. Thus, Chirac's critics claim that France should keep its distance from the PRC, be more critical, and refrain from giving the public the impression that it is caving in to every demand formulated by the Beijing authorities.
For these critics, Taiwan has been another blatant example of weakness on the part of the French Government. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, France developed a close "non-official relationship" with Taipei and sold a large amount of weapons to the Republic of China's armed forces. After the Mirage sale in December 1992, France was ostracised by the Chinese Government which retaliated by excluding French companies from the Chinese market and closing the French Consulate in Guangzhou. However, instead of rebutting these discriminatory measures (with the help of the EU), the French Government "capitulated" in January 1994, accepting to sign with its Chinese counterpart an agreement that not only banned France from selling any more arms to Taiwan but also included the unprecedented recognition that the PRC exercised sovereignty over the island, a commitment that had not been made by de Gaulle in 1964. (8) Since then, Paris has been very shy to let any of its cabinet ministers visit Taiwan, relying on high-level civil servants, retired politicians and parliamentarians to keep open its channels of communication with Taipei. (9)
Since 2002, though Taiwan has remained a dynamic economic partner of France, most French politicians are willing to give clear priority to relations with China. Nevertheless, Chirac and Raffarin's remarks on cross-Taiwan Strait relations and their willingness to lift the EU arms embargo on China have drawn large criticism in the media, among the opposition and some pro-government politicians. Chirac's detractors have in particular accused him of putting France on the side of a threatening authoritarian system, and against a fragile young democracy, and thereby moving away from the common EU policy on Taiwan. The basis of this policy remains (a) a recognition of one China, (b) support for the status quo and criticism of any move against it (for example, Chen Shui-bian's decision to scrap the National Unification Council in February 2006 was qualified as "unhelpful"), and (c) clear support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Chirac's detractors have also accused the French president not only of jeopardising France's relations with the US but also of dividing the EU by pushing hard for an end to the arms embargo before agreeing on any strengthening of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct with respect to arms exports to "zones of tension".
Lifting of the Arms Embargo and EU-US Relations
Relations with the US, on the one hand, and the future of the EU on the other, are not only debates between the EU and France, but also among French bureaucrats, politicians and opinion leaders. Although a majority of politicians and French citizens are opposed to the US war in Iraq, both are more divided about how much France should move away from the US, politically and strategically. A number of right-and left-wing politicians have argued that France and the US, despite their differences, still share the same set of political and moral values. Since George W. Bush's re-election in November 2004, taking into account this criticism, Chirac's government has gone out of its way to mend France's relations with the US.
In this new context, lifting the arms embargo on China without providing the US and other major Asian nations, such as Japan, better guarantees about how the EU's arms exporters and France, in particular, will behave towards China, has become much harder. Assurances have been given by Paris that French arms manufacturers would not sell anything lethal to China. However, contradictory statements have been made by various members of the French Government, feeding concern in Washington and Tokyo. (10) The adoption by China of an Anti-Secession Law aimed at Taiwan in March 2005 convinced most EU members that any decision on this issue ought to be postponed. The election, in September 2005, of a new German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, opposed to any lifting of the embargo, in combination with the inability of Beijing so far to demonstrate any important symbolic gesture on human rights, e.g., ratify the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, made any move on this issue unlikely in the foreseeable future.
These new factors have not altered Chirac's stance on the arms embargo, which in his eyes, remains "a relic of the Cold War" but conditions are far from being sufficiently ripe to convince France's partners to make any move on it. The French and European weapons industry [for example, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)] have gradually become more guarded on this issue, unwilling to jeopardise their position on the American arms market, just for the sake of developing their position in a much smaller and much more uncertain Chinese arms market.
Disappointing Trade Relations
The major factor limiting close cooperation between France and China has been the disappointing level of trade and economic exchange between the two countries. Over the past decade, despite a genuine increase, bilateral trade has remained relatively small--three times smaller than German-China trade --and more and more unbalanced in favour of China. In 2004, France was China's 11th trade partner with a market share of 1.5 per cent. (11) Imports from France, have never exceeded two per cent of China's total imports (see Table 1).
French investments represented just 0.9 per cent or USD2.06 billion of total realised investment in China from 1983 to 1991. They increased since the early 1990s, amounting to USD7.00 billion for the period 1992-2005 (see Table 2). But France has remained China's tenth largest outside investor and third largest European investor. (12)
One of the major weaknesses in France's exchanges with China has been the constant dominance of large government-sponsored contracts and sales of Airbuses. Contrary to Germany and also Italy (which in some years has had more trade with China than France), small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in France have not demonstrated sufficient dynamism in developing business relations with China. (13) During his latest visit to China in October 2004, Chirac brought with him 100 managers of French SMEs, but this positive gesture underlines how much French businesspeople, including the CEOs of SMEs rely on government support to develop business relations with China. As a matter of fact, the French SMEs' lack of aggressiveness has more to do with the structural problems faced by the French economy than with the Government's belated interest in these enterprises' export strategies.
The dearth of French exports to China has fed a growing deficit, already intensified by the rapid increase of China's exports of consumer goods to the EU. China's accession to the WTO in late 2001 and the abolition of all quotas on textile imports from China in January 2005 have rapidly deepened this deficit, forcing the EU Commission and the Chinese Government, under pressure from France, Italy and other EU members, to negotiate export limitations that prevented the EU from imposing emergency safety measures. An agreement was reached between China and the EU in June 2005, and another in September on that matter. Similarly, under pressure from more or less the same nations (with Spain and Portugal), tariffs were imposed on Chinese-and Vietnamese-made shoes in early 2006.
Differences on the Reform of the UN and Other Issues
The reform of the UN and expansion of the Security Council have underscored in 2005 rather unexpected differences in viewpoints between France and China: while the former has unequivocally supported the G4 initiative (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), China has been openly opposed to Japan's accession to the status of Security Council Permanent Membership (UNSC). Despite Italy's opposition to Germany's application to the UNSC, this difference illustrates the lingering gap between, on the one hand, the EU, an entity where all former enemies have fully reconciled and are more ready to share power, responsibilities and even sovereignty and, on the other hand, Asia, a continent where the scars of World War II are still open, and states, because of their lack of security or legitimacy or both, have remained very jealous of their own regional influence and sovereignty.
Since 2004, the relations between France and China have soured somewhat due to the eruption of fresh differences with respect to other international issues such as Iran, Sudan, or more generally, Africa.
France as part of the EU 3 group (with Germany and the United Kingdom) has been very active in trying to persuade Iran, and also the US, that multilateralism could prove to be the best way to deal with, and keep Iran's nuclear ambitions under control. China's, as well as Russia's lack of cooperation have been perceived in France, and in most of the EU, as very unhelpful in solving this issue and more generally, in the cause for multilateralism and peaceful (versus military) resolution of international issues.
Another difficulty has been Sudan. The internationalisation of the Darfur human tragedy has been supported by France and the EU while China, because of key energy interests (partly protected by Chinese military personnel) has tried to prevent this internationalisation. The attempt by some rebels based in Sudan, equipped with Chinese weapons, to topple the Chad Government in the spring of 2006 intensified international pressure on both Sudan and China. It was hoped that both countries would accept the dispatch of UN troops to Darfur to stabilise the situation and put an end to the current massacres.
More generally, Beijing's activism in Africa is observed with some concern in Paris. This has less to do with the Chinese Government's aiming to secure stable access to oil-rich nations such as Nigeria or Angola, and more to do with the indiscriminate aid that it is providing--not only money, but also weaponry--to non-democratic (Zimbabwe) and destabilising regimes (Sudan).
After all, France is a founding member of the EU, meaning that while it exerts a noticeable influence on EU foreign and China policies, it must also take into account the member-states' majority opinion on these matters, including on China. The difficulties between Paris and Beijing relating to some of these new issues have somewhat bridged the gap between Chirac's Neo-Gaullist policy and the EU's common foreign and security policies, thereby creating some fresh distance between the French and Chinese authorities.
France and China: A New Type of Entente Cordiale
This brief analysis of Sino-French relations tells us as much about France's foreign policy as it does about China's. The reservations and criticisms voiced by the public and politicians of France have not had, on the whole, a strong impact on the Government's China policy. Both the right and the left think that China is an important and growing partner that cannot be neglected. In the last decade or so, the French Government, whatever its political colour, has actually invested a lot--partly directly, partly through the EU--in its relationship with China. It has done so, not only because of the economic rise of this country but also because it believes that China, as an independent player in international relations, can contribute to balancing the US' "hyperpower" and, in so doing, increase France's room for manoeuvre and influence in global affairs.
In other words, the Gaullist syndrome in France's foreign policy is not restricted to one political party. It is a powerful force that is perceived by most French politicians as the only way for France, and also for the French language and culture, to continue to exist, make its voice heard and exert an influence in a world that is no longer organised around the old Europe and its major powers, but more and more around the US, Asia, and in particular China. But is there really a Paris-Beijing axis taking shape today?
Such a conclusion would be a little far-fetched, for two main reasons. On the one hand, as an active member of the Northern Atlantic Alliance, France has remained a US ally and has been required to cooperate or coordinate with the US on a large number of security issues, including the arms embargo on China. On the other hand, France is an EU country: while it has been tempted to utilise the EU as a power multiplier, the French Government must also take into account the mainstream opinion of its European partners on such issues as China and Taiwan. Instead of an anti-US axis, the Paris- Beijing connection appears to be a new type of entente cordiale, not based, as the Franco-British one of a century ago, on shared political values, but on common economic, strategic and cultural interests.
(1) With the exception of the United Kingdom which, because of Hong Kong, normalised relations with Mao's China in 1950, the PRC's external relations were until 1971 dominated by Soviet bloc partners and non-aligned third world countries such as India and Indonesia.
(2) Similar to other western countries, such as Australia, one of France's few conditions for resuming high level relations with China was acceptance by the Chinese Government to allow an "independent delegation of French jurists" to visit and assess the human rights situation two years following the Tiananmen Massacre. The author was a member of this delegation which went to China in October 1991. A very negative report on the human rights situation there was afterwards submitted to the French Government.
(3) Reached in late December 1993, this agreement was made public on 12 January 1994. See China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/xos/gjlb/1842/ 1843/t23831.htm> [28 July 2005]; see also Jean-PierreCabestan, "France's Taiwan Policy: A Shopkeeper Diplomacy", East-West Dialogue (Special Issue: The Role of France and Germany in Sino-European Relations), vol. vi, no. 2/vol. vii, no. 1 (June 2002): 264-91.
(4) Chinese Ambassador Wu Jianmin tried repeatedly to keep the partnership alive, and more specifically France away from Taiwan. However, he did not always succeed. For instance, his good relations with Chirac could not prevent the sale of a French satellite to Taiwan, ROCSAT 2, in 1999.
(5) Joint Statement, 27 Jan. 2004. See China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ chn/wjb/zzjg/xos/gjlb/1842/1843/t59093.htm> [28 July 2005].
(6) Chirac described Chen's revised (under US pressure after President Bush's 9 December 2003 criticism) referendum initiative on how to address China's missile threat and open peace negotiations with Beijing as "irresponsible", "aggressive" and "dangerous for everybody".
(7) In 1989, the EU arms embargo imposed on China was officially based upon human rights considerations and not because of Taiwan. At the time, there was very little tension in the Taiwan Strait.
(8) The Sino-French Communique of January 1964 on the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and "the Government of the People's Republic of China" included no allusion to the Taiwan issue or the unity of China, i.e., that Taiwan was part (or not part) of China. See Francois Joyaux, "Le Nouveau Triangle Paris-Pekin-Taipeh", Politique Internationale, no. 61 (Fall 1994): 50. The 12 January 1994 communique states: "The French Government recognises the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legal government of China, Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of China."
(9) One of the rare exceptions occurred in June 1998 when Junior Minister of Foreign Trade Jacques Dondoux visited Taiwan. In any case, several factors have contributed to moderating the Socialist leaders' criticism of Chirac's China and Taiwan policies: the growing importance of the China market compared to Taiwan's, the various scandals associated with the arms deals that broke up in the late 1990s, involving some French public firms (e.g., ELF) and close associates of Mitterand (such as Roland Dumas, his Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1993, and his mistress) as well as the political cohabitation context of these years.
(10) Nevertheless, in order to be able to continue competing in the US arms market, large companies such as EADS and Dassault have made it clear that they will not sell China anything that could weaken their business relations with the US.
(11) France's deficit with China has drastically worsened in the last few years, amounting to 15.1 billion Euros (USD19.4 billion) in 2005, up from 2 billion Euros in 1995 according to French statistics. In 2004, Germany registered 49.6 billion Euros of trade with China, and only a 7.6 billion deficit; Britain's trade with China amounted to 24 billion Euros (deficit of 17.1 billion) while Italy's trade was 16.3 billion (deficit of 6.3 billion). (An exchange rate of 1 Euro = USD1.3 was used for the 2004 statistics.)
(12) In terms of FDI, France is way behind not only Hong Kong, the US, Taiwan or Japan, but also Singapore (USD24 billion for the 1983-2003 period), the Virgin Islands, Korea (USD20 billion), Britain (USD11.4 billion) and Germany (USD8.9 billion). Moreover, France's share in the FDI to China has slightly decreased since 2001 to 1.0 per cent in 2005 (USD615 million) from 2.2 per cent in 1999 (USD884 million) (see Table 2).
(13) In 2004, there were around 7,000 German and Italian SMEs in China, but only 3,700 French ones, Le Monde, 4 Oct. 2004.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan (email@example.com) is a Senior Researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research and an Associate Researcher of the Asia Centre, both in Paris. His PhD is from the University of Paris 1 in Public Law. His main research interests include Chinese foreign policy as well as Chinese legal and political reforms.
Table 1. China's Trade with France (USD million) 1983 1985 1990 China's Imports Value 639 718 1,674 from France Share of China's 1.0 0.8 1.1 total imports China's Exports Value 231 228 654 to France Share of China's 3.0 1.7 3.1 total exports France's share in Value 870 946 2,328 China's Total Trade Share 2.0 1.4 2.0 Trade Balance Value Value -408 -490 -1,020 for China 1995 2000 2003 China's Imports Value from 2,649 3,951 6,102 France Share of China's 1.2 1.5 1.7 total imports China's Exports Value 1,844 3,715 7,330 to France Share of China's 2.1 1.8 1.5 total exports France's share in Value 4,493 7,666 13,432 China's Total Trade Share 1.6 1.6 1.6 Trade Balance Value Value -805 -236 1,228 for China 2004 2005 China's Imports Value from 7,648 9,009 France Share of China's 1.4 1.4 total imports China's Exports Value 9,921 11,640 to France Share of China's 1.7 1.5 total exports France's share in Value 17,569 20,649 China's Total Trade Share 1.5 1.5 Trade Balance Value Value 2,273 2,631 for China Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues. Table 2. FDI to China from France 1983-91 1992 1995 1999 Contracted Total amount (USD 244.5 million) 244.5 291.7 642.4 473.0 Share in China's total FDI (%) 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 Realised Total amount (USD 205.5 million) 205.5 44.9 287.0 884.3 Share in China's total FDI (%) 0.9 0.4 0.8 2.2 2003 2004 2005 1992-2004 Contracted Total amount (USD 244.5 million) 722.7 1,229.7 NA 8,725.5 Share in China's total FDI (%) 0.6 0.8 NA 0.8 Realised 1992-2005 Total amount (USD 205.5 million) 604.3 656.7 615.1 7,000.3 Share in China's total FDI (%) 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China External Economies and Trade, various issues.
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|Publication:||China: An International Journal|
|Date:||Sep 1, 2006|
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