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Regulating illegal trade: foreign vessels in Brazilian harbors.

BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISED authority over foreign vessels calling at their ports. How local administrators treated those foreign ships is an indicator of the degree of enforcement of regulations concerning illegal commerce. By law all commerce with the colonies had to pass through a Portuguese entrepot where goods were transshipped to Portuguese bottoms, which were the only vessels permitted to trade with Brazil. There was thus no justification for a foreign ship to anchor in a Brazilian harbor, other than one in distress--or conducting illegal trade. Brazilian port officers therefore considered suspect the entrance of any foreign ship, and had at their disposal a wide range of measures designed specifically to prevent any landfall by a foreign vessel. But local officials used such legislation, which was meant to combat illegal commerce, for the regulation of contraband trade. captains and crews of foreign vessels had to comply with coercive acts by local authorities if their contraband trading was to be condoned by these same officials.

The degree of local control over illegal trade changed over the course of the eighteenth century, with three distinct periods. The first of these, from the discovery of gold in the 1690s, to the end of the 1720s was characterized by policies aimed at asserting crown authority over unruly mining communities in Minas Gerais and establishing control over the production and fiscalization of gold. During this period Portugal was particularly vulnerable to intrusions by foreigners who, in the absence of adequate coast guard patrols and fortifications, had virtual carte blanche to engage in contraband trade. During the half century from the 1730s to the 1770s local authorities were able to establish and maintain their authority over foreign ships that called at Brazilian ports as long as they arrived in small numbers. in this period most illegal trade was concluded by Portuguese or Brazilian vessels sailing to Portugal and to Africa. After the 1770s Brazilian authorities gradually lost their authority over contraband trade. The growing numbers of foreign ships calling at Brazilian ports as a result of the south Sea whaling fishery, the opening of La Plata trade, and a more intensive coastal trade all made official regulation increasingly difficult.

This article will analyze how colonial authorities used metropolitan rulings to regulate illegal trade by foreign vessels. Central to my analysis are case studies of the manner in which Brazilian officials received foreign ships. Authorities condoned illegal trade, but only in so far as foreign vessels adhered to an unwritten code concerning regulation. Cases of confiscation demonstrate what constituted the demarcation line between officially condoned contraband and punishable illegal trade. Because of their special position, I will analyze the relations with Spain and Spanish America separately in the second part of this paper.

Dauril Alden's work Royal Government in Colonial Brazil has been the first work to discuss extensively the procedures, regulations, and practices of receiving foreign vessels in Brazilian ports. In his analyses, Alden shows how local authorities used legal procedures in order to regulate foreign vessels during their presence in Brazilian harbors. (1) Yet, whereas Alden's seminal work saw smuggling as a duel between the contrabandist and the crown, I see it as a symbiosis. Negotiation between captains and officials was not always over the occurrence of illegal trade itself, but on whose terms this commerce could take place.

In the two centuries after Cabral's 1500 landfall in Brazil, foreign and Portuguese vessels shared the trade. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had competed with French interlopers for the supply of commerce in Brazilwood; during the seventeenth century both Dutch and English ships were incorporated into the annual Brazil fleets. Only at the end of the seventeenth century, when the discovery of gold became common knowledge, did the Portuguese king exclude all foreign vessels from the Brazil fleets.

During the first three decades of the eighteenth century, the political and military situation in Brazil remained unstable. The Portuguese administration sided with their English and Dutch counterparts against the French and the Spanish monarchs during the War of the Spanish Succession. This made Brazil vulnerable to French and Spanish corsairs and invasions, and led to the successful ransacking of Rio de Janeiro in 1711. Southern harbors, such as Parati, Santos, and Angra dos Reis remained defenseless against foreign pirates. Moreover, even their supposed friend, the Dutch West India Company, attacked Brazilian slave vessels on the West African coast. There were also internal problems which seriously impeded effective regulation of the production, taxation and flow of gold until the end of the 1730s, when stability was imposed upon Minas Gerais. (2)

It was during this unruly era that local policies towards foreign vessels took on a definitive form. The centralization of local administration, the end of civil strife in Minas Gerais, and re-routing of the gold trails made it possible to regulate illegal commerce. During Gomes Freire de Andrade's government of the southern Brazilian provinces (1733-62), Luso-Brazilian administrators finally consolidated their authority over contraband trade.

The law of 8 February 1711 ruled that Brazilians could not have commercial ties with foreigners, and the law of 5 October 1715, clearly specified regulations concerning the handling of foreign vessels entering Brazilian harbors. (3) These laws delegated to port officials absolute authority and jurisdiction over foreign vessels. All ships were to be inspected once they came within cannon ball range of fortresses. The most severe sanction was confiscation, applied when the governor or viceroy judged that the vessel had no good reason for entering the port. Such a decision had to be confirmed by the High Court, which resided in Salvador. Only after 1751 did a second Brazilian High Court function in Rio de Janeiro. If a foreign vessel did not have enough money to pay fines, the captain was permitted to pay in kind. His cargo was sold to the royal treasury, and sent to Portugal, while the captain had to pay double duties. Several cases of confiscation and the protracted process leading to final resolutions eroded any vestiges of resistance to these laws.

The laws of 1711 and 1715 buttressed the legal authority and jurisdiction of local officials over foreign vessels. (4) These laws were executed selectively, namely only in cases of flagrant disobedience and disrespect for local authorities. It was significant that so many confiscations took place within a the single decade from 1725 to 1735 during which time the governor of Rio de Janeiro and the viceroy in Salvador applied the law of confiscation to seven French vessels (La Reine de Nantes [1715], Le Succes [1716], La Subtile [1718], LAspirant [1720], La Francoise [1721], Saint Jean Baptiste [1721], and Le Comte de Toulouse [1725]), one English boat, Saint Joseph (1718), and the Dutch ship Don Carlos (1725) (Table i). (5) These cases, in which such drastic measures were taken, merit more detailed analysis, as they demonstrate how local officials enforced their authority over foreign visitors in order to regulate illegal commerce.

To begin with, we might ask why so many French vessels were confiscated. French diplomats were not so subtle when it came to policies in support of their nationals' direct trade to Brazil, a fact that did not escape the attention of Portuguese authorities. (6) English diplomats even feared that local officials in Brazil were acting in behalf of French captains. British representatives protested to the Portuguese king about French contraband trade to Brazil, and inquired whether there existed a commercial treaty between Portugal and France that legitimized such trade. (7) Their suspicions were further aroused by the preamble to the 1715 law against foreign ships entering Brazilian harbors, which referred only to breaches of the law committed by captains of English vessels. (8)

Confiscation of vessels occurred when foreigners refused to accommodate themselves to local procedures and denied the local officials their role as intermediaries in illegal commerce. The governor of Rio de Janeiro and the viceroy in Salvador confiscated the Reine de Nantes because they did not approve of a manoeuvre designed to circumvent the law. In 1715, Jean Dansaint sailed his vessel La Reine de Nantes into the harbor of Rio de Janeiro with a cargo of slaves from the Mina Coast. In order to sell his 450 slaves in Brazil, Jean Dansaint had sold his vessel and its cargo to the crown judge (ouvidor) of the island of Principe in the Bight of Benin, making the vessel officially Portuguese; thus Dainsant was legally able to sell its slaves in a Brazilian port. (9) The governor of Rio de Janeiro judged this to be a contrived transaction, and therefore confiscated the vessel. (10)

Such uncompromising enforcement of the policy towards foreign ships trading outside of the official realm also occurred in 1725. The viceroy in Salvador confiscated another French vessel, Le Comte de Toulon, in identical circumstances. (11) Had the governor of Rio de Janeiro and the viceroy in Salvador approved the sale of these vessels in Africa to a Portuguese official, they would have been condoning illegal trade conducted in an area beyond their jurisdiction. But by refusing to recognize the legality of the new ownership, the governor and viceroy preserved their authority over the regulation of contraband trade.

Brazilian officials took other French vessels by force in small harbors along the coast south of Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian authorities had at their disposal a wide range of measures designed to prevent at best, or to forcefully discourage at worst, any landfall by a foreign vessel. But local officials invoked such measures not to combat, but to regulate illegal trade. Such was the case of the captain and crew of La Subtile, who sold textiles for gold in Rio de Janeiro with merchants who had contacts with Minas Gerais. (12) The French privateer was ultimately captured and a boarding party sailed it to Santos where local authorities condemned the ship. (13) The French captain, Geslain, told a different story claiming to be a slaver in need of provisions on his way from Sao Tome to La Plata; but local officials had refused to allow him to enter a harbor in Ilha Grande. (14) After nine members of the crew had absconded with a sloop, Geslain sailed for Santos, where the local governor confiscated the vessel. This French vessel traded along the coast without using the local authorities as intermediaries. The perils of such a lack of cooperation became readily apparent. The governor of Rio de Janeiro labeled the ship a "pirate", and made it subject to confiscation.

Brazilian authorities captured three other French vessels along the Southern Brazilian coast, all of them trading outside the jurisdiction of the Carioca officials. St. Jean Baptiste was confiscated for illegal slave trading on Ilha Grande. (15) LAspirant was also caught with a cargo of slaves off Ilha Grande and brought to Santos for confiscation. (16) La Francoise was a small vessel constructed in Santa Catarina for the French captain George Bourdain, who sailed it along the Brazilian coast to the island of Sao Sebastiao and Ilha dos Porcos, where it was captured by Portuguese authorities. (17) These examples demonstrate that all French vessels trading on the coast south of the Bay of Guanabara were liable to be confiscated, and even the more so if they had skipped the harbor of Rio de Janeiro.

The one Dutch vessel--Don Carlos--confiscated in Brazilian waters was also taken over a matter of jurisdiction. (18) First anchored off Ilha Grande, where it was reported to have traded with the local population, the ship then sailed to Rio de Janeiro. There it stayed for three months, while the captain waited for seasonal winds (monsoon) to carry it to the Pacific. But the governor of Rio de Janeiro grew impatient, especially after the Dutch captain refused the offer of the governor's services for repair and provisioning of the vessel, and ordered the Don Carlos to leave without returning to Brazilian territories. When the Dutch captain defied this gubernational order and did return to Ilha Grande, the coast guard brought the ship back to Rio de Janeiro, where the governor confiscated the vessel.

In sum, in all cases of confiscation without exception, the authority of a local governor was at stake. Trade was conducted outside the Bay of Guanabara in the myriad of safe havens far from the watchful eyes of crown officials. By trading outside the major ports captains placed themselves, their cargoes and vessels under suspicion. Ipso facto, crown officials assumed that such vessels were engaged in illegal trade and confiscated them, since this illegal commerce was unconditionally proscribed as it afforded no opportunity for mediation by an official.

That foreign vessels could trade with impunity was amply demonstrated by Le Gentil de la Barbinais, commander of an anonymous French vessel that sailed into the harbor of Salvador at the end of 1717. (19) His ship, which was one of three, was damaged and needed repairs. The vessel was richly loaded with merchandise from Peru and China. Upon entering Salvador, the owner of the ship disembarked to have an audience with the viceroy, the Marquis of Angeja.

The viceroy explained the measures that would be taken against the vessel and warned that it might be confiscated if the captain failed to make a strong case to justify entering the harbor. He stressed that many French vessels had visited Salvador, and that prior experience with these vessels had let him to mistrust the crews. This thinly veiled warning did not restrain the French, although the conversation with the viceroy made an impression on them. They gave all the visiting inspectors presents to gain their goodwill. The inspectors reluctantly accepted the gifts, but had other matters on their minds. They were interested in determining who should be permitted to have access to the French vessel for the purpose of trade, as becomes clear from the continuation of le Gentil de la Barbinais' account.

The officials reported to the viceroy that indeed the vessel urgently needed repairs. More importantly, they advised that the ship should be left in a dock for repairs, and the cargo stored in a warehouse. The French disagreed and the ship was repaired in the harbor. This permitted illegal trade to be conducted in the harbor itself, where the visiting inspectors had less authority. Military guards in sloops surrounding the ship were less hostile to the crew. They offered the crew their good services, with the result that every night local merchants came to trade with the ship.

This trading did not contribute to the goodwill of the three inspectors: the chief inspector of the treasury (provedor da fazenda); the customs inspector (provedor da alfandega); and a high court judge (desembargador). On the contrary, they became obstructive, delaying the process of repairing the ship and even threatening to confiscate the vessel. The viceroy abstained as much as possible from these intrigues, but was sympathetic to the well-being of the French merchants. He knew that the intention of the three inspectors was not to scrupulously implement the execution of the king's orders, but rather to obtain their share of the trade cake. Their revenge for not receiving it was to come shortly afterwards.

It took seven months to repair the French vessel. Upon leaving the capital of Brazil, the captain discovered that water was still leaking into the ship. On his return to Salvador some friendly officials informed le Gentil de la Barbinais that:
   Prisons ... are filled with unfortunate Merchants who have traded
   with the French, and whose goods were confiscated for having
   transgressed the King's Orders. ... They added that the three
   Inspectors [Judges] of the Treasury, avaricious and corrupt
   persons, would do all in their power to persecute him.
   ... The Frenchman answered that as the Inspectors [Judges] of the
   Treasury were avaricious people, it should not be difficult to win
   them over to his side, by promising them a good deal. (20)


As a result of a scheme implemented by Le Gentil de la Barbinais, the French did win the support of the local authorities. Decision on the fate of the vessel was taken by a board consisting of the viceroy, whose vote counted double, the three inspectors and two other high officials. The opposing inspectors were forced into a minority opinion because the two high officials and the viceroy were more positively inclined towards the French. As a consequence, the carpenters responsible for the shoddy repairs were imprisoned, the inspectors obtained more presents from the French, and the vessel was soon on its return voyage to France.

The court in Lisbon heard appeals against confiscations and did in some cases restore vessels to their owners. Such restitution depended on another 20 set of variables: the exigencies of the Portuguese king's diplomatic relations with France and the Dutch Republic respectively. As a result French and Dutch petitions for the restitution of vessels were judged differently. The Portuguese king tried to stay on friendly terms with the French, so as not to get involved in the continental wars, as well as the Spanish, who were the natural allies of the French. Given these political considerations the Portuguese had no alternative but to condone both French and English illegal trade. French vessels were, in general, restored to their owners.

Still, illegal trade could not be seen to go completely unpunished, and therefore the Portuguese bureaucracy punitively delayed the process of restitution for several years or even decades. Furthermore, the Portuguese were not willing to countenance full restitution of confiscated vessels. For instance, the owners of the vessel St. Jean Baptiste, confiscated in 1721, received only a part of the value of the vessel and its cargo in 1725. A complete financial settlement had to wait until 1734. (21) The affair of Le Succes, confiscated in Salvador in 1717, promised to be speedily resolved in view of the fact that within twelve months the Portuguese king ordered its return. Such hopes were unfulfilled. Two decades later the French consul was still pleading for a final settlement. (22) In the case of Le Comte de Toulouse, the Overseas Council even admitted that the delay was intentional, arguing that since similar cases involving Portuguese ships were pending before French courts, the case should be prolonged even though John V had ordered the vessel's return. (23) And, indeed, while the ship had been confiscated in 1725, five years later French authorities were still pleading for redress. (24) Concerning the English vessel, the Saint Joseph, confiscated in Salvador, the only information was that it was restored to the owner as a royal favor. (25)

In the case of La Reine de Nantes the Portuguese king turned the confiscation to his own advantage. The sale of the ship to the judge of Sao Tome raised a fine point of law, and Portuguese courts dealt with the case for more than a decade. (26) The Portuguese government offered a settlement to the captain, Jean Dansaint, which was conditional on his entering the royal service as the main director of the Corisco Company, a short-lived trading company that defied the Dutch on the Mina coast. With the profits Dansaint was to recoup the money the Portuguese government took from him in the confiscation of his vessel. Although this plan failed, the French captain did stay in Portuguese service, and the king even bestowed upon him the Order of Christ. (27)

Dutch attempts to gain restoration of the vessel Don Carlos met with failure. (28) At the time the Portuguese and Dutch governments were engaged in diplomatic tussles over jurisdiction on the Mina Coast. The Dutch West India Company claimed that as a result of the 1661 peace treaty Portuguese vessels had to trade with their fortress at Whydah. As the Brazilian slavers refused to comply with this demand, the Dutch West India Company started to capture Brazilian vessels, and the Portuguese government undertook harsh reprisals. (29) The Don Carlos was confiscated in Rio de Janeiro even though Dutch representatives pleaded that the Don Carlos was not a West India Company vessel. The Portuguese king was only prepared to restore the vessel only if a solution could be found to the Mina Coast issue. (30) The owners suffered such a financial loss that in 1782, fifty-seven years after the confiscation of the Don Carlos, they were still pleading for restitution. (31)

During the first thirty years of the eighteenth century Portuguese and Brazilian officials established their authority over illegal trade. Whenever contraband trade was beyond their jurisdiction and control, they confiscated vessels. The fact that a relatively high number of ships were confiscated was indicative of the officials' determination to regulate this illegal commerce.

The period from the 1730s to the 1770s was marked by stability. The control Luso-Brazilian officials had gained over trade remained unchallenged for these four decades. Significantly, Brazilian officials did not confiscate any foreign vessels during this period (table 1.1). The absence of confiscations did not mean that captains and crews of foreign ships were not engaged in illegal trade; if illegal trade did take place, it was condoned because now local officials were able to regulate these activities.

Although illegal trade was a major concern to both Portuguese and Brazilian administrators, they also took military and strategic factors into consideration. Luso-Brazilian officials took safety measures in order to diminish foreign presence in Brazilian harbors. Published travel accounts routinely contained full descriptions of a port's fortifications, which aroused suspicion in the minds of Portuguese and Brazilian officials as to a visitor's real intentions. (32) That such reports influenced the conduct of the local governor or viceroy towards incoming foreign ships goes without saying, and especially so in the 1730s to the 1770s, which was a period of war and territorial contestation in the colonies. However, I would argue that local circumstances, and especially the conduct of foreign captains, i.e. their recognition of the Brazilian officials' authority over the harbor, deeply influenced the way officials received foreign vessels.

Gomes Freire de Andrade's rule over the southern captaincies (1733-62) definitively established royal authority over the mining areas and southern Brazil. Recognizing officially what had long since been apparent, namely that Rio de Janeiro was the most important city of Brazil, in 1763 the king made it the de facto capital of Brazil and the seat of the viceroy. Southern ports were fortified against foreign vessels, and routes from Minas Gerais to the coast were diverted to the city of Rio de Janeiro. Foreign vessels that called at ports of southern Brazil were obliged to sail to Rio de Janeiro. Foreign captains had to obey local authorities. Those captains who chose to be recalcitrant would be subjected to a degree of harassment and lack of understanding that made their stay in Brazilian ports less comfortable. That a system of qaid pro quo prevailed, with compliance bringing cooperation, was illustrated by the case of the French vessel Arc-en-Ciel.

Upon the Arc-en-Ciel's arrival at the bar of the Bay of Guanabara in 1748, the captain sent a sloop to inform the governor of Rio de Janeiro of its presence, and to seek advice as to the number of cannon salvos required by protocol on passing the fortress of Santa Cruz. (33) By this gesture the captain paid due respect to the person and authority of the governor and recognized his jurisdiction over the ship while within territorial waters.

The Arc-en-Ciel was a French warship, sent and manned at the expense of the French king, and bound for the East Indies, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), in which Portugal remained neutral. Gomes Freire de Andrade reacted positively to the arrival of the Arc-en Ciel because that the Portuguese king, being an ally and friend of the French king, had given express orders to offer every assistance to French vessels that entered his territory. (34) The captain was given his own country house, where Gomes Freire de Andrade paid him several visits and helped the captain in solving his credit problems, and was allowed to buy provisions freely in the market of Rio de Janeiro, without the usual intermediaries; and the governor assigned a hospital in town for treatment of the scurvy ridden crew. Moreover, captain and crew were free to circulate wherever they liked, and Gomes Freire de Andrade even accepted an invitation to dinner on board the Arc-en-Ciel.

In the case of the Arc-en-Ciel, the deferential behavior of captain and crew and the status of the vessel led to the most favored treatment possible. Captain and crew could freely stay in town, the French vessel was not guarded, and provisions could be delivered to the vessel by any person the captain requested. This latitude meant that no Brazilian official would verify that all payments had been made for deliveries of provisions or whether any member of the crew had sold French textiles to the citizenry. Credit could not be obtained from the royal treasury but, with the governor's assistance, monetary support was secured from local merchants. The captain and crew of the Arc-en-Ciel played by the rules and their compliance was rewarded with cooperation on the part of Brazilian officialdom.

Conversely, the circumstances surrounding the visit of the British vessel Endeavour under the command of captain James Cook illustrated that failure to comply could bring its just results. In 1768, on an expedition to chart the transit of Venus, Cook put into the Bay of Guanabara in order to obtain provisions and to do research on the indigenous flora and fauna, and perform astrological observations. (35) Captain Cook, conscious of his "Higher Mission to the Profit of Mankind," assumed that he would have the full cooperation of any officials that he might meet on his voyage of circumnavigation. He was soon to learn that such lofty goals would not absolve him from following regulations required of any captain of a foreign vessel putting into a Brazilian port. (36) The viceroy, the Count de Azambuja, was determined to teach the young British navy lieutenant a lesson in protocol and instill in him respect for the appropriate procedures to be observed to by any residing vessel.

When he arrived in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, captain Cook was unfamiliar with the protocol to be followed on arrival in a Brazilian port, sent his first officer to the viceroy. The first lieutenant asked for a pilot and indicated the place where he would like to anchor. He had orders from captain Cook to reveal as little as possible about the purpose of the journey. The lieutenant was promptly arrested, sloops with soldiers surrounded Endeavour, the vessel was boarded, and Brazilian authorities interrogated the crew. The viceroy noted that these measures were in full compliance with His Majesty's Orders and port regulations, as detailed in his dispatch of 17 November 1768 to captain Cook:
   I am not surprised at the Novelty that Lieutenant James Cook finds
   in the treatment that his Ship had in this Port; being in all its
   points which he takes Notice of, in Conformity not only with the
   Orders of His Most faithful Majesty my Master, but also to the
   Ancient Custom of the same Port ... And this is the reason why
   before any thing else the Solemn Ceremony was made I practised with
   your Officers, in asking them if you would subject yourself to the
   Customs & Orders that are in this Port, because only under this
   Subjection & the information that is taken in the Visit which is
   made that you put into this Port with real necessity, it is that
   you are admitted. Wherefore, if you think it hard Submitting to
   what in your Memorial you Express, it is in your power to leave the
   Port ... Ships have always Subjected themselves in these Ports to
   all cautions that are taken to this End, which is never more
   necessary to be put in Practice than when the same Ships oppose
   them; because they become more Suspicious. (37)


In the following weeks captain Cook protesting in vain against all these "cautions", suffered humiliation on several occasions. The Count de Azambuja did not honor his request to be relieved of the guard, whom the viceroy had ordered to escort him while he was on shore; Cook was also required to buy provisions through the intermediary of a factor appointed by the viceroy. No other crew member was permitted to go ashore, nor were two of his scientists, Sir Joseph Banks and Dr. Solander, who had planned to measure the Transit of Venus over the Sun. According to Cook, the viceroy was incapable of grasping the meaning of this project, and somehow thought that what Cook had in mind was that the North Star would pass over the South Pole. Indeed, the viceroy reported to the Secretary of State that Cook's unyielding requests for permission to make observations of the "star" [sic] Venus and examine the Brazilian flora and fauna made captain and crew very suspect in his view. (38)

Mistakenly thinking he could dominate the viceroy by his behavior, Cook demanded permission for Sir Joseph Banks and Dr. Solander be allowed on land, the removal of his guard, and freedom to trade. He was surprised when the Count de Azambuja held fast and denied all such demands. Not merely contemptuous of an Englishman who did not behave in a manner deemed appropriate and respectful, the viceroy accused Captain Cook of being a smuggler and claimed that illegal trade was the reason for his calling at Rio de Janeiro. Cook did his best to clear his name of such an allegation. Azambuja treated the English Gentleman with caution because "Notwithstanding all care I [the viceroy] am informed that always your People have Smugled [sic] some goods". (39) That the viceroy's suspicions were fully merited was confirmed by Sir Joseph Bank's journal entry of 26 November 1768:
   I myself went ashore this morning before day break and stayd till
   dark night; while I was ashore I met several of the inhabitants who
   were very civil to me, taking me to their houses where I bought
   from them stock for the ship tolerably cheap. (40)


Captain Cook went so far as to suggest that the viceroy should have kept a closer rein on his own personnel, as "[T]his would have prevented such of them as even under His Excellency's roof [i.e. in the Palace of the Viceroy] from tempting such of my People as were ashore ... [to carry on] Contraband trade." (41) Cook also observed that some Spanish ships from Buenos Ayres had arrived and received far more favorable treatment, he sent his report and supporting documentation to the Admiralty, hoping that the Portuguese and English Courts would rule against the unfriendly reception of English vessels. In fact, he should have been grateful that his ship was not confiscated. The merchants who did trade with Cook, one of them a naturalized Englishman, were arrested and endured many difficulties before being released. (42)

In fierce contrast to the elegant behavior of the French admiral of the Arc-en-Ciel, stood the recalcitrance of James Cook. The former was rewarded by being granted free movement of his sick mariners and total liberty to purchase all the goods that he wanted from any source. The French were free to go wherever they liked and had no credit problems. Had the French conducted illegal trade, officials were more likely to have turned a blind eye. Captain Cook's behavior on the contrary, earned him the fate of being constantly under guard and having to buy all provisions through a single intermediary.

Regulation of commerce was critical. That failure to control trade would have led to anarchy can be best demonstrated by the case of a French squadron of six vessels under the command of the Count d'Ache that entered Rio de Janeiro in 1757. (43) The squadron was on its way to the East Indies to combat the English at the beginning of the Seven Year's War, and a stop in a Brazilian harbor for provisions was deemed inevitable. Aware that such a landfall might cause problems, the French authorities gave instructions to the Count d'Ache to cooperate fully with Brazilian authorities. (44) His Most Christian Majesty judged that Ilha Grande was the best place to anchor, since provisions were abundant in that area. (45) The Brazilian authorities had advised all foreign vessels that visited Southern Brazil to go to Rio de Janeiro. When the governor of Rio de Janeiro received notice of the squadron's arrival at Ilha Grande, he requested the French squadron to put into his harbor. (46)

The arrival of so many French ships and troops created such panic among the Carioca population that even foreign diplomats in Lisbon reported on the event. (47) Gomes Freire de Andrade was in Minas Gerais and the acting governor could not handle the situation. The populace was openly hostile to French soldiers. An inhabitant of French origin was accused of engaging in illegal trade. (48) Only with the return of Gomes Freire de Andrade order reestablished. (49) After the departure of the French squadron the governor arrested some Brazilians for engaging in illegal trade with the French troops. (50) In Portugal there was also a fiercely negative reaction to the arrival of this and other French squadrons off Ilha Grande. The Portuguese Secretary of State, Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Mello (the later Marquis de Pombal), called the French military "intolerably arrogant, abusing the laws of hospitality". (51)

In the period from 1730 to 1770, local officials were able to regulate foreign vessels that entered Brazilian ports. The sources are remarkably silent about contraband trade by foreigners. Whenever documentation mentions illegal trade in this period, it involved Portuguese vessels in the Bay of Guanabara or occurred elsewhere such as at the Colonia do Sacramento on Rio de la Plata.

This situation began to destabilize in the 1770s. Whalers from Britain and North America appeared in the South Seas; other vessels were attracted by the opening up of commerce with Spanish America. As a consequence the number of foreign ships off the Brazilian coast began to increase, creating new problems. Matters came to a head during the last decade of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. So great were the numbers of foreign vessels putting into Brazilian ports that Brazilian officials were no longer capable of controlling commerce (Table 1).

An indication that contraband trade had become less regulated was the resurgence in confiscation of foreign vessels. The viceroys Marquis of Lavradio and Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza confiscated two British ships, the Argyle (1770) and the Hind (1780), and one American vessel, the Leviathan (1773). Their cases are instructive, as they underline the fact that by this time defiance of regulation, rather than proven involvement in illegal trade, was a sufficient cause for confiscation.

Both the Argyle and the Hind were vessels in the service of the British East India Company. The Argyle had sailed from the African coast to Rio de Janeiro, where it had made a rendezvous with another British ship. (52) Since foreign vessels could enter Brazilian ports only for emergency reasons, this entry was sufficient legal cause to confiscate the vessel. The viceroy, Marquis do Lavradio, was especially upset by the behavior of the Argyle's captain, who had forced his way into the Bay of Guanabara, despite the viceroy's reluctance to let him enter. During his presence in the harbor, the captain of the Argyle remained recalcitrant. Thus, when it became clear that the Argyle had indeed arranged a rendezvous with another British vessel within the harbor, the viceroy had sufficient grounds for confiscating the vessel.

The confiscation of the Hind had the same judicial basis. (53) The Hind arrived from St. Helena, claiming that the vessel needed provisions and repair. The pretext for the Hind's arrival was that the governor of St. Helena needed materials. The Brazilian viceroy stated unequivocally that it was not up to a British governor to decide whether a British ship could enter a Brazilian harbor. Thereupon, the viceroy confiscated the ship, because under Portuguese law it was illegal for a vessel to enter a Brazilian harbor unless in distress. (54)

Restitution of the two English vessels went more smoothly than that of the confiscations of French vessels in the 1720s. The restitution of the Argyle was more protracted, because the infringement of Portuguese law was more blatant. Only after three years of petitioning did the British consul, Robert Walpole, receive official notice that the Argyle would be restored to its owners. (55) Even then, the Portuguese authorities delayed the sailing of the Argyle from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon for another year. (56) In this case, only a royal pardon helped to restore the vessel after legal con demnation. Thus any claim for damages was made moot. (57)

One year after its confiscation, the viceroy returned the Hind to the representative of the British East India Company as an "act of grace". This restitution set a record for promptness: the total process from confiscation to restitution had taken only fifteen months. (58) As with the case of the Argyle, all claims for compensation by the English East India Company were declared invalid. (59)

Both cases of confiscation were provoked by violators of procedures: the captains had acted inappropriately and defied the viceroy's authority. In 1773, there was one other confiscation, that of a Rhode Island whaler, but this one was a grounded in pragmatism combined with national interest. (60) Upon the arrival of the American vessel the Leviathan, the viceroy, the Marquis do Lavradio, noticed that the crew were specialists in fishing for spermaceti whales, a technique with which the Brazilian whale contractor was totally unfamiliar. Thus the viceroy decided to confiscate the Rhode Island whaling ship on the somewhat spurious grounds of suspicious behavior. Captain and crew were afforded the choice of being jailed or offering their services to the Brazilian whaling contractor in order to teach his personnel how to catch spermaceti whales. (61) After a few voyages, the American captain refused to cooperate further: he was to perish in prison, but two crew members survived incarceration and reached the Portuguese capital in 1779, three years after British diplomats had learned of their fate. (62)

In the period between 1790 and the arrival of the Portuguese court in Brazil in 1808, Brazilian administrators confiscated at least five British, two American, and two French vessels (table 3.1). The British vessels were the Mary of Bristol (1797), the Packet (1800), the Duke of Clarence (1801), and the Saint Peter (1803); the American, the Pilgrim (1801) and the Samuel (1802); and the French were the Buen Viaje (1793) and the Diligent (1802). This relatively high number of confiscations indicates the degree to which illegal trade had become less regulated, since only contraband trade that was proscribed was cause for confiscation. Local officials had lost control of their ability to regulate this contraband trade, since too many ships appeared in Brazilian waters.

British and American whalers played a pioneering role in the opening of South Atlantic commerce. Their vessels began to appear regularly in the South Atlantic in general and off the Brazilian coast in particular during the 1780s, drawn by the information they had about the potential for commercial activities, they intruded on the local trading patterns even when these were unrelated to whaling activities.

The genesis of this illegal trade can be traced back to the period of the American Revolution, when British whalers were manned with American crews that had emigrated from New England, especially from Nantucket. The British government encouraged those American fishermen, to settle in Milford Haven in South Wales. (63) These sailors often behaved secretively. For instance, when the British Privy Council on Trade questioned Mr. Enderby, one of the most prominent owners of whaling vessels, about whether a spermaceti whale had ever been captured by his crew, the answer was: "Mr. Enderby never heard that it was--if it is the sailors do not let us know, but sell it privately". (64) Whaling crews frequently engaged in smuggling and the owners of the whalers defended their actions. Such was the case when the Emilia returned in 1790 from the South Seas with foreign alcoholic beverages on board. (65) Concerned British customs officials confiscated the liquor. But the Privy Council on Trade ruled favorably on Samuel Enderby's plea to restore the beverages and stock them in a warehouse until the sailors could make proper use of them during the ship's next voyage.

Illegal trade by South Sea whalers was of concern to the Privy Council on Trade, which in a 1791 meeting suggested a penalty if illegal commerce in the harbors of the South Seas. (66) The owners of South Sea whalers declared that:
   They did not think it would operate as any detriment to the said
   Trade or Fishery, if the owners, masters, mates, and other officers
   of the ships employed therein, were to be bound in a bond not to be
   concerned in any illicit trade contrary to law or treaty. (67)


But there is no evidence that the owners could have had any such influence over their crews. On the contrary, as table 3.2 demonstrates, quite a few whaling ships did enter Brazilian ports, even though they sailed with enough provisions for twenty months. (68) The ship owners justified calling at South American ports by claiming that crews suffered from scurvy. (69) Although their need for fresh provisions was plausible, Brazilian authorities became suspicious about the quantity of whalers and other adventurers that entered their ports. Some vessels were confiscated and their crews spent varying lengths of time in Brazilian prisons.

Whenever British ships defied the authority of the local officials they incurred the threat of confiscation. In 1795, the Brazilian viceroy, Count de Rezende, complained that British captains always had spurious pretexts for entering Brazilian ports:
   The debates ... are immense, and always indecorous and offensive to
   the immunity of the King's Orders, to the character of the
   Minister, and to the respect that a Viceroy's signature deserves.
   (70)


Such was the case with the Saint Peter in 1803. (71) Carrying a load of timber, the ship entered the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, claiming that it leaked, the steering wheel was malfunctioning, and they needed provisions. (72) The Brazilian officials who examined the vessel did not believe the English captain, since the ship had visited three other Brazilian ports--Paraiba, Pernambuco, and Salvador--before arriving at Rio de Janeiro. This convinced the Brazilian examiners that the Saint Peter was a smuggler's ship. Moreover, all the reasons given for their arrival in Rio de Janeiro proved untrue. The Saint Peter had left Salvador only eight days before, rendering the captain's claim of need for provisions unlikely; the steering wheel showed no malfunctions. To verify whether the vessel really did leak, the authorities demanded that the vessel be unloaded. When the captain and crew complied as slowly as possible, so that the vessel would not be empty before dark, the Brazilian examiners became impatient and started to unload the ship themselves but could not be completed before dark. As soon as the officials left, the guards noticed the English crew below decks with torches. By the following dawn the Saint Peter did indeed leak. The officials argued that the leak had been created under cover of darkness. The viceroy's response to such furtive behavior by the captain and crew and their lack of respect for his authority was to confiscate the vessel.

The Lisbon authorities stood firm on these confiscations. Although the British plenipotentiary in Lisbon did his best to obtain the return of the Saint Peter, his efforts were in vain and even aggravated the matter. (73) On a later occasion, when the subject of such reclamations of confiscated British vessels was broached, the Portuguese Secretary of State remarked to a British diplomat that:
   But, I never can believe that the British Government will degrade
   itself by exposing the cause, not of injured subjects, but of
   detected smugglers. His Royal Highness knows too well what is due
   to his own rights to give up to the enemies of his manufactures,
   the very weapon with which they carry on their warfare against
   them. (74)


The judicial procedures were very arbitrary. Depending on the goodwill of local authorities, confiscation could be avoided, as illustrated by the case of the Ann Joseph, which arrived in Rio de Janeiro from St. Helena and Capetown in 1802 on the pretext that the main mast was broken. In order to hide the fact that it was not, the crew had put ropes and cables all along the mast and resisted officials' close examination. (75) The viceroy thereupon confiscated the vessel. But, on second thought, the captain claimed that there was another reason for his arrival: namely, he did not have enough water. Reinspection of the Ann Joseph bore this out and, remarkably enough the ship was released, but the captain was forced to leave within forty-eight hours and, according to the viceroy, without conducting any contraband trade. (76)

When a foreign vessel put into one of the many minor ports along the Brazilian coastline, local authorities were more than eager to receive some part of the cake. Trading outside of the big port cities of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Pernambuco was a blatant attempt to circumvent the highest authorities, who did not hesitate if they could find any pretext for confiscation. In 1797 the Mary of Bristol, a sailing vessel equipped for hunting seals sailed into the harbors of Sao Sebastiao (captaincy of Sao Paulo), twice to Rio de Janeiro, and once more into Salvador under various pretenses. (77) The ship was finally confiscated in Ceara, where the captain and some members of the crew put ashore in a sloop. Although no illegal trade was proven, the ship was sailed to Recife, where local officials confiscated it. Still, the suspicious behavior of the captain of the Mary was an excuse for these decisive actions by the Brazilian authorities. (78)

In most cases it was difficult to prove that illegal trade had taken place. But there were exceptions. One of these was the privateer the Duke of Clarence, which the coast guard encountered near Cabo Frio without captain and mate. (79) On board, the Portuguese authorities found documentation of commerce in tobacco, gold, and slaves. The Duke of Clarence had sailed to Santos, where it had loaded a cargo of slaves and tobacco. However, near Cabo Frio the British captain and mate had had a fatal encounter with a Spanish vessel sailing under a Portuguese flag. The Spanish captain, pretending to be Portuguese, invited the British captain and mate over for dinner on board his vessel. When the Britons came on board the Spanish ship, they were instantly killed and the crew of the Duke of Clarence fled immediately to shore. The Brazilian authorities caught some of the crew, and their fate was to perish in a Brazilian prison. (80)

Another obvious case was that of Thomas Lindley, captain of the Packet, who eventually published an account of his experiences as a contrabandist along the Brazilian coast. (81) In 1800 the English adventurer and his wife were sailing off the Brazilian coast in their own vessel. Lindley urgently needed repairs and provisions, which he found in the harbor of Porto Seguro in the captaincy of Bahia. He was welcomed by the local judge (ouvidor) who suggested a lucrative sale of Brazil wood. Lindley eagerly consented, but talk of these commercial activities ran quickly through town. Unfortunately, the judge had some enemies who profited from this intelligence to oust their adversary. Lindley was advised to leave even though repairs were not completed. The Packet returned to sailing along the Bahian coast, and found another safe harbor at the mouth of the river Carcarelos. By now the governor of Bahia had been informed about Lindley's activities, and the governor dispatched the coast guard to intercept the British vessel. The troops arrested Lindley, his wife, and the crew of the Packet and brought them to Salvador. After a year Lindley and his wife managed to escape to Lisbon and they sailed from there to Great Britain.

Even though Lindley's guilt was obvious, he did try to reclaim his vessel and cargo. Lindley's argument was that, having assumed the trade in brazilwood to be legal, since the local crown judge himself had suggested it, he did not commit any crime. The British plenipotentiary did petition the Portuguese Secretary of State to this effect. (83) As the diplomat himself expected, there was no positive result. (84) In contrast to other cases, antiauthoritarian behavior by the captain was not the reason for this confiscation. Lindley was the victim of his own naivety. He could not have known that he was dealing with the wrong officials.

During the decade preceding the opening of Brazilian ports to international trade (1808), the situation deteriorated. In 1799 a Portuguese captain remarked that the British market was filled with gold dust and diamonds from Brazil. (85) A year later, the Portuguese representative in Sweden received a startling request from the royal court. A Swedish East India vessel had anchored in Rio de Janeiro and engaged in contraband trade. So lucrative was this commerce, that the company's officers suggested to the Portuguese Court that permission be granted for all its ships to enter the harbor of Rio de Janeiro and engage in such trade. (86) The Portuguese court was both offended and shocked by such a suggestion.

Confronted with the large number of foreign vessels sailing along the Brazilian coast and claiming their right to enter Brazilian harbors under diverse pretenses, Donald Campbell, a British commander in Portuguese service, exclaimed:
   Every nation has the right to defend its revenues by laws that it
   judges appropriate to impose. I can not imagine for one moment that
   Portugal is likely to cede its rights in favor of the English, or
   any other nation. Still we are not here discussing nations but
   contrabandists, who in all parts are subject to the force of the
   law of the land wherever they are without ever giving the just
   motives for causing offense to their own nation. (87)


Whereas the British had become experienced smugglers, the newly independent American republic still had much to learn. Thinking that trading with Brazil was normal, United States custom officers issued passports listing Brazilian destinations. Two ships, the Pilgrim and the Samuel, were victims of this negligence. The Pilgrim sailing out of Rhode Island, entered the port of Rio de Janeiro in February of 1802. The captain, Samuel Staples, argued that the ship urgently needed repairs; the inspectors were skeptical. When they read the passport, signed by Thomas Jefferson, bluntly stating the destination of the ship as Rio de Janeiro, confiscation was unavoidable. (88) In 1802 the Samuel also carrying a passport mentioning Rio de Janeiro as its destination, sailed from Boston to Montevideo, with a stop in Rio de Janeiro. Running into problems off the coast of northeast Brazil, the ship entered the small harbor of Porto de Touros in Rio Grande do Norte. The local officer arrested the American captain and crew immediately and sent them to Recife, where the American captain died in prison. (89) There was no redress for confiscation of either the Pilgrim or the Samuel. The captain of the Pilgrim was eventually set free, since the authorities could not but believe his ignorance. In the case of the Samuel, all appeals failed since its rich cargo of textiles convinced Lisbon authorities that smuggling had been the objective of captain and crew. (90)

There were also some confiscations involving French nationals by Portuguese authorities, though few occurred in Brazil and most of the French faced the better end. In 1793, two Frenchmen and one Frenchwoman sailed to Brazil with the Spanish ship the Buen Viaje, which was confiscated in Parati for illegal trade. All three French nationals--Bonnafous, Sauvaget and d'Entremeusse--received redress for their specific cases in the beginning of the nineteenth century. (91) The Diligent, a French vessel confiscated in Recife, was also restored to its captain. (92) British diplomats complained about the favored treatment of the French. (93) The explanation lay not in Brazil but in Lisbon, where the prince regent took advantage of every opportunity to forge good relations with representatives of the French government and looked favorably on private citizens of that country.

The study of the confiscation of foreign vessels is central to understanding illegal trade. Paradoxically contraband trade could be condoned only when regulated by Brazilian administrators. Once officials were no longer in the position to regulate this illegal commerce, foreign captains crossed the line between having their actions condoned or proscribed. In the latter case confiscation was inevitable. The absence of confiscations in a given period signified that contraband trade was regulated. But for other periods it is essential to understand why vessels were confiscated in order to understand the degree of authority that officials had over this contraband trade.

In the first three decades of the eighteenth century, when Brazilian officials had not yet established their authority, confiscations occurred regularly. This pattern changed in the next four decades, when illegal trade took other forms, namely within the Portuguese fleet system itself. After the 1770s more foreign vessels were engaged in illegal trade on the Brazilian coast. Ships confiscated in the 1770s and 1780s were confiscated because they did not comply with the stipulations of Portuguese law and the captain defied the authority of local officials. Defiance of authority continued to be a strong reason for confiscation in the 1790s and 1800s, but, during this period in contrast to the 1770s and 1780s, the authorities lost control over illegal trade. Only in the 1790s and 1800s, when smugglers did not need officials as intermediaries of illegal trade, was royal authority seriously defied.

In the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth century, Portuguese authorities became reluctant to restore confiscated British and American vessels. Contraband trade had got out of hand and, if the Portuguese authorities were ever to reassert their authority, they had no alternative but to adhere unswervingly to a strict policy of enforcing the law. Such was the opinion of the Secretary of State, the Viscount da Anadia, writing to a colleague:
   The contraband trade in which foreign ships engage in Brazilian
   harbors is so manifest and scandalous, and the cunning with which
   they in the majority of cases circumvent the laws under pretext of
   emergency entries into harbors, demands that on those few occasions
   that it is proved beyond doubt ... legal action must be taken
   against the infractors to the full extent of the penalties
   prescribed in these laws. (94)


French vessels were excepted from such stringent enforcement because the Portuguese government wanted to please the French and keep them from invading their country. Thus were the French permitted to defy Portuguese authority, just as the English had in earlier decades.

The relationship between Portuguese and Spanish America during the eighteenth century deserves special treatment. Spanish vessels from the Rio de la Plata area were excepted from the Portuguese prohibition on direct trade by foreigners with Brazil. The Portuguese government considered trade between Portuguese and Spanish America "less illegal" for two reasons. The first and most important was the delivery of silver. Silver, no 94 less than gold, was a noble metal, essential to the minting of coins and for commerce with the East Indies. Secondly, Portuguese authorities saw their commercial activities in the Rio de la Plata area as a means of territorial expansion. There was a parallel policy for the Amazon region, in recognition of the fact that this waterway was the means of access for Portuguese manufactures to the market in Quito. (95)

Spain was uneasy with the Portuguese lust for expansion, and it was not until 1777 that the nations established good relations with the treaty of Santo Ildefonso, whose signing was conditional on resolution of the problem of Colonia do Sacramento. Sacramento was founded in 1680 on the north bank of the estuary of Rio de la Plata for the purpose of asserting Portuguese territorial claims to the north bank, and sharing in the profits from the silver mines of Potosi. Thus Colonia do Sacramento became a smuggler's paradise, used by Portuguese and other foreigners to participate in commerce with the viceroyalty of Peru. Spanish troops captured and blockaded Colonia several times stopping Portuguese illegal trade. (96) But under British and Portuguese pressure, the Spanish authorities were subsequently forced to restore the territory at the peace negotiations.

The treaty of Madrid, celebrated in 1750, altered this situation. The Portuguese statesman Alexandre de Gusmao, realizing that Colonia do Sacramento was less important to the Portuguese than had been previously believed, was able to exact large concessions from the Spanish for its return. (97) Unfortunately, the main treaty could not be signed, because a prerequisite, namely the dissolution of the seven Indian/Jesuit villages in the Cisplatine region, proved impossible and the treaty was nullified. Renewed war over the Platine region ended in a complete Spanish victory in 1775 with the Colonia do Sacramento falling to Spain this time. Working from a newly acquired position of strength, Spain cultivated neighborly relations with Portugal by joining in condoning "illegal" trade between Spanish and Portuguese America. (98)

The Portuguese policy of showing more tolerance towards illegal trade by Spanish ships than by vessels of other nations was not new. Welcoming the silver carried by Spanish ships, Portuguese authorities did not object to their presence. Especially during war, Spanish merchants and officials profited from Portuguese neutrality by transporting goods and persons under a the Portuguese flag. (99) Portugal had the good fortune not to participate in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the War of American Independence (1778-1783), and remained neutral during the first two years of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), for five years during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and as long as possible during the wars following the French Revolution (1792-1814).

Thus the treaty of Santo Ildefonso or treaty of Defensive Alliance (Alianca Defensiva) (1777) contained a novel provision, namely that "contraband" trade was to be officially encouraged by both Portuguese and Spanish authorities. Illegal trade that had hitherto been conducted directly, but clandestinely, in the Plate now became visible. (100) In 1782 the Portuguese and Spanish governments established an official arrangement: Spanish vessels incorporated into Portuguese fleets and transportation of Spanish goods in Portuguese vessels was permitted. (101) These measures allowing Spanish ships to enter Brazilian harbors and Portuguese vessels to anchor in Spanish American ports, actively stimulated illegal coastal trade between the colonies of both countries in South America. As Robert Walpole, the British plenipotentiary in Lisbon, remarked, these actions were "against the general system of jealousy and exclusion that has constantly prevailed". (102)

Portugal's objective was limited to gaining access to silver originating in Potosi, for which La Plata was a major exit route. (103) Spain wanted to trade in slaves from the Portuguese African colonies, in exchange for local commodities such as hides, meat, herba mate (herbal tea), and tobacco. Since the Portuguese authorities were reluctant to permit Spanish participation in the slave trade and, and wanted to obtain silver in return for their products, there was a discrepancy between the respective expectations and aspirations of the two nations.

As regards the Spanish American point of view, the situation was quite different. Intercolonial trade was important for the Rio de la Plata area. The general opinion was that African slaves were essential to the economic development of Alto Peru; many foreign vessels, especially British and French, transported slaves to Rio de la Plata in the eighteenth century. Serious interruptions to this slave trade occurred during the frequent European wars. In these periods, Spanish and French vessels could not safely enter the ports of Buenos Aires, Montevideo or Maldonado. At such times the trade ceased or shifted to Portuguese colonies.

As long as Colonia do Sacramento remained under Portuguese rule, the slave trade could utilize this free port. But Spanish authorities were unwilling to accept the implication that the slave trade could be re-routed and thereby removed from the control of Spanish authorities in Buenos Aires. After the treaty of Santo Ildefonso (1777) the slave trade was diverted from Rio de la Plata to southern Brazilian ports.

One complication was that authorities in Portugal declared the slave trade from Brazil to Rio de la Plata illegal. Moreover, Brazilian authorities were ordered to accept only silver and hides from Spanish vessels, and limited those Brazilian products that the Spanish Americans could receive in return. If these regulations had been executed in full, commerce between Spanish and Portuguese America would have stagnated. In practice, Brazilian officials retained some authority, because they could threaten to confiscate Spanish American vessels if their captains did not acquiesce to the officials' wishes.

The practical workings of "illegal commerce" between Rio de la Plata and Brazil is aptly demonstrated by the case of the San Juan y San Jose. one of the first Spanish ships to enter the port of Rio de Janeiro after the treaty of Santo Ildefonso. (104) In 1780 the Spanish viceroy in Buenos Aires permitted this ship to sail for Rio de Janeiro in order to exchange a cargo of salt, flour, and silver for Brazilian tobacco. (105) Officially, this voyage contravened the terms of the Portuguese law of 1715, which forbade the entrance of any foreign vessel unless it was in urgent need of assistance. But the Brazilian authorities admitted the San Juan y San Jose in order to maintain "good harmony" between the crowns of Spain and Portugal. (106)

The Brazilian viceroy, Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, consequently started to negotiate with the captain of the Spanish vessel. He forbade the Spanish captain to sell any product other than silver in exchange for tobacco, and threatened him with confiscation if he did not obey. The Brazilian viceroy was successful in bringing about the sale of all available tobacco and thereby extracting as much silver as possible. He sold about 1365 arrobas of tobacco to the Spanish ship. When this was not enough, he traded slaves and various commodities for the rest of the silver. (107) A law of 1751 forbade trade in slaves to foreign territories, but Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza broadly interpreted this legislation, that claiming exceptional circumstances justified his actions, namely:
   That one can put an end to that frequent transgression of the above
   mentioned law, which as far as I can remember was published for the
   sole reason of satisfying foreigners who made complaints about the
   large amount of contraband through the introduction of these slaves
   [by Colonia do Sacra.,108 mento] (108)


The Brazilian viceroy thus interpreted the legislation to his own advantage, but it did not follow that others could take the same liberties with the law.

The San Juan y San Jose did not leave Brazilian waters as soon as these commercial transactions had been completed. After official negotiations with the viceroy, the captain of the San Juan y San Jose traded on the beach of Nossa Senhora da Gloria just outside the urban boundaries of the city of Rio de Janeiro, and on the Enseada das Palmas on Ilha Grande. (109)

Whereas the Brazilian viceroy rationalized his own transgressions of the law, infringements by others were not condoned. Reports about illegal trade by this Spanish vessel led to several official inquiries. In Rio de Janeiro two merchants were found guilty of trading with the San Juan y San Jose: with the full knowledge of the military guards on board they had traded meal for gunpowder. (110) As a result, a second lieutenant and a corporal on duty at the time were arrested and sentenced to death by the War Council in Rio de Janeiro. (111) The viceroy protested and refused to carry out this severe verdict, whereupon the king commuted the sentence to banishment to Angola for ten years. The guards were to be employed in Angola in the same military positions they had held in Rio de Janeiro. (112)

On Ilha Grande judicial inquiries led to confiscation of the Portuguese vessel Bom Jezus de Iguagipe. Several witnesses declared that the ship had sailed from Salvador for the specific purpose of conducting illegal trade with the San Juan y San Jose. (113) On an unguarded beach, out of view of all officials, the crews had traded sugar, tobacco, and slaves for Spanish flour.

Some other Spanish ships were to follow the example of the San Juan y San Jose, and the viceroy in Buenos Aires invited Brazilian vessels to sail to Rio de la Plata where they would be well received under the pretense of emergency situations. (114) Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza did not complain about the illegality of this trade. Rather he was concerned about "o espirito de ma fe, que lhes-he inherente" (the spirit of bad faith, that is inherent to them), by which he was referring to the Spanish authorities' ability to set all the terms for this illegal commerce. (115) The Brazilian viceroy related the following incident. Two Spanish vessels calling at the harbor of Rio de Janeiro and announced that the viceroy in Buenos Aires was eager to receive any Brazilian vessel that entered Rio de la Plata. The Spanish captains themselves freighted some Brazilian ships for this purpose. Thereupon, the Spanish authorities in Montevideo cordially welcomed a Portuguese vessel, until they received news of a richly laden Spanish fleet bound for the same port. Thereupon the officials admitted only the goods that Spanish merchants had paid for from these Brazilian ships, and wasted no time in returning the vessel with the Brazilian merchants' goods in short order.

Still, La Plata trade involved cooperation between Spanish and Portuguese merchants, and even joint ownership of vessels. Especially in times of war, ships flew the flag that was the safest. For instance, a Spanish merchant in Cadiz, the Count of Reparas, sent six vessels flying the Portuguese flag from Lisbon to Montevideo via Rio de Janeiro in the name of the Portuguese merchant Fernando Jose Ferreira. (116) In 1781, the captain of the Rio Crande, Jose Joaquim de Freitas Lisboa, came upon the Nossa Senhora da Conceicao. This vessel was sailing under a Spanish flag off Rio Grande de Sao Pedro, but the captain raised British colors on his approach. The ship proved to be a British privateer, eager for information about commerce between Portuguese and Spanish ships. (117)

During the war of American Independence (1778-83), the Portuguese and Spanish governments made arrangements to their mutual benefit. (118) Spanish goods and persons were now transported via Rio de Janeiro in order to guarantee their safety from capture. One problem remained: who was going to set the terms for this trade? Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza remained reluctant to let Spanish goods be carried in Portuguese vessels to Lisbon. He claimed that the Spanish were just taking advantage of the Portuguese vessels' substantially lower freight costs. (119) The Brazilian viceroy also stated that merchants from Spanish America entered Rio de Janeiro under false pretenses to trade in slaves. (120) Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza resented the way the Spanish merchants conducted this trade, since Spanish authorities denied Brazilian merchants their fair profits. Reports about this commerce diminished as soon as peace was concluded in 1783, but were revived during the wars of the French Revolution.

After the French Revolution, Portuguese and Spanish authorities were even more eager to engage in coastal trade between Brazil and Rio de la Plata. The coastal captains frequently infringed the Portuguese ruling that they could not engage in the slave trade and should carry only silver to exchange. A petition by merchants of Rio Grande de Sao Pedro in 1800 claimed that seventy ships were engaged in such illegal trade between Rio de la Plata and Rio de Janeiro to the detriment of on their own commerce. (121) These merchants alleged that products from Spanish America were the same as those from the southern part of Brazil, and they could not compete with such low prices. Three years later an official from Rio Grande de Sao Pedro wrote an alarmist report that this contraband trade in slaves in exchange for agricultural products elevated the price of slaves, diminished the number of workers in the fields, and competed with Brazilian goods. In order to convince the Lisbon authorities of the case's gravity, he added a list of sixteen ships that had sailed to Buenos Aires and Montevideo. (122)

The attentive British commander of the Portuguese fleet, Donald Campbell, devoted part of his long memorandum to the thriving Rio de la Plata trade. (123) Campbell recognized the importance of the silver that Portuguese merchants received from this commerce, and its crucial role in the India trade; textiles, especially from India, were as essential to the slave trade from Angola as was Bahian tobacco to the slave trade to the Mina coast. (124) But Campbell claimed that the loss of slaves to Spanish America was harmful to the Brazilian economy. The Portuguese Secretary of State was less impressed with the Britisher's report, and suggested that his main focus should be to combat contraband by captains of English vessels. (125)

It is difficult to estimate the number of vessels engaged in the commerce between Brazil and Rio de la Plata. One problem is the incompleteness of customs records for Portuguese and Spanish America. Even where reliable records were kept, trading beyond the official routes remained unregistered. The intensity of such commerce is indicated by the following reconstruction based on Brazilian sources, namely the autos de exame of all foreign vessels that entered the port of Rio de Janeiro (Table 4). These records were probably complete, but do not include Spanish vessels that went to small Brazilian ports along the coast. Spanish vessels arriving to await incorporation into convoys to Lisbon were also mostly exempt from this examination.

These figures (Tables 3 to 5) represent the minimum numbers of vessels engaged in the trade. Data for the years of 1803 and 1804 are the most complete. If we add Corcino Medeiros dos Santos' numbers (Table 5) to those of Elena F. Scheuss de Studer (Table 4), the total number of Portuguese and Spanish vessels that sailed between Rio de la Plata and Brazilian ports is 31 for 1803 and 60 for 1804.

According to Table 4, 1803 and 1804 represent average years. An informed general conclusion is that the minimum number of vessels engaged in this trade was between 30 and 60 a year. This figure is not far from the number of 70 mentioned in the petition by the merchants of Rio Grande de Sao Pedro. (126) These numbers were not high if we compare them to the coastal trade. According to Corcino Medeiros dos Santos's numbers, 261 coastal vessels of all kinds and tonnages entered the port of Rio de Janeiro in 1803; and in 1804 these numbered 255. (127) The total numbers of foreign ships entering the port of Rio de Janeiro were 54 and 32 in 1803 and 1804 respectively (Table 4).

But even if this trade formed but a small part of the total commerce in Rio de Janeiro, its impact remained important. That Carioca authorities had lost their control over this trade was highly significant, as will become clear from the study of some cases of capture of contrabandists in Southern Brazil.

The case of the Nossa Senhora da Conceicao e Santa Rita demonstrates well how commercial networks in the southern ports of Brazil were intertwined. In 1794, the vessel left Santa Catarina for Montevideo with a cargo of slaves and after the cargo was sold set sail for Salvador. But, buffeted by contrary winds, the ship had to return to the island of Santa Catarina. There, the inspector of the treasury (provedor da fazenda) was tipped off about these illegal actions and alerted the interim governor of the island. After correspondence with the Spanish viceroy, the Count de Rezende demanded the transportation of the crew and ship to the Brazilian capital. The crew of the Santa Rita was immediately imprisoned and the ship taken into custody in Rio de Janeiro. The ensuing judicial inquiry into the actions of the mate, captain, crew, and owners of the Santa Rita, was one of the most extensive investigations of its time. (128)

The arrest of the ship, captain, and owners had been in error, but was a fait accompli. The owner of the Santa Rita was Joao Marcos Vieira, the highly respected director of the whaling company in Rio de Janeiro. When the confiscation took place in Santa Catarina, one Jacinto Jorge dos Anjos wrote him a letter expressing his feelings about the incident:
   There are no words adequate to express my feelings and there is no
   person on this island [Santa Catarina] who does not feel likewise,
   seeing the insult heaped on the patron of this community and his
   clientele. (129)


But Jacinto Jorge dos Anjos explained that they could do nothing about the situation. The provedor da fazenda himself had made the denunciation to the interim governor. Though highly touched by what had occurred, the appointed governor was too ill to take action of Vieira's behalf. Still, the letter writer was full of hope for justice since: "He will not fail to exercise them on behalf of Your Excellency in such critical circumstances." (130)

Even though Vieira was a favorite of the viceroy, justice would prevail. (131) A high court judge in Rio de Janeiro conducted a thorough interrogation, in which all the crew of the Santa Rita confessed that they had been in Montevideo and had sold slaves. The judge needed evidence to determine the matter of guilt. Concerning ownership of the slaves, eight crew members, especially the slaves, testified that the mate, second mate and six sailors had sold slaves and goods of their own. (132) The zealous investigators had found Joao Marcos Vieira's correspondence, attesting that most of the slaves came from Joao Marcos Vieira and the merchants he was dealing with.

Along with the testimony of several witnesses, the confiscated correspondence proved that Vieira was a busy merchant with an extensive commercial network including merchants from Santa Catarina, a priest, a merchant from Porto Alegre, a lieutenant in Rio de Janeiro, a merchant in Rio Grande de Sao Francisco, and both the former governor and provedor da fazenda of Santa Catarina. (133) There was evidence that Vieira had been trading since 1787 with Spanish merchants and had contacts in Montevideo. (134)

The whaling contractor himself did not confess to his crime. Vieira claimed to be stunned by the fact that the Santa Rita sailed not to Salvador but to Montevideo, which was certainly not his order. (135) He pleaded ignorance as to the identity of his correspondents, and reinterpreted their letters. For instance, an entrepreneurial friar, one Antonio de Santa Anna Palha, bluntly related the difficult time he had with a small vessel full of contraband goods. Failing to make headway against contrary winds, he beached his vessel and had to sleep on the beach in order to guard the cargo so that it would not be stolen. (136) Joao Marcos Vieira told the interrogators that "this friar, being something of a gallant, used the term contraband to refer to women". (137) The outcome of case is not fully known, but Vieira's goods were confiscated on royal order, and the six seamen were imprisoned. (138) However, by 1797 Vieira had regained his old position, even though his case was still proceeding in Lisbon. (139)

This case study illustrates how the trade to La Plata had become incorporated into the coastal trade in southern Brazil. Spanish merchants in Montevideo and Buenos Aires were equal partners with merchants in Porto Alegre, Santa Catarina, and Rio de Janeiro. Moreover military officers and senior civil servants were involved in this illegal trade. Even the governor of Santa Catarina and the viceroy in Rio de Janeiro participated, and Vieira expected, and probably obtained, protection from the king's personal representative. Vieira's case became too public to be ignored and a full legal prosecution was inevitable. But, as in many other cases, after the legal process in Lisbon had finished, he returned to his old place in the sun. (140)

Reports about local involvement in illegal trade to Rio de la Plata became more and more frequent. Several cases in the year 1796 suggest the extent of this trade. In one case there circulated the denunciation that the captain of Ubatuba, a city south of Ilha Grande, was a main contractor in the slave trade to La Plata and had as his commercial contact a Carioca merchant. (141) In another case a captain of a Spanish vessel in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro wanted to buy slaves. His request was denied by the authorities, who assumed that the vessel would take on slaves once it was out of sight of the harbor; sending the coastguard would not help, since smugglers always knew when the coastguard would go on patrol. (142) On yet another occasion the inspector of the treasury had his doubts about an inhabitant of the Valongo, the slave market area in Rio de Janeiro. Though he claimed to be bound for Angola, the inspector had heard that his real destination was Montevideo. (143) And finally, on Ilha dos Porcos the coastguard arrested three Brazilians, who had been on board a Spanish vessel loaded with slaves that came from Rio de Janeiro. (144)

The officials fought with no avail against this commerce. If the trade could not take place in the port of Rio de Janeiro, then captains sought other venues such as the southern harbors, Salvador or even just outside the bar of Rio de Janeiro. Measures such as a prohibition on fishermen sailing by night and registration of all slaves arriving in Rio de Janeiro did not diminish the number of reports of such illegal activity. (145) This contraband trade went on, with or without the approval of local officials.

In some cases the Portuguese authorities still showed their teeth. Around 1800 a Spanish vessel, the Miercoles, was a victim of sporadic official efforts. This Spanish vessel was on its way with slaves from Salvador to Montevideo when it encountered the coastguard vessel Voador on patrol off Cabo Frio. This time the officials on board the Voador were really alert, and confiscated the Spanish ship. (146) The Miercoles was held by the coastguard at Cabo Frio and then brought to Rio de Janeiro. The Spanish owner, Pedro Dubal, called this an infraction of the terms of the treaties and a threat to harmonious relations between Portugal and Spain.

Of course, there ensued protests by the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon. (147) The stance adopted by the owner of the vessel was instructive, pointing out exactly what was illegal, but condoned. (148) He claimed that this trade was essential to Spain, since it supplied their American colonies with the labor needed to promote agriculture and industry. This was the very reason given by the Portuguese government in prohibiting a slave trade to Spanish America. At issue was the fact that, should the Spanish claim be upheld, then Brazilian officials would lose their authority to regulate illegal trade. The confiscation of vessels was one manner in which local functionaries could assert its authority. Dubal also stated that his vessel was commanded by a Portuguese captain and was therefore Portuguese. This claim only made his case worse, since the employment of Portuguese persons in Spanish service could lead to their loss of nationality: such practices were considered as acts of treason. Pedro Dubal pleaded ignorance of the law forbidding the transport of slaves from Brazil to Spanish America. (149) The Secretary of State could not believe this ignorance given the circumstances of the case: namely that the slaves had been embarked clandestinely under cover of darkness and off the bar of Salvador. (150)

Pedro Dubal was correct in his views that this commerce was illegal, but condoned; there were good reasons for him to question the grounds for the confiscation of his vessel, since such trade was common practice. But the Portuguese authorities did not alter their opinion and, in 1805, the Spanish ambassador was still petitioning for a more favorable outcome. (151)

If this case was meant to set an example, then it failed. At least three other Spanish vessels were confiscated after the Miercoles: the Belisario, Espada de Hierro, and Monte Toro. (152) This illegal trade became even more blatant. There were numerous petitions from Spanish captains who wanted to trade in Spanish American goods, and memoranda that indicated the extent of contraband on this route. (153) Petitions took on an increasingly defiant tone. One such was by a Carioca merchant who asked the prince regent to permit him to engage in trade with Rio de la Plata, especially since the merchant had a running account with a Spanish merchant. (154) On another occasion the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, acting on behalf of a Spanish merchant, requested permission to negotiate the exchange of 2000 slaves from Brazil for 2000 mules from Rio de la Plata. (155) Contraband trade ceased to be considered illegal. The last viceroy in Rio de Janeiro, the Count of Arcos, made this clear in a letter to the Prince Regent a few months before the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil:
   The crime of contraband trade is so prevalent as to have lost the
   taint of criminality because of the frequency and familiarity with
   which it is engaged by the inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro, and it
   has rapidly gained acceptance as an innocent and legal enterprise.
   (156)


By this time local authorities had lost all their ability to regulate illegal trade. On each side of the Atlantic there were distinctive positions as to what should be considered illegal trade. "Utility" was the main standard for Portuguese authorities. If contraband trade was beneficial to the mother country, then it should be condoned even though it was prohibited by law. The trade with Rio de la Plata was beneficial since it brought in silver and appeased the Spanish who entertained political aspirations in Europe.

Local authorities in Brazil reacted differently. The illegality of contraband trade was useful, since this allowed officials to regulate illegal commerce. Once illegal trade became legalized by authorities in Portugal, a local bureaucrat's position as intermediary became endangered. Portuguese rulings that outlawed the distinction between condoned and proscribed illegal trade undermined the authority of Carioca administrators. The acceptance by the local merchant community of illegal trade as a form of free trade challenged not only the legitimacy of the bureaucrats as commercial intermediaries, but also the very pattern of a monopolistic economy.

Ernst Pijning

Minot State University

(1) Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil. With a Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1779 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 403-17.

(2) Charles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), 30-60; A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "Colonial Brazil: The Gold Cycle c. 1690-1750," in Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2: 547-600; Manoel S. Cardozo, "The Brazilian Gold Rush," The Americas 3 (1946): 137-60.

(3) Alvara 9 February 1711 and alvara 5 October 1715, Arquivo Historico Ultramarino [A.H.U.] (Lisbon), codice 1193.

(4) See Ernst Pijning, "Contrabando na Legislacao Portuguesa durante o Periodo Colonial," Anais da Sociedade Brasileira de Pesquisa Historica 14 (1994): 85-8.

(5) La Reine de Nantes: Dispatch from the French consul in Lisbon, Du Verger, to French Secretary of State, 9 April 1715, Archives Nationalles Paris [A.N.P.], Affaires Etrangeres [A.E.], B/1/653, fols. 306r-306v; Le Succes: Dispatch from Luis Antonio de Sa Queiroga to king, 8 August 1718, A.H.U., papeis avulsos nao catalogados [p.a.n.c.], caixa 12, doc. 76; La Subtile: Dispatch from the French consul to Lisbon, Du Montagnac, to the Council of Marine, 28 September, 1720, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/658, fols. 238r-239r; LAspirant: Declaration of Captain George Bourdain, 30 December, 1721, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/660, fols. 39r-41v; Saint Jean Baptiste: Dispatch from De Montagnac to the Council of the Marine, 9 September 1721, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/659, fols. 166r-169r; Le Comte de Toulouse: Dispatch from De Montagnac to French Secretary of State, 15 May 1725, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/662, fols. 270r-272r; Saint Joseph: Royal dispatch to the viceroy, Marquis de Angeja, 8 April 1718, A.H.U., cod. 1193, #14; Don Carlos: Sentence of Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Luis Vahia Monteiro, 4 October 1725, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 16, doc. 96.

(6) Dispatches from Du Verger to French Secretary of State, 17 July 1713, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/652, fols. 405r-408r; 25 September 1713, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/652, fols. 442r-445v; 27 November 1713, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/652, fols. 452r-459v; 4 December 1713, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/652, fols. 46r-463r; Dispatch from the French ambassador in Lisbon, Abbe de Mornay, to French Secretary of State, 23 October 1714, A.N.P., A.E., B/1/653, fols. 182r-185r.

(7) Dispatches from the British plenipotentiary in Lisbon, Henry Worseley, to British Secretary of State, Viscount Bolingroke, 8 September 1714, Public Record Office (now National Archives (London)) [P.R.O./N.A.L.] (London), State Papers [S.P.] 89, vol. 23, fols. 82r-84v; 29 September 1714, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 23, fols. 91r-92r; 16 October 1714, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 23, fols. 93r-94r; Dispatches from Worseley to British Secretary of State, Lord Stanhope, 21 January 1715, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 23, fols. 153r-155v; and 8 February 1715, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 23, fols. 163r-165r.

(8) Dispatch from Worseley to James Stanhope, 18 October 1715, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 23, fols. 304r-v.

(9) Dispatch from the French consul in Salvador, De Pantigny, to French Secretary of State, 22 March 1715, Quay d'Orsay [Q.D.O.] (Paris), Bahia, Consulaire et Commercial, vol. 1, fols. 42r-v.

(10) Dispatch from Du Verger to French Secretary of State, 10 June 1715, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/653, fols. 362r-363r.

(11) Dispatch from De Montagnac to French Secretary of State, 22 May 1715, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/662, fols. 274r-275r.

(12) Dispatch from the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Antonio de Brito de Menezes, to Captain of Ilha Grande, Thomas Gomes da Silva, 15 February 1718, Arquivo Nacional de Rio de Janeiro [A.N.R.J.], Colonial, cod. 84, vol. 1, fols. 33r-35r, Dispatch Antonio de Brito e Menezes to Thomas Gomes da Silva, 17 February 1718, A.N.R.J., Col., cod. 84,vol. 1, fols. 35r-36v.

(13) Consultation of the Overseas Council, 11 August 1718; and Dispatch from Antonio de Brito e Menezes to the king, 10 March 1718, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, papeis avulsos catalogados [p.a.c.], 3573-3574.

(14) Declaration of Geslain, 27 January 1720, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/658, fols. 13r-17r.

(15) Dispatch from De Montagnac to the Council of Marine, 16 December 1721, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/659, fols. 267r-269r.

(16) Dispatch from De Montagnac to the Council of Marine, 28 September 1720, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/658, fols. 238r-239r.

(17) Declaration of George Boudain, 30 December 1721, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/660, fols. 39r-41v.

(18) Dispatch from Luis Vahia Monteiro to the king, 11 September 1725, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 16, doc. 96.

(19) [Le Gentil de la Barbinais], Nouveau Voyage au Tour du Monde par M. le Centil, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1728) 2: 112-76; Ernst Pijning, "The Other Side of the Coin. Contraband Trade in Portuguese Brazil," The Portuguese American 17 (33) (8 September 1993): 20.

(20) Barbinais, Nouveau Voyage, 2: 168, 169.

(21) Dispatch De Montagnac to Council of Marine, 4 November 1721, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/659, fols. 196r-1985; Dispatch De Montagnac to French Secretary of State, 1 May 1725, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/662, fols. 266r-267r; Dispatch idem. to idem., 13 September 1734, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/668, fols. 164r-1655.

(22) Dispatch French consul in Lisbon, St. Colombe, to Council of Marine, 2 February 1717, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/655, fols. 12r-13v; Dispatch Du Vernay to French Secretary of State, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/670, fols. 228r-230r.

(23) Consultation Overseas Council, 18 January 1726, Documentos Historicos (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1928-1955), 96: 94-97.

(24) Dispatch De Montagnac to French Secretary of State, 22 May 1725, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/662, fols. 274r-275r; Dispatch De Beauvegan to French Secretary of State, Q.d.O., Memoires et Documents, Amerique, vol. 6, fol . 523r-526r.

(25) Royal Dispatch to Marquis da Angeja, 8 April 1718, A.H.U., cod. 1193, #14; Dispatch Diogo de Mendonca Corte Real to Worsley, 9 April 1718, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P.89, vol. 26, fols. 36[TM].

(26) Consultation of Overseas Council, 28 May 1725, Documentos Historicos 96: 158-162; Dispatch De Montagnac to Marine Council, 18 March 1723, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/660, fols. 73r-74r; Dispatch De Montagnac to Secretary of State, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/663, fols. 130r-132v.

(27) Pedro de Azevedo, "A Companhia da Ilha do Corisco," Arquivo Historico Portugues 1 (1903): 422-424.

(28) Autos de Exame, 12 September 1725, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 16, doc. 96.

(29) Dom Luis da Cunha, Instruccoes ineditas de Dom Luis da Cunha a Marco Antonio de Azevedo Coutinho, in Pedro de Azevedo, ed. (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1929), 152.

(30) Dispatch Dutch resident in Lisbon, Houwens, to States General, 15 July 1727, Nationaal Archief (Den Haag) [NADH], Staten Generaal, Liassen Portugal, 7022/1.

(31) Representation Dutch resident in Lisbon, Smissaert, to King, 25 March 1782, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [A.N.T.T.] (Lisbon), Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros [M.N.E.], Arquivo Central [A.C.], caixa 507.

(32) Alden, Royal Government, 110-11.

(33) Pepin de Bellisle, "Extrait d'un Journal de la Campagne des Vaisseaux du Roi aux Indes Orientalles en l'Annee 1748," A.N.P., Marine, B4, N.62, fols. 281r-302v; another shorter version exists in the Biblioteca do Palacio de Ajuda, 54-XIII-4 (19).

(34) "Extrait Journal Arc-en-Ciel," A.N.P., Marine, B4, No.62, fol. 284r.

(35) Alden, Royal Government, 409-10; James Cook, "An Account of a Voyage Round the World in the Years MDCCLXVIII, MDCCLXIX, MDCCLXX, and MDCCLXXI," in John Hawkesworth, ed., An Account of the Voyages undertaken by the order of his present Majesty for making the discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and successively performed by Commodore_Byron, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret and Captain Cook, 3 vols. (London: Printed for W. Strahan; and T. Cadell, 1773); and J. C. Beaglehole, ed., The Voyages of Captain James Cook on his Voyages of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 1.

(36) An Account of the Voyages undertaken by the order of his present Majesty for making the discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere and successively performed by Commodore Byron, 3 vols. (London: for W. Strahan; and T. Cadell, 1773) 1: 1-134; The Voyage of Governor Philip to Botany Bay with an Account of the Establishment of the Colonies of Port Jackson & Norfolk Island (London: for John Stockdale, 1789); L'Abbe Courte de la Blanchediere, Nouveau Voyage fait au Perou (Paris: Imprimerie de Delaguette, 1751); Louis de Bougainville, Voyage Autour du Monde par la Pregate du Roi la Boudeuse, et la Flute l'etoile; en 1766, 1767, 1768 & 1769 (Paris: Chez Saillant & Nyon, 1771); Abbe de la Caille, Journal Historique du Voyage fait au Cap de Bonne Esperance (Paris: Chez Guillyn, 1763).

(37) Dispatch of the viceroy, Count de Azambuja, to James Cook, 18 November 1768, Beaglehole, The Voyages of Captain James Cook, 1: 488-9.

(38) Dispatch of the Count de Azambuja to Secretary of State, Francisco Xavier de Mendonca Furtado, 28 November 1768, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 93, doc. 46.

(39) Dispatch of Count de Azambuja to Cook, 22 November 1768, Beaglehole, ed., Voyage of the Endeavour, 1: 493.

(40) Joseph Banks, The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771, in J. C. Beaglehole, ed., (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1962), 1: 190.

(41) Dispatch of Cook to Azambuja, 1 December 1768, The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks, 1: 497.

(42) Letter of Thomas Forster to Joseph Banks, 5 November 1771, in Beaglehole, ed., The Endeavour Journal, 2: 321-3.

(43) Dispatch Interim Governor Patricio Manoel de Figueiredo to Secretary of State, Thome Joaquim da Costa Corte Real, 19 August 1757, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c, 20316. I would like to thank Maria Fernanda Baptista Bicalho for this information.

(44) Instructions to Count d'Ache, 23 January 1757, A.N.P., Marine, B4, No.77, fols. 167r-175v.

(45) Instructions to Count d'Ache, January 1757, A.N.P., Marine, B4, No.77, fols. 136r 150v.

(46) Dispatch Count d'Ache to governor Rio de Janeiro, 19 July 1757, A.N.P., Marine, B4, No.77, fols. 297".

(47) Dispatch Patricio Manoel de Figueiredo to Count dAche, 4 August 1757, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.c., 20324; Dispatch British plenipotentiary in Lisbon, Edward Hay, to British Secretary of State, Pitt, 9 December, 1757, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 51, fols. 63r-64r; Dispatch Dutch resident in Lisbon, C.F. Bosch de la Calmette, to States General, 6 December 1757, NADH, Staten Generaal, Liassen Portugal, No. 7028/1.

(48) Dispatch Patricio Manoel de Figueiredo to king, 4 August 1757, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.c., 20326.

(49) Journal Count d'Ache, 19 August 1757, A.N.P., Marine, B4, No.77, fols. 305r-306v.

(50) Information provedor da fazenda, Francisco Cordovil Sequeira e Mello, to Thome Joaquim da Costa Corte Real, 6 July 1759, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.c., 20771.

(51) Sebastiao Jose Carvalho e Mello, to governor Rio de Janeiro, Gomes Freire de Andrade, 8 April 1759, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 65, doc. 25.

(52) Alden, Royal Government, 413-5.

(53) Consultation Overseas Council, 1 January 1781, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 126, doc. 7; Report Robert Sherson to British Secretary of State, 17 September 1781, P.R.O./N.A.L., Foreign Office [F.O.]63, vol. 2, Royal dispatch to viceroy, Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, 30 October 1781, Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro [B.N.R.J.], ms. 4,4,3, fol. 14r.

(54) Sentence High Court Rio de Janeiro, 16 January 1781, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 127, doc. 7.

(55) Dispatch British Secretary of State, James Rockford to British plenipotentiary in Lisbon, Robert Walpole, 3 August 1773, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P.89, vol. 75, fols. 65r-66v.

(56) Dispatch Robert Walpole to Earl of Rockford, 19 October, 1774, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 78, fols. 46r-v.

(57) Dispatch Robert Walpole to Earl of Rockford, 29 March 1775, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 79, fols. 83r-845.

(58) Dispatch Martinho de Mello e Castro to Robert Walpole, October 1, 1781, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O.63, vol.2, and B.N.R.J., ms.4,4,3, fol. 14r-v; Dispatch Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, May 18, 1782, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 129, doc.72, and B.N.R.J., ms.4,4,4, fol. 99v-10v.

(59) Dispatch Robert Walpole to Lord Grantham, 23 March 1783, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 4.

(60) Dauril Alden, "Yankee Sperm Whalers in Brazilian Waters, and the Decline of the Portuguese Whale Fishery (1773-1801)," The Americas 20 (1964): 276-82; Myriam Ellis, A Baleia no Brasil Colonial (Sao Paulo: Edicoes Melhoramentos, 1969), 169-71.

(61) Dispatch Robert Walpole to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 29 April 1776, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 82, fols. 67".

(62) Dispatch Robert Walpole to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 29 April 1776, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 82, fols. 67r-v; Dispatch John Hort to Viscount Weymouth, 19 September 1779, P.R.O./N.A.L., S.P. 89, vol. 86, fols. 305r-307r.

(63) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 13 July 1790, P.R.O./N.A.L., Board of Trade [B.T.] 5, vol. 6, fol. 131'.

(64) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 17 March 1806, P.R.O, B.T. 3, vol. 3, fols. 132r-133v.

(65) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 3 July 1790, P.R.O./N.A.L., B.T. 5, vol. 6, fols. 257r-v.

(66) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 14 February 1791, P.R.O./N.A.L., B.T. 5, vol. 7, fols. 26v-28r.

(67) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 21 January 1791, P.R.O./N.A.L., B.T. 5, vol. 7, fols. 11r-12r.

(68) Meeting Privy Council on Trade, 20 January 1791, P.R.O./N.A.L., B.T. 5, vol. 7, fols. 8v-10v.

(69) Report Samuel Enderby and Champion to the Privy Council on Trade, 19 March 1792, P.R.O./N.A.L., B.T. 5, vol. 7, fols. 203r-v.

(70) Dispatch viceroy, Count de Rezende, to Secretary of State, Luis Pinto de Souza, November 5, 1795, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 161, doc. 28. "Os debates ... sao immensos, e sempre indecorosos, e ofensivos a immunidade das Reaes Ordens, ao carater do Ministro, e ao respeito que merece a signatura do Vice Rey."

(71) Act of Sequestration, Relacao Rio de Janeiro, 11 March 1803, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 43.

(72) "Sentenca da arribada do bergantim Ingles denominado Sao Pedro," 10 March 1803, A.N.R.J., Colonial, cod. 157, vol. 11, fols. 35r-36r.

(73) Dispatch Robert Stephen Fitzgerald to Lord Hawkesbury, 17 December 1803, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 42.

(74) Dispatch Lord Strangford to George Canning, 16 July 1807, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 55, fols. 15r-18r.

(75) "Sentenca da arribada," 27 April 1802, A.N.R.J., Col., cod. 157, vol. 11, fols. 16r-v.

(76) Dispatch of the viceroy, Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal, to Secretary of State, Viscount de Anadia, 18 March 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 200, doc. 22.

(77) "Minutes taken from Daniel Morse's protest," 31 July 1798, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 459.

(78) Representation of Robert Walpole to Luis Pinto de Souza, 28 January 1800, and annexes, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c, caixa 181, doc. 56.

(79) Dispatch of Jose Feliciano da Rocha Gameiro to Count de Rezende, 11 September 1801, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 194, doc. 25.

(80) Dispatch of Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal to Viscount de Anadia, 30 November 1803, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 210, doc. 38.

(81) Thomas Lindley, Narrative of a Voyage to Brazil: Terminating in the Seizure of a British Vessel, and the Imprisonment of the Author and the Ship's Crew, by the Portuguese (London: J. Johnson, 1805).

(82) Dispatch of Gambier to British Secretary of State, Lord Hawkesbury, 2 December 1803, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 42; Dispatch D. Ships Bouns to Hammond, 10 April 1805, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 47.

(83) Dispatch of the British plenipotentiary, Fitzgerald, to Viscount de Balsemao (Luis Pinto e Souza), 14 December 1803, P.R.O./n.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 43, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 460.

(84) Dispatch of the Viscount de Balsemao to Fitzgerald, 13 March 1804, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 43.

(85) Letter of Francisco Jose de Lima to Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 19 September 1799, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 177, doc. 5.

(86) Dispatch of Fernando Joseph Correa to the king, 1 January 1800, A.H.U., Reino, maco 267.

(87) Dispatch of the Commander of the Brazil fleet, Donald Campbell, to Count de Rezende, 4 May 1801, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 191, doc. 84. "Toda a nacao tem direito de defender as suas rendas pelas leis que julga proprio impor. Nao posso imaginar por hum momento que Portugal esteja em estado de ceder os seus direitos em favor dos Inglezes, ou de qualquer outra nacao, porem nos nao tratamos de nacoes, tratamos de contrabandistas, que em toda a parte devem encontrar a forca da lei do pais aonde estiverem sem nunca jamais darem justos motivos de ofensa a sua mesma nacao."

(88) Autos de Exame, 13 February 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 197, doc. 38.

(89) Representation of John Watson, without date, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 461.

(90) Dispatch of the Viscount de Anadia to Secretary of State, Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, 11 February 1805, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 461.

(91) For Joanna d'Entremeusse see: Dispatch of the French ambassador to Lisbon, General Lannes, to the Prince Regent, 7 April 1802, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 476; For Sauvaget see: Dispatch Rayneval to Antonio de Azevedo de Araujo, 24 May 1807, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 477.

(92) Dispatch of the Intendente Geral da Policia, Ignacio de Pina Manique, to Secretary of State, Joao de Almeida de Mello e Castro, May 13, 1802, Arquivo Historico do Itamaraty (Rio de Janeiro), III-30, lata 185, maco 3.

(93) Dispatch of Fitzgerald to Lord Hawkesbury, 19 August 1803, P.R.O./N.A.L., F.O. 63, vol. 41.

(94) Viscount de Anadia to Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, 11 February 1805, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 461. "Os contrabandos que os navios estrangeiros vao fazer aos portos do Brasil sao tao manifestos, e escandalosos, e a astucia com que a maior parte das vezes a illudem as leis com o pretexto de arribadas forcadas, requer que essas poucas occasioens em que se prova evidentemente ... se proceda contra os culpados com as penas estabelecidas nas mesmas leis."

(95) Dauril Alden, "Late Colonial Brazil," in Leslie Bethell, ed., Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2: 622.

(96) See for instance: Dispatch of the Marquis de la Ancennada to Don Jose de Andonaegue, Madrid, 10 April 1748, Biblioteca Publica do Porto, codice 903, 52.

(97) Advice of Alexandre de Gusmao, secretary of the Overseas Council, 15 January 1750, in Jaime Cortesao, Alexandre de Qusmao e o Tratado de Madrid (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, 1953), 5: 494-9.

(98) Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil. With a Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1779 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 93-275.

(99) Dispatch of Don Domingo Caperetatro, 9 December 1702, Archives Nationales Paris [A.N.P.], Affaires Etrangeres [A.E.]., B/I/651, fols. 367"; Dispatch French consul in Lisbon, Du Vernay, to French Secretary of State, 28 October 1748, A.N.P., A.E., B/I/679, fols. 161r-162r; Dispatch Secretary of State, Martinho de Mello e Castro to viceroy, Marquis de Lavradio, Arquivo Historico Ultramarino [A.H.U.] (Lisbon), Rio de Janeiro, papeis avulsos nao catalogados [p.a.n.c.], caixa 115, doc. 45; Royal dispatch to viceroy, Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, 14 March 1780, Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro [B.N.R.J.], 4,4,2, fols. 5r-v; Dispatch Count de Rezende to viceroy Rio de la Plata, 28 July 1799, British Library, Add.ms. 32606, fols. 38r-v; Representation Spanish ambassador to Lisbon, Count del Campo, to Secretary of State, Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, 5 May 1807, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [A.N.T.T.] (Lisbon), Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros [M.N.E.], Arquivo Central [A.C.], caixa 434.

(100) Zacharias Moutoukias, "Una Forma de Oposicion," 334-5, 340.

(101) Dispatch of Martinho de Mello e Castro to Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, 24 August 1782, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 130, doc. 77, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,4, fols. 38v-39r.

(102) Dispatch British plenipotentiary in Lisbon, Robert Walpole to British Secretary of State, Lord Grantham, 23 November, 1782, P.R.O./N.A.L., Foreign Office [F.O.] 63, vol. 3.

(103) Dispatch of Marquis de Lavradio to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 6 June 1778, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 116, doc. 53.

(104) Corcino Medeiros dos Santos, O Rio de Janeiro e a Conjuntura Atlantica (Rio de Janeiro: Expressao e Cultura, 1993), 175-6.

(105) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Melo e Castro, 29 February 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 122, doc. 40, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,1,2, fols. 19r-v.

(106) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Coronel Vicente Joze de Velasco Molina, 5 March 1780, Arquivo Historico do Itamarati, III-30, lata 188, maco 1.

(107) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 30 March 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 122, doc. 54., and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,2, fols. 22v-23v.

(108) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to king, 30 March 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 122, doc. 54 and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,2, fols. 22r-23r. "Que embaracase aquela transgressao tao frequente do sobredito alvara, que a vista de tudo me lembra seria publicado com o unico fim de satisfazer aos estrangeiros talvez queixosos do muito contrabando, que com a introducao dos mesmos negros."

(109) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 123, doc. 40, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,2, fol. 47v-48r.

(110) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro 22 June 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c, caixa 123, doc. 40 and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,2, fols. 47r-48r.

(111) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 22 September 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 124, doc. 39, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,2, fols. 63v-64r.

(112) Royal dispatch to Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 126, doc. 29, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,3, fol. 9v.

(113) Auto de Devassa, 20 April 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 123, doc. 40.

(114) Medeiros dos Santos, O Rio de Janeiro, 184-5; Elena F. Scheuss de Studer, La Trata de Negros en el Rio de la Plata, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1958), appendix, cuadro xv.

(115) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 7 December 1781, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 128, doc. 6.

(116) Dispatch of Martinho de Mello e Castro to Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza, 24 August 1782, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 130, doc. 21, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,4, fol. 38r.

(117) Appendix of the dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 16 December 1781, B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,3, fols. 58r-v.

(118) "Papel que acompanhou a Carta de 4 de Agosto de 1782," A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 130, doc.77, and B.N.R.J., ms. 4,4,4, fols. 385-39r.

(119) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 12 September 1780, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 124, doc. 22.

(120) Dispatch of Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, December 13, 1781, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 128, doc.13; Dispatch Luis de Vasconcellos e Souza to Martinho de Mello e Castro, January 1, 1782, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 129, doc.1, and B.N.R.J., ms.4,4,4, fol. 57r-58v.

(121) Petition by 110 merchants of Rio Grande de Sao Pedro to Prince Regent, November 24, 1800, A.H.U., Rio Grande do Sul, p.a.n.c., caixa 7, doc.47. I would like to thank Helen Osorio for this and the following reference.

(122) Dispatch of Paulo Jose da Silva Gama to Secretary of State, Visconde de Anadia, April 12, 1803, A.H.U., Rio Grande do Sul, p.a.n.c., caixa 10, doc.40.

(123) Medeiros dos Santos, O Rio de Janeiro, 176-177; Donald Campbell, "Reflexoens imparciais sobre o trafico de escravatura entre as colonias de Portugal e Hespanha," April 30, 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 199, doc.6.

(124) Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death, Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 73-78.

(125) Dispatch of the Viscount of Anadia to Commander of the Fleet, Donald Campbell, October 12, 1801, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 195, doc.19.

(126) Petition by 110 merchants of Rio Grande de Sao Pedro to Prince Regent, 24 November 1800, A.H.U., Rio Grande do Sul, p.a.n.c., caixa 7, doc. 47.

(127) Medeiros dos Santos, O Rio de Janeiro, 84-5.

(128) Autos da devassa by dezembargador ouvidor do crime, Francisco Alvares de Andrade, 20 July 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 66.

(129) Letter Jacinto Jorge dos Anjos to Joao Marcos Vieira, 8 March 1794, in: correspondence found in the house of Joao Marcos Vieira, appendix A, Autos de Devassa, 16 June 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 66, fols. 13r-56v. "O meu sentimento excede as minhas exprecoens, e nao ha pessoa alguma nesta Ilha que o nao tenha sentido, vendo macultado o Pay destes Povos, e seu favorecido."

(130) Letter Jacinto Jorge dos Anjos to Joao Marcos Vieira, 8 March 1794, in: correspondence found in Joao Marcos Vieira's house, appendix A, Autos de Devassa, 16 June 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 66, fols. 13r-56v. "Todo o bom exito deste intrincado objecto depende do nosso amablissimo Ill.mo e Ex.mo Senhor Vice Rey, que possuhido de piedade, e compaixao que tanto resplandecem em todas as suas accoens, e farao memoravel o seu illuminadissimo Governo, nao deixara de as praticar com Vossa Merce, em tao critica conjunctura."

(131) "Carta escripta do Rio de Janeiro ao Ill.mo e Ex.mo Conde de Rezende, Vice Rei que foi do Rio de Janeiro, em que hum seu amigo lhe descreve o carater; e accoes mais notaveis do seu sempre detestavel Governo," without date [c. 1801], B.N.R.J. ms. 11,2,2.

(132) "Perguntas a Matheus Califate" (slave of Joao Marcos Vieira), 1 August 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 157, doc. 1; Perguntas a Joaquim da Mina (slave), 31 July 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 75; "Perguntas a Joao Baptista" (sailor, Santa Rita), 4 August 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 157, doc. 5.

(133) "Auto de exame e revisao dos papeis que se achao no escritorio de Joao Marcos Vieira," 16 July 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 66, fols. 9r-12r; Contents of 6 letters of the former governor of Santa Catarina, Jose Pereira Pinto, 16 August 1794, Interrogation of the master of the Santa Rita, Jose de Aruda, 12 August 1794, and Royal order to Ouvidor Santa Catarina, 26 August 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 157, doc. 4.

(134) Letters found in Joao Marcos Vieira's office, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156 doc. 66, fols. 64r-75r; Accounts of Joao Marcos Vieira, correspondence Luis de Escovar, 25 July 1794, and Dispatch Dezembargador Procurador da Fazenda, Jose Soares de Barbosa to Provedor da Fazenda, Joao de Figueiredo, 7 August 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c, caixa 156, doc. 69.

(135) Auto de perguntas of Joao Marcos Vieira, 12 July 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 63.

(136) Letter Frei Antonio de Santa Anna Palha to Joao Marcos Vieira, September 3, 1791, in: papers from office Joao Marcos Vieira, appendix T, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 156, doc. 66, fols. 6or-63v.

(137) Interrogation Joao Marcos Vieira, 14 August 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 157, doc. 4. "Que este Frade por ser muyto galante chamava as molheres fazenda de contrabando."

(138) Royal order to juiz ordinario of Villa do Rio Pardo, 8 November 1794, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, caixa 157, doc. 4, Autos de Prisao of Antonio Fernandes, contramestre Santa Rita, and 6 seamen from the Santa Rita, 3 November 1794, A.H.U, Rio de Janeiro, caixa 157, doc. 4.

(139) Dispatch Count de Rezende to Luis Jose de Carvalho e Mello, ouvidor geral do crime, 4 May 1797, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 492, pac. 2.; Request Dona Bernadina de Azevedo Lima, wife of Joao Marcos Vieira, handled 27 June 1799, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 174, doc. 67.

(140) Ernst Pijning, "Conflicts in the Portuguese Colonial Administration. Trials and Errors of Luis Lopes Pegado e Serpa, Provedor-Mor da Fazenda Real in Salvador, Brazil 1718-1721," Colonial Latin American Historical Review 2 (4) (1993) 403-23.

(141) Dispatch of Joao de Figueiredo to viceroy, Count de Rezende, 31 October 1796; and Dispatch idem. to idem., 10 November 1796, A.N.R.J. colonial, caixa 485, pac. I.

(142) Dispatch of the juiz da alfandega, Jose Antonio Ribeiro Freire, to Count de Rezende, 25 October 1796, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 495, pac. I.

(143) Dispatch of Joao de Figueiredo to Count de Rezende, 13 December 1796, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 485, pac. I.

(144) "Perguntas feitas a Francisco Lopes de Soiza," 23 December 1796, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 49[degrees], pac. I.

(145) Dispatch of Joao de Figueiredo to Count de Rezende, 24 October 1796, and Instruction Joao de Figueiredo to Jose Antonio de Castilhos, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 485, pac. 1.

(146) Consultation Overseas Council, 20 March 1800, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 182, doc. 54.

(147) Dispatch of the Spanish Ambassador, Marquis de Villena, to Secretary of State, Luis Pinto e Souza, 5 March 1800, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 431.

(148) Request of Gaspar Soliveres (in name of Don Pedro Dubal) to Spanish Secretary of State, Madrid, 7 January 1800, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 431.

(149) Request of Evaristo Perez de Castro to Joao de Almeida de Mello e Castro, 3 February 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 197, doc. 37.

(150) Dispatch of the viceroy, Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal, to Prince Regent, 29 April 1803, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 206, doc. 74.

(151) Dispatch of the Viscount de Anadia to Francisco de Borja Garcao Stockler, 12 January 1805, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 218, doc. 15.

(152) Belisario: Request of Ignacio Joaquim Pereira de Souza to Prince Regent, handled 9 December 1806, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 236, doc. 10; Espada de Hierro: Dispatch of Jose Antonio Ribeiro Freire, to viceroy, 20 April 1806; Monte Toro: Dispatch of the viceroy, Count dos Arcos, to Viscount de Anadia, 27 March 1807, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, caixa 237, doc. 92.

(153) Dispatch of the Count de Rezende, to Secretary of State, Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 22 November 1798, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 171, doc. 5; Dispatch of the Count de Rezende, to Secretary of State, Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 12 December 1798, A.H.U, Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 171, doc. 45; Dispatch of Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal to Viscount de Anadia, 21 October, 1801, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 195, doc. 39; Dispatch of Joao de Figueiredo to Count de Rezende, 23 January 1797; Dispatch of Jose Antonio Ribeiro Freire to Conde de Rezende, 1 March 1799, Dispatch of Jose Antonio Ribeiro Freire to Conde de Rezende, 17 April, 1799, Dispatch idem. to idem., 14 June 1799, Dispatch idem. to idem. 17 November 1799, Dispatch idem. to idem. 23 March 1800, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 495, pac. 1; Dispatch Jose Caetano de Lima to Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 6 December 1800, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 189, doc. 64; Dispatch Jose Antonio Ribeiro Freire to Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal, 9 November 1804, and Dispatch idem. to idem., 12 September 1807, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 495, pac. 1; Request Miguel Costa to Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal, 18 April 1805, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 495, pac. 2, Dispatch Dom Fernando Jose de Portugal to Viscount de Anadia, 6 August 1807, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 241, doc. 11; Count de Rezende, "Memoria do que se deve praticar a fim de se evite o extravio dos escravos," to Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 12 December, 1798, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c, caixa 175, doc. 87; Memorandum chancellor High Court, Luis Beltrao de Almeida, to Viscount de Anadia, 16 April 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 196, doc. 40; Campbell, "Reflexoens imparciais sobre o trafico de escravatura entre as colonias de Portugal e Hespanha," 30 April 1802, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 199, doc. 6.

(154) Request Francisco Lima to Prince Regent, handled 20 February 1805, A.N.R.J., Col., caixa 490, pac. 1.

(155) Dispatch Count de Campo to Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, 16 October, 1805, A.N.T.T., M.N.E., A.C., caixa 433.

(156) Dispatch Count dos Arcos to Viscount de Anadia, 2 September 1807, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixa 241, doc. 6. "O crime de contrabando chegou a perder ate o cheiro de crime com a frequencia e familiaridade que com elle tem contratado os homens no Rio de Janeiro, e mais depressa parecia considerado huma industria inocente, e licita."
Table 1 Foreign Vessels Confiscated in Brazilian Ports, 1700-1807.
Excluding Spanish Ships

Year         Nationality   Name                    Status

1. 1715      French        La Reine de Nantes      Restored
2. 1716      French        Le Succes               Restored
3. 1718      French        La Subtile              Unclear
4. 1718      British       Saint Joseph            Restored
5. 1720      French        L'Aspirant              Unclear
6. 1721      French        La Francoise            Unclear
7. 1721      French        S. Jean Baptiste        Restored
8. 1725      French        Le Comte de Toulouse    Restored
9. 1725      Dutch         Don Carlos              Not Restored
10. 1770     British       Argyle                  Restored
11. 1773     British       Leviathan               Not Restored
             America
12. 1780     British       Hind                    Restored
13. 1793     French/       Buen Viaje              Restored
             Spanish
14. 1797     British       Mary of Bristol         Not Restored
15. 1800     British       Packet                  Not Restored
16. 1801     British       Duke of Clarence        Not Restored
17. 1801     U.S.A.        Pilgrim                 Not Restored
18. 1802     U.S.A.        Samuel                  Not Restored
19. 1802     French        Diligent                Restored
20. 1803     British       Saint Peter             Not Restored

Sources: see text.

Table 2 British Vessels Owned by the Enderbys Calling
at Rio de Janeiro and Santa Catarina (S.C.), 1788-1807

Enderby, (Anderby) Charles & Co, London: November 1802,
William; January 1799, Kent.

Enderby, Father and Son, London: February 1793, Rattler.

Enderby, Samuel, London: February 1792, Speedy; July 1790, Greenwich.

Enderby, Samuel & Brothers, London: June 1803, Brittania;
February 1799, William; July 1797, London; April 1797, Carolina;
February 1794, Speedy; November 1793, Atlantic; November 1793,
William; August 1793, Emilia; March 1792, Brittania.

Enderby, Samuel and Charles, London: November 1796, Greenwich (S.C).

Enderby, Samuel and Son, London: January 1793, William; December 1792,
Hero; August 1792, Greenwich; June 1792, Emilia; March 1792, Atlantic;
October 1791, Hero; October 1791, Kent; August 1790, Emilia;
October 1789, Emilia; December 1788, Emilia.

Enderbys, London: August 1804, Rebecca.

Sources: "Autos de Exame," A.N.R.J., Colonial, caixas 492 and 493,
codices 156 and 157, A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c., caixas 141-241.

Table 3
Spanish Slave Vessels sailing from Rio de la
Plata to Brazil, 1793-1806

1793    1794    1795    1796    1797
2         2       0       2       2
1798    1799    1800    1801    1802
7        15       9       1       9
1803    1804    1805    1806
7        16       9       3

Source: Elena F. Scheuss de Studer, La Trata de Negros
en el Rio de la Plata, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
de Buenos Aires, 1958), appendix, cuadro xv.

Table 4 Number of Spanish Vessels and Foreign Ships
entering Rio de Janeiro, 1792-1807

1792       1793      1794      1795      1796
5 (34)    0 (29)    3 (19)    6 (26)    2 (16)

1797       1798      1799      1800      1801
2 (24)    14 (27)   25 (39)   30 (70)   4 (64)

1802       1803      1804      1805      1806
9 (51)    10 (54)   8 (32)    6 (38)    1 (59)

1807
1 (47)

* Spanish vessels are the first mentioned numbers;
the total number of foreign ships are between brackets.

Sources: A.N.R.J., Colonial, caixas 492 and 493,
codices 156 and 157; A.H.U., Rio de Janeiro, p.a.n.c.,
caixas 151-243, passim.

Table 5

Luso-Brazilian Vessels Entering Montevideo, 1803-1806

1803    1804   1805   1806
9        12     30     22

Luso-Brazilian Vessels entering Buenos Aires, 1803-1804

1803    1804
15       22

Source: Corcino Medeiros dos Santos, O Rio de
Janeiro e a Conjuntura Atlantica, 201, 202.
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