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Regionalism and the quest for security: ASEAN and the Cambodian conflict.

The reordering of the international system in the absence of a hegemonic war has revitalized the debate on the nature of international politics, and the continued relevance of the realist paradigm.(2) Critics of the realist paradigm contend that as survival has ceased to be a problem for more developed states, they no longer search consistently for relative gains. Their behavior now can only be understood in the context of international institutions that both constrain states and make their actions intelligible to others.(3) Indeed, some argue that multilateral norms and institutions have made significant contributions toward stabilizing the peaceful transformation of the international system, and that they are likely to become increasingly important in the management of change at the regional and global levels.(4) Multilateralism may or may not supplant the self-help approach and become the dominant mode of interaction among states; there is little doubt, however, that its relevance will further increase, as indicated by the important role of international organizations in post-cold War era conflict resolution.(5)

This article will examine the effectiveness and limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in coping with the Cambodian conflict.(6) An international accord ending the 13-year-old conflict was signed at a U.N.-sponsored peace conference in Paris in October 1991. Although involving states external to the Association, the conflict threatened the security of at least one ASEAN member and also affected the security of the Southeast Asian region as a whole. As ASEAN has frequently been cited as one of the more successful Third World regional organizations, an investigation of its role and effectiveness in the Cambodian conflict should provide valuable insight into the security roles of regional organizations in general.

Current interest in security regionalism may be traced to two major developments. First, the lifting of the Cold War overlay has removed the integrating dynamic and increased the discontinuity between the global system and regional subsystems. Combined with increasing resource constraints, the major powers may no longer have the interest or the capability to become involved in regional conflicts as in the past. While conflicts like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait may evoke prompt and substantive response, others less consequential to their interests may not. This could shift the burden of addressing regional problems to local states; but it also presents them with the opportunity to gain greater control over their regional environment.

Second, the end of the Cold War has invigorated the U.N. Security Council's role of maintaining international peace and security, which could also strengthen the security function of regional organizations. In a report prepared on the instruction of the Security Council summit meeting, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated:

... In this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service ... the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations could not only lighten the burden of the Council, but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.(7)

Longer-term developments have also made regionalism more attractive to developing states, including their growing political maturity, and the perceived potential of regionalism to promote their economic development and to mitigate their disadvantaged position in the international system.(8) This is not to argue that regionalism will mushroom in every part of the globe. Rather, the general conditions at the systemic and unit levels are becoming more favorable, and the security regionalism option is likely to receive greater attention from the international community.

What then is the place and role of regionalism in the still-emerging post-cold War security architecture?(9) The answer will depend on the effectiveness of regional organizations and other multilateral security institutions in preserving and enhancing the national security of member-states. With this question in mind, this article seeks to examine the role and effectiveness of regional organizations in the prevention, containment and termination of the threats and conflicts that they are likely to confront.

Before examining the role and effectiveness of ASEAN in the Cambodian conflict, it will be useful to briefly outline an analytical framework. This is especially important in light of the dearth of specifically relevant conceptual literature on regional security organizations.(10)

Regional Security organizations:

Definition, Roles and Strategies


There is no agreed-upon definition of the concept of region.(11) As Joseph Nye has pointed out: "There are no absolute or naturally determined regions. Relevant geographical boundaries vary with different purposes; for example, a relevant region for security may not be one for economic integration."(12) Even within an issue area like security, the relevant region for collective security, collective self-defense, security regimes and security community can differ.(13) In this study, regional security organization refers to a formal, intergovernmental organization among geographically proximate states in a region that is internally and externally recognized as distinct. At least one of the primary purposes of the organization should be the maintenance of peace and security, with membership confined to countries in the region.(14) Such an organization does not have to include all states in the region. The comprehensiveness of participation will, however, have a significant impact on the types of conflicts addressed, the strategies adopted and the effectiveness of the regional organization in carrying out its mandate.

At least three conceptions of regional security organization can be distinguished in the post-1945 period. The first, with its basis in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, is regional organization as a building block of world order and as part of the universal collective security system. The second, with its foundation in collective self-defense, is the containment of global- or systemic-level security threats - such as international communism or capitalism. In this conception, regional organizations are at the service of the global powers. In the third conception, the primary purpose of a regional security organization is the enhancement of the security and welfare of member-states through cooperation and collective action: The organization is at the service of member-states. Although the three conceptions are not mutually exclusive, regionalism based on the U.N. collective security system or superpower alliances is likely to differ from regionalism driven by the interests of member-states. With the end of the Cold War, this third conception, which may be termed indigenous security regionalism, appears to be gaining prominence.

The role and effectiveness of such regional security organizations will vary with the type of conflict. For analytical purposes, conflicts may be classified as intrastate, intramural, external and extra-regional. Intrastate conflicts refer to those among actors internal to the state; intramural to those among member-states; external to those involving regional states that are not members of the regional organization; and extra-regional to those that involve actors external to the region. This article will confine itself to the investigation of indigenous regional security organizations in coping with external conflicts that affect the security of individual members and/or the region.

Roles and Strategies

In broad terms, regional security organizations have three roles: conflict prevention, conflict containment and conflict termination. The effectiveness and limitations of regional organizations in these three roles will hinge upon their ability to influence the interests and capabilities of states.(15)

In the conflict prevention role, regional security organizations seek to forestall conflict situations and prevent the outbreak of hostilities or other forms of disruptive behavior.(16) Disruptive behavior refers to the overt use of force and other actions designed to compel a state to modify or abandon its position through the coercive use of political, diplomatic and economic measures. The preventive role requires redefinition of the interests and capabilities of the concerned states and may be achieved through "assigning of property rights, providing information, and altering patterns of transaction costs" as well as altering the underlying power capabilities of states through collective action.(17)

Strategies of socialization, integration, reassurance and deterrence are relevant to the conflict prevention role. Socialization can contribute to the building of security regimes, while integration can mininize or eliminate the security dilemma and foster the development of a security community.(18) Reassurance and deterrence strategies are critical in preventing the outbreak of war, both intended and unintended.(19)

In the conflict containment role, the task of regional security organizations is to deny victory to the aggressor and to prevent the spread of conflict. Denial of victory includes stopping the aggressor short of attaining his full goal and persuading him to undo his action. Preventing the spread of conflict includes stopping horizontal escalation in which other countries and geographical and issue areas become involved. Prevention may also be directed to halt vertical escalation up the ladder of violence, including the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Isolation and intervention are the two key strategies relevant to conflict containment. Isolation imposes a cordon sanitaire to prevent horizontal and possibly also vertical escalation of the conflict, allowing time and

opportunity for the protagonists to resolve the conflict bilaterally and preserve a future intermediation role for the regional security organization. Isolation does not mean non-involvement, but passive involvement, or avoiding a partisan role.

Intervention refers to direct and active involvement in the conflict through coercive application of collective political, economic and military resources to contain and terminate it. There are four possible types of intervention: collective security, collective self-defense, coercive diplomacy and peacekeeping. In collective security, intervention is undertaken to enforce the security system of the regional organization in conflicts among member-states, and sometimes in intrastate conflicts. Legally, this type of intervention can be done only with the concurrence of the Security Council. In collective self-defense, the regional security organization mobilizes to confront the aggressor on the battlefield; a security alliance among member-states is a prerequisite for this type of intervention. Coercive diplomacy is used to affect the aggressor's will rather than his capability. Political, economic and military pressure is applied to wear down the adversary, forcing him to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict.(20) Peacekeeping is undertaken to facilitate mediation efforts by interposing forces between belligerents and preventing further fighting.

In the conflict termination role, the task of regional security organizations is to halt and bring hostilities to a satisfactory conclusion through settlement or resolution. Satisfactory conclusion from the perspective of the regional organization includes defeating the aggressor and reestablishing the status quo antebellum, achieving a compromise through splitting the difference, or removal of the source of the conflict.

Conflict settlement focuses on achieving an agreement to end the use of violence and resolve the more immediate and overt dimensions of the conflict.(21) Conflict resolution, on the other hand, seeks to remove the source of conflict altogether. This requires changes in the goals, attitudes and perceptions of the conflicting parties. While these two aspects of conflict termination are not mutually exclusive, conflict resolution usually follows conflict settlement and requires long-range political and economic strategies to alter, if not completely transform, the underlying security dynamics of the conflict. In a sense, this brings the regional security organization back to its conflict prevention role.

Intermediation and internationalization are two strategies applicable to conflict termination. Intermediation refers to a nonpartisan and usually non-coercive approach to settlement. Regional security organizations may urge conflicting parties to use regional or global mechanisms and procedures for pacific settlement of disputes, or may attempt to play a more direct and active role by engaging in conciliation and mediation.(22) This strategy depends on the capabilities and resources of the intervening party, as well as the relative power positions of the conflicting parties.(23) To be credible, the intervenor must have a stake in the outcome, and must have the resources and political will to guarantee the enforcement of the negotiated settlement; impartiality is also a key prerequisite for acceptance by all parties. Mediation is unlikely to be successful if any party to the conflict believes that it has the upper hand and that time is on its side; conditions of uncertainty, stalemate or mutual exhaustion tend to facilitate the mediation process.(24)

The strategy of internationalization becomes relevant when conflict prevention, containment and termination are beyond the capabilities of the regional security organization or when extraregional actors become involved. Through internationalization, regional security organizations can mobilize the resources of external actors and organizations in support of their strategies, while denying the same resources to their adversaries. Although internationalization does have benefits, it can also restrict the flexibility of regional actors. Their interests may also be overridden by those of the external actors.

While the above discussion has linked specific strategies with specific roles, some strategies may also be applicable to other roles. These strategies are not necessarily mutually reinforcing and their relevance will vary with the type of conflict.

External Conflict

The security of member-states may be affected by non-member-states in several ways. First, domestic conflicts in these states may have transnational dimensions with consequences for the security of member-states. Second, their actions may set precedents for violation of norms established for the region. Third, a non-member-state may threaten, or its actions may be perceived as threatening, the security of one or more member-states. Finally, conflicts among non-member-states may invite intervention by extra-regional actors, with negative consequences for regional security and stability.

Nearly all the roles and strategies discussed above can be adapted to cope with external conflicts. Socialization will be relevant if the regional security organization has critical mass. Partial security regimes designed to increase transparency, regulate competition and facilitate communication may reassure non-member-states, while demonstration of irrevocable commitment and necessary capability may deter them from aggressive behavior. Intervention and internationalization will be crucial in conflict containment. These strategies, however, are likely to inhibit the conflict termination role of regional organizations in coping with external conflicts. The roles of regional security organizations and strategies available to them are summarized below.

Asean and the Cambodian Conflict

ASEAN as a Regional Security Organization

ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization of Southeast Asian states with its primary_purpose being the "promotion of regional peace and stability."(25) Rooted in the desire of the founding states to avoid the "self-defeating and wasteful" conflicts that characterized the sub-region in the early 1960s, ASEAN's principal concern has been to establish a framework for regional order.(16) Although security did not formally enter the agenda until its fourth summit in January 1992, the Association's success in its first 25 years has been primarily in the political-security realm.

Internal security and stability are major preoccupations of the ASEAN states, and have significant regional implications, but the responsibility for addressing domestic conflicts is assigned almost entirely to each member-state.(27) The de facto role of the Association in intrastate conflicts is limited to preventing external interference, and providing diplomatic support to members in international fora. ASEAN has refrained from intervention or intermediation in domestic conflicts even when there was a distinct possibility that the conflict would deteriorate into civil war with negative consequences for regional stability and the survival of the Association, as was the case in the Phillippines during the 1985 to 1986 period.(28)

ASEAN's security roles have focused on intramural and extraregional conflicts. At the intramural level, ASEAN envisioned a formal but limited conflict prevention role, with regional cooperation and pacific settlement of disputes as the two principal instruments. Political, economic and cultural cooperation are intended to contribute to the development of a sense of regional community, thus minimizing - if not eliminating - the use of force among member-states. This is articulated in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, and amplified in the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord. When disputes arise, member-states are urged to settle them through friendly negotiations using the procedures outlined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.(29)

Shortcomings do, however, exist. First, there is no requirement for contracting states to use the treaty provisions for pacific settlement of disputes, and they remain unused." Second, there is no provision for a system of collective security in the event a state resorts to the use of force to achieve its goals; ASEAN has avoided addressing the role of force in enforcing regional order. Also, the Association has not explored roles in conflict containment and termination in intramural conflicts, although some of the provisions of the 1976 Treaty may be relevant in an intermediary role.

From its inception, some ASEAN states have been concerned with the negative consequences of great power rivalry and conflict within the region, and have sought to exclude the superpowers from the region via proposals to create a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear weapons-free zone.(31) Little progress has been made on these proposals, however, and since the ASEAN fourth summit, the organization has emphasized dialogue with and constructive engagement of the external powers.(32) This change notwithstanding, ASEAN has taken an essentially preventive approach to dealing with extra-regional powers.

ASEAN did not envisage conflict prevention, containment and termination roles in regard to external conflicts. It hoped eventually to include all 10 states in the region, and that - pending inclusion - ASEAN's proposals for peace and security would cover all of Southeast Asia and not just the ASEAN sub-region. The Indochinese states and Burma, however, did not subscribe to this view and did not accede to the 1976 Treaty.(33) Thus the conflict prevention measures of the Association have not applied to non-ASEAN Southeast Asia. ASEAN has explicitly eschewed any kind of military alliance among member-states to deter external threats. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, however, forced the Association to explore security roles in relation to external conflicts.

Anatomy of the Cambodian Conflict

The Cambodian conflict is in many ways typical of the conflicts that characterize developing regions. At the beginning, the conflict was bilateral (Khmer-vietnamese) and domestic (Intra-Khmer), but became internationalized by the dynamics of deep-seated Thai-Vetnamese and Sino-Vietnamese antagonisms, and global Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American rivalries.

While its origins can be traced to the pre-colonial period, the more immediate cause of the Cambodian conflict was the deterioration in Khmer-Vietnamese relations, following the Khmer Rouge seizure of power in 1975.(34) Perceiving their former allies as unalterably opposed to special relations, and concerned that they were receiving Chinese military assistance, Hanoi responded to Khmer Rouge military incursions by invading Cambodia in December 1978 and installing a puppet regime, the Heng Samrin-led People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).(35) The Khmer Rouge, which later entered into an uneasy coalition with two non-comunist Khmer resistance forces, however, resumed guerrilla warfare, this time against the Vietnamese and their proxies in Phnom Penh.(36)

The Khmer-Vietnamese conflict quickly became linked to burgeoning Sino-Vietnamese antagonism,(37) which climaxed in the punitive Chinese attack on Vietnam in February-March 1979.(38) Hanoi interpreted Beijing's military assistance to the Pol Pot-led government as an attempt to deny Vietnam's legitimate security interests, and as a continuation of a Chinese policy designed to deny the unity of the Indochinese countries and to dominate the states on its southern flank. Beijing, on the other hand, saw Vietnam as trying to dominate Indochina, and viewed this attempt - as well as Hanoi's growing strategic relationship with the Soviet Union - as a threat to its security. The Chinese also perceived the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as undermining their international prestige and credibility.(39)

Vietnam's ambition to become the preeminent power in Indochina and to neutralize the Chinese threat, required political, economic and military resources well beyond its means. For these reasons, it entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union.(40) For the Soviets, this alliance had the potential to create insecurity for China on its southern flank, and Moscow - through Hanoi - sought to become a major player in Southeast Asia. Access to military facilities in Vietnam also facilitated Soviet strategic competition with the United States. Sino-Soviet and U.S.-soviet rivalries thus sustained the Cambodian conflict.

ASEAN's Perception of the Conflict

In ASEAN's view, Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia violated two of its cardinal security norms: non-interference and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another country, and the non-use of force to resolve political disputes. From the start of the conflict, ASEAN consistently and strongly deplored Hanoi's intervention and reaffirmed the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination.(41)

Thailand viewed the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia as a national security threat.(42) The concern was not military invasion, but the dominant position of Vietnam in Indochina and its potential to subvert Thai security by supporting insurgency and secession - especially in northeastern Thailand. The notion of an expansionist Vietnam also informed the security perceptions of Singapore and Malaysia, while, on the other hand, Indonesia viewed China as the long-term threat to security in Southeast Asia, and saw Vietnam as a possible buffer against this threat.

Indonesia was nevertheless concerned that Thailand would go its separate way if it did not receive ASEAN backing, and so eventually accepted the position that the Vietnamese action threatened the security of Thailand and the ASEAN sub-region. Hanoi's intransigence and numerous incursions into Thailand, beginning in June 1980, made it easier for Indonesia to accept this view. From June 1980 on, the ASEAN foreign ministers characterized Vietnamese intrusions into Thai territory as a "grave and direct threat to the security of Thailand," and "affecting the security of ASEAN member-states and endangering peace and security in the whole region."(43) Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur also viewed the large refugee outflows from Cambodia and Vietnam as threatening their security.(44)

Moreover, the Cambodian conflict was seen by Indonesia and Malaysia as entrenching great power rivalry in the region - resulting in the indefinite postponement of the ZOPFAN and the nuclear weapons-free zone proposals. While member-states differed on these issues, all were determined to reverse the situation in Cambodia. As noted by Kishore Mahbubani, "The stakes in Kampuchea are high. The outcome in Kampuchea could well determine the future political orientation of Southeast Asia ... for this reason, the ASEAN states cannot afford to see Vietnam succeed in Kampuchea."(45)

ASEAN's Role in Conflict Prevention

There was little that ASEAN could have done to prevent the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, even if it had been anticipated. As it happened, the invasion came as a surprise and a shock, forcing an ad hoc response by the Association.(46) ASEAN had not envisaged, let alone formulated, any formal conflict prevention, containment or termination role in relation to conflicts involving non-member states. ASEAN had hoped that, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Indochinese countries could be socialized into the ASEAN conception of regional order for Southeast Asia.(47)

The communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975, however, created apprehension - and provided the stimulus for more concrete ASEAN cooperation to demonstrate cohesion and solidarity. In 1976, at its first summit meeting, ASEAN adopted the Declaration of Concord and its members signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Notwithstanding this, ASEAN persisted in its attempt to draw Vietnam and the other two Indochinese countries into a cooperative framework, and the Treaty was made open to accession by other states in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi, however, was suspicious of ASEAN, and showed no interest in its regional framework. 48 At the meeting of non-aligned states in Sri Lanka in 1976, Vietnam and Laos denounced the ASEAN neutrality proposal. Vietnam did not accept the status quo in Southeast Asia, and thus the prospects of ASEAN drawing Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries into a region-wide cooperative framework dimmed rather quickly. Hanoi's primary concern was consolidating its political dominance in Indochina; as Vietnam looked to the Soviet Union for assistance and support, there was little hope of a rapprochement with ASEAN.

ASEAN's Conflict Containment Role

ASEAN was more effective in the conflict containment role, but this was facilitated in large measure by favorable international circumstances. The Association's ultimate goals were contained in the declaration of a July 1981 Asean-initiated, U.N.-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK). The declaration called for total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, emphasized the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination and stressed the need for Cambodia to remain non-aligned in order to safeguard the legitimate security concerns of its neighboring states. More immediately, ASEAN sought to deny victory to Vietnam in Cambodia and to prevent the spread of the conflict to the ASEAN states, especially Thailand. The first objective required the prevention of consolidation by the Vietnamese-installed PRK government, while the second required keeping Vietnam on the defensive and bogged down in Cambodia - enhancing Thai security.

A war-winning strategy, involving military action to defeat Vietnam in the battlefield, was out of the question for ASEAN, which lacked a collective self-defense arrangement. Even had one existed, the ASEAN states did not have the collective capability to inflict military defeat on Vietnam. Such a strategy would also have made ASEAN a direct party to the conflict, legitimating Vietnamese incursions into Thailand. This would have inadvertently contributed to a horizontal escalation of the conflict, and would also have increased ASEAN dependence on China and other external actors for assistance.

Instead, ASEAN used coercive diplomacy to achieve its intermediate and ultimate objectives. ASEAN sought to terminate the conflict - through a combination of political-diplomatic, economic and military pressure - on the terms outlined in the ICK Declaration, by making the cost of dominance in Cambodia unbearably high for Hanoi. The key components of this coercive diplomacy strategy were: keeping the Cambodian conflict in the forefront of the international agenda; structuring international debate of the issue on the terms articulated by ASEAN; denying internal and international consolidation to the Vietnamese-installed PRK government; continuing direct political, military and economic pressure on Vietnam; and mobilizing the resources of key external actors in support of the ASEAN strategy.

To mobilize international support for their cause, the ASEAN states successfully used their membership in the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the British Commonwealth, as well as ASEAN's dialogue relations with the United States, the European Community, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This strategy was greatly facilitated by the overlap of their interests, especially with China and the United States, which were concerned about Moscow's new Southeast Asian presence. Also, Beijing feared Vietnamese domination of Indochina, while Washington had misgivings about Vietnam from its own war in Indochina.

Preventing the internal and international consolidation of the Vietnamese-installed PRK government was a key element in ASEAN's strategy of denying victory to Vietnam. This strategy had several sub-components: retention of the U.N. seat for the Government of Democratic Kampuchea (D.K.) and, later, the Khmer resistance's Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK); denial of diplomatic recognition to the PRK government; and support for the Khmer resistance forces against Vietnam. Arguing that Vietnamese behavior violated international norms and principles, and that the Heng Samrin government was a puppet of Vietnam, the ASEAN countries successfully fended off challenges from Soviet-bloc countries and preserved the Cambodia seat in the United Nations for the D.K. government. After 1983, Vietnam did not challenge its U.N. credentials.

Through adept collective diplomacy, ASEAN continued to draw attention to the Cambodian conflict in the United Nations; ASEAN-drafted resolutions on Cambodia received increasing support each year. The 1989 Asean-sponsored resolution was carried by 124 in favor, 17 against and 12 abstentions, the widest margin since the Cambodian issue first came before the United Nations in 1979 .

ASEAN was also influential in persuading the international community to accept and support its proposal for a comprehensive political settlement.(50) At ASEAN's initiative, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 35/5 of 1980 called for the International Conference on Kampuchea.(51) Held in July 1981, the meeting adopted a declaration that included ASEAN's principles and elements for a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict. Although the Soviet-bloc countries boycotted this conference, the declaration was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations and became the basis for international consideration of the conflict.

The ASEAN members were also successful in persuading noncommunist countries not to recognize the PRK government. While a number of Western countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, withdrew recognition from the D.K. government, they also did not recognize the PRK. Only a few less developed countries, such as India, accorded diplomatic recognition to the PRK government.

Continuing international support for the ASEAN position was due in part to growing concern that the bestial Khmer Rouge might seize power in the wake of a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. For instance, the Asean-sponsored 1989 U.N. resolution warned against a return to universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past, an allusion to the brutal four-year rule of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge.

Further, to facilitate its efforts to maintain international support, ASEAN took the lead in forming a coalition of the three Khmer resistance forces, the CGDK. The suspicious Khmer factions were reluctant to cooperate with each other, and ASEAN needed considerable Chinese diplomatic pressure on the Khmer Rouge before the coalition - which remained one of convenience - could be proclaimed in 1982.

While all ASEAN members agreed on supporting the CGDK diplomatically, differences over the provision of military assistance led ASEAN states to act separately. Despite this, ASEAN recognized the importance of continued military resistance to the Vietnamese occupation, particularly as a focal point for anti-Vietnamese Cambodian nationalism.(52) To strengthen the non-communist resistance forces vis-&-vis the Khmer Rouge, ASEAN requested that the United States supply them with arms. China, however, remained their main military backer, and was thus in a position to decisively influence both the military strength of the resistance groups and their stance in negotiations. Thailand also had considerable influence, because its acquiescence was crucial to Beijing's arms supply efforts.

The relative success of ASEAN's containment role was because it overlapped with the interests of key external and extra-regional actors. Through alignment with China, and with the support of the United States, Japan and the E.C., ASEAN was able to exert considerable pressure on Vietnam. Although the Chinese attempt to curb Vietnam's ambitions was not a complete success, Beijing's 1979 punitive attack and continued military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border tied down a large number of Vietnamese forces, and carried a high economic and psychological cost. Hanoi was also concerned that Beijing had declared Cambodia to be the principal obstacle to improving relations with Moscow.

Vietnam was further isolated because many Western countries and multilateral financial institutions had reduced or suspended assistance to Vietnam after its invasion of Cambodia. The ASEAN countries, convinced that prolonged economic pressure would bring about Hanoi's economic and political collapse, sought to convince donor countries and agencies to tie resumption of aid to Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia. Although some countries like Sweden, Belgium and India did not suspend aid, ASEAN was largely successful in this effort. With the reduction and eventual termination of economic and military assistance from the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, Vietnam's economic situation deteriorated and was a major factor in forcing Vietnam to cut its losses in Cambodia.

Overall, ASEAN was successful in its containment role. By early 1984 the Vietnamese security threat to Thailand had all but disappeared, and Hanoi was politically and militarily stalemated in Cambodia. While there was much discussion about which party had a time advantage, clearly Vietnam could not win.(53) But Hanoi was also far from being forced to the negotiating table on the terms advocated by ASEAN. ASEAN could contain Vietnam, but it could not end the conflict.

ASEAN's Conflict Termination Role

Despite ASEAN's efforts, the principal actors were not ready to compromise and begin the peace process until 1987.(54) Vietnam, still confident of Soviet support and fearful of a Khmer Rouge return to power, sought a settlement that would exclude the Khmer Rouge and rejected any role for the United Nations. China believed Vietnam had not been sufficiently weakened, and that the time was not ripe for settlement through compromise. The CGDK, which had insisted that the conflict was bilateral - between Cambodia and Vietnam - was against direct negotiations with the PFK; neither Phnom Penh nor the Khmer Rouge were interested in national reconciliation. ASEAN simply did not have the power and influence to redefine the goals and interests of the combatants or their backers, or to alter the underlying capabilities and dynamics of the situation. Further, ASEAN was itself divided, as reflected in the rejection of the so-called Indonesian "cocktail diplomacy" proposal by Thailand and Singapore. The latter two countries insisted that Vietnam should meet directly with the CGDK.(55)

Only when changed circumstances led actors to make compromises - with little assistance from ASEAN - did the peace process begin in earnest via a series of breakthroughs. The first breakthrough came in 1987. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, convinced that time was running out for him to play a role and also sensing changes in Moscow and Hanoi, declared that he was - in his individual capacity - ready to meet informally with PRK-leader Hun Sen, who had replaced Heng Samrin, to discuss the five-point proposal of the PRK government.(56) Sihanouk's independent line put pressure on China, ASEAN and his two recalcitrant coalition partners. Beijing quickly endorsed the idea of national reconciliation under the leadership of Sihanouk, while ASEAN coalesced around the earlier Indonesian idea of cocktail diplomacy. Sihanouk's meetings with Hun Sen in Paris in December 1987, and again in January 1988, produced agreement on national reconciliation and the need for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's independence and neutrality. Sihanouk's threat to resign from the presidency of the CGDK forced his two coalition partners to support the idea of a four-party conference, thus paving the way for the first of the Jakarta Informal Meetings (Jim) in July 1988.

The second breakthrough came in April 1987 when the Soviet Union agreed to make the compromises demanded by China for normalization of relations: Moscow decided to support national reconciliation among the warring Cambodian factions and persuade the PRK government to meet with the three Khmer resistance forces.(57) Moscow also prodded Vietnam to accelerate its withdrawal from Cambodia and to explore normalization of relations with China.

The third breakthrough came with the change of government in Bangkok. Chatichai Choonhavan, who became premier in August 1988, abandoned the hard-line position of Thailand and adopted a new "step-by-step" approach to the resolution of the conflict that rested on his vision of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place."(58) Bangkok was now prepared - at least in the short term - to accept some Vietnamese political influence in Cambodia and Laos in return for a settlement, hoping that this influence would consequently be reduced by the resulting economic liberalization of the region. This approach reduced tensions in Thai-Vietnamese relations, and the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989 effectively ended the Thai-Vietnamese dimension of the conflict.

While these breakthroughs provided the initial momentum for the peace process, the numerous attempts at dialogue among the Khmer factions and the ASEAN states made little headway in resolving the key issues that led to the suspension of the August 1989 Paris Peace Conference. Deep distrust and suspicion among the Khmer factions, Vietnam's fear of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge, and lack of progress in Sino-Vietnamese relations stood in the way of national reconciliation and power-sharing in an interim government - the two key elements of a settlement. The CGDK also expressed concern over Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, and differences existed over the proper role of the United Nations. These difficulties were subsequently overcome through the direct involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council and negotiations between China and Vietnam. Yet again, ASEAN was only a bystander to the process.

In the wake of the 1989 Paris Peace Conference failure, U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz suggested that the United Nations play a greater role in the administration of Cambodia, pending the U.N.-supervised elections. This idea - subsequently elaborated upon by the Australians - helped overcome the key problem of power sharing, and provided a critical stimulus to the peace process.(59) Improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations, which took place in the latter part of 1990, was critical in overcoming Khmer Rouge opposition and providing momentum to the stalled peace process in 1990-1991.(60)

The United States, which had previously stayed on the sidelines, decided to take a lead role in the peace process. Criticized by Congress that U.S. aid to the non-communist resistance benefitted the Khmer Rouge, which was making significant gains in the battlefield, the Bush administration decided to withdraw U.N. recognition from the CGDK. Although this did not translate into recognition of the PRK government, the decision to begin discussions with Phnom Penh made it possible for Washington to adopt a more even-handed approach toward the various Cambodian factions, and to bring pressure to bear upon the CGDK, in particular the Khmer Rouge. By making a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Cambodia one of the two key conditions for normalization of relations, Washington also brought pressure to bear upon Vietnam. This was all the more significant in light of the declining Soviet influence over Vietnam and the continuing internal debate in Vietnam over economic renovation.

Change in American policy also put pressure on China, which had the added incentive of rehabilitating itself after the 1989 Tianarumen Square incident. Also, Chinese objectives to prevent Vietnamese hegemony in Cambodia had largely been achieved. Thus all three key external actors - the United States, China and the former Soviet Union - became positively disposed toward a comprehensive political settlement, and were willing to use the leverage at their disposal to achieve this goal. The decision of the five permanent members of the Security Council to work jointly to bring about the termination of the conflict made it possible to agree upon a framework for a political settlement; this framework addressed the composition of a transition government, verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal and the other issues that had obstructed the Paris conference, and was eventually accepted by all the Khmer factions and endorsed by the Security Council in September 1990.(61)

The final breakthrough came in June 1991, when Phnom Penh and the Cambodian resistance factions agreed in Pattaya, Thailand, to operationalize the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC, composed of government and resistance representatives and chaired by Sihanouk, served as the official Cambodian decisionmaking body during the transition process. The establishment of this critical element of the U.N. framework was in substantial measure because of Sihanouk." His ultimatum that he would visit Phnom Penh in October that year, regardless of progress made in operationalizing the SNC, put pressure on the Khmer Rouge. Concerned about becoming further isolated, the Khmer Rouge conceded to an arrangement that gave Sihanouk the power to convoke the SNC and preside over its future meetings. Agreements on cease-fire and cessation of external arms supplies were also reached during the Pattaya SNC meeting.

The various breakthroughs after 1987 had the effect of undermining ASEAN's hard-line position, and reducing its role in the settlement. For example, Chatichai's change in Vietnam policy, and his step-by-step approach, created a dilemma for ASEAN as its hard-line orientation looked inappropriate. Also this step-by-step approach contradicted the comprehensive political settlement previously advocated by ASEAN.

This does not, however, imply that ASEAN played no role in conflict termination. Through its involvement in the conflict, ASEAN established itself as a regional actor whose interests and concerns have to be taken into account and whose participation is important in matters of peace and security in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's earlier input into the drafting of the ICK Declaration, and subsequent insistence on a comprehensive political settlement did pay off. The final agreement signed in Paris in October 1991 was indeed comprehensive, and drew upon the principles and elements contained in ASEAN's 1981 declaration.

ASEAN's political-diplomatic investment since 1979 and its greatly enhanced regionalist credentials, implied that it could not be ignored in the peace process. This was also reflected by the fact that Indonesia was made co-chair of the Paris peace conferences, and was also invited to participate in Security Council discussions to operationalize the U.N. framework for settlement of the conflict; all the ASEAN countries were invited to participate in the signing of the final agreement, with Malaysia and Thailand being named to the U.N. core group responsible for supervising the implementation of the Paris accords. That countries like Australia, japan and India - which at various times sought to play a role in conflict termination - found it necessary to consult and coordinate their actions with ASEAN or its members, demonstrates ASEAN's important role.

ASEAN's initial efforts to play an intermediary role were not successful. From the Vietnamese perspective, ASEAN was not an impartial party, and the Association's goals, if achieved, would have translated into defeat for Hanoi. Also, Vietnam insisted that the conflict in Cambodia was a civil war and therefore a solution had to be found through negotiations among the Cambodian factions. ASEAN, on the other hand, insisted that the conflict was between Cambodia and Vietnam and that it was not a party to the conffict. Generally the early ASEAN proposals were one-sided and focused on the terms of negotiations and procedures, and not on the substance itself. 63

ASEAN's intermediary role became more credible, however, when Chatichai's change in policy made Bangkok - together with Jakarta - acceptable to Vietnam and all the Khmer factions. Thus while earlier tensions between jakarta's sympathetic orientation toward Vietnam and the hard-line position of Bangkok and Singapore - and subsequently between Bangkok's more flexible approach and the continued ASEAN hard-line - were detrimental to ASEAN solidarity, they also enabled the sympathetic members of the Association to play an intermediary role. From 1988 onward, ASEAN's intermediary role, through Jakarta and Bangkok, became more significant. By providing the first-ever opportunity for a.meeting among the Khmer resistance, the Phnom Penh government and all the Southeast Asian countries except Burma, the JIM meeting paved the way for the 1989 Paris Peace Conference.

Although subsequent meetings in Jakarta were held under the aegis of the interim committee of the Paris Peace Conference, they can nevertheless be construed as a reflection of ASEAN's role. While leadership had clearly passed to the Security Council, a de facto division of labor between the universal and regional processes emerged. The Security Council focused its efforts on the framework agreement, while the regional conference focused its attention on national reconciliation among the Khmer factions, and upon the formation of the SNC. The role of Thailand, under Premier Chatichai and subsequently under Premier Anand Panyarachun, was especially significant in bringing about national reconciliation and the operationalization of the SNC. As an interested but now impartial state acceptable to all parties, Thailand urged compromises by the various Khmer factions and also facilitated the several meetings among them, including the SNC meeting in Pattaya.


This discussion of ASEAN's role in the Cambodian conflict suggests certain conclusions about the role of regional organizations in external conflict situations. First, the ASEAN experience indicates that indigenous regional organizations may have only a minimal role in preventing conflicts involving non-member regional states. Had it tried, there was little that ASEAN could have done to prevent the intra-Khmer conflict or the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The conflict prevention strategies available to regional security organizations are not relevant to such conflicts. Effective conflict prevention requires a credible deterrence strategy; the regional security organization has no such obligation with respect to non-member-states.

The ASEAN experience also shows that regional security organizations can play only a limited role in preventing aggression by non-member-states against member-states; this kind of conflict prevention will depend upon credible deterrence, which is beyond the capability of most Third World regional organizations, and requires the participation of extra-regional actors. In the ASEAN case, Chinese and American commitment to Thai security was critical in preventing substantial Vietnamese incursion into Thailand.

Second, the ASEAN experience suggests that regional organizations can play a more effective role in conflict containment. This, however, is dependent upon a number of factors including the regionalist credentials of the organization, its cohesion and solidarity, collective diplomatic skills and, more significantly, on favorable international circumstances. In the Cambodian conflict, nearly all the factors worked to ASEAN's advantage. Its regionalist credentials were continually enhanced by its role in the conflict. Despite their different strategic perspectives and occasional differences over the means, the ASEAN states generally presented a common front on the key issues. ASEAN's adept collective diplomacy kept the issue in the forefront of the international agenda.

War-winning strategies are clearly beyond the scope of regional organizations, except in isolated cases. The relatively low political, economic and military cost of the strategy of coercive diplomacy makes it particularly suited to the containment role of indigenous regional organizations; coercive diplomacy makes maximum use of the collective political-diplomatic capabilities with which regional organizations are relatively well endowed. To be successful, however, this element has to be supplemented by the political, military and economic power of the key major actors. While this reliance on the resources of external powers may be posited as a weakness of regional organizations, it also draws attention to the linkages and interface between the regional and global levels, and highlights the importance of the internationalization strategy for the success of regional organizations. ASEAN's success in its containment role was in substantial measure due to favorable international circumstances. Key actors like China, the United States and Japan shared its concerns and cooperated with its containment strategy. Without such favorable circumstances, it is rather unlikely that ASEAN could have harnessed the much needed international political, military and economic support for its strategy of coercive diplomacy.

Third, partisan involvement on behalf of member-states and lack of leverage over the parties to the conflict work against an independent intermediary role for regional security organizations. They can nevertheless play a complementary role in the conflict termination process. While the leadership role in conflict termination had clearly passed from ASEAN to the Security Council in the post-1989 period, ASEAN - through Jakarta and Bangkok - played an important role in arranging meetings among the Khmer factions to work out the details of the elements of the Security Council-approved framework.

The concurrent operation of the universal and regional processes, and the link between them through Paris and Jakarta, which were part of both processes, is a classic example of how regional organizations and the United Nations can cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security.(64) The ASEAN experience in relation to Cambodia gives meaning to the Secretary-General's assertion that utilization of regional agencies can "contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs."(65) ASEAN could play this facilitator role, however, because Jakarta and Bangkok were able to differentiate their bilateral relations with Vietnam, from ASEAN's hard-line stand.

The Cambodia case study suggests that success in mediation - and thus eventually in conflict termination - can only come about in a situation of uncertainty and/or mutual exhaustion, or when one party decides to cut its losses. Until 1987, the various Khmer factions and their regional and global patrons believed that they could ultimately prevail, and were not willing to make compromises; ASEAN's diplomatic efforts could not bear fruit. Beginning in 1987, however, Soviet retrenchment, severe economic problems at home and continued pressure from China and the international community - forced Hanoi to cut its losses and settle the conflict on the terms set by the Security Council. This change also provided the incentive for Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, Thailand and China to moderate their positions. The willingness of the Soviet Union and China, and later the United States, to exercise the leverage at their disposal and guarantee the implementation of the international settlement were critical in terminating the conflict.

Still, the agreement signed in Paris in October 1991 is a settlement and not a resolution of the intra-Khmer and Vietnamese-Khmer dimensions of the conflict. The deep distrust among the four Khmer factions, and the animosity between the Cambodians, especially the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese remain unaltered. In other words, there has been no significant change in the goals, attitudes and perceptions of these parties. There is the distinct possibility that the conflict could be reignited at some point in the future. For example, should the U.N.-supervised elections fail to produce a stable government, intra-Khmer conflict could resurface and intensify. ASEAN would then be confronted with the task of containing that domestic conflict within Cambodia, and preventing horizontal escalation of the conflict through external intervention.

From this case study, it is clear that indigenous regional security organizations like ASEAN can make limited but valuable contributions to the prevention, containment and termination of regional conflicts - and can thus play an important role in maintaining international peace and security. Yet ASEAN's need for international support suggests the limitations of this role, and care must be taken to avoid exaggerating the significance of regional organizations. Equally important, however, is to avoid dwelling only on their weaknesses and therefore undervaluing them. Regional organizations can and do complement other self-help and systemic approaches to international peace and security; they are one of the several levels in the emerging post-Cold War security architecture. To be effective, regional organizations must be linked to the other layers at the national, broader regional and global levels. In this framework, regional organizations can perform specific functions and tasks important to conflict resolution, and their role should be maximized.

(1.) This article is part of the author's ongoing work on regionalism and security. He would like to thank Yaacov Vertzberger and Paul Kreisberg, colleagues at the East-West Center, for their comments on an earlier draft. (2.) For an excellent summary of this debate in the early 1980s, see the collection of articles in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). See also Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics, 60, no. 2 (January 1988) pp. 235-51. For a more recent discussion see James M. Glodgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992) pp. 467-91. (3.) Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," International Journal, 65, no. 4 (Autumn 1990) pp. 733-36. (4.) John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization, 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992) p. 561. (5.) For a definition of multilateralism and asugpey of the "major clusters of research" in this area, see Keohane, "Multilateralism," pp. 731-64. (6.) Indonesia Malaysia., the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are the founding members of ASEAN. Brunei joined in 1984. (7.) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1992) pp. 36-7. (8.) Paul Taylor, "Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., Framework for International Relations (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990) pp. 151-71. (9.) Richard Rosecrance posits that there is a centralizing tendency in world politics and that regions and regionalism will have to flower in participation with this tendency. See Rosecrance, "Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era," International Journal, 66, no. 3 (Summer 1991)-pp. 373-93. (10.) The few works that examine the role of regional organizations in conflict management include Joseph S. Nye, ed., International Regionalism: Readings, Part Two (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1968) pp. 75-146; Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Ernst B. Haas et al., Conflict Management by International Organizations (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972); and Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds.Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973). (11.) William R. Thompson, "the regional Subsystem," International Studies Quarterly, 17, no. 1 (March 1979) pp. 91-3. (12.) Nye, International Regionalism, p. v. (13.) Collective security is the name given to the system for the maintenance of international peace that was supposed to replace the system of balance of power after the Second World War. The United Nations system for maintaining international peace and security incorporates a version of collective security. For a good discussion of collective security see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Ploughshares (New York: Random House, 1956) pp. 245-85. Collective self-defense alliances and is provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. A security community refers to a group of people that has become integrated and in which there is real assurance that the members of the community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1956) p. 5. A security regime refers to the principles, rule and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982) p.357. (14.) This definition draws upon the definitions advanced by Nye and Thompson. See Nye, Peace in Party, p. 5; and Thompson, p. 101. (15.) For discussion of how international institutions can affect the interests and capabilities of states, see Keohane, "Multilateralism," pp. 736-40. (16.) For definition of conflict situations, see C. R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981) p. 17. (17.) Keohane, Multilateralism," p. 737. (18.) For definitions of security regime and security community see footnote 13. Security dilemma refers to the condition when the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of other states. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misiperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 72-6. (19.) For a good discussion of the role of and distinctions between the strategies of reassurance and deterrence, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues, 43, no. 4 (1987) pp. 5-71. (20.) This is a modification of the definition of coercive diplomacy advanced by Alexander L. George. See his "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L. George et al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) pp. 2-3. (21.) Foro a good discussion of the differences between conflict settlement and resolution, see Mitchell, pp. 275-7. (22.) For a discussion of the intervenor's repertory of practice, see Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton (University Press, 1967) pp. 50-79. (23.) ibid., pp. 80-90. (24.) Mitchell, p. 282. (25.) The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967. For text see ASEAN Document Series 1967-1986 (Jakarta: The ASEAN Secietariat, 1986) pp. 23-4. (26.) Roger Irvine, "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-75," in Alison Broinowski, ed., Understanding ASEAN (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982) pp. 11-18; Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regiona/Organization and Order in Southeast Asia London: MacMillan Press, 1982) pp. 45-66; and Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 1989) pp. 1-16. (27.) Declaration of ASEAN Concord, ASEAN Document Series, p. 32. For the dynamics of and concerns in relation to domestic conflicts in the ASEAN states, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert Scalapino et al., eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988) pp. 50-78. See also, Muthiah Alagappa, "The Dynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 45, no.1 (May 1991) pp. 1-37. (28.) Domestic opposition to the martial law regime of Ferdinand Marcos mounted following the assassination of Benigni Aquino 1983, with a real possibility of civil war during 1985 to 1986. Ultimately the mutiny by key segments in the Philippine Armed forces and the massive "people power" rally, at EDSA in conjunction with several other factors, led to the ouster of Marcos in February 1986. For a good discussion of these developments see Anne Mackenzie," People Power or Palace Coip: The Fall of Marcos," in Mark Turner, ed., regime in the Philippines: The Legitimation of the Aquino Government, Political and Social Change Monograph No. 7, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University (1987). (29.) For texts of these documents see ASEAN Document Series, pp. 30-1 and 35-7. (30.) For discussion of these shortcomings see Muthiah Alagppa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12, no. 4 (March 1991) pp. 289-97. (31.) The ZOPFAN states to refrain from involvement in great power rivalry and conflict. For a discussion of this concept see Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements," pp. 269-305. For a discussion of the nuclear weapons free proposal see Muthian Alagappa," A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," Australian Outlook, 41, no. 3 (December 1987) pp. 173-80. (32.) See Muthiah Alagappa, "ASEAN's Fourth Summit: Laying the Foundations for a New Era," East-West Center Asia-Pacific Current Affairs, no. 28 (March 1992) pp. 4-6. (33.) Vietnam and Laos acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1992. (34.) Stephen Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnam Conflict," Southeast Asian Affairs 1979 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979) pp. 157-88. (35.) Cambodia was called Kampuchea during the period of Khmer Rouge rule, and under the PRK government. On Vietnam's desire for a special relationship, see Joseph S. Zasloff, ed., Postwar Indochina: Old Enemies and New Allies (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1988) Chapters 1-6. (36.) Relations between Khmer resistance groups have long been suspicious and antagonistic. The first non-communist group is FUNCINPEC, the Frencliacronym for the forces loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former monarch of Cambodia; Sihanouk ruled Cambodia from 1941 to 1955, after which he was Cambodia's head of state until his overthrow by General Lon Nol, in a 1970 U.S.-backed coup. tSubsequently he cooperated with the Khmer Rouge to defeat the Lon Nol government, but was placed under house arrest after their victory; the Khmer Rouge also killed several members of his family. The second non-communist group is the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by Son Sann, a cabinet member under Sihanouk who broke with him in the 1960s; other key leaders of the KPNLF served in the Lon Nol government and had little sympathy for the former monarch. (37.) For details of the Vietnamese and Chinese official views see The Truth of Vietnam-China Relations over the Last 30 Years (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979) and "Facts about Sino-Vietnamese Relations," in Zhou Guo, ed., China and the World (Beijing: Beijing Review, 1982) pp. 94-128. For a good discussion of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, see William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986). (38.) Dennis Duncanson, "China's Vietnam War: New and Old Strategic Imperatives," World Today, 35, no. 6 (June 1979) pp. 241-8. (39.) Simon Long, "China and Kampuchea: Political Football on the Killing Fields," Pacific Review, 2, no. 2 (1989) pp. 151-8. (40.) For details on this relationship see Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). (41.) These statements were made explicitly in the joint Statement of the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in Southeast Asian Region, issued in Bangkok on 12 January 1979 and consistently reiterated thereafter. For text of Joint Statement see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Thailand, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985-(undated) p. 74. (42.) For details of the Thai perception see Muthiah Alaggppa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (Dover, Na: Auburn House Publishing, 1987) pp. 78-147. (43.) Joint Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Situation on the Thai-Kampuchean Border (Bangkok: 25 June 1980). For text see Documents on the Kampuchedn Problem, p. 81. (44.) See "Statement on Behalf of ASEAN by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee," issued in Bangkok on 21 February 1979. For text of statement see ASEAN Document Series, pp. 447-8. See also Michael Richardson, ASEAN and Indo-Chinese Refugees," in Broinowski ed., pp. 92-113. (45.) Kishore Mahbubani, then Deputy Chief of Mission of the Singapore Embassy in Washington,The Kampucheian Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception," Foreign Affairs, 62, no. 2 (Winter 1983/84) p. 423. (46.) Despite the lack of anticipation, ASEAN responded rather swiftly to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. On 9 January 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers deplored the armed intervention, and on 12 January, they called for the immediate and total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia. By July 1979, ASEAN had reached a consensus that formed the basis for the U.N. General Assembly Resolution (G.A. Res.) 34/22 (1979). For text, see Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of its Forty-Fourth Session, United Nations Press Release, GA/7977 (22 January 1990) pp. 37-40. (47.) This hope was made explicit in the communique issued after the informal meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers held in February 1973 after the Paris Agreement, which brought the Vietnam War to a conclusion. For text of communique, see ASEAN Document Series, pp. 115-6. (48.) For a good summary of ASEAN-Indochina relations during the 1975-78 period, see Leifer, pp. 65-86. (49.) For text of this U.N. General Assembly Resolution, see Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of its Forth-Fourth Session, United Nations Press Release, GA/7977 (New York: United Nations, 22 January 1990) pp. 37-40. (50.) G.A. Res. 36/5 approved the report of the International Conference on Kampuchea and called for its full implementation. For text of this resolution, see Resolutions and Decisions, General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/36/51) pp. 13-14. (51.) For the text of G.A. Res. 35/6, see Resolutions and Decisions, General assembly Official Records: Thirty-Fifth Session, Supplement 48 (A/35/48) pp. 13-14. (52.) Mahbubani, p. 414. (53.) Konathan Stromseth, Time on Whose Side in Cambodia? (Bangkok: ISIS, Chulalongkorn University, 1988). (54.) According to the Thai foreign ministry, as of 1985, ASEAN had put forward 16 proposals. See Documents on the Kampuchean Problem, p. vii. (55.) This proposal, worked out by the Indonesian and Vietnamese foreign ministers in 1986, called for a two-phase meeting. The four Khmer factions were to meet in the first phase, with Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN countries joining in the second phase. For positive account of the idea of cocktail diplomacy see Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Cambodia: The Vagaries of |Cocktail Diplomacy,"' Contemporary Southeast Asia, 9, no. 4 (March 1988) pp. 300-20. (56.) For details see, Chang Pao Min, "Kampuchean Conflict: The Diplomatic Breakthrough," Pacific Review, 1, no. 4 (1988) pp. 429-37. (57.) Muthiah Alagappa, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia: Towards Constructive Engagement," Pacific Affairs, 63, no. 3 (Fall 1990) p. 321-50; also Muthia Alagappa, "The Kampuchean Conflict: Changing Interests," Pacific Review, 3, no. 3 (1990) pp. 266-71. (58.) For a discussion of changes in Thai foreign policy, see Katharaya Um, "Thailand and the Dynamics of Economics and Security Complex in Mainland Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13, no. 3(December 1991) pp. 245-70. (59.) For details of the Australian proposal, see Government of Australia, Cambodia: An Australian Proposal (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1990). (60.) "UN, China Deal helps Khmer Peace Effort," Bangkok Post, 16 September 1990, p. 3. (61.) U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 (1990) endorsed the framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Cambodia contained in Security Council Document S/21689. (62.) It's fragile, but a breakthrough," Bangkok Post, 27 June 1991, p. 4. (63.) Leifer, pp. 27-38. (64.) While not a member of the Security Council, the Indonesian foreign minister and foreign ministry officials were involved in the deliberations among the permanent members about how to operationalize the U.N. framework agreement. (65.) Boutros-Ghali, p. 37.
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Title Annotation:Keeping the Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century
Author:Alagappa, Muthiah
Publication:Journal of International Affairs
Date:Jan 1, 1993
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