Raw materials, race, and legal regimes: the development of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the Americas.
What follows is by and large an exploratory piece, part of a larger project. We wish to discuss how the rise of Pan-Americanism in Latin America owes much to a pro-sovereignty move embodied precisely in the principle of PSNR, which challenged the overweening imperial influence of the United States as well as assumptions about Latin Americans' "primitiveness" and their consequent inability to govern themselves and their own resources. We therefore argue that, despite general assumptions to the contrary, sovereignty is not necessarily the enemy of international relations, and that, at least in this instance, sovereignty has served as the means to galvanize support for the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS), one of the most important regional organizations in existence.
State Sovereignty in a World History Perspective
It may seem paradoxical that the history of the struggle for sovereignty over natural resources may provide a useful lens for the study of world history, which, after all, takes interconnectedness as a starting point. But it is intrinsically connected to the issues of war, trade, and international institutions, all of which are shaping the patterns of interactions between societies, and consequently fodder for world historians. (6) The transnational turn in the historiography of international relations has taught us how the state's boundaries are porous, allowing us to track global flows of people, culture, capital and commodities across borders. The contest for control over raw materials provides an important perspective on the issue of sovereignty since political boundaries seldom conform to geological boundaries; geopolitical calculations or purely economic requirements of the different states compel the internationalization of resource issues. A particularly salient example is the reliance of the industrial complexes in Northern America and Western Europe on the raw materials that are found in developing countries in the Global South. Another key element in the recent efforts to transnationalize history has been the influence of race in shaping the perspectives and actions of policymakers, as well as their reception in the global arena. (7) Thinking on race powerfully shapes the political discourse on resources in a myriad of ways, whether in terms of regulating the right of ownership or turning the native people themselves into a labor resource that can be utilized for tapping other natural resources. (8)
Trade and resource extraction are cross-border activities that fall under the purview of international law, as well as world history. Thinking on race also informs the formulation of legal regimes, and especially raises the question of who is fit to exercise sovereignty over natural resources. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) is a strand of critical international law scholarship that argues that, fundamentally, international law exists for the creation and perpetuation of empire and imperial structures. It shows that attitudes of developed countries towards developing ones are informed by deep-seated racism and a belief that colonization is (and must be) justified by international legal structures. (9) TWAIL is thus an appealing lens through which to examine the way international law has developed in the Americas, in light of the relationship between the United States and countries to its south.
From Bolivar to Monroe and Back: The Evolution of Pan-American Ideals
The ideals of Pan-Americanism go back to the eighteenth century, when the process of decolonization in the Americas was in full swing. Naively defined from the South, and in Simon Bolivar's view, Pan-Americanism meant the unity of American nations, not only against the common European enemy, but, most importantly, out of a sense of shared identity (ironically, largely derived from the European ancestry of elites across the continent, that is, provided by the same enemy they were uniting against). Pan-Americanism became a flag of liberation and progress for the Americas, a utopian dream that was never really to see the light of day. (10)
In his State of the Union address in 1823 President James Monroe announced that any further expansion of European power in Latin America, including any attempt to re-impose colonialism on the many newly-independent republics, would be regarded as an unfriendly move against the United States. This doctrine in a sense embodied the ideals of solidarity of Pan-Americanism, while in fact it appropriated and colonized them, simply replacing European colonial aspirations with North American ones, disguised as solidarity between the strong northern power and their impoverished southern neighbors. However, Washington's claim to leadership in the cause of the common hemispheric interest was fraught with contradictions, not least since the very notion of hemispheric unity conflicted with the Anglo-Saxon belief in their own racial superiority. (11) That way the U.S. justified its own expansion in the continent as a process of liberation from European colonialism. Moreover, securing the independence of Latin-American states also diminished the European threat close to home, in addition to creating new prospective allies (and markets) for the United States. The imperialist underpinnings of the doctrine became crystal clear with the development of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe doctrine (1904), which turned the doctrine into an assertion of the right of the U.S. to intervene militarily in other American republics. (12)
Over the course of the nineteenth century the Monroe doctrine became a hallowed precept of American foreign policy to the extent that it was considered in Washington to be tantamount to international law. In Richard Olney's famous interpretation from the 1897 Venezuelan border dispute: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." (13) This expansive interpretation was shot down by a stinging rebuke from Lord Salisbury, with the result that the doctrine was not incorporated into positive international law until after the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations affirmed that "[n]othing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." (14) Despite this affirmation, Frank Ninkovich suggests that from the mid-1920s onwards, the Roosevelt Corollary was quietly shelved. In its stead the Republican administrations laid the groundwork for a non-interventionist policy in Latin America based on respect for international law, an approach the next President Roosevelt would eventually appropriate and label the Good Neighbor policy. (15) Whether this newfound respect for the sovereignty of the Latin American nations would also extend to their ownership over natural resources would remain an open question.
Despite Woodrow Wilson's insistence on self-determination after the close of the First World War, the Monroe Doctrine gained a new lease on life in the interwar years. The explorer, politician and academic who 'discovered' Machu Picchu, Hiram Bingham, argued that too much could be made of the principle of "racial self-determination." Rather, Bingham insisted that "we owe it to the progress of the world and to the world's need for its natural resources to see to it that the republics of Tropical America behave like citizens of the world rather than like pirates or members of savage head-hunting tribes." (16) He was not alone among U.S. elites in linking race, sovereignty and the ability to provide raw materials for U.S. industry. Racism was rife among the U.S. internationalist elites in the interwar years, drawing on a long prehistory of viewing Latin Americans as a deplorable bunch of half-breeds. (17) As an observer at the Council of Foreign Relations noted, if the inhabitants did not have the necessary abilities or capabilities to develop these resources, somebody else would have to, "regardless of the ethics." (18) The implications of this worldview were clear: if the population of an area could not utilize their local resources, whether due to lack of capital or some racially determined inability to cope with mine management, it was tantamount to a forfeiture of their right to rule themselves, and the U.S. would gracefully step in as the benevolent caretaker who would exploit resources for the good of the hemisphere. The imposition of imperial control was thus justified in terms of the need to secure continued resource extraction.
Race was an amorphous biological and cultural concept and conformance with the values espoused north of the Rio Grande implied the possibility of improvement. The Americans described Latin Americans as "childlike" and "docile", the "dregs of a once powerful and progressive race" that only could be saved by an influx of American capital, organizational techniques, and vocational training. (19) Improvement would take time however, as Thomas Lamont at JP Morgan wrote to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes during negotiations over Mexican debt payments in 1922: "These Mexican people ought not to (be) proud and peculiar, but they are, and we can't change them overnight into Anglo-Saxons." (20) There were limits to how much could be done by improving culture, however. Inherited racial characteristics were seen as a significant factor shaping the suitability of the Latin American host societies to American investment. Chile, for instance, was singled out by the Council of Foreign Relations in 1930 as a prime location for investment in copper and other natural resources, primarily due to the large influx of civilized Europeans, but also due to the "soundness of the racial stock," referring to the native Araucanian Indians who were considered to be fiercely independent and energetic. (21) The Monroe Doctrine itself was imbued with such racist assumptions about how the lesser peoples of Latin America would benefit from American tutelage in return for their markets and resources. It thereby became a vessel for a potent mix of contradictory ideas and policies, enabling American elites in the interwar years to combine their time-honored tradition of political isolation with hemispheric domination, their self-perceptions as purveyors of civilization with economic exploitation. (22)
The Monroe Doctrine remained in place as a guide for American policy in the interwar years, and both the doctrine itself and the underlying conceptions of race shaped the responses to any political developments that could threaten American ownership over natural resources. The feud over the Mexican attempt to nationalize its subsoil mineral reserves after the Revolution of 1917 proved a case in point. Not only was the nationalization incompatible with Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, but it drew instead on the Spanish tradition of vesting mineral ownership in the crown and Indian notions of communal ownership. (23) It caused many out-and-out racists in the State Department and in the oil industry to call for embargo, or even war, in order to protect the interest of American oil companies. After all, the Mexicans were "weak and bumbling, incapable of resisting American fighting men, and in great need of being bossed around by the Anglo race." (24) Bossing the Latin Americans around was not a policy option limited to Republican administrations. President Roosevelt withheld recognition and sent warships to Havana in late 1933, effectively paving the way for the ouster of president Ramon Grau San Martin after he raised the banner of nationalization. Roosevelt also kept the screws tight on Bolivia for years after the confiscation of Standard Oil's properties in 1937. The White House defended the investments of U.S. companies in Latin America and the principle of compensation with such alacrity that the decision not to intervene after the Mexicans finally nationalized their subsoil minerals in 1938 has been considered the very apogee of the Good Neighbor policy. (25) By that time, however, developments in Europe ensured that the U.S. had to recalibrate its policy towards the rest of its own hemisphere, and the question was to what extent the prewar ideas, prejudices, and political structures would survive the Second World War.
From Monroeism to Multilateralism
In 1947, the Norwegian explorer Thor Heyerdahl won worldwide fame by crossing the Pacific on a raft of balsa wood, while attempting to prove his theory that Polynesia had been populated by Peruvians under the leadership of a race of light-skinned rulers. (26) The main problem for Heyerdahl as he set out to prove that the oceans were pathways rather than barriers to migration was that almost all available balsa timber had been felled and sold to the U.S. during the Second World War, along with numerous other raw materials. (27) The endless U.S. demand for Latin American raw materials during the war, such as rubber, copper, tin, and manganese, placed a heavy strain on the Good Neighbor policy. At the inter-American meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1942, the issue of an equitable distribution of raw materials was of prime importance, and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles offered economic assistance in return for the exclusion of the Axis nations from trade within the hemisphere. As Max Paul Friedman has pointed out, Washington turned to strong-arm tactics to keep the Axis away from the resources of Latin America to an extent that clearly marked the return to a Monrovian policy. (28)
Good fences make good neighbors, and presumably clearly demarcated lines of sovereignty do as well. During the Second World War, U.S. soldiers, government planners, and purchasing agents swarmed across the Southern Cone countries to protect, develop, and exploit the various sources of raw materials. The pressure for access to raw materials generated strong antipathies towards the norteamericanos across Latin America. This carried substantial risks both from the perspective of Washington and the entrenched Latin American regimes, since the rising resentment at foreign ownership of natural resources strongly correlated with a growth in revolutionary sentiment directed at the domestic political order. (29) "Yankeephobia" thus breathed new life into Pan-Americanism; it suggested to Latin American elites that the creation of a Pan-American organization where they could come together to become at last a counterweight to the U.S. was not only possible, but necessary for the economic viability of their states and their own political survival. The series of treaties designed to exclude the Axis from trading within the hemisphere had further important ramifications in this regard, as they became the institutional-legal germ for the creation of the Organization of American States. (30) However, because the nascent OAS relied on the structures of the preexisting bilateral arrangements, the pro-U.S. hegemony bias ended up replicated in the newly-created organization as well.
The OAS Charter, approved in 1948 during a diplomatic conference in Bogota, is quick to proclaim the OAS as "... the international organization that they [American states] have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence." (31) Article 3 of the Charter announces the principles of the Organization, among which are ". respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of States. ", and that "[e]very State has the right to choose, without external interference, its political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State." (32) Relatedly, Article 19 is a strong provision on non-intervention, according to which "[n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements." (33)
The provisions of the OAS Charter highlight its intent to protect the sovereignty of all American nations. From the U.S. side, it meant the consecration of the idea of "America to the Americans," while for Latin Americans it represented the creation of safeguards not only against external powers from outside the hemisphere, but also safeguards against the northern hegemon. (34) Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the U.S.'s commitment to bilateralism in this area, and its decision to rely on the Open Door policy instead of negotiating explicit provisions on access to strategic raw materials in the founding documents of the Organization, the OAS Charter does not mention natural resources explicitly in its text, despite the importance that the trade in materials played in strengthening inter-American cooperation and building up momentum for the creation of the OAS. But the Charter does contain a small provision on economic self-determination (and PSNR is widely understood to be an essential part of economic self-determination). More specifically, Article 17 states that "[e]ach State has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally...." (35) This provision, coupled with Article 19's mandate of non-intervention, might be considered as the legal basis for the assertion of a principle such as PSNR, but that was not to be, precisely because of the net of bilateral treaties that predated the OAS Charter and specified commitments in this area.
An assertion of sovereignty from Latin American states was the catalyst for cosmopolitanism (understood in the Kantian sense of peaceful and friendly relations between nations towards the installation of a universal order) in the American hemisphere. At the same time, though, it was not sufficiently strong to entirely curb U.S. imperialism in the region, perhaps precisely because Latin American states tried to strike a balance between asserting their sovereignty and opening up to regional cooperation (which also meant much-needed U.S. dollars through development programs). At the end of the day, sovereignty can in fact be a pro-cosmopolitan move, at least to the extent it can bring states together against a common imperial enemy. Empire has too long disguised itself as cosmopolitanism, and PSNR is one of the ways through which the mask can be pulled off the ugly face of domination and conquest. Current disputes over resources should be informed by these ideas, as a means to aid in the clearer pursuance of anti-and post-colonial agendas, instead of catering to the demands of a perennially hungry and unequal "free" market. (36)
International law as embodied in the OAS Charter thus became the language through which U.S. domination is expressed. (37) And, even though the OAS is quick to proclaim its allegiance to liberal ideals of human rights, equality, and non-discrimination, the rhetoric carries the undertone of American superiority. A TWAIL analysis would suggest that the text of the OAS Charter carried all along a colonial undertone, even as it nominally served to level the playing field between the U.S. and the Latin American states. And, because U.S. quasi-colonial practices towards Latin America are rooted on racial superiority, racism is at the foundation of the OAS. (38) Additionally, bilateral treaties cast a net which informs the uses of the OAS Charter, undermining its potential for promoting greater autonomy for Latin American states. Most importantly, the idea of developing "freely" becomes coupled with the idea of regional cooperation and assistance, which, even if it opens the door for the U.S. money Latin American states needed, through the very same door comes the possibility that the U.S. will have some input in domestic affairs, particularly those related to the exploitation of natural resources. After all, it is not only the U.S. that committed to cooperating with Latin American countries; Latin American countries also agree to cooperate with the U.S. for the pursuance of hemispheric peace and security. This quid pro quo logic ends up killing the dream of Latin American emancipation through the OAS.
Latin American attempts to push for sovereignty over their natural resources were rather unsuccessful. Realizing how damaging the reliance on raw materials was for their economic development, they sought to diversify and industrialize. They met with little more than derision in Washington, where the Latin American governments were likened with children playing with intricate things they could not understand, a comparison tinged with more than a little latent racism. (39) Washington preferred that the Latin Americans remain exporters of raw materials rather than diversifying and building up a trade in manufactures. (40) Eventually it became clear that there was little hope for economic assistance from the United States, and the Latin Americans, spearheaded by the National Revolution in Bolivia, intensified their efforts to reassert control over their natural resources. (41) This caused considerable dismay within Washington, and the State Department noted how Latin American nationalistic feeling was on the rise, and declarations in favor of nationalization of minerals again had become fashionable. (42) The Latin American states had much to fight for. As Peter Drucker observed in 1959: "The twenty largest underdeveloped countries produce more than one half of the Free World's industrial raw materials. But they themselves consume less than 5 per cent of what they produce. All of them except Brazil are colored! " (43) While this statement attests not only to the problematic concept of color or the enduring inclination to view the gap between the industrialized countries in the North and the developing countries in the South through that darkly tinted lens, it also shows how the quest for control over these raw materials would remain an uphill struggle with very high stakes.
Given the difficulties of working in the OAS context, assistance was sought elsewhere. And the United Nations was the chosen forum, where Latin American states made the initial push for the recognition of the principle, ultimately approved with the votes of newly-independent North African countries. (44) But, regardless of the fact that PSNR failed to be promulgated first by the OAS, the fact remains that it is the PSNR impetus (even if not the terminology) that is responsible by and large for the creation of the Organization of American States. Perhaps the failure to ultimately promulgate PSNR in this forum is telling of how quickly its aspiration to become a U.S. counterweight in the hemisphere was frustrated.
Travelling around Latin America in 1950, the influential American diplomat George Kennan reflected on the importance of Latin America for the United States. American success in the Cold War would depend on turning the Latin American states into allies and establishing solid economic links. It could never be a partnership of equals though, as he mused that the interbreeding of Spaniards, Indians, and Negroes had produced a most infelicitous outcome. Fortunately, Kennan thought, they would not need the Latin Americans as soldiers, but as miners of raw materials for the United States. The creation of the OAS had changed little about the way Washington thought about its entitlement to the raw materials found south of the Rio Grande.
The history of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the Americas is a tale of how sovereignty can, in fact, serve international law and international relations. It is also a tale of how international law is still mired in the mud of empire. That the OAS is largely founded on a desire to promote PSNR as a means to overcome racist domination, and yet the Latin American states that were the absolute majority in the organization failed to formally proclaim the principle and had to move the discussion to the UN, is telling of the intricacies of international politics and how certain biases can be built into institutions both in and despite of the language of its constitutional instruments.
History shows how sovereignty works for and against cosmopolitanism, and tells us much about the law that most lawyers (and, in fact, many historians) tend to overlook: law is not a static, autonomous set of ideals; it is rather a moving process of sedimented categories of knowledge and power. What is more, the geography of power also matters, particularly in international law. In other words, Kennan unwittingly got it half right when he suggested that in Latin America, the impediments to progress were "written in blood and geography." (45)
This article is part of a larger project titled "A Raw Deal? An Interdisciplinary Study on the Development of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the Americas," funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, to whom we are extremely grateful for their support.
(4) Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 42-59.
(5) Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 211-216.
(6) Anthony Steinhoff, "Taking the Next Step: World History and General Education on the American Campus," World History Connected 3, no. 3 (July 2006), http:// worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/3.3/steinhoff.html (accessed March 27, 2013).
(7) Ryan Irwin, The Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
(8) Kavita Philip, Civilising Natures: Race, Resources and Modernity in Colonial South India (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2003).
(9) B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law: AManifesto," International Community Law Review 8, no. 1 (April 2006).
(10) Alonso Aguilar, Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A View from the Other Side (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
(11) Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and the Narratives of U.S. Empire (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 98.
(12) Herbert Matthews and K.H. Silvert, Los Estados Unidos y America Latina: De Monroe a Fidel Castro (Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1967), 25. For a recent and very valuable contribution on the emergence and the implications of the Monroe Doctrine, see Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011).
(13) Olney wrote to Salisbury that the Monroe Doctrine was established "American public law." Jerald Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2008), 1:136.
(14) Cited in William Everett Kane, Civil Strife in Latin America: A Legal History ofU.S. Involvement (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 99.
(15) Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 84; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Volume I (New York: Macmillan, 948), 310-340.
(16) Hiram Bingham, "The Future of the Monroe Doctrine," The Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (April 1920): 400; Hiram Bingham, "Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine?" The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (January 1914): 334-358.
(17) Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).
(18) Council of Foreign Relations, Mineral Resources and Their Distribution as Affecting International Relations, January 6, 1922, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Box 565, Mudd Library, Princeton University; Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 113.
(19) James Carson, "Upon the Indian Depends Mexico's Future," The Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (October 1920): 215-223.
(20) Robert Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972), 216.
(21) Council of Foreign Relations Study Group Report on Chile, January 21, 1931, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Box 129, Folder 4, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
(22) Christopher Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of the Global Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 13.
(23) Clayton Koppes, "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation," The Journal of American History 69, no. 1 (June 1982): 65.
(24) Jonathan Brown, Oil and Revolution in Mexico (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 243; Ninkovich, Wilsonian Century, 82-5.
(25) Koppes, "Good Neighbor Policy," 63.
(26) Axel Andersson, A Hero for the Atomic Age: Thor Heyerdahl and the Kon-Tiki Expedition (Oxfordshire: Peter Lang, 2010).
(27) Thor Heyerdahl, Kon-Tiki Ekspedisjonen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1948), 40.
(28) William Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 186; Max Paul Friedman, "There Goes the Neighborhood: Blacklisting Germans in Latin America and the Evanescence of the Good Neighbor Policy," Diplomatic History 27, no. 4 (September 2003): 569-597.
(29) Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 71-80.
(30) William Everett Kane, Civil Strife in Latin America: A Legal History of U.S. Involvement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 84.
(31) OAS Charter, Article 1.
(32) OAS Charter, Article 3.
(33) OAS Charter, Article 19.
(34) Eduardo Galeano, As Veias Abertas da America Latina (Porto Alegre, Brazil: L & PM, 2011), 205-263.
(35) OAS Charter, Article 17.
(36) Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 95-171.
(37) B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto," International Community Law Review 8, no. 1 (April 2006): 3.
(38) Exploring the relationship between TWAIL and racism, albeit in the Canadian context, see Sunera Thobani, "Reading TWAIL in the Canadian Context: Race, Gender and National Formation," International Community Law Review 10, no. 4 (December 2008): 421-430.
(39) Michael Krenn, The Chains of Interdependence: U.S. Policy toward Central America, 1945-1954 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
(40) David Rock, "War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the United States," in Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, ed. David Rock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 15-40.
(41) Glenn Dorn, The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Constitutional Liberal Oligarchy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).
(42) U.S. Department of State, "The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Administrator of the Defense Materials Procurement Agency, December 30, 1952," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Volume IV (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 1504. Also available under U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, http:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d679 (accessed March27, 2013).
(43) Peter Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 164.
(44) Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 36.
(45) U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1950," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1950), 598624. Also available through the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/ FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v02&entity=FRUS. FRUS1950v02.p0614&q1=kennan (accessed March 27, 2013).
Mats Ingulstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) * and
Lucas Lixinski (University of New South Wales) **
* Post-Doctoral Researcher, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Ph.D. in History, European University Institute. I would like to thank the George C. Marshall Foundation for the Marshall-Baruch Fellowship that enabled me to carry out the initial archival research for this article.
** Senior Research Fellow, University of New South Wales. Ph.D. in Law, European University Institute. I am thankful to Louise Buckingham for her research assistance.
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|Title Annotation:||Special Section: Sovereignty and World History|
|Author:||Ingulstad, Mats; Lixinski, Lucas|
|Publication:||World History Bulletin|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2013|
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