Printer Friendly

Ratio: Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2016.

Back to Black, CLAUDIO CALOSI and ACHILLE C. VARZI

This is a brief sequel to Max Black's classic dialogue on the identity of indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the (by now popular) view according to which Black's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bilocated sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black's challenge. A is simply denying that there can be worlds with two or more indiscernible entities.

Group Peer Disagreement, J. ADAM CARTER

A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis-a-vis p as he initially was. This conciliatory insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (nonsummativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out and explore an extension of the conciliatory insight from individual peer disagreement to group peer disagreement; in doing so, this paper raises and addresses three key problems that face any plausible defense of such a constraint.

Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox, KENNETH BOYCE and ALLAN HAZLETT

The problem of multipeer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe ~[P.sub.1] ... [P.sub.n] and disagree with a group of epistemic peers of yours, who believe ~[P.sub.1] ... ~[P.sub.n], respectively. However, the problem of multipeer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called steadfast view in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement about P. After some terminology is defined, Peter van Inwagen's challenge to the steadfast view is presented. The preface paradox is then presented and diagnosed, and it is argued that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox. The reasonable response to multipeer disagreement is discussed, and an objection addressed.

Sincerity and Transmission, STEPHEN WRIGHT

According to some theories of testimonial knowledge, testimony can allow you, as a knowing speaker, to transmit your knowledge to me. A question in the epistemology of testimony concerns whether or not the acquisition of testimonial knowledge depends on the speaker's testimony being sincere. This paper outlines two notions of sincerity and argues that, construed in a certain way, transmission theorists should endorse the claim that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge requires sincerity.

Shame, Publicity, and Self-Esteem, PHILLIP GALLIGAN

Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself. On the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? This essay begins by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then presents a theory of shame according to which shame is a response to the subject's perception that he is not thought of in the way he intrinsically values himself for being thought of by someone else. Then the essay goes on to suggest some refinements to this basic view. First, the subject of shame is primarily concerned about his audience's attitudes toward him, not what they believe about him. And second, there may be one particular attitude which he values himself for inspiring. There is no very perspicuous term for this attitude, so it is here called proto-respect--the attitude a social animal directs toward those it regards as valuable allies or bad enemies.

Modesty as Kindness, ALAN T. WILSON

The trait of modesty has received significant philosophical attention in recent years. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counterexample to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. This paper engages with the debate about the nature of modesty by proposing a new account. Modesty as kindness states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. The paper sets out the account, explains its benefits, and defends it against possible objections. It then asks whether or not the intense focus on the trait of modesty has actually furthered our understanding of the nature of virtue more generally, and suggests that alternative approaches ought to be considered.

Philosophy, Famine Relief, and the Skeptical Challenge From Disagreement, PETER SEIPEL

Disagreement has been grist to the mills of skeptics throughout the history of philosophy. Recently, though, some philosophers have argued that widespread philosophical disagreement supports a broad skepticism about philosophy itself. This paper argues that the task for skeptics of philosophy is considerably more complex than commonly thought. The mere fact that philosophical methods fail to generate true majority views is not enough to support the skeptical challenge from disagreement. To avoid demanding something that human reasoning cannot supply, sceptics must show that philosophers have sufficient overlap to resolve their disagreements in particular concrete cases.
COPYRIGHT 2016 Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2016 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Title Annotation:PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Date:Mar 1, 2016
Words:888
Previous Article:Phronesis: Vol. 61, No. 1, 2016.
Next Article:Aristotle, the pythagoreans, And structural realism.
Topics:

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2018 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters