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Rapid dominance: integrating space into today's air operations center.


It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the "best of the best" student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school's core curriculum in their own professional development and in "advancing aerospace power." The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, USAF



Control of the vertical dimension--air and space--is essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle space when necessary. While airpower has existed for almost a century, military space operations are yet in their infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium.

This paper is based upon research in current aerospace operations, exercises, doctrine, and command and control ([C.sup.2]) warfare. It also draws on personal experience as the first space warfare officer (1996-98) at the Thirteenth Air Force, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), Guam. That experience included numerous Pacific Air Forces and Pacific Command major joint/combined exercises and several real-world military operations including noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, peacetime cooperative engagement, and military operations other than war. Many still believe and treat space merely as just an extension of the air medium, expecting little and receiving less from space operations. Accordingly, the Department of Defense needs to address significant issues in the areas of space training, doctrine, equipment, personnel, and [C.sup.2] in order to integrate space into military operations. It is important for the United States Air Force to make great gains in these areas in preparation for the Expeditionary Aerospace Force.

I appreciate the assistance of my faculty research advisor, Maj Daniel Blaettler, at Air Command and Staff College and the space personnel at the Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. I also thank Col William J. "Chip" Beck, Air University (AU) space chair; Col Victor P. Budura Jr. (former AU space chair and current Air War College [AWC] faculty); Col Edward Groeninger, 613 AOS/CC; and Maj Gen Lance L. Smith, AWC commandant, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

I extend gratitude to my wife, Kimberly, and our children Joanna, Noah, and Kristina for their patience and support.

Rapid Dominance

Future warfare depends on the rapidity of collecting information and making decisions.

--Gen Charles "Chuck" Horner

Rapid dominance--the ability to exploit information and quickly destroy critical targets--is the key to warfare. The military that most effectively collects, fuses, and delivers information from sensors to shooters will be victorious. In this realm, aerospace forces form the critical link in rapid dominance. Today, aerospace forces are capable of delivering lethal military power anywhere on earth within hours (aircraft, ballistic missiles, and space systems). Aerospace power controls the vertical dimension with unparalleled speed, range, precision, and flexibility. Space systems provide the crucial links and nodes in warfare by rapidly collecting information and delivering it to war fighters for timely, accurate decisions.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of space mindedness in the planning and execution of joint air operations, which significantly reduces battle space rapid dominance. This research paper identifies the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity (COG) and military war-fighting medium. It offers practical, near-term solutions to a space-minded aerospace force by focusing on improved joint space training, space resources (personnel and equipment), joint doctrine, and theater command and control ([C.sup.2]) of space forces.

Space: Important Yesterday, Necessary Today, and Critical Tomorrow

Operation Desert Storm (1991), hailed by some as the "first space war," (1) clearly employed significant force enhancement contributions for the first time in combat. Today, almost a decade later, all United States (US) services depend upon and use force multiplying space systems to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives. Tomorrow's twenty-first century space-enhanced warfare will dwarf current space war-fighter operations due to improvements in joint space doctrine, training, equipment, personnel, and [C.sup.2]. Additionally, three simultaneous factors make space power even more essential in achieving rapid dominance in current and future warfare: the Department of Defense (DOD) drawdown of the 1990s, the significant increase in DOD operations tempo, and the emergence of the information age.

Department of Defense Drawdown

The daunting defense force structure drawdown of the last decade (table 1) places a greater demand on space systems to deliver focused, accurate, timely information to leaders, planners, and war fighters. The near 40 percent decrease across the board of military personnel and 50 percent decrease in defense spending since fiscal year (FY) 1987 can be balanced by more effective real-time information systems, which depend on space operations. (2) Space forces provide indispensable contributions to US forces in the absence of personnel through automated collection-- [C.sup.2] systems delivering information at the speed of light to war fighters.

Increasing Operations Tempo

The current strategic environment is one in which the US military will engage increasingly in small-scale contingencies (SSC) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) to protect our national interests. (3) The formidable monolithic threat of the cold war has transitioned to multiple, often unpredictable, international security threats. The strategic environment remains complex, and in addition to regional dangers, presents asymmetric challenges--terrorism, information warfare (IW), weapons of mass destruction; transnational threats--organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic disputes, refugee flows; and "wild cards." (4) The surge in operations tempo magnifies the reliance on space systems due to their global presence, precision, and reliability (fig. 1). DOD total force is deployed in support of 10 joint/combined operations and participates in 11 exercises in more than 70 countries. (5) Once US military forces are deployed to these operations, there is a propensity for "mission creep" to occur; the conflict escalates, extending US military involvement beyond the original intent (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, etc.). This volume of deployed personnel, exercises, and real-world operations demands global space assets to provide communications, navigation, weather, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), warning, targeting, and airlift/logistics support. Due to their global nature, space systems are usually the first intheater, on-the-scene assets collecting valuable information for commanders and leadership to gain situational awareness for planning and executing military operations.


Twenty-First Century: The Information Age

Military campaigns live and die according to accurate, timely information or lack thereof. Warfare in the twenty-first century--the information age--depends on real-time, global information collection and dissemination to military leadership, often only capable by space systems. Information that is provided by an ounce of silicon in a computer chip might have more effect than a ton of uranium. (6) Information-based precision weapons are replacing weapons of shear firepower and mass destruction at a rapidly increasing rate, as evident in recent military operations using exclusively precision-guided munitions (PGM). (7) MOOTW and SSC, usually constrained by politically sensitive environments and complex cultural and population factors, necessitate the need for accurate, timely space-based information. (8) To illustrate the inextricable relationship between space and information, US Space Command now has the responsibility for DOD information operations. (9) For the United States to maintain global leadership and military power, US forces must exploit the space medium to create fully integrated aerospace campaigns and achieve rapid dominance, especially in the era of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF).

The Challenge: Space Mindedness

Rapid dominance is achieved when war fighters at all levels grasp and apply what space brings to the fight. To fully exploit the space medium in war fighting requires military leaders, planners, and operators to understand how to effectively integrate space power with air operations to control the entire vertical dimension while supporting land and sea forces. The rapid growth of military space operations, however, is depreciated and often perceived as trivial due to inadequate space awareness and training of today's war fighters. Unfortunately, a lack of space mindedness exists in today's joint air operations center (JAOC) where the aerospace campaign is planned, controlled, and executed. (10) The JAOC is pivotal--it is the nerve center and senior [C.sup.2] node for theater aerospace combat power. Air Force Space Command's (AFSPC) Fourteenth Air Force recent initiatives to place qualified space experts (W-13SX) and space support teams (SST) in-theater are a good start in improving space awareness during JAOC campaign planning and execution, but there is still a long way to go. Compounding the problem, numbered air forces (NAF) do not have complete JAOC staffs--JAOCs are usually augmented by other NAFs and joint/combined war-fighting units for exercises and real-world operations. The result-- a high percentage of JAOC personnel do not understand or appreciate the role of space in military operations and do not know how space combat power is employed in their specific JAOC function. This lack of space mindedness prevents the application of space power in joint operations and reduces force enhancement in every medium--air, land, sea, and space.

To better gauge this deficiency, the author gathered data from interviews, personal JAOC experiences, and a survey of JAOC augmentees--the 1998-99 Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Prairie Warrior (PW) exercise team--to determine their initial space mindedness as they began their exercise in November 1998.11 The PW exercise team demographics closely paralleled the composition of an actual JAOC (personnel from all services). Despite the PW team members being among the most planning and operations-minded people at their grade level (O-4), the survey results indicate a lack of space mindedness at the operational level. Table 2 summarizes basic trends from the survey. These results indicate that the majority of today's JAOC personnel do not understand the entire spectrum of what space offers; and, therefore, they are not prepared to adequately integrate space into joint theater air operations. The problem is that most JAOC personnel have not been educated on how space supports specific JAOC planning and operations, and "they don't know what they don't know." The end result--rapid dominance is neither as rapid nor as dominant as it could be due to lost space integration potential.

The Solution: Putting the Aerospace Puzzle Together

Rapid dominance requires effective air and space integration, yet this is limited by the lack of space mindedness among war planners and war fighters. Space operations must be more than an afterthought in campaign planning and combat operations. This paper addresses the trends identified in current aerospace operations and recommends methods to improve aerospace integration in five major areas to facilitate the understanding, application, and integration of space combat power in the JAOC. These five interrelated elements--training, personnel, equipment, doctrine, and [C.sup.2]--are all necessary to establish an integrated aerospace force capable of battle space dominance (fig. 2).


Training. JAOC personnel need to receive better space support training and education to capitalize on space force enhancement capabilities and space limitations.

Doctrine. Individual service components have their own space doctrine, but there is no joint doctrine on military space operations. This must be corrected, and the first step is a solid Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.

Personnel. Joint aerospace combat power requires permanent, qualified, and competent space operations personnel at JAOCs, NAFs, wings, and Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) units, augmented by flexible SSTs and expertise reach back to space operations centers (SOC).

Command and control. Theater space forces [C.sup.2] must be clear, rapid, and structured to support theater campaign objectives. Space forces require centralized control and decentralized execution. The JAOC must effectively coordinate and integrate military, civilian, commercial, and foreign space capabilities.

Equipment. JAOCs and Expeditionary Operations Centers (EOC) need resident standardized space support equipment, as well as deployable space support hardware to effectively inform leaders and planners during en route operations.

This paper identifies methods to improve aerospace integration. It does not analyze space war-fighter applications that are already documented in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, Tactical Employment of Space, the Aircrew Combat Information Guide (ACIG), and at the Air Force Weapons School, Space Division, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. (12) The first element of space mindedness is for aerospace planners and operators to understand the importance and legitimacy of space as a war-fighting medium. This paper provides recommendations in training, doctrine, personnel, space [C.sup.2], and equipment. The paper concludes with a discussion of integrated aerospace power in the EAF, providing a military that works better and costs less through smart use of aerospace application, resulting in rapid battle space dominance.

Space--Dominating the High Ground

Take the high ground, and hold it!

--Sun Tzu, circa 500 B.C.

Great military leaders realize the strategic, operational, and tactical advantages of controlling the high ground. Ancient warriors in Sun Tzu's period understood the advantages of security and situational awareness in securing the high ground--a hill or a mountain. Armies of the US Civil War took the high ground to the next level with manned balloons to gather battlefield intelligence. Great aeroplane pioneers of World War I courageously took to new heights with crude flying machines, demonstrating the ability to weaponize the skies; and by World War II airpower proved the value of multidimensional warfare (land, sea, and air). During the Persian Gulf War, coalition forces' superb air power achieved unparalleled domination of the battle space and witnessed the emergence of military operations in the ultimate high ground--space. Establishing control over the entire vertical dimension is critical, as stated by Gen Charles "Chuck" Horner--"Everything is possible if you have it; little is possible if you lose it." (13)

Importance of the Space Domain

The first element of space mindedness for aerospace planners and operators is to understand the importance and legitimacy of space as a COG and as a war-fighting medium. The rapid growth of commercial, civil, and military activities in space suggests that space will soon be an economic COG and perhaps already has achieved that. (14) Approximately 600 functional satellites are in orbit, 220 of which represent a US investment of more than $100 billion. (15) Estimates indicate that during the 1998-2003 time frame, the United States and other space-faring nations will invest $500 billion into space systems and launch between 1,000 and 1,500 satellites. (16) The estimated annual revenues for the global space industry in 1998 exceeded $88 billion and are expected to increase at a staggering 50 percent per year through 2001.17 Communications, navigation, environmental resources, weather, education, telemedicine, entertainment, and science are just a few of the many applications migrating to space and driving this space "gold rush." The 1998 national security strategy (NSS) equates space to an emerging vital national interest, recognizing that US dependence on space could grow into vulnerability and a target. "Space has emerged in this decade as a new global information utility with extensive political, diplomatic, military, and economic implications for the United States. Unimpeded access to and use of space is essential for protecting U.S. national security and promoting our prosperity. Our policy is to promote development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects our vital security interests. We will deter threats to our interests, and if deterrence fails, defeat hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space." (18)

Space Power: What Does It Bring to the Fight?

When you think about protecting this nation's global interests, you have to remember it starts with space . . . it is the fourth medium of warfare.

--Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF

Force Multiplier: With Space Forces, 1 + 1 = 3

Space forces provide military leaders, operators, and planners with enormous force enhancement products and services that are essential in achieving rapid dominance of the battle space. Today's space systems provide key information via global communications, navigation, weather, warning, and ISR to achieve full spectrum dominance across the range of military operations (table 3). (19) These same space forces allow the USAF to execute the core competencies of Global Engagement. (20) Military space applications are growing at an increasing rate delivering products and services to military leaders, planners, and operators better, faster, and cheaper than many conventional terrestrial systems.

Bullets Win Battles; Information Wins Wars

Today, the primary military contribution from space is information. With it a campaign is successful; without it failure is almost certain, and JAOC planners must understand this. Joint force commanders (JFC) strive to achieve information superiority--"the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying the enemy the same." (21) Information operations (IO) is integral to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) aerospace planning process, consisting of information in warfare and IW. The JFC must quickly gain and exploit information in warfare (ISR, communications, precision navigation missile warning, etc.) for battle space situational awareness and rapid, solid decision making. Timely, accurate information is equally as important (arguably, even more important) as firepower; and combining information and firepower is lethal (e.g., PGMs). Some go so far to say that the ultimate precision-guided weapon is the electron, delivering or denying critical military information. (22) Warfare in the information age is highly dependent on global space forces, which allow forces to achieve dominant battle space awareness and decrease the "fog of war," providing the war fighter a clearer picture of the battle space. Space-based information is key for US forces to exploit battle space information for sensor-to-shooter operations (fig. 3). Real-time-in-the-cockpit (RTIC) and real-time-out-of-the-cockpit (RTOC) information is emerging in exercises and deployments. (23) Theater commanders employ elements of IW to defend friendly IO and attack enemy IO, both relying on space systems.


Aerospace Campaign Planning

Space forces play an integral part in deliberate, crisis action and adaptive planning by linking and leveraging joint terrestrial operations to achieve JFC objectives. There is one theater campaign--and four major pieces to it: land, sea, air, and space. Space mindedness means consciously making space as much a part of the campaign plan as land, sea, and air. During campaign planning, space forces provide critical information for intelligence updates and real-time global communications to facilitate rapid campaign planning. The JFACC must know what space forces are in the fight (friendly and enemy) and effectively integrate them into the overall campaign plan. As with air, land, and sea power, space power requires careful thought and planning to make it lethal and successful. Aerospace campaign planning starts with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), (24) which provides guidance to the commander in chief, US Space Command (USCINCSPACE), apportions space forces, and assigns space tasks to combatant commanders and service chiefs. USCINCSPACE initiates space campaign planning in the operations plan's (OPLAN) Annex N (space operations). Space must migrate and be expanded throughout the entire OPLAN.

The JFC normally designates a JFACC, who is responsible for exploiting air and space operations to support JFC theater campaign objectives and accomplishes this through the Joint Air and Space Operations Plan (JASOP)-- the aerospace part of the campaign that must effectively integrate air and space theater operations and forces. (25) Every JASOP section should reflect the space medium by identifying friendly/enemy capabilities, space objectives, enemy/friendly space COGs, space courses of action, and strategy development. The JFACC executes the JASOP through the JAOC, the JFC's theater air and SOC. (26)

Space Warfare: What Is the Threat?

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.

--Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Space mindedness includes the realization that the United States is not the only nation that recognizes the strategic use of space--there are more than 40 space-faring countries that have varied levels of space programs to reap the contributions from space. There are 14 active space launch sites worldwide, and 26 nations have astronauts/cosmonauts. (27) More than 70 percent of the world's nations use satellite communications (SATCOM). (28) There are now more than 20 foreign and commercial imagery systems (expected to be more than 30 in 2001) providing imagery from 30 meters down to a one-meter resolution to anyone who can pay for it. Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation signals--standard precision service (SPS) < 100 meters accuracy--are available to any user who has a GPS receiver. Potential adversaries already exploit space-based communications, imagery, and navigation to further their own interests.

As the United States increases its reliance on space assets, potential adversaries will realize US dependence on space systems and eventually use space in threatening ways. Already nations have jammed regional SATCOM because of turf wars over geosynchronous slots over the equator. (29) This friction intensifies as telecommunications increase and satellites crowd the geosynchronous belt. JAOC personnel must also understand that GPS, with an inherently weak signal, has already experienced interference in signal saturated environments and is susceptible to jamming. (30) The DOD initiated the navigation warfare (NAVWAR) program in 1996 to ensure US military access to GPS signals in the face of enemy jamming while denying enemy access to GPS signals. Solutions to the NAVWAR challenge involve user equipment changes (near term) and GPS satellite signal modifications (long term). (31) Obviously, any interference with GPS or SATCOM weakens the ability to plan and execute joint aerospace operations.

Space Control

Whoever has the capability to control space will likewise possess the capability to control the surface of the earth.

--Gen Thomas D. White

Today, space is a friendly COG, but it could easily be an enemy COG in future conflicts. The United States must be prepared to seize the initiative and control space, just as we do in the land, sea, and air mediums. This is merely an old problem in a new medium--as the sixteenth-century blue water navy was created to protect sea commerce--the twenty-first century requires protection of space assets to secure space and information commerce. Space control is a controversial, hotly debated topic due to internationally and politically charged issues of national sovereignty, privacy, and weaponizing space. (32) JAOC planners--especially in the guidance, apportionment, and targeting (GAT) and master air attack plan (MAAP) cells--need to recognize that negating enemy space forces can be accomplished by controlling the adversary's space links (electromagnetic signals) and nodes (ground stations, satellites, and user equipment). These links and nodes represent space choke points and lines of communication (LOC), lucrative targets for any combat medium. Figure 4 illustrates links and nodes that are vulnerable to attack.


Primary nodes include ground control stations, the satellites themselves, data-processing nodes, and user equipment, which can be neutralized through physical operations--bombs on target or antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. Primary links (e.g., LOCs) include ground [C.sup.2]satellite links, satellite-user signal links, and satellitedata-processing-user links. Neutralizing the LOCs requires signal disruption. The JAOC space and information operations personnel bring this expertise to the GAT and MAAP cells to neutralize and/or negate the enemy space and IO threat. The level of warfare depends on the desired outcome--temporary or permanent soft kills to deny, degrade, disrupt, and deceive enemy space systems, or a hard kill destruction. The point is that JAOC planners and leaders must think with space in mind, understand what the enemy space systems bring to the fight, and then determine the space control objective.

Space Forces Limitations

Space mindedness requires military planners, leaders, and operators to understand the basic limitations of space systems (force application, timeliness and availability, and the space environment) and how to optimize what is available. The first limitation is that the United States currently possesses neither weapons in space nor an operational ASAT capability. (33) Therefore, force application and space control is limited to the above discussion. A second limitation is asset availability. On-orbit space forces are not continuously in-theater; and space-based ISR are near-real-time information systems, not continuous, real-time global systems. ISR systems are tasked via a complex priority driven process. JAOC personnel must understand when space assets are available to support military operations. The JAOC space operations officer (SOO), JAOC space cell (now a "specialty team"), and JAOC J2 collection manager provide this information. A third limitation is the harsh space environment itself. Space systems can be negatively affected by solar activity (flares, electromagnetic storms, etc.), and satellite signals can be distorted as they traverse the earth's atmosphere (scintillation, natural and intentional interference, etc.). The JAOC weather cell and SOO advise the JFACC when this risk is likely.

This section addressed the necessity for aerospace planners and operators to become space minded warriors-- they must recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a COG and as a war-fighting medium. With this foundation, the remainder of this paper will provide recommendations on how to build space mindedness and achieve rapid dominance.

Joint Space Training: Education and Exercises

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in weapons; and with that change must come a continual change in the manner of fighting.

--Rear Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan

Rapid dominance requires military leaders, planners, and operators to have space mindedness--a basic understanding of the importance and legitimacy of space as a COG and military medium. In order to achieve this, JAOC warriors must be educated and exercised on space warfare capabilities, threats, and limitations.

Today's JAOC personnel know very little about space force enhancement that could directly improve their functional JAOC duties. (34) There is no formal JAOC or NAF space training and education program for JAOC personnel. The JAOC space officer and SST champion space education; but this is a very slow, piecemeal process in the absence of structured, mandatory space awareness education. Effective space education captures four critical elements: (1) strong senior leadership who demand JAOC staffs understand and integrate space operations, (2) space in professional military education (PME), (3) structured JAOC space education training, and (4) seriously integrating space in joint and combined exercises.

Space: Leadership by Example

The first priority in building space-minded warfighting is the commitment of senior leaders to recognize and communicate that space is an important medium of warfare that must be exploited. Space superiority can no longer be taken for granted and therefore needs to be as much of a concern to the JFACC as achieving air superiority. The JFC, component commanders (air, land, sea, and special operations), JAOC director, and senior JAOC supervisors must adopt a space-minded attitude and seek to make it a part of the joint force team. The Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer states that the JFC is responsible to "exploit all forms of combat power (land, sea, air, space)." (35) This commitment must be sincere so that the chain of command will respond positively to space training and integration in exercises and real-world operations.

Space Education: Not Just an Afterthought

The second step is solid education at all officer levels of products and services space brings to the fight (not just space systems themselves) and basic space threats, to ensure that officers understand the basic space warfighting medium. This step starts with commissioning sources and continues through the Aerospace Basic Course, Squadron Officer School, ACSC, and Air War College. Although progress is being made, space is too often an afterthought rather than a core objective. Perhaps even more importantly, space education must be integrated into the backbone of JAOC/JFACC courses at the [C.sup.2] Warrior School, Command and Control Training and Innovation Center ([C.sup.2]TIC). (36) The [C.sup.2] Warrior School treats the JAOC as a [C.sup.2] weapon system, provides JAOC initial qualification training, and certifies personnel before they are assigned to a JAOC. The [C.sup.2] Warrior School is a key target of opportunity in educating JFACC and JAOC personnel on the importance and legitimacy of space as a war-fighting medium and specifically what space brings to the JFACC/JOAC fight. These [C.sup.2]TIC courses as well as the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course need space embedded throughout, particularly in the end-of-course exercises, where a true appreciation of space is revealed by application.

Third, each JAOC/NAF needs to provide space education during their mission qualification training (MQT) to new personnel and augmentees prior to major exercises and deployments so that they understand how space supports their specific function and how to take advantage of space force enhancement. Most NAFs and JAOCs already have tailored MQT (indoctrination briefings, documentation, and qualification tests)--space needs to be integrated into this process. (37) (See table 4.)

Fight Like You Train, Train Like You Fight!

Space must be injected into major DOD joint and combined exercises much more intensively than in today's space deficient exercises. One of the leading inhibitors to aerospace integration is the exclusion of space participation in service, joint, and combined exercises. (38) When it comes to integrating space into major exercises, the DOD is simply guilty--we do not fight like we train or train like we fight. Actual combat is not the time to develop space procedures, [C.sup.2], and force enhancement techniques. The investment of a few key space exercise objectives will return huge joint war-fighting benefits and develop space as a powerful arrow in the JFC's quiver.

Solutions to integrating space into exercises are many, but three stand out. First, the senior leaders responsible for the specific exercise (the host command CINC, JFC, JFACC, and their staffs) must recognize and articulate the need to include space. In this respect, stronger USSPACECOM pressure on the other CINCs is necessary to include space objectives and training in major exercises. Second, it is essential for JAOC/NAF space planners to be proactive, persistent, start planning early, and continue throughout the exercise planning cycle. (39) The early adoption of space exercise objectives and requirements (personnel, equipment, and work space) cannot be overemphasized, with follow through to inclusion on the exercise time phased force deployment data (TPFDD). Realistic space exercise scenarios train both space personnel and the entire JAOC/JFC. Exercises would do well to integrate the AFSPC space aggressor teams (Space Warfare Center/DOTW) that emulate adversary space capabilities, a parallel to the traditional adversary tactics flight in a flying squadron. The final step is to ensure that space exercise experience is documented in joint universal lessons learned (JULL) so that resources (time, personnel, and money) are used wisely and we don't reinvent the wheel with each exercise. (40)

Structured space education and exercise integration provides visibility to JAOC warriors of the necessity to integrate space operations, but it is not recognized as such in joint doctrine. Joint doctrine must be created that recognizes the space medium as equal to land, sea, and air mediums and provides guidance on fundamental space employment.

Space Doctrine

At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory ... it is fundamental to sound judgement.

--Gen Curtis E. LeMay

There is a complete void of joint space doctrine in the US military. There is no joint doctrinal guidance on the employment of space forces in joint capstone, keystone, or tactics, techniques, and procedures doctrine documents. The US Army and USAF each has only one service level space doctrine document--Field Manual (FM) 100-18, Space Support to Army Operations, and Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations; the US Navy has none. (41) Doctrine forms the backbone of unity of effort in employing military forces--without it, space power will never reach its force multiplying potential in battle space rapid dominance.

Space Doctrine and Policy

Space employment is driven by two closely linked elements: space policy and space doctrine (fig. 5). Stated simply, doctrine is the set of fundamental beliefs and principles that guide the employment of military forces and operations. (42) Doctrine applies theory and past experiences, describing "how" to employ forces effectively; policy takes precedence over doctrine and is "what" needs to be done, concerning it with implementing political decisions, cost, rules, and programs based on the current environment. Ideally, policy and doctrine balance each other and allow military forces to be employed consistently with both doctrine and current policy. Although joint space doctrine is nonexistent, national space policy exists and provides guidance for military, civil, and commercial space sectors and articulates strategic objectives for military space forces. (43) To date, however, space policy has been improperly substituted in the absence of space doctrine, stunting space war-fighting potential and effective aerospace employment in joint operations. (44) The result is an unstable, politically driven military space capability, rather than a solid doctrine driven space force. Military space employment effectiveness will remain weak, fragmented, and disorganized until proper joint space doctrine is approved and implemented.

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Title Annotation:p. i-21
Author:Harter, Mark E.
Publication:Wright Papers
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Apr 1, 2000
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