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Racial categories and the politics of (Jewish) difference in late imperial Russia.

The past two decades have produced a virtual explosion in academic interest in racial theory and the history of race and racism. Historians, literary critics, and moral philosophers have published a staggering number of books, articles, and journals and organized countless conferences, symposia, and seminars devoted to these themes. The study of race and racism has emerged as a worldwide concern that knows no geographic boundaries or chronological limitations. Yet in the romance with racial matters, scholars have used race and racism so loosely, uncritically, and unreflectively that these terms have lost their analytical rigor and historical specificity and have become a "cliched vocabulary." (1) Some scholars have even advocated "forsaking once and for all the inflammatory and exceedingly ductile category of 'racism' save as a descriptive term referring to empirically analyzable doctrines and beliefs about 'race.'" (2) Others, however, continue to debate the significance of race in contemporary society and culture and use such provocative titles as Race Matters and Against Race to market their books to a wider audience. (3) In recent years, researchers have even broadened their inquiry to include previously uncharted geographic and chronological territories that range from the Greco-Roman world ("proto-racism") to modern France ("soft-racism"). (4)

While the popularity of racial studies continues to grow and attract ever more attention from the academy, scholars of imperial Russia have shown little interest in the recent theoretical and historical discussions of race. (5) The "absence" of race in Russian imperial historiography, however, needs to be raised as a historical problem that requires explanation and analysis. If racial categories began to play a significant role in ordering social relations and behavioral practices in 19th-century Europe, why did these enormously influential ideas not penetrate Russian political culture and society? How unique was the Russian scientific community in its acceptance of environmental or neo-Lamarckian theories of development? To put it somewhat differently, did resistance to racial ideology symbolize Russia's alternative path to Western civilization and modernity?

This article seeks to integrate "race" into discussions of imperial Russian culture and politics by analyzing the multiple and often contradictory intersections of the world of ideas (the debates between environmental and biologically deterministic theories of human development) and everyday social relations (the role that antisemitism and intolerance played in a multicultural and multi-religious empire). In particular, I examine the politicization of racial difference in the context of the anti-liberal shift that took place toward the end of the 19th century. As a deep conservatism and pessimism gripped Russian politics and culture, Jews emerged as the most visible "others" who were often perceived as a threat to the health and prosperity of the imperial "nation." Yet to argue that Jews proved to be the exception in an otherwise tolerant and flexible imperial order is to overlook the very problematic (and still not well understood) meanings of Russianness, the politics of belonging and exclusion, and the ways in which differences were constructed, defined, and maintained at the end of the old regime.

In late imperial Russia, race had two broad meanings that could--but did not always--overlap. The first signified color and designated "races" as white, yellow, red, dark, and black. The second, more ambiguous meaning categorized groups such as Slavs, Semites, Caucasians, Greco-Romans, and Turko-Tatars as well as "smaller" ones such as Poles, Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews as distinct "races" (rasy), "types" (tipy), or "ethnicities" (narody) based on highly elaborate and often contradictory physical categories and ethnographic descriptions. (6) While Jews could not be distinguished from Germans or Slavs by skin color, they could be identified as "Jews" by physical characteristics and ethno-cultural descriptions. In other words, as ethnicity (narodnost' and natsional'nost') began to acquire popular and administrative-scholastic currency to classify peoples by a combination of factors such as language, cultural practices, and religion, so did the belief that these differences were racially fixed--that is, intrinsic, unchangeable, and permanent. This gradual shift in documentation practices--from religion and social estate to ethnicity and race--reflected the reorientation of the empire's population along "cultural" lines and did not prove in any way remarkable in the fin de siecle. (7)

Following George Frederickson, I therefore do not regard ethnicity and race as two distinct phenomena; rather, as Frederickson points out, race may be defined "as what happens when ethnicity is deemed essential or indelible and made hierarchical." (8) This conceptualization of race allows us to analyze the dynamic process of racialization (the ways in which social attitudes and administrative practices constructed, validated, and justified a hierarchy of human difference) without restricting our focus solely to scientific studies of race. The tsarist regime may not have established a racial order based explicitly on biological theories of human development, but it did promote racial consciousness (the awareness of ethno-cultural differences based on religion, customs, and ancestry) and racist attitudes (institutional and popular discriminations based on essential and ultimately unbridgeable differences).

The Absence of Race

Although race may have played an important role in everyday social relations and intellectual life in modern Europe, recent scholarship has suggested that racial categories had hardly any influence on imperial Russian culture or politics. As the historian Vladimir Borisovich Avdeev wrote in an introduction to a volume of 19th-century primary documents on Russian physical anthropology, "About race science in prerevolutionary Russia, you will not find any discussions, no serious scholarly works, and no footnotes to primary sources. Everywhere there is a scholarly silence." (9) Although Avdeev referred to the history of ideas, something similar can be said about the ways in which racial categories influenced everyday social relations. In the existing historical literature, the reluctance to acknowledge the fluidity of race and racial thinking stems from a combination of four factors: a narrow, biologically based conception of race; Russia's "distinctive" political and economic development; the perception that Russians developed flexible and tolerant attitudes toward minority groups; and the unique makeup of the imperial geographic landscape.

Several historians have argued that Russia's scientific and intellectual community favored the "soft" neo-Lemarckian approach to human development rather than the "hard" biological interpretation of human difference, which helps explain (so the argument goes) why racial thinking never really penetrated the Russian imperial landscape. The "soft" theory of inheritance favored an environmental or sociological explanation for understanding the development and acquisition of physical traits and physiological differences. According to this theory, peoples adapted to their environment and thereby transformed the genetic makeup of their organism. Social Darwinism and its ingrained individualism never found a home in imperial Russia precisely because its educated and professional elites selectively misread and creatively reworked the very principle that lay at the heart of Herbert Spenser's philosophy--the "survival" metaphor. (10) Some of the most sophisticated and balanced accounts have shown how Russia's scientific community resisted biological determinism and therefore differed from Western intellectual currents. (11)

Moving from a history of ideas to an examination of the popular and political expressions and manifestations of racism, several historians have suggested that Russia's "distinctive" political and economic development and the unique makeup of the geographic landscape of the empire produced three other structural factors that seemed to account for the inherent resistance to (or lack of interest in) racial thinking. First, due to the class configuration of Russian society and the absence of a parliamentary democracy, the expression and exercise of political power emerged in a radically different political and ideological context than it did in the "West." While educated Russians stood atop the corporatist social hierarchy, they "resented their own position as the objects of an oppressive custodial regime" and continued to view the popular masses "with a strong sense of moral obligation and collective guilt." (12) The collectivist-corporatist mentality of Russia's educated elites stood united against repressive autocratic rule; at least until the 1905 Revolution radically reconfigured the landscape of imperial politics. As Laura Engelstein argues, "It was only after workers, peasants, and professionals had jointly engaged in a common political venture and after the privileged groups had secured a measure of political responsibility for themselves that the biological determinism already current in the West began to exert a noticeable appeal." (13)

Second, Neil MacMaster summarizes the dominant scholarly consensus by arguing that antisemitism in Russia (one of the most elaborate and exemplary forms of racism) was fueled by "medieval forms of irrational prejudice and rumor" and "expressed in terms of the traditional Catholic and [Russian] Orthodox anti-Judaism of an ignorant, superstitious peasantry." (14) Due to the economic and political "backwardness" of the imperial state, scientific forms of racial ideology did not inform anti-Jewish hatred, and antisemitism was never popularized by mass propaganda and the activities of political organizations. "In Russia, with few exceptions," John Klier argues, "complaints [against Jews] focused on the alleged 'religious fanaticism' of the traditionally minded Jewish masses, and their 'economic exploitation' of the Christian peasantry. Any racial element was strikingly absent." (15) Manifestations of anti-Jewish violence as well as the more tacit, informal expressions of intolerance and hatred developed (according to this argument) in the context of an urban demographic explosion and the uneven economic modernization of the polity. (16)

To exemplify the religious nature of Russian antisemitism, some historians have pointed out that conversion allowed Jews to break ties with the Jewish world and integrate in imperial Russian culture and society. In contrast to Western Europe, where Jewish religious practices were becoming weaker and less pronounced, in Russia the problem with Jews was not so much their Jewishness (as it was in the "West") but their Judaism. Religious transfer ceased to absolve West European Jews of their innate Jewishness precisely because difference was no longer defined by religious criteria but in ethno-racial terms. (17) In imperial Russia, however, religion continued to play an important role in administrative, legal, and everyday affairs, and conversion from Judaism to Christianity served as the quickest and surest means by which Jews could enjoy all the legal, geographic, and institutional privileges of other subjects in the polity. From this perspective, conversion signified not only a complete break with "Jewishness" but also acceptance by, and inclusion in, Russian society. The historian Eli Weinerman argues, for example, that "in general converted Jews were accepted by Russians, and [that] the majority of the Russian elite endorsed Russification of the Jews and their inclusion in the Russian people." He therefore concludes (based on this reasoning) that racial thinking had an "insignificant influence" on Russian society. (18) Religious conversion, in short, eradicated the principal marker of difference between Jews and Christians. (19)

Finally, scholars concerned with questions of empire, imperialist politics, and colonial expansion have suggested that either "there was no place for racism" or that the "racial obsession of Western Europe throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century evoked (with a few significant exceptions) only a limited response in Russia." (20) The specificity of Russia's colonial expansion played an important role in the construction of these tolerant attitudes toward minority groups. Unlike its British or French overseas counterparts, Russia was a contiguous empire, and as it acquired more and more territories throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, clear and obvious distinctions between the "center" and "periphery" did not exist. According to this argument, Russians could not draw the absolute cultural divides that would mark the "ruler" from the "ruled" or the "us" from the "they." In their encounters, Russian colonists, administrators, and elites did not experience the same sense of "otherness" as did their colonial counterparts in the West. (21)

Race: The Word and the Idea

Race as word and idea first began to be discussed by West European scientists and political theorists in the 17th century. The term was used to designate common cultural origins, language, and customs, as well as to categorize humankind according to psychic and physical expressions, bodily features and structures, and other observable characteristics. European writers also commonly referred to races as nations. (22) Although the Age of Enlightenment established the racial typologies used to classify humankind, much of this thought was "without immediate practical application." (23) The modern, exclusionary forms of racism appeared only as political conservatism "began to spread across the face of Europe" during the last three decades of the 19th century. (24) Patterns of discrimination based on immutable and indelible physical characteristics formed the essence of modern racism(s), although the precise contours varied according to each social, political, economic, and cultural context.

In fact, during the 19th century, the concept of race acquired nearly universal currency in scientific circles as well as in popular culture and played an enormously influential role--not only in a negative manner (social discrimination, exclusion, and oppression) but also in a positive sense (in the construction and affirmation of collective identity). Scientists, health officials, and journalists, for example, relied on racial categories to order and rank humanity according to "objective," scientific criteria. (25) The so-called "racial" groups such as Jews appropriated the language of race as a positive form of collective self-expression and self-definition (to identify themselves in relation to others). (26) Even individuals who vehemently denied the influence of biological determinism on the development of "peculiar" human traits and social deviance increasingly framed their arguments in racial terms. (27) As we soon shall see, imperial Russia was no exception to these developments, although, as with so many other social, economic, and intellectual changes, the debates concerning race appeared later in Russia than they did in Western and Central Europe.

The word rasa (a foreign borrowing) began to appear in print in Russia only in the 1860s and 1870s. Two popular contemporary dictionaries, Nastol'nyi slovar' dlia spravok po vsem otrasliam znaniia (Desk Dictionary for Reference in All Branches of Knowledge, 1864) and Russkii entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1875), defined race as "tribe" (plemia). Tribes, in turn, were distinguished by five groupings: (1) white or Indo-European; (2) yellow-skinned or Asiatic; (3) red-skinned or American; (4) dark-skinned; and (5) black or African. All tribes could be distinguished by specific bodily features such as nose, hair, eyes, and height. (28) As the historian Charles Steinwedel has argued, "Plemia meant a particular group but did not contain a judgment as to whether the people had a spirit or destiny or indicate their status within the empire." (29) The early definition of race (or plemia) followed an "enlightened" system of classification that attempted to establish a coherent taxonomy that stressed shared characteristics of humankind.

In the mid-19th century, Russian ethnographers paid particular attention to cultural norms, histories, and languages and shared a "liberal humanism" with respect to the empire's multicultural and multi-religious population. (30) "At no time have we Russians devoted so much time to the study of our fatherland's ethnic groups, as we have in the past ten years," one ethnographer commented in 1872. (31) The Russian field of ethnography was characterized by what Nathaniel Knight has called a "relatively tolerant attitude toward less developed peoples." (32) To be sure, ethnographers, geographers, and various non-Russian administrators continued to characterize non-Russian peoples (inorodtsy) as "crude," "savage," and "dangerous." Despite these negative assertions, Russian officials had great faith in the civilizing mission: that they could transform the lives of these "primitive" and "backward" natives by introducing them to Russian ways of life, teaching them the Russian language, and perhaps even converting them to the Russian religion. (33)

In Russia, as in Europe, Jews stood as the quintessential outsiders and scapegoats. "A more despicable, artificial, mercenary set of wretches cannot be seen; they are without character, without patriotism, and without manners," is how the English traveler Robert Johnston described the Jewish population after his travels to the western regions of the Russian empire. (34) If foreign observers such as Johnston used a negative and ultimately hostile tone to describe Jews, then Russians vacillated between Romantic admiration and repulsion. According to the Russian Geographical Society, for example, it was difficult to encounter another "tribe" (plemia) in the empire that possessed the degree of Jewish solidarity and isolation: "The Jews represent a nation within a nation; they are an isolated tribe, with its own language, its own religion, its own economic base, and its own community--in administrative as well as civil terms." (35) Another traveler described the women as well-proportioned and attractive: "Their large eyes are overshadowed with thick, black eyebrows; the nose is Asiatic; the cheeks are fresh and bright; pale neck that is covered with large necklaces; [and] a magnificent bust." (36) Other ethnographers also focused on the discerning features of Jews: "Brown hair, intelligent black eyes, a gentle facial expression, aquiline nose, [and] pale face--these are their discerning characteristics." But Jews could not be distinguished only by these traits; they also could be identified by an exceptional and barely perceptible "imprint" that permeated their entire soul. This "imprint" could be found among the educated and uneducated, among the wealthy and the poor in all countries of the world that Jews inhabited. (37) Although Jews were usually placed on the bottom of the human hierarchy due to their "sly intellect, hidden morals, and perfidious heart," most observers stressed that their "peculiarities" would gradually fade away with the benefits of civic betterment. (38) This classic mid-19th-century position argued for the "rapprochement" (sblizhenie) of Jews and Christians without constructing impermeable boundaries between the Jewish "tribe" and their Christian neighbors. (40)

Yet in the last two decades of the 19th century, two important developments occurred that helped construct more rigid and ultimately impermeable boundaries among "races." First, in Russia as in other European countries, physical anthropology, criminology, and medicine began to incorporate tools of social knowledge that relied on statistics and quantitative measurements. The turn from the textual, narrative tradition to an "objective," scientific methodology represented an important innovation in the ways in which social scientists examined and documented their subjects. The measuring of skulls, skeletons, and other physical dimensions not only differentiated human races but also helped rank them. In a review of physical anthropology in Russia and the West, one of the leading anthropologists in Russia, Dmitrii Nikolaevich Anuchin (1843-1923), explained why the discipline began to garner respect for technological innovations in the analysis of skulls, brains, and other bodily features:
   There is no doubt that in the near future the importance of
   anthropology will be even more widespread, that in time it will take
   a visible place in fields of scientific inquiry. Biologists,
   doctors, historians, philosophers, and even ordinary educated
   persons will realize the importance of a greater scientific
   "knowledge of oneself." (40)


Statistical measurements made it easier to compare anatomical peculiarities among races and helped document social conceptions of "normalcy" and "deviancy" in scientific terms. (4)

Second, the trust in statistical representations that gripped Russia at the end of the 19th century began to give scientific credibility to earlier stereotypes, prejudices, and observations. Ideologies of anti-Jewish hatred expressed the fears, anxieties, and paranoia that emerged in a highly transitional and economically turbulent period. "This is a person from another part of the world, of another race [drugaia rasa] in physical, as well as moral, dimensions," the popular publication Narody Russkogo tsarstva described Jews. (42) The discovery of the population in scientific terms helped construct a powerful and lasting image of Jews as "outsiders" to the administrative and social system. Although Jews had been perceived as "outsiders" throughout history, modernist race science repackaged earlier descriptive conceptions into a series of discourses predicated on positivist science. Jews' bodies, for example, were increasingly described as weak, unhealthy, and unfit for performing social duties such as military service. These descriptions acquired credibility because the very essence of human frailty--chest sizes, muscular strength, and physical incapacity--could be "objectively" documented by the power of numbers. Anthropometric measurements revealed that Jews possessed smaller chests and other physical peculiarities in comparison to other groups. (43) In Russia, as in Central Europe, journalists and administrators argued routinely that narrow chest sizes and height prevented Jews from fulfilling military obligations and becoming good soldiers. (44)

Racist ideologies began to penetrate the Russian imperial landscape in the context of profound social and economic dislocations, the appearance of exclusionary nationalist sentiment, and the rise of respectable race science. As these ideologies began to be more pronounced, the earlier, more tolerant views of human difference began to be replaced with more fixed, impermeable, and rigid conceptions. As we see in the remaining part of this article, Russian scientists, professionals, and academics participated in an international dialogue on the meanings of race that debated the role of environment or biology (and sometimes a mixture of the two) for producing physiological and anatomical peculiarities, social deviance and pathologies, and criminal behavior. In these debates, scientists, academics, journalists, and medical doctors employed the language of race, even as they attempted to discredit biologically deterministic theories of racial difference. For the so-called racial groups, the debates had profound implications for comprehending not only the nature of their collective identity but also the possibilities of their inclusion and exclusion in the civil sphere.

Revisiting an Old Debate

Russian intellectuals usually explained human evolution, physical differences, and abnormal behavior in sociological or environmental terms. (45) The social thinkers who came of age in the 1860s and 1870s (whether liberal, conservative, or Populist) embraced Darwin's principle of natural selection but rejected the Social Darwinist understanding of individualistic competition, conflict, and struggle, viewing the progressive development among species (and humankind) in terms of mutual cooperation and communal aid. To quote the famous anarchist and social thinker Petr Kropotkin, "We [Russians] see a great deal of mutual aid where Darwin and Wallace see only struggle." (46) One of the broader implications of this line of reasoning (which has been called a "distinct Russian national style" by more than one historian) resulted in the valorization of environmentalism: that social conditions (and not biology) shaped relations among humankind, the development of deviancy and normalcy, and the evolution of observable, physical characteristics. (47)

This distancing from biological laws of development did not isolate the Russian scientific community from the worldwide debates concerning nature and nurture that took place at the end of the 19th century. In fact, Russian anthropologists, criminologists, medical doctors, and biologists shared their reservations as to the determinism of heredity with many of their colleagues abroad. French criminologists and anthropologists were perhaps the most vocal opponents of "crude" biology, stressing the importance of culture and environment in identifying and explaining racial differences. (48) These neo-Lamarckian approaches to disease, health, and the body played an influential role in the development of a Russian race science. (49) Yet as David Horn has recently pointed out, the adoption of the binary divisions of nature and nurture, biology and environment, and Social Darwinism and neo-Lamarckianism obscures the differences, as well as the similarities, shared by these theoretical approaches. (50) Jan Sapp has similarly observed that "ascribing the belief in evolution by the inheritance of acquired characteristics to Lamarck and contrasting it to Darwin is misleading." (51) By appropriating the language of race, Russian social scientists engaged in an international discourse on the meanings of difference--a debate that remained highly fluid, inconsistent, and often imprecise at the beginning of the 20th century.

Following the lead of their German-Jewish counterparts, for example, Jewish social scientists relied on the power of numbers and the prestige of social science to construct what Mitchell Hart has called a "counter-narrative" to the racially deterministic model. (52) Medical experts, demographers, and sociologists published essays in Voskhod, Evreiskii meditsinskii golos, and many other medical and scientific periodicals, analyzing Jewish health, hygiene, and identity in order to assess (and ameliorate) the social conditions in which Jews lived. (53) "The majority of [medical] experts consider Jews the most nervous people in the world," an entry read in the Evreiskaia entsiklopediia (Jewish Encyclopedia) on nervous and psychological illnesses. (54) While most Jewish social scientists agreed that the Jewish race was prone to hysteria, neurasthenia, and epilepsy, they nevertheless challenged biologically deterministic explanations and attempted to revise theories of Jewish essentialism. What made Jews so susceptible to these disorders? Parents forced children to study in dark, filthy, and unhygienic Jewish primary schools (heyders), which caused Jewish children to develop "degenerative" states of mind; and prolonged social and economic isolation played no small role in fostering these abnormalities. (55) Experts analyzed a broad spectrum of sociological factors--climate, economy, culture, and hygiene--that may have contributed to the distinctiveness of the Jewish race. Although Jewish social scientists did not disagree with the statistical evidence that accounted for these states of "degeneration," they did construct their own explanations for the qualitative and quantitative discrepancies (or "differences") between Jews and non-Jews.

The larger point, then, is that hardly any anthropologist, medical doctor, statistician, or criminologist who kept up with the latest scientific literature denied the existence of "races," even if they questioned the role that biology or environment played in the construction of racial differences. Both sides of the nature-and-nurture debate relied on racial categories to construct their arguments. With this in mind, let us consider the debates that took place among Russian anthropologists in the late imperial period.

In Russia, as in Europe and North America, physical anthropology emerged as a respected academic discipline in the last decades of the 19th century. The ethnographic division of the Russian Geographical Society--as well as Moscow University's Society of Admirers of Natural Science, Ethnography, and Anthropology (founded in 1863) and Kazan University's Society of Archaeology, History, and Ethnography (founded in 1878)--served as important predecessors to the rise of the anthropological profession. One of the first and most prominent Russian anthropologists, Anatolii Petrovich Bogdanov (1834-96), used French craniometrical techniques to measure skulls that he personally excavated from Moscow cemeteries and produced some of the most influential studies in craniometry. (56) In 1879, Bogdanov organized an anthropological exhibition that brought together many of the empire's anthropological, archaeological, and ethnographic collections, which were later housed in Moscow University's Museum of Anthropology. Bogdanov also trained some of the most prolific anthropologists, such as Dmitrii Anuchin, who later helped found the Moscow school of physical anthropology. (57)

Russian anthropology began to develop largely due to the efforts of men such as Bogdanov and Anuchin, whose multidisciplinary interests in zoology, archaeology, geography, anthropology, and ethnography helped shape the profession in the late imperial period. Both men read widely in the international theoretical literature on race and human development, participated in conferences and exhibitions in Western and Central Europe, and sought to create a Russian anthropological profession of international stature. In 1876, Bogdanov founded the first Department of Anthropology at Moscow University. The 1884 University Statute stunted the academic development of Russian anthropology, however, when the Ministry of Education refused to include anthropology in the statute and instead created a department of geography. (58) Nevertheless, Anuchin, as a newly appointed professor of geography at Moscow University, continued to conduct anthropological research, supervise dissertations, and read lectures on physical anthropology, the history of anthropology, the origins of man, and ethnology. (59) In the last years of the 19th century, St. Petersburg and Moscow became important centers for anthropological investigations in the empire. Many of the most prestigious and influential studies of physical anthropology were published in Moscow University's Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal (founded in 1900), and a series of dissertations on non-Russian peoples were written at the St. Petersburg Military Medical Academy under the direction and supervision of Professor Aleksandr I. Tarenetskii. (60)

Although St. Petersburg and Moscow anthropologists continued to produce some of the most innovative research, Russian anthropology was also distinguished by a regional dimension. In the 1870s and 1880s, Kazan, Khar'kov, and Kiev emerged as centers for the production and organization of anthropological, ethnographic, and archeological knowledge. The fascination with local cultures and religions gave birth to ethnographic and archaeological museums in places such as Novgorod, Vladimir, Samara, Astrakhan, Vladikavkaz, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, and Minsk that collected, preserved, and displayed their respective regional identities. In contrast to German anthropology's provincial "worldliness," then, Russian anthropology was marked by an imperial "regionalism"--with the description and analysis of the vast and diverse territories, peoples, and cultures of the imperial frontiers. (61)

For Russian anthropologists, the empire's unparalleled cultural and religious diversity consumed, and at the same time, complicated the scientists' work. "The ethnic composition of Russia's population is distinguished by an incredible physical as well as cultural diversity," the anthropologist Aleksei Arsen'evich Ivanovskii wrote in a review article of Russia's inorodtsy, "which we do not find in any West European country." "All the ethnic groups [narodnosti] and all the tribes [plemena] develop their own particular racial characteristics [razlichnye chelovecheskie rasy]," he argued. (62) The physical traits could be distinguished by the color of the skin, the shape and color of the hair, height, the proportions of the body, the shape of the head, and the distinctiveness of the face. Russian anthropology's concern with non-Russians--their experiences, cultures, and physical characteristics--shaped the scientific program. The territories of the empire and its diverse peoples constituted one of the world's richest laboratories for anthropological investigations and comparisons. "In these vast territories reside many physical types, with diverse lifestyles [and] different [stages of] cultural development," Anuchin wrote. "Comparative anthropological analysis should help explain the racial composition of these peoples, establish their types, and allow the researcher to make comparisons with similar peoples of the world." (63) Russian anthropologists often lamented, however, that they could not make the kinds of empirical comparisons that German and French anthropologists were able to make among "races." Whereas German and French anthropologists could make anthropological comparisons based on "objective" (that is, numerical) indices, Russian anthropologists continued to rely on descriptive observations made by ethnographers and linguists and therefore incorporated both the "cultural" (descriptive) as well as the more "objective" (statistical) methods of research. "Regardless of our achievements," Ivanovskii wrote in 1902, "the anthropological profession finds itself in a preparatory stage [podgotovitel'naia stadiia]; the collection of materials is far from adequate for making a systematic classification of the empire's multiethnic population." (64)

In spite of these "inadequacies," Ivanovskii nevertheless decided to construct a classificatory map of the entire population of the empire based on the individual research projects carried out by Russian anthropologists. Although much raw statistical data had been collected for each individual ethnic group, the materials had not been collectively ordered, processed, or analyzed. "Without a doubt," Ivanovskii began his study entitled "An Attempt at the Classification of the Population of Russia," "one of the most significant impediments to the development of Russian anthropology is the absence of systematized, collected data." Ivanovskii wanted to create a preliminary typology of the imperial population based on ten distinct indices that could be easily measured and compared: (1) color of hair and eyes; (2) height; (3) size of head; (4) cranial measurements; (5) absolute length of face; (6) nose; (7) size of torso; (8) width of chest; (9) size of arms; and (10) size of legs. (65)

Ivanovskii hoped to isolate the racial characteristics that would allow him to compare one ethnic group with another based on rigorous, scientific measurements. To his surprise, however, he found it difficult to distinguish one ethnic group from another based on a particular physical trait and therefore concluded that the indices did not isolate imperial ethnic groups but blended them together. Belorussians, for example, could not be easily distinguished from Ukrainians or Poles, Azerbaijani Tatars from Kurds, or Kalmyks from Iakuts. But Ivanovskii did find one exception: the Jews. "On the whole," he wrote, "Jews form a complete and an entirely isolated anthropological group that is not adjoined to any other group." Even if only a relatively small sample had been measured and observed in the western borderlands, the collected data seemed to suggest that Jews formed a distinct race. By the color of the hair and eyes, the Jew constituted a dark "type"; by the size of the body, the Jew was deemed unusually small; and by the length of the chest, the Jew was viewed as sickly, weak, and underdeveloped. Cranial measurements, moreover, revealed that a statistically significant proportion of Jews were brachycephalic (or round-headed), a trait usually equated with primitive European inhabitants rather than the more progressive dolichocephalic (or long-headed) peoples. (66)

Numerous other studies conducted by Russian anthropologists confirmed that Jews did in fact constitute a unique, biologically pure race that could be easily distinguished and identified from the other peoples of the empire. The anthropologist A. D. El'kind pointed out that, "regardless of the geographic territory in which they reside, Jews can be more or less distinguished by their anthropometric and physiognomic characteristics." (67) Perhaps the most unique physical characteristic of the Jews was the brain. The anthropologist R. L. Veinberg showed in a highly detailed comparative study of the brain that "Jews belong to those peoples with comparatively small brains" that do not conform to either "normal" or "typical" human brains. The structural composition of the Jewish brain was closer to that of the less developed peoples (as opposed to the Slavs, who possessed larger-sized brains) and tended to weigh less than that of the more "civilized" peoples. (68) In his dissertation on the Jews of Mogilev province, written at the Military Medical Academy, Mikhail Georgievich Iakovenko showed that Jews could be easily distinguished by their nose (specifically their nostrils, which were categorized as type two nostrility because of the irregular extensions of the nostril passages that divided sharply at the tip of the nose). (69)

In short, as race science acquired academic prestige in 19th-century Europe, the experts who relied on racial categories for interpreting the evolution of humanity did not accept its universalism blindly. Even in those national contexts where Social Darwinism, eugenics, and degeneration seemed to have the most profound influence (such as England, Germany, and France), intense debates ensued over the efficacy of race as an explanatory "truth." (70) In this context, intellectuals in the Russian empire (both Jews and non-Jews) engaged in these worldwide discussions by reading, reviewing, and critiquing national literatures on race in scientific journals. Acknowledging the limits of social scientific research, anthropologists (and medical experts) conceded that more data needed to be collected to comprehend, in an objective and scientific manner, the role that environment, intermarriage, and biology (among other factors) played in the construction of racial types. But even though comparative anthropological analysis revealed the difficulties of categorizing and comparing the imperial population based on distinct racial differences, most Russian anthropologists did agree on one exception: the Jews. (71)

Boundaries of Exclusion

Although Russian social scientists did not add a qualitative dimension to their arguments, it did not take long for mass consumer culture to appropriate the metaphor of human difference and repackage a highly academic discourse to a popular audience. As Neil MacMaster reminds us, however, "there is a danger in interpreting racism as a history of ideas" that is translated into action and programs by institutions and governments. (72) Racial ideology is a cultural construction that reflects the fears, anxieties, preoccupations, and values of societies and is shaped and sustained by social and political settings. Ideas, in other words, "are not contained entities which are transmitted into people's minds; they travel and change course on the way." (73) For the social historian, the more complex part of this equation is analyzing the ways in which ideologies of cultural difference translated into popular behavior. How were beliefs in difference and behavior expressed in the subjective dimensions of social relations? What role did the popularization and dissemination of stereotypes and images play in racist behavior and perceptions? How did these stereotypes, perceptions, and visual representations form and maintain collective prejudices and hierarchies?

Like perceptions of blacks in the United States and in European colonial empires, anti-Jewish images and stereotypes became a universal feature of governmental policy, public opinion, and the popular imagination toward the end of the 19th century. (74) The presence of Jews in some of the most visible geographic spaces and public places of the empire aroused the fear of the state, since, it was argued, Jews and Jewish radicalism "threatened" to undermine and perhaps even destroy the social order. Some of the fears corresponded to the general paranoia, prejudices, and other imaginary perceptions that were international in scope and not peculiar to Russia; others, however, were indeed grounded in reality (by the remarkable participation of Jews in radical and revolutionary movements). Beginning in 1878, the rise of terrorist attacks led to Russian legislation that was among the harshest legislation implemented in Europe, designed to curtail urban disturbances and preserve the stability of the polity. That the majority of the political criminals came from the empire's western borderlands (Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic regions, and Belorussia) and that a high percentage of all those sentenced happened to be Jewish only strengthened the popular belief that Jews threatened the prosperity and tranquillity of the empire. (75)

The political conservatism intensified anti-Jewish fears and hostilities, marking the appearance of a modern, exclusionary imperial racism that attempted to limit the participation of Jews and individuals of Jewish origin. The expulsions of Jews from the countryside, residence restrictions, and quota systems in institutions of public education and free professions were among some of the most notable laws that attempted to preserve traditional social hierarchies and police the boundaries between Jews and their "Christian" neighbors. Notwithstanding the scientific and popular belief that Jews could be easily distinguished by customs, speech, and appearance, the expressions and symbols of Jewishness underwent enormous change, and the boundaries between Jews and their neighbors gradually lost their so-called distinctiveness. Toward the end of the 19th century, more and more Jews began to erase some of the most prominent symbols of their collective identities by changing names, mores, dress, and religion. By destabilizing common markers of Jewish identity, these cultural refashionings helped increase the instability and invisibility of Jewishness. (76) Jews were thus becoming invisible and unknowable at precisely the time that the concept of the racially fixed and ubiquitous "Jew" began to acquire intellectual and popular resonance.

Arousing fears, anxieties, and suspicions among government administrators, conservative commentators, and the broader public, the illegibility of Jewishness did not go unnoticed in the late imperial period. As Alexander III "affirmed the principle of ethnic supremacy" by glorifying and elevating Russianness and Russian Orthodoxy, the state introduced a series of regulations that attempted to distance Jews from their "Christian" neighbors by making Jews more visible and identifiable in the imperial landscape. (77) In St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Warsaw, police officials required Jewish merchants to display their forenames, patronymics, and surnames on all privately owned shops. (78) While conversion may have marked the end of professional and residential restrictions, "the distinction between converts and 'real' Christians remained and there were efforts to maintain it." (79) Like the French colonial administrators who inscribed noir to document ex-slaves in the Caribbean, Russian officials marked "of Jewish origin" (iz evreev) on all official documentation for those Jews who converted to Russian Orthodoxy. (80) At the turn of the 20th century, a series of new ordinances restricted (or, in some cases, attempted to bar) baptized Jews from participating in voluntary associations, unions, and government institutions based on "origin" (proiskhozhdenie) and not religious classification. (81)

In the 1904-5 period, three events helped intensify racial tensions and behaviors. First, the Russo-Japanese War unleashed anxieties over "yellow" migrants in the Far East. The Voennaia entsiklopediia (Military Encyclopedia) warned, for example, that the "success in the struggle for political domination in the Far East between the white and yellow races, which before the Russo-Japanese War inclined toward the white race, now appears to be within the grasp of the yellow." Fears of the domination of the yellow race led to legislation that banned Chinese and Korean labor, and in the inter-revolutionary years, Chinese workers faced constant threats of expulsion. (82) Popular dailies such as Novoe vremia printed cartoons of "undesirable" Asian (and Jewish) labor migrants polluting Russian streets. (83) This ambiguous and highly negative treatment of labor migrants had broader parallels with the labor-migration racism that occurred in Britain and in Continental Europe. (84)

Second, by the beginning of the 20th century, the religious landscape became more fluid as a result of the proliferation of Christian sectarianism, secularization, and increased population movement and social interactions among the peoples of the empire. The April 1905 law on religious freedom only further destabilized religious identities and the boundaries of Russianness by legalizing confessional transfer. The reformation of the religious landscape and the complications arising from efforts to regulate confessional transfer after 1905 contributed to what Paul Werth has called "religion's eclipse as a mode of classification." (85) As a result of these reorientations, ethnic markers such as language and names began to play important roles in the delineation, recognition, and articulation of cultural difference. The 684 baptized Jews who returned to Judaism shortly after the 1905 law on religious freedom, for example, did so because conversion to Christianity did little to unburden them of their innate "Jewishness." They returned, in another words, after realizing that conversion did not alleviate the professional, political, geographic, and social stigmas of their origin. In contrast, those individuals who remained Christians in the inter-revolutionary period found it difficult to distance themselves from their Jewish roots and to erase all the signs and symbols of their Jewishness. (86)

Finally, the Revolution of 1905 popularized racist stereotypes and images as violence and disorganization erupted, as censorship laws and public opinion were liberalized, and as commercial culture proliferated. Highly exaggerated, distorted, and often vulgar images of Jews--as parasites, revolutionaries, and degenerates--suddenly appeared in editorials, articles, and cartoons in the mass media. The emergence of right-wing organizations and the publication of conservative newspapers such as Zemshchina, Russkoe delo, Pakhar', Russkoe znamia, and Russkaia zemlia helped diffuse these racist images and representations to the public. (87) Popular and political periodicals such as Novoe vremia, Pluvium, Vampir, and Karikaturnyi listok represented Jews as "filthy" and "dangerous," with highly exaggerated physiognomic features such as large noses and thick lips, polluting the streets of Russia and threatening to destroy the moral fabric of the imperial state. (88) By the beginning of the 20th century, the negative image of the Jew was firmly entrenched in popular culture.

The thousands of name-changing petitions that have survived from the inter-revolutionary period also suggest that ethnic minorities such as Jews, Germans, and Poles, among others, experienced unparalleled alienation, discrimination, and hostility in their everyday lives based, in part, on a socially recognized perception of "difference." These "differences" were grouped not always by color but by highly ambiguous, subjective, and often unstable characteristics such as civilization, history, and customs. If in 1900 only 152 individuals petitioned to change their surname, in 1915, at the height of the Great War, the Chancellery of Petitions received 2,296 requests. (89) Although the tensions grew out of long-term developments in government policies, the Great War helped mobilize nationalist sentiment and polarize the empire along ethno-racial lines. As Eric Lohr has recently demonstrated, fears of "enemy-aliens" were largely responsible for the eruption of ethnic riots. In Moscow, for example, rioters targeted stores and shops with German, Jewish, and other foreign names (only 90 Russians with Russian-sounding names suffered losses or damage out of some 735 damage claims). (90) Peasants did not hesitate to lynch landowners with German surnames, accusing them of deception and treason. (91) Government officials and factory owners readily dismissed the usual "suspects," identified as "German" or "Jewish" by their names. (92)

In response to social hostilities and everyday forms of discrimination, individuals such as the baptized Jew Kirill Aleksandrovich Vigorchik claimed that he had "nothing to do with the Jews" since he had broken with his former identity and accepted "Russian" ideals, traditions, and customs. Although by law, conversion emancipated baptized Jews from legal restrictions, Vigorchik, like most Jewish converts, continued to be identified as a "Jew" in daily life. "I sense that my co-religionists do not trust me, if only because they recognize my origins by my family name," he wrote. "The only way to resolve these tensions, if emigration is to be excluded as a possible solution, is to change the Jewish root of my surname." (93) Vigorchik was one of hundreds of baptized Jews who petitioned the state to erase the public memory of his "Jewishness" by asking to change one of its most visible signifiers, his surname. (94)

The Peculiarities of Russian Race

In his contribution to a recent discussion of racial politics, Amir Weiner acknowledged that "race was present in Russian scientific and political discourse" but questioned the "impact of the racial factor on the making of social politics." In the late tsarist period, the political institutions that advocated policies based on racial criteria remained, according to Weiner, "on the margins of the political arena or failed to spread their agenda beyond their domain." Although racial thinking may not have carried "the day in politics or science," it is difficult to dismiss the notion that racial categories and ideologies had little, if any, impact in the construction of social boundaries and hierarchies in the imperial setting. (95) Race, in other words, is not only about the history of ideas or social policies; it is also about the creation of ineradicable boundaries and hierarchies within a social system.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the language of race made its appearance in Russia. (96) Participating in an international discourse on human difference, Russian anthropologists, criminologists, and medical doctors remained skeptical of the determinism of biology. Despite their reservations, the voluminous writings, discussions, and debates scattered in scientific, political, and popular journals and periodicals were nonetheless infused with racial metaphors and idioms. On the eve of the Great War, these ideas had hardly any influence on legislation not only in the Russian setting but in Germany, England, and France. (97) Although much has been written about the appropriation and elaboration of racial thinking by educated elites from 1870 to 1914, much less is known about the ways in which these ideas filtered down to popular culture and governed everyday social relations and interactions. Although race science was largely inaccessible to the common folk, racist attitudes and perceptions based on notions of cultural inferiority and difference were transmitted to the "public" by a rich conglomeration of signs and symbols. (98) The extent to which racial consciousness and racist attitudes dictated everyday social experiences and influenced power relations in the imperial setting, however, is a question that deserves more scholarly attention. Something similar can be said about the ways in which racial hierarchies--based on highly ambiguous but easily perceptible differences such as physiognomy, customs, language, and shared history--divided the imperial collective. (99)

Yet by moving away from a biologically and color-based conception of race and by acknowledging the plasticity of race, we are able to make three conclusions about the peculiarities of Russian race culture. First, Russian imperial elites were never obsessed with fears of miscegenation, the moral and sexual dangers of contamination, and the destabilization of the fixed category of Russianness. (100) Most missionaries, for example, (at least in the eastern regions of the empire) did not see a fundamental incommensurability between indigenous communities and Russian nationality, which, they believed, was firmly rooted in Russian Orthodox consciousness, behaviors, and attitudes. As many of these missions began to fail at cultural transformation, Russian colonial officials realized that "the concept of a unitary 'Russian people' was an ideal." (101)

Even if acceptance of diversity governed the ebbs and flows of imperial encounters, as many commentators have suggested, some "differences" posed more concrete dangers than others. Throughout the 18th and the first half of the 19th century, Russians did not (and could not) draw clear distinctions between metropole and colony and between "us" and "them." As Russia incorporated more and more territories (especially in the west), it relied on local aristocracies and elites--Baltic Germans, Poles, and Jews--to help administer and govern its population. Yet in the last three decades of the old regime an important shift took place in imperial politics, and the "alliance with local aristocrats" broke down. (102) The emergence of political terrorism, the dangers of nationalist separatism, the events of 1904-5, and the experience of the Great War helped spark a racial discourse embedded in the specific social, intellectual, and political realities of imperial Russian history.

Finally, according to the conventional narrative of race, East European immigrants, and Jewish immigrants in particular, remained largely untouched by the terminology of race and began to describe themselves in racial terms only when they set foot in the United States. Since Jewishness remained an "all-encompassing identity" in Russia, these individuals were isolated "from pressures to define themselves" according to ethno-racial categories. (103) However, this conventional narrative of identity formation and racial ascription--both in the positive and negative meanings--should be revised. By taking into account the ways in which racialized forms of Jewishness began to develop in the imperial setting, an examination of these racial constructions sheds light on the broader formation of ethno-racial differences in the empire and helps revise a common narrative.

An earlier version of this article was first presented at the Department of History faculty seminar at Colby College and at the Russian-Jewish Studies Workshop at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. I thank all the participants for their suggestions, comments, and criticisms. I would also like to thank Nathaniel Knight, Marina Mogil'ner, Brian Porter, Amelia Glaser, and the editors of Kritika for their careful readings of various versions of this article. The research and writing of this article was generously supported by the Social Science Research Council and Colby College.

(1) David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 1.

(2) Loic J. D. Wacquant, "For an Analytic of Racial Domination," in Political Power and Social Theory 11, ed. Diane E. Davis (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1997), cited in George M. Frederickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 152.

(3) See, for example, the popular titles by Cornell West, Race Matters (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); and Paul Gilroy, Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

(4) See, for example, the recent studies by Benjamin H. Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); David M. Goldenberg, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader, eds., Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); and Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds., The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

(5) For two important exceptions, see Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); and Marina Mogil'ner, "Evreiskaia antropologiia v Rossii v kontekste evropeiskikh rasovykh issledovanii," in Istoriia i kul'tura rossiiskogo i vostochnoevropeiskogo evreistva: Novye istochniki, novye podkhody, ed. Oleg Budnitskii et al. (Moscow: Dom evreiskoi knigi, 2004), 116-43. Historians of Soviet Russia have expressed more interest in race and racial politics as a historical problem. See, for example, Eric Weitz, "Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges," Slavic Review 61, 1 (2002): 1-29 (with commentary on Weitz's article by Francine Hirsch, Amir Weiner, and Alaina Lemon); Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 6 (State-Struggle against German Biological Determinism); Peter Holquist, "State violence as Technique: The Logic of violence in Soviet Totalitarianism," in Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework, ed. Amir Weiner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 38-44; and V. B. Avdeev and A. N. Savel'ev, eds., Rasovyi smysl Russkoi idei: Sbornik statei, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Belye al'vy, 2000).

(6) See, for example, the discussion of ethnic categories and the problem of classification of the imperial population in the popular ethnographic textbook N. A. Ianchuk, ed., Narody Rossii: Kratkie ob" iasnitel'nye ocherki k khudozhestvenno-etnograficheskomu al'bomu (Moscow: I. Knebel', 1905), 4-9. For a suggestive analysis of the race/color distinction in the 19th- and 20th-century United States, see Thomas A. Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7-9; and Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 5-9.

(7) On the conflation of "race" and "ethnicity" in imperial Germany, see David Blackbourn, History of Germany, 1780-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 332-40. For America, see Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color. For France, see Chapman and Frader, "Introduction: Race in France," in Race in France, 5-7. On ethnicity in Russia, see Charles Steinwedel, "To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861-1917," in Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), chap. 3; Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Mark von Hagen, "The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire," in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, ed. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 3; Juliette Cadiot, "Searching for Nationality: Statistics and National Categories at the End of the Russian Empire (1897-1917)," Russian Review 64, 3 (2005): 440-55; and Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 65-82.

(8) George M. Frederickson, "Understanding Racism: Reflections of a Comparative Historian," in his The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 83-85; and Frederickson, Racism, 54-55.

(9) V. B. Avdeev, ed., Russkaia rasovaia teoriia do 1917 goda: Sbornik original'nykh rabot russkikh klassikov (Moscow: Feri-V, 2002), 2.

(10) For the reception of Herbert Spenser in Russia, see Michal Bohun, "Nicholai Michailovskii and Konstantin Leont'ev: On the Political Implication of Herbert Spenser's Sociology," Studies in East European Thought 54, 1/2 (2002): 71-86. For an analysis of a selective "misreading" of Spenser in the kingdom of Poland, see Brian A. Porter, "The Social Nation and Its Futures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Warsaw," American Historical Review 101, 5 (1996): 1470-92.

(11) See, for example, Steven G. Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 2 (Kropotkin's Anti-Darwinian Anarchism); James Allen Rogers, "Charles Darwin and Russian Scientists," Russian Review 19, 4 (1960): 382-83; and Rogers, "Darwinism, Scientism, and Nihilism," Russian Review 19, 1 (1960): 17-18.

(12) Laura Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siecle Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 130-31.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Neil MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 1870-2000 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 104, 107.

(15) John D. Klier, "German Anti-Semitism and Russian Judeophobia in the 1880s," Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 37, 4 (1989): 539-40. On anti-Jewish violence in Russia, see John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

(16) Most comparative histories place East European antisemitism, and the Russian variant in particular, outside the trajectory of "modern" antisemitism. See, for example, Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). William Brustein's Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ignores Russia in its entirety. Herbert Strauss also views Russian antisemitism as "qualitatively different from Western parallels." See Herbert Strauss, ed., Hostages of Modernization: Studies of Modern Antisemitism 1870-1933/39, 2 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993), 2: 1177. For a recent collection of essays that places Polish antisemitism in a broader historical and political context, see Robert Blobaum, ed., Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). A similar initiative has yet to be undertaken for Russia.

(17) On the politics of distancing for Jewish converts in comparative perspective, see Todd M. Endelman, "Memories of Jewishness: Jewish Converts and Their Jewish Pasts," in Jewish History and Jewish Memory: Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, ed. Elisheva Carlebach et al. (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press: 1998), 311-29.

(18) Eli Weinerman, "Racism, Racial Prejudice, and Jews in Late Imperial Russia," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, 3 (1994): 448, 472.

(19) The legal historian, Il'ia Grigor'evich Orshanskii, was one of the first and most influential scholars to make this argument (I. G. Orshanskii, Russkoe zakonodatel'stvo o evreiakh: Ocherki i issledovaniia [St. Petersburg: A. E. Landau, 1877]). For an important exception, see Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics, chap. 2 (Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism: A Reappraisal).

(20) S. Frederick Starr, "Tsarist Government: The Imperial Dimension," in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), 19. In his otherwise superb article, Nathaniel Knight fails to specify these so-called "exceptions." See Knight's "Ethnicity, Nationality, and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia," in Russian Modernity, 58.

(21) These points have been summarized expertly by Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 228-30. See also Kevin Tyner Thomas, "Collecting the Fatherland: Early-Nineteenth-Century Proposals for a Russian National Museum," in Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), chap. 4; and Burbank, "An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," Kritika 7, 3 (2006): 403-4.

(22) Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 187-232; and Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 21-23. See also Michael Banton, The Idea of Race (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977); and Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1982).

(23) Frederickson, Racism, 61.

(24) MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 21.

(25) See, for example, John Efron, Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siecle Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 13-58; Nancy Leys Stepan, "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science," in Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 38-57; and Stepan, "Race, Gender, Science, and Citizenship," Gender and History 10, 1 (1998): 26-52.

(26) Lisa Moses Leff, "Self-Definition and Self-Defense: Jewish Racial Identity in Nineteenth-Century France," Jewish History 19, 1 (2005): 7-22; and Eric L. Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 35-50.

(27) Eduardo A. Zimmerman, "Racial Ideas and Social Reform: Argentina, 1890-1916," Hispanic American Historical Review 72, 1 (1992): 31; and Mitchell Hart, Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).

(28) Nastol'nyi slovar' dlia spravok po vsem otrasliam znaniia (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1864), 3: 269; and Russkii entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1875), 1, pt. 4: 90. The word "race" had not appeared in Russian dictionaries in 1854 (Spravochnyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' [St. Petersburg: A. Dmitriev, 1854]).

(29) Steinwedel, "To Make a Difference," 72.

(30) I borrow the phrase "liberal humanism" from H. Glenny Penny and Matti Bunzl, ed., Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 1. Notions of biological evolution were absent in German anthropology for most of the 19th century; for the shift to biological determinism in German anthropology, see Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 66-85, 214-16; and Bunzl and Penny, "Introduction: Rethinking German Anthropology, Colonialism, and Race," in Worldly Provincialism, 21-22.

(31) A. M. Sementovskii, Etnograficheskii obzor Vitebskoi gubernii (St. Petersburg: M. Khan, 1872), 58; and Sementovskii, ed., Sbornik v pamiat' pervogo russkogo statisticheskogo s"ezda (St. Petersburg: M. Khan, 1872), 297.

(32) Nathaniel Knight, "Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1855," in Imperial Russia, 131.

(33) Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy, 124-46; Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 113-29; and Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 166-67.

(34) Robert Johnston, Travels through Part of the Russian Empire (New York: Arno, 1970), 331. Johnston's account first appeared in London in 1816.

(35) P. P. Chubinskii, ed., Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v zapadno-russkii krai 7 (St. Petersburg: K. B. Trubnikov, 1872): 3.

(36) A. Glagolev, Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika s 1823 po 1827 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi rossiiskoi akademii, 1837), pt. 1: 129.

(37) Narody Rossii: Etnograficheskie ocherki, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1878), 1: 390. For a similar observation, see the popular illustrated ethnographic album that sold for a modest nine rubles, Zhivopisnyi al'bom: Narody Rossii (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Kartograficheskogo zavedeniia A. Il'ina, 1880), 192, 199.

(38) Glagolev, Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika, 132-33; for other descriptions and accounts of the Jewish communities in the western borderlands, see M. I. Berlin, Ocherk etnografii evreiskogo narodonaseleniia v Rossii (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1861); and A. A. Alekseev, Ocherki domashnei i obshchestvennoi zhizni evreev: Ikh verovaniia, bogosluzhenie, prazdniki, obriady, Talmud i kagal, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: I. L. Tuzov, 1896).

(39) For an excellent account of the social engineering program of Nicholas I that stressed "gradualism," see Michael Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825-1855 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982).

(40) D. N. Anuchin, "Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii," Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (1900): 34.

(41) On the rise of statistics in Russia, see, for example, Martine Mespoulet, Statistique et revolution en Russie: Un compromis impossible, 1880-1930 (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001); and Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

(42) V. L'vovich, ed., Narody Russkogo tsarstva: Kniga dlia chteniia doma i v shkole (Moscow: M. V. Kliukin, 1901), 584.

(43) D. N. Anuchin, O geograficheskom raspredelenii rosta muzhskogo naseleniia Rossii (po dannym o vseobshchei voinskoi povinnosti v imperii za 1874-1883 gg.): Sravnitel'no s raspredeleniem rosta v drugikh stranakh (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1889), 113. See also Iokhanan Petrovskii-Shtern, Evrei v Russkoi armii, 1827-1914 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003), 204-9.

(44) For Central Europe, see Efron, Defenders of the Race, 99-100; and Sander Gilman, The Jews' Body (New York: Routledge, 1991), chap. 2 (The Jewish Foot: A Foot-note to the Jewish Body). For Russia, see M. L. Usov, Predanie i fakty (k evreiskomu voprosu), 2nd enl. ed. (St. Petersburg: [n. p.], 1910), 69-79.

(45) Daniel P. Todes, Darwin without Malthus: The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evolutionary Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Alexander Vucinich, Darwin in Russian Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See also the excellent review of these studies by Douglas R. Weiner in Isis 84, 1 (1993): 124-27.

(46) As quoted in Daniel P. Todes, "Darwin's Malthusian Metaphor and Russian Evolutionary Thought, 1859-1907," Isis 78, 4 (1987): 546.

(47) On Russian national style, see Todes, "Darwin's Malthusian Metaphor," 546; and Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World, chap. 2.

(48) See, for example, Richard Fogarty and Michael A. Osborne, "Constructions and Functions of Race in French Military Medicine," in The Color of Liberty, 226-27; and Robert A. Nye, Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 4 (Heredity or Milieu: The Born-Criminal Debate and the Foundations of Criminology).

(49) Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 237. On the influence of the French on criminal anthropology and the rejection of positivist Italian criminal anthropology, see, for example, the popular textbook by S. K. Gogel, Kurs ugolovnoi politiki v sviazi s ugolovnoi sotsiologiei (St. Petersburg: A. G. Rozen, 1910), esp. 1-165; Kh. M. Charykhov, Uchenie o faktorakh prestupnosti: Sotsiologicheskaia shkola v nauke ugolovnogo prava (Moscow: M. Kurskaia, 1910); and Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness, 128-64. For translations of French criminologists, see Gabriel de Tarde, Prestupnik i prestuplenie, trans. E. V. Vystavkina (Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 906); and Emil Loran, Tiuremnyi mir (tipy i kharakteristiki), trans. S. Shkliaver (St. Petersburg: Ia. Kantorovich, [n.d.]).

(50) David G. Horn, The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3-4. Horn takes issue with Robert Nye's Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France. Even some of the most influential racial theorists--such as the Italian criminologists Cesare Lombroso and Enrico Ferri--used the language of race imprecisely and inconsistently and, at times, even slipped from full-blown biological determinism to environmentalism. See, for example, Mary Gibson, "Biology or Environment? Race and Southern 'Deviancy' in the Writings of Italian Criminologists, 1880-1920," in Italy's "Southern Question": Orientalism in One Country, ed. Jane Schneider (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 103-6; and Gibson, Born to Crime: Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), chap. 3 (Race and Crime).

(51) Jan Sapp, Genesis: The Evolution of Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6.

(52) Hart, Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity, 10-11.

(53) For an excellent bibliography published by the Society for the Maintenance of the Health of the Jewish Population, see "Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' po voprosam zdravookhraneniia evreev," in Trudy Obshchestva okhraneniia zdorov'ia evreiskogo naseleniia, ed. V. I. Binshtok and S. A. Novosel'skii (Petrograd: Gramotnost', 1914), 44-60.

(54) "Nervnye i psikhicheskie zabolevaniia," Evreiskaia entsiklopediia: Svod znanii o evreistve i ego kul'ture v proshlom i nastoiashchem, 16 vols. (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 11: 669.

(55) I. Stavskii, "Shkol'no-patologicheskii tip v evreiskikh uchebnykh zavedeniiakh g. Odessy," Evreiskii meditsinskii golos, no. 1-2 (1911): 1-17.

(56) Bogdanov's own work was influenced by the noted French anthropologist and craniometrist Paul Broca (1824-80), who argued that brain size bore a direct relationship to intelligence. See, for example, Anatolii P. Bogdanov's translations of Broca's work that were printed in two installments: Paul Broca, comp., Antropologicheskie tablitsy dlia kraniologicheskikh i kefalometricheskikh vychislenii, trans. and ed. Anatolii P. Bogdanov (Moscow: S. P. Arkhipov, 1879). On Paul Broca, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 105-41. On Bogdanov, see D. N. Anuchin, "Nekrolog A. P. Bogdanov," in D. N. Anuchin o liudiakh russkoi nauki i kul'tury: Stat'i, nekrologi, i zametki, ed. A. V. Artsikhovskii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo geograficheskoi literatury, 1950), 237-55.

(57) "Antropologiia," Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Brokgauz-Efrona (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1890), 1A: 870-71; and Anuchin, "Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii," 25-42.

(58) L. D. Alekseeva, "Moskovskii universitet i stanovlenie prepodavaniia etnografii v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii," Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, series 8, no. 6 (1983): 54-62.

(59) V. V. Bogdanov, D. N. Anuchin, antropolog i geograf (1843-1923) (Moscow: Moskovskoe obshchestvo ispytatelei prirody, 1940), 23; and G. V. Karpov, Dmitrii Nikolaevich Anuchin (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1962), 8-11.

(60) For a short biography of Tarenetskii, see Professora voenno-meditsinskoi (medikokhirurgicheskoi) akademii (1798-1998) (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1998), 52.

(61) Anuchin, "Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii," 38. For a list of the regional museums in the Russian empire, see "Muzei," Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Brokgauz-Efrona, 20: 118-19. For a recent study of a regional museum, see Susan Nicole Smith, "Museum Practices and Notions of the Local in a Russian Provincial City, 898-1935," (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 2005). On German anthropology's provincial worldliness, see Penny and Bunzl, eds., Worldly Provincialism.

(62) A. A. Ivanovskii, "Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii inorodcheskogo naseleniia Rossii," Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (1902): 112.

(63) Anuchin, "Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii," 30.

(64) Ivanovskii, "Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii inorodcheskogo naseleniia Rossii," 116.

(65) A. A. Ivanovskii, "Opyt antropologicheskoi klassifikatsii naseleniia Rossii," Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal, no. 3-4 (1903): 107-8.

(66) Ibid., 152, 158.

(67) A. D. El'kind, Antropologicheskoe izuchenie evreev za poslednie desiat' let (Moscow: P. P. Riabushinskii, 1912), 1. See also his "Evrei," Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal, no. 3 (1902): 41-42; and Evrei: Sravnitel'no-antropologicheskoe issledovanie, preimushchestvenno po nabliudeniiam nad pol'skimi evreiami (Moscow: A. V. vasil'eva, 1903), with charts and graphs.

(68) R. L. Veinberg, "K izucheniiu o forme mozga cheloveka," Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (1902): 1-4, 12, 20-21.

(69) Mikhail Georgievich Iakovenko, Materialy k antropologii evreiskogo naseleniia Rogacheskogo uezda, Mogilevskoi gubernii (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, 1898), 48-50.

(70) See, for example, Frank Dikotter, "Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics," American Historical Review 103, 2 (1998): 467-78; Robert A. Nye, "The Rise and Fall of the Eugenics Empire: Recent Perspectives on the Impact of Biomedical Thought in Modern Society," Historical Journal 36, 3 (1993): 687-700; and Hart, Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity.

(71) Anuchin, "Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii," 32.

(72) MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 7.

(73) Ulinka Rublack, Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46. See also Frederickson, Comparative Imagination, 82.

(74) On the comparisons between Jews and blacks in the Russian setting, see Hans Rogger, "Conclusion and Overview," in Pogroms, 358. For the European context, see Neil MacMaster, "'Black Jew--White Negro': Anti-Semitism and the Construction of Cross-Racial Stereotypes," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6, 4 (2000): 65-82; and MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 209-23. On Jews in the Russian political imagination during the Great Reform era, see John Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the negative portrayal of Jews in popular fiction, see Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 231.

(75) On the 1878 law and the rise of political terrorism, see Jonathan Daly, "Political Crime in Late Imperial Russia," Journal of Modern History 74 (March 2002): 78, 86; and Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 23-48. On the involvement of Jews in political terrorism, see Erich Haberer, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Naum Abramovich, Di geshikhte fun der yidisher arbiter-bavegung in Rusland (Vilna: Tomor, 1931), 7-93.

(76) For an elaboration of this argument, see Eugene M. Avrutin, "A Legible People: Identification Politics and Jewish Accommodation in Tsarist Russia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2004). See also Harriet Murav, Identity Theft: The Jew in Imperial Russia and the Case of Avraam Uri Kovner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

(77) Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 2: 237.

(78) In August 1899, the Senate ruled that Jewish merchants did not have to display their full names in shop windows. On the legislation, see Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. 102, deloproizvodstvo 2, op. 76A, d. 1340, ll. 28 ob.-30; and Henrik B. Sliozberg, Pravovoe i ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Evreev v Rossii (St. Petersburg: Levenstein, 1907), 97-100.

(79) Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, 35. See also I. E. Antropova, Sbornik dokumentov po istorii evreev Urala (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2004), 102.

(80) Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) f. 821, op. 133, d. 792, l. 14; and GARF f. 102, deloproizvodstvo 2, op. 76A, d. 1969, l. 14. Police officials were not required to mark iz evreev for those individuals who converted to Lutheranism or Catholicism, although several Moscow officials disregarded the law and documented Jewish origin for all Jewish converts. The law was repealed in 1906. On the French Caribbean, see Laurent Dubois, "Inscribing Race in the Revolutionary French Antilles," in The Color of Liberty, 95-107.

(81) Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, 36-37; and Natan Meir, "Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in Kiev: Interethnic Relations in Late Imperial Associational Life," Slavic Review 65, 3 (2006): 495-96.

(82) Voennaia entsiklopediia, 17 vols. (St. Petersburg: I. D. Sytin, 1912), 7: 590, as quoted in Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "Another 'Yellow Peril': Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian Reaction before 1917," Modern Asian Studies 12, 2 (1978): 323. Siegelbaum notes that, during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, Russian military and police officials massacred between 3,000 and 3,500 Chinese workers. See also Viktoriia Romanova, Vlast' i evrei na Dal'nem Vostoke Rossii: Istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (Krasnoiarsk: Klaretianum, 2001), 86-87. For a popular pamphlet that discusses "what" Russians should do about the infiltration of the yellow race, see I. Levitov, Zheltaia rasa (St. Petersburg: G. A. Bernshtein, 1900).

(83) Novoe vremia, no. 10618 (23 September 1905), 4. See also Eva-Maria Stolberg, "The Siberian Frontier between 'White Mission' and 'Yellow Peril,' 1890s-1920s," Nationalities Papers 32, 1 (2004): 165-81. Compare to Elisa Campiscioli, "Reproducing the 'French Race': Immigration and Pronatalism in Early-Twentieth-Century France," in Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History, ed. Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 223, 227.

(84) Tyler Stovall, "National Identity and Shifting Imperial Frontiers: Whiteness and the Exclusion of Colonial Labor after World War I," Representations 84 (Fall 2003): 52-72; Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 27-109; and Gary P. Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1944-1975 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

(85) Paul Werth, "Arbiters of the Free Conscience: State, Religion, and the Problem of Confessional Transfer after 1905," in Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia, ed. Heather Coleman and Mark Steinberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

(86) Eugene M. Avrutin, "Returning to Judaism after the 1905 Law on Religious Freedom in Tsarist Russia," Slavic Review 65, 1 (2006): 90-110.

(87) On the Russian Right, see, for example, Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, chap. 7; Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, "Political Symbols and Rituals of the Russian Radical Right, 1900-1914," Slavonic and East European Review 76, 3 (1998): 441-66; and Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, "The 'Jewish Policy' of the Late Imperial War Ministry: The Impact of the Russian Right," Kritika 3, 2 (2002): 217-54.

(88) See, for example, Vampir, no. 6 (1906); Karikaturnyi listok, no. 4 (1906) and no. 5 (1906); Pluvium, no. 24 (17 March 1907) and no. 21 (24 February 1907); and Novoe vremia, no. 10599 (4 September 1905) and no. 1065 (10 November 1905).

(89) RGIA f. 1412, op. 251, d. 108 (1900); and f. 1412, op. 251, d. 117 (1915). For a discussion of name changes in the Russian context, see Andrew M. Verner, "What's in a Name? Of Dog-Killers, Jews, and Rasputin," Slavic Review 53, 4 (1994): 1046-70.

(90) Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 37.

(91) David Moon, "Peasants into Russian Citizens? A Comparative Perspective," Revolutionary Russia 9, 1 (1996): 47.

(92) Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire.

(93) RGIA f. 1412, op. 3, d. 486A (1917).

(94) For an elaboration of this argument, see Eugene M. Avrutin, "Kreshchenye evrei, etnicheskii konflikt, i politika povsednevnoi zhizni v Rossii vo vremia pervoi mirovoi voiny," in Mirovoi krizis 1914-1920 godov i sud'by vostochnoevropeiskogo evreistva, ed. Oleg Budnitskii et al. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005).

(95) Amir Weiner, "Nothing but Certainty," Slavic Review 61, 1 (2002): 50.

(96) In the years leading up to the Revolution of 1917, Russian scientists engaged in population genetics and in the eugenics movement that became popular in liberal European settings (progressive eugenics) as well as in more reactionary environments (negative eugenics). In 1913, Iurii Aleksandrovich Filipchenko, among other scientists, popularized some of these "new" ideas by lecturing at St. Petersburg University on Mendelian genetics, biometrics, and mutation theory and publishing several articles and textbooks on these subjects. See, for example, Mark B. Adams, "Eugenics in Russia, 1900-1940," in The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia, ed. Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 160; and Loren R. Graham, "Science and values: The Eugenics Movement in Germany and Russia in the 1920s," American Historical Review 82, 5 (1977): 1145. The Ministry of the Interior was also not impervious to the latest breakthroughs in criminal science that were infused with the language of race. Confronted with the growing problem of recidivism and political terrorism, the ministry began to rely on the techniques established by Alphonse Bertillon to detect criminals based on anthropometric measurements of the body and forensic photography. The Bertillon system, as it came to be called, was premised on the principle that all human measurements were racially fixed and obeyed objective, statistical norms. In the inter-revolutionary period, the St. Petersburg police force received taxonomic charts based on the Bertillon system; in their descriptions of the criminal body, police officials were instructed to pay particular attention to physiognomic indicators that served as important clues to criminal identity: nose, ear, mouth, and race if the suspects were colored (esli tsvetnokozhii). See, for example, Kratkoe rukovodstvo dlia antropologicheskikh izmerenii s tsel'iu opredeleniia retsidistov, sostavlennoe po sisteme Bertil'ona (izdano po rasporiazheniiu S.-Peterburgskogo gradonachal'nika) (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Kantseliarii S.-Peterburgskogo gradonachal'nika, 1891); M. W. Lebedeff, Note concernant l'organisation de la Police des Recherches criminelles et Service d' identification des Recidivistes: Rapport fait au 1-er Congres de la Police judiciaire internationale (Paris: E. Worlff, 1914); "Novyi oblegchennyi universal'nyi fotograficheskii apparat A. Bertil'ona," Vestnik politsii, nos. 12, 13, 16 (1908); and Iain Lauchlan, Russian Hide and Seek: The Tsarist Secret Police in St. Petersburg, 1906-1914 (Helsinki: SKS-FLS, 2002), 191-92.

(97) See the judicious comments in MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 55-57.

(98) On the construction of stereotypes, see Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), esp. 15-38.

(99) As Peter Kolchin has recently pointed out, even some of the most developed and sophisticated scholarly literatures on race--such as the "new" whiteness studies--tend to ignore actual social relations and focus on representations of whiteness. See Kolchin's review article: "Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America," Journal of American History 89, 1 (2002): 154-73.

(100) See Paul W. Werth, "The Legal Regulation of Mixed Marriage in the Russian Empire, 1721-1917" (unpublished manuscript). Compare to Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), chap. 4 (Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: Cultural Competence and the Dangers of Metissage).

(101) Robert P. Geraci, "Going Abroad or Going to Russia? Orthodox Missionaries in the Kazakh Steppe, 1881-1917," in Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia, ed. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 310.

(102) Lieven, Empire, 274-75.

(103) Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness, 95-98. In his recent study, David R. Roediger acknowledges that new immigrants may have been exposed to the vocabulary of race before their "arrival," but he nevertheless concludes that the "marking of the 'paradigmatic truth' of a sharp break between home country experiences of race and U.S. experiences remains compelling evidence against a pat conclusion that the immigrants were simply white before coming." See Roediger, Working towards Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 119.

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