Public perceptions of corruption in Ethiopia: assessment and descriptive analysis.
According to Johnston (2010), corruption is not a coherent national attribute in the same sense as GDP or average rainfall, it is often secretive, and takes place in diverse forms and settings. The Namibia Institute for Democracy (2012) lists nine types of corruptions and offers precise context based definitions. This list of corruption includes bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, favoritism, nepotism, and illegal contributions (e.g., an individual or group may give money to a political party in power in exchange for some value). However, one may add to this long list what Garoupa and Klerman (2010) identify as another type of corruption which is called collusion, a case of corruption which the literature tends to overlook. Collusion takes place when law enforcers pay citizens to commit a crime in order to collect a reward (Garoupa & Klerman, 2010). Within acts of corruption, there are also forms and levels such as petty and grand corruption as well as business and organized and chaotic corruptions.
The complex nature of corruption makes it hard to sort out the theoretical literature and to categorize them into one or two broad theories, normative or positive (Kayizzi-Mugerwas, 2003). The vast literature on corruption tends to focus primarily on definition and assessment (Johnston, 2010), measurements of impact (Heston & Kumar, 2008), preventative strategies (World Policy Institute, 2010), and policy prescriptions (World Policy Institute, 2010). The literature also identifies the conditions under which corruption thrives vigorously. The conditions include, lack of freedom of the press (Megiso, 2007, Us Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007), large-scale privatizations (Koyuncu, Ozturkler & Yilmaz, 2010), low or the total absence of property rights (Us Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007), and concentration of political and economic power (Us Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007).
Megiso (2007) and Arriola (2008) state corruption in Ethiopia is known to have flourished particularly in the areas of land sales and government housing, provision of telephone and electric services, licensing and issuance of permits and collection of taxes and procurement. Customs and excise offices are also believed to be affected by corrupt practices. Similarly, a recent corruption perception survey conducted by Kilimanjaro International (2012) has identified municipalities (95%), tax collection agencies (89%), the courts (81%), and kebele administrations (80%) being as the most vulnerable to corruption. They are followed by the police (79%), woreda administrations (76%), educational institutions (29%) and even parliament is reported to be corrupt at the level of the 22nd percentile.
These conditions are ominously present in the Ethiopian political-economy and provide the basis and rationale for conducting this study. Therefore, this study attempted to assess the status and corrosive nature of corruption in Ethiopia through the lenses of public officials and other relevant communities of Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia.
BACKGROUND OF THIS STUDY
In May 2001, Article Seven of the establishment Proclamation of the current regime of Ethiopia established a Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) with the aim of creating offenses awareness in society about the corrosive effects of corruption, promoting ethics and anti-corruption education. The agency was also empowered investigating and prosecuting corruption and improprieties. Unfortunately, studies made since the establishment of the FEACC in 2001and the realities on the ground have shown little progress being made in mitigating corruption. Furthermore, despite lofty pronouncements against corruption by the ruling party, there is wavering political support to address corruption.
The environment in which corruption has become a serious problem in the country is well described by recent remarks by the two influential men and powerbrokers of the ruling party, founders of Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Mr. Sebhat Nega and the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In his February 2012 address to parliament, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was observed expressing his frustration about the rampant corruption in the country. He told his audience that when it comes to the case of urban land, the revolving door of embezzlement involves two kinds of thieves (embezzlers): those working for the government and those working in the private sector. In a follow up parliamentary address, which was delivered in March 2012 (Zenawi: March 17, 2012), he seemed to be subdued and even sounded defeated by the extent of corruption in the country. He admitted that his administration learned that going after corrupt officials was insufficient, and perhaps an exercise in futility and an unwinnable war.
Consequently, he said, his administration has now shifted toward focusing on drying up the "sources (polluted wells) of corruption which have been mudding the waters." He then spelled out three major policy decisions that his administration had begun implementing: (a) modernizing the customs and revenue department and how taxes are paid; (b) reforming urban land ownership via the new urban land lease law; and (c) exposing the opaque and highly oligopolistic market structures to increased competition. He admitted, however, that the fight against corruption is an uphill battle mainly because corruption has elephant owners and those entrenched into it are fighting the government reform efforts tooth and nail. On February 22, 2012, Mr. Nega who currently heads the government affiliated think-tank, Ethiopian Peace and International Affairs Institute, lamented about the pervasive nature of corruption in the country to the extent that the rampant corruption castigated both the Ethiopian Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the government for its unwillingness to fight corruption. Corruption is so rampant, he argued, it even permeates the religious institutions.
The concern of the two leaders about the coercive nature of corruption in Ethiopia is abundantly clear. Their concern is also born by unfavorable corruption rankings by several NGOs such as Transparency International, Global Integrity, World Bank's Governance Indicators, Trust Organization, Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). Reputable agencies and scholars who empirically established the existence of and the permeating nature of corruption in Ethiopia include: U.S. State Department's Annual Reviews, the World Bank (2004), African Economic Studies (2008), Ayalew (2005), Mengistu and Vogel (2009), Tamyalew (2010), Kidan (2010), Mezmur (2011), Arriola (2011) and Kilimanjaro International and FEACC (2012).
A recent study by the World Bank (2012), in collaboration with the FEACC, however, concluded that, "The diagnostics strongly suggests that in Ethiopia, corruption practice in the delivery of basic services is comparatively limited and potentially much lower than other low-income countries (World Bank, 2012:1). Why the Bank seems to be oblivious to the findings of the studies cited above, and for that matter its own earlier findings, is not self-evident to us. What is further not self-evident is the failure of the World Bank's study not even to take note of then Prime Minister and Sebhat Nega's call on the Ethiopian people to stand against corruption. The Bank assessed the corruption situation in Ethiopia as comparatively lower than other places. The authors also find the choice of word "potentially" in a diagnostic work that, according to the editor, Janelle Plummer, is meant "... to fill [the] information gap" in the study of corruption in Ethiopia rather vague, if not downright deceptive.
The U.N. Convention against Corruption of December 09, 2003 highly recommends to member states to establish mechanisms, such as anti-corruptions commissions, which among other things will provide protection to would be reporters of corrupt behavior by government officials. The Ethiopian regime, to its credit has established such a commission. Megiso's study (2007), sponsored study by the FEACC, gave the commission a high mark in meeting some of its stated objectives, including pressing charges against 500 "corrupters" of whom 100 received a sentence of 1to 19 years of imprisonment (Megiso, 2007). The study, however, identifies what it considers "major problems encountered" by the Commission such as capacity constraints and a judicial system that does not seem to grasp the corrosive effect of corruption. The author of this study mentions the absence of "vibrant media" with the potential to expose corrupt behaviors by individuals and most importantly, government officials (Megiso, 2007). Another FEACC commissioned study (Kilimanjaro International: 2011, 2012) reported that "... corruption has become a serious problem and is getting worse rather than improving [and this is] despite the government's efforts" (p.96). The Kilimanjaro International study identified public officials and civil servants to be the main instigators of corruption behavior. In other words, the Ethiopian state, not only it does not seem to have established a strong institutional mechanism in place that has the capacity to fight against the culture of corruption, but even if it does, the indications are that the confidentiality of the reporters was not kept confidential, and their bona fide reports were often not fully investigated. Protection mechanisms in place or not, the majority of the respondents to our survey think that government officials ignore conflict of interest issues in the conduct of their respective functions.
The survey instrument was administered to a convenience sample of participants during March-April 2011. The instrument was composed of twenty-four questions (using Likert-type items), three multiple choice questions, thirteen yes/ no/don't know questions, and two open-ended questions. Additionally, given the government sanctioned ethnic sensitivity and the assumption that ethnic factors may have significant influence on respondents; the survey instrument included seven demographic questions. The questions in the aggregate were typical of what a survey instrument would involve in surveying households and firms. In other words, the questionnaire does not ask specific questions about government offices, how they function, handle their own budgets, conduct procurements, or quality of services delivered to the public. This approach was purposefully designed to gather as much information as possible from respondents without fear of implicating themselves.
This approach also addressed the authors' concern that government employees may not always openly discuss corruption and/or may be reluctant to tarnish the image of their won offices and departments. At the same time this survey instrument would allow one to compare survey results with those already obtained by others who posed similar questions to households and firms. The questionnaire was assessed for content and construct validity by a panel of experts in and around the university of Addis Ababa. The panel was composed of experts in business, religion, NGOs, and several panelists were university professors and affiliated professionals. In addition, the questionnaire was piloted prior to distribution.
Sample and Data Collection
One thousand questionnaires were distributed by the researchers to a central office of organizations, departments, and colleges in Addis Ababa. The questionnaires were placed in unsealed envelopes with an instruction and a request to return the surveys in a sealed envelope that was provided by the researchers. The actual distribution of the questionnaires was left to representatives such as department heads and administrative assistants, but respondents were instructed to return their respected survey responses in the sealed envelope only to a designated secretarial staff. All efforts have been made to ensure anonymity and in return increase both the rate of return and the integrity of the survey.
Of the one thousand surveys that were distributed to the convenience sample, 564 usable responses were returned for a response rate of 56.4 percent. Since the survey was written in English, the single prequalifying characteristic for participating in the survey was English language comprehension.
In terms of a methodological approach to presenting and analyzing the data, many researchers recognize and suggest a study to include elements of both quantitative and qualitative strategies (Creswell, 2003; Trochim & Domelly, 2007; Mengistu & Vogel, 2009). Given the organization and design of the survey instrument, the preferred method is a quantitative approach.
RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
Respondents were asked to share with the researchers their respective gender, age group, marital status, religion, ethnic identity, to whom they work for, and primary language spoken at home. The question on the primary language spoken at home was meant to kind of provide a "safe choice" for those who do not wish to identify themselves as "ethnic" as a significant portion of the society views ethnic identity as imposed by the ruling party.
Given the sensitive nature of ethnic identity, the questionnaire asked first if respondents would like to voluntarily identify their respective ethnicity and that question was followed by what it is the primary language spoken in their respective homes. It was felt that since a large portion of the country would not like to ethnically identify, language identification may serve as a category. Of the total 564 respondents, only 3 percent identified themselves as Gurage, 12 percent Oromo, 5 percent Tigre, only 6 percent said Ethiopian, 22 percent identified themselves as Amhara and the large percentage, 46 percent declined/refused to identify themselves.
The self-reported response to language was somewhat in reverse order, 63 percent of respondents indicating Amharic being the language spoken at home, followed by a 20 percent of respondents declining to identify the primary language spoken in their respective homes. The details of the specific percentages for ethnicity, language and religion are presented in Table 1.
The Extent or the Prevalence of Corruption in the Ethiopian Administrative System
The survey questionnaire about Ethiopian corruption begins with the question: In your view, how corrupt is the administrative system in Ethiopia? As shown in Table 2, only 0.7 percent of the respondents say that the Ethiopian administration is not at all corrupt while at least 88.3 percent of the respondents indicate corruption is more prevalent in the Ethiopian administrative system. As reported below, this negative perception about the existing system is similar to the ones, the authors present later using another research question, which asks respondents to evaluate whether the government's overall fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies are transparent.
Rating the Integrity of Key Public Agencies
Ethiopian corruption perception survey asked respondents to put a corruption ranking in numerical figures from 1 to 10, (10 being the most) to 14 government organizations. As shown in Table 3, Participating respondents ranked hospital and medical service sectors as the most corrupt government agencies, followed by mass media and news service personnel, health care workers (Doctors, Nurses, Heath Care Administrators), and persons at the institutions of higher education, respectively. Even though none of the listed government sectors are rated favorably, the results of corruption ratings, which involve nearly 71 percent of government bureaucrats, differ from those obtained by other researchers, whose corruption survey respondent targets were households and firms.
In general, customs and traffic police repeatedly find themselves cited as the most corrupt and least honest organizations. The fact that Ethiopian bureaucrats and elite members of the community find the educational and health care institutions which are agencies that provide services for which there are little to no alternative and expected to be more egalitarian than others as most corrupt, should be troubling to the relevant authorities.
It should be noted that the respondents of this corruption survey are government bureaucrats and "elite members of the community." By design, the corruption perception survey, therefore, measures perceptions from its demand side as opposed from its victims' side (households). Moreover, corruption is believed to be most widespread among bureaucrats.
As insiders to corruptive practices, bureaucrats and other elite members of the community are expected to have more direct knowledge, contact and information about actual corruptive practices and level of corruption as compared to households and firms. Their corruption perception, in aggregate may reveal the pervasive nature of corruption in the country than those of households. In the Ethiopian unique case in which government bureaucrats (who account for about 71% of the respondents) and some members of the elite community are the survey responses targets, the authors understand that it is not easy for such kind of survey respondents to base their perceptions about or attitude toward corruption on personal experience.
Actual Corruption Encounters
The majority of respondents as shown in Table 4 below (in all ten cases of potentially observable corruption incidents) strongly deny to have observed any type of actual corruption. Even though survey respondents failed to candidly tell us if they or persons they know have witnessed or experienced an actual corruption incident, such a lack of correspondence between the existence of high level corruption perception and actually experiencing corruption is very common in the country. For example, such a lack of correspondence is documented by Association for the People-APAP (2001). Kidan (2010) also notes the existence of similar discrepancies. Using the 2008 Transparency Ethiopia's corruption perception survey results he wonders why survey respondents is ranked corruption as the fourth most important socioeconomic problem following the problems of escalating costs of living, unemployment, and housing while at the same time 63%-75% of the same respondents indicating corruption as being abhorrent and unjustifiable.
While not being outside of what other researchers have reported, the authors believe the results presented in Table 4 are both unique and somewhat contradictory. For one, the denial by the majority of survey respondents for not having personally experienced/witnessed an actual incidence of corruption contradicts the responses that these same respondents tell us in the majority of the research question items within this corruption perception survey. Secondly, the corruption rankings obtained here somewhat differ from and in contradiction to findings made by other researchers and organizations about the extent of corruption in the country. For example, the 2008 Transparency Ethiopia corruption diagnostic baseline survey reports that a tabulation of survey responses indicate "... escalating cost of living, unemployment, housing, corruption and drugs have been rated as the five most serious problems in the country and given ratings of 99.8%, 95.3%, 84.7%, 81.8% and 74.5% respectively."
An online report, www.trust.org, citing business-anti-corruption.com as its main source, also reports corruption being high in the country to the extent that corruption is institutionalized in some sectors such as land distribution and administration and the tax system which "... generally is considered to lack transparency and to contain many corrupt officials." It is also in contradiction to the 1998 report of the World Bank which states corruption being very high, pervasive and widespread in the public revenue system (customs and taxation) and public procurement.
Public Officials and Corruption
Government reports such as court proceedings and convictions related to corruption, weekly reports of both government-controlled and privately owned newspapers and reports from online blogs, strongly indicate that the Ethiopian people are paying bribes just to get their basic services. The list of professions reported receiving bribes include members of the police force and traffic officers, teachers, government officials at many levels and political cadres. The government "acknowledges the widespread existence of petty corruption (World Bank: vi). In order to gauge the problems, survey respondents were presented with Likert-type questions dealing with nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, etc.... As presented in Table 5 below, combining the choices of "strongly agree" and "agree," respondents believe that, in all six items, government officials are involved in corruption by a wide margin save one: having personal knowledge of an actual bribe being paid to civil servants.
Table 5 shows that 52.3 percent of the respondents happen to know people who bribe civil servants in order to avoid paying the full assessment of taxes and other charges. The fact that 72% of the respondents either strongly agree or agree for bribery being part of everyday life, but a good majority of them have rarely seen it (as mentioned in Table 4 above), strongly indicates the reluctance or refusal of survey respondents to have witnessed an actual corruption taking place.
Evaluating Governmental Institutions
The World Bank, in its 1998, 2007 and 2009 reports, stated that the Ethiopian system being highly opaque, the ruling party owned companies possessing the commanding heights of the Ethiopian economy, these same companies enjoying preferential treatments "over private sector companies with respect to government contracts, government controlled credit facilities, import and export licenses, and customs clearances." World Bank, 1998:7). As Channie's (2007) shows, the Ethiopian system being highly clientelistic and political patronage and nepotism is the norm rather than the exception. Negash (2006) explains the systematic nature of conflict of interest involving high government officials including their respective subordinates. What do government bureaucrats and other members of the elite community think about such findings? The survey results dealing with these and related issues are presented in Table 6.
Overall, the responses to the survey items in table 6 are near 3-way splits, making it hard to interpret. However, 71 percent of the respondents indicate that the government of Ethiopia does not assure openness, equity, and efficiency in government hiring, thereby affirming the existence of patronage and opaqueness of the entire system. Furthermore, respondents indicate the existence of corruption within the bidding/tendering processes even though it is at the low rate of 31.1 percent. Additionally, 42.3 percent of the respondents report that the national law of Ethiopia does not provide protection to private citizens, who, in good faith, report acts of corruption.
As the responses in "Key public corruption ranking" in Table 7 indicates that even institutions such as the military, government providers of medical services and school teachers are viewed to be highly corrupt. Under the title "no corrupt" in the second column in Table 7, the ranking order (descending) of the high ten (10) responses assigned by participating respondents to the selected statements are: customs and Tax Revenue Service (IRS) employees (41.8%), municipal workers (38.2%), Traffic Police (33.7%), Judiciary-Judge And Prosecutors (27.9%), Police force (19.2%), school teachers (18.0%), prison guards (15.6%), parliamentarians (15.3), workers at the bank-lenders, etc. (14.8%), and military (14.6%).
Under the title "corrupt" in the third column in Table 7, the ranking order (descending) of the high ten (10) responses assigned by participating respondents to the selected statements are: hospital and medical services (92.3%), mass media and news service personnel (88.7%), health care workers-doctors, nurses, heath care administrators (87.2%), persons at the institutions of higher education (85.7%), military (85.4%), workers at the bank-lenders, etc. (85.2%), Parliamentarians (84.7%), prison guards (84.4%), School Teachers (82.0%), and Police Force (80.8%).
Corruption and the Role of Foreign Aid
Whether or not foreign aid can exacerbate corruptive behavior is an unsettled issue. Among the several authors who find positive correlations between increased donor aid and corruption included Alesina and Weder (2002), Ali and Isse (2003), Moyo (2009), Newby (2010), Transparency International, Feinstein International Center and The Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (2008). As reported in Table 8 below, respondents to this survey agree to the findings of the empirical literature about the contribution of aid to corruption.
As shown in Table 8, respondents strongly agree with the recommendations that donors withhold their aid if there is evidence of corruption affecting earlier contracts; aid recipient governments to be required to allow independent local, national and international media to do their investigative work and allow government agencies to be open for the investigative work; aid recipient governments be required to raise awareness of the damaging effects of corruption; and that the donor should place investigative mechanisms in order to crack down on corruption; and donors to withhold funds unless the recipient government undertakes genuine civil service reforms.
Nepotism, Crony-Capitalism, Patronage and the Opacity of the Ruling Party
The existence and practice nepotism, patronage and cronyism have been documented by the World Bank and the U.S. State Department annual reports on several occasions, in addition to routine complaints by opposition parties and the general public. Vaughn and Tronvoll (2003: 54) report that, "... beyond these two areas, it seems clear that the private sector has not grown to the extent that it represents an effective voice in the political arena Milkias (2003) further reports that the ruling party officials are known to provide preferential treatments to party-owned companies in their handling of import-export licenses, customs clearances and import duties and even in pressuring foreign companies and NGOs to primarily collaborate with party-owned companies.
Vestal (1999), Young (1997), and Anonymous (2006) document not only the complex web of corporate ownership structure is unique to Ethiopia but also these authors individually and collectively document that public resources and funds are often used as seed capital for the political party owned conglomerates. It is also reported that these party official owned and operated companies are immune from paying taxes since they enjoy the legal cover of being "endowed" institutions. Given the findings of the empirical literature, this survey attempts to assess the perceptions of government bureaucrats and other members of the elite community regarding nepotism, crony-capitalism, etc. The survey provided the four items, as presented in Table 9 below, with the options "Yes", "No" or "I Do Not Know." The findings, of Table 9 below, are at best unclear as, on the one hand, they seem to support the findings of the empirical literature and on the other hand refute them.
Table 9 shows that 47.5 percent of the respondents reported that the ruling party affiliated companies have unfair access to loans while 42.2 percent do not know and the clear minority, 9.7 percent, reported that it is not the case at all. And yet a slight majority of respondents, 53.7 percent indicate that ruling party affiliated companies win tenders. Furthermore, about 52% of the respondents choosing the "I Do Not Know" option may further indicate the respondents' unwillingness to express their explicit knowledge about the rampant corruption they reported earlier to have existed. In regards to conducting fair and accurate auditing, only 15.1 of the survey respondents said it is easy to do, while the combined scores for those who reported that conducting fair and accurate auditing in Ethiopia is very hard to impossible is 76.9 percent.
Governance and Economic Policies
The next set of survey questions dealt with the protection of property rights and enforcing contracts, transparency in fiscal, monetary, banking and exchange rates and taxation policies. One of the cardinal roles of a government is the protection of property rights and enforcing contacts. Failure to secure property rights would indicate, among other governance and policy issues, institutional dysfunctionality to execute the proper role of government in the country.
As Arriola (2011:14) reports, Ethiopia high-level officials are suspected to have the "opportunity to enrich themselves by colluding with economic interests to evade regulation or commit fraud." This may be why the 2007 International Property Rights Index (IPRI) placed Ethiopia in its bottom quartile, near dead last--68th out of 70 countries. With zero being the weakest and 10 being the strongest in the protection of property rights, Ethiopia has received 2.7 ranking.
Using similar ranking method, the 2002-2011 TI's corruption ranking of Ethiopia, respectively, were: (3.5), (2.5), (2.3), (2.2), (2.4), (2.4), (2.6), (2.7), (2.7), and (2.7). The 25th edition of the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2011: 131) also reports that "Ethiopian and foreign investors alike complain about patronage networks and de facto preferences shown to businesses owned by the government or associates of the ruling party, for example, in the form of preferential access to bank credit, foreign exchange, access to land, procurement contracts and import duties."
Laying out high quality policy frameworks allows a government to guarantee price and exchange rate stability and sustainable fiscal and external balances. In order to maintain stability in prices and exchange rates, the central bank needs to operate independently from fiscal authorities and/or ruling parties. In general, unsustainable fiscal and external balances, volatile and multiple exchange rates, distorted interest rate regimes and unreliable statistics are symptoms of a non-transparent government.
The survey results dealing with these issues are presented in Table 10. It can be seen that a slight majority (52%) disagree that the securities of property and contract rights are well protected, while 39.1% agreed with the statement. When asked what is the likelihood for some businesses not to pay their share of government taxes 67.4% of survey respondents believe it is likely, while only 6.4% of the respondents said that it is unlikely. Regarding their knowledge about some businesses receiving favors such as access to easier bank loans, only 3.7% indicate the claim to be unlikely while 83.7% of respondents affirming to the statement. However, 12.6 % of the respondents chose the "I Do Not Know" option.
Lastly, when asked to evaluate, the kind of the "catch all and tell all" statement, which is: "Overall, Do You Believe That There Is Transparency of Economic Policy (Fiscal Policy, Taxation, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy?", a slight majority of the respondents (54.7%) said there is little or no transparency while 40.5% of the them indicated that there is some or complete transparency.
The almost split response here by the survey participants may represent either a lack of a good working knowledge of the complex nature of fiscal and monetary policies or the 40.5% response is another example of declining to report by partisan government bureaucrats, a situation that requires further investigation as the study here does not control for reporting by either ethnic or party affiliation.
The Government's Commitment, Ability and Willingness in Fighting Corruption
The theory of jurisprudence in democratic governance in general suggests that since the judiciary is assumed to shape how the country is governed, it must be independent and act according to the written laws of the country. Experts in the field such as International Crisis Group (March 2012), USAID (1993), Blechinger (2005), and the online sourcebooks of Transparency International, agree that a government which sincerely wants to curb corruption needs to eliminate the growth opportunities of corruption. Doing so may require, among other things, improving the legal system, insure transparency, accountability and independence of the judiciary system from interference by high-ranking officials.
Furthermore, a government which truly wants to curb corruption understands the importance of a free press and values the assistance of civic organizations and independent monitoring systems in fighting corruption. Highly opaque business-political relationships and the lack of free press, on the other hand, weaken a government's ability to fight corruption. As Blechinger (2005) notes, party domination in all branches of government can make structural checks and balances obsolete. These problems are more likely to be exasperated when there is one-party dominance and control over public assets and government institutions.
To assess the Ethiopian ruling party's commitment, ability and willingness to fight corruption, participants to this survey were given the items in Table 11. Combining the response percentiles for "not all committed" and "not very committed," 66.3% respondents said that the government is not committed in fighting crime of corruption. 31.6% of the respondents, however, reported that the Ethiopian government is very committed or committed to fighting corruption. Interestingly enough there was no response to the research question on the government's ability to fighting corruption.
As to the question of how well is the government doing in handling the matter of corruption, a combined percentile for "not at all" and "not very" is 65.9%, while the combined percentage for "committed" and "very committed" is 32.4%. The vast majority of those surveyed expressed their doubts about the government's commitment, and perhaps, even its sincerity in fighting corruption.
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The two main limitations of the corruption survey are content and access to the general population. In the first case, the design of the survey is not comprehensive, as it does not cover all aspects of corruption across all sectors of the public spheres even though its content had many manifestations and indicators of corruptions. In the second case, the limitation is that respondents to the survey, as already acknowledged, were residents of Addis Ababa. Given these two limitations, the generalizability of our survey findings might be somewhat limited.
However, the authors' analysis suggests that by mostly focusing on public officials and elite professionals who reside in Addis Ababa, this survey adds to efforts in diagnosing the extent of corruption in the country in addition to raising the level of awareness on the part of the public, the current regime and even to those who participated in responding to the survey. The authors believe that the findings of this study are of an interest to many scholars and the stakeholders in the Ethiopian public affairs.
At least two-thirds of the survey respondents are government employees. Given this populace, the authors anticipated contradictions, reticence responses and non-responses to survey questions that could be construed as self-incriminatory and/or reluctance to incriminate the bureaucracy that they are a part. In accordance with results by other researchers, a significant majority of the participating respondents who categorically (and contradictorily) denied to having witnessed an incidence of corruption.
Scholarly studies, reports from donor agencies, public complaints and newspaper accounts strongly indicate that corruption is expanding unabated in Ethiopia. Using several themes of corrupting practices, this multi-dimensional corruption survey has attempted to assess through the lens of public officials and other relevant communities of Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, the status and corrosive nature of corruption in Ethiopia. The survey asked public officials and some members of the "elite community" of Addis Ababa about their perception of corruption and their corruption experiences, if any. The rather unique nature and distinguishing characteristic of this survey is that, instead of asking the victims of corruption, that is, households and firms as done customarily, we targeted government bureaucrats and a representative of the elite society in order to assess their perceptions and feelings about the extent of corruption in the country.
Participants to the survey were further asked, among other things, if they believe that the government is committed and is currently doing enough to combat the pervasive nature of corruption. The overall findings of this survey are that the nation is experiencing, as the two powerbrokers. The late Prime Minister Zenawi and Mr. Sibhat Nega admitted corruption in the country being endemic to the extent that it has "elephant owners" and has permeated religious institutions.
Survey respondents believe that favoritism and nepotism are ubiquitous and all the key government institutions listed in the survey are corrupt. Favoritism and nepotism are known to exist particularly in the areas of recruitments and appointments to minor and significant posts including the courts, military and security apparatus. A significant percentage of the respondents reported that preferences are given to individuals and party affiliated organizations access to government funds, bank loans, and public procurement biding opportunities, that the written laws and codes are largely ignored or circumvented with new directives.
They believe that the judiciary system itself is corrupt and even the effectiveness of some among its ranks in fighting against corruption is diminished due to the lack of judicial independence and the ever presence of political interference by member of the ruling party. A majority of survey respondents conflict of interest is pretty common and overall the system lacks integrity and institutional transparency; that donor aid should be tied to improved governance and measurable reform and the FEACC largely a veneer and ineffective.
The findings of this study also support the findings of the empirical literature thesis: reticence. Unlike ordinary citizens and firms, bureaucrats have more direct knowledge and information about actual corruption. Despite this fact, a great majority of respondents failed to report if they or persons they know have actual experiences with corruption and they did this at the same time when they were confirming about the presence and the pervasive nature of corruption in the country. The tendency to omit truth when ethical dilemma is involved and the frequent discrepancy between perceptions and experiences are perhaps universal problems.
But what to do with them in any serious undertaking to combating endemic corruption such as the case in Ethiopia is beyond this paper. The best this paper can offer, by way of conclusion, is some general statements of systemic reform. The findings of this multidimensional corruption perception survey which involves more than two-thirds of government bureaucrats indicate avenues for further research, among them being the impact of donor aid on corruption as applied to Ethiopia.
The authors of this study have drawn the following conclusions. First the survey results indicate that corruption is endemic and pandemic in Ethiopia. Second, crony-capitalism, favoritism, nepotism and opacity are ubiquitous. Third, the lack of institutional capacities such as a free media and independent judiciary system provide an enabling environment for corruption to thrive. Fourth, the findings of the study suggest that lack of transparency in government fiscal and monetary policies contributes (omit "s") to corruption. Fifth, the study also suggests that one of the main sources of corruption is the government system of public procurement, a topic that the authors intend to isolate as an area of investigation and study. Sixth, even government bureaucrats and elite participants to this survey seriously question the commitment and even the sincerity of the government to fighting corruption.
The authors believe that the Ethiopian unique corruption perception survey results have important policy and administrative implications to all stakeholders, such as the government of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian people, donor nations and multinational institutions, the international business community and those who are working against the scourge of corruption globally.
The Survey Instrument
Subject: Questionnaire on perception of corruption in Ethiopia
The purpose of this survey is to assess the people's perceptions about corruption in Ethiopia. We hope to use the completed survey in understanding the extent of corruption in the country. We also hope that the data collected and analyzed will assist policy makers, citizens and civic organizations in combating corruption and in promoting transparency and accountability in the country.
We would request the questionnaire to be filled or answered by you and return to us sealed in the enveloped provided within 5 days of receiving this questionnaire. Should you have any question, please do not hesitate to contact Dr Tilahun Tekelu or Dr Berhanu Mengistu by dialing the following phone number: 0111246680.
Instructions for completing the questionnaire:
* All surveys are confidential
* Do not put your name on the survey or the envelope. Your individual survey will not be identified and all responses will be reported only in aggregate.
* Please read each question and check the response that most accurately reflects your perception.
* If a question does not seem to apply to you, please mark "don't know" and continue.
* If you make an error, cross it out and indicate your actual response.
* We thank you for your willingness to participate in this very important survey.
1. In your view, how corrupt is the political system in Ethiopia?
 Extremely corrupt
 Somewhat corrupt
 Not very corrupt
 Not at all corrupt
 I do not know
2. Either the people I know and/or myself have been (choose as many as can apply):
 stopped by a police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law;
 being asked to pay a bribe to a police officer;
 observing a bribe being paid to a police officer;
 observing a bribe being paid to a public official;
 being asked to pay a bribe to a public official;
 being asked to pay an illegal fee to expedite a transaction at the municipal government;
 being asked to pay a bribe at work;
 being asked to pay a bribe in the court system;
 paying bribes to a public utility to avoid paying the full bill;
 being asked to pay a bribe in the school system;
In questions 3-9 below, please state how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
3. "Public officials hire their relatives or friends to high official positions without merit"
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
4. "High Ethiopian public officials influence court decisions in civil suits and proceedings."
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
5. "I happen to know people who bribe civil servants to avoid paying taxes and charges."
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
6. "Bribery is part of everyday life."
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
7. "Bureaucratic delaying is part of everyday life."
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
8. "Most government officials are involved, directly or indirectly, in corrupt activities regarding the infrastructure projects"
 Strongly agree
 Disagree strongly
 I do not know
9. Do you believe there are provisions and practical mechanisms in place in Ethiopia which prevent conflicts of interest for government officials while performing their functions?
 I do not know
10. Do you believe government officials assure openness, equity and efficiency in government hiring?
 I do not know
11. Does the national law of Ethiopia provide for systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption?
 I do not know
Please respond to the following regarding procurements:
12. There are model tender documents such as handbooks, model forms, model contracts, etc. which contain a specific anti-corruption clause in each public office of the country.
 I do not know
13. In today's Ethiopia, to what extent are the tendering and contract award rules and instructions followed?
 Strictly followed
 Moderately followed
 Poorly followed
 Never followed at all
 I do not know
Please evaluate the following statements.
14. To the best of my knowledge, the selection and award criteria for procurement, such as how bids which are opened and negotiated, etc. are clearly prescribed by law in the country are free and fair.
 I do not know
15. The actions and decisions in the procurement process are recorded and are open for everyone to see and investigate.
 I do not know
16. There are clear codes of ethics or similar instruments that explicitly apply to procurement personnel in the country.
 I do not know
17. Bidders have to explicitly declare their abstention from any means that could improperly influence the procurement process or decision.
 I do not know
18. Bidders are required to disclose commissions, gratuities, or fees that have been or have to be legally paid to individuals or sub-contractors for their services provided for instance in the preparation of a bid or the execution of the contract.
 I do not know
19. There are regular and systematic internal and external audits of procuring entities in the country.
 I do not know
20. Please put a corruption ranking in numerical figures from 1 to 10, (10 being the most corrupt) to the following categories :
--Customs and tax revenue service employees
--Judiciary--judge and prosecutors
--Persons at the institutions of higher education
--Mass media and news service personnel
--Health care workers (doctors, nurses, healthcare administrators)
--Workers at the bank (lenders, etc.)
--Hospital and medical services
Please tell us if you or someone you know has:
21. Paid bribes to get access to get healthcare services in a public and non-profit organizatons:
 I do not know
22. Paid bribes to get access to education:
 I do not know
23. Paid bribes to get access to police services:
 I do not know
24. Paid bribes to receive utility services such water, electric power, land survey and even to pay the proper amount of fees and taxes due:
 I do not know
25. Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party having unfair access to bank accounts or loans:
 I do not know
26. Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party wins tenders:
 I do not know
27. Conducting fair and accurate auditing is:
 Easy to do
 Often difficult to do
 Very hard to do
 Impossible to do
 I do not know
28. Please choose what you believe closely matches your view putting a number, 1 to 10, 10 being the highest ranking. "The way things are taking place in today's Ethiopia..." :
--Hard work brings success and better life
--Success does not generally depend on hard work
--Success and better life depend on good luck
--Success and better life depend more on one's affiliation and connections than hard work
--People can only get rich at the expense of others
--There is enough opportunity for everyone
29. Please indicate how you agree or disagree with this statement: "To day in Ethiopia the security of property and contract rights are well protected. "
 Strongly agree
 Strongly disagree
 I do not know
30. Have you or someone that you know who have lost business to competitors that have made illicit payments to government officials such as tax assessors?
 I do not know
31. How likely do you believe the claim that some business in Ethiopia do not pay their share of government taxes:
 Very likely
 Somewhat likely
 I do not know
32. How likely do you believe the claim that some businesses receive favors such as access to easier bank loans:
I do not know
33. Do you believe some social groups are the biggest "winners" from socio-economic and political changes in recent years in Ethiopia? (Open-ended question)
34. What social groups do you believe are the biggest "losers" from the same socio-economic and political changes in recent years in Ethiopia? (Open-ended question)
35. Overall, do you believe that there is transparency of economic policy (fiscal policy, taxation, monetary policy, exchange-rate policy)?
 Yes, there is complete transparency
 There is some transparency
 There is very little transparency
 There is no transparency
 I do not know
36. How committed do you think the government is in fighting corruption?
 Very committed
 Not very committed
 Not at all committed
 I do not know
37. How well would you say the government is handling the matter of fighting corruption?
 Very well
 Fairly well
 Not very well
 Not at all
 I do not know
General (Demographics) Information about the Respondent (We are asking you to fill out the following information for statistical purposes)
1. What is your gender?
2. Age--into which age group do you fall? ?Younger than 24 yrs old
 25 to 34 yrs old
 35 to 49 yrs old
 50 to 59 yrs old
 60 yrs old or older
 Decline to respond
3. Present marital status
 Not married
 Married but living separately
 Common law marriage
 Decline to respond
5. Are you currently working? If yes, please mark the industry below that your work experience can most closely be indentified with:
 Government or public institution
 Private--business or industry
 Private--self employed
 Non--profit organization
 Church affiliated non--profit organization
 Not applicable
6. If applicable, into which one of the following broad ethnic categories do you fall? Please fill in the ethnic group that you would like to be categorized with:
7. What languages do you primarily speak at home:
Thank you for your participation in this survey.
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Old Dominion University
Murray State University
Addis Ababa University
Berhanu Mengistu is a professor of public policy and administration in the College of Business and Public Administration at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA 23529. Dr. Mengistu teaches Public Management and Policy.
Seid Hassan is professor of economics in the Department of Economics and Finance at Murray State University, Murray, KY 42071. Dr. Hassan teaches economics and International Business.
Tilahun Teklu is the former Dean of the Faculty of Business and Economics at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Dr. Teklu is a professor of Economics and Management at Addis Ababa University.
Table 1 Ethnicity, Language, and Religion Gender Female Male 18.7 81.3 Age younger than 25 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 59 24 years old years old years old years old 5.7 41.7 37.6 11.3 Marital Not married Married Married but Common Law Status living Marriage separately 2.0 42.6 50.5 2.5 Religion Muslim Christian Jewish Atheist 7 84 1 1 Employment Government Private- Private-Self Nonprofit Status or Public Business or Employed Organization Institution Industry 70.9 5.4 3.2 7.2 Ethnicity Amhara Ethiopian Gurage Oromo 22 6 3 12 Language Amharic Oromiffa Tigrigna -- (Spoken At Home) 63 7 5 5 Gender Age 60 years old or older 3.8 Marital Divorced Widower Status 1.8 0.5 Religion Other Refused 1 6 Employment Church Other Not Status Affiliated Applicable NGO 4.9 2.2 6.3 Ethnicity Tigray Other Refused 5 6 46 Language Other Refused (Spoken At Home) 20 Table 2 Corruption Perception Regarding the Ethiopian Administrative System Research Question: "The Administrative System in Ethiopia is ... " Extremely Somewhat Not very Not at Don't corrupt (%) corrupt (%) corrupt (%) all corrupt Know 44.6 43.7 8.5 0.7 2.5 Table 3 Corruption Rating Corruption Rating (Integrity) of the 14 Key Public Agencies Survey Item (Government Agency). Not Corrupt Corrupt In Today's Ethiopia: (1st-2nd) % (3rd-10th) % Customs And Tax Revenue Service Employees 41.8 58.2 Judiciary-Judge And Prosecutors 27.9 72.1 Municipal Workers 38.2 61.8 Persons At The Institutions of 14.3 85.7 Higher Education Mass Media And News Service Personnel 11.3 88.7 Health Care Workers (Doctors, 12.8 87.2 Nurses, Heath Care Administrators) Workers At The Bank (Lenders, Etc.) 14.8 85.2 Hospital And Medical Services 7.7 92.3 Parliamentarians 15.3 84.7 Traffic Police 33.7 66.3 Prison Guards 15.6 84.4 School Teachers 18.0 82.0 Police Force 19.2 80.8 Military 14.6 85.4 Notes: Respondents were informed that each numerical number they use represents as: Not At All Corrupt= 1; Not Corrupt= 2; Very Slightly Corrupt=3; Slightly Corrupt=4; Almost Moderately Corrupt=5; Moderately Corrupt= 6; Almost Substantially Corrupt=7; Substantially Corrupt=8; Almost Extremely Corrupt= 9; and, Extremely Corrupt=10. Table 4 Actual Corruption Encounters and the Question of Reticence Yes, there was No, there was such an incident not such an incident Research Question % % Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been stopped by a 16.0 84.0 police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 27.0 73.0 a bribe to a public officer? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have observed a bribe 32.4 67.6 being paid to a police officer? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have observed a bribe 31.4 68.6 being paid to a public officer? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 31.0 69.0 a bribe to a public official? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 30.9 69.1 an illegal fee to expedite a transaction at the municipal government? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 18.8 81.2 a bribe at work? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 18.8 81.2 a bribe in the court system? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know paid bribes to a public 17.7 82.3 utility to avoid paying the full bill? Was there an incident that either you or the people you know have been asked to pay 11.3 88.7 a bribe in the school system? Table 5 Public Officials and Corruption Survey Question Strongly Agree Disagree Agree (%) (%) (%) Public officials hire their relatives 39.1 43.0 6.8 or friends to high official positions without Merit. High Ethiopian public officials 32.3 39.2 10.6 influence court decisions in civil suits and proceedings. I happen to know people who bribe civil 18.3 34.0 11.3 servants to avoid paying taxes and charges. Bribery is part of everyday life. 26.2 45.8 18.4 Bureaucratic delaying is part of 37.8 46.2 10.8 everyday life. Most government officials are involved, 40.5 37.3 5.3 directly or indirectly, in corrupt activities regarding the infrastructure projects. Survey Question Disagree Don't Strongly (%) Know (%) Public officials hire their relatives 2.7 8.4 or friends to high official positions without Merit. High Ethiopian public officials 1.6 16.3 influence court decisions in civil suits and proceedings. I happen to know people who bribe civil 3.1 33.3 servants to avoid paying taxes and charges. Bribery is part of everyday life. 4.3 5.2 Bureaucratic delaying is part of 2.7 2.5 everyday life. Most government officials are involved, 1.6 15.3 directly or indirectly, in corrupt activities regarding the infrastructure projects. Table 6 Governmental Institutional Set-Ups and Disincentives to Corruption Survey Question Yes (%) Do you believe that there are provisions and practical mechanisms in place in Ethiopia 33.7 which prevent conflicts of interest for government officials while performing their functions? Do you believe that government officials assure openness, equity and efficiency in 15.1 government hiring? Does the National Law of Ethiopia provide a system for protecting public servants and 42.3 private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption? There are model tender documents such as handbooks, model forms, model contracts, 32.2 etc., which contain a specific anti-corruption clause in each public office of the country. To the best of my knowledge, the selection and award criteria for procurement, such 27.5 as how bids which are opened and negotiated, etc., are clearly prescribed by law in the country are free and fair. The actions and decisions in the procurement process are recorded and are open for 19.8 everyone to see and investigate. There are clear codes of ethics or similar instruments that explicitly apply to procurement 31.1 personnel in the country. Bidders have to explicitly declare their abstention from any means that could improperly 32.1 influence the procurement process or decision. Bidders are required to disclose commissions, gratuities, or fees that have 27.0 been or have to be legally paid to individuals or subcontractors for their services provided for instance in the preparation of a bid or the execution of the contract. There are regular and systematic internal and external audits of procuring 32.4 entities in the country. In today's Ethiopia, to what Never Poorly Moderately extent are the tendering and Followed followed followed contract award rules and at (%) (%) (%) instructions followed? 5.7 47.5 23.8 Survey Question No (%) Don't Know (%) Do you believe that there are provisions and practical mechanisms in place in Ethiopia 38.2 28.1 which prevent conflicts of interest for government officials while performing their functions? Do you believe that government officials assure openness, equity and efficiency in 75.1 9.9 government hiring? Does the National Law of Ethiopia provide a system for protecting public servants and 33.3 24.4 private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption? There are model tender documents such as handbooks, model forms, model contracts, 25.6 42.2 etc., which contain a specific anti-corruption clause in each public office of the country. To the best of my knowledge, the selection and award criteria for procurement, such 45.3 27.2 as how bids which are opened and negotiated, etc., are clearly prescribed by law in the country are free and fair. The actions and decisions in the procurement process are recorded and are open for 52.6 27.6 everyone to see and investigate. There are clear codes of ethics or similar instruments that explicitly apply to procurement 32.9 35.9 personnel in the country. Bidders have to explicitly declare their abstention from any means that could improperly 23.4 44.5 influence the procurement process or decision. Bidders are required to disclose commissions, gratuities, or fees that have 18.9 54.1 been or have to be legally paid to individuals or subcontractors for their services provided for instance in the preparation of a bid or the execution of the contract. There are regular and systematic internal and external audits of procuring 33.5 34.2 entities in the country. In today's Ethiopia, to what Strictly Don't extent are the tendering and followed Know contract award rules and (%) instructions followed? 3.9 19.1 Table 7 Corruption Ranking by Key Public Agency Public Agency Not Corrupt Corrupt (1st-2nd %) (3rd-10th %) Customs And Tax Revenue Service Employees 41.8 58.2 Judiciary-Judge And Prosecutors 27.9 72.1 Municipal Workers 38.2 61.8 Persons At The Institutions of 14.3 85.7 Higher Education Mass Media And News Service Personnel 11.3 88.7 Health Care Workers (Doctors, Nurses, 12.8 87.2 Heath Care Administrators) Workers At The Bank (Lenders, Etc.) 14.8 85.2 Hospital And Medical Services 7.7 92.3 Parliamentarians 15.3 84.7 Traffic Police 33.7 66.3 Prison Guards 15.6 84.4 School Teachers 18.0 82.0 Police Force 19.2 80.8 Military 14.6 85.4 Notes: Choices Given To Survey Respondents: Not At All Corrupt= 1; Not Corrupt= 2; Very Slightly Corrupt=3; Slightly Corrupt=4; Almost Moderately Corrupt=5; Moderately Corrupt= 6; Almost Substantially Corrupt=7; Substantially Corrupt=8; Almost Extremely Corrupt= 9; and, Extremely Corrupt=10. Table 8 Corruption and Foreign Aid To the Statement: Do you believe the Disagree Disagree Agree following should be done to curb the Strongly (%) (%) problem of corruption in internationally Agree(%) financed infrastructure projects in Ethiopia? Donors should withhold follow-on funding if there is evidence of corruption 4.7 17.4 34.7 affecting earlier contracts. The aid recipient government should be required to allow independent local, 1.6 7.6 29.7 national and international media to do their investigative work and allow government agencies to be open for the investigative work. Lending agencies should include genuine anti-corruption provisions in loan 1.6 9.3 28.9 agreements, rather than paying lip service to them. The aid recipient government should be required to raise awareness of the 2.9 6.8 27.3 damaging effects of corruption, particularly on the poor. The donors should place an investigative mechanism in order to crack down on the 1.8 5.2 28.8 corruption that are committed by their own agents and country desk representatives. Donors should withhold funds unless the recipient government undertakes genuine 6.3 21.2 33.5 civil service reform. To the Statement: Do you believe the Strongly Don't following should be done to curb the Agree (%) Know (%) problem of corruption in internationally financed infrastructure projects in Ethiopia? Donors should withhold follow-on funding if there is evidence of corruption 33.8 9.4 affecting earlier contracts. The aid recipient government should be required to allow independent local, 55.5 5.6 national and international media to do their investigative work and allow government agencies to be open for the investigative work. Lending agencies should include genuine anti-corruption provisions in loan 56.5 3.6 agreements, rather than paying lip service to them. The aid recipient government should be required to raise awareness of the 59.5 3.4 damaging effects of corruption, particularly on the poor. The donors should place an investigative mechanism in order to crack down on the 60.4 3.8 corruption that are committed by their own agents and country desk representatives. Donors should withhold funds unless the recipient government undertakes genuine 34.0 5.0 civil service reform. Table 9 Nepotism, Crony-Capitalism, and the Opacity of the Ruling Party To the statement: Do you think the following has taken place in Ethiopia? Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party having unfair access to bank accounts or loans Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party wins tenders." Have you or someone that you know who have lost business to competitors that have made illicit payment s to government officials such as tax assessors?" Conducting fair and accurate Impossible Very hard Often auditing is ... to do (%) to do (%) difficult to do (%) 8.5 26.2 42.2 To the statement: Do you think Yes No Don't the following has taken place in (%) Know Ethiopia? Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party having 47.5 9.7 42.8 unfair access to bank accounts or loans Someone or a company affiliated with the ruling party wins 53.7 9.8 36.4 tenders." Have you or someone that you know who have lost business to 37.0 11.3 51.7 competitors that have made illicit payment s to government officials such as tax assessors?" Conducting fair and accurate Easy Don't auditing is ... to do (%) Know (%) 15.1 8.0 Table 10 Corruption and the Economic and Political Policies of the Ethiopian Government Security and Protection of Disagree Disagree (%) Property and Contract Rights Strongly (%) In Today's Ethiopia, The 17.8 34.2 Securities of Property and Contract Rights Are Well Protected. The Issue of Taxation Very Likely (%) likely (%) Some Business In Ethiopia Do Not 40.4 27.0 Pay Their Share of Government Taxes. Measuring the Presence of Very Likely (%) Political Rents in the Banking likely (%) Sector Some Businesses Receive Favors 39.9 26.6 Such As Access To Easier Bank Loans. Transparency in Fiscal, Monetary There is no There is and Exchange Rate Policies transparency (%) very little transparency (%) Overall, do You Believe That 16.6 38.1 There Is Transparency of Economic Policy (Fiscal Policy, Taxation, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy)? Security and Protection of Agree (%) Strongly Property and Contract Rights Agree (%) In Today's Ethiopia, The 35.5 3.6 Securities of Property and Contract Rights Are Well Protected. The Issue of Taxation Somewhat Unlikely likely (%) (%) Some Business In Ethiopia Do Not 16.7 6.4 Pay Their Share of Government Taxes. Measuring the Presence of Somewhat Unlikely Political Rents in the Banking (%)likely (%) Sector Some Businesses Receive Favors 17.2 3.7 Such As Access To Easier Bank Loans. Transparency in Fiscal, Monetary There is some Yes, there and Exchange Rate Policies transparency (%) is complete transparency (%) Overall, do You Believe That 32.2 8.3 There Is Transparency of Economic Policy (Fiscal Policy, Taxation, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy)? Security and Protection of Don't Property and Contract Rights Know (%) In Today's Ethiopia, The 8.9 Securities of Property and Contract Rights Are Well Protected. The Issue of Taxation Don't Know (%) Some Business In Ethiopia Do Not 9.4 Pay Their Share of Government Taxes. Measuring the Presence of Don't Political Rents in the Banking Know (%) Sector Some Businesses Receive Favors 12.6 Such As Access To Easier Bank Loans. Transparency in Fiscal, Monetary Don't and Exchange Rate Policies Know (%) Overall, do You Believe That 4.8 There Is Transparency of Economic Policy (Fiscal Policy, Taxation, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy)? Table 11 The Government's Commitment, Ability and Willingness in Fighting Corruption Government's Commitment and Not at all Not very Willingness in Fighting committed (%) committed (%) Corruption How Committed Do You Think The 15.2 51.1 Government Is In Fighting Corruption? Government's Ability in Fighting Not at Not very Corruption all (%) well (%) How Well Would You Say The 14.3 51.6 Government Is Handling The Matter Of Fighting Corruption? Government's Commitment and Committed Very Don't Willingness in Fighting (%) committed (%) Know (%) Corruption How Committed Do You Think The 25.6 6.0 1.6 Government Is In Fighting Corruption? Government's Ability in Fighting Fairly Very Don't Corruption well (%) well (%) Know (%) How Well Would You Say The 26.4 6.0 1.8 Government Is Handling The Matter Of Fighting Corruption?
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|Author:||Mengistu, Berhanu; Hassan, Seid; Teklu, Tilahun|
|Publication:||International Journal of Business and Public Administration (IJBPA)|
|Date:||Sep 22, 2013|
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