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Poverty and Reforms: Friends or Foes?

As reforms in economic policy--generally centered on dismantling inward-looking policies on international trade and attracting equity investment--and the privatization of many public-owned enterprises have swept across the developing world, critics have charged that these reforms are inimical to the reduction of poverty. Thus, it is not unusual for a long-standing proponent of these reforms like myself to get into recurring debates on the question. Only a few months ago, I and Martin Wolf of The Financial Times teamed up to face two rather impassioned opponents in a BBC debate. Our opponents claimed that proglobalization policies are responsible for the accentuation of poverty, while we argued exactly the opposite.

In fact, this debate is only a replay of the debate that we Indian economists and planners had almost four decades ago, with occasional argumentation thereafter, when we began planning for national poverty amelioration. India at the time had (and still has, precisely because of the policies that presently call for proglobalization reforms) the misfortune of having a comparative advantage in poverty. Since policy economics is like literature and reflects the immediacy of one's experience, Indian economists have not surprisingly been at the forefront of debates about how to reduce poverty.

As I shall presently argue, this debate in India was precisely between those who maintained that growth reduced poverty and those who argued that it bypassed or even increased it. Proponents of the pro-growth strategy were divided into those who came to see the inward-looking import-substitution (IS) model toward trade and direct foreign investment (DFI) as the culprit that crippled growth and hence accentuated poverty (a minority in the 1960s and 1970s), and the vast majority that continued to cling to the increasingly implausible notion that these antiglobalization strategies were in fact pro-growth policies, despite compelling theoretical arguments and a growing body of evidence suggesting the opposite.

Since the 1980s, a majority of policy economists around the world have begun to favor economic reforms that increase global integration, in the strong belief that such reforms would, ceteris paribus, promote growth and would, both directly and indirectly (by raising resources for spending on social programs and in other ways discussed below), help to improve living standards among the poor. Today, the widespread view among Indian intellectuals and policymakers is that the absence of pro-growth economic policies for nearly three decades only served to accentuate Indian poverty. Ironically, the growth-retarding and hence poverty-enhancing policies in place throughout this time were adopted at the urging of those very economists who claimed that they were the virtuous ones who wished to attack poverty, while the rest of us were interested in growth for itself.(1)

Against this backdrop, I argue that pro-globalization and proprivatization economic reforms must be treated as complementary and indeed friendly to both the reduction of poverty and social agendas. I maintain that poverty reduction and advancement of social agendas require not merely a policy focus on schooling, public health, etc., but also simultaneous attention to reforms aimed at improving the economic efficiency and growth of the economy. More precisely, I shall argue specifically in this paper that:

* Growth (or "development") has been regarded for several decades as a principal instrument for reducing poverty, rather than as an objective in itself. Hence the contention in some influential developmental circles and international agencies that poverty reduction has only recently been designated as an objective of development, displacing the earlier preoccupation with growth per se, is totally off the mark. The falsity of this argument is a cause for concern insofar as it encourages the harmful ethos that somehow growth is irrelevant, if not inimical, to poverty reduction and to the promotion of social agendas. Growth is, in fact, an important force for poverty alleviation and has been regarded as such, at least in Indian planning and policy circles, since the 1950s.

* Growth is properly regarded as an instrumental means of reducing poverty because, generally speaking, it moves poor unemployed and underemployed people into gainful employment. Growth can still have varying degrees of efficacy in terms of its impact on poverty, depending on the "structural" forms that poverty and growth take and on the political and social contexts in which the growth process unfolds.

* Increased integration into the global economy (through trade and DFI) and other reforms (such as privatization) currently being proposed in poverty-ridden countries can be fully expected to assist in poverty eradication.

* Growth attacks poverty in yet another way: economic prosperity alone increases tax revenues which, in turn, can be used to finance conventional anti-poverty programs such as the building of schools and the provision of clean water, electricity and health facilities for the poor. Without revenues, these expenditures cannot be sustained, let alone expanded. But this requires that these agendas be on the radar screen of governments: the availability of funds is no guarantee that they will be used for the right purposes.

* In this respect, there is a clear role for democracy to guarantee effective political participation among peripheral groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social activists. There is also a profound need for a combination of government and private NGO work to maximize the impact of governmental expenditures on social and economic programs that target the poor. Growth will also support social and poverty-reduction agendas, since it will enhance the effectiveness of legislation aimed at helping the poor.

Thus, in conclusion, those who viscerally oppose economic reforms today as anti-poor are misguided and unfortunately accentuating poverty instead. We need to build bridges between economic reformers and anti-poverty campaigners, not burn them.


In the mid-1970s and 1980s, I began to encounter assertions, from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and elsewhere, that growth had long been the primary objective of development planning and that poverty had been recognized as worthy of attention only recently. Such claims profoundly surprised me. A few dramatic examples of some of the untrue statements I was exposed to are illuminating.

First, I remember reading a biographical sketch of one of the South Asian architects of the Human Development reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The thrust of these reports is that the UNDP deals with human beings, and hence with poverty and social agendas, whereas those of us who have worked at encouraging growth over the years are somehow tangential or inimical to those objectives. Such assertions prompted me once to mischievously inform the affable and dynamic UNDP head, Gus Speth, when he asked me at a party what I did, that I worked on Inhuman Development. The biographical sketch amusingly claimed that this particular economist had "dethroned the goddess of GNP from her pedestal."

I recall another example that took place several years ago when I was giving the keynote address at the 25th anniversary celebration of the Center for Development Studies in Antwerp, Belgium. In response to my comments on poverty, the Dutch economist Louis Emmerij (who had run the program on poverty at the ILO)said somewhat sarcastically that it was good to see Professor Bhagwati finally talking, not about free trade and growth, but about poverty and inequality. I could not resist retorting that I might have agreed with the statement were it not for the fact that, apropos of my speech that day, I was reading my best-selling 1966 book, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries. The first chapter of that book is entitled "Poverty and Income Distribution."

In fact, many social scientists have responded with strongly disapproving commentary to the claim of some early development economists that pro-growth economists and policymakers ignored poverty. To cite one eminent sociologist, Gilbert Etienne, who has worked for decades on India's villages: "The claim that developmental strategies in the 1950s and 1960s overemphasized growth and increases of the GNP at the cost of social progress is a surprising one! ... Equally peculiar is the so-called discovery of the problem of poverty."(2)


So, let me explain why we perceived growth at the time, and must continue to do so almost four decades later, as an effective anti-poverty strategy. This is because in countries such as India, where the poverty is immense, there are no simple answers like income redistribution (even if feasible politically) to bring poverty down. The problem is that redistribution would have little impact on poverty, even in the short-term. As the eminent Polish communist economist Mikhail Kalecki told me in India in 1962, the trouble with India is that there are too many exploited and too few exploiters. Moreover, governments need to pursue a sustained attack on poverty rather than a one-shot approach. With a rising population and stagnant growth, any favorable effects of redistribution on poverty would quickly erode.

Hence, Indian planners saw rapid growth as the principal component of an anti-poverty strategy The idea was an activist program which would raise domestic savings and investment, assisted where possible by the influx of foreign funds through aid and investment in order to achieve accelerating growth that would move increasing numbers of people into gainful employment. The theoretical rationale was embodied in the well known Harrod-Domar growth model, in which employment rises with increasing capital stock and the chief policy instrument is a fiscal strategy to raise domestic savings.

All this was a far cry from the conventional liberal view in domestic debates within OECD countries, where growth is often presented as a passive, "trickle-down" process. Indeed, we thought of our strategy as an active, "pull-up" strategy requiring extensive savings mobilization, with the state playing a major (interventionist) role in that effort. Clearly, this was no conservative option.

Of course, not all growth has identical effects. Economists are ingenious enough to construct all kinds of scenarios. Thus, I am known for having demonstrated that growth can actually diminish economic well-being, as when it leads to losses from worsened terms of trade which outweigh the primary gains from growth.(3) To take another example, if rich farmers implement technical change, output increases and prices fall--and the poor farmers who did not innovate are hurt. For this reason, we used to say that the Green Revolution (which brought in new high-yield seeds) might lead to the Red Revolution! But these downside scenarios can be ruled out by suitable accompanying policies: in the former instance, an optimal tariff is the answer; in the latter, the government could adopt a price maintenance program or a policy to raise national investment, which would lead to a matching increase in demand for the added output of the high-yield grains.

Then again, it is obvious that growth may simply bypass certain pockets of poverty. Thus, for example, if tribal areas in India are not integrated into the main economy, growth occurring in the latter will not touch the former. This may well be the case internationally if an impoverished nation is not linked to the growing world economy and hence to profits from either trade or DFI. Indeed, such is the situation for many of the smaller, impoverished nations today (though, I would say, these "non-linkage" afflictions are, at least to some extent, a result of bad inward-looking policies over the years, and not an unfortunate external calamity of which poor countries are simply victims). Once again, supplementary programs are needed to accompany growth, so that it can act more effectively as a locomotive lifting people out of poverty.

If the efficacy of the locomotive depends on the nature of growth, there is enough evidence by now that the IS strategy harmed the poor, not just by slowing growth but also by affecting the horsepower of the locomotive. In a project for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) that I and Professor Anne Krueger directed in the 1960s, we found that the IS strategy tended to reduce employment by biasing growth toward capital-intensive projects and choice of techniques, seriously limiting the assault on poverty as a result. This finding was reinforced by Krueger in a subsequent NBER Project, which focused more directly on the employment effects of the IS and the export promoting (EP) strategies.(4) Thus, the Far Eastern economies, with striking growth rates over nearly three decades, had a substantial positive impact on the living standards of the poor because the development was based on labor-intensive production and exports. In India, on the other hand, the impact on poverty was handicapped, not merely by abysmally low growth rates, but also by the fact that the Indian economic planners--under the impetus of counterproductive theorizing that legitimated the use of capital-intensive techniques and the promotion of huge white elephants in heavy industry--biased the growth of the economy away from employment-creation.(5)

We may still ask whether the evidence demonstrates that in India, for instance, growth has pulled people out of poverty After much debate, it seems that by now evidence of a favorable link has become more compelling. In the 1980s, when the Indian growth rate picked up from a range of 3 to 3.5 percent to around 5 percent, poverty reduction accelerated.(6) Evidence on the Green Revolution's spread has also shown it to be linked to improvements in poverty


Against this backdrop, the recent wave of economic reforms in much of the developing world and in formerly socialist economies is to be regarded as an important long-run input toward the elimination of poverty There are, however, two important caveats. First, the short-term effects of a transition to globalization, in which economies are opened up to integration into the world economy, may well exacerbate poverty. This is sometimes glossed over by ideologues. See, for example, the World Bank's 1996 World Development Report on the transition problems that the former-socialist countries face, entitled From Plan to Market. This report virtually dismisses, and even ignores, the problems concerning unemployment and income distribution that attend such transitions. Moreover, it asserts without any serious response to the arguments advanced by scholarly opponents of the shock therapy model propounded by Jeffrey Sachs that these effects are desirable.(7) On the other hand, serious scholars of such transitions--chief among them Padma Desai of Columbia in her recent book, Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in the World Economy, and John McMillan of the University of California at San Diego--have insightfully analyzed these problems associated with attempts at global integration.(8)

The second caveat is that all forms of globalization are not equally desirable, even from the viewpoint of efficiency and growth. Thus, it has become evident recently that the IMF's determination to push for capital account convertibility around the world has been hasty and, in fact, dangerous. The Asian financial crisis since 1997 has radically shifted opinion in the direction of halting the aggressive spread of such convertibility. Hence, the IMF is now conscious of what I have always argued, that free trade in widgets is not the same as free trade in dollars.(9) Unfortunately public perception has likewise confused these two forms of globalization (goods vs. dollars); and now that the latter has once again caused a crisis, with incalculable economic and political consequences for the countries caught in the aftermath, there has been a tendency to condemn globalization per se, condemning the good form of globalization for the sins of the bad one.(10)

I would stress that the postwar experience has amply demonstrated the mutual gains to be made from trade liberalization. This is also true of equity investments, which bring into a country the benefits of capital, skills and technology I would add the caveat, however, that energetic regression-prone economists such as Harvard's development experts Robert Barro and Sachs do not help us by turning out endless cross-country associations between growth rates and trade indicators. They even persuade financial journalists to reproduce these results as if they "proved" that globalization in trade, for instance, is immensely beneficial to liberalizing countries. In fact, they do not really do this.(11) My faith in the advantages of freer trade and eased restrictions on DFI inflows derives instead from sophisticated and nuanced studies of countries in which trade liberalization and DFI inflows are put into the appropriate context.

I should also add that privatization is now widely seen as conducive to economic efficiency This view is not ideological, as it was when we were embarking on development and many of us had not pondered the deep-seated incentive problems that public enterprises would face, given the political context within which they would be operating, especially in developing countries. Political staffing, often excessive and of middling quality the ability to ride out losses by resorting to subsidies and the absence of effective incentives for workers and managers to perform are among the key and ineradicable defects of public enterprises. Some unreformed proponents of the Marxist and Fabian preference for public ownership insist that suitable reforms could still salvage public enterprises as efficient economic entities. This logic, however, is like saying that if we put stripes on an elephant, it will become a zebra.(12)


Let me then turn to another reason why growth, aided and accelerated by reforms like those outlined above, can help. Without prosperity, the government will fall short of the funds needed to advance literacy, secondary schooling, health, sanitation and a host of programs aimed directly at the poor and conventionally described as "anti-poverty" programs in donor agencies and recipient countries. Of course, because it pulls the poor into gainful employment, growth is also to be seen as an indirect anti-poverty program, as I have already argued, and it is wrong to think otherwise. Indeed, to those who use the cliche of "development with a human face," I respond: "Yes, indeed. But remember that the face cannot exist by itself, except as a mask in a museum. It must be joined to the body; and if the body is emaciated, the face must wither no matter how much we seek to humanize and make it pretty."

For those who doubt this, it is perhaps necessary to reflect how, faced with a budget deficit, President Clinton turned away from social programs requiring funding, enraging in the process his liberal supporters who concluded that he had abandoned liberalism. As soon as the budget turned into a surplus, however, his liberal voice became loud and clear.(13)

Growth, Poverty and Social Agendas: All Bedfellows

Though revenues resulting from prosperity allow for spending on anti-poverty programs and on social agendas, this does not guarantee that they will be so spent. For this, it is necessary to identify processes and institutions that will generate and sustain the right "preferences," not just culturally but in terms of effective political demand. This is where we recognize the importance of democracy, with effective participation among the poor and minorities. Their vote enables their voice to be heard.(14) The introduction of democratic politics into poor countries should therefore be seen as "political reform" that complements the "economic reforms" that I have discussed so far.

The specific forms that such democratic politics may assume can be diverse. One important aspect is the growth of NGOs, which Indians call Social Action Groups. These NGOs help to ensure that in poor communities, still emerging in some cases from feudal social and political structures, the voice of peripheral groups is not silenced by intimidation despite formal democratic practices. I might add that the role of female education in the development of civil society has been phenomenal. In the early 1960s, when I was working on poverty at the Indian Planning Commission, I recall discussing with the great Indian planner, Pitambar Pant, the immense growth of women in higher education and wondering where they would all go and with what consequences. We came up with images of women engineers, doctors, scientists and scholars. But we had no idea that several of them would wind up as active members of NGOs, pushing social agendas in all directions. Indeed, both in rich and in poor countries (with higher education), NGOs are increasingly dominated by women.

In addition, it is important to emphasize that growth seriously enhances the efficacy of social legislation and anti-poverty programs. Take literacy, for instance. Political scientist Myron Weiner has beautifully noted that literacy has usually required that the incentive of poor parents to put children to work rather than sending them to school is outweighed by countervailing values. In the Lutheran religion, for example, everyone needed to know how to read the Bible instead of relying on a priest to act as a liaison to God. For economists, this countervailing pressure can come from the prospect of earning higher income as a result of education. Higher income, however, will come only when growth provides economic opportunities that allow increasing numbers of children to travel down the educational road. The few schools that do exist in India have had problems with attendance and thus work below potential output, largely because low growth over the decades has drastically reduced the chances that improved incomes will result from sending children to school.(15)

Moreover, in some instances, it can be argued that social agendas follow economic growth. Thus, for example, many political scientists and sociologists, among them Barrington Moore and Ralf Dahrendorff, have maintained that democracy emerges when growth has produced a middle class that seeks democratic rights. Similarly, movements for environmental protection, for children's and women's rights, etc., seem to gather steam as economies grow and their populations acquire information and ideas from other countries further up the development ladder.

I should note that this tendency is sometimes used by economists to argue, totally without justification, that economic growth will eventually take care of social and poverty concerns and that we therefore do not need to address them directly. I have a simple answer to that. If a hapless woman is being beaten by her husband and screams for help, it would be a bit ludicrous to say to her to hang in there, because growth will eventually change values and laws so that husbands are no longer able to abuse their wives. What you will want to do is immediately nail the guy to the wall. And so must social agendas for the poor and minorities move ahead, hand in hand with the growth process.

One final remark on the positive relationship between growth and poverty reduction is worth making. Sometimes, expenditures aimed at removing poverty can in turn promote growth. Thus many economists have recently argued that if credit market imperfections prevent the poor from investing in health, education and enterprises, then this can impede growth. Again, a malnourished labor force cannot be conducive to higher productivity: the "efficiency wage" theory, associated with economists James Mirrlees and Harvey Leibenstein, formalizes the idea that firms will sometimes pay more than the going wage if a productivity boost results from better nutrition enabled by higher incomes.


And so, in many ways, the current reforms in developing countries must be seen as significant inputs into the important fight against world poverty. Unfortunately, in countries that face serious poverty, this is still not understood and reforms are considered to be a luxury for the rich and irrelevant to the poor. Having begun this essay with relevant reminiscences about India in the 1950s, let me conclude it with pertinent remarks about India in the 1990s.

Specifically, as we Indians try to move ahead with economic reforms to finally reduce poverty through rapid growth, let me express my astonishment, anguish and outrage over the following all-too-familiar criticism of reforms made by two influential economists:
 Debates on such questions as the details of tax concessions to
 multinationals, or whether Indians should drink Coca Cola, or whether the
 private sector should be allowed to operate city buses, tend to `crowd out'
 the time that is left to discuss the abysmal situation of basic education
 and elementary health care, or the persistence of debilitating social
 inequalities, or other issues that have a crucial bearing on the well-being
 and freedom of the population.(16)

Mindful of the damage that such attitudes have done to the cause of poverty reduction in India over a quarter of a century, I was moved to respond, in a review essay:
 Much is wrong here. No one can seriously argue that there is a crowding out
 when the articulation of Indians is manifest in multiplying newspapers,
 magazines and books and the expression of a whole spectrum of views on
 economics and politics; this reviewer has noticed no particular shyness in
 discussing social issues, including inequality and poverty in India...But,
 more important, the putdown of attention to multinationals misses the point
 that India's economic reforms require precisely that India join the Global
 Age and that India's inward direct investments were ridiculously small in
 1991, around $100 million, and that this was an important deficiency that
 had to be fixed. The reference to Coca Cola is no better, serving as a
 cheap shot against multinational investment; but it also betrays the
 assumption that Coca Cola is drunk by the elite or the Westernized middle
 class, not by the truly poor. It is more likely, however, that the former
 derive their caffeine from espresso coffee as well whereas the poor are the
 ones who must depend on coke instead!(17)

In fact, the contemptuous reference to the privatization of bus transportation in cities could only come from elitist economists who travel by private car and are unaware that the common people (especially the poor) travel by buses whose efficiency needs to be improved by privatization. In short, we confront here the spectacle of economists, who espouse the cause of the poor, becoming unwitting accomplices in the perpetuation of poverty. Ironic indeed.

(1) See my critique of these economists and the hugely deleterious effects they had on India's poverty even as they were identified in the public eye as economists "more genuinely" concerned about poverty, in Jagdish Bhagwati, "A Machine for Going Backwards," Times Literary Supplement, reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) chapter 56.

(2) The-Etienne quote is cited in my 1987 Vikram Sarabhai Memorial Lecture on Public Policy and Poverty, printed in World Development, 16, no. 5 (1988) pp. 539-555 and reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati, Political Economy and International Economics, ed., Douglas Irwin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) chapter 25.

(3) Jagdish Bhagwati, "Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note," Review of Economic Studies, 25, no. 3 (June 1958) pp. 201-205.

(4) The volumes from the first project were published in 1978 by Ballinger and for the second project by University of Chicago Press in 1982. In addition, much important research-project-based work along these lines was done, in particular, by I.M.D. Little, Maurice Scott and Tibor Scitovsky for the OECD Development Center in the 1960s and by the late Bela Balassa for the World Bank. The findings of these projects and other research have been reviewed in Jagdish Bhagwati, "Export-Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues and Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, 3, no. 1 (1988) pp. 27-57, reprinted in Bhagwati (1991) chapter 24.

(5) Here, I have in mind the work on the choice of techniques in the 1960s by economists such as Amartya Sen, which did incalculable harm to the cause of growth and hence of poverty reduction by emphasizing the role of capital-intensive techniques in accelerating the growth rate by increasing savings. These conclusions came, of course, from the assumptions underlying the models built. But logical rigor is no substitute for wisdom; and, as the Oxford economist Thomas Balogh, adviser to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, used to say, rigor can lead to rigor mortis.

(6) For a generally favorable assessment of the effect of growth on poverty reduction in India, see the recent World Bank, "India: Achievements and Challenges in Reducing Poverty," World Bank Country Study (Washington, DC: 1997).

(7) In fact, one looks in vain even for references to the contributions of academic scholars who have opposed shock therapy.

(8) Padma Desai, Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in the World Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

(9) See Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Capital Myth," Foreign Affairs, 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998) pp. 7-12. In explaining why free trade in widgets and in dollars were equated without justification, I also advance the view that a role has been played by what I call the "Wall Street-Treasury complex," an idea that has been picked up by the political scientist Robert Wade and others and needs further scholarly investigation.

(10) A particularly good example of this is a recent Los Angeles Times story by Tom Plate (May 12, 1998), citing my Foreign Affairs article on "The Capital Myth" and saying: "This Columbia University professor still swears allegiance to free-market philosophy in other respects [than free capital flows as with capital account convertibility], but his defection on this issue is on the order of a Vatican bishop turning up at a Presbyterian pulpit." The irony is that, not merely are the two forms of globalization, in free trade and in free capital flows, quite distinct from each other, but I have always been skeptical of free capital flows (as distinct from the advantages of equity investments).

(11) In fact, such regressions are double-edged, since those opposed to trade can also play around with them, often leading to reversals of the "findings" by adding more variables, changing proxies, altering time periods or country coverage, etc. We are faced then with mutually assured destruction by opposed groups, each claiming scientific rectitude that serious econometricians and scholars would find unacceptable.

(12) None of this is to say that all forms of privatization are good. Recently, for example, there has been much criticism of the Russian privatization. But few of the critics have faced up to the problem that all privatization programs must be politically and economically feasible, and unless they offer a better and feasible alternative, their critiques are not compelling. See, for example, Padma Desai, "Russian Privatization: A Comparative Perspective," The Harriman Review, 8, no. 3 (August 1995) pp. 1-34; and her review of Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995) in Journal of International Economics, 42, no. 1/2 (February 1997) pp. 244-246.

(13) Of course, nothing is uni-causal in the world of politics. Clinton's personal problems may have also intensified his need to rally the liberal Democrats around him. But he simply could not have done that without the necessary revenue surplus.

(14) See my Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Lecture on "Democracy and Development," reprinted in Bhagwati (1998) chapter 40.

(15) As is always true, the full explanation of India's appalling illiteracy is more complex. Thus, in some cases, it is the teachers who do not turn up.

(16) Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. vii.

(17) Jagdish Bhagwati, Economic Journal, 108 (January 1998) pp. 198-199.

Jagdish Bhagwati is Arthur Lehman professor of economics and professor of political science at Columbia University. Previously, Dr. Bhagwati was economic policy advisor to the director-general of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Prior to this, he was Ford International professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Bhagwati has received several prizes, among them the Bernhard Harms Prize in Germany; the Seidman Distinguished Award for Political Economy and the Kenan Award in the United States; and the Freedom Prize in Switzerland. He has published extensively, most recently in Foreign Affairs and the Economist. His newest book is entitled A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democracy.
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Author:Bhagwati, Jagdish
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Date:Sep 22, 1998
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