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Political interest distribution and provincial response strategies: central-local relations in China after the 17th National Congress of the CPC.

INTRODUCTION

The National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is an assembly that determines current political interests, which inevitably vary between congresses. (1) The outcomes of these assemblies greatly influence resource distribution (2) and the ability of provinces to interact with the central government. (3) Therefore, the distribution of central-provincial political interests must be analysed to determine its impact on the degree to which provinces implemented central government policies after the 17th National Congress of the CPC.

The CPC is the ruling political party in China, controlling the government and the political system. Nominally, the CPC Central Committee (CC) is the highest authority; substantially, however, the Politburo (PB) and the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) are the true authorities. (4) Therefore, for studies of CPC elite politics, members of the CPC CC, the PB and the PBSC are essential indicators. (5) The central-local relationship is one that revolves around interest. (6) In this study, the term political interests refers to the membership and power of the CPC CC, the PB and the PBSC, and represents the relationship between the central government and the local authorities. The substantial meaning of political interests is similar to that of political capital, namely, local governments with political interests have channels to influence the central government's decisions and resource distribution. (7) Social relationships and political institutions are the fundamentals of political capital. (8) Analysis of the jiguandi (place of ancestry origin, PAO) and the jueqidi (place of rise to power, PRP) of social relationships, and the xianzhidi (place of current position, PCP) of political institutions can be employed to evaluate the distribution of political interests in the central and local governments. As different indicators are adopted, existing research can be categorised into three models: the systematic model (PCP), the dual-place model (PAO and PCP) and the triple-place model (PAO, PCP and PRP).

Shirk was a pioneer of the systematic model approach. Using the PCP of CC members as the calculation basis, she analysed central-provincial interactions to explain China's economic reform. (9) However, because the 15th CC installed two CC members in each province, (10) this approach has become invalid. Based on the systematic model, Bo proposed a CC index to assess provincial power. (11) However, this index is flawed because it cannot recognise the importance of each position. (12)

To address the deficiencies of the systematic model, the dual-place model employs a leverage index and includes PAO as a new calculation basis. However, this model is also flawed because it excludes PBSC members in the analysis. This model shows that no relationship exists between political interests and resource distribution. Additionally, the more political interests a province obtains, the weaker it becomes in resisting the policies of the central government. (13) Conversely, the triple-place model, which considers PRP, indicates that a positive relationship exists between political interests and resource distribution. (14) However, this method is also imperfect because it does not consider political transitions.

According to this analysis, the triple-place model has four advantages. First, it proves that a relationship exists between political interests and resource distribution. Second, it includes the CC members, PB members and PBSC members in the analysis. Third, it accentuates the discrepancy in the importance of each position. Finally, it identifies the distribution of provincial political interests. Therefore, the triple-place model is deployed in this study to analyse the distribution of political interests after the 17th National Congress. This study also transitions into unrelated political interests and constructs a behaviour prediction model for provincial policy implementation.

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

This study evaluates the political interests, transitions into political interests and provincial policy implementation of China's central government. The analysis framework used in this study can be divided into three parts to explain the measurement criteria and method.

Evaluation of Political Interests

To evaluate political interests, this study defines the CC members, PB members and PBSC members as the norms; the given indices for each object are 1, 9 and 27, respectively. Thus, the total political interest equals the number of CC members x 1 + the number of Politburo members x 9 + the number of PBSC members x 27. (15) Alternate CC members are not included in the analysis because they have no voting rights and therefore cannot affect policy decisions. (16)

The definitions of PCP, PRP and PAO are as follows. PCP refers to CC members who are elected by the province where they hold their current position. PAO refers to the province of their ancestral origin. (17) Meanwhile, PRP has multiple definitions, though CC members have only one PRP. PRP refers to the province where the person acquired CC membership. By contrast, each PB member has two PRPs: one is where they acquired the CC membership and the other is the province where they acquired the PB membership. Compared to these members, the PBSC members also have a third PRP, which is the province where they acquired the PBSC membership. (18) Using appropriate and simple calculations, the ratio of political interest distribution among the three places (PCP, PAO and PRP) is 0.6: 0.3: 0.1. (19)

Political Interest Transition Calculation

Studies of central-provincial relations generally focus on the timing of each National Congress and the first plenary sessions of the CPC CC, and ignore transitions of political interests during the five-year term. (20) A few studies have examined the transition of political interests by adopting the month-to-year formula. (21) Although this method is extremely precise, it is excessively complicated to calculate and involves the verification of numerous documents. However, this model can be simplified to the year-by-year formula and used to analyse the timing of each plenary session of the CC. If more than one session occurs per year, the model only analyses the most recent session. Therefore, the political interests calculated for that time frame can be used to represent the political interests that the organisation may gain in the following year.

Because of the low number of CC members, the central government typically transfers the CC members to other positions, substituting them with an alternate or full member. The effect of these transfers is minimal. Therefore, using the year-by-year formula is appropriate for calculating the number of CC members. By contrast, the month-to-year or day-by-day formulae should be used to calculate the number of PB and PBSC members. As the number of PB and PBSC members is high, their positions are primarily transferred from provinces to the central government. Therefore, this study emphasises the PCP transition of CC members and compares the changes between the first and third plenary sessions of the 17th CC. This study uses the day-by-day formula to calculate the PCPs of PB and PBSC members. The political interests represented by the PB members' PCP equals the index (i.e., 9) x the proportion of the PCP (i.e., 0.6) x the number of days on duty in the location of their current position/353. (22) The same calculation can be applied to the political interests represented by PBSC members' PCP, which equals the index (i.e., 27) x the proportion of the PCP (i.e., 0.6) x the number of days on duty in the location of their current position/353.

Provincial Policy Implementation Strategies

The local policy implementation model emphasises the rational choice of provincial governments and classifies their behaviour patterns into three types. The first is "pioneering", where the local government leads the implementation of policies approved by the central government. The second is "bandwagoning", where the local government adopts a cautious attitude of not following or leading the implementation of central government policies. The local government displays the third resisting behaviour pattern if it delays implementing policies approved by the central government or modifies the policies to benefit the province. (23) However, the non-zero-sum framework indicates that unless both local and central government compromise and cooperate, neither will win. Provincial governments cannot autonomously implement any policy. (24) That is, they are influenced both by a certain degree of provincial autarchy and central dependency. (25) Previous studies have reported that the political interests obtained by each province significantly influence resource distribution. (26) Therefore, the freedom each province has regarding implementing central policies can be analysed from the perspective of political interests.

This study employs the bisection method for analysing and observing relations between provinces and the central government. However, for an accurate comparison with that of the central state, the interests of each province must be multiplied by 33, which is the total number of provincial entities. The subsequent results will portray relations between provinces and the central government with greater accuracy; otherwise, provincial political interests will always be less than that of the central government. Therefore, the political interests of each province will be multiplied by 33 to determine the policy implementation behaviour, which indicates the choices that each province may make. (27) In Figure 1, X represents the proportion of local political interests and Y represents the percentage of central political interests, and the addition of X and Y equals 1. Figure 1 shows that Zone 1 ranges from zero to X; Zone 2 is the area between X and Y; and Zone 3 spans across the remaining area. If the resulting number for political interests is located in Zone 1, the province can make only pioneering choices. Zone 2 includes two options, pioneering and bandwagoning, to choose from depending on various factors. Finally, Zone 3 provides three choices, namely pioneering, bandwagoning and resisting. Each province can make their choice freely.

The degree of provincial autarchy can be determined from the political interests, which refer to the behaviour options of provincial policy implementation. However, the option preferred by each province could still not be predicted precisely. Rational choice theory assumes that individuals have preferences and make selections after ordering their preferences. (28) People seek to maximise the utility of preference. (29) Therefore, people consider every possibility to obtain the greatest benefit by selecting the best option. (30) Individual preferences are determined by the local system and social structure because the local system limits the available options and provides personal benefits. Personal benefits depend on a person's relationship with others, which also reflects their social status. (31) Therefore, an analysis of the degree of central dependency is necessary.

To analyse political interest transitions in this study, CC, PB and PBSC memberships are traced back to the change of PCP, where power is in the hands of the central government. (32) Provincial party secretaries and governors are automatically or passively regarded as representatives of provincial political interests. (33) Otherwise, they would not be supported by local people. (34) The threat of losing political capital would reduce their opportunity for promotion in the future. (35) In addition to their practical abilities (to which the achieved economic growth is a testament), an important factor in the promotion of local officials is their relationship with the leader. (36) In summary, this article examines the objectives, party secretaries and governors of 31 provinces (37) using the indices of "whether qianzhidi (place of previous position, PPP) is a central institution" and "whether the member has experience of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL)". Utilising this method, one can determine whether each province implements policy preferred by the central government.

The PPP refers to the previous positions that the provincial party secretaries and governors occupied before their current position. The PPP is the same as the PCP if the duration serving in the previous position exceeds five years. A low initiative to pursue benefits for the province is predicted if a member's PPP was at the central government. Members who have occupied positions relevant to the CCYL are regarded as having CCYL experience. This definition is vague because experience related to the CCYL has been characterised as the most important clique relationship (guanxi) during Hu Jintao's leadership. (38) Guanxi continues to significantly influence the behaviour of Chinese political elites. (39) Thus, any CCYL experience is aggrandised and widely used, irrespective of how trivial the experience actually was. Many believe that if a person has CCYL experience, the relationship between that person and Hu will exhibit characteristics of patronage-clientelism. (40) Thus, a low initiative to pursue benefits for their province is predicted for that member.

Through a cross-analysis of the provincial party secretary and governor using the two indices "whether PPP is a central institution" and "whether the person has CCYL experience", we identified nine options regarding implementing central government policy (see Table 1). When the two officials' PPPs are at the central government, irrespective of whether one or both have CCYL experience, the preferred choice is pioneering. When neither of the officials has CCYL experience, the preferred choice is bandwagoning. When only one of the officials' PPP is at the central government, but both officials have CCYL experience, the preferred choice will be pioneering. When only one official has CCYL experience, the preferred choice is bandwagoning. If neither of the officials has CCYL experience, the preferred choice is resisting. When both officials' PPPs are not at the central government but they have CCYL experience, the preferred choice is bandwagoning. If one or both officials do not have CCYL experience, the preferred choice is resisting.

Table 2 shows the possible combination of provincial behaviour options and preferences, and the prediction of nine provincial policy implementation types. When the only provincial policy implementation option available is pioneering, regardless of preference, the predicted behaviour is always pioneering. When the options include pioneering and bandwagoning, and the preferred response is pioneering, the predicted behaviour is pioneering. If the preference of a province is bandwagoning and resisting, the predicted behaviour is bandwagoning. When the options are pioneering, bandwagoning and resisting, the predicted behaviour depends on the preference. That is, the predicted behaviour is pioneering if a province's preference is pioneering. Conversely, when a province's preference is bandwagoning, the predicted behaviour is bandwagoning. When a province's preference is resisting, the prediction is resisting.

DATA ANALYSIS

In this section, using the analysis framework, we discuss the distribution of political interests in the 17th CC of the CPC, the transition of political interests from the first to third plenary session of the 17th CC, and the prediction of provincial policy implementation behaviour based on the evaluation criteria and methods.

The Distribution of Political interests in the 17th CC of the CPC

Utilising the preceding formula, which calculates the intensity of political interest, the political interest in the 17th CPC CC, PB and PBSC members is 672. Table 3 shows the political distribution of both the provincial and central governments. As shown in Table 3, the political distribution displays three major characteristics. First, the political interests of the central government (50.22 per cent) are greater than those of provinces (41.88 per cent) and the military (7.9 per cent). The ratio of the central government interests to local interests works out to be 5.8: 4.2, which is the same as that in the 16th CC. Second, compared to the 16th CC, (41) local interests increased slightly by 0.28 per cent, whereas both the military and central interests declined by 0.18 per cent and 0.1 per cent, respectively. Finally, the intensity of political interests differs significantly between provinces; Shanghai has the highest percentage at 5.57 per cent, which is 42.8 times higher than that of the lowest percentage held by both Hong Kong and Macau. Political interests in Shanghai are also 25.3 times higher than that of Yunnan Province.

After multiplying the provincial political interests by 33 (Figure 2), if the percentage is lower than 41.88 per cent, the only policy implementation option available to the provincial government is pioneering. Provincial governments displaying this behaviour pattern include Jilin, Hong Kong, and 21 other provinces and cities (Figure 2). These governments comprise 69.7 per cent of the total. If the political interest after multiplying by 33 is greater than 41.88 per cent, but lower than 58.12 per cent, it is shown that 6 per cent of the policy implementation options are pioneering and bandwagoning. Provincial governments that fit into these behaviour patterns include Chongqing and Hubei. Finally, if political interest exceeds 58.12 per cent, the options are pioneering, bandwagoning and resisting. Provinces with behaviour demonstrating characteristics of these options include eight provinces and cities, ranging from Xinjiang to Shanghai (Figure 2), which represent 24.2 per cent of the total.

The Political Transition between the First and Third Plenary Sessions of the 17th CC

Making a comparison of the CC members of the first plenary session of the 17th CC of the CPC with that of the third session, it is found that 58 members of the first session held provincial PCPs. By the third plenary session, the number of members had decreased by nine, and 105 members held central PCPs, an increase in nine compared to the first plenary session. Additionally, eight (32 per cent) PB members' PCPs had changed; five members were transferred from their provinces to the central government; two were transferred from their provinces to other provinces; and one was transferred from the central government to a province. Two (22 per cent) PBSC members' PCPs had also changed; both were transferred from their provinces to the central government.

Table 4 shows the distribution of central-provincial political interests in the third plenary session of the 17th CC. The percentage of political interests shared by 33 provinces in the first plenary session was 41.88 per cent, which declined to 33.24 per cent in the third plenary session. Political interests held by the central government in the first plenary session was 50.22 per cent, which increased to 58.86 per cent in the third plenary session. The military still accounted for 7.9 per cent of political interests. Comparing political interests of the central government with those of local provinces, the ratio is 6.7: 3.3. The percentage of political interests of 20 provinces (60.6 per cent) remained the same, that of 11 (33.3 per cent) provinces had decreased, and two (6.1 per cent) provinces experienced an increase.

Prediction of Provincial Responses to Central Government Policy

Figure 3 shows the percentage of political interests after multiplying by 33 for each province at the third plenary session of 17th CC. The results show that less than 33.24 per cent of provinces display pioneering behaviour as the only option for implementing central government policy. These provincial governments include Hunan, Hong Kong and 19 other provinces and cities (Figure 3), and account for 63.6 per cent of the total, which is a decrease of 6.1 per cent compared to that of the first plenary session. If the value after multiplying by 33 is greater than 33.24 per cent, but lower than 67.76 per cent, the policy implementation options are pioneering and bandwagoning. Six provinces display these behaviour patterns, including Shaanxi and Tianjin City (see Figure 3). These provinces comprise 18.2 per cent of the total, which grew by 12.2 per cent compared to that of the first plenary session. When the percentage after multiplying by 33 exceeds 67.76 per cent, the available options are pioneering, bandwagoning and resisting. Provinces with these options include Anhui, Shanghai and four other provinces and cities (see Figure 3); they comprise 18.2 per cent of the total, which is a 6 per cent decrease compared with that of the first plenary session.

The PPP distribution shows that nine (29 per cent) of the 31 provincial party secretaries and four of the 31 provincial governors (13 per cent) were transferred to their positions from the central government. Through cross-analysis of the PPPs of provincial party secretaries and governors, it is found that there were two provinces (6.5 per cent) where both officials' PPPs were at the central government, nine provinces (29 per cent) where only one official's PPP was at central government and 20 provinces (64.5 per cent) provinces where neither of their PPPs were at the central government. As for those with CCYL experience, eight (25.8 per cent) of the 31 provincial party secretaries had equivalent experience, whereas 18 of the 31 provincial governors had CCYL experience. A cross-analysis of the CCYL experience of party secretaries and governors revealed that there were five provinces (16.1 per cent), where both officials had CCYL experience; 16 provinces (51.6 per cent), where only one of the two officials had CCYL experience; and 10 provinces (32.3 per cent), where neither of the two officials had CCYL experience. Finally, the results from the cross-analysis of the PPPs and CCYL experience of 31 provincial party secretaries and governors were used to predict the behaviour preferences of each province when a central government policy damages local interests, as illustrated in Table 5. The results show that three provinces (9.7 per cent) prefer pioneering behaviour, seven provinces (22.6 per cent) prefer the bandwagoning option and 21 provinces (67.7 per cent) prefer resisting behaviour.

Table 6 shows the policy implementation options and preferences of 31 provinces. According to this table, when the central government policy harms local interests, 20 provinces (64.5 per cent) are predicted to adopt a pioneering response, six provinces (19.4 per cent) are expected to adopt a bandwagoning response and five provinces (16.1 per cent) would resist the policy.

TEST OF RESEARCH VALIDITY

The analyses conducted in this study led to the following results: (i) the political interests of each province following the first plenary session of the 17th CPC CC were obtained, as shown in Figure 2; (ii) the political interests of each province following the third plenary session of the 17th CPC CC were also identified, as shown in Figure 3; and (iii) the likelihood that the CPC central government can successfully promote its preferred policies regardless of whether they damage local interests was found to be high. To verify the validity of this study, a predictive validity test was conducted.

To examine whether the political interests of each province influenced the resources they received, this study used the total investment in fixed assets of the entire country as the predictive validity criterion. Political interests determine the central government's decisions and resource distribution. The primary economic resources distributed by the central government are infrastructure investments and preferential policies. The total amount of fixed asset investments can be used to evaluate infrastructure investments and preferential policies. The correlation coefficient (r) of the political interest ratio of each province following the first plenary session of the 17th CC and the total fixed asset investment ratio of each province in 2007 was 0.364 (p = .044). The correlation coefficient (r) of the political interest ratio of each province following the third plenary session of the 17th CC and the total fixed asset investment ratio of each province in 2008 was 0.387 (p = .031). These numerical results demonstrate the validity of the first and second research findings.

Next, this study used political interests to forecast the investments in fixed assets for the following year. In Model 1, the political interest ratio of each province after the first plenary session of the 17th CC was assigned as the independent variable, the population ratio of each province in 2007 was assigned as the control variable and the total fixed asset investment ratio of each province in 2008 was assigned as the dependent variable. Similarly in Model 2, the political interest ratio of each province after the third plenary session of the 17th CC was assigned as the independent variable, the population ratio of each province in 2008 was assigned as the control variable and the total fixed asset investment of each province in 2009 was assigned as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 were used to verify the predictive validity of the first and second research findings, respectively. Results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 7.

As the results in Table 7 indicate, the first and second findings of this study have significant predictive validity. In Model 1, political interests and population can explain the 78.7 per cent variance in fixed asset investments. Political interests have a positive influence on fixed asset investments; when political interests increase by 1 per cent, the predicted fixed asset investment increases by 0.385 per cent. This indicates that the political interest measurement tool adopted in this study is valid. In Model 2, political interests and population can explain the 80.1 per cent variance in fixed asset investments. Political interests positively affect fixed asset investments. When political interests increase by 1 per cent, the predicted fixed asset investment increases by 0.573 per cent. This indicates that the approach proposed in this study for calculating changing political interests is valid.

To examine whether the central government can successfully promote preferred policies that damage local interests, this study used the 2009 policy dispute over resuming the Labour Day Golden Week holiday (May 1 to 7) as the predictive validity criterion. During this policy dispute, local governments implemented practical actions that violated the policy of the central government. Information of the different opinions held by each province can be obtained from media reports. This dispute is a suitable validity criterion for analysis because it occurred five months after the third plenary session of the 17th CC.

In 2008, the central government abolished the Labour Day Golden Week holiday, which had been celebrated for seven years, and added three traditional holidays (Qingming Festival, Dragon Boat Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival). In 2009, to maintain economic growth during the financial crisis, Guangdong proposed a workday adjustment and paid annual vacation to provide the labour force with a vacation from May 1 to 7, thus resuming the Labour Day Golden Week holiday. Chongqing, Henan, Hunan and Xinjiang also proposed policies to resume the Labour Day Golden Week holiday. (42) These five provinces implemented practical actions to resist the policy of the central government. By contrast, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Shaanxi and Jilin conformed to the central government policy. Although Guangdong, Chongqing, Henan, Hunan and Xinjiang did not publicly insist on resuming the Labour Day Golden Week holiday, Guangdong's resistance encouraged other lower-level governments to follow its example. (43) Meanwhile, the other 21 provinces were pioneers of the central government policy. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shandong, Sichuan, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Fujian, Hubei, Hainan, Yunnan, Guangxi and Inner Mongolia publicly announced that they would not resume the Labour Day Golden Week holiday. Hebei, Shanxi, Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia also followed the central government policy, but without making a public announcement.

Whether each province resisted or conformed to the central government policy regarding Labour Day Golden Week, they followed the central government policies since the State Council issued the Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Strictly Implementing the Relevant Provisions on National Statutory Holidays on 26 March 2009. This indicates that the central government can successfully promote preferred policies that damage local interests. Table 6 shows the predicted responses of each province to the central government policy. Table 8 illustrates a cross-analysis of the predicted responses and actual actions of each province during the policy dispute. As shown in Table 8, the predicted responses of 19 provinces were consistent with their actual actions; therefore, the predictive accuracy rate is 61.3 per cent.

The predicted responses and the actual actions of each province have ordering characteristics. This study examined the predictions to explain the actions and it was found that the predicted responses and the actual actions were asymmetrically related. Therefore, this study employed the measure of Somers' D to calculate the correlation between the predicted responses and the actual actions. The Somers' D result was 0.332, which reached the level of statistical significance (p = .026). The value of 0.332 reveals that the predicted responses were positively correlated with the actual actions, and predictions using the analytical framework proposed by this study can reduce 33.2 per cent of errors. The result indicates the validity of the research framework of this study for analysing local responses to central government policies.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the central-provincial relations after the 17th National Congress of the CCP, exploring the distribution and transition of political interests and their impact on provincial policy implementation. Political interests are evaluated by adopting the triple-place model criteria and methods. Additionally, the day-by-day formula was applied to assess the transition of political interests. The evaluation criteria and methods proposed in this study were based on two variable items: provincial autarchy and central dependency. Using the three provincial options and preferences, nine behavioural predictions were established for provincial policy implementation. The three main findings of this study are presented in the following paragraphs.

Regarding the distribution of political interests, the 17th CC shared highly similar central-provincial political interests with those of the 16th CC. First, the CC members' PAOs were primarily from Jiangsu province, and the policy of assigning two CC members to each province was continued in the 17th CC. Second, 10 PB members' PCPs were provincial at both the 16th and 17th CC. This overlapped between congresses in seven provinces: Guangdong, Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Hubei. Third, none of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members were military representatives. Seven PBSC members' PCPs were at the central government and two were at the provincial level; however, the provincial representatives were soon to be promoted to the central government. Finally, the ratio of political interests between the central government and local provinces worked out to be 5.8: 4.2. However, following the 17th National Congress, Hu Jintao's control of the provinces was greater than after the 16th National Congress. The power and authority is most obvious from the promotion of members of Hu's cliques to the Politburo as local barons, including Li Keqiang in Liaoning (who has CCYL experience and whose PAO is Anhui), Li Yuanchao in Jiangsu (who has CCYL experience) and Wang Yang in Chongqing (who has CCYL experience and whose PAO is Anhui).

The transition of political interests from the first plenary session of the 17th CC to the third session shows that the distribution of central-provincial power does not follow a winner-takes-all or power-balancing model. (44) Instead, the power distribution model tended towards a centralism-oriented power-balancing model. This is because the PCPs of eight Politburo members (32 per cent) have changed; five (62.5 per cent) were transferred from the provinces to the central government, two (25 per cent) were transferred from one province to another and only one (12.5 per cent) was transferred from the central government to a province. The PCPs of two PBSC members (22 per cent) also changed; they were both transferred from provinces to the central government. Therefore, the provincial share of political interests declined from 41.88 per cent in the first plenary session of the 17th CC to 33.24 per cent in the third session, a decrease of 8.64 per cent. By contrast, the central government's political interests increased from 50.22 per cent in the first plenary session to 58.86 per cent in the third session, an increase of 8.64 per cent. The growth was 17 per cent, whereas the political interests of the military remained at 7.9 per cent. Therefore, the ratio of political interests between the provincial governments and central government was 6.7: 3.3.

Regarding provincial policy implementation strategies, the central government can implement its preferred policy, even if it damages provincial interests. Provinces adopting a resistance response to implementing central government policy decreased from eight provinces in the first plenary session to six in the third session. Concerning the PPP distribution, 13 (21 per cent) of the 62 provincial party secretaries and governors were transferred to their position from the central government. Additionally, 24 (42 per cent) of the 62 officials had CCYL experience. To generalise the analysis of the policy implementation options and preferences of 31 provinces, although central government policy harmed local interests, 20 provinces (64.5 per cent) adopted a pioneering response, six provinces (19.4 per cent) adopted a bandwagoning response and five (16.1 per cent) adopted a resistance response.

The political interest distribution model and the political interest transition model proposed in this study can effectively predict the fixed asset investment of each province for the following year. These models can also be used to determine the fixed asset investment for the years following the 18th CPC CC. This study developed a prediction model of local governments' responses to the central government policies using the 2009 policy dispute over resuming the Labour Day Golden Week holiday as the validity criterion. It is found that the Somers' D correlation coefficient was 0.332 (p = .026), which indicated that predictions that deploy the analytical framework proposed in this study can reduce 33.2 per cent of errors. To improve prediction validity, future research can be conducted on the level of influence that the central government policies has on each province, the characteristics of each provincial leader and the expected response of each province to the central government policies in measuring indicators of locally preferred countermeasures.

(1) Sheng Yumin, "Central-Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions, Measurement and Empirical Trends, 1978-2002", The China Quarterly 188 (June 2005): 352-3.

(2) Su Fubing and Dali L. Yang, "Political Institutions, Provincial Interests, and Resource Allocation in Reformist China", Journal of Contemporary China 9, no. 24 (July 2000): 228.

(3) Linda Li Chelan, Centre and Provinces: China 1978-1993, Power as Non-Zero-Sum (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 34-45.

(4) Chao Chienmin and Liu Sungfu, "Gaige kaifang yilai zhonggong zhongyang zuigao lingdao ji juece tizhi zhi bianqian" (Changes of CCP Top Decision-Making System in the Reform Years), Yuanjing jijinhui jikan (Prospect Quarterly) 8, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 78-9.

(5) Bo Zhiyue, China's Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Singapore and Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 19-90.

(6) Xin Xiangyang, Daguo zhuhou: Zhongguo zhongyang yu defang guanxi zhi jie (Fiefdoms of Big Country: The Knot between Central and Local Relations) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1997), p. 15.

(7) Su and Yang, "Political Institutions, Provincial Interests, and Resource Allocation in Reformist China", p. 221.

(8) Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, "Political Capital in a Market Economy", Social Forces 88, no. 5 (July 2010): 2108.

(9) Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 90-1.

(10) Li Cheng, "A Pivotal Stepping-Stone: Local Leaders' Representation on the 17th Central Committee", China Leadership Monitor 23 (Winter 2008): 7.

(11) Bo Zhiyue, "The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups", Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (May 2004): 231. Bo Zhiyue, "The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation", Issues & Studies 44, no. 3 (Sept. 2008): 10.

(12) S. Philip Hsu, "Zhongguo dalu zhongyang yu gesheng guanxi zhong de shuipingxing yu chuizhixing quanli jingzheng, 1993-2004: jingying zhengzhi yu touzi de yiti lianjie fenxi" (The Horizontal and Vertical Power Competence between the Central Government and Provinces in China, 1993-2004: Analysis of Elite Politics and Investment Policy), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) 50, no. 2 (June 2007): 18.

(13) Ibid., pp. 19-20, 29.

(14) Wang Chiachou, "Zhengzhi liyi yu ziyuan fenpei: Zhongguo dalu gesheng yingxiangli moxing zhi jianli yu jianding" (Political Interests and Resource Distribution: A Model for Establishing and Examining the Influence of Each Province), Yuanjing jijinhui jikan (Prospect Quarterly) 10, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 120.

(15) Wang, "Zhengzhi liyi", pp. 99-100.

(16) Hsu, op. cit., p. 18.

(17) Research on political elites according to their place of ancestry origin and place of rise. See Zang Xiaowei, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?", Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (Aug. 1993): 793-5; Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin", Asian Survey 38, no. 3 (Mar. 1998): 245-7; Li Cheng, "Jiang Zemin's Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC", The China Quarterly 161 (Mar. 2000): 15-8.

(18) Wang Chiachou, "Zhonggong duitaiyongwu zhengce guochengzhong difang lixing jueze zhi fanying" (Rational Reaction of the Provinces in the PRC to the Use of Military Force against Taiwan), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Study) 48, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 67.

(19) Wang, "Zhengzhi liyi", p. 124.

(20) Sheng Yumin, "The Determinants of Provincial Presence at the CCP Central Committees, 1978-2002: An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 51 (May 2008): 224.

(21) Sheng, "Central-Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees", pp. 354-5.

(22) There were 353 days between the first plenary session of the 17th Central Committee, which was held on 9 Oct. 2007, and the third, which was held on 9 Oct. 2008.

(23) Chung Jae Ho, Central Control and Local Discretion in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 6-8.

(24) Linda Li Chelan, "Kuayue linghe: Sikao dangdai Zhongguo de zhongyang difang guanxi" (Beyond Zero-Sum: Central-Provincial Relations in Contemporary China), Huazhongshifan daxuexuebao (Journal of Central China Normal University [Humanities and Social Sciences] 43, no. 6 (Nov. 2004): 123.

(25) Li, Centre and Provinces, pp. 34-45.

(26) Su and Yang, "Political Institutions, Provincial Interests, and Resource Allocation in Reformist China", p. 228.

(27) The three possible central-provincial political interest relationships are greater than, equal to and smaller than. As the previous studies on the political interests between the central government and provinces indicate that the ratio is 5.5: 5.4, this article shows only the first relationship. See Wang Chiachou, "Zhonggong shiliuda hou de zhongyang yu difang guanxi--zhengzhi liyi fenpei moxing zhi fenxi" (The Central-Provincial Relationship after the 16th National Congress--Analysis of Political Interests Distribution Model), Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao (Soochow Journal of Political Science) 18 (Mar. 2004): 175.

(28) William H. Riker, "The Future of a Science of Politics", American Behavioral Scientist 21, no. 1 (Sept./ Oct. 1977): 33.

(29) John F.S. Hsieh, "Zhengzhi zhidu yanjiu fangfa zhi jiantao" (Approaches to the Study of Political Institutions), Wenti yu yanjiu (Issues & Studies) 36, no. 9 (Sept. 1997): 31.

(30) Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", Political Studies 44, no. 2 (June 1996): 944-5.

(31) Keith Dowding and Desmond King, eds., Preferences, Institutions, and Rational Choice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 2.

(32) Tao Yi-feng, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao China, 1978-98: An Event History Analysis of Provincial Leader Turnover", Issues & Studies 37, no. 4 (July 2001): 97.

(33) Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, Zhongguo goujia nengli baogao (China National Ability Report) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 125.

(34) He Pin and Gao Xin, Zhonggong xinquangui--zuexin lingdaozhe quexiang (China New Bigwigs--The Newest Leaderships) (Hong Kong: Generation Month Journal, 1993), p. 442.

(35) Zheng Yongnian, Jiang Zemin de zhengzhi yichan: zai shoucheng he gaige zhijian (Jiang Zemin's Political Inheritance: Between Conservation and Revolution) (New Jersey: Bafang Corporation, 2002), p. 151.

(36) Xiao Tangbiao, "Zhongguo zhengzhi gaige de tizhinei ziyuan--dui difang guanyuan zhengzhi taidu de diaocha yu fenxi" (Resources within China's Political Reform System--Investigation and Analysis on Provincial Officials' Political Attitudes), Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu (Modern China Studies) 90 (Sept. 2005), at <http://www.chinayj.net/StubArticle.asp?issue=050303&total=90> [15 Oct. 2009].

(37) Excludes two special subdivisions, Hong Kong and Macau.

(38) Bo Zhiyue, China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore and Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2007), p. 139.

(39) Guo Xuezhi, "Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics", The China Journal 46 (July 2001): 69.

(40) Kou Chien-Wen, "Hu Jintao shidai tuanxi ganbu de jueqi: paixi kaoliang versus ganbu shusong de zuzhi renwu" (CCYL Cadres Rising during the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Networking or the Organization's Mission), Yuanjing jijinhui jikan (Prospect Quarterly) 8, no. 4 (Oct. 2007): 82.

(41) In the 16th CC, the share of political interests for the provinces was 41.6 per cent, the central government had 50.32 per cent and the military had 8.08 per cent.

(42) See <http://chinareviewagency.com/doc/1009/2/4/4/100924422.html?coluid=73&kindid=1982& docid=100924422&mdate=0403104235> [7 Oct. 2011].

(43) See <http://www.stnn.cc:82/china/200903/t20090326_1003611.html> [7 Oct. 2011]; <http://liaoning. nen.com.cn/liaoning/21/3240021.shtml> [7 Oct. 2011]; <http://travel.people.com.cn/GB/41636/41642/ 8864241.html> [7 Oct. 2011]; <http://finance.ifeng.com/money/roll/20090226/403187.shtml> [7 Oct. 2011].

(44) Bo Zhiyue, "Political Succession and Elite Politics in Twenty-First Century China: Toward a Perspective of 'Power Balancing'", Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 166-7.

Wang Chia-Chou (jjw@isu.edu.tw) is Associate Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Management, I-Shou University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He obtained his PhD from the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University. His research interests include Chinese politics, intergovernmental relations and cross-Strait relations.

TABLE 1
NINE TYPES OF LEADERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION PREFERENCES

                              CCYL experience

                              Both positive

PPP is        Both positive   (1) pioneering
the central   One negative,   (4) pioneering
government    one positive
              Both negative   (7) bandwagoning

                                     CCYL experience

                              One positive,      Both negative
                              one negative

PPP is        Both positive   (2) pioneering     (3) bandwagoning
the central   One negative,   (5) bandwagoning   (6) resisting
government    one positive
              Both negative   (8) resisting      (9) resisting

Source: The authors study.

TABLE 2
PREDICTIONS OF PROVINCIAL BEHAVIOUR ACCORDING TO THE
COMBINATION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS AND PREFERENCES

                                Policy
                                implementation
                                options

                                Pioneering

Policy           Pioneering     (1) pioneering
implementation   Bandwagoning   (4) pioneering
preferences      Resisting      (7) pioneering

                                Policy implementation options

                                Pioneering,        Pioneering,
                                bandwagoning       bandwagoning,
                                                   resisting

Policy           Pioneering     (2) pioneering     (3) pioneering
implementation   Bandwagoning   (5) bandwagoning   (6) bandwagoning
preferences      Resisting      (8) bandwagoning   (9) resisting

Source: The authors study.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCIAL-CENTRAL POLITICAL INTERESTS
FOR THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE 17TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

                   CC        Politburo   PBSC
                   members   members     members

1. Beijing           2        18.9         0
2. Tianjin           1.8       9           2.7
3. Hebei             3.9       1.8         2.7
4. Shanxi            2.2       1.8         0
5. Neimenggu         2.5       0.9         0
6. Liaoning          3.1       9.9        24.3
7. Jilin             3         2.7         2.7
8. Heilongjiang      1.7       0           0
9. Shanghai          2.3      10.8        24.3
10. Jiangsu          4        14.4         2.7
11. Zhejiang         3.6       0.9         0
12. Anhui            3.3       3.6         8.1
13. Fujian           2.8       0.9         0
14. Jiangxi          2.2       0           0
15. Shandong         3.8       0.9         0
16. Henan            2.6       2.7         0
17. Hubei            2.4       8.1         0
18. Hunan            2.1       0.9         2.7
19. Guangdong        2.2       8.1         8.1
20. Guangxi          2.3       0           0
21. Hainan           1.8       0           0
22. Chongqing        2.1       8.1         0
23. Sichuan          2.4       2.7         0
24. Guizhou          2.3       0           0
25. Yunnan           1.5       0           0
26. Xizang           3.2       0           0
27. Shaanxi          3         1.8         2.7
28. Gansu            1.9       0           0
29. Qinghai          3         0           0
30. Ningxia          2.4       0           0
31. Xinjiang         4.2       8.1         0
32. Hong Kong        0.9       0           0
33. Macau            0.9       0           0
Provincial total    83.4     117          81
Central             83.7      91.8       162
Military            36.9      16.2         0
Total              204       225         243

                   Total   Rate     Multiplied
                                    by 33

1. Beijing          20.9     3.11   102.63
2. Tianjin          13.5     2.01    66.29
3. Hebei             8.4     1.25    41.25
4. Shanxi            4       0.6     19.64
5. Neimenggu         3.4     0.51    16.7
6. Liaoning         37.3     5.55   183.17
7. Jilin             8.4     1.25    41.25
8. Heilongjiang      1.7     0.25     8.35
9. Shanghai         37.4     5.57   183.66
10. Jiangsu         21.1     3.14   103.62
11. Zhejiang         4.5     0.67    22.1
12. Anhui           15       2.23    73.66
13. Fujian           3.7     0.55    18.17
14. Jiangxi          2.2     0.33    10.8
15. Shandong         4.7     0.7     23.08
16. Henan            5.3     0.79    26.03
17. Hubei           10.5     1.56    51.56
18. Hunan            5.7     0.85    27.99
19. Guangdong       18.4     2.74    90.36
20. Guangxi          2.3     0.34    11.29
21. Hainan           1.8     0.27     8.84
22. Chongqing       10.2     1.52    50.09
23. Sichuan          5.1     0.76    25.04
24. Guizhou          2.3     0.34    11.29
25. Yunnan           1.5     0.22     7.37
26. Xizang           3.2     0.48    15.71
27. Shaanxi          7.5     1.12    36.83
28. Gansu            1.9     0.28     9.33
29. Qinghai          3       0.45    14.73
30. Ningxia          2.4     0.36    11.79
31. Xinjiang        12.3     1.83    60.4
32. Hong Kong        0.9     0.13     4.42
33. Macau            0.9     0.13     4.42
Provincial total   281.4    41.88
Central            337.5    50.22
Military            53.1     7.9
Total              672     100

Sources: The author's study. Data compiled from "Zhonggong
shiqida zhongyang weiyuan mingdan" (List of the Names of the
17th CPC Central Committee Members), Lianhe Bao (United
Daily News), 22 Oct. 2007, p. A14. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu,
Zhongguo gongchandang lijie zhongyang weiyuan dacidian (A
Biographical Dictionary of CPC Central Committee Members)
(Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 2004). Xinhua news at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2007-10/21/content_6917500.htm>
[4 Aug. 2009].

TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL-PROVINCIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS
FOR THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE 17TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

                   CC        Politburo   PBSC
                   members   members     members

1. Beijing           2        14.1         0.0
2. Tianjin           1.2       9.0         2.7
3. Hebei             3.9       1.8         2.7
4. Shanxi            2.3       1.8         0.0
5. Neimenggu         1.9       0.9         0.0
6. Liaoning          2.5       4.6         8.4
7. Jilin             3         2.7         2.7
8. Heilongjiang      1.1       0.0         0.0
9. Shanghai          2.3      10.8         8.3
10. Jiangsu          3.3       9.1         2.7
11. Zhejiang         3.6       0.9         0.0
12. Anhui            2.7       3.6         8.1
13. Fujian           2.8       0.9         0.0
14. Jiangxi          2.2       0.0         0.0
15. Shandong         4.4       0.9         0.0
16. Henan            2.6       2.7         0.0
17. Hubei            1.8       2.8         0.0
18. Hunan            2.1       0.9         2.7
19. Guangdong        2.2       8.1         8.1
20. Guangxi          1.1       0.0         0.0
21. Hainan           1.8       0.0         0.0
22. Chongqing        2.1       8.1         0.0
23. Sichuan          2.4       2.7         0.0
24. Guizhou          2.3       0.0         0.0
25. Yunnan           1.5       0.0         0.0
26. Xizang           3.2       0.0         0.0
27. Shaanxi          3         1.8         2.7
28. Gansu            1.9       0.0         0.0
29. Qinghai          3         0.0         0.0
30. Ningxia          2.4       0.0         0.0
31. Xinjiang         3.6       8.1         0.0
32. Hong Kong        0.9       0.0         0.0
33. Macau            0.9       0.0         0.0
Provincial total    78        96.23       49.15
Central             89.1     112.57      193.85
Military            36.9      16.20        0.00
Total              204       225.00      243.00

                   Total    Rate     Multiplied
                                     by 33

1. Beijing          16.1      2.40    79.06
2. Tianjin          12.9      1.92    63.35
3. Hebei             8.4      1.25    41.25
4. Shanxi            4.1      0.61    20.13
5. Neimenggu         2.8      0.42    13.75
6. Liaoning         15.5      2.31    76.12
7. Jilin             8.4      1.25    41.25
8. Heilongjiang      1.1      0.16     5.4
9. Shanghai         21.4      3.18   105.09
10. Jiangsu         15.1      2.25    74.15
11. Zhejiang         4.5      0.67    22.1
12. Anhui           14.4      2.14    70.71
13. Fujian           3.7      0.55    18.17
14. Jiangxi          2.2      0.33    10.8
15. Shandong         5.3      0.79    26.03
16. Henan            5.3      0.79    26.03
17. Hubei            4.6      0.68    22.59
18. Hunan            5.7      0.85    27.99
19. Guangdong       18.4      2.74    90.36
20. Guangxi          1.1      0.16     5.40
21. Hainan           1.8      0.27     8.84
22. Chongqing       10.2      1.52    50.09
23. Sichuan          5.1      0.76    25.04
24. Guizhou          2.3      0.34    11.29
25. Yunnan           1.5      0.22     7.37
26. Xizang           3.2      0.48    15.71
27. Shaanxi          7.5      1.12    36.83
28. Gansu            1.9      0.28     9.33
29. Qinghai          3        0.45    14.73
30. Ningxia          2.4      0.36    11.79
31. Xinjiang        11.7      1.74    57.46
32. Hong Kong        0.9      0.13     4.42
33. Macau            0.9      0.13     4.42
Provincial total   223.38    33.24
Central            395.52    58.86
Military            53.1      7.90
Total              672      100.00

Sources: The authors study. Data compiled from "Zhonggong
shiqida zhongyang weiyuan mingdan" (List of the Names of the
17th CPC Central Committee Members), Lianhe Bao (United Daily
News), 22 Oct. 2007, p. A14. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu,
Zhongguo gongchandang lijie zhongyang weiyuan dacidian
(A Biographical Dictionary of CPC Central Committee Members)
(Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 2004). Xinhua news at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2007-10/21/content_6917500.htm>
[4 Aug. 2009].

TABLE 5
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PREFERENCES OF 31 PROVINCES

                              CCYL experience

                              Both positive

PPP is        Both positive   (1) pioneering
the central
government    One positive,   (4) pioneering
              one negative    Heilongjiang

              Both negative   (7) bandwagoning
                              Qinghai, Shanxi,
                              Xinjiang, Guangdong

                              CCYL experience

                              One positive,
                              one negative

PPP is        Both positive   (2) pioneering
the central                   Hebei, Hunan
government    One positive,   (5) bandwagoning
              one negative    Shanxi,
                              Shandong, Jilin

              Both negative   (8) resisting
                              Shanghai, Neimenggu,
                              Sichuan, Anhui,
                              Jiangsu, Xizang,
                              Hainan, Hubei,
                              Yunnan, Fujian,
                              Liaoning

                              CCYL experience

                              Both negative

PPP is        Both positive   (3) bandwagoning
the central
government    One positive,   (6) resisting
              one negative    Jiangxi, Henan,
                              Chongching,
                              Zhejiang, Guizhou
              Both negative   (9) resisting
                              Tianjin, Beijing,
                              Gansu, Ningxia,
                              Guangxi

Source: The authors study.

TABLE 6
PREDICTED POLICY IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSES OF 31 PROVINCES

                                  Policy
                                  implementation options

                                  Pioneering

Policy           Pioneering       (1) pioneering
implementation                    Heilongjiang, Hunan
preferences      Bandwagoning     (4) pioneering
                                  Qinghai, Shanxi,
                                  Shandong
                 Resisting        (7) pioneering
                                  Guangdong, Yunnan,
                                  Hainan, Gansu, Jiangxi,
                                  Guizhou, Ningxia,
                                  Neimenggu, Xizang,
                                  Fujian, Zhejiang,
                                  Hubei, Sichuan, Henan

                                  Policy
                                  implementation options

                                  Pioneering,
                                  bandwagoning

Policy           Pioneering       (2) pioneering
implementation                    Hebei
preferences      Bandwagoning     (5) bandwagoning
                                  Shanxi, Jilin, Xinjiang

                 Resisting        (8) bandwagoning
                                  Chongqing, Tianjin


                                  Policy
                                  implementation options

                                  Pioneering,
                                  bandwagoning,
                                  resisting
Policy           Pioneering       (3) pioneering
implementation
preferences      Bandwagoning     (6) bandwagoning
                                  Guangdong

                 Resisting        (9) resisting
                                  Anhui, Jiangsu,
                                  Liaoning, Beijing,
                                  Shanghai

Source: The authors study.

TABLE 7
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL INTERESTS AND POPULATION
COMPARED WITH THE FIXED ASSET INVESTMENTS OF EACH PROVINCE

                              Model 1             Model 2

                        B       (S.E.)        B        (S.E.)

Constant              -0.300   (0.310)       -0.296     (0.388
Political interests    0.385   (0.108) **     0.573     (0.216) *
Population             0.697   (0.075) ***    0.894     (0.091) ***
N                     31                     31
[R.sup.2]              0.787                  0.801
S.E.E                  0.832                  1.003

Notes: *, **, *** indicate a significance level of
p < 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001, respectively.

Sources: Data were obtained from Table 3, Table 4 and China
Statistical Yearbook 2008-2010 at
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/> [1 Oct. 2011].

TABLE 8
THE PREDICTED RESPONSES AND ACTUAL ACTIONS OF THE 31 PROVINCES
REGARDING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY

                         Predicted responses

                         Pioneering

Actual    Pioneering     Heilongjiang, Hebei,
actions                  Qinghai, Shanxi,
                         Shandong, Guangdong,
                         Yunnan, Hainan, Gansu,
                         Jiangxi, Guizhou, Ningxia,
                         Neimenggu, Xizang,
                         Fujian, Hubei, Sichuan
          Bandwagoning   Zhejiang
          Resisting      Hunan, Henan

                                  Predicted responses

                         Bandwagoning           Resisting

Actual    Pioneering     Tianjin                Anhui, Beijing,
actions                                         Shanghai

          Bandwagoning   Shanxi, Jilin          Jiangsu, Liaoning
          Resisting      Xinjiang, Guangdong,
                         Chongqing

Source: The author's study.
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Title Annotation:Communist Party of China
Author:Chia-Chou, Wang
Publication:China: An International Journal
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Date:Apr 1, 2013
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