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Planning convergence.

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True wisdom in strategy must be practical because strategy is a practical subject. Much of what appears to be wise and indeed is prudent as high theory is unhelpful to the poor warrior who actually has to do strategy, tactically and operationally.

--Colin S. Gray (1)

In the Department of Defense (DOD) today, several initiatives are emerging and have begun to converge. Adaptive Planning (AP), Capabilities-based Planning (CBP), and Global Force Management (GFM) are three prime examples. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) reaffirms the DOD commitment to these initiatives and places emphasis on a need to "integrate processes that define needed capabilities, identify solutions, and allocate resources to acquire them." (2) Thus, it is incumbent on DOD to effectively manage the convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM in order to fully support the vision of sound decisionmaking in an uncertain defense environment.

The argument of this essay is simple: Placing tight bounds on military operational planners will effectively institute a new planning and military decisionmaking process. The purpose is to suggest a move away from open-ended strategic guidance toward explicit intent, assumptions, and constraints. Unlike today's strategic guidance, strictly limiting available force capabilities and other resources will generate more creative planning options and risk mitigation strategies. This idea may seem counterintuitive. However, it is the iterative process of setting new bounds, reformulating a plan, and providing results back to strategists that can ultimately provide insight for decisionmakers. A more meaningful and beneficial convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM will occur because the iterative process demands continuous communication and information-sharing among the strategist, force provider, warfighting planner, and out-year programmer.

To effectively merge processes and support decisionmaking, operational planning that uses AP methods must constantly interact with CBP as employed by defense analysts and programmers. In fact, the interaction must occur prior to the formal start of a DOD planning cycle to assist strategy writers in forming the detailed parameters that will then guide operational planning. Adaptive Planning must also interface with GFM as designed by the Joint Staff as a centralized force provider process. The idea is to unify operational and future force structure planning results to objectively support decisionmaking and revisions in strategy. In addition, interaction between planners at lower levels will shape the debate over tradeoffs between current and future force structure throughout the planning and programming cycle. DOD must find a way to expand CBP horizontally through functional areas, such as operational planning, and vertically from the strategic to the tactical level. In turn, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) can have a consolidated picture for resource decisions.

Background

The Department of Defense is struggling to shed a longstanding threat-based method of planning. The method starts by estimating enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intent. From this estimate, a scenario is developed to plan against. The process essentially results in a list of required forces and assets to win decisively in the worst possible circumstances. Threat-based planning typically uses isolated (non-collaborative) analysis and, on the surface, seems adequate because it provides senior leaders a basis for justifying programs and budgets. In fact, a threat-based mindset still pervades DOD today because it is sufficient in competing for annual appropriations. However, threat-based planning is slowly giving way to Capabilities-based Planning because the former is very weak in determining an effective capability mix within resource constraints.

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After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, in-depth defense studies seeking peace dividends and force structure realignments became commonplace. In fact, during the 1990s, "there were no fewer than five major defense reviews: the Base Force (1991), Bottom-Up Review (1993), Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (1993), Quadrennial Defense Review (1997), and National Defense Panel (1997)." (3) Concurrently, military strategy simply shifted from a Soviet-centric threat to a dual Major Theater War (MTW) threat-based system and continued to fight budget constraints based on a strategy-resource gap. (4) Focusing on the gap did little to improve standing plans, and very few if any of the lesser plans, mission sets, and military tasks were directly accounted for in this process.

The idea of laundry listing requirements as a way to achieve a grand strategy with full knowledge that the needs will be underfunded lingers. However, the seeds of change were planted during all those defense review debates in the 1990s (5) and came to fruition in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 at a Military Operations Research Society CBP conference, the 2001 QDR introduced the capabilities-based strategy, but its use and implementation were formally directed in 2003. (6) The tragedy of 9/11 and lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom accelerated the shift away from threat-based planning and toward capabilities-based planning. Since the 2001 QDR, there has been solid progress in transforming operational planning, force structure planning, and military force management. Of course, the transformation is far from complete; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) and operational planning do not synchronize information and analysis in a valuable and comprehensive manner for the MDMP.

In addition to CBP, QDR 2006 strengthens the DOD commitment to change the operational planning characteristics of the joint force. For example, the Department of Defense is continuing to "shift emphasis to meet the new strategic environment ... characterized by uncertainty and surprise." (7) This includes changing from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning, peacetime planning to rapid adaptive planning, single focus threats to multiple complex challenges, predetermined force packages to tailored/flexible forces, and vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) to more transparent, horizontal integration (matrix). (8) Transforming parts of a system is difficult enough, but ensuring that all the parts and processes merge to increase effective decisionmaking can seem insurmountable. On the other hand, current opportunities dictate that process mergers undertaken without delay can overcome challenges and install a new and effective MDMP.

Problem: Who Cares?

In DOD, there is a lack of control and coordination on inputs and outputs in the MDMP. The current methodology focuses too much on outputs, largely avoids synchronized efforts and analysis, and yields an aggravating situation when major spending decisions are on the line. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld consistently voiced this frustration: "It's a train wreck ... every year when you're trying to do the budget. It's just a meat grinder trying to pull things together because they didn't start coming together earlier at the lower level.... [W]e're going to fix that." (9) Without well-crafted strategic guidance and a common denominator for comparisons, planning processes operate independent of each other until it is too late for effective decisionmaking. When the train wreck occurs near the end of a cycle, professional judgment, strength of presentation, and protection of interests dominate recommendations.

The central problem examined in this essay is an inability of the combatant command operational planning process to effectively inform and complement the PPBES. Three notable factors contribute to the problem. First, operational planning does not currently use the CBP construct and align with the PPBES cycle to achieve credible defense budget decisions. Second, DOD does not integrate planning processes and fails to place equal emphasis on inputs and outputs. Third, meaningful collaboration among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services early in the PPBES and at lower levels is severely lacking. Finding a new course is critical in a world of uncertainty and complexity that includes planning for humanitarian relief, nonstate enemies, traditional large-scale conflict, and stabilization operations.

AP, CBP, and GFM: operational Planner's View

The priorities and methods employed by combatant command operational planners (Adaptive Planning) and force structure planners (Capabilities-based Planning) are vastly different. The key variations are found between the lexicons and taxonomies, starting points and entering arguments for planning, and the timelines for resource availability. However, it seems plausible that the starting points could remain different while the lexicons, taxonomies, and resource timelines could merge into one process. The framework (lexicon and taxonomy) of CBP and the force management (resource timelines) of Global Force Management are the foundation. A closer look at the relationship among AP, CBP, and GFM demonstrates the potential to converge while they are still developing and before institutionalization of separate processes takes root.

According to the AP Roadmap, Adaptive Planning is "the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require." (10) Essentially, AP represents the transformation of joint operational planning away from specific threat-based planning using a scenario mechanism toward adaptive planning using a CBP framework to produce options for a wide range of circumstances. This does not suggest that planners ignore threat assessments; they are still a vital part of AP. One of the underlying AP themes is to account for smaller-scale contingencies and threats more directly and not assume that one well-developed plan (for the most dangerous scenario) would contain the needed capabilities for lesser cases. Indeed, the ability to create or revise a warfighting plan rapidly as global conditions change, to do it collaboratively and systematically, and to have the end product in a realistic, ready-to-execute state is transformational.

The seven characteristics of AP provide a foundation to plan for uncertainty and complexity. (11) In particular, the seventh characteristic--relevant--suggests qualities of detail and flexibility. If AP is striving to develop plans that are more relevant, operational planning must start with detailed strategic guidance. This means having accurate friendly force allocations, availability, and readiness information from the force provider through the GFM process. This is tantamount to understanding one's own strengths and weaknesses before assessing a threat and drawing up plans to oppose an enemy. Overall, the characteristics of AP are sufficient to usher in a new operational planning process. However, for AP to achieve full potential (that is, creative, flexible, and executable plans), it must be enabled by detailed strategic guidance and constant information exchange with CBP and GFM.

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Detailed strategic guidance improves operational planning creativity by shifting focus from developing resource requirements in a worst-case scenario to options for employing a known set of capabilities. In this manner, a planner seeks to maximize effectiveness with an economy of force that is ready and available rather than stand satisfied with a notional mass force. Multiple options across a wider spectrum of contingencies mean more decisionmaking flexibility as conditions warrant, and the use of actual force status information (location, readiness, availability) improves operational execution readiness.

In addition to details in strategic guidance, constant information exchange with future force CBP and GFM is necessary. Combatant command and Service staffs must have a global perspective. The idea is to conduct continuous capability and risk tradeoffs until multiple plans and options are executable and are also fairly balanced with future capability needs. In this context, the defined role of CBP in AP is to provide a common framework for information exchange and analysis. In other words, CBP examines enemy capability while AP evaluates friendly capability to start a planning cycle, but both collaborate using the same language and analysis system. Thus, operational planning, future force planning, and Global Force Management come together.

The end result is "apples-to-apples" tradeoff analysis for senior leader decisionmaking. These tradeoff decisions are generally within or across plans, programs, and time. However, tradeoffs can extend into many areas, including changes in doctrine, operations, and training, or externally into interagency and partner nation capabilities. Instead of updating a list of requirements, warfighters are driven during each cycle to develop or rewrite plans and options against a foe using a revised set of specific capabilities. The iterative process yields new and creative ways to accomplish objectives as well as new insights into the means to carry them out.

Expanding CBP into AP to form a common framework is not a simple endeavor. There are many tasks related to implementing CBP in AP. (12) First and foremost is a common set of force capability identifiers. DOD is making a concerted effort through initiatives such as the Joint Capability Area (JCA) taxonomy, Linking Plans to Resources work, and the Functional Control Board process. Unfortunately, the proposed identifiers are too generic for effective operational planning. The identifiers must correlate exactly with Service unit designations for use in bounding operational planners. With exact bounds in mind, the key question operational planners begin to answer is, "What courses of actions are available if there are only these units and resources to work with?" The iterative process of holding units and resources fixed while altering other plan elements eventually reveals a strategy that is feasible, links risk to capabilities, and balances with many other competing plans and objectives. Ultimately, with a CBP framework in AP, plans are shaped by resources as much as or more than resources are shaped by plans.

The use of CBP in AP does not have to exactly replicate the application of CBP in future force structure planning or in the broader PPBES. Within the current PPBES, future force CBP initially examines future enemy capabilities. The capability-based future force planning process "starts by identifying plausible worries that a country or an agency might face." (13) From this point, strategists and long-term force structure planners develop a dispersed range of possible scenarios. Scenario analysis aims to reveal potential friendly force capability needs that could ensure access and advantage over an enemy. In this manner, force structure recommendations develop to counter future enemy capabilities. This is the commonly understood DOD method of using CBP, but it is not readily apparent in the most frequently cited definition. According to Paul Davis, CBP is "planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework." (14) The definition seems very close to the AP definition; however, the starting points make the two processes different. AP must use limited friendly resources to iteratively plan against current problem sets, while CBP projects enemy capability problem sets and then evaluates friendly force capability tradeoffs within budget constraints. Stated differently, near-term operational plans must have narrow physical constraints, while long-term procurement plans have broader fiscal constraints.

The commonly understood CBP process is all well and good for a large group of operational researchers and analysts but not practical for a combatant commander's staff. Combatant command staffs should utilize a less analytic CBP application appropriate to joint operational planning that still fully supports a capability-needs comparison throughout a single defense planning process. Expanding the CBP framework into AP will address and define the interactions (inputs and outputs) between each element of the PPBES to provide synchronized support to the MDMP. (15) In other words, force structure tradeoffs between current and future forces can be synchronized and justified more clearly through capability needs. Permitting operational plans to stand as a set of unconstrained requirements is incompatible with defining and prioritizing capability needs. Constraining or bounding available capabilities changes the paradigm.

To bound capabilities for operational planners requires a capacity to allocate or assign an initial set of specific forces in light of the global spectrum of plans and priorities. GFM provides a valuable force structure baseline for strategy writers to bound operational planners over short planning periods (1 year or less). In turn, the changing global availability of ready units and resources yields a continuous shaping process of U.S. military plans and capability. Thus, for each contingency plan that requires capability sourcing, strategists should direct GFM to allocate forces for an entire planning cycle and operational planners to revise the plan using actual unit location and readiness data.

DOD currently refers to the activity of bounding capabilities as contingency sourcing, but the process and mechanism are still immature and not broadly accepted or practiced. Essentially, contingency sourcing is the automated data exchange process of updating allocated forces and specific units. The point here is to fully develop contingency sourcing in order to connect GFM and AP. This, in turn, can enable iterative bounding and CBP linkages. The concept is to determine if a force allocation for that planning period can satisfy an operational plan. If not, planners would adjust other components of the plan to mitigate shortfalls in capabilities and minimize risk while capturing varying options along the way. The results inform strategists as they prepare the detailed guidance to initiate the next plan cycle and decisionmakers on where the next capability dollar should be spent.

Today, changes in resources or shortfalls do not necessarily drive a responsive change in a war plan. Planners often maintain a mission and task set and account for resource changes and shortfalls by adjusting risk. Process change needs to occur so an operational plan is rewritten or reoriented according to adjustments in constraints and capabilities. According to Davis, "Having platforms, weapons, and infrastructure is not enough: What matters is whether the missions could be confidently accomplished successfully." (16) Rapidly completing operational mission analysis, resetting tasks, modifying an operational plan, and then updating risk are part of the emerging AP process and are essential to improving the feedback loop.

The MDMP tolerates higher risk only when convinced no other ways or means exist. Warfighters and their operational planners are no longer independent actors vying for scarce resources. In fact, "Combatant Commanders with new global command responsibilities are expected to provide expert opinion and inputs for the global force management system overseen by the Pentagon and other national authorities." (17) To effectively accomplish this task, a synthesized planning system must emerge. In turn, strategic guidance thinkers can absorb new inputs from the GFM system and reset operational planning boundary detail for the next planning cycle.

In summary, the characteristics of AP can converge with CBP and GFM using a common language (the lexicon and taxonomy of CBP) and specific force allocation (the contingency sourcing of GFM). Detailed strategic guidance, constant information exchange, and a common set of force capability identifiers enable the process. Developing operational planning options iteratively entails some trial and error but creativity increases. Furthermore, despite different starting points, current and future force structure decisions benefit by leveraging the same core planning structure and encouraging lower level interaction that can improve recommendations. Finally, execution readiness and risk assessments are more relevant when using globally managed, specific force sets.

Implications

Setting planning bounds is not new. Strategists have worked through assumptions, constraints, and mission definitions as a regular part of the planning process. Setting tight limits on available forces (capabilities) as part of the strategic planning guidance is relatively new. This is not apportionment or allocation of unnamed units. Nor is it a starting list of forces that may be added to as planning circumstances dictate. Bounding operational planners means specific unit designations for planning purposes. The vertical and horizontal integration of DOD processes depends on debates over specific units and the capabilities (to include availability and readiness) they bring to the fight.

Glossing over the differences in units through generic allocations or Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) introduces unneeded uncertainty into the process. It can also decrement the fidelity of results by generalizing capabilities in order to simplify an otherwise large and complex matrix of units. JCAs offer value in terms of communicating concepts and categorizing capabilities but are no substitute for unit designations. (18) To compensate, transformation requires continuous collaboration using a common framework and interrelated processes.

Expanding CBP further and deeper into AP and GFM is an important step in the transformational endeavor. Restricting operational planning with tight bounds promotes a rapid trial and error process to overcome an inability to find effective solutions in other general or rigorous ways. Of course, there are second-order effects to consider. Addressing some of the key implications (for example, integrating and synchronizing related processes, recalibrating senior leader focus, and reforming national strategy documents) will provide a broader context for what it means to set bounds in operational planning and foster a convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM.

First, functional areas that support joint warfighting capacity will have to adjust processes and lexicons as DOD transforms the method of presenting tradeoff decisions to senior leaders. For example, acquisition processes need to go further to create a flexible, adaptable, and reliable means of delivering information technology. Bureaucratic and legal delays of software or networking hardware deliveries disrupt and frustrate AP and GFM processes. This, in turn, undermines confidence in transformation and progress in broadening and institutionalizing CBP. As stated by the OSD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, a key process objective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to "integrate and synchronize the requirements process, PPBE, and the acquisition system." (19) As a framework, CBP can lead the integration, but only if the acquisition corps delivers enabling technology on agreed dates.

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Similarly, key decisions in weapons system acquisition processes will have to align to the cycle as well. In other words, the schedules for capability need decisions and acquisition milestone decisions must become interdependent. The goal is to have flexibility to shift resources in a world of uncertainty without significant impacts or unknown costs to one functional area or to DOD overall. Unlike the current system, a warfighting combatant commander and operational planners will have a better chance of satisfying short-term needs (20) if capability decisions are not consistently hand-tied by expensive and inflexible acquisition processes. A combatant commander with a clear voice in a unified planning process (CBP and GFM) simply replans and mitigates risk according to strategy with specific bounds that include weapons system procurement decisions.

Another second-order effect is the focus of the senior leaders. According to the 2006 QDR, "a key measure of success is the extent to which the Department's senior leadership is able to fulfill" six core functions. (21) The potential of specifying units as part of writing strategy and linking AP to CBP directly serves each function. However, resolving strategic guidance force bounds for use in operational planning may conflict with the first listed function, Strategic Direction.

Strategic Direction tasks senior leaders to "identify the key outputs--not inputs--they expect from the Department's components and determine the appropriate near-, mid-, long-term strategies for achieving them." (22) Does a senior leader's focus on outputs include providing strategic guidance for a warfighter's operational plan? It is not clear, but certainly achieving desired outputs starts with controlling inputs and processes. To add to the confusion, nearly all DOD components have a slightly different definition for near-, mid-, and long-term. (23) Senior leaders must drive the system through unambiguous strategy and timelines. Otherwise, outputs from organizational components will continue to lack comparability and synthesis. Finally, a good argument can be made that a "shift to a top down capabilities-based planning system that is focused on outputs rather than inputs is a return to the basic principles of the PPBS (predecessor to PPBES) implemented by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961." (24) Leaders today must provide explicit guidance upfront (inputs), frequently conduct project and process reviews, and then evaluate outputs.

Senior leaders must also review organizational design. Reorganizing staffs could very well become an outgrowth of transforming business practices and decisionmaking. Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow make a good case for reforming DOD decisionmaking and standing up a "Decision Support Cell." (25) Although it seems impractical in the current budget environment to grow a staff or add responsibility to overtasked leaders, the three tasks for the Decision Support Cell are vital:

* integrate products for the Secretary of Defense

* improve the quality of decision support to contingency planning and resource allocation

* help senior leaders to develop their intuitive decisionmaking. (26)

At a minimum, senior leaders need training because the system is complex, and neither general nor rigorous solutions are likely to surface. Managing the converging relationship between AP (contingency planning), CBP (integrated products), and GFM (resource allocation) can serve the same purpose as a Decision Support Cell.

The third implication relates to the National Security Strategy and the grand strategy it implies. In a world of uncertainty and difficult tradeoff decisions, the unclassified National Security Strategy and DOD counterpart documents will disconnect further from realistic expectations and observable activities. In addition, an effective PPBES with a unified and collaborative planning process would necessitate reform of national strategic documents. However, there are limits to the choices. For example, DOD could allow the strategy documents to remain as they are and perpetuate the longstanding "strategy-resource mismatch" (27); update the documents at a rate commensurate with faster PPBES and operational planning cycles; or add a series of classified strategic guidance statements for planning. In any case, the documents must assist intuitive decisionmaking and resource changes rather than inhibit them.

In terms of operational planning, a faster AP cycle will require more frequent updates of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) publication. Currently, the JSCP is "intended to provide planning guidance to combatant commanders and service chiefs based on current military capabilities." (28) However, it often falls short of operational planning expectations in terms of content or the timing of an update. Improving the effectiveness of the JSCP is paramount if it will include the constraints and force sets for warfighting plans.

Fortunately, some strides in changing the JSCP to improve support to AP are occurring. For example, apportioning notional forces is fading in relevance. The term apportion is more appropriate in the old threat-based system but should not be part of the new CBP construct. DOD should simply allocate resources for long-range planning. Thus, the important final step will be how to allocate forces to combatant commands for planning using GFM data in an automated method. Ultimately, this will dictate how CBP works in operational planning and, in turn, how solutions integrate with future force structure plans.

In summary, three implications only begin to delve into the possible issues at hand. Planning for simultaneous contingencies, dependence on foreign capabilities, mismatch between the vision and funding, expectations of other instruments of national power, and unintended consequences could all come into play. Driving a top-down PPBES that includes strict bounds on operational planners should have careful and thorough consideration. Practically, time is of the essence, and momentum in many segments of DOD is already under way. How to write strategy in order to merge processes for the benefit of decisionmakers may be the first order of business.

Final Argument

This essay has argued for strategic guidance with specific bounds for each operational plan. The goals for force planning have hardly changed in the last 10 years. DOD must take assertive actions to achieve these goals. The next step is to integrate emerging initiatives such as Adaptive Planning, Capabilities-based Planning, and Global Force Management in order to advance planning and force structure decisionmaking. In so doing, planning conversations between combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense will improve in three core ways. First, a deeper synthesis of information and analysis will have occurred at lower levels and across functional areas. Second, risk discussion will center not on shortfalls in requirements but on capability tradeoffs in light of multiple options and timeframes. Third, top-down decisions on capabilities will have a greater effect on DOD ability to adjust to changing threats, lessen institutional resistance, and build unity of effort. The simple act of clearly defining and limiting available forces for an operational plan is an important facet of altering the PPBE system. In fact, bounding operational planners may serve as a stepping stone toward the integration of the PPBES and the MDMP.

DOD continues to press for transformation and the use of a CBP framework to guide decisionmaking. According to the Joint Defense Capabilities Study, "the adoption of a capabilities-based approach provides capabilities to address a wide range of potential adversaries or other security challenges, thus mitigating the uncertainty of current threat projections." (29) A National Defense University paper states the critical importance of a "transparent and well understood process" that is "integrated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels"--all made possible by "institutionalizing a capabilities-based approach to defense decisionmaking." (30) Both the 2001 and 2006 QDR call for the adoption of capabilities-based force planning, adaptive operational planning, and global management of forces. As these initiatives mature, the pressure to integrate them will escalate so senior leaders can make decisions that span the spectrums of planning, programming, budgets, and warfighter execution.

The implications of setting tight bounds on operational planners are complex; therefore, there will be hesitancy and resistance to trying it. Practically, managing detailed inputs at the strategic level is an intensive exercise but is also a key part of a top-down driven decisionmaking system. Theoretically, framing resources in detail contradicts the traditional mindset of issuing broad assumptions and constraints and expecting the operational and tactical levels to develop options by working through issues. The current fight and those of tomorrow "compel us to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our forces, and to reinvigorate our alliance." (31) Operational planning can no longer have loose ties to future force planning; it must utilize the same CBP framework to interject warfighter needs in a useful way. In the end, the consequences of instituting bounds on operational planners will require close monitoring. However, continuing with the unbounded status quo assumes integration will occur incrementally over time or by some unidentified, unifying catalyst.

The time has arrived to shift emphasis from transformational initiatives to the interaction among these maturing processes. Tight Global Force Management bounds on forces available in an iterative Adaptive Planning process adds rigor, communicates with Capabilities-based Planning, and presents tradeoff decisions in a new way. DOD must focus on inputs, process, and outputs to best inform strategic choice. One is not more important than another. JFQ

NOTES

(1) Colin S. Gray, "Why Strategy is Difficult," Joint Force Quarterly 34 (Spring 2003), 81-86.

(2) Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), vi-viii.

(3) Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, November 2000), 7.

(4) Ibid., 7.

(5) Ibid., 16.

(6) Evan M. Chanik, key address to the Military Operations Research Society Capabilities-Based Planning Conference, Alexandria, VA, April 4, 2006.

(7) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, vi.

(8) Ibid., vi-vii.

(9) Quoted in Stephen K. Walker, "Capabilities-Based Planning: How It Is Intended to Work and Challenges to Its Successful Implementation" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 2.

(10) Department of Defense, Adaptive Planning Roadmap, 2005 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 13, 2005), v.

(11) The seven characteristics of Adaptive Planning are rapid, iterative, flexible, collaborative, networked, seamless, and relevant. See Adaptive Planning Roadmap, 2005, 1.1.

(12) These tasks include force capabilities identification and sourcing; wargaming; plan/project management (both within and across plans and projects); assessment of nonkinetic effects; interagency coordination; Global Force Management; and plan annex development. See Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, workshop proceedings (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, October 19-21, 2004), 3.

(13) John Kamensky, "Capability-Based Planning: Responding on Demand in a Post-September 11 World," PA Times 28, no. 6 (June 2005), 8-9.

(14) Paul K. Davis, Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 1.

(15) Boyd Bankston and Todd Key, "White Paper on Capabilities Based Planning (Draft)," paper presented at Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, 11.

(16) Davis, 1.

(17) Christopher J. Lamb, Transforming Defense, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005), 19.

(18) Causes of difficulty in analytic architecture for CBP include system complexity, the need for numerous subjective judgments, the many legitimate considerations other than combat capability that affect defense expenditures, and a constantly changing environment.

(19) Kenneth J. Krieg, key briefing to Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, slide 17.

(20) Bankston and Key, 9.

(21) The six core functions are strategic direction, identity, capital acquisition and macro resource allocation, corporate decisionmaking, performance assessment, and force employment. See 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 66.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Bankston and Key, 10.

(24) Walker, 3.

(25) Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow, "Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking," Joint Force Quarterly 43 (4th Quarter, 2006), 68.

(26) Ibid., 70.

(27) Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, 7.

(28) Jeffrey B. Kendall, "Capabilities-based Military Planning: The Myth" (Research paper, National War College, 2002), 7.

(29) Walker, 7.

(30) Lamb, 31-33.

(31) Brian M. Jenkins, "Redefining the Enemy: The World Has Changed, but Our Mindset Has Not," RAND Review 28, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 16-23.

Colonel Paul J. Judge, USAF, wrote this article while a student at the Air War College. It won the inaugural 2007 Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Competition.
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Title Annotation:ESSAY WINNERS
Author:Judge, Paul J.
Publication:Joint Force Quarterly
Date:Dec 1, 2007
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