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Phronesis Vol. 48, No. 4, August 2003.

Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions, DAVID WOLFSDORF

This paper examines the manner in which Socrates pursues definitions in Plato's early definitional dialogues and advances the following claims. Socrates evaluates definitions (proposed by his interlocutors or himself) by considering their consistency with conditions of the identity of F (F-conditions) to which he is committed. In evaluating proposed definitions, Socrates seeks to determine their truth value. Socrates evaluates the truth value of a proposed definition by considering the consistency of the proposed definition with F-conditions that F he believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed definition's inconsistency with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the definition is false.) Socrates' belief in the truth of a given F-condition to which he is committed may be based on self-evidence, its endoxic status, experience, or deduction from premises to which he is committed on the basis of any of the previous three. However, Socrates does not consider the epistemological grounds of his commitments to his F-conditions. This is part of a general avoidance of metaethical and ethical epistemological issues. Due to his avoidance of these, Socrates' pursuit of true definitions is theoretically naive.

Sextus Empiricus and the Tripartition of Time, JAMES WARREN

A discussion of the arguments against the existence of time based upon its tripartition into past, present, and future found in SE M 10.197-202. It uncovers Sextus' major premises and assumptions for these arguments and, in particular, criticises his argument that the past and future do not exist because the former is no longer and the latter is not yet. It also places these arguments within the larger structure of Sextus' arguments on time in SE M 10 and considers these arguments as an example of his general strategy for producing ataraxia by assembling opposing sets of argument on a given question.

Ancient Automata and Mechanical Explanation, SYLVIA BERRYMAN
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Title Annotation:Philosophical Abstracts
Author:Berryman, Sylvia
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Article Type:Critical Essay
Date:Mar 1, 2004
Previous Article:Phronesis Vol. 48, No. 3, July 2003.
Next Article:The metaphysical roots of Aristotle's teleology.

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