Phronesis: Vol. 52, No. 2, April 2007.
Actuality, Potentiality and De Anima II.5, ROBERT HEINAMAN
Burnyeat has argued that in De Anima II.5 Aristotle marks out a refined kind of alteration which is to be distinguished from ordinary alteration, change of quality as defined in Physics III.1-3. Aristotle's aim, he says, is to make it clear that perception is an alteration of this refined sort and not an ordinary alteration. Thus, it both supports his own interpretation of Aristotle's view of perception, and refutes the Sorabji interpretation according to which perception is a composite of form and matter where the matter is a material alteration in the body. The author of this paper argues that Burnyeat's interpretation of II.5 should be rejected for a number of reasons, and offers a new interpretation of the distinctions drawn in the chapter, and the relations between them. He concludes that the chapter provides no evidence against the Sorabji view or for Burnyeat's view. Aristotle's assertion that perception is a refined kind of alteration means that it is the kind of alteration that preserves and is good for the subject of that alteration. There is no inconsistency in the thought that perception is a refined alteration of this sort while it, or its matter, is an ordinary alteration.
The Ontological Argument of Diogenes of Babylon, MICHAEL PAPAZIAN
An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this paper the author presents a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. He argues that my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. He argues that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. He concludes by arguing that the objections made against considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Author:||Mignucci, Mario; Heinaman, Robert; Papazian, Michael|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Sep 1, 2007|
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