Phronesis: 2011, Vol. 56, No. 4.
Plato on the Norms of Speech and Thought, MATTHEW EVANS
Near the beginning of the Cratylus (385e-387d), Plato's Socrates argues, against his friend Hermogenes, that the standards of correctness for our use of names in speech are in no way up to us. Yet this conclusion should strike us, at least initially, as bizarre. After all, how could it not be up to us whether to call our children by the names of our parents, or whether to call dogs, "dogs"? This paper aims to show that, although Plato's argument does not succeed in establishing this apparently bizarre conclusion, it may well succeed in establishing an equally momentous conclusion: that the standards of correctness for our use of concepts in thought are in no way up to us.
Predication, Things, and Kinds in Aristotle's Metaphysics, FRANK A. LEWIS
What in Aristotle corresponds, in whole or (more likely) in part, to our contemporary notion of predication? This paper sketches counterparts in Aristotle's text to our theories of expression and of truth, and on this basis inquires into his treatment of sentences assigning an individual to its kinds. In some recent accounts, the Metaphysics offers a fresh look at such sentences in terms of matter and form, in contrast to the simpler theory offered in the Categories. This paper argues that the Metaphysics initiates no change in this regard over the Categories. The point that form is (metaphysically) predicated of matter is a contribution, not to the account of statement predication, but to the analysis of compound material substances. Otherwise put, in our terms, Aristotelian form is not--in particular, is not also--a propositional function, but a function from matter to compound material substances.
Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics [THETA] 1, ANDREAS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics [THETA] by explicating various senses of the term [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle's central innovation, the sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the preexistent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for "complete' activity. It is argued further that, in starting with the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] sense of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as capacity for change, Aristotle begins with the most familiar and acknowledged kind of capacity, in order to move to the less familiar but ultimately more useful notion of capacity for substance, and to bring these two kinds together through an analogical relation.
Neoplatonism, PETER ADAMSON
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|Title Annotation:||CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES: PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2011|
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