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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 92, No. 1, January 2016.

Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style, CHRISTOPH KELP

Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know, a knowledge first version of accessibilism, and a knowledge first version of mentalism. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.

Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal, CONOR MAYO-WILSON and GREGORY WHEELER

Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or closeness to truth. The second is a shift from numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions. This paper argues that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, it employs a (slightly generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane, who show that there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. This paper argues instead that another Joycean assumption--called strict immodesty--should be rejected, and proves a representation theorem that characterizes all mildly immodest measure of inaccuracy.

Relativism, Retraction, and Evidence, DIANA RAFFMAN

According to MacFarlane, a relativism is distinguished from contextualism (in particular, from nonindexical contextualism) by the relativist's insight that in certain domains of discourse, such judgments of taste and epistemic modals, assertions have their truth-values relative to contexts of assessment in addition to their contexts of use. He explains that the practical difference between the two positions is evidenced in the relativist's retraction rule, namely, the rule that an assertion must be retracted if it is untrue as used at the context of the original assertion and assessed from the context in which the retraction is being considered. MacFarlane's account is penetrating and very, very subtle, and his defense of it is a tour de force. In a few brief remarks, this essay poses some questions and voices a methodological concern.

Precis of Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications, JOHN MACFARLANE

Assessment-Sensitivity: The Manifestation Challenge, CRISPIN WRIGHT

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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Date:Mar 1, 2016
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