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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 77, Issue 2, September 2008.

Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge, EDWARD HARCOURT

Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate, MATTHEW CHRISMAN

"True" as Ambiguous, MAX KOLBEL

This paper argues (a) that the predicate "true" is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind. Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth. Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate. The overall position is not new and it has previously been defended by supervaluationists about vagueness. However, the position is here motivated in a new, independent way, and an explanation is offered why some uses of "true" do not seem to require disambiguation.

Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity, J. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS

John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. This paper responds to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and concludes that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. The author develops a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds, and argues that the revised version avoids Hawthorne's challenges. It is argued that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis's first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis's own suggested modification.

The Metaphysics of Harm, MATTHEW HANSER

Respect for Just Revenge, BRIAN ROSEBURY

This paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extralegal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgment we may make of such acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to obey other compelling motives. This thesis is tested against various objections, notably those which doubt the intelligibility or application of such nonmoral "respect", or would assimilate it to moral approval; and it is distinguished from various positions with which it might be confused, such as the "admirable immorality" of Slote, or the Nietzschean critique of morality.

The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection, MATTHEW SOTERIOU

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? This paper presents an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According to this account, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation--it is neither justified nor unjustified--but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgments about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one's attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time travel--a case of revisiting, or reacquaintance with, some past episode.
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Title Annotation:PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Dec 1, 2008
Words:546
Previous Article:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 77, Issue 1, July 2008.
Next Article:Phronesis: Vol. 53, no. 4/5, November 2008.
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