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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: January 201 O, Vol. 80, No. 1.

What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do, HILARY KORNBLITH

Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument, GUY KAHANE

This paper presents a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. Its argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. It asks what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, it will be argued, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. The paper ends by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of mind might be more closely intertwined than philosophers in either area would like to believe.

The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass, DAVID EFIRD and TOM STONEHAM

Biodiversity and All That Jazz, ALAN CARTER

This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualizations of "species". The article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how "species" ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art. Hence, if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork, then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed.

Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated, PETER CARRUTHERS

This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. This paper assumes that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude.

Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription, STEPHAN TORRE

This article considers whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. It evaluates an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. It claims that how one formulates the self-ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. It provides two different formulations of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. It argues that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. It argues that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible.

Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness, LAURA SIZER

Self-Knowledge and Rationality, BARON REED

There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. This paper argues, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view.

How to be a Normative Expressivist, MICHAEL PENDLEBURY

Introspective Availability, JOHN KULVICKI
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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Mar 1, 2010
Previous Article:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: November 2009, Vol. 79, No. 3.
Next Article:Philosophy And Phenomenological Research: March 2010, Vol. 80, No. 2.

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