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Philosophy: vol. 90, no. 3, July 2015.

Time as Relative, DENIS CORNISH

Philosophical development of Leibniz's view that time is merely earlier--later order is necessary because neither Leibniz nor modern followers sufficiently answered the Newtonian charge that order does not give quantity. Logically, order is transitive, quantity, as in distance, is not. Quantity, as well as order, is naturally assumed in Newton's absolute time, so that to declare the mere relative order sufficient is to have to show how quantity can arise for it. The modern theory of the continuum, perfectly applicable to Newton's absolute, does not show this but assumes quantity. The development given here shows how interval, instant, and simultaneity can be logically developed from Leibniz's insight.

Artists and Engineers, D. H. MELLOR

The author disputes a widespread contrast between the sciences and the humanities that undervalues the latter compared to the former. This contrast assumes that science is more valuable than the humanities because it is more useful, an assumption the author rejects on the grounds that (1) science is not more useful than the humanities and (2) the value of usefulness, being instrumental, depends on the noninstrumental value of what it is usefulness for. The author concludes that science is not made more valuable than the humanities either by its instrumental or by its noninstrumental value.

Making Morality Intelligible, CHRISTOPHER MILES COOPE

The demands of morality ought to be intelligible. However, they are not always readily intelligible. Thus it is easy to see why we need good sense and courage, and why we should seek to live at peace with our neighbors. But moral necessity is not always that transparent. Furthermore, the intelligibility we seek is perhaps not always of this kind. This paper illustrates these difficulties by considering certain basic and unshakable convictions we share about homicide and sexuality, two topics we tend to think badly about. It explores a significant similarity in the moral philosophies of Anscombe and Kant.

Fields and the Intelligibility of Contact Action, DAVID SHERRY

This article concerns arguments for the impossibility of contact action and, subsequently, the use of force fields to render intelligible apparent cases of contact action. The author argues that instead of unraveling the mystery of contact action, fields only deepen the mystery. Further, he shows that there is a confusion underlying arguments for the impossibility of contact and present an analysis of contact, based upon Komer's treatment of empirical continuity, which restores intelligibility to apparent cases of contact action.

Beyond the Magical Thinking Behind the Principle Principle, EDWARD JAMES

David Lewis's Principal Principle (PP) states that our credence in a single case follows from the general probability of all such cases. Against this stands the Challenge Argument (CA)--to show that the inference is justified. Recent (1) law-to-chance, (2) Bayesian, and (3) propensity theories of probability take up the challenge--but, the author argues, fall short. Rather, we should understand (4) propensity via Aristotle's analysis of spontaneity (5) and probabilistic reasoning via the anti-PP and (6) the practice of bundling one-offs, where (7) forced bad-odds one-offs illuminate how extensive a role luck plays in our lives.

Kant, Respect, and Hypothetical Acts, JOHN SHAND

The role of hypothetical acts, as opposed to actual acts, has been neglected in understanding the nature of what is required by the respect for persons formulation of the categorical imperative in concrete moral relations between persons. This had led to a failure to understand fully the way and the extent to which the categorical imperative may be present in all such relations with others as encapsulated in an appropriate attitude toward others that may refer to hypothetical acts, as well as actual acts. The result is an underestimation of the direct relevance and moral efficacy of the categorical imperative.
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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Date:Sep 1, 2015
Previous Article:The Philosopical Review: vol. 124, no. 2, April 2015.
Next Article:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: vol. 91, no. 1, July 2015.

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