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Phenomenologist at work/Fenomenologui dirbant.

Es ist sehr schwierig, hier reine Methode innezuhalten und die reinen Ergebnisse zu gewinnen (34/184) (1)

The term "Husserlian phenomenology" not only embraces Husserl's own research interests and achievements, but can also refer to a number of distinctive attitudes and methods that any phenomenologist working in this tradition can bring to bear on further themes (2). I would accordingly like to carry out some methodological Selbstbesinnung on Husserlian phenomenological practice as I understand it, focusing on such methods as critique of presuppositions, retrieval from anonymity, and the radical reduction to the living present. However, since methodological consciousness is founded in the experience of actually using the method(s) concerned (3), I shall refer to one of my own recent research projects--not reporting on it for its own sake, but merely taking it as one example of a style of research that can also be carried out by others on different themes. The example will nevertheless also indicate how a specific research topic can (re)shape the methods we bring to it. And at the end, I shall briefly turn to that topic in its own right in order to show how such Husserlian investigations converge with Patocka's reflections on our situated embodiment.

We are always coming to phenomenological work in media res; there is already a tradition underway, and we inherit its findings along with its methods. Thus when I began a study of "interkinaesthetic affectivity" (Behnke 2008a), I was able to rely on my own previous investigations of interkinaesthetic experience (Behnke 2007: 76ff.), but had to come to a suitable working understanding of Husserl's notion of affection (Behnke 2008b). Then I had to consider how to bring the affective-interkinaesthetic field to itself-givenness on the basis of the best possible evidence pertaining to a shifting, subtle "atmosphere" or "medium" (in contrast, for example, to a relatively stable object of cognitive interest whose abiding features are to be explicated) (4). I found that to attain such evidence in "filled and firsthand" fashion, I had to undergo the affective-interkinaesthetic field from within by participating in it as a sentient/sensitive motility, being there with it in such a way that I am not only suffused by it (rather than having it as the object of my reflective regard), but moved by it (5). This required not only understanding myself as a kinaesthetic consciousness in general (Claesges 1964: 119ff.), but thematizing the "kinaesthetics of undergoing" in particular by turning to the affective register (for example, to what I can directly feel somaesthetically, in my own body) and appreciating the way in which I am kinaesthetically "welcoming" or "barring off" whatever I feel, sensing how I am moving-with the shifting vectors and valences as they emerge, or else "freezing up," inhibiting their flow. Proceeding in this way, however, I was not simply describing natural experience within the ready-made world; instead, what I found myself bringing to lucid awareness was the ongoing "how" of the living texture of transcendental life6. What are some of the methodological issues that are at stake here?

Let us begin with the key notion of "critique of presuppositions." Although Husserlian phenomenology has been criticized for claiming to be a "presuppositionless" philosophy, the critics typically equate "presuppositionlessness" with being "desituated," as if we were not embodied, historical, linguistic beings. But Husserl makes it quite clear that the principle of "presuppositionlessness" means making no use of presuppositions unless and until they have received a genuinely phenomenological realization (7). Thus presuppositions must be both brought to light and tested (8). Those that receive evidential confirmation can be accepted, while the others remain in strategic suspension: we make no use of them in our descriptions and judgments. They may indeed become themes for phenomenological elucidation--for example, as correlates to be traced back to the subjective operations in which they are constituted--but we cannot simply assume and appeal to them as we work. In the case of somaesthetic affection, one obvious candidate for suspension is the naturalized body, which is accordingly set out of play (9). But a more fundamental presupposition must be addressed here as well--namely, that of the ready-made world (10). To bring this to light as a prejudice, however, requires retrieving constituting subjectivity from anonymity and inquiring into its achievements (11); for example, although kinaesthetic performances play several major constitutive roles, kinaesthetic life itself often remains doubly anonymous--not only "out of awareness," but "proceeding without the explicit control of the active, awake I"--and these performances should accordingly be thematized and described.

Yet above and beyond issues specifically related to kinaesthetic functioning, the overall task of retrieving presuppositions and other performances from anonymity can also be seen in terms of two different directions of research. The first involves the correlational a priori per se: rather than automatically accepting a ready-made world in its being and being-thus, we inquire back into the effective performances of constituting transcendental subjectivity--a dimension that remains hidden for naive consciousness (12). But in addition to--and as a part of--a correlational retrieval, there is also what may very provisionally be called a stratificational retrieval: working out the correlational a priori also requires investigating non-actional yet co-functioning performances and their correlates, so that as previously anonymously presupposed levels and performances "become indices of problems concerning evidence," they lead us ever further into "the vast system of constitutive subjectivity" (13). What might a stratificational retrieval entail?

A static approach to strata sets aside not only questions of genetic origins, but also temporal ongoingness per se, and considers the structure of the experience in a "freeze-frame" mode, typically using a series of abstractive moves to disclose one-sided founding relations, in search of an ultimately self-sufficient level with respect to which the other levels are non-self-sufficient. Thus, for example, feeling and valuing are said to presuppose pregiven objectivities that function as substrates for further acts whose correlate is the affective tone or valence of the objectivities concerned: object-consciousness founds feeling-consciousness (14). But what happens when these strata are thought generatively? We may find some clues in a text that was originally a part of Husserl's 1920/1924 lecture course on ethics (15). Pursuing what an earlier lecture had termed a "reductive analysis" of surrounding-worldly objects to "mere things"16, Husserl uses the method of Abbau, systematically dismantling higher levels of feeling and willing--and their sense-bestowing accomplishments, which are what make the objects in question cultural objects--to reach an abstract world of merely natural things, sheer spatiotemporally extended objects free from both value-predicates and practical predicates. Part of this analysis was already indicated in Ideen II in terms of a clarification of the theoretical-cognitive attitude in which the "mere things" of the natural sciences are constituted. But in the later text, Husserl begins to see the very idea of such a "lowest" ontological region of sheer material nature as an accomplishment of the modern natural sciences: this Abbau is exactly what Galileo and Descartes effectively carried out, yielding the "physical nature"--and its noetic correlate, "pure experience of the physical"--that makes physical natural science possible (17). Thus the "ultimately founding" level turns out to be a presupposition that is correlated to a certain type of theoretical stance, and if we do not retrieve the constitutive sources of this presupposition from anonymity, we are--as Husserl later says (6/52)--taking for "true being" what is actually the achievement of a particular method.

Furthermore, although the experience of a natural thing at the lowest level of objective apperception may be the "lowest" in static-phenomenological terms, it is a complex rather than a primitive object, involving, for example, temporal synthesis. This motivates a genetic-phenomenological account of the performances in which such an object comes to be given, an account in which the ordering principle is temporal sequence (18). Yet even here Husserl continues to speak of "strata", and even of a phenomenological "archaeology" unearthing the "hidden constitutive structures" of the apperceptive sense-performances whose correlate is the seemingly "ready-made" world--a search for ultimate origins that, as with archaeology in the usual sense, proceeds by way of "reconstruction" (19). This, however, raises questions of evidence: can something functioning as an "ultimate origin" in the sense of temporal priority--and perhaps something "buried" deep in the past--become itself-given for me here and now, in "filled and firsthand" fashion? Or must we observe infants, or consider limit cases such as persons blind from birth learning to see after an operation? (20) Husserl appeals, for example, to the notion of a primal, undifferentiated kinaesthetic capability whose development is exemplified by the way in which the infant's sheer joy in motility eventually leads to the mastery of differentiated kinaesthetic systems that are freely at one's disposal (HM8/327ff.). But this kind of genetically primal "stratum" can be difficult (though not impossible) to retrieve as an adult (21). Moreover, in one passage (HM8/394) Husserl emphasizes that genetic acquisitions ongoingly function together at all levels, with all strata coexisting within immanent temporality. And in the course of my own investigation, I found that the very model of stacked "strata"--whether they are ordered in the temporal fashion displayed in an archaeological excavation, with the oldest layers at the bottom, or in hierarchies of one-sided founding relations--becomes irrelevant when we are investigating the ongoing functional activity of these coexisting "strata" in their dynamic efficacy. We can accordingly suspend any automatic acceptance of the assumption that we are necessarily dealing with a "stratificational" type of organization--a move that can then allow us to discern a number of mutually co-founding, interpenetrating, and interfunctioning moments (e.g., in the case of my investigation into interkinaesthetic affectivity, the key moments are sensuous salience, affective tone, and the kinaesthetics of undergoing), all in play here and now, in the living present, and available in principle for evidential retrieval from anonymity.

At this point, let us recall that the goal of the critique of the ready-made world--a critique that retrieves the silent labor of subjective functioning from anonymity and penetrates into its deep structure--is not to abandon the world-experiencing life we started with, but to understand it. Thus, for example, if a tangible thing is constituted for us, what we experience is indeed the thing. It is true that other "implicated" dimensions are constituted at the same time, such as the sensuous moments presenting features of the thing, yet these sensuous moments are not themselves immediately given in their own right--they are subsumed, so to speak, in the whole of the thing to which we are perceptually attending, and only emerge as such when we perform the kind of phenomenological work I have been discussing (22). It is here that I accordingly propose speaking not of a "stratificational" retrieval, but of becoming lucidly aware of the usually anonymous moments "through-which" the experience ongoingly proceeds, appreciating them in their dynamic efficacy, "in-the-act", which is to say: not as "levels" in a static structural hierarchy, and not as pre-objective "stages" left behind on the way to object-constitution, but as dimensions still permeating the experience and continuing to function as living "Durchgang"-moments in the temporal ongoingness of a complex whole--as "intermediating" moments-"through"-which a phenomenon is given (23). Now if we return to the theme of affection, we find that although the immediate experience of "sheer" sensuous affection apart from "something" of which it is a moment is relatively rare (24), an affective salience such as a sensuous gleam, rustle, or pang may indeed function at the very beginning of my engagement with the object it contributes to constituting, attracting me with an affective force that I am already kinaesthetically partnering "before I know it." But such moments can also exert their affective force during the course of an ongoing experience--for example, as shifting dimensions of tone color and phrasing in a musical performance, dimensions that need not be thematized in their own right in order to enjoy the song. They nevertheless can be thematized in principle, which once again brings up the question of Evidenz (above and beyond the question of fine-tuning our ability to appreciate certain kinds of distinctions). What methodological considerations come into play in this context?

I find the reduction to the primal standing-streaming living present to be very helpful here (25). But to indicate how it can be worked out in terms of the investigation that is serving as my example, it is first necessary to touch upon the (still controversial) notion of the hyletic-apperceptive structure of sensuous experience (26). In a text that may have been written around February 1932, Husserl refers to apperception in terms of apprehensional core (the hyletic moment) and apprehension-as (HM8/344). However, this need not assume a simplistic scheme in which some sort of bare sense-data are supposed to function as preexisting raw materials upon which a form is then imposed (27). Instead, what is implied here is that mutually co-functioning moments can be distinguished from one another through processes of coincidence in variation: on the one hand, the sculpture in the garden catches my eye now with a dull gleam and now with an iridescent flash, but is apprehended as the same sculpture in each case; on the other hand, what I initially heard as a low-flying jet airplane turned out to be hurricane-force wind in the treetops, but in each case the core sensuous moment was a thunderous roar. Given this reciprocity of mutually co-functioning moments, then, what we might term a "hyletic reduction" and an "apperceptive retrieval" turn out to be two sides of the same coin.

Now there are several passages where Husserl refers to abstractively dismantling co-functioning apperceptions in order to reach a primal hyletic sphere of ultimate "perceptions" that are no longer "apperceptions," and he does so by refraining from taking these moments as "adumbrations-of" something (28). At this point, we are certainly not describing how mundane things are typically given in the natural attitude. Instead, what is at stake is a new type of transcendental experience in which I am lucidly living-through the shifting play of primal sensuous affection and its intimately interwoven affective tone, in its equally intimate correlation with primal kinaesthetic functioning, in the primal standing-streaming present: it is a matter of appreciating primal temporalization not as an abstract or empty form, but in terms of a contentually filled and affectively tinged specificity in which I myself am already kinaesthetically participating (even if I am not consciously controlling my participation). When I actually attempt to thematize these matters in full evidential awareness, taking the somaesthetic saliences I am currently undergoing as an example, it becomes clear that what must be suspended in order to perform the radical reduction to the living present is the tendency to take the events that I am feeling as adumbrations-"of" the privileged (and enduring) experiential "object" that might be termed "my own lived body sensuously felt from within" (29). For the purposes of the investigation serving as my example, however, it is appropriate to deactivate this familiar apperception, not only in order to focus on the affective texture of the living present in its own right, but also to make room for an alternative apperception in which I am free to sense the same sensuous events as registering not a "state" of my own body, but the tugs and pulls, the vectors and valences, of the interkinaesthetic-affective field. In other words, here an apperceptive variation becomes a methodological strategy for opening up the very field of research of the investigation in question (30).

The tendency to apprehend sensuous feelings as adumbrating bodily states is nevertheless merely one example of a much more deeply sedimented apperceptive tendency: namely, a "habitual thematic direction toward objects of external apperception," a global apperceptive style that "determines the course of the further formation of apperceptions" in terms of the "objective thematic," so that even subjective functioning itself is objectively apperceived, by way of the psychophysical apperception, as a component part of the world (34/64f.; cf. 399). Husserl even raises the question of an original instinct of objectivation (31) that is already at work in the primal syntheses producing the objectivities that will ultimately be experienced as persisting substances--identical, transtemporal unities as substrates for further determination, yielding not only an enrichment of their sense, but the production of knowledge as an abiding acquisition (32). And if we penetrate even more deeply into this tendency toward the integration and preservation of transcendencies, we can see it already at work in the primal "conservation" of the "settled," retentional past as "the same" (33).

Another way of addressing this is to point out that Husserl's interest in retrieving the deep structures of transcendental life from their anonymity stands within the horizon of a larger project that he saw as his own historical task: that of a universal, absolutely grounded science upon which all other sciences depend (34). And if this is indeed the task, it is crucial to focus on concordant unities rather than on the shifting play of multiplicities. According to Cairns,

Husserl spoke of the levels of pre-being, that have become mere passageways to the awareness of the world, as having once themselves been termini ad quem for the ego's interest. The development of the world is teleologically directed upon the substitution of unities for multiplicities, and the latter become anonymous, uninteresting to the ego (35).

This is nothing other than a genetic account of "Durchgang"-moments as mere phases to be transcended, and is certainly congruent with the project of providing an ultimate foundation for science. However, in the investigation I have taken as my example, not only are my theoretical reflections nested within practical projects (36), but the very theme of the investigation is radically different: I am not dealing with an abiding thing and its (relatively) fixed determinations, but with the shifting dynamics of an interkinaesthetic-affective field that permeates me and moves me. It therefore makes perfect methodological sense to renew the reduction to the primal living present and to let the affective saliences come and go as they will without marshaling these moments in service of the constitution of an object-like entity. In fact, if the radical reduction to the living present is to be radically attuned to the style of givenness of the matters that are at stake here, my task is not even to make what I am experiencing into an "object" of my attention at all; instead, what I am thematizing in lucid awareness is how I am living-through what I am experiencing, in the ongoing immediacy of the kinaesthetics of undergoing precisely "this," of resisting or yielding to it in precisely this way as it shifts and unfurls (37). In short, the embodied texture of interkinaesthetic affectivity is to be lived from within, and not constituted as an object that we observe: the research topic itself requires the researcher to set aside the presuppositions pertaining to the phenomenological analysis of an objective world of "things," and to adopt instead a qualitatively different style of experiencing that retrieves a deep dimension from its anonymity, allowing its silent voice to be heard. And once we are alive to these matters, we can find them everywhere we turn (38).

It was nevertheless one of the findings of the descriptive project motivating the present methodological reflections that in many public settings, the entire register of interkinaesthetic affectivity seems to be muted or dimmed: people do indeed move around the world and interact, yet seem strangely unaware not only of the affective forces criss-crossing the interkinaesthetic field, but also of their own flesh as a medium through which these affective forces are propagated, leading to the lived experience of being-moved. What is going on here? I will briefly turn to Patocka both for a way of identifying the problem and for some clues toward a possible response.

Body, Community, Language, World (39) can be read as an extended meditation on the "profound truth" (17) that can be learned from subjective corporeity (or what I am calling sentient/ sensitive motility), which is "not a thing," but is always "a moment of a situation in which we are" (27). And one of the most important dimensions of this situatedness is what Patocka terms an elementary "protofact" or "ground" (133): we are affectively rooted in--and addressed by--a physiognomic world in such a way that even prior to the positing or presentation of something like "being," there is always an affective, prelinguistic sensibility caught up in movements of attraction or repulsion (134, 140). Patocka links this sphere with the instinctual, with the life of the animal and the child. But he also insists that in the human, this persisting base is transformed by being overlaid with two further "movements of human life" for which it serves as the foundation (143). For my purposes, what is crucial is that with the emergence of the second movement--set in the realm of work, tools, and social roles--the first movement tends to be ignored, marginalized, repressed, and suppressed, if not completely shattered (148, 150, 158). My fieldwork confirms Patocka's diagnosis: coming home on the bus, for example, I found that the trees in the park we were passing were far more vividly present as vibrant fellow members of the affective field40 than were the other humans riding in the bus, each of them seemingly enclosed in a private "mental" space for which their bodies merely provided some anonymous physical support. Husserl refers to an affective incitement as "knocking at the door" (4/219f.; cf. 11/166)--but in many cases, there was no one home, only a disinhabited, utilitarian body, serving, but not lucidly lived by, the person in question. Why is this so prevalent? Patocka links the vital-affective movement of harmony with the world, of sinking roots and anchoring our existence, with a sphere of safety and vital warmth created by the human microcommunity into which every infant is born and upon which it depends (149, 157). But when we look to recent history, we may well wonder whether the lived, kinaesthetic experience of trust and safety is truly possible in our uprooted world. So what should we do?

If we note the metaphors that Patocka uses for his three movement of human life, we can see that they are sometimes seen as stacked strata, each serving as the basis for the next, and sometimes in terms of a sequence of developmental stages. But he also speaks of the third movement of human life (the "movement of existence in the true sense") in terms of the possibility of authentically reintegrating the previous movements into our life (151). In terms of the methodological distinctions developed in this paper, this means that affection and sensibility are neither "lower" psychic functions to be transcended in favor of "higher" levels of mental life, nor "past" stages of development to be transcended in mature life, but interfunctioning moments-through-which life proceeds, Durchgang-moments within broader dynamic movements that "presuppose and interpenetrate each other" (147). And we can learn to appreciate these co-functioning moments in-the-act. In this way we can learn to live our sensibility profoundly rather than superficially (140), accepting the challenge posed by the affective plenitude with which the world calls out to us, a world in which we are confronted with two fundamental possibilities: "to come to ourselves, or to forget ourselves" (137) (41). If Patocka is right about the body--which is not a substrate, but a vital process (155) that is simultaneously a moment in a situation and irreducible to the situation (27) (42)--then the moment of homecoming that anchors us in our own affective body and its shifting play of sensibilities both requires and can generate a special type of situation, a resonant interkinaesthetic community in which there is enough local safety and warmth to support the lived experience of one's own flesh as a medium permeated by these ever-present affective forces (43). Creating such a situation of mutual nourishment requires that we become lucidly aware of, rather than oblivious to, our own styles of kinaesthetic comportment (44)--our interkinaesthetic openness and availability, our ability to partner and move-with the situation and with others. But creating a field of mutual replenishment where we are enlivened by the presence of others and in turn enliven them also requires an ethos of open generosity, as well as the courage to steer our "pilgrim" steps (139) toward a homecoming into a future that is not guaranteed in advance. If in our uprooted, nomadic world, "in the harsh turmoil of the reality of labor and conflict, no longer shielded by the community of kin" (177), we are a people in search of an oasis of safety and trust, we may find that the wellsprings we seek lie in the deep structures of our own situated motility--if we are able to retrieve our own ("ownmost") possibilities from anonymity and to give them a genuinely phenomenological realization.

Iteikta 2009-10-01; priimta 2009-11-01


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(1) All references in this form refer to Husserl 1950ff., cited by volume/page number(s); references to Husserl 2001ff. will use the abbreviation HM, followed by volume/ page number(s); references to Husserl 1999 will use the abbreviation EU, followed by page number(s). References to Husserl's work are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

(2) What is at stake here is the scientificity of phenomenology, including, for instance, the requirement that its research results be intersubjectively confirmable by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft in question (see, e.g., 20-1/319ff., 6/439); the sense of its proceeding as a path that can be taken again at any time, as well as carried further (see, e.g., 6/123, 440); the issue of the eidetic universality of its observations (see, e.g., 17/256); and the possibility of a radical clarification and critique of its own principles (see, e.g., 17/194, 294f.; 6/445; 8/passim, 34/passim). For more on the scientificity of phenomenology, see also Zirion 2006, and on the contrast between "pure phenomenology" as science and "phenomenological philosophy," see, e.g., Aguirre 1970: 23ff.

(3) Cf. HM8/7: "Der Rechtfertigung, der Selbstverstandigung der Methode muss die naiv geubte Methode vorangehen, und selbst das, dass es so sein muss, muss nachtraglich einsichtig gemacht werden"; see also HM4/73, Seebohm 2004: 51.

(4) For Husserl, the best evidence is the fullest, most perfect, most original (see, e.g., 17/209, 287f., 293); what I would additionally like to emphasize, however, is that obtaining the best possible evidence requires developing appropriate modes of comportment attuned to the style(s) of experience/phenomena in question.

(5) Cf. HM8/114; see also 351f. on "fuhlendes Dabei-Sein". Note that holding back, withholding my kinaesthetic complicity and refusing to partner an affective invitation, is already a way of responding to it: as Husserl notes (6/108), holding still is itself a mode of lived movement. A limit case might be the experience of being paralyzed by extreme fear or anxiety, hardly able to act or react at all--cf. 34/262f.

(6) Husserl certainly does acknowledge the importance of descriptions of the structures of mundane life in the natural attitude (see, e.g., 34/218f.). He nevertheless insists on the radicality of the shift in interest and attitude that opens up a new universal field of transcendental experience for transcendental-phenomenological investigation; see, e.g., 34/91, 159f., 178, 291f., 323, 352, et passim, and cf., e.g., 6/140, 151, 153, 214.

(7) "Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung, die ernstlichen Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit erhebt, muss, wie man schon oft betont hat, dem Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit genugen. Das Prinzip kann aber unseres Erachtens nicht mehr besagen wollen als den strengen Ausschluss aller Aussagen, die nicht phanomenologisch voll und ganz realisiert werden konnen" (19-1/24). Cf. 19-1/28f.; 3-1/136; 5/160f.; 17/279, 283; 34/66, 176, 303ff.; HM8/41.

(8) These twin methodical moments may be given terminological form as a moment of "Aufweisung" and one of "Ausweisung", although Husserl does not explicitly reserve these terms for this purpose or use them consistently.

(9) More specifically, what had to be suspended for the interkinaesthetic affectivity project was the psychophysical apperception (cf. 34/79, 398): rather than automatically accepting the notion of the "psychophysical" and thinking in terms of it, we must see it as the correlate of a "hidden apperceptive traditionality" whose "constitutive history" must be revealed and explicated in phenomenological terms (34/363; cf. 159f., 441ff.).

(10) This may be designated the "prejudice of all prejudices"--see, e.g., 34/151, 303, and cf. 17/283; HM8/41; 8/461, 465, 479.

(11) Correspondingly, such a subjectivity may be designated the "presupposition of all presuppositions"--see, e.g., 17/282, and cf. 279. Note that a move such as suspending automatic acceptance of the validity of a "naturalized" body may be characterized as a "Ruckgang" to the Lebenswelt, while the more fundamental move of tracing the ready-made world back to constituting subjectivity has been characterized as a "Ruckfrage"; see EU/49 (in [section]11 of the Introduction). Lohmar 1996 focuses on identifying the original manuscripts underlying the main text of EU rather than on the materials used in the Introduction ([subsection]1-14), for which Landgrebe was chiefly responsible, and he supplies only a few indications, discovered by chance, of specific manuscript passages that Landgrebe drew upon in [subsection]1-14 (see Lohmar 1996: 35, 43f., 70 n. 12). But I am happy to report that I was able to find (quite by accident) a source where Husserl makes the Ruckgang/Ruckfrage distinction in much the same way as it appears in EU/49: see 34/582f., in the citation from a brief text (B I 10, 52a) dated 4.II.31. Elsewhere, however, Husserl does not seem to maintain this terminology consistently (although the conceptual distinction it points to remains important for him).

(12) See, e.g., 6/209; 34/396. Note that this concealment does not pose a problem for the natural attitude, where the living, predelineating intentionality "carries me along" despite its anonymity (17/242). But Husserl is hardly satisfied with leaving such performances to their anonymity (cf., e.g., 6/114f.): they must not only be retrieved, but critiqued (see, e.g., 17/179).

(13) 17/277. The notion of non-actional (nichtaktuelle) yet co-functioning performances requires some clarification concerning the distinguishable yet overlapping ways in which Husserl uses the term aktuell: to mean "currently actual" in a temporal sense; to mean "actional" in the sense that the I is actively engaged; and to mean "effectively in operation" in the sense of actually (rather than merely potentially) functioning. When Husserl contrasts "activity" and "passivity", the tendency is to take "activity" in terms of I-engagement (e.g., as an act in which the I is "directed" toward something in "intentions in the proper sense"), and "passive" correspondingly means "ohne Tun des Ich, mag auch das Ich wach sein und d.i. tuendes Ich sein," e.g., the I does not have to "do" anything to produce the primal streaming life that emerges in passive temporalization: the streaming "happens" (34/179). Despite the importance of this distinction, however, understanding "activity" solely in terms of I-engagement blurs another possible use of the term: namely, to refer to a process that is not only currently actual, but dynamically ongoing and exerting a particular functional efficacy proper to it--an efficacy that can be phenomenologically discerned "in-the-act," whether it is operating within an actional (I-engaged) performance or a non-actional one.

(14) See, e.g., 31/5. Here it is not possible to address the substantial literature on the theme of "objectivating" and "non-objectivating" acts.

(15) Here I am concerned with [section]9 of this text (37/291ff.), editorially titled "Die Methode des Abbaus und die abgebaute Welt reiner Erfahrung als abstraktive Unterschicht der konkret gegeben Umwelt".

(16) See 37/xli n.1, where the reference is to Husserl's "Einleitung in die Philosophie" (Winter Semester 1919/20), F I 40, 110b ff.; cf. the general scheme of hierarchically stacked strata organizing regional ontologies: Ding-Leib/ Seele-Geist, with each higher stratum once again presupposing the lower strata.

(17) See 37/297; this hint from the early 1920s toward a historical-generative dismantling is carried out somewhat more explicitly in the 1927 lecture course on "Natur und Geist" (see, e.g., 32/124ff., 242ff.) before blossoming into the form familiar to us in Part Two of the Crisis (cf. 32/xxxix).

(18) For example, we may speak of events of salience, affection, advertence, and engagement, with each event genetically motivating the next.

(19) HM8/352ff., 356f.; cf. 39/466ff. See also Lohmar 1993: 122ff., 138f. n. 13.

(20) See, e.g., de Almeida 1972: 11ff.; cf. 11/413, 1/112.

(21) There are a number of approaches in transformative somatic practice that are indeed oriented toward retrieving these primal possibilities, particularly the work of Emilie Conrad Da'Oud and Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen.

(22) 17/294; cf. 3-1/135f., and see also 38/20; 39/16 n. 2; Aguirre 1970: 171; Holenstein 1972: 98, 109.

(23) Husserl uses the term "Durchgang" in a number of quasi-technical ways whose explication deserves an essay of its own; for an initial orientation, see 39/13-18. Of course, he also not only routinely refers to higher and lower levels, but speaks of phenomenological research as penetrating to ever deeper depths--see, e.g., 34/168, 193. If we are to continue speaking of the "deep" structures of subjective functioning in the context of the present paper, however, we must specify that what is at stake here is a transparent-dynamic "archaeology" in which moments at various degrees of mereological complexity are investigated in terms of their ongoing functional efficacy within more encompassing wholes.

(24) I vividly recall a "glowing red," glimpsed through a partly open door, that maintained both its radiant sensuous plenitude and its affective tone (it was a wonderful sight) for quite some time while resisting all of my attempts to see it as an appearance "of " a red thing. (Eventually, I investigated further and found out "what", in lifeworldly terms, it "was"--but this has never cancelled the luminous splendor of the initial experience, which remains, in memory, what it was before the affective event was reinscribed as an adumbration-"of " a particular thing seen under certain circumstances.)

(25) See, e.g., 34/162ff., 185ff., 384ff.; HM8/108ff., 117.

(26) There are, of course, many critiques of Husserl's approaches to the hyletic dimension under its varying titles of sensation, impression, and affection. For some orientation to the difficulties, see, e.g., Holenstein 1972: 86-117. Sokolowski 1964: 54ff., 94ff., 102ff., 177ff., 204ff., addresses a number of problems with the matter-form structure; de Almeida 1972 offers both a critique of the form-content model and an alternative account (see especially Ch. 1); Aguirre 1970: xviii ff. acknowledges the difficulties but points to the legitimacy of the notion of apperception and develops it in Part Three of his work; the treatment of sensibility in Kern 1975 is helpful (see, e.g., [subsection]28ff.), as is the theory of apprehension offered in Lohmar 1993, which emphasizes its dynamic, anticipatory function (see especially 129ff.); and a defense of the notion of somaesthetic hyletic experience can be found in Gallagher 1986: 141ff.

(27) See, e.g., 17/292, EU/74f.; cf., e.g., de Almeida 1972: 91, 96, 97 on the reciprocal interplay between what is sensuously given and what is intentively meant.

(28) See HM8/134, 352; cf. Cairns 1976: 84 and Aguirre 1970: 174ff. Note that such an "apperceptive epoche" (a suspension of the automatic efficacy of functioning apperceptions in order to thematize the moment of primal affection) can also be thought as an "apperceptive reduction" (tracing "pregivenness-as" back to the constitutive performances of specific apperceptions), since it must bring these very apperceptions to light precisely in order to suspend them.

(29) For some of the strata involved in the constitution of such an object, see Behnke 2001: Part II.C.

(30) Steps here include accepting (on the basis of an appropriate phenomenological realization) Husserl's rethinking of the "impressional" moment within inner time-consciousness in terms of the event of affection, here taken correlationally with the accent on the kinaesthetics of undergoing; the radical reduction to the living present, which encourages us to experience our own bodily life in terms of the paradigm of an ongoing tone (and its shifting tone colors) rather than the paradigm of a fixed thing; and the alternative apperception that re-constitutes me as a dynamic moment in a field, a strand in a living texture that I contribute to ongoingly re-weaving (or weaving anew and differently): I not only register the affective tone of the interkinaesthetic field from my own situated standpoint, but co-constitute it, perhaps shifting it.

(31) See, e.g., 39/17; HM8/258, 331. This theme is also explored in Lee 1993.

(32) See, e.g., EU/231ff. et passim.

(33) Cf. 34/169ff.; HM8/30f., 44f.; 39/374.

(34) See, e.g., 34/138f., 314, and cf., e.g., HM7/92; 35/306f., 481ff.

(35) Cairns 1976: 94. Textual support for Cairns's report can be found in 39/17 (cf. Holenstein 1972: 95), where Husserl does indeed use the term "Durchgang." Cf. also the reference to "Durchgangsseiendes" in Cairns 1976: 80.

(36) For example, my research into the kinaesthetics of undergoing is relevant to restorative embodiment practices.

(37) Here I can only touch on the question of how lucidly living-through what I am experiencing can change the experience itself, which is linked with the question of how it is possible for something new to emerge during the course of such experience, something that does not merely reiterate the apperceptive foreshadowing of the past or fulfill the empty predelineations motivated by the current style of the experience. Elsewhere (Behnke 2004: 35ff.; 2009: [subsection] 3, 6) I have described how an improvisatory consciousness and a practice of "not-knowing" at the leading edge of the living present can play a role. The present research project is additionally beginning to clarify how bringing awareness to what is felt corporeally and intercorporeally can shift it: by undergoing the affective event in lucid awareness, retrieving it from anonymity and becoming more open to it as well as more available for being moved by it, I am, quite precisely, affected by its motivational force more fully--a tightness (or a situation) eases, breath (or interkinaesthetic partnering) flows more freely, and so on, because such release is quite precisely called for by the restriction in question, and we are now allowing matters to move on.

(38) Here it is appropriate not only to note that the matters investigated in this project affected how the methods used to investigate them had to be understood and employed, but also to acknowledge that carrying out such an investigation can change the researcher as well.

(39) Patocka 1995 is based on student notes from Patocka's lectures at Prague's Charles University during the 1968-69 academic year; parenthetical page references refer to the English translation (Patocka 1998).

(40) Here the critique of the psychophysical apperception opens the way for the recognition of a true biosocial plenum (Behnke 2008a: 156ff.).

(41) Here we see Patocka carrying on, in his own historically situated way, both a Husserlian theme of ethical renewal through transcendental self-clarification and a Heideggerian hermeneutics of authenticity.

(42) "I am in a situation in such a way that the situation is not distinct from me and I am not bereft of influence on it" (48).

(43) Husserl points out (6/111) that even though we are not always thematically occupied with ourselves, we always, and inevitably, belong to the affective domain. When feeling this is too much to bear, we can--mercifully--shut it out. But we can also retrieve these deep dimensions through restorative embodiment work, and keep them alive through practices of renewal and regeneration. Cf. Behnke 2002.

(44) See Behnke 2006 for descriptions of the style of lucid awareness at stake here.

Elizabeth A. Behnke

Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body, PO Box 66, Ferndale, WA 98248, USA

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Date:Mar 1, 2010
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