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Perceptions of equity across cultures and over time: a questionnaire-experimental approach.

Abstract We discuss the results of investigations where students from several countries were confronted with questionnaires describing hypothetical situations. All situations start from the preference structure which underlies an equity axiom based on Rawls's difference principle. We ask whether respondents satisfy the equity axiom by supporting the worst-offs and how often they revise their initial decision when more people join the side of the more advantaged. Moreover, we control for context-dependency and investigate whether there are major differences across countries and cultures. The available data also allow us to consider changes of justice evaluations over time.

Keywords Social choice * Welfare economics * Equity * Justice * Experimental economics * Questionnaire

JEL D63 * D64 * D71 * 138

Introduction

Utilitarianism in one form or another has been the dominant criterion for evaluating social welfare for more than two centuries. In order to decide from a societal point of view whether one state is at least as good as an alternative state, utilitarianism prescribes that the individual utilities of all members of society be aggregated under both states. So a state will be chosen for a particular society if the corresponding utility sum is at least as large as the utility sum in the alternative situation. Utilitarianism presupposes that utility is both cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable. Let us assume for a moment that these presuppositions are unproblematic. Then the question arises as to whether it is natural to sum up individual utility quantities. Or, to put it differently, do "normal individuals" think in terms of aggregate utilities that accrue to the individuals under, say, different social policies when they make welfare judgments? In Gaertner (1994), we designed a sequence of situations of increasing complexity with which we confronted undergraduate students. We wanted to know whether they made their evaluations on the basis of calculating sums of individual utilities. Although more data is definitely needed, the results showed that this was not the case for many students. The situations presented to the probands are also, with minor modifications, the basis for the present investigation.

Rawls's (1971) theory of justice has become a powerful contestant of utilitarianism. He proposes two principles of justice which are meant to be guidelines for how the basic structure of society may realize the values of liberty and equality. Economic theory almost entirely concentrates on the first part of the second principle. It is known as the difference principle or maximin rule and requires policy-makers to focus on the worst-off (group of) individual(s) in society when it comes to choosing between alternative economic policies. Consequently it prescribes the policy which maximizes the welfare of the worst-off as being the best. This maxim presupposes that utility is ordinally measurable and that comparisons can be made of levels of welfare across individuals.

Is it possible to check whether individuals follow Rawls's second principle in their judgments? Our question is twofold. First of all, we want to know whether people's evaluations satisfy the demands and implications of an equity axiom on which the Rawlsian difference principle is based. Secondly, we would like to know whether those who fulfill this axiom would follow it unconditionally, i.e. focus exclusively on the worst-off members of society. How can this be done? The next section presents the equity axiom and summarizes the basic ideas of a theoretical model formulated by Gaertner (1992).

An Equity Axiom

The equity axiom which is constituent for the difference principle and which has been formulated, for example, by Sen (1973), Hammond (1976) or Deschamps and Gevers (1978), creates a particular requirement for a society where only two individuals are affected by a change from one policy to another. Let there be two policies x and v. We postulate that person 1 prefers x over y while person 2 prefers y to x, and independently of whether x or y will eventually be implemented, person 2 is always unambiguously better off than person 1. In such a situation the equity axiom requires x to be socially preferred to y.

But how can we evaluate whether individuals act in accordance with the axiom considered? In Gaertner (1992) the suggestion was made to consider a two-person profile of so-called extended orderings. [R.sub.i], i [member of] {1, 2} that shall be denoted by [E.sup.1]:

[~.R.sub.1]: (y, 2)(x, 2)(x, 1)(y, 1),

[~.R.sub.2]: (y, 2)(x, 2)(x, 1)(y, 1).

This has to be interpreted in the following way: The two individuals agree that in the given situation, it is best to be person 2 under policy y. Moreover, both of them prefer to be person 2 under x, than person 1 under x which, again, is deemed better than being person 1 under y. According to the equity axiom, x will be declared socially preferable to y.

Next we enlarge this basic profile by successively adding the extended orderings of three further individuals who are better-off, thereby preserving the structure of [E.sup.1]. For example, the corresponding three-person profile of extended orderings denoted by [E.sup.2] is:

[~.R.sub.1]: (y, 3)(x, 3)(y, 2)(x, 2)(x, 1)(y, 1),

[~.R.sub.2]: (y, 3)(x, 3)(y, 2)(x, 2)(x, 1)(y, 1),

[~.R.sub.3]: (y, 3)(x, 3)(y, 2)(x, 2)(x, 1)(y, 1).

We then ask all members of the society how they would wish to resolve the profiles [E.sup.1], [E.sup.2],. ... Individuals who accept the equity axiom will say that for [E.sup.1], alternative x should be preferable to y. For a moment, let us focus on just one member of the society initially deciding in favor of state x. Will he or she find x preferable in situation [E.sup.2] as well? And if so, will the same verdict hold in [E.sup.3], [E.sup.4], ...? Possibly at some point in this successive questioning, the respondent will wish to switch from "x preferable to y" to "now y should be preferred to x socially". Of course, it could also be the case that, given the size of the society, the evaluating member we are currently focusing on would always want x to be socially preferred to y. Hence, the spirit of the equity axiom would be followed throughout the sequence regarded. Clearly, for different members of the society being considered, there will be differing switching points, if at all. Furthermore, the society's degree of equity orientation can be expected to be largely dependent on the issue at stake.

The Situations

We will consider and describe three of the six different situations covered in the questionnaire. (1) The structure of these cases is similar to the one in our [E.sup.1], [E.sup.2], ... profiles presented in the previous section. There is always one (group of) person(s) who is unambiguously worst off under both alternatives x and y. That person is better off under x than under y, whereas all the other (groups of) individuals who are introduced successively are better off under y than under x.

The situations that we presented to the students always required either-or decisions in that it was not possible to split up the given resource. In the first case described here, the students had to decide whether to allocate a certain amount of money to provide some help and assistance for a handicapped person (alternative x) or to further the education of one, two, three or four intelligent children (alternative y). In the second case, a decision had to be taken to either give a certain sum of money to starving people in Sub-Saharan Africa (x) or to finance environmental programs in the home country of the proband (y). In the third situation, which is the last case in the sequence of six situations, the issue at stake is whether an economically run-down country should fully restore workers' rights and, as a result, accept a slow recovery process (x) or take up a favorable bank loan. The latter serves an increasing number of groups, i.e., large enterprises, self-employed persons, civil servants, and retired members of society, but is conditional on a longer curtailment of workers' rights (y). Hence, to summarize, the first and second situations reflected different aspects of needs while the third case presented a dilemma between human rights and economic benefits.

The situations were presented to several classes of undergraduate students at the University of Osnabruck (Germany) between 1989 and 2003, to students in the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) during the academic year 1997/98 and in 2001, to students in Israel (Bar-Ilan and Ruppin) in 1999 and 2003, and to students in Slovenia and Austria between 1998 and 2004. All students were enrolled in economics or business administration, but at the time of the investigation, they had not yet taken a course on welfare economics or theories of distributive justice, such as utilitarianism, Rawlsianism or game theory.

Basic Results and Their Interpretation

It is impossible to report on all the results that we have obtained so far so we have to be selective. (2) We present the judgments of students in Osnabruck (n-63 individuals questioned in the academic year 1994/95) and Israel (n=46, 1999), the responses of 67 students from the Baltic states, 49 students from the province of Carinthia in Austria (1999), and 115 students from Ljubljana in Slovenia (1998/99).

Their answers are given in Tables 1, 2, 3 for the three contexts. In the first column of each table, a choice of alternative x is always represented by 0 whereas a decision in favor of alternative y is coded as 1. To be more explicit, 0000, for example, refers to those participants who took a decision in favor of x in all cases, i.e. in the basic situation and in all of its variants. Furthermore, the sequences 0001, 0011, and 0111 represent the verdicts of those respondents who decided at some point to revise their original judgment in favor of alternative y. Finally, sequences such as 0101 are very difficult to interpret, but this particular one, for example, hardly occurred. In cases where it did, it represented the opinion of just one student.
Table 1 Investigation of situation 1, different places and years;
relative frequencies for all possible decision patterns [sample size n;
x coded as 0, y coded as 1]

Sequence          Germany    Israel  The        Austria  Slovenia
                  1994/1995  1999    Baltics    1999     1998/1999
                                     1997/1998

                  n = 63     n = 46  n = 67     n = 49   n = 115

0000                  0.603   0.609      0.03     0.34       0.235

0001                  0.016       0      0        0.106      0.051

0010                  0       0.021      0.045    0          0

0011                  0.095   0.174      0.179    0.213      0.255

0100                  0       0          0        0          0

0101                  0       0.021      0.015    0          0

0110                  0       0          0.045    0.043      0

0111                  0.143   0.109      0.343    0.213      0.245

1000                  0       0          0.015    0          0.01

1001                  0       0          0.015    0          0

1010                  0       0          0.015    0          0

1011                  0       0          0.03     0.021      0.041

1100                  0       0          0.015    0.021      0.01

1101                  0       0          0.015    0          0

1110                  0       0          0        0          0

1111                  0.143   0.065      0.239    0.043      0.153

% of switch          25.4    32.6       52.2     53.2       55.1

% fulfillment of     85.7    93.5       65.7     91.5       78.6
equity axiom

Table 2 Investigation of situation 2, different places and years;
relative frequencies for all possible decision patterns [sample size n;
x coded as 0, y coded as 1]

Sequence          Germany    Israel  The        Austria  Slovenia
                  1994/1995  1999    Baltics    1999     1998/1999
                                     1997/1998

                  n = 63     n = 46  n = 67     n = 49   n = 115

0000                  0.413   0.413      0.119    0.234      0.149

0001                  0.016   0          0.06     0.021      0.046

0010                  0       0          0.06     0.021      0.012

0011                  0.048   0.196      0.134    0.106      0.138

0100                  0       0          0        0.043      0

0101                  0       0          0.015    0          0.012

0110                  0       0.043      0.03     0          0.012

0111                  0.079   0.065      0.104    0.021      0.149

1000                  0       0          0        0.085      0.023

1001                  0       0          0.03     0.021      0.012

1010                  0.016   0          0.03     0.021      0

1011                  0       0          0        0.021      0.035

1100                  0       0          0.045    0.043      0.023

1101                  0       0          0.015    0          0

1110                  0.079   0          0.045    0.021      0.092

1111                  0.349   0.283      0.313    0.34       0.299

% of switch          14.3    30.4       29.8     14.9       33.3

% fulfillment of     55.6    71.7       52.2     44.7       51.7
equity axiom

Table 3 Investigation of situation 3, different places and years;
relative frequencies for all possible decision patterns [sample size n;
x coded as 0, y coded as 1]

Sequence          Germany    Israel  The        Austria  Slovenia
                  1994/1995  1999    Baltics    1999     1998/1999
                                     1997/1998

                  n = 63     n = 46  n = 67     n = 49   n = 115

0000                 0.667    0.689     0.149     0.267     0.333

0001                 0.048    0         0.149     0.111     0.03

0010                 0        0         0.015     0         0

0011                 0.048    0.2       0.134     0.111     0.152

0100                 0        0         0.015     0         0

0101                 0        0         0         0         0

0110                 0        0         0.015     0         0

0111                 0.032    0.02      0.149     0.111     0.131

1000                 0        0         0.015     0.022     0.01

1001                 0        0         0         0         0.01

1010                 0        0         0         0         0

1011                 0        0         0.015     0.022     0

1100                 0        0         0.015     0.022     0.010

1101                 0        0.02      0.015     0         0

1110                 0        0         0.03      0.044     0

1111                 0.206    0.067     0.284     0.289     0.323

% of switch         12.8     22.2      43.2      33.3      31.3

% fulfillment of    79.5     91.1      62.6      60.0      64.6
equity axiom


The numbers in the next columns give the relative frequencies of answers within each group of students. Percentage values of a revision or switch are contained in the lower part of each table. Furthermore, all sequences starting with 0 represent those students who satisfied the equity axiom introduced above. Correspondingly, all those sequences which begin with 1 hint at a violation of the equity axiom. The percentages of respondents who satisfied the equity axiom are also given at the bottom of each table.

Let us discuss some of the results of the three situations that we have selected for presentation.

Situation 1

The decision to give the money to the disabled person in all cases was very strong in Osnabruck (60.3%). Only 14.3% of the German students wanted, to finance the education of the intelligent child(ren) right away. This percentage value also indicates the relative frequency of a violation of the equity axiom. When the number of intelligent children increased, 25.4% of the probands wanted to revise their original decision to help the handicapped person. The results for Israel are quite similar: 60.9% wanted to transfer the money unconditionally to the handicapped person while 6.5% wished to give the resource to the child(ren) right from the beginning. Switching was a bit higher (32.6%) than in Germany.

The Baltic results are totally different. Only 3% of the respondents were willing to give the money to the handicapped person in all cases, while 23.9% unconditionally wanted the money to go towards the child(ren)'s education. Switching could be observed more frequently (52.2%) than in Germany and Israel, and the equity axiom was satisfied by only 65.7% of the students. Carinthian and Slovenian students lie "somewhere in the middle" between the German and Israeli students on the one hand and the Baltic students on the other. While 34% of the Austrian students unconditionally wished to give the resource to the handicapped person (versus 23.5% in Slovenia), only 4.3% of the Austrian students wanted the money to go into education right from the beginning (versus 15.3% in Slovenia). What is quite interesting in a comparison of these two samples and the results from Germany and Israel is that the percentage points both for the sequence 0011 and 0111 are quite high and almost the same in Carinthia as in Slovenia, resulting in nearly the same percentage of a switch. This frequency is almost the same as that for the students from the Baltic States.

Situation 2

Particularly in Germany and Israel, strong opinions were articulated, either in terms of a resolute decision in favor of helping starving people in Sub-Saharan Africa (41.3% both for Germany and Israel) or in favor of supporting the environmental program (34.9% or 28.3% respectively). For the sequence 1111, the percentages are roughly the same for all samples considered. The frequencies for the Baltic States, Austria and Slovenia are definitely lower (11.9%, 23.4%, and 14.9%) for unconditional help going to Africa than the corresponding values from Germany and Israel. Finally, Osnabruck and Carinthian students show a very low switch frequency compared to the other three samples.

Situation 3

The final case presented is about the restoration of basic human rights versus a quick economic recovery. Our hunch is that for the Baltic and Slovenian students, but not so much so for the other three groups, our made-up story contained some real-life elements. Unconditional support for human rights was very strong (and almost identical) in Germany and Israel (66.7%, 68.9%), while it was considerably lower in Carinthia (26.7%) and Slovenia (33.3%). But most strikingly, the support was appallingly low in the Baltics (14.9%). This corresponds inversely to the high relative frequency for the unconditional growth option, expressed by the sequence 1111, in the Baltics, Carinthia, and Slovenia (28.4%, 28.9%, and 32.3%). Moreover, the fulfillment of the equity axiom is much lower in those three areas (62.6%, 60%, and 64.6%) than in Germany and Israel (79.5%, 91.1%). This last impression gains additional support from the fact that switches occurred much more often in the first three areas than in the last two.

Overall, there are a couple of striking points that we think are worth mentioning. First of all, the results from Germany and Israel are surprisingly similar while the data from the Baltic States contrasts sharply. Obviously, the situation of handicapped people was of no great concern in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia at the time the data were collected. Moreover, the issue of guaranteeing basic human rights does not seem to be very high on the agenda there either. The percentage of Baltic probands who are primarily concerned with economic growth is close to the percentage of those who would unconditionally support the education of gifted children. This seems to manifest a certain Weltanschauung.

At one point, we said that the Austrian and Slovenian students are somewhere in the middle. This is surprising in so far as one would perhaps have expected the Austrian answers to be closer to the German responses. The data tell us that this is by no means the case, particularly with respect to situations 1 and 3 where the answers of the Austrian students are more similar to those from Slovenia than to those from Germany. However, in situation 3, the frequencies for sequences 0000 and 1111 are both higher in Slovenia than in Carinthia. This could indicate that on that particular issue, there is more polarization of public opinion in the former socialist country than in Austria. The reasons for this seem to be obvious in the light of its recent history. Finally, in situation 1 the fulfillment of the equity principle is considerably higher in Austria than in Slovenia.

Intertemporal Aspects of Equity Perceptions

As there are clear differences with respect to perceptions of equity between respondents from different countries, one may ask whether these differences have changed over time and, if so, whether there is some convergence in the attitudes of students within Europe. For this purpose, we look at the results from the same questionnaire experiment conducted over an extended period of time. First, we look at the data from Osnabruck University (Germany) collected between 1989 and 2003. This enables us to incorporate an intertemporal dimension, thereby extending the scope of existing equity studies considerably. Moreover, information on the demographic, social, and personal characteristics of the respondents allows us to gain further insights. Here we only consider the results for situation 3 from above. They are displayed in Table 4. A more extensive statistical analysis is given in Gaertner & Schwettmann (2007) and Schwettmann (2009).
Table 4 Investigation of situation 3 in Germany (Osnabruck), 1989-2003;
relative frequencies for all possible decision patterns [sample size n;
x coded as 0, y coded as 1]

Sequence           1989    1990    1993    1994    2002    2003

                  n = 65  n = 93  n = 81  n = 63  n = 80  n = 99

0000               0.739   0.548   0.593   0.667   0.525   0.364

0001               0.046   0.065   0.099   0.048   0.075   0.081

0010               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0

0011               0.015   0.097   0.037   0.048   0.038   0.091

0100               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0

0101               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.010

0110               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.010

0111               0.031   0.075   0.074   0.032   0.100   0.152

1000               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.013   0.0

1001               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0

1010               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.010

1011               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0

1100               0.0     0.0     0.012   0.0     0.025   0.0

1101               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0

1110               0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.010

1111               0.169   0.215   0.185   0.206   0.225   0.273

% of switch        9.2    23.7    21.0    12.8    21.3    32.3

% fulfillment of  83.1    78.4    80.3    79.5    73.8    70.7
equity axiom


To recapitulate: the respondents are undergraduate students in business administration and economics at the University of Osnabruck. They have to decide between restoring basic human rights on the one hand and a quick economic recovery on the other, which is not an easy situation to evaluate. The relative frequencies of students saying that human rights should not be traded off against a quick economic recovery, which implies growth and gains in efficiency, were 73.9%, 54.8%, 59.3%, 66.7%, 52.5%, and 36.4%. A resolute decision in favor of a quick economic revival was taken by 16.9%, 21.5%, 18.5%, 20.6%, 22.5%, and 27.3%. It is probably fair to say that these figures show a slow, but gradual increase in unconditional support for the growth option while unconditional support for the restoration of basic rights is stronger during the first few years of our inquiry. Here, there is clear evidence that the human rights option loses much of its initial support over the years.

At the same time, the sequence 0111 expresses a very early switch from human rights to growth gains support over time. So our students, acting as outside observers, gradually reduced their interest in basic human rights or, to put it differently, developed stronger support for growth over the period of almost 15 years (and, implicitly, for greater efficiency in the productive sector of the economy). Is it possible, one might ask, that the change in evaluating behavior is due to a change in the demographic characteristics of the different cohorts? We checked for this, but almost all of the characteristics that we asked our respondents to submit proved to be statistically insignificant over the period considered.

Having further broadened the scope of our investigation by considering changes in cultural effects, we wonder whether the discovered time trend in Osnabruck is country-specific. As the results from Klagenfurt University, Austria, described above lay between those of the Baltic States and Germany, we expanded our sample and included the questionnaire results from Klagenfurt University which were gathered between 2001 and 2004 to examine this question. Although these samples are rather small and do not cover a long period of time, some tentative conclusions about both intertemporal effects and cultural differences can be drawn.

For situation 3, intertemporal disparities can be found again. Contrary to our results from Osnabruck, we discover that the consideration of basic human rights in Klagenfurt (and in Ljubljana, not shown here) has grown remarkably. However, the support in both countries started from a considerably lower level. Thus, faced with the alternative of a quick economic recovery, attitudes towards human rights seem to have changed over time in all three countries. Certainly, it is possible that, especially in situation 3, contemporaneous economic developments within the countries which we could not control for in our study influenced the results. However, at least to some degree, the adjustment mentioned can also be observed in the findings of situation 1, which are not presented here. (3) We think that this aspect may be of relevance in Europe as it grows closer together, and not just in a political sense.

Table 5 shows that the findings based on consecutive investigations held in Klagenfurt between 2001 and 2004 seem to converge on the 2003 results from Germany. In Klagenfurt, our questionnaires were given to both undergraduates and graduates. It seems as though the older (more mature?) students attach greater importance to the restoration of basic rights. Their switching behavior is also considerably lower than that of the undergraduates. Maybe they were also influenced by having been exposed to (rudimentary) knowledge of theories of distributive justice. These results contrast with (unpublished) findings from a college in Norway where first-year students in business administration show stronger unconditional support for basic human rights (sequence 0000) than third-year undergraduates who put more emphasis on reconstruction and growth.
Table 5 Investigation of situation 3 in Austria (Carinthia), 2001-2004;
relative frequencies for all possible decision patterns [sample size n;
x coded as 0, y coded as 1]

sequence           2001      2001    2002      2002    2003    2004

                  n = 26    n = 25  n = 30    n = 22  n = 25  n = 27

                  undergr.  grad.   undergr.  grad.   grad.   undergr.

0000                0.192    0.640    0.300    0.682   0.400    0.333

0001                0.192    0.040    0.100    0.045   0.040    0.185

0010                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

0011                0.038    0.0      0.100    0.045   0.080    0.148

0100                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

0101                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

0110                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

0111                0.115    0.080    0.100    0.091   0.080    0.037

1000                0.0      0.0      0.033    0.0     0.0      0.0

1001                0.0      0.040    0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

1010                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.037

1011                0.038    0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

1100                0.0      0.0      0.033    0.0     0.040    0.0

1101                0.0      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0      0.0

1110                0.038    0.0      0.067    0.0     0.0      0.0

1111                0.385    0.200    0.267    0.136   0.360    0.259

% of switch        34.6     12.0     30.0     18.2    20.0     37.0

% fulfillment of   53.8     76.0     60.0     86.4    60.0     70.4
equity axiom


Concluding Remarks

In this paper on empirical social choice, we focused on Rawls's theory of justice and on his maximin principle in particular. We attempted to see whether individuals think and argue in terms of Rawlsian justice. Our interest was twofold. First of all, we wanted to know to what extent students base their evaluations on the maximin principle and the equity axiom underlying it. We have good reasons to assume that only very few of our probands, if any at all, knew the Rawlsian principles of justice or had heard of the equity axiom at the time they took part in the study. Thus in contrast to other investigations, the issue here was not to have the students take a clear stand either for or against the equity principle. Secondly, we wished to know to what extent individuals are prepared to follow Rawls in his unconditional focus on the worst-off in society. We have seen that the answer to both queries is both context-dependent and dependent on the political and cultural environment. Building on earlier investigations, we also wanted to know whether justice evaluations changed over a period of 15 years and, if so, in what way. Finally, we investigated whether there is a cultural dimension to justice evaluations. We compared judgments in three European countries and realized that there are indeed significant differences between the responses of those probands. However, we also detected some convergence of answers over time. This may be of relevance for the political and social climate as the process of uniting Europe continues.

It seems to us that the insights obtained from investigations such as ours are of great importance in an era when, in Europe at least, political boundaries are beginning to recede. Of course, further studies are badly needed in order to broaden the data base which will, eventually, provide a more solid basis for our inferences.

Acknowledgment Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 64th Congress of the HPF, Maastricht, 22-25 August 2008; the 23rd Annual Conference of the European Economic Association and the 63rd European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Milan, 27-31 August 2008; the Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association, Graz, 23-26 September 2008; the 67th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Rome, 11-14 March 2009; and the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, Linz, 22-23 May 2009. Comments from participants at these conferences and from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.

(1) The entire questionnaire is available from the authors or in Gaertner and Jungeilges (2002).

(2) For more details, see Gaertner (1994), Gaertner et at (2001), Gaertner and Jungeilges (2002), Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007), Schwettmann (2009).

(3) The relevant results for situation 1 are reported in Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007).

References

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Gaertner, W. (1992). Distributive Judgments. Chapter 2 in W. Gaertner and M. Klemisch-Ahlert. Social Choice and Bargaining Perspectives on Distributive Justice, Heidelberg et al.: Springer Verlag.

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Gaertner, W., & Jungeilges, J. (2002). Evaluation via extended orderings: empirical findings from Western and Eastern Europe. Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 29-55.

Gaertner, W., Jungeilges, J., & Neck, R. (2001). Cross-cultural equity evaluations: a questionnaire-experimental approach. European Economic Review, 45, 953-63.

Gaertner, W., & Schwettmann, L. (2007). Equity, responsibility and the cultural dimension. Economica, 74, 627-49.

Hammond, P. J. (1976). Equity, Arrow's conditions, and Rawls's difference principle. Econometrica, 44, 793-804.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Wulf Gaertner * Reinhard Neck * Lars Schwettmann

W. Gaertner

University of Osnabruck, Osnabrack, Germany

W. Gaertner

London School of Economics, London, UK

R. Neck (*)

Department of Economics, Klagenfurt University, Universitaetsstr, 65-67, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria

e-mail: reinhard.neck@uni-klu.ac.at

L. Schwettmann

University of Halle-Wittenberg, Halle, Germany

Published online: 14 November 2010

[C] International Atlantic Economic Society 2010
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Author:Gaertner, Wulf; Neck, Reinhard; Schwettmann, Lars
Publication:International Advances in Economic Research
Geographic Code:4EUGE
Date:Feb 1, 2011
Words:5390
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