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Peace through self-awareness: a model of peace education based on Buddhist principles.


In my twenty-plus years as professor of East Asian and comparative religions, intercultural communication or miscommunication has become a central theme of my work. There is, of course, the personal level of a German researching and teaching Japanese philosophy and religion in the United States or in Japan, Hong Kong, and the Peoples Republic of China. There is the methodological level of my work pertaining to the question of how one can apply concepts and thought structures developed in one cultural setting to another. Finally, there is the political level that I could not avoid when I was teaching Japanese Buddhism to a group of monks and nuns from the P.R.C. in Shanghai. Meeting my students for eight hours a day, it soon became clear to me that I was dealing with cultural and national myths, tropes, and identities as much as with the subject matter.

This suspicion became even stronger when I researched the ways in which the Nanjing massacre was remembered or forgotten by various cultures. Even in the memories of Americans (specifically Caucasian Americans) (1) and Germans, (2) national narratives are visible insofar as these narratives or myths emphasize the role, mostly remembered as a heroic one, that Americans and Germans played between December, 13, 1937, and February 18, 1938, in Nanjing. Thus, without wanting to belittle the importance of economic and political factors, the importance and role of identity politics in conflict and in our memories slowly dawned on me. The discourse on these conflicts, be they interpersonal, intercultural, or interreligious, especially with regard to memories of what I call "unique inescapable ruptures"--such as the Holocaust as symbolized by the Reichsprogromnacht of November 9, 1938, or the events in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, or the Bombing of Hiroshima, or the Nanjing massacre--seems to be driven by such identity politics at least as much as by historical, economic, or military discourses.

I began to think that intercultural and interreligious understanding--and, ultimately, peace between cultures, nations, and religions--is closely tied to our understanding of identity. It seems that a lot of identity discourses, be they racial, religious, or national, assume a conception of identity that is akin to that of a Leibnizian monad, that is, an identity is conceived of as an independent, monolithic, unchanging essence. Such a definition of cultural and religious identities as, to use a phrase of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), "windowless," monolithic, and unchanging is, of course, at odds with our realities. Every current theory of culture (and religious tradition) with which I am familiar envisions cultures to be fluid, heterogeneous, and subject to change. For example, Kwame Anthony Appiah has described "culture" as a "shape-shifting target"; (3) Gerd Baumann suggested that the key to culture lies in "the boundaries that separate ethnic groups" rather than in any "cultural stuff'; (4) and Ananda Abeysakara maintained that essences of cultures and religions are constructed in discourses at "contingent conjunctures." (5) Thus, it seems that to understand the dynamics of intercultural and interreligious encounters we need a conception of identity that reflects this fluid, transient, heterogeneous nature of cultures and traditions. Such a nonessentialist and, in many ways nondualist, theory of identity, I suggest, we can find within sources of the Buddhist tradition.

My goal in this essay is twofold: First, I will look in Buddhist texts for conceptual resources for such a nonessentialist notion of identity; second, I will suggest the preamble for pedagogy toward intercultural and interreligious understanding--and, one hopes, peace--based on a theory of identity as fluid, transient, fragmented, and not independent, which borrows its major cues from various Buddhist theories of "no-self' (S. anatmari). This exercise is theoretical in nature, as I am currently developing a new notion of identity-formation and politics based on nonessentialism and based on the philosophical considerations discussed herein. In addition, it is also profoundly practical, insofar as my colleague Ching-yuen Cheung [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and I would like to facilitate trilateral meetings of Chinese, Japanese, and American students in Hiroshima and Nanjing in the not-too-distant future. In this essay, however, I will focus on the philosophical underpinnings of such a model for peace education.

I. Notes toward a Buddhist Notion of No-Self

In this section, I would like to present sources for such a nonessentialist notion of identity. Before I do this, I would like to offer a few words of caution. It goes without saying that we cannot find any notion of identity that applies to the problems of intercultural encounters in the pre-modern Buddhist canon. I am also not interested in constructing a "Buddhist" notion of identity--this, I think, is impossible anyway--or in outlining the nonessentialist position of any given thinker or text. I am simply looking for sources for a nonessentialist alternative to essentialist notions of self, substance--the equivalent in Indian philosophy is "self-nature" (S. svabhava)--and, by extension, cultural, religious, and national identity. In Part II, I will apply this nonessentialism to the discourse of cultural and national identity.

Early Buddhist doctrine is famous for the emphasis of the conception of "no-self." (6) However, as is well known this conception does not imply a negation of any kind of self but rather a rejection of the doctrine of "no-self' and the notion of an eternal and causally independent self that this doctrine entails. However, more appropriate than the term "no-self' would be the phrase "middle way position on the question of selfhood." In a well-known narrative from the Pali canon, the wanderer Vacchagotta approached Buddha and asked him whether "we possess a self." Buddha famously refused to answer. When his disciple Ananda pressed him later as to why he did not answer, Buddha responded that "if I had said that there is a self, he would have formed the view of the self. If I had said that there is no self, he would fall into ignorance and madness and would be even more confused." The Mahaprajnapdramitd-sastra, a Mahayana Buddhist text, later echoes the same theme when it suggests that "the claim 'the five skandhas are impermanent, empty, and without a self means that in the perfected wisdom, the five skandhas are neither permanent nor impermanent, neither empty nor non-empty, neither with a self nor devoid of a self." (8) Both the Buddha and the Mahaprajfiaparamita-sastra seem to indicate that the so-called "no-self' doctrine affirms the existential ambiguity of the self: The self neither is nor is-not, neither is permanent nor impermanent, neither is empty nor non-empty. In the language of the "two truths' (C, erdi) attributed to Nagarjuna, the self is both "empty" (S. sunya) and "provisional" (S. samvrti).

But, what does this mean? How can we understand this ambiguity of the self? More to the point, how can this doctrine render a conceptual framework that is applicable to intercultural encounters? The thinkers belonging to the Tiantai and Huayan schools of Buddhism suggest to understand the provisional "self' devoid of an independent substance as the dialectic of individuality and totality. Utilizing the notion that the "self' inhabits the "middle" (C. zong [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) between "emptiness" (C. kong) and "provisionality" (C. jia), (9) the Chinese Tiantai thinker Zhiyi (538-597) suggested the notion of the "many-and-yet one" (yijiduo --) to further elaborate on the relationship between emptiness and the realm of provisionality: Since emptiness is common to all provisional "selves," Zhiyi conceives of it as oneness, as the common ground of all particular realities. However, this oneness does not dissolve the particularity of the "many" but, to the contrary, supports it. Zhiyi thus understood reality as the oneness of emptiness within a multitude of provisional particularities. Such a worldview affirms neither a particularism a la Leibniz (who conceived of particulars as causally independent, "windowless" monads) nor a monism that denies individuality. Rather, it describes the world using a phrase we often employ in religious studies in an entirely different context: "unity in diversity and diversity in unity." The key to this worldview and to the ability to reconcile the moments of both unity and diversity is the rejection of essentialism and its definition of the "real" as causally independent entities.

The Huayan Buddhist thinker Fazang (643-712) took this kind of non-essentialism one step further and suggested that the mutual relationship between individual and totality implies a mutual relationship among individuals. While Zhiyi focused on the relationship between individuals and the totality of existence, - Fazang was concerned with the relationship among individuals. In the Records of the Search for the Mysteries of the Avatamsaka Sutra (Huayanjing tanxuanji), Fazang claimed that the conception of "the dharma-world of the phenomena (shifajie) and "the dharma-world of the noumenon" (lifajie) implies not only "the unobstructed interpenetration of noumenon and phenomena (lishiwuaifajie) but also "the unobstructed interpenetration among phenomena" {shishiwuaifajie). Like Zhiyi, Fazang did not understand individual and totality to be separate realities; the more the totality and each individual are not only connected, they "do not obstruct" each other. In other words, when I see the totality, I see all individuals. By the same token, Fazang continued, when I can see the totality in each individual and all individuals in the totality, then the relationship among individuals must also be one of "nonobstruction"; in other words, in the face of the self, I see the other.

These four dharma-worlds, especially the latter two, are usually interpreted to reveal, according to Fazang, the worldview of the Buddha. In her brilliant "Living with the Inconceivable: Huayan Buddhism and the Postmodern Differend," Jin Park proposed that this fourfold dharma-world can not only be understood as Buddha s perspective but also that it reflects the postmodern worldview. She argued against the traditional interpretation of the four dharma-worlds as a justification of totalitarianism, suggesting instead:
      Both Hua-yen [sic] and Lyotard's postmodern philosophy identify
   themselves with the vision of the world in which scattering force
   finds its raison d'etre without being subjugated to the
   centralising power. The ultimate stage of Hua-yen emphasizes
   harmonious coexistence of particularities without necessarily
   foregrounding their noumenal aspect. The postmodern envisions the
   happening of small discourses without interference of the
   regulating power of our rationalism and teleological tendency. (10)

In short, the fourfold dharma-world of Fazang is not only egalitarian in its implications for a political philosophy but also is applicable to a postmodern worldview. His vision was that of "a realm in which diverse entities [exist] freely without conflict and without foregrounding a centralising power." (11) Particulars are not in conflict with each other but coexist harmoniously; neither a particular phenomenon nor "their noumenal aspect" inhabits a privileged position. In short, Huayan metaphysics foreshadows the postmodern ideal of decentralized discourses such as multiculturalism, religious pluralism, and intercultural or global philosophy.

Similarly, the twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Nishida implied the applicability of Fazang's fourfold dharma-world to contemporary philosophy of history. Starting in 1937, he began to cite Zhiyi's dialectic as well as the "fourfold dharma-world" of Fazang to develop his conception of the "historical world" (rekishiteki sekai) Concretely, this is
   [t]he world that determines itself in the form of individuals as
   the absolute dialectical self-identity of the one-and-yet-the-many
   and the-many-and-yet-the-one must be the world of negative and
   mutual determination of the subject and the environment, which
   oppose each other to some degree. The historical world in which the
   subject determines the environment and vice versa is the world of
   the negative mutual determination of the many and the one. (12)

In this passage, Nishida adopted the moment of interdependence between the totality of the historical world and the individual activity within it. He replaced Fazang's phrase, "non-obstruction," with the positive "mutual determination" (sogo gentei) and developed what I have referred to elsewhere as the "fourfold determination:" (13) the "self-determination of the universal," "the individual determination by means of which the individual determines itself," (14) the place wherein the "universal determines the individual while the individual determines the universal," (15) and the "mutual determination between two individuals." (16) Particular phenomena not only "express" (hyogen) the horizon of totality but are also intimately related with other particular phenomena. Thus, Nishida's terminology also implies the vision of an egalitarian world without a center and without hegemonic power structures. (17)

The key to recognizing these underlying structures of "mutual determination" that give rise to an egalitarian vision of society and a reprieve from suffering is, according to thinkers such as Dogen, self-awareness. In a famous, often-quoted and often-discussed passage, Dogen proposed that "to study the Buddha way is to study the self; to study the self is to forget the self; to forget the self is to be actualized by the 10,000 dharmas; to be actualized by the 10,000 dharmas is to cast off body and mind of self and other." (18) To Dogen, self-awareness reveals not only the elusiveness of what we call "self' but also its intimate relationship to the totality of existence--Dogen's "10,000 dharmas"--and to the other. Whether or not the overcoming of power structures by self-awareness--even if it is not merely intellectual but embodied, as Dogen suggested--is realistic or practical, this essay cannot answer. However, it can outline how a nonessentialist theory of self-awareness can resolve the dissonances brought about by the process of identity-formation and the encounter of others. A nonessentialist theory of self-awareness follows roughly the outline of Fazang's fourfold dharma-world.

The self-conscious self tends to constitute itself as a particular and independent self at odds with the others and the world--this state corresponds to the first dharma-world. Deep self-awareness, according to Dogen, brings about the awareness that the construction of an independent self is delusory--this stage is reflective of the second dharma-world--and that what we call the self is nothing but a particular expression of the 10,000 dharmas. At this point the self-aware self has moved to the third dharma-world, the "the unobstructed interpenetration of noumenon and phenomena." However, if one realizes that what we call the "self' is but an expression of the totality, one realizes the similarity with the other that underlies any perceived difference. Concretely, people realize that the emphasis of difference and of causal as well as cultural independence is constructed; on the contrary, the perceived other is a particular expression of the totality in the same way the self is. If this is the case, Fazang claims, one can see the "unobstructed interpenetration among phenomena." Translated into the context of intercultural communication, this means that both self and other are equally particular expressions of the same totality and that there is, as it has become a slogan in religious studies, "unity in diversity." At this point self-awareness has, to use Dogen's terms, "cast off body and mind of self and others." I believe that the place where self-awareness leads to an understanding of the other is the starting point for intercultural understanding and peace education.

II. Notes Working toward Peace Pedagogy

Obviously, an application of the classical Buddhist theories of no-self to intercultural understanding requires much conceptual fine-tuning, which would require a more careful development of the terms introduced above. What I would like to suggest here, however, is how the nonessentialist conception of the no-self and its relationship to others by the Buddhist thinkers discussed above can contribute to our understanding of intercultural learning and how it can provide suggestions for a blueprint to envision peace education.

While most people would agree that dialogue between members of different cultures, nations, and religious traditions has the potential to lead to mutual understanding and possibly reconciliation, in practice, however, exercises often result in misunderstanding rather than understanding, discord rather than harmony. Why is this so? The central problem of interpersonal, intercultural, and interreligious dialogue is that the basic structure of the encounter with the other is inherently paradoxical. Encounters with the perceived "other" are, at the same time, constitutive of the self and laden with conflict potential. The conflict in any dialogue situation arises from the predicament that what Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) would have called projects of the two conversation partners are formulated from two different standpoints and are thus at odds. In the case of power differential between the two interlocutors, the self is able to superimpose one's vision on the other who adopts the interpretation of the self; in the case of a power equilibrium, the dialogue results in a stalemate. Japanese philosopher Iwao Koyama (1905-93) suggested:
   When we speak of antiphony as a dialogical relationship between two
   subjects (I and Thou), we ought not think in terms of two persons
   muttering and gesturing like two physical objects existing in
   space. This is no way to explain antiphony because the two
   individual persons present here are two "l's" and not an "I" and a
   "You." Whenever two "I's" speak out, there is no call and hence no
   response. It is not dialogue but two monologues that happen to
   coincide. (19)

In short, two subjects are incapable of engaging in a constructive dialogue; if they do meet, their interaction is doomed to deteriorate into a cacophony, in which both are talking and no one is listening. Subjects project and objectify; they do not listen and respond. A successful dialogue requires a "listening subject," what James Heisig has called "antiphony."

Heisig chose this term as the English-language equivalent of Koyama's "ko'o" [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], literally "call-and-response," when translating Koyama's article for Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook. Koyama believed that without the basic features of "problem-and-solution," "call-and-response," and a "dialogical "give-and-take," human interaction erases the humanity of the two dialogue partners and renders them "third-person entities, or rather, impersonal objects." Heisig picked up this theme of "call-and-response" and suggested that this antiphony is the basic condition for what he termed "cultural disarmament." (21)

In his Nothingness and Desire: An East-West Philosophical Antiphony, Heisig proposed three concrete steps to transform the cacophony of two or more subjects who are shouting at each other into a "dialogical give-and-take." He suggests that a good "place to begin is in an internal antiphony, conducted at the borderlands where the conflicting horizons melt into each other. Antiphony requires ideas ... to resound off of one another in all directions, a shifting standpoint from which the echoes are not annihilated by an intervening abyss." (22) The assumption of a "cultural block universe," (23) in which perceived cultural monoliths such as "East" and "West" or "Christianity" and "Buddhism" oppose each other, is counter-productive. Not only does it deny the obvious internal diversity within and similarities across cultures and traditions, but it also overlooks that it is not cultures and traditions but individual "culturally determined human mindfs]" (24) that engage in dialogue. These individuals express particular standpoints that are provisional and thus subject to change. The starting point of a "dialogical give-and-take" should be, if not the commonality between them then, at least, as Heisig suggested, "the borderlands where the conflicting horizons melt into each other." Of course, the danger of such an approach is that a "dialogical give-and-take" transforms the standpoint of the dialogue partners and, thus, to rephrase Heisig's words, pokes cracks into our "guiding fictions" (25) or, even more drastically, challenges our understanding of the world.

This practice of antiphony challenges especially the "guiding fiction" of essentialism. It questions the fundamental assumption of essentialism that the interlocutor, regardless of whether she or he is seen as a person or the representative of a culture, constitutes a wholly other, separated by an "intervening abyss." On the contrary, this antiphony as envisioned by Heisig can function as the catalyst of an ever-deepening process in which self-awareness and the understanding of the other are intrinsically intertwined. This antiphony recognizes the particularity of specific standpoints--personal, cultural, and religious--and, at the same time discloses commonalities, be they rooted in shared specific identities, a common humanity, or the shared predicament of being particular expressions of one, though ever-transforming, totality. Most of all, a true "dialogical give-and-take" reveals that the assumption of "cultural blocks" veils the fact that identity-constructions are complex and multifaceted. It does not take much imagination to realize that a Christian feminist may not only find "common ground" with a Christian fundamentalist but also with Hindu feminists. In this sense, the practice of antiphony calls into question our identity-constructions and identity-discourses and empowers us to see specific standpoints as particular expressions of the human experience. As the discussions of Fazang and Nishida have already demonstrated, the full expression of the totality of life requires that we listen to an infinite number of voices and not absolutize our own "guiding fiction."

So, how are we able to overcome the standpoint of the subject who projects and objectifies and arrive at the "listening subject" capable of antiphony? According to the Buddhist sources that provided us the clues for nonessentialism, the answer to this question is rather simple: through the cognitive transformation engendered by practices such as meditation. However, this is not an option for an interreligious dialogue that proposes to treat beliefs and practices from various religious traditions equally or exercises in intercultural understanding that presuppose a more or less secular or religion-neutral framework. Is there a way to envision a dialogue praxis that is not associated with one particular religious tradition, school, or practice? Is there a way to facilitate such a cognitive transformation without employing a religious practice unique to one particular tradition? The reflections of Fazang and Nishida suggest that self-awareness reveals a common ground with the other, on the one side, and the perspectivalism of the vantage points inhabited by self and other, respectively, on the other side. It involves the recognition that self and other are equally full but incomplete expressions of the shared ground, of our shared humanity. If this is correct, one path toward the listening self is a tri- or multilateral setting in which all participants together explore the self-understanding of everyone involved.

A second ingredient of this communal practice of transformation is what I call "unique inescapable ruptures." In lieu of the experience of a shared totality that religious experience reveals, I think it is possible to discover this common ground--or, as Heisig proposed, "the borderlands where the conflicting horizons melt into each other"--by experiencing the perspective of the other. Each identity is constructed by means of foundational narratives. As a person's or community's identity changes over time and in relation to the people one encounters, a given identity is imaged to rival the importance of those narratives changes. For example, the national identity of the U.S.A. in the past several years hinges more on "9/11" than on "Pearl Harbor" or even the "Founding Fathers." Events that give rise to such narratives that are central to any particular identity--formation and that change an identity--construction so irreversibly that they constitute a "point of no return" and dominate a given identity discourse, are what I call "unique inescapable ruptures." For a person it may an event that made one reevaluate one's career choice or that determined one's lifestyle decision, such as "coming out of the closet." For postwar Germany, it is the Holocaust; for the world community, the dropping of the first atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. Of course, these are my interpretations and reflective of my particular understanding of these communities. Be that as it may, "unique inescapable ruptures" usually evoke an intense emotional response by the members sharing in one identity as well as by members of the communal identity against which one's identity is formulated. The case of the Nanjing massacre not only illustrates how the emotional investment of the parties involved makes a reasonable and informed discussion of the historical event itself almost impossible.

I believe that Avishai Margalit unwittingly identified the reason for this antiphony. In his Ethics of Memory, he suggested that it may be "injustice rather than justice that 'hurts us into politics.'" (26) He asserted correctly that it is the memory of injustice done to us that motivates people to become politically active and to fight for social justice. While the commemoration of the injustice experienced by one's own community is important, the exclusive focus on one's own suffering results in what I call "extrovert criticism," the creation and condemnation of the other. The result of this is a dualism that essentializes communities, creates the "cultural block universe," and denies existential as well as moral ambiguities. Self--awareness, however, also requires "introvert criticism," that is, an awareness of one's own shortcoming as well as the commemoration of past sins of one's community. It is the acceptance of what Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) called "shadow" and the realization that one's "guiding fiction" has holes, is incomplete, has a shadow side. To acknowledge this is very difficult, but it is the only path to a mutual understanding. In his Being Peace, Thich Nhat Hanh suggested "voluntary confession," in addition to "face--to--face sitting" and "remembrance," as one of the fundamental steps toward reconciliation. (27) It is the recognition of one's own imperfection that saves the "other" from our condemnation.

While it is impossible to discuss the intricacies of such a reconciliation process in a few pages, it is worth noting that the process of self--awareness reveals the whole self in all its ambiguities. It involves learning about one's own history as well as listening to the histories and narratives of the designated "other." Intercultural understanding involves a joined pilgrimage to the places that commemorate our suffering as well as our moral defeat. It includes "problem--and--solution," "call--and--response," and a "dialogical "give--and--take." It is in this process, which I call "knowing one self--understanding the other, knowing the other--understanding oneself," that our common humanity emerges and that we, self and other together, discover a world "in which diverse entities [exist] freely without conflict and without foregrounding a centralising power." (28) These are, I think, the political implications of the Buddhist doctrines of no--self: to withdraw one's self from the center of the discourse, to challenge one's identity and worldview, and to create space for many expressions of the 10,000 dharmas. This is the road to understanding. This may be the road to peace.

(1) See Nanking, directors: Bill Guttentag and Dan Sturman; SnagFilms, 2007.

(2) Nee John Rabe, director: Florian Gallenberger; Strand Releasing, 2010.

(3) Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 130.

(4) Gerd Baumann, The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious Identities (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 84.

(5) Ananda Abeysakara, Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and Difference (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), p. 3.

(6) I discuss the Buddhist doctrine of "no-self' in more detail elsewhere; see Gereon Kopf, "'When All Dharmas Are the Buddha-dharma': Dogen as Comparative Philosopher," in Steven Heine ed Dogen and Soto Zen (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 138-164

(7) Takakusu Junjiro and Watanabe Kaigyoku, eds., Taisho Taizokyo (Tokyo: Taisho Shinshii Daizokyo Kankokai, 1961),

(8) Ibid., 25.1509.17.

(9) Ibid., 30.1566.126 and 46.1911.1.

(10) Jin Y. Park, "Living with the Inconceivable: Huayan Buddhism and the Postmodern Differend " Asian Philosophy, vol. 13, nos. 2/3 (2003), p 171

(11) Ibid. p. 167.

(12) Kitaro Nishida, Nishida kitaro zenshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 8:506.

(13) "For the full argument, see Gereon Kopf, "Philosophy as Expression: Towards a New Model of Global Philosophy," Nishida Testugakkai Nenpo, vol. 11 (2014), pp. 181-155.

(14) Nishida, Nishida kitaro zenshu, 7:149,

(15) Ibid., 7:264.

(16) Ibid., 8:31.

(17) Ironically, Nishida's own political philosophy belies this egalitarian vision. However, as I have shown elsewhere, there seems to be a discrepancy between Nishida's philosophical vision and his occasional support of the Japanese imperialism of the first half of the twentieth century. See Gereon Kopf, Between Dialectic and Non-dualism: Nishida's Conception of Culture?" in Augustine Thottakara, ed., Religion and Politics in Asia Today (Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2001), pp. 137-164.

(18) Dogen, Dogen zenji zenshu, ed. Doshu Okubo (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1969-70), 1:7.

(19) Iwao Koyama, "Identity in Antiphony," tr. James Heisig, in James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, eds., Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), pp. 742-743.

(20) Ibid., p. 743.

(21) James W. Heisig, Nothingness and Desire: An East-West Philosophical Antiphony (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), p. 131.

(22) Ibid., p. 130.

(23) Ibid., p. 132, quoting a term of William James.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid., p. 129.

(26) Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 104.

(27) Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1996).

(28) See note 11, above.
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Author:Kopf, Gereon
Publication:Journal of Ecumenical Studies
Article Type:Essay
Date:Jan 1, 2015
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