Printer Friendly

Part one: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Pretrial Detainee, Due Process, Placement in Segregation, Restraints

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Pretrial Detainees, Segregation

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Punishment, Restraints, Segregation, Due Process

Allah v. Milling, 982 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against prison officials, asserting claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on his placement in an administrative segregation program. The officials moved for summary judgment on the due process claims. The district court denied the motion, finding that summary judgment was precluded by several fact issues. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the decision by prison officials to place the pretrial detainee, who had previously been in an administrative segregation program before being discharged from the correctional facility, in administrative segregation immediately upon his readmission for a subsequent offense, was for a punitive purpose or was based on a legitimate non-punitive purpose. The court found that a fact issue existed as to whether the restrictions imposed upon the detainee during his confinement in administrative segregation, including handcuffs and leg shackles, constituted punishment. (Gamer Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Cell Assignment, Failure to Protect, Separation

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault, Medical Care

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care, Inadequate Care

Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 986 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2013). A state prisoner who was seriously injured in a fight with his cellmate brought a [section] 1983 action against a warden, corrections officers, prison nurse, the prison's healthcare provider, and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that a corrections officer was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm posed by the cellmate, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where: (1) the prisoner alleged that his cellmate told the officer that he would become violent if the prisoner was not removed from the cell; (2) the prisoner requested to be separated from his cellmate; (3) the officer did nothing in response to this information; and (4) that a fight ensued, which resulted in serious injuries to the prisoner.

The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that the treatment he received from a prison nurse after he was brought to the infirmary following a fight with his cellmate was so grossly inadequate that it amounted to no treatment at all, and thus he stated a [section] 1983 claim that the nurse was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that he was brought to the infirmary with open wounds, swelling on his head and face, and covered with blood, that he vomited while awaiting treatment and, after being "treated," he left the infirmary with open wounds, swelling on his head and face, covered with blood, and with four ibuprofen in his pocket. (South Florida Reception Center, Florida)

19. FREE SPEACH, EXPRESSION, ASSOC.: Marriage

44. STANDARDS: State Statute

Amos v. Higgins, 996 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Mo. 2014). Fiancees of prisoners brought an action against a county recorder of deeds, in her official capacity, asserting that a state law's requirement that a marriage license applicant must sign the application in the presence of a recorder was unconstitutional, as applied in instances when one or both applicants could not appear in person, or when an applicant was incarcerated. The fiancees moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the recorder from requiring prisoners to execute or sign their marriage license applications in her presence. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the Missouri statute requiring both applicants to execute and sign a marriage license in presence of the issuing recorder was unconstitutional as applied, and an issuance of a permanent injunction was warranted. The court noted that the "in presence" statutory requirement significantly interfered with the fiancees' exercise of their fundamental right to marry, and it was not closely tailored to solely effectuate a sufficiently important state interest, given that the identity of incarcerated marriage license applicants could be verified through other means without requiring them to sign a marriage license application in the recorder's physical presence. (Moniteau County Recorder of Deeds, Tipton Correctional Center, Missouri)

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Temperature, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Medical Care

15. FACILITIES: Temperature, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, General Conditions, Ventilation

29. MEDICAL CARE: ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Deliberate Indifference

Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F.Supp.2d 639 (M.D.La. 2013). State death row inmates brought a [section] 1983 action against a state department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations of violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in part and denied in part. The court held that the temperature and humidity of cells presented a substantial risk of harm to death row inmates, as required for their claims against the prison and officials, alleging the conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that: (1) the inmates were regularly subjected to temperatures above 90.5 degrees and heat indices above 100 degrees; (2) the heat index inside death row tiers was often higher than that outside the facility; (3) inmates were subjected to consecutive days with heat indices above 100 degrees; (4) inmates were at risk of heat-related illnesses including heat stroke and worsening of their underlying conditions, which included diabetes, hypertension, and uncontrolled blood pressure; and (5) two inmates were over age 55, increasing the risk for them.

The court found that prison officials had knowledge that the heat and humidity in death row tiers placed inmates at a substantial risk of harm, as required to find the officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. The inmates had submitted multiple administrative complaints regarding the heat, and officials responded that they knew it was "extremely hot." According to the court, prison officials disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm to death row inmates regarding heat and humidity in cells, as required to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, where the officials did not take any actions to reduce the heat conditions despite knowledge of the conditions.

The court found that there was no evidence that death row inmates were limited in any major life activities due to their medical conditions, including hypertension, obesity, and depression, as required for their claims against the prison and officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. (Louisiana State Penitentiary)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Juveniles, Suicide Attempt

26. JUVENILES: Use of Force, Medical Care, Suicide Attempt, Due Process

29. MEDICAL CARE: Juvenile, Mental Health, Delay in Care

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Juvenile, Restraints, Failure to Provide Care, Deliberate Indifference

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Juveniles, Medical Care, Mental Health, Restraints, Use of Force, Due Process

47. TRANSFERS: Denial

48. USE OF FORCE: Restraining Chair, Excessive Force

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a [section] 1983 action against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The court held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment altogether was clearly established at the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints to punish detainee, for the purposes of the juvenile detention center's staffs qualified immunity defense. According to the court, the senior correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the eleven-year- old without any penological purpose. The court found that the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when employees allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The court noted that prison officials who assumed a "gate keeping" authority over the prisoner's access to medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed access to medical care. But the court also held that the detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of his choice while awaiting trial was not clearly established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a nearby shelter, for purposes of the juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity defense.. The court stated: "Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96-pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro- Straint Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Chair Model RC-1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints all. In the months that followed, the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self- harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And that's the nub of this lawsuit." (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Policies/Procedures

18. FOOD: Commissary, Religious Diet

37. RELIGION: Diet, Sincerity, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act, Sincerity

42. SERVICES-PRISONER: Commissary

Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against state prison officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the officials' decision to revoke his vegan diet. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the officials' motion, granted the prisoner's motion, and entered an injunction. The court held that the fact that the prisoner's vegan diet had been restored did not render moot his declaratory judgment action against state prison officials, in which he alleged that they violated his religious rights by revoking his vegan diet for purchasing chicken-flavored ramen noodles, because no vegetarian noodles were available to him, and his vegan diet was subject to revocation anytime he ordered ramen noodles, regardless of whether he consumed the seasoning packet containing chicken. The court found that the prisoner demonstrated a substantial burden to his religious practice, satisfying his initial burden under The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the prisoner held a religious belief that required him to adhere to a vegan diet, he purchased chicken-flavored ramen noodles from the state prison commissary, the commissary did not carry a vegetarian noodle option, the prisoner did not eat the meat flavoring packet but instead discarded it, and the prisoner's vegan diet was revoked solely due to his noodle purchase.

According to the court, prison officials' revocation of the prisoner's vegan diet was not the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, and thus the officials did not meet their burden under RLUIPA to justify such action,. The court noted that although the state prison policy dictated that personal preference diet cards could be confiscated if a prisoner abused or misused the privilege by voluntarily consuming self- prohibited foods, and such policy was legitimately geared toward weeding out insincere requests, the prisoner's purchase of noodles with a meat seasoning packet did not mean that his beliefs were insincere. The district court decision opened by stating: "It is not every day that someone makes a federal case out of ramen noodles. But unfortunately that's what Joshus Borkholder had to do." (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Evidence

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Medical Care, Use of Force

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Medical Screening

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care, Medication, Deliberate Indifference

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Failure to Protect, Medical Care, Use of Force

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force, Failure to Protect

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under [section] 1983 against a county board of commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his arrest. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the force used against the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a corrections officer and the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent deputy sheriffs from using excessive force, absent a showing that the nurse and officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring; (3) the nurse was not liable for deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical needs, where the arrestee's latent cranial injury was not so obvious that a lay person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention; (4) the county board of commissioners was not liable under [section] 1983 for any alleged conduct of deputy sheriffs in violating the arrestee's federal constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violations; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriffs' use of force against the arrestee was reckless under Ohio law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriff assaulted the arrestee in response to an off- color jibe; and (7) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county board of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew that litigation was probable and whether their destruction of videotape evidence of deputies' use of force against the arrestee was willful.

The court also found that the jail nurse did not act with malice and in a wanton and willful manner in allowing the arrestee to sit in a county jail cell for 12 hours with serious injuries, where the nurse attended to the arrestee, assessed what she perceived to be minor injuries, provided him with ibuprofen for his pain, and advised him he could contact someone for further medical assistance if necessary. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Appointed Attorney, Exhaustion

13. EX-OFFENDERS: Claims, Access to Court, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Exhaustion, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

29. MEDICAL CARE: Mental Health, Suicide Attempt, Deliberate Indifference

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Suicide, Failure to Provide Care, Deliberate Indifference

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of the First

and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the deliberate indifference claim and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of alleged constitutional violations that occurred while in prison were mooted by his release from prison. The court found that there was no evidence that prison mental health care providers were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs, as required to support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, where the prisoner was seen by mental health care employees regularly for his complaints, and evidence showed that the prisoner's suicide threats were manipulative in nature.

The court held that denial of the former prisoner's request for appointment of counsel was not abuse of discretion by the district court, where the prisoner was unlikely to succeed on the merits, and had been able to articulate his legal claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved.

According to the appeals court, in deciding whether the former prisoner's [section] 1983 claims were administratively exhausted pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the district court should have used the date of the First Amended Complaint, which added the claims, rather than the date of the original complaint. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Sexual Assault, Supervision

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Failure to Protect, Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment, Work Release

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Release, Work/Study

36. RELEASE: Work Release

45. SUPERVISION: Inadequate Supervision, Cross Gender Supervision, Deliberate Indifference

50. WORK-PRISONER: Equal Protection, Supervision, Work Release

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a [section] 1983 action against state officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were participating in the Prisoner Public Works Program ("PPWP") that allowed offenders to work off-site at different state offices. They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma Governor's Mansion, where they were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When inmates work at places such as the Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at the work site. Instead, they are supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like guards. These individuals go through an eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by the groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's Mansion.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether prison guards were deliberately indifferent. The court held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the inmates because the supervisor did not know that the inmates were working only with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison supervising case manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4) there was no evidence that the employee had supervisory authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate did not return to the work assignment where she was allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the alleged abusers, as required for the continuing violation doctrine to apply to her [section] 1983 action that alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment.

According to the court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a groundskeeper under his supervision, the supervisor was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but did not have knowledge of the sexual assaults, and he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the groundskeeper. The court also found that the prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public works program, was not deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates working at the governor's mansion as part of the program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager and the manager was never informed of misconduct. (Hillside Community Corrections Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Due Process

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Screening, Procedures

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Unlawful Detention

36. RELEASE: Timely Release, Due Process

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought [section] 1983 claims and state-law claims against a county and its jail director, relating to the arrestee's detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest. After removal to federal court, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part, and remanded to the state court. The court held that the arrestee's [section] 1983 claims against a county and its jail director, relating to detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest, were properly characterized as Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, rather than for malicious prosecution. The court found that county jail employees did not violate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, when they booked him into the jail following a city police officer's arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that was facially valid, but that had been cancelled before the arrest. According to the court, county jail employees, upon learning from the arrestee's attorney about the pre- arrest cancellation of the facially valid bench warrant pursuant to which city police officers had conducted the arrest, did not act with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely imprison the arrestee by requiring a release order from a judge, and thus, the arrestee's continued detention for two days, until the release order was issued, did not constitute false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that jail employees acted reasonably, since a judge could better determine why a bench warrant remained available to city police at the time of arrest, and whether any other basis for detaining the arrestee existed. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Bernalillo County, New Mexico)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Expert Witness

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Clothing, Privacy, Searches

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Clothing, Searches, Telephone, Use of Force

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Clothing, Privacy, Searches, Use of Force

33. PRIVACY: Searches, Staff of Opposite Sex

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Clothing, Pretrial Detainees, Searches, Use of Force

41. SEARCHES: Retaliation, Pretrial Detainees, Strip Searches, Use of Force

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a [section] 1983 action against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things, that jail officers "strip searched" her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in retaliation for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.

The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a "strip search" within the meaning of the Iowa law which defined a "strip search" as "having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so as to permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe by any body cavity," where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions during the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a "strip search" requiring reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee's privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra--institutional safety--was substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's [section] 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights.

The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the amount of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female arrestee's under- wire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail officers did not use excessive force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female officers had allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Policies/Procedures

19. FREE SPEACH, EXPRESSION, ASSOC.: Association, Former Prisoners, Family, Regulations

31. PERSONNEL: Association, Free Speech, Marriage, Work Rules

49. VISITING: Family, Former Employees, Former Prisoners, Spouses

Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A correctional officer brought an action against the Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's (DOCCS), alleging DOCCS's work rule prohibiting personal association of DOCCS employees with current and former inmates and their associates was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the officer's motion. The court held that the work rule was facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, where DOCCS had enforced the rule against the officer and denied her the right to associate with her former husband and the father of her grandchild.

The court found that the rule was not narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interest in maintaining safe and orderly administration of its prisons, as applied to constitutionally protected close familial relationships, and thus, did not withstand strict scrutiny on the First Amendment overbreadth claim. The court noted that the rule provided no temporal or geographical limitation with respect to the former inmate's incarceration, nor did its prohibition account for variations in the seriousness of that person's offense or his or her prison disciplinary history. The court found that the rule was substantially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment, as applied to close familial relationships, where the rule would prevent a DOCCS employee from visiting, or even corresponding with an incarcerated spouse if the couple had no children or if their children did not maintain a relationship with the incarcerated parent, and the rule prohibited employees from ever reestablishing contact with a spouse, child, sibling, or parent when that person was released and became a "former inmate." (New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Evidence, Legal Material, Retaliation for Legal Action

2. ADMINISTRATION: Property, Policies/Procedures

35. PROPERTY-PRISONER PERSONAL: Confiscation, Destruction of Property, Legal Material, Limitations, Searches

38. RULES & REGULATIONS-PRISONER: Access to Court, Items Permitted

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Fire Safety, Safety Regulations, Items Permitted, Searches- Cell

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a [section] 1983 claim against two prison officials, claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment, and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from a prison official to a law librarian supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity of the e-mail, and no evidence that the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose or transmit the purported e-mail. The court held that the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal materials from his cell, to eliminate a fire hazard and to make it easier for officials to conduct searches and inventories of the prisoner's property during prison searches, was not retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a prior lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner's speculation regarding the officials' motive could not overcome the officials' sworn statements on the motion for summary judgment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Evidence, Investigation

15. FACILITIES: Facility Design, Equipment

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Video Surveillance

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 3 F.Supp.3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In a county jail detainees' action against a county, the detainees moved for spoliation sanctions based on the county's alleged failure to preserve capital project plans that allegedly showed surveillance camera locations, and videos from a surveillance camera in the housing area where one detainee was allegedly beaten. "Spoliation" is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees failed to show that the capital project plans existed, and failed to show that a surveillance camera in the housing area existed. The court noted that ambiguous statements made by a jail official that he was not sure if such plans existed but that they might indicate camera locations, and a speculative expert opinion stating that it was customary for a system installer to provide an "as built" floor plan detailing camera placement, were insufficient to show that such plans in fact existed for the jail. (Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Civil Suit, Evidence

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: False Arrest, False Imprisonment

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution

41. SEARCHES: Evidence, Retaliation, Search Warrant

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). A former member of a county board of supervisors brought an action against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, a former county attorney, and deputy county attorneys, asserting claims under [section] 1983 and state law for wrongful institution of civil proceedings, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful search. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiffs motion, and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by fact issues: (1) with respect to the malicious prosecution claims; (2) as to whether misrepresentations and omissions of evidence in a search warrant affidavit were material; (3) as to unlawful search claims against the sheriff and deputy county attorneys; (4) with respect to the false arrest claim; and (5) with respect to the claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. The court noted that a reasonable magistrate would not have issued a search warrant based on the accurate and complete representation of known evidence.

The court held that the retaliatory animus of the county sheriff and prosecutors would chill a person of ordinary firmness from criticizing the sheriff and prosecutors and from vigorously litigating against them. According to the court, fact issues as to whether the county sheriff and prosecutors acted outrageously and either intended the arrestee harm, or were recklessly indifferent to whether their actions would infringe on his rights and cause him severe distress, precluded summary judgment for the defendants with regard to the claim for punitive damages in the action for unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment violations. (Maricopa County Sheriff and County Attorneys, Arizona)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Protective Custody

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Failure to Protect, Gangs, Protective Custody

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Protection from Harm, Threats

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Gangs, Protection, Safety

Dunn v. Killingsworth, 984 F.Supp.2d 811 (M.D.Tenn. 2013). A prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing him with adequate protection from gang-related violence. The district court conducted an initial review of the prisoner's complaint, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the prisoner's allegations: (1) that a gang member threatened his personal safety: (2) that the prisoner's family paid other inmates for the prisoner's personal safety; (3) that the prisoner repeatedly requested to be placed in protective custody; and (4) that prison officials denied such requests, were sufficient to state the serious deprivation prong of his claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials denied his requests for protection despite the stabbing of prisoners and a guard at the prison, and that prison officials failed to take any effective steps to provide better protection for all inmates, were sufficient to state a deliberate indifference prong of his claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (South Central Correctional Center, Tennessee)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Discrimination, Harassment, Working Conditions

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

31. PERSONNEL: Discrimination, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Supervision

Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). African American corrections officers brought an action under [section] 1981 and [section] 1983 against prison administrators and supervisors, alleging race based harassment and retaliation, and disparate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the officers had a subjective belief that the discrimination and harassment they experienced was severe and pervasive; (2) the officers established a broad pattern of harassment, and thus specific individual acts had to be viewed as illustrative; (3) the acts, comments, and inaction by a supervisor were purposeful and objectively actionable; (4) the officers suffered materially adverse consequences after they filed an official complaint, as required for a retaliation claim; (5) supervisors who permitted and participated in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work assignments, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officers experienced anxiety, dread, and panic attacks, they felt like they were being treated more like inmates than fellow officers, they initially enjoyed going to work but subsequently found their job to be depressing and anxiety-producing due to discrimination and harassment, they felt personally at risk because they no longer trusted that their fellow officers would come to their aid in a dangerous situation, and one officer's hair started to fall out from the stress he suffered. The officers had alleged that they experienced racist remarks on a near daily basis, that supervisors had been present and laughing without objection to statements made by others, and each officer became aware of offensive remarks even if each individual did not hear it first-hand. Supervisors allegedly acted to intensify the pattern of harassment of African American corrections officers after they filed an official complaint of a racially hostile environment, subsequently assigning them inferior or less desirable jobs, "papering" their files with reports on trivial or invented misconduct, and singling them out for additional work details and consistently forcing them to take unpopular details. The court held that these were materially adverse employment actions sufficient to support the officer's prima facie case of retaliation under [section] 1981.

The court found that a reasonable prison supervisor would have understood that permitting and participating in racially derisive remarks, and then assigning inferior work assignments for reporting such conduct, would have violated the rights of the African American corrections officers, and thus the supervisors who did permit and participate in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work assignments, were not entitled to qualified immunity to the officers' hostile work environment and retaliation claims under [section] 1981 and [section] 1983. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)

10. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Failure to Protect, Medical Care

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Medical Care, Wrongful Death

27. LIABILITY: Official Capacity, Reckless Indifference

29. MEDICAL CARE: Medication, Misdiagnosis, Failure to Provide Care, Deliberate Indifference

Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F.Supp.3d 689 (D.N.J. 2014). The parents of an inmate who died in a state prison brought a [section] 1983 action, individually and the mother as administrator of the inmate's estate, against the state, the department of corrections (DOC), a prison, corrections officers, a medical care provider, and physicians and nurses, alleging the inmate had been deprived of necessary medical care. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that corrections officers, who were sued in their official capacities, were not immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) where there were not just errors in medical judgment, but claims of deliberate or reckless indifference, and the survivors' clearly alleged conduct that may have been outside the scope of the officers' employment or that may have constituted willful misconduct. The court found that allegations that individual medical providers responsible for the inmate misdiagnosed the inmate's congestive heart failure as bronchitis, failed to provide a medical workup following the inmate's complaint of chest cavity pain, and failed to properly medicate him, were sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment in the [section] 1983 action against the providers. (Northern State Prison, New Jersey)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Wrongful Death, Medical Care, Use of Force

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care, Deliberate Indifference

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Wrongful Death, Failure to Protect, Medical Care, Use of Force, Due Process

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force, Stun Gun

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014). The estate of deceased pretrial detainee who died while in custody after officers restrained him in his response to his alleged insubordination, brought a [section] 1983 action in state court against the deputies and a sergeant, alleging excessive force, deprivation of life without due process, and failure to provide immediate medical care. Following removal to federal court, the district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's right to be free from excessive force, including use of a neck restraint, stun gun, and pressure on his back while he was on his stomach and not resisting, was clearly established, for purposes of determining whether the deputies and sergeant were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that failing to check a pretrial detainee's vital signs or provide immediate medical attention after he was rendered unconscious by the use of force, which allegedly included at least a two-minute neck hold, 140 pounds of pressure on his back, and the use of stun gun for eight seconds, was deliberate indifference. (Downtown Detention Center, Denver, Colorado)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Contract Services

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Wrongful Death, Medical Care

27. LIABILITY: Supervisory Liability

29. MEDICAL CARE: Negligence, Inadequate Care, Contract Services

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 988 F.Supp.2d 726 (N.D.Tex. 2013). Family members of a pretrial detainee who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail brought a [section] 1983 action against a county and a jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of contract. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted the motions in part, and denied in part. The physician and the county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion, finding that the physician was not subject to supervisory liability under [section] 1983, absent any finding that the nurse refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical need. The court held that the county was not liable in the [section] 1983 claim brought by family members, absent a showing of an underlying constitutional violation by a county employee or a county policy that permitted or caused some constitutional violation. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Evidence

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: False Imprisonment

13. EX-OFFENDERS: Claims

24. IMMUNITY: Absolute Immunity, Prosecutorial Immunity

Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner who was wrongfully convicted of murder and sentenced to death brought an action against, county prosecutors, among others, alleging a [section] 1983 claim of violation of his due process rights and related state tort claims. The former prisoner had been incarcerated for 17 years before the conviction was overturned. The district court partially granted and partially denied a defense motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the former prisoner moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated its prior order to the extent that it dismissed the former prisoner's federal claim against prosecutor arising from the prosecutor's pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence, and retained jurisdiction over the state claims. The prosecutors appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the prosecutor did not have absolute or qualified immunity from [section] 1983 claims arising out of his preprosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; (2) the prosecutor did not have absolute immunity under Illinois law for his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; and (3) remand was required to allow reconsideration of the determination that the prosecutor did not have immunity from state law claims arising out of use of fabricated evidence at retrial. The court noted that absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors is only for acts they commit within the scope of their employment as prosecutors; when they do non-prosecutorial work they lose thenabsolute immunity and have only qualified immunity. (Illinois)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Failure to Protect, Verbal Harassment, Classification

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Failure to Protect, Harassment, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, Separation

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault, Sexual Assault

Fletcher v. Little, 5 F.Supp.3d 655 (D.Del. 2013). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison official, alleging that the official failed to protect him from an attempted rape by a known sexual offender and that she discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation as a homosexual. The prisoner filed motions to compel, for appointment of counsel, for partial summary judgment, and for a preliminary injunction, and the official filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the prisoner's motions and granted the official's motion. The court held that the prison official was not deliberately indifferent to the risk that the prisoner would be assaulted by a cellmate because of the prisoner's homosexuality, where the official did not ignore the prisoner's concern. The court noted that before the assault, the official had the prisoner and cellmate removed from their cell and separately interviewed them. Each reported they feared the other, the official instructed them to "stop bickering" or face time in isolation, they agreed to stop and were returned to the cell, and when the official conducted a check 30 minutes later, the prisoner and cellmate were asleep in their beds. The court found that the prison official's alleged statements to the homosexual prisoner, including a comment that because he was a "gay man," he should expect harassment from other inmates who had "not been with a woman in a long time," and that he should "man-up and stop coming to jail," did not support an equal protection claim, no matter how offensive or derogatory the alleged statements were, because they were merely verbal abuse. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Exhaustion

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Transportation

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Exhaustion, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Transportation

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a [section] 1983 action against a county and the county sheriffs office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a correctional officer who was driving a jail transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the inmate to hurtle forward and hit his head on a metal divider.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court had the ability, in the interests of judicial economy and finality, to address the merits of the suit once it determined that the inmate had not exhausted his remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Kankakee County, Jerome Combs Detention Center, Illinois)

4. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS: Medical Costs

27. LIABILITY: Injunctive Relief

29. MEDICAL CARE: Eye Care, Deliberate Indifference, Inadequate Care

Foster v. Ghosh, 4 F.Supp.3d 974 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against Illinois Department of Corrections officials and an optometrist who treated him in prison, alleging under [section] 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to grant him access to an ophthalmologist to evaluate his cataracts. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the optometrist and medical director were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs and that the inmate would suffer irreparable harm absent the issuance of an injunction. According to the court, the only treatment the inmate received in prison was a prescription for eyeglasses, which was not effective, and the inmate's request for a consultation was not expensive, unconventional, or esoteric. The court noted that the cost the defendants would bear providing adequate care to the inmate did not outweigh the irreparable harm the inmate would endure if his cataracts remained unevaluated. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Medical Screening, Medication

29. MEDICAL CARE: Intake Screening, Medication, Malpractice, Negligence, Deliberate Indifference

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Medical Care, Intake Screening

Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee sued a county and jail officials for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, after he became legally blind allegedly due to his high blood pressure while incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the lack of medical screening at intake, failure to prescribe medication, and a delay in administering medication were not deliberate indifference. The court held that the officials' failure to conduct medical screening of the detainee at intake did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials began logging the detainee's daily blood pressure in response to his complaints of heart problems.

The court found that the officials' failure to prescribe medication for the detainee after several high blood pressure readings did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted that although the officials at most should have known they were committing malpractice by not prescribing medication, medical malpractice was not deliberate indifference. According to the court, the officials' delay in administering blood pressure medication to the detainee by failing to write a second prescription sooner, after the medication did not arrive following first prescription, did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials at most were negligent, and deliberate indifference required even more than gross negligence. (Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Sexual Assault, Officer on Prisoner Assault

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Sexual Assault, Failure to Protect

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Failure to Protect, Sexual Assault

Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013). A female pretrial detainee brought an action under [section] 1983 against a corrections officer and various other officers at a jail after she had been sexually assaulted. The district court denied the supervisory defendants' motion to dismiss and they appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the detainee had to allege that the supervisory officers actually knew of a serious risk that the offending officer posed, and that her complaint was insufficient to state a plausible claim that each supervisory officer should have known of a substantial risk that the offending officer would sexually assault her. (Shelby County Jail, Florida)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault

15. FACILITIES: Cells, Equipment, Maintenance, Security

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Locks, Security Practices

Freeland v. Ballard, 6 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.W. Va. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging the officials were deliberately indifferent to serious security breaches and failed to protect him from another inmate who escaped a segregation cell and attacked him with a piece of metal. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that there was at least one prior incident when an inmate repeatedly beat on his door until it became unsecured and permitted the inmate to escape from the cell and assault another prisoner, did not give rise to a plausible claim that prison officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner and disregarded that risk in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But the court found that the prisoner's allegations, that an inmate escaped a segregation cell and attacked prisoner with a piece of metal but prison officials did nothing to intervene to stop the attack when they had the opportunity to do so, and that the officials were aware of prior incidents of inmates beating their doors open and attacking other inmates, were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. (Mount Olive Correctional Complex, West Virginia)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Initial Appearance, Due Process

6. BAIL: Alien

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Aliens, Due Process

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Alien, Due Process, Initial Appearance

Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). Aliens brought a class-action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other federal and state government agencies, alleging that the defendants' acts of subjecting individuals to mandatory immigration detention violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause. The government moved to dismiss. The district court declined to dismiss the alien's claims for injunctive relief, finding that the aliens had standing to challenge the adequacy of the Joseph hearing and associated mandatory detention procedures, and that allegations that the Joseph hearings failed to afford aliens adequate protection were sufficient

to state claims for due process violations. (Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, District of New Jersey)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Hearing Impaired, ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act, Medical Care

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se, brought a [section] 1983 action against prison officers, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in failing to provide batteries for his hearing aids. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers. The detainee appealed. The appealed court affirmed. The court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the detainee's severe hearing loss that could be corrected by hearing aids was an objectively serious medical need, and whether prison officials' response to the detainee's need for batteries for his hearing aids was objectively insufficient. But the court held that the detainee's right to a functioning hearing aid was not clearly established at the time, and therefore the officers were entitled to summary judgment. (Wakulla County Jail, Florida)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Initial Appearance, Due Process

6. BAIL: Alien, Bond

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Aliens, Due Process

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Alien, Bail

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Aliens, Due Process, Initial Appearance

36. RELEASE: Alien, Bail, Due Process, Timely Release

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase "when the alien is released" in the statute authorizing mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant "at the time of release," and that the petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County Jail and House of Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Sexual Assault

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Sexual Assault

Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013). A sentenced female county jail prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against the county and others, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in connection with two guards' conduct of having sexual intercourse with her. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the county jail prisoner consented to engaging in sexual intercourse with the two officers, and thus, the officers' conduct could not support the prisoner's [section] 1983 Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. The court noted that the prisoner admitted to talking to one officer about her sexual fantasies and that she asked to have sex with him. She also admitted to allowing another officer to look at her naked, she did nothing to indicate her lack of consent when the two officers entered her cell, when they removed her clothing, or when they touched her. According to the court, there was no showing that the prisoner's mental health issues negated her ability to consent or that the officers had any knowledge of the prisoner's mental health issues. The officers had confessed and were fired immediately. (Logan County Jail, Oklahoma)

11. DISCIPLINE: Appeal, Good-Time

20. GOOD TIME: Good-Time Credit, Revocation

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Good Time

Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging a prison disciplinary action resulting in the loss of his "good-time" credit that would extend his period of incarceration by 30 days. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prisoner was not required to seek a certificate of appealability (COA) before appealing the denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court allowed the appeal to go forward. (Plainfield Correctional Facility, Indiana)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Conditions

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Lighting

10. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Lighting

15. FACILITIES: Lights

45. SUPERVISION: Cell Checks

Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days violated the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by factual issues as to: (1) the brightness of the continuous lighting in the prisoner's special management unit cell; (2) the effect on the prisoner of the continuous lighting; and (3) whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent. The inmate was housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU), an administrative segregation unit with single-cells that are continuously illuminated for twenty-four hours a day. Each cell in the SMU has three, four-foot-long fluorescent lighting tubes in a mounted light fixture. A cell occupant can use a switch inside the cell to turn off two of the tubes, but the center tube is always on. The tube is covered by a blue light-diffusing sleeve. Institution policy requires welfare checks in the SMU to be conducted every thirty minutes, which is more frequent than checks for the general prison population. Officials asserted that continuous illumination allows officers to "assess the baseline behavior of offenders to ensure they are not at risk of harming themselves or making an attempt to harm staff, cause property damage or incite problem behavior from other offenders." The officials stated that turning the cell lights on and off every thirty minutes would be disruptive to the cell occupants. The prisoner alleged that the light was so bright he could not sleep, even with "four layers of towel wrapped around his eyes." He alleged that the lighting gave him "recurring migraine headaches" and that he could not distinguish between night and day in the cell. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Gangs, Segregation, Transfer

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Segregation, Transfer

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Classification, Gangs, Segregation, Transfer

47. TRANSFERS: Habeas Corpus, Purpose

Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his placement in a security housing unit (SHU). After the writ was issued, the district court ordered the state to release the inmate from segregated housing conditions, and the state appealed. The appeals court vacated, reversed, and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the state had violated its order issuing a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release the inmate from the facility's security housing unit (SHU). According to the court, the state subsequently placed the inmate in the facility's administrative segregation unit (ASU) and then in another facility's SHU. The court noted that the inmate had been released into federal custody before the order was issued, his placement in ASU after he was released from federal custody pending evaluation of his gang status was standard procedure, and the inmate was validated as an active gang member and placed in other SHU. According to the court, the district court improperly impeded state prison management. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Civil Commitment, Segregation, Due Process

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Civil Commitment, Hot Water

15. FACILITIES: Plumbing, Maintenance

23. HYGIENE-PRISONER PERSONAL: Hot Water

24. IMMUNITY: Sovereign Immunity

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Civil Commitment, Due Process, Conditions

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). A civilly-committed resident at a special treatment unit (STU) operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) brought action an against NJDOC officials, alleging violations of his substantive due process rights under [section] 1983. The district court held that the resident's claims against the officials in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that the resident's allegations adequately pled the officials' personal involvement in his complaint that: (1) there were visibly leaking steam pipes in a special treatment unit (STU) for which trash cans were used to collect water; (2) NJDOC officials personally toured STU; (3) STU received numerous written complaints from residents about inadequate hot water; and (4) an STU assistant administrator told the resident that defective piping valves were too expensive to repair. The court found that the officials were subject to liability under [section] 1983 in their individual capacities. The court held that NJDOC officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the civilly committed resident's [section] 1983 conditions of civil commitment claim under the Due Process Clause, arising from inadequate hot water at a special treatment unit (STU) in which he was housed. (Special Treatment Unit, Avenel, Middlesex County, New Jersey)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Due Process, Liberty Interest, Conditions, Exercise, Privileges, Recreation

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Punitive Segregation, Due Process, Liberty Interest, Segregation

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Discipline, Segregation, Cells, Exercise, Showers

11. DISCIPLINE: Segregation

12. EXERCISE AND RECREATION: Segregation, Recreation

23. HYGIENE-PRISONER PERSONAL: Showers

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner who had spent six months in segregation as punishment for a disciplinary misconduct charge which was later expunged, filed a [section] 1983 action, alleging that the segregation violated his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's placement in disciplinary segregation in a cell with a solid metal door and a confrontational cell mate for 182 days, with only weekly access to the shower and the recreation yard, did not amount to atypical and significant hardships, as required to establish a deprivation of the prisoner's due process liberty interests, where the prisoner was not deprived of all human contact or sensory stimuli. The court found that the state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct in placing the prisoner in disciplinary segregation, as the disciplinary segregation did not violate any clearly established right. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault, Protection from Harm

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Hobbies, Crafts

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Protection, Safety, Security Practices, Weapon

45. SUPERVISION: Inadequate Supervision, Deliberate Indifference

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against prison officials, relating to an inmate-on-inmate assault with a box cutter, and asserting an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials and denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) past incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence involving weapons did not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the prison's policies for monitoring a back hallway in which the prisoner was attacked did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) lack of oversight of the prison's hobby craft shop did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; and (4) prison officials were not deliberately indifferent with respect to oversight of the hobby shop. (W.C. Holman Correctional Facility, Alabama)

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Temperature

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Wrongful Death, Medical Care

15. FACILITIES: Temperature

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Medical Screening, Medication

29. MEDICAL CARE: Medications, Failure to Provide Care, Intake Screening

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 994 F.Supp.2d 840 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The mother of a former inmate who died of hyperthermia while incarcerated brought an action against the prison's health care provider, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging the provider's failure to make accommodations for the inmate's disabilities resulted in the inmate's death. The provider moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the mother alleged sufficient facts to state that the inmate was discriminated against by the prison's health care provider, in support of her claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, by alleging that the provider knew of the risks and dangers associated with certain medical conditions and medications, that the provider knew the inmate suffered from those conditions and used those medications, and that despite that knowledge, the provider failed to make reasonable accommodations, resulting in the inmate suffering more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoners, namely, his death.

The court noted that the mother alleged that the provider knew both that the inmate suffered from hypertension, diabetes, schizophrenia, and/or depression, and was prescribed medications to treat his disabilities, and that extreme temperatures could be deadly, but still failed to protect the inmate from the extreme temperatures that ultimately resulted in the inmate's death.

The court found that the mother alleged sufficient facts concerning the accommodations that should have been provided by the prison's health care provider without a request, but were denied or refused, as well as which facilities, programs, or services should have been modified by the provider, to state claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The mother complained that the provider's intake process was flawed in that it could take up to 10 days for prisoners to receive an intake physical, and that the delay created a loophole that left inmates with heat sensitive conditions and disabilities especially vulnerable to death because they did not receive accommodations for their heat sensitive disabilities, and that the provider's failure to employ 24-hour medical staff at the prison resulted in a fatal delay and denial of vital medical care to the inmate. (University of Texas Medical Branch, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Garza West Unit)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Harassment

10. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Harassment

Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2nd Cir. 2013). A pro se prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against various correction officers alleging that three masked officers sprayed him with an unknown substance while he was in his cell. The substance was apparently a mixture of fecal matter, vinegar, and machine oil. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner stated a [section] 1983 claim against prison officials for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging the officials approached his cell wearing masks and proceeded to spray him with a mixture of feces, vinegar, and "some type [of] machine oil." The court found that the officials' alleged conduct was unequivocally contrary to contemporary standards of decency, and, given the context, the assault obviously was not a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but rather was an attempt to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Placement, Length, Conditions, Law Library, Privileges, Telephone, Medical Treatment, Liberty Interest

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Privacy, Discipline, Conditions

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Mentally 111, Policy/Procedure, Segregation, Suicide, Due Process, Liberty Interest, Punitive Segregation, Privileges

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Clothing, Mattress, Medical Care, Showers, Food

18. FOOD: Segregation

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Privacy, Suicide, Supervision, Medication, Segregation, Special Housing

42. SERVICES-PRISONER: Telephone

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against corrections officers and a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while incarcerated at a county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected liberty interest was implicated. The inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting classification officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel had deemed a continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate remained on suicide watch for eight days after a psychiatrist and a social worker recommended his removal from the suicide watch. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of confinement while he was placed on suicide watch imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, such that it implicated a protected liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took away the inmate's clothing and required him to wear a suicide-safe garment- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tear-resistant material and Velcro. He was not allowed to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock. He was housed in a stripped cell in the Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare mattress and a blanket made out of the same coarse material as the smock. Corrections officers situated immediately in front of the Plexiglass cell window constantly supervised the inmate. According to the county, suicide watch inmates have access to the yard, a plastic spoon, a rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors, and medical and mental health services, but the inmate claimed that he had no showers, telephone calls, prescription medications, food, or access to the law library while in the BMHU. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Execution

10. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Lethal Injection

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 994 F.Supp.2d 906 (S.D. Ohio 2014). An inmate, who was scheduled to be executed, brought a challenge to Ohio's two drug execution protocol of midazolam and hydromorphone, claiming that the protocol would subject him to a substantial risk of severe pain that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved for a stay of execution. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate's physical and medical characteristics which placed the inmate at risk for obstructive sleep apnea did not preclude the use of Ohio's two drug execution protocol on the grounds that the protocol would subject the inmate to a substantial risk of severe pain, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, expert testimony that the inmate would experience air hunger, or a terrifying inability to obtain a breath to satisfy the ventilatory drive, failed to consider the execution protocol's use of a massive dose of hydromorphone, an analgesic. (State of Ohio)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Searches, Equal Protection

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Search, Equal Protection, Access to Court

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Searches, Equal Protection

41. SEARCHES: Strip Searches, Qualified Immunity

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were forced to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior Court filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, alleging that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district court granted summary judgment to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock was at all times a federal official acting under the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia could not be held liable under [section] 1983 for the marshal's conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme gave the District of Columbia no power to exercise authority over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal, and lacked the discretion to stop sending pre-presentment arrestees to the marshal. According to the court, any Fourth Amendment right that the former United States Marshal may have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on minor charges to blanket strip searches was not clearly established at the time of any violation, and therefore the marshal was entitled to qualified immunity on the detainees' claims alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no evidence that the marshal purposefully directed that women should be treated differently than men with respect to the strip-search policy at the Superior Court cellblock, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (District of Columbia, United States Marshal for the Superior Court)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Investigation

2. ADMINISTRATION: Policies/Procedures, Staffing Levels

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Civil Commitment, Due Process, Programs, Religion, Search, Sex Offender

19. FREE SPEACH, EXPRESSION, ASSOC.: Censorship, Mail, Newspapers, Publications, Sex Offenders, Telephone

28. MAIL: Censorship, Publications, Limitations

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Civil Commitment, Conditions, Cell Searches, Due Process, Mail, Programs, Telephone, Searches

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Sex Offender, Treatment Programs, Right to Treatment, Due Process

37. RELIGION: Privacy, Clothing, Free Exercise, Restrictions, Services, Opportunity to Practice, Religious Articles

41. SEARCHES: Cell Searches, Pat Down Searches, Strip Searches

42. SERVICES-PRISONER: Telephone, Right to Treatment

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) brought a [section] 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs' motions.

The court held that the patients' allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially amounted to lifelong confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and run like, a medium to high security prison, sufficiently stated a [section] 1983 substantive due process claim pertaining to the punitive nature of the patients' confinement.

The court found that the patients' allegations that, based on policies and procedures created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or seven hours per week in treatment, that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a [section] 1983 substantive due process claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment.

According to the court, the patients stated a [section] 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against state officials with allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be monitored during religious services and during private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain religious property, and did not allow patients to "communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts," and that such policies and practices were not related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients' allegations that state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and removed or censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a [section] 1983 First Amendment claim that officials unreasonably restricted their right to free speech.

The court found that the patients stated a [section] 1983 unreasonable search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment with allegations that, taken together with the patients' other allegations surrounding the punitive nature of their confinement, state officials violated their Fourth Amendment rights through their search policies, procedures, and practices, and that they were subjected to cell searches, window checks, strip searches, and random pat downs,.

The court ordered that its court-appointed experts would be granted complete and unrestricted access to the documents the experts requested, including publicly available reports and documents related to the patients' lawsuit, as well as MSOP evaluation reports and administrative directives and rules. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Attorney Fee

2. ADMINISTRATION: Contract Services

4. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS: Attorney Fees

5. ATTORNEY FEES: Prevailing Party, Consent Decree, Post-Judgment Services

27. LIABILITY: Settlement, Consent Decree, Contempt, Court Monitor, Contract Services, Private Operator

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden and the contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center violated their constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found the operator to be in contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt proceeding, by the contractor that operated the state correctional facility, which provided an extension of the settlement agreement, required a specific independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of the settlement agreement term, and offered to pay reasonable attorney fees, did not give the inmates the same relief that they achieved in the contempt proceeding, and thus the inmates' rejection of the offer did not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and costs they incurred in the contempt proceeding. The court noted that the inmates were already entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the event of a breach, and the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt proceeding with regard to the extension and the addition of an independent monitor. After considering the totality of the record and the arguments by counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in fees and costs. (Idaho Correctional Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Dental Care, Delay in Treatment, Deliberate Indifference

King v. Chapman, 4 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against prison medical and dental providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the delay in providing a new dental "night guard" to the inmate by a dentist working for the state was deliberate indifference; (2) whether a prison dentist was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in delaying sending the inmate to a specialist and in prescribing medication to the inmate; and (3) whether the medical director was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in obtaining physical therapy for the inmate after surgery. (Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Menard Correctional Facility, Stateville Correctional Facility, Illinois)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Retaliation, In Forma Pauperis, Frivolous Suits

Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner filed a [section] 1983 action against a warden and other state officials, claiming retaliation for the website of the prisoner's mother that allegedly exposed prison corruption and fought for prisoners' rights. The district court granted the officials summary judgment. The prisoner appealed, and the officials moved to dismiss on the ground that the prisoner was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The appeals court held that, in a matter of first impression, repeated knowing violations of the notice pleading rule are strikes under PLRA, and the prisoner was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court noted that the prisoner's two prior appeals that were dismissed as frivolous for lack of good faith counted as strikes, and his three prior complaints that violated the notice pleading rule's short and plain statement requirement counted as strikes for failure to state a claim, as he was given leave to amend but failed to correct the violations after repeated warnings by the district court. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

13. EX-OFFENDERS: Claims

29. MEDICAL CARE: Eye Care, Failure to Provide Care, Right to Refuse, Deliberate Indifference

Kuhne v. Florida Dept, of Corrections, 745 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2014). A former state prisoner filed a [section] 1983 claim, alleging that state corrections officials acted with deliberate indifference by failing to provide him with medical care for his retinopathy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the "refusal of medical care" form signed by the prisoner was modified after he signed it to indicate that he was refusing medical treatment for his retinopathy: (2) whether the prisoner voluntarily declined treatment for his retinopathy; and if so, (3) whether he changed his mind and requested medical treatment for his retinopathy thereafter. (Jackson Correctional Institution, Florida)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Sex Offender, Due Process, Discrimination

Kvech v. New Mexico Dept, of Public Safety, 987 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.N.M. 2013). A convicted Colorado sex offender who was on probation brought a [section] 1983 action against an employee of the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, alleging his placement on the New Mexico sex offender registry violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The employee moved for summary judgment based on qualified and statutory immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the employee's statement that the offender was a sex offender under New Mexico law was false, the statement was derogatory and injured the offender's reputation, and the employee imposed a burden on the offender that significantly altered the offender's legal status in New Mexico. The court held that the employee's refusal to remove the Colorado convicted sex offender from New Mexico's sex offender registry, despite the state court dismissing the failure to register charges, without any pre-determination notice or hearing, did not satisfy procedural due process for the purposes of the offender's Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus procedural due process claim. According to the court, the employee determined that the offender was subject to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) without providing the offender any opportunity to contest her conclusion. But the court determined that the employee was entitled to qualified immunity because an offender's right to a pre-determination hearing before being placed on New Mexico's sex offender registry was not clearly established at the time. (State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety)

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Educational

Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia, 741 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2014). The question of who pays when a student between the ages of 18 and 22 who is eligible for special education services in California and is incarcerated in a county jail, was certified to the Supreme Court of California for the interpretation of the California Education Code, section 56041. Reviewing the Supreme Court's decision, the federal appeals court held that the cost of the student's education is borne by the school district where the student's parent resides. (Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Office of Education, California Department of Education)

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

33. PRIVACY: Searches, Staff of Opposite Sex, View by Staff

37. RELIGION: Opportunity to Worship, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

41. SEARCHES: Strip Searches, Privacy

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state inmate brought an action against a prison captain in his individual capacity, alleging that the captain ordered an unconstitutional strip search and prevented him from attending religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act (RLUIPA), and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the inmate's motion for default judgment and granted the captain's motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate was not entitled to monetary damages against a correctional officer under the provisions of RLUIPA; (2) the strip search did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights; (3) a reasonable officer would not know that a lengthy strip search in the presence of female officers violated clearly established law, and thus the captain was entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the captain did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner by refusing to permit the inmate to attend a religious service after the search, where the inmate had created a disturbance during the search. According to the court, the inmate's potentially provocative questions in a public hallway constituted a disturbance, where during the strip search, the inmate asked the captain why he was singling out Muslims and subjecting them to harassment in a hallway with several other Muslim inmates who were waiting to attend a religious service. (H.H. Coffield Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Harassment, Staff Discipline, Working Conditions

31. PERSONNEL: Hostile Work Environment, Retaliation, Sex Discrimination, Sexual Harassment, Title VII, Assignment, Equal Protection

Meadors v. Ulster County, 984 F.Supp.2d 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). Female county corrections officers brought an action under [section] 1983, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) against a county, a sheriff, a jail superintendent, and a deputy jail superintendent, alleging sex discrimination, hostile work environment, sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the female corrections officers' work environment was hostile and abusive; (2) whether the county had a good faith complaint procedure; and (3) whether the county treated a female corrections officer differently than similarly-situated male officers with regard to discipline, for matters that occurred outside the workplace.

The court held that county officials did not retaliate against a female corrections officer, in violation of Title VII, for filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), even though her supervisor revoked her shift change, another supervisor assigned her to an undesirable unit, and she was not selected for a desirable intake position. The court also found that county jail officials' reassignment of a female corrections officer to a different position after she verbally complained about a co-worker's sexual harassment, even if it was a less desirable position, did not constitute a materially "adverse employment action" required to support her Title VII retaliation claim.

According to the court, county jail officials' rescission of a female corrections officer's request for light duty assignments during her pregnancy, her reassignment to work in male housing units, and her receipt of a written discipline report for noting her reassignment, did not constitute materially "adverse employment actions" required to support her Title VII retaliation claim. (Ulster County Jail, New York)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Discrimination, Racial Discrimination, Due Process

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest, Due Process, Probable Cause

Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013). Latino persons brought a class action against a sheriff and sheriffs office, seeking injunctive relief based on allegations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments violations in the policy of using race as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion and in investigating or detaining Latino occupants of motor vehicles suspected of being in the country without authorization, without any basis for state charges. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that: (1) the policy of the sheriffs office directing deputies to detain vehicle occupants because of the belief that occupants were not legally present in the United States violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) the policy permitting deputies to use race or Hispanic appearance as a factor in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment; (3) the policy permitting deputies to use race as a factor in forming reasonable suspicion that persons violated state laws relating to immigration status was not narrowly tailored; (4) the sheriffs office intentionally discriminated against Latino persons; (5) deputies investigating the identities of, and arresting, vehicle passengers on immigration violations without reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop lengthened the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (6) deputies could not use reasonable suspicion of unauthorized presence in the United States, without more, as probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a state law had been violated. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Contract Services, Discrimination

31. PERSONNEL: Age Discrimination, Racial Discrimination, Termination, Title VII

Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2013). An African- American employee brought an action against his former employer, a contractor for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging wrongful termination and violation of his civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, [section] 1981, and other various statutes. The employer removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss. The federal district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the employee stated a claim against his former employer under [section] 1981, even though the employee's complaint contained no mention of his race or racial discrimination in the termination of his employment contract, where the defendant attached to his amended complaint his charge of discrimination filed with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, and made a presentation to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The employee alleged, "I was terminated for alleged gross misconduct," and "I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black American) and age (54), in violation of Title VII." (District of Columbia Jail, Carter Goble Lee [CGL] Contractors)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Inmate Funds

4. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS: Medical Costs

24. IMMUNITY: Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Sovereign Immunity

29. MEDICAL CARE: Costs, Deliberate Indifference

35. PROPERTY-PRISONER PERSONAL: Inmate Funds

44. STANDARDS: State Statute

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a [section] 1983 action against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health care services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.

The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for administration and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference where the inmate did not allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical care or basic necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it was not unreasonable for the prison to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical care. The court noted that the prison posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and what it covered, and a regulation was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

4. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS: Fees

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Sex Offender

36. RELEASE: Ex Post Facto, Sex Offenders

44. STANDARDS: State Statute

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). Two convicted sex offenders brought an action challenging Wisconsin's statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring, alleging violation of the prohibition against states enacting ex post facto laws. The district court ruled that the act's $100 annual registration fee was unconstitutional, but upheld other provisions of the act. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, modified in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that: (1) the sex offenders had standing to challenge the registration requirement, even though they did not intend to ever return to the state; (2) the sex offenders did not have standing to challenge provisions of a monitoring requirement relating to working with and photographing minors because the offenders no longer resided in the state; (3) the sex offenders did not have standing to challenge Wisconsin's prohibition against a sex offender changing his name, where neither offender had expressed the intent to change his name; (4) the sex offenders had standing to challenge monitoring of the act's requirements of continual updating of information supplied to the sex offender registry; (5) the monitoring act's requirements that sex offenders continually update information supplied to the sex offender registry were not punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post factor laws; (6) the $100 annual registration fee was not punitive; and (7) allowing the sex offenders to litigate pseudonymously was not warranted where the sex offenders' convictions were matters of public record and both sex offenders were currently registered in Wisconsin, making their names and other information freely available. The court noted that the annual fee was intended to compensate the state for the expenses of maintaining the sex offender registry, and since the offenders were responsible for the expense, there was nothing "punitive" about making them pay for it. (Wisconsin)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Policies/Procedures

19. FREE SPEACH, EXPRESSION, ASSOC.: Name

37. RELIGION: Name, Equal Protection, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought an action alleging that a Wisconsin prison policy that required inmates to use their committed names in conjunction with a second name unless a state court approved a change-of-name application, in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the policy did not violate either the speech clause or the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, absent an allegation that any inmate, of any race or religion, was allowed to change his name on his own say-so after being convicted. The court found that the policy did not create a substantial burden on the inmate's religious exercise, as would violate RLUIPA. The court noted that the dual name requirement served the compelling governmental interest of maintaining prison security, and the requirement was the least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. The court commented on the name of the statute: "... which often goes by the unpronounceable initialism RLUIPA but which we call 'the Act' so that the opinion can be understood by normal people." (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

13. EX-OFFENDERS: Claims

18. FOOD: Medical Diet

29. MEDICAL CARE: Medication, Special Diet, Deliberate Indifference

Noble v. Three Forks Regional Jail Authority, 995 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D. Ky. 2014). A diabetic former inmate brought an action against a regional county j ail and a number of its employees, individually and in their official capacities, alleging both constitutional claims under [section] 1983 and state claims stemming from his incarceration. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that the county jail maintained an official policy or custom to deprive inmates of medical care to save money, thus precluding the former inmate's [section] 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against jail arising from his alleged receipt of daily diabetes medication that was contrary to his doctor's advice, and food that exacerbated his diabetic condition.

The court found that the diabetic inmate was not at an excessive risk of serious harm, nor did county jail employees fail to take adequate precautions to protect the inmate from harm, and thus the employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical condition, in violation of Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate received substantial medical attention while incarcerated, and he was allowed special accommodations based on his diabetic condition, including taking his medication and blood sugar test kit to his cell. He was granted a specialized menu from the cafeteria, and his daily medication administration schedule was modified after consultation with a physician. (Three Forks Regional Jail Authority, Kentucky)

27. LIABILITY: Municipal Liability

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Searches, Unlawful Detention

36. RELEASE: Timely Release

41. SEARCHES: Strip Searches

Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, against the District of Columbia and a police officer, alleging unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and deliberate indifference to the arrestee's over-detention and strip search. The detainee also alleged that the District maintained a custom and practice of strip searches in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that the District of Columbia was deliberately indifferent to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations jail officials inflicted upon the detainee when they subjected him to "over-detention" and strip searches, as required to state a claim against District for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations under the theory of municipal liability. (D.C. Jail)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Procedures, Exhaustion

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Medical Treatment, Regulations

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Exhaustion, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Procedures

Palmer v. Flore, 3 F.Supp.3d 632 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants asserted an affirmative defense that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district dismissed the defendants' defense with prejudice, finding that the prisoner's timely submission of a Step-I grievance pursuant to the Michigan Department of Corrections' (MDOC) three-step grievance process was sufficient to comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, even though the prisoner received no response from prison officials. The court noted that the prisoner completed the required form an slid it through the crack in his cell door, which was apparently a common practice that prisoners in administrative segregation used for submitting grievances. (St. Louis Correctional Facility, Michigan)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Budget, Staffing Levels

29. MEDICAL CARE: Dental Care, Costs, Delay in Treatment, Deliberate Indifference, Staff

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison's chief dental officer, its chief medical officer, and its staff dentist, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the chief dental officer and the chief medical officer at the close of inmate's case, and entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of the dentist. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held: (1) it is appropriate to consider the resources available to a prison official who lacks authority over budgeting decisions, overruling Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, and Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978; (2) evidence warranted a jury instruction on the lack of resources available to the staff dentist; (3) evidence did not establish the chief medical officer's awareness of the inmate's dental needs; and (4) evidence did not establish the chief dental officer's awareness of the inmate's dental needs. The court noted that there was evidence that budgetary constraints actually affected the state prisoner's dental treatment: (1) where the staff dentist listed "staffing shortages beyond our control" as an explanation for the waiting list for dental procedures; (2) evidence was presented that the prison had less than half the number of dentists required by law; (3) there were no dental hygienists; and (4) that dentists frequently had to work without dental assistants. The staff dentist testified that staff shortages limited the amount of time he could have spent with the prisoner during any visit and that he focused on a prisoner's most pressing complaint because he did not have enough time. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Suicide Attempt

29. MEDICAL CARE: Mental Health, Pretrial Detainee, Suicide Attempt, Deliberate Indifference

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Suicide, Deliberate Indifference, Pretrial Detention

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Mental Health, Suicide Attempt

Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). By and through his guardian, a pretrial detainee brought a [section] 1983 action against a county and various jail officials, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his risk of suicide in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the detainee's motion for a new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that a nurse and doctor were not deliberately indifferent, that there was no evidence that the sheriff or a captain knew of a substantial risk of harm for the detainee, and that the jail's suicide prevention policies and practices were not so inadequate that they violated the detainee's rights. But the appeals court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy and a sergeant were aware of the detainee's risk of suicide, where the detainee requested to see a crisis intervention person. According to the court, when an inmate presents an officer with a request to see a crisis intervention person and the officer also is aware that the reason for the request well may be a serious psychological condition that is beyond the officer's capacity to assess definitively, the officer has an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to refer that individual to the person who, under existing prison procedures, is charged with making that definitive assessment. (Madison County Jail, Illinois)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Law Library, Legal Mail, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Due Process

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Lighting, Medical Care, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act

11. DISCIPLINE: Evidence, Notice, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Due Process

12. EXERCISE AND RECREATION: Outdoor Recreation

29. MEDICAL CARE: Wheelchair, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act

35. PROPERTY-PRISONER PERSONAL: Legal Materials, Limitations

Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F.Supp.2d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against public officials employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and prison medical providers, alleging, among other things, that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and provided inadequate medical treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motions in part and denied in part, and denied the inmate's motion. The district court held that state prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allegedly serious medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in requiring the inmate to use a wheelchair to access outdoors for "yard time" or to see visitors, rather than transporting the inmate on a gurney. The court noted that the officials relied on the medical providers' judgment that the inmate was able to sit up and get into a wheelchair.

The court found that the allegedly excessive bright lighting at prison facilities which was left on for 24 hours-a-day, was related to a legitimate penological concern of providing security for staff and inmates, and thus the lighting did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

According to the court, the inmate's absence at his misconduct hearings, allegedly due to his injuries, and his subsequent sentence of 540 days of disciplinary custody, did not violate his procedural due process rights, where the inmate received both advanced written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon in reaching their decision.

The court found that the inmate's alleged restricted access to his personal effects and legal mail when he was moved between cells, and his alleged denial of access to a law library, did not result in an actual injury to inmate, thus precluding his [section] 1983 access to courts claim. The court noted that the inmate proceeded with all of his legal claims in addition to his complaint of denial of access to courts. (SCI Graterford, SCI Greene, Pennsylvania)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Initial Appearance, Restraints, Due Process

6. BAIL: Alien, Bond, Delay, Appearance

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Alien, Access to Courts, Due Process

27. LIABILITY: Injunctive Relief

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Alien, Access to Courts, Bail, Restraints

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Restraints

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action against, among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of individuals who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six months and were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own behalf, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motion. The court held that an individual assessment is required before a detainee may be shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the individual assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an assessment by an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in the detainee's case. The court denied the motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety concerns about his immigration proceedings, including the logistical issues of escorting the detainee through multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Massachusetts)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Medical Care

27. LIABILITY: Supervisory Liability, Individual Capacity

29. MEDICAL CARE: Inadequate Care, Failure to Provide Care, Policies, Pretrial Detainee, Deliberate Indifference

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Failure to Provide Care, Due Process

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Medical Care, Supervision, Due Process

Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D. Okla. 2014). Four pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates brought an action against a county sheriff, asserting claims under [section] 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs stated a [section] 1983 claim against the sheriff for supervisory liability in his individual capacity, and a [section] 1983 claim against the sheriff for liability in his individual capacity. The court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects pretrial detainees against the denial of medical attention. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the sheriff was responsible for ensuring that pretrial detainees received appropriate medical care; (2) that he was responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, nd enforcing the policies that his subordinates allegedly violated; (3) that he failed to provide prompt and adequate care in the face of known and substantial risks to each detainee's health-;, and (4) that he had long known of systemic deficiencies in the jail's medical care. The plaintiffs cited numerous incidents and reports, as well as inmate deaths, which they alleged provided clear notice to the sheriff of seriously deficient medical and mental health care which placed inmates at a serious risk of injury or death. One such notice included a report by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties which "found a prevailing attitude among clinic staff [at the Jail] of indifference." (Tulsa County Jail, Oklahoma)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Suicide, Supervision

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Suicide, Screening

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Suicide, Supervision

45. SUPERVISION: Video Surveillance, Prisoner Checks, Deliberate Indifference, Failure to Supervise

Rogge v. City of Richmond, Tex., 995 F.Supp.2d 657 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The parents of an arrestee who committed suicide while in police custody brought a [section] 1983 and state law action in state court against the city and two police officers. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the arresting police officer was unaware of the arrestee's risk of self harm. The arrestee committed suicide in a police station holding cell, and thus, by not checking on the arrestee for several hours, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The court noted that the arrestee was calm and that he cooperated with the officer during their interaction, and although he said he was terminated from his job, admitted drinking, and said he was on medication for anxiety, he did not express an interest in hurting himself or appear distraught. The message that the officer received from the arrestee's father did not raise suspicion of a risk of suicide, and the officer believed that all dangerous personal items had been taken from the arrestee and that the dispatch officer would monitor him via a video feed.

The court found that the police dispatch officer who was monitoring the video feed from the police station holding cell was unaware of the arrestee's risk of self harm, and thus, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The arrestee slept on bench in the cell for most of the two and a half hours he was in the cell before hanging himself, and the officer did not observe on the video monitor any behavior on the arrestee's part that suggested he was a suicide risk. The officer observed that the arrestee did not have items of personal property considered to be suicide implements, and although the arrestee's father came to the station and told the officer that he and his wife were worried, he did not indicate the arrestee might be suicidal. (Richmond City Jail, Texas)

6. BAIL: Alien, Bond

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Alien, Bail, Access to Courts

Rosciszewski v. Adducci, 983 F.Supp.2d 910 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A lawful permanent resident (LPR) petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his continued detention in a county jail without a bond hearing, upon the recent reopening of his deportation case after it lay dormant for 15 years. The district court granted the petition. The district court held that the District Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the district in which the alien was being detained was the proper respondent, not the warden of the jail in which the alien was being held. The court found that the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that required mandatory detention of a criminal alien during the pendency of removal proceedings did not apply to the alien, a citizen of Canada and a lawful permanent resident (LPR), who had been taken into immigration custody 15 years after his deportation case had lay dormant, and, thus, the alien was entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Calhoun County Jail, Michigan)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Length, Liberty Interest, Due Process, Evidence, Review

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Length of Segregation, Due Process

11. DISCIPLINE: Length of Segregation, Due Process

Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against a state prison and its personnel, alleging violation of his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the prisoner's confinement in administrative segregation for 13 years was sufficiently atypical as to give rise to a protected due process liberty interest; (2) a factual issue existed as to whether the prisoner received meaningful periodic reviews and whether state prison officials' decision to continue the prisoner's confinement in administrative segregation for nearly 13 years was supported by "some evidence"; (3) the defendant state prison and prison personnel could not be granted qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage on the prisoner's civil rights claim alleging violation of his due process rights; and (4) the prisoner's First Amendment religious freedom claim was deemed abandoned. The court noted that a reasonable prison official should have known that the prisoner could not be confined in administrative segregation for pretextual reasons. (Marquette Branch Prison, Michigan Department of Corrections.)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Use of Force, Prisoner on Staff Assault

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Use of Force, Restraints

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Pretrial Detainees, Protection, Safety Regulations, Use of Force, Restraints

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force, Stun Gun

Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county, its sheriff, and sheriffs deputies, alleging that the deputies used excessive force against him when they subdued him with a stun gun while he was in custody. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriffs deputies did not act with deliberate indifference towards the detainee's federally protected rights when they subdued the detainee with a stun gun while he was in custody, and therefore the deputies did not use excessive force against the detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court: (1) the deputies tried to handcuff the detainee several times before using the stun gun, showing that they sought to minimize the stun gun's use; (2) the deputies also warned the detainee that the stun gun would hurt and that he did not want to have the gun used on him, which showed that they were trying to avoid unnecessary harm; and (3) the deputies faced an ongoing danger with the detainee thrashing about on the cell floor with a loose handcuff, as the deputies had been trained never to lose control of an inmate with a loose handcuff because it could be used as a weapon.

The court held that the incident, in which the detainee lunged towards a sheriffs deputy with his hands raised after a hospital examination, was a rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament which precluded the luxury of a calm and reflective pre-response deliberation, and therefore the detainee was required to show that the deputy's actions involved force employed maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, in order to establish the use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee lunged toward the deputy after asking the deputy "Do you want a piece of me?" and the deputy explained that he had "no way of retreating" because of the cramped quarters and the detainee's position over him while standing on the hospital bed. (Franklin County Corrections Center II, Ohio)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Law Library, Equal Protection, Law Library

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Retaliation

37. RELIGION: Opportunity to Practice, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

Simmons v. Adamy, 987 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) officials and a corrections officer, alleging, among other things, that the defendants subjected him to unlawful retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and inmate cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motion. The court held that the alleged actions of prison officials in restricting the law library access of the Muslim inmate after he filed grievances, scheduling his library "call-outs" to conflict with religious celebrations and classes, and filing a false misbehavior report, were not adverse actions that could support the inmate's [section] 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that: (1) the inmate was treated differently from other inmates who had not pursued grievances; (2) he was afforded less than reasonable, or less than typical, access to the law library; (3) his free exercise rights were affected in more than a de minimis fashion; or (4) he was unfairly disciplined as a result of the report.

The court found that the inmate was not denied reasonable access to a prison law library, thus precluding his denial of access to courts claim under [section] 1983, where during the year-and-a-half that the inmate was incarcerated at the prison, he was scheduled for more than 100 law library "call-outs" and was granted "special access" to the library on eight different occasions. The court noted that the inmate received more frequent access to the law library during his incarceration than any other inmate, visiting the law library as many as 63 times in seven months.

According to the court, the prison's scheduling of the Muslim inmate's law library call-outs to conflict with Muslim classes, services, and observances, did not place a substantial burden on the inmate's ability to practice his religion, and thus did not amount to denial of the inmate's religious freedom under the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the overlap occurred less than 20% of the time. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Cell Assignment, Trusty, Work

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Retaliation, Right of Access

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Removal from Program, Work/Study

50. WORK-PRISONER: Removal from Job

Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against county detention center employees, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fast as to: (1) the inmate's First Amendment retaliation claim against a supervisor; (2) First Amendment retaliation claims arising from the inmate's transfer to another housing module; and (3) claims arising from the alleged obstruction of the inmate's access to a grievance process.

The court found a dispute of material fact as to whether a program supervisor was motivated by the lawsuit the inmate had previously filed against her, when she removed the inmate from a trustee program almost immediately after he reminded her about his having filed the suit, resulting in his loss of access to income, work opportunities, and housing advantages as well as other privileges.

A fact issue was found as to whether the 53-year old inmate would have been transferred from a housing module for older inmates to a module that housed younger and more violent offenders, but for his use of the grievance process. The inmate had been approved for the detention center's Inmate Worker Program (IWP), also known as the "trustee program." Inmates in the trustee program received job assignments within the detention center and were paid for each shift, with an opportunity to earn more for additional work. They also received a number of privileges and incentives. They were housed in a trustee module and were eligible for late nights, weekend contact visitation rewards, and access to popcorn, soda, and a movie player. One of inmate's work assignments was in the kitchen, where inmates received extra food and may have one meal per work day in the break room area. (Jackson County Detention Center, Missouri)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Sex Offenders, Due Process, Equal Protection, Programs

19. FREE SPEACH, EXPRESSION, ASSOC.: Mail, Publications, Sex Offenders

27. LIABILITY: Individual Capacity, Official Capacity

28. MAIL: Confiscation, Limitation, Regulations

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Sex Offender, Due Process, Equal Protection, Rehabilitation

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process rights by failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal protection rights by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison employees. The prisoner appealed.

The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state prison's rule providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) was neutral, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers and religious materials, since the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison did not have any ulterior motive in promulgating the rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in sex-offender rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, since the rule placed restrictions on reading material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing distractions. The court noted that the magazines that the prisoner requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in the professional judgments by prison officials tasked with overseeing program. According to the court, confiscation of the magazines of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to the rule, did not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the prisoner could, and did, use the prison's grievance system to claim that he had been wrongly denied those magazines, and prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and giving written justification that explained why he was not entitled to relief. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Goree Unit)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Contract Services, Harassment, Working Conditions

31. PERSONNEL: Contractors, Discrimination, Equal Protection, Hostile Work Environment, Retaliation, Sex Discrimination, Supervision, Title VII

Stoner v. Arkansas Dep. of Correction, 983 F.Supp.2d 1074 (E.D. Ark. 2013). A nurse employed by a company which contracted with the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) to provide on-site medical services to ADC inmates brought an action against ADC, a warden, and the company under Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act for gender discrimination and retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the ADC was the prison nurse's employer for purposes of the nurse's Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against ADC and a warden. According to the court, although the nurse was hired by a company which contracted with ADC to provide on-site medical services to inmates, ADC trained company employees on sexual harassment policies and reporting requirements, the warden held company employees accountable to the same standards as ADC employees, and the warden had the ability to ban the nurse from the prison complex, effectively terminating her employment.

The court held that the warden employed by ADC was subject to personal liability with respect to the female former prison nurse's claims for gender discrimination under [section] 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), where the nurse's right to be free from gender discrimination was secured by the Equal Protection Clause, and her right to be free from retaliation based on protected speech was secured by the First Amendment, and the warden, as a prison authority, was acting under the color of state law.

According to the court, the alleged harassment of the nurse by the prison warden was not part of the same employment practice as a correctional officer's prior alleged harassment of the nurse, and thus the warden's alleged harassment did not constitute a continuing violation for the purposes of the nurse's Title VII hostile work environment claim. The court noted that the alleged conduct was committed by different actors, and the harassment seemed to have been motivated by different animus, specifically, the officer's harassment was based on sex, while the warden's harassment was based on retaliation.

The court held that ADC took prompt and effective remedial action after learning of the male correctional officer's alleged sexual harassment of the female nurse, and thus ADC could not be held liable under Title VII for the alleged hostile work environment created by the officer's conduct, nor could the company be held liable as a third-party for such alleged conduct. (Correctional Medical Services, and Arkansas Department of Correction, McPherson Unit)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Contract Services, Failure to Provide Care, Deliberate Indifference

Stones v. McDonald, 7 F.Supp.3d 422 (D.Del. 2014). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison warden, the Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction (DOC), the state's contractor for prison medical services, and a physician employed by the contractor, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, relating to damage to the nerves in his left ankle and foot after the prisoner slipped off a curb and rolled his ankle. The prisoner filed motions to compel discovery, for appointment of counsel, and for appointment of a medical expert witness, and the state officials filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The district court held that: (1) the physician's alleged negligence in not sending the prisoner for physical therapy did not provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the prisoner's disagreement with a non-party physician's recommendation against surgery did not provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim; (3) the prisoner did not show a policy of the contractor that violated the prisoner's constitutional rights; and (4) the prisoner did not show state officials' personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

6. BAIL: Alien, Bond

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Alien, Bail

Straker v. Jones, 986 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An alien, who had been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under a statute that called for mandatory detention by DHS of any alien who had been convicted of certain crimes "when the alien is released," petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ordering the administrator of a correctional facility to provide the alien with a bond hearing. The district court granted the petition. The court noted that the detained alien was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, by making an argument before an Immigration Judge that he had not been "released," within the meaning of the statute, before making such argument before the district court on a petition for habeas corpus, since making such an argument before an Immigration Judge would have been futile, as the Immigration Judge would have been bound to follow a contrary precedent from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Searches

26. JUVENILES: Search 41. SEARCHES: Juvenile, Strip Searches

T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). Parents, on behalf of their minor children, brought a [section] 1983 action against the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, correctional officers, and other administrators, claiming that the suspicionless strip search of the juveniles, as part of the intake process of the detention center, violated the juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the parents. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the right of juvenile detainees held on minor offenses to be free from suspicionless strip searches was not clearly established at time the two juveniles arrested for underage drinking were strip searched, and thus, correctional officers who conducted searches were protected by qualified immunity from liability in the [section] 1983 action arising from the searches. The court noted that prior court decisions had recognized that a strip search of a person arrested for a minor offense was unreasonable, given that subsequent court decisions had found that state's enhanced responsibility for juveniles supported strip searches, and a recent Supreme Court decision had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit strip search of all adult criminal detainees. The court found that under Kentucky law, the correctional officers' strip searches of the two juveniles, as part of the intake process of a juvenile detention center, were ministerial acts, and thus, the officers were not eligible for qualified official immunity from liability on the juveniles' claims of negligence, invasion of privacy, assault, false imprisonment, grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress, and arbitrary action in violation of state constitution, even if officers were both acting in good faith and within scope of their employment. (Breathitt Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Kentucky)

29. MEDICAL CARE: ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Deliberate Indifference

33. PRIVACY: Drug Testing

38. RULES & REGULATIONS-PRISONER: Drug Testing

Terbush v. Massachusetts ex rel. Hampden County Sheriffs Office, 987 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.Mass. 2013). An inmate brought a state court action against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a medical doctor, a registered nurse, and a physician assistant, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate alleged that his inability to provide a urine sample while participating in a day reporting program, was due to an alleged "Shy Bladder Syndrome" condition as well as subsequent medical issues following his return to a correctional facility. The day reporting program provided home-based incarceration for selected inmates with the goal of transitioning them back to the community. Inmates were still "incarcerated" but were allowed to live at home under strict reporting conditions, including drug testing. When the inmate could not produce a urine sample upon his admission to the program, he was returned to jail. The defendants removed the action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.

The court found that the inmate's alleged "Shy Bladder Syndrome" condition was not a "disability" under the ADA, and even if the condition was a disability, the inmate did not meet the essential eligibility requirements for participation in the program and, therefore, was not a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. The court noted that inmate had often refused to cooperate with medical advice, he received extensive medical care on practically a daily basis, sometimes multiple times a day, the inmate failed to inform anyone at the facility of his urinary retention until two or three days after returning to the facility, the inmate was sent to a hospital when he complained about his urinary retention, and while the inmate did not see an outside urologist until approximately one month later, at that point his medical issues were resolved. (Hampden County Sheriffs Department Day Reporting Program, Hampden County Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

8. CLASSIFICATION & SEPARATION: Failure to Protect, Cell Assignment, Gangs, Separation

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Classification, Clothing, Emotional Distress, Separation

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault, Protection from Harm

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Classification, Gangs, Protection

Thornton v. Jackson, 998 F.Supp.2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2014). An inmate and his wife brought a [section] 1983 action against various prison employees and officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, as well as negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate, who was housed at the prison as a visiting-inmate while testifying against another member of the inmate's gang, was not incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm, as required to establish the objective requirement for his [section] 1983 claim against various prison officials and employees. The inmate alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment after he was assaulted by three other inmates. The inmate claimed that his different color jumpsuit identified him as snitch and as a target for violence. The court noted that the prison's inmates did not have a history of attacking visiting inmates, the prison had an order requiring the inmate be kept separate from one other inmate, but did not require protective custody or isolation, the inmate did not have problems with anybody for seven days, and the inmate saw some other inmates talking and reported that he suspected that they were talking about him, but he did not hear what they were saying. (Fulton County Jail, Atlanta)

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

37. RELIGION: Services, Volunteers, Free Exercise, Opportunity to Worship

Turner v. Hamblin, 995 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D. Wis. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought an action against various prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause by failing to provide services to Muslim prisoners when an outside volunteer was not available to lead the service. The prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner's claim, where the law was not clearly established that the Free Exercise Clause required prison officials to hold religious services for prisoners if no qualified non-prisoners were available to lead the service. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Transportation, Wheelchair, ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Deliberate Indifference, RA- Rehabilitation Act

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Wheelchair, Transportation

Turner v. Mull, 997 F.Supp.2d 985 (E.D.Mo. 2014). An inmate, who suffered from a demyelinating neurological disorder of unknown etiology, brought an action against a correctional officer, a warden, a transportation officer, and a health services administrator, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the prison's policy that inmates were not permitted to be transported in a handicapped-accessible van unless they appeared at the pickup area in a wheelchair did not violate the inmate's rights; (2) the warden failing to take action in response to letters by the inmate was not deliberate indifference; (3) a correctional officer and a transportation officer who did not transport the inmate in a handicapped-accessible van were not deliberately indifferent; (4) a supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (5) the alleged exposure to urine and vomit during a van ride did not violate the Eighth Amendment; (6) the prison did not discriminate against inmate based on his disability by not transporting the inmate in a handicapped-accessible vehicle; and (7) the administrator did not discriminate against the inmate. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Sex Offender, Civil Commitment

36. RELEASE: Civil Commitment, Sex Offenders

U.S. v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151 T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). The government filed a certification attesting that an inmate was a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, and seeking the inmate's civil commitment. The district court committed the inmate to civil custody. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the government failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the sex offender, who suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance abuse, would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. The court noted that the offender did not test positive for any substances or engage in any sexual misconduct or hostility toward women during his extended incarceration, the offender had no disciplinary infractions, the offender completed his GED as well as other professional programs, and readily sought out the prison's mental health resources, and the offender expressed remorse for his past acts. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI-Butner, North Carolina)

36. RELEASE: Sex Offender, Supervised Release

43. SENTENCE: Sex Offenders, Supervised Release

U.S. v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013). The United States District Court for the District of Montana revoked an offender's supervised release, imposed for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and sentenced the offender to two terms of 14 months' imprisonment to run concurrently, and to a lifetime term of supervised release. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that reduction of a renewed lifetime term of supervised release by the length of time spent in prison for the violation was not warranted. (Montana)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Employee Union, Policies/Procedures

31. PERSONNEL: Union, Working Conditions

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Contraband, Safety, Security Practices

U.S. Dept, of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Fla. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority 737 F.3d 779 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) petitioned for review, and the BOP and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) cross-applied for enforcement of FLRA's order stating that the BOP was required to bargain with a labor union over proposals relating to the BOP's use of metal detectors at a high security prison. The BOP moved to dismiss on the grounds of mootness. The appeals court denied the motion, granted a motion to vacate in part, and granted a motion to enforce, and remanded. The court held that the decision to use the federal prison's compound metal detectors to screen only those inmates suspected of carrying contraband did not render moot the FLRA decision stating that the BOP was required to bargain with the employee union over proposals relating to safety issues arising out of the prison's use of metal detectors, absent a showing that there was no reasonable expectation that the union's safety concerns would not recur. The court found that the FLRA's determination that the BOP was required, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), to bargain with the labor union over a proposal that prison management have inmates turn in all watches that did not clear the compound metal detector, treat such watches as contraband, and assure that watches sold in the prison store would not set off the metal detectors, in order to avoid bottlenecks of inmates at the entrance to the compound/detector area, was eminently reasonable and supported by the record. According to the court, the proposal was sufficiently tailored to target employees likely to be harmed by the installation of outdoor metal detectors, was intended to reduce nuisance alarms triggered by prohibited watches, thereby moving inmates through the compound-detector bottlenecks more quickly, and would not excessively interfere with the BOP's management rights. The court found that the FLRA determination that the labor union's proposal requiring construction of a block and mortar officer's station near one of the prison's two metal detectors was non-negotiable as a whole under FSLMRA. (Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Staff Discipline

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

31. PERSONNEL: Discipline, Free Speech, Retaliation, Suspension, Work Rules

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2013). An employee at a correctional center brought a [section] 1983 action against various officials alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment arising from the issuance of a written reprimand and suspension following his comments to a state attorney regarding the criminal prosecution of a co-worker. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employee failed to show that a reasonable official would have known that to restrict or punish his speech regarding a co-worker's punishment was unconstitutional at the time of his discipline, as required for the employee to defeat a supervisors' claims of qualified immunity from the employee's [section] 1983 claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment speech rights. According to the court, the Illinois Department of Corrections' interests in suppressing the speech of a supervisor at a correctional facility regarding a co-worker's discipline outweighed the supervisor's interests in making the speech, and, thus, the supervisor's First Amendment speech rights were not violated when he was disciplined for such speech. The court noted that supervisors were tasked with enforcing rules and regulations, and when the supervisor criticized a disciplinary decision it undermined respect for the chain-of- command, and there was value in maintaining order and respect in the paramilitary context of a correctional center. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

37. RELIGION: Costs, Free Exercise, Opportunity to Worship, RLUIPA-Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Religious Services, Security Practices

Walker v. Artus, 998 F.Supp.2d 18 N.D.N.Y. 2014). A Muslim inmate housed in a state prison special housing unit (SHU) brought a [section] 1983 action alleging that state prison officials deprived him of his rights in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that denial of the inmate's requests to participate in congregate religious services by audio or video feed was reasonably related to legitimate security and cost concerns, and the inmate had adequate means to exercise his burdened right, including weekly visits from an Imam, and thus denial of the inmate's requests did not violate the inmate's free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The court also found that the officials' denial furthered compelling government interests of promoting prison security and managing costs, and the burden placed on the inmate was the least restrictive means necessary to serve those interests, and thus denial of inmate's requests did not violate RLUIPA. (Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

18. FOOD: Religious Diet

35. PROPERTY-PRISONER PERSONAL: Loss of Property

37. RELIGION: Articles, Free Exercise, Diet, Opportunity to Practice, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014). A Muslim state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and [section] 1983 alleging that prison officials interfered with his Ramadan observance. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that state prison officials' decision to abandon the policy of requiring inmates to provide some physical indicia of the Islamic faith, such as a Quran, Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained from the prison Chaplain's office, in order to receive accommodations for a Ramadan observance did not moot the inmate's challenge to the policy as violative of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA, where the officials retained the authority and the capacity to reinstate the policy.

The court found that the policy violated the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause, where the inmate provided a reasonable explanation for the fact that he lacked physical manifestations of his faith, officials ignored numerous signs that he was a practicing Muslim, and there was no evidence that the requested accommodation would have been unduly burdensome. The inmate provided a state court judgment against the Commonwealth as proof that the VDOC had lost his possessions, and also produced documents showing that he was receiving common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed officers that he had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009. Despite this, an official responded, "that don't mean anything." The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the inmate's action under RLUIPA and [section] 1983. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Access to Counsel, Appointed Attorney, Indigent Inmates, Initial Appearance, Right to Counsel

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Access to Court

42. SERVICES-PRISONER: Indigent Inmates

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). Indigent criminal defendants brought a class action in state court against two cities, alleging the public defense system provided by the cities violated their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the deprivation was caused by deliberate choices of the city officials who were in charge of the public defense system. The court noted that the cities were appointing counsel in a timely manner, but the public defenders were assigned so many cases that the defendants often went to trial or accepted plea bargains without meeting with counsel. The court required the cities to re- evaluate their public defender contracts and to hire a public defense supervisor to ensure indigent criminal defendants received their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (City of Mount Vernon and City of Burlington, Washington)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Attorney Fee, PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act

5. ATTORNEY FEES: Determination, Limitation, PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Officer on Prisoner Assault

27. LIABILITY: PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act, Damages

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action alleging an officer maliciously and sadistically assaulted him with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that the officer "lifted and then slammed him to the concrete floor where, once pinned, punched, kicked, kneed, and choked" him until the officer was removed by another member of the corrections staff. After a jury returned a verdict for the prisoner, the district court granted the prisoner's motion for attorneys' fees, but only in the amount of $1.40. SANITATION: The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), capping attorneys' fee award at 150% of the value of the prisoner's monetary judgment, satisfied a rational basis review. The court held that the PLRA provision did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component by treating the prisoner and non-prisoner litigants differently, where the provision rationally forestalled collateral fee litigation while ensuring that the incentive provided by an attorneys' fee award still attached to the most injurious civil rights violations. (Lanesboro Correctional Institute, North Carolina Department of Public Safety)

18. FOOD: Commissary, Equal Protection, Religious Diet

37. RELIGION: Diet, Equal Protection, Free Exercise, Opportunity to Practice, RLUIPA-Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act

42. SERVICES-PRISONER: Commissary

Winder v. Maynard, 2 F.Supp.3d 709 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison official, asserting that the official hindered his religious practice. The official filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that denial of the inmate's request for pork products for a Wiccan ceremonial meal did not substantially impede the inmate's ability to practice his religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the inmate's request for a religious ceremonial meal had been approved and he was directed that while the requested pork products could not be provided through the dietary department or prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchen facilities, pork products could nevertheless be purchased through the commissary and consumed at the ceremonial meal. According to the court, the prison's accommodation of other religious prisoners through the adoption of a religious diet while allegedly refusing to provide pork products for Wiccan practitioners did not violate the equal protection rights of the inmate because: (1) the kosher Jewish diet demanded certain food preparation and food choices not required for Wiccan inmates; (2) neither Jewish nor Muslim inmates received ritually slaughtered meat; (3) no pork was prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchens in order to respect the religious dietary requirements of Jewish and Muslim inmates; (4) the prison was unable to provide pork through dietary services due to legitimate penological goals regarding budget and security; (5) the prisoner was free to purchase pork products through the commissary; and (6) prison meal plans were created in order to see that the needs of all religious groups are accommodated. (Jessup Correctional Institution, Maryland)

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Temperature, Medical Care, Pretrial Detainees

15. FACILITIES: Temperature

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care, Pretrial Detainee

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Conditions, Medical Care

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Va., 2 F.Supp.3d 804 (E.D. Va. 2014). A detainee in a city jail filed a [section] 1983 action against the city, the sheriff, and deputies, claiming constitutional and state law violations arising from the detainee's heat stroke allegedly caused by deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. The detainee was housed on the top floor of the jail during a time when outside temperatures exceeded 100 degrees, and when interior temperatures were even higher. The inmate suffered a heat stroke and was found unresponsive in his cell, and he had a body temperature of 106.1 degrees. The sheriff cross-claimed against the city for indemnification or contribution. The city moved to dismiss the cross-claim. The court dismissed the cross-claim, finding that the sheriff lacked the right to contribution and the right to indemnification for [section] 1983 claims or state law claims. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

37. RELIGION: Sweat Lodge, RLUIPA-Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act, Sincerity

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Religious Services, Security Practices, Segregation, Staffing

Yellowbear Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against individual prison officials, seeking prospective injunctive relief against them for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a factual issue as to whether preventing the state prisoner from exercising his sincerely held religious belief--using a sweat lodge--served a compelling governmental interest, and that it was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The appeals court began its opinion by stating: "Andrew Yellowbear will probably spend the rest of his life in prison. Time he must serve for murdering his daughter. With that much lying behind and still before him, Mr. Yellowbear has found sustenance in his faith. No one doubts the sincerity of his religious beliefs or that they are the reason he seeks access to his prison's sweat lodge--a house of prayer and meditation the prison has supplied for those who share his Native American religious tradition. Yet the prison refuses to open the doors of that sweat lodge to Mr. Yellowbear alone, and so we have this litigation." The prison's sweat lodge is located in the general prison yard and Yellowbear was housed in a special protective unit because of threats against him, not because of any disciplinary infraction he had committed. Prison officials asserted that the cost of providing the necessary security to take the prisoner from the special protective unit to the sweat lodge and back was "unduly burdensome." (Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Attendance, Court

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Verser v. Barfield, 741 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a pro se [section] 1983 action against prison security officers who allegedly held him down and punched him in the stomach during a cell change, alleging that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. Following a jury trial in the district court, a verdict was returned in favor of the officers. The inmate appealed denial of his motion for a new trial. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the total exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom at the time the verdict was read prevented the inmate from exercising his right to poll the jury. According to the court, the error arising from the district court's total exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom was not harmless, and thus a new trial was warranted. The court noted that a jury poll definitely or even likely would have revealed that the verdict in favor of the officers was not unanimous. (Western Illinois Correctional Center)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Initial Appearance

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Initial Appearance, Length, False Arrest

Ysasi v. Brown, 3 F.Supp.3d 1088 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought a [section] 1983 action against county sheriff officers and a detention center, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and other claims under the Constitution. The officers and the detention center moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee presented no evidence that the four-day incarceration prior to his arraignment prejudiced his defense, either in his criminal trial or in the current civil case, by concealing evidence against the arresting county sheriff officers. The court noted that the arrestee was arraigned within the time required by New Mexico rule. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)
COPYRIGHT 2015 CRS, Inc.
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2015 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Publication:Detention and Corrections Caselaw Quarterly
Article Type:Case overview
Date:Apr 1, 2015
Words:25172
Previous Article:Part one: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.
Next Article:Table of cases.
Topics:

Terms of use | Copyright © 2017 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters