Printer Friendly

Part II: examples and extracts from the mass of captured documents (Letters, Orders and Memoranda a copy of a Letter from dighenis - Appendix I).


Makariotate *

REVERSES cannot be excluded from any struggle. We can even say that a struggle is always made up of successes and reverses and whoever has finally more successes, he is the one to win.

In our struggle, which is an unequal one, we have always expected reverses. Yet, we have faith in the final result.

The caique's misfortune has not affected our courage, but on the contrary, it has hardened our hearts so that with greater will-power, self-sacrifice and stubbornness, we will proceed forward to liberate Cyprus and take our revenge.

I am not only speaking for myself but also on behalf of those whom I had the honour to command and amongst whom I now happen to be.

With all those whom I was able to communicate I have met the strong decision to proceed forward.

I give you my word of honour that I will not rest as long as I breathe, but on the contrary, I will never stop striking the occupier. I promise you that in spite of the poor means at my disposal I will cause him great difficulties, and that I will not lay down my arms unless you yourself ask me to do so because it will mean that our object has been fulfilled.

This, my promise, please consider it as coming from an honest soldier.

The loss of the caique's load has compelled me to change our original plans. These plans now consist of combined guerilla and sabotage action. This guerilla action by upsetting the armed forces and all movements of the British will play the greater part of the combined action, owing to the fact that our material possibilities from such activities are greater than those which are in our possession for sabotage action.

My actual efforts tend to find here the necessary material for sabotage operations and if I am successful in finding such material I intend to use it for carrying out the struggle inflexibly.

You must have complete trust in me and I hope you will grant me complete freedom to carry on the resumption of our struggle. I will await your instructions to start the struggle. Anyway, my opinion is that we should not postpone operations beyond the 20th February.

For this purpose I beg of you to put at my disposal all necessary financial means, because Andreas, who was dealing with all financial matters, is now away. My needs are as follows: --

(1) To pay out daily 15 persons and three or four families.

(2) The purchase of 100 okes of petrol and 200 empty bottles, 100 okes of dynamite and a certain quantity of fuse. (If such materials may be obtained, as I hope.) The above materials will be used for sabotage operations.

(3) For the movement of couriers, etc., and the transportation of arms and ammunition.

Please reply to me on the above matters through the same channel.

(Signed) Dighenis.


This organizing will be done in secrecy within the framework of EOKA.

(l) AIMS

The initiation of persons in order that they should be able to offer the following assistance:

(a) by taking part in mass demonstrations in villages, mass protests, etc.

(b) concealing and giving asylum to members of the Organization.

(c) participating in acts of violence and, if necessary, with arms.

(d) obtaining and passing information as regards the object and nature of any movement of troops and police.

(e) observing Government agents.

They are not to be used for any political or party purposes.


The organization will be temporary and is to be modified in due course.

In every province there is to be a section of the Organization with District HQ in the capital of the province. At the head of this section there will be a District Leader, who is to be assisted by a staff which, for the present, he himself will be able to pick at his discretion.

District Leaders will have the power of appointing Local Leaders who will be responsible to the District Leader for the organizing, etc. in each town, locality or village.

District Leaders will be responsible exclusively to the Leader of EOKA from whom alone they will receive their orders.


The initiation of persons must be done in absolute secrecy in order that the existence of this Organization should not be revealed to the authorities or to unauthorized persons.

The persons will be bound by oath to obey all orders issued by the Organization and to keep absolute secrecy.

The members must be made to realize that any disobedience will be severely punishable. At every locality (town, village), a nucleus of one or two persons will be formed to start with, and according to local requirements. This is to be done in absolute secrecy and these nuclei are then to undertake expansion by initiating further members of their communities and in accordance with local requirements and conditions.

But the object is not NUMBERS but QUALITY.

The initiation of new members will be limited to nationalists who have proved themselves reliable or whose trustworthiness and courage can be relied upon.

The persons who are taken into the Organizations in each locality must be divided into categories A, B, C, D, E, according to the work it is intended to use them for (see under sub-heading "Aims").

Steps must be taken to prevent indiscretions even between members, so as to preclude the possibility of leakages which can give our members away, as well as information about our purposes. For this reason and in so far as this may be practicable, one member should not know any other member in the same locality or elsewhere, particularly as regards members who have been given responsible tasks such as the concealment of wanted men. In this case it is particularly important that both the members themselves and their work should be unknown to the other members.

As for the members directly concerned, they are to be very careful in their conversations with other people and in their various other activities, so as not to give grounds for the slightest suspicion which could result in attracting the attention of the authorities.

(4) In order to make good and rapid communications possible and in order to ensure that members can be contacted at short notice, it is essential that quick and safe couriers should be established. This will be the responsibility of the District Leaders.

The setting up of the Organization will be initiated at once. The Leader of EOKA is to receive every Sunday evening from his District Leaders their reports on what was accomplished in their respective districts in the course of the preceding week, and also any recommendations that they may have to put up.

The Leader, Dighenis.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO "THE LEADER". The sender's name is not given and there is no date on the letter, but a note by Grivas on it says that it was received on 3rd April, 1955, and there is a reference to it in his diary entry for that day. He there says it was received from Genikos--the Archbishop.


I share your views concerning the broadcasts of the "Voice of the Fatherland". I have also listened to two such broadcasts; they have not only not pleased me but moreover they grieved me very much. For the purpose of facing the situation I am sending one of my men to Athens tomorrow with instructions to those in charge of the Broadcasting Station.

You will certainly carry on the struggle with courage and confidence without being affected--although it is natural for you to be sorry--by acts of meanness which are completely temporary and will be surmounted soon.

I am sending you my warmest wishes and sincere congratulations. One thousand bravos to you! The rulers have realized that we have entered upon a serious stage of struggle.
 Extract from the report on the political situation in Paphos by
 Agapenor. There is no date on the report and the addressee is not

The question of the Bishop [i.e. of Paphos] remains as it was. Unfortunately we have no concrete evidence. The only evidence we have had is from his deacon, who has stated that the Bishop is a traitor, and that if the Archbishop asked to see him he will report everything to him. The same statement has been made by the Archimandrite. He is, however, closely followed by fanatic members of the Organization and as soon as we have concrete evidence we shall submit a report.

See also memorandum--pages 73-4.


The Archbishop agreed that pupils should organize strikes and demonstrations and take part in national activity, but he insisted that this should be done only after consulting the Leaders of the Church, and every action by the pupils should be organized beforehand with tact and care so that it might have a good repercussion not only in Cyprus but in the foreign countries as well.


Melas has reported to me through Dafnis the following: Material Bought

19 mines of which 16 are black. The black mines may be no good and he should not have accepted them. We accept white mines only.
 1 pistol.
 160 sticks of dynamite.
 50 pipes.
He received from Nicosia
 450 detonators.
 70 feet fuse.
 32 sticks of dynamite.
From Kouklia
 2 black mines.
 20 sticks of dynamite.
 3 amatol--.
 5 hand-grenades.
 2 pistols.
 30 feet fuse.


For Hermes.

Work to be carried out. Attention to the following:

(1) Reorganization for the explosive squads. Recruitment of new ones. Take care about the newly recruited ones.

(2) Organization of the administration of squads in each city or area. Appointment of replacements. Care is needed so that if by chance leaders are arrested there remains an administration which can carry on action and keep touch with the leader of the organization.

(3) Check if my orders have been understood about the coming attack on targets.

(4) Concentration of study on the attack on targets.

(5) On the basis of tried study, provision of the necessary material in accordance with my orders.

(6) The workshop of trainers to take on the training of new members, etc. It should be in a position to go into the districts for this purpose.

(7) The safest way of transporting material from the districts should be studied.

(8) Finding and purchasing new material for sabotage (pistols, dynamite, etc.).

(9) Workshop for the preparation of hand bombs.

(Signed) The Leader, Dighenis.


My Leader,

First of all--although formally this is somewhat late, in the divine service in which I officiated I offered a special prayer for your health--I wish you many happy returns on your name day and full success in your plans for a happy end of our struggle. Let us pray to God to help us celebrate free Cyprus next year....

7. Newspapers. I admit that their attitude is deplorable. However, steps are being taken and we hope that something will be done....

9. "A" has written that no activity should take place now. He stresses that very high national interests are risked. We must wait for new instructions from him....

Yours, X


To Leader,

Receipt of order of 3rd May, 1955, is acknowledged, as well as General Instructions for guerilla warfare.

My movements are very restricted and have to be made with great prudence. The information given is a figment of the imagination.

At all events, the fact that I have not been transferred hinders the carrying out of the missions which have been assigned.

From the training point of view, the men are in good shape. Organization. Informers and food suppliers have been established in various villages. We are encountering difficulties on the southern side of the mountain range, because there are many Turkish villages there.

If there is a group at Trikomo, I beg that it should be entrusted with the organization of food suppliers and informers in the villages of Mandres, Flamoudi, Ardana, Ayios Nikolaos, Ayios Elias. If there is no group, then Melas from Famagusta must be appointed to organize the district, because he originates from that part and he knows persons and objects. The police stations as far as Trikomo are as follows:
 1. Myrtou 7 policemen
 2. Lapithos 6 policemen
 3. Kyrenia 30 policemen
 4. Ay. Epiktitos 4 policemen
 5. Ay. Amvrosios 3 policemen
 6. Boghaz 2 policemen
 7. Lefkoniko 8 policemen
 8. Trikomo 7 policemen

I was not able to approach the company at Boghaz. In my opinion, however, it is only by a night operation that we can ascertain the position of sentries.

If it is possible, the sentries should be captured and this should be followed by an attack with automatic weapons and hand-grenades. If our aim is seen we will attack them with hand-grenades, rifles and machineguns, their electric light having been cut off beforehand in order to create confusion.

This is a very rough plan until I receive details of the camp. (Signed) Zidros.


The attitude taken by ALL the national Press causes me astonishment. In spite of my warning to you and my written warning to the Press, its attitude continues to be not only luke-warm but even suspicious about our struggle. Another example of this is its attitude towards the illiberal law about curfew which is aimed against our organization in particular. While the national Press publishes simply a summary as newspaper information the Communistic paper "Demokrates" inveighs against the Government in a leading article against this law. So the Communists gain ground. So it can be explained why Communism has become gigantic in Cyprus....
 (Signed), Dighenis.
 This subject is referred to in Grivas' diary for 8th May--Grivas was
 clearly becoming very worried about the Communists.



In consultation with Agras undertake quickest the organization of the region: Trikomo-Mandres-Flamoudi-Davas-Ardana-Ay. Nikolaos-Ay. Elias from the following viewpoints:

(1) The finding of houses which will receive persecuted members.

(2) The finding of persons as food suppliers and informants for our men in hiding.

(3) Organization of the Youth into EOKA.

(4) Organization of population into EOKA.

The above work would be possibly executed better and speedier if it could be achieved to create a group in Trikomo to undertake this work.

Report result of your efforts. The Leader, (Signed) Dighenis.


I wish to acquaint you on the situation as it is presented today, as well as with the repercussion of the events, which started on April 1st, on the decisions and actions of the Government of Cyprus and the Turks of Cyprus.

I thought it necessary to bring this to your knowledge so that you, as the real Leader of the National Liberation Struggle, may make decisions, after having known the events and not under the influence of men of politics or of the party. I do this because it has come to my knowledge, or rather I have been informed from Greece by a person with whom I have no connection at all, that there have been various behind-the-scenes activities in Athens in connection with the continued militant struggle, and that my removal from here was demanded ...

The experience of the national struggles, which I have been conducting for 15 years, has made me capable of seeing clearly the things connected with them and of looking at their results with rationalism not only on the military field but also on the repercussions which they have on the political and diplomatic fields.

I shall not try to speak to you on the past and on the mistakes made simply because of the intervention of certain persons, but I shall confine myself to speaking to you on the present, how the situation is developing today and what are my plans for the future. You will then be the competent person to decide.

The Government Measures.

In addition to the repressive military and police measures which are taken by the Government, and which it is doubtful could be effective in case of a general rising, preventive measures are also taken, the object of which is to paralyze our activity in advance so that it may not be allowed to be expressed or be mild enough if it is. These measures are as serious as the repressive ones, if not more serious, and we must think seriously how to face and neutralize them. These measures are the following:

(a) Assassinations of leaders of the movement and especially of Yourself. In a letter which was sent to the Turkish leaders in Cyprus, and which I rather think has been sent by the Government, the following is written:

"Instead of shouting, you had better murder the Archbishop because then the Greeks will be occupied with the election of a new Archbishop and refrain from the Enosis movement ..."

What should be the Future Plan of Action?

Our plan must include a total and co-ordinated use of all of our means, i.e. sabotage in the towns and the countryside. Cutting off of communications and attacks on rural police stations, and if possible on army camps. Simultaneous rising and disturbances by the pupils and the people in the country. The struggle must be organized in such a way so that it may last at least until next October, when the Cyprus question will be discussed in the UNO.

This plan will be executed in stages. On the one hand we shall disperse, fatigue and irritate the enemy and on the other hand we shall see how we can reach the final stage of the plan without running the risk of seeing our struggle suppressed prematurely and before October.

So: At the beginning we shall organize acts of sabotage in the towns and in important communication centres, with simultaneous attacks on police stations, especially on mountainous areas, in order to compel the enemy to disperse its forces.

If this effort is crowned with success, then we shall go on with activity by small groups of armed men in mountainous areas which will make sudden attacks and then hide themselves. The targets will be police stations and Army camps.

Finally, if the above are crowned with success, we shall organize a general rising of the youth in the towns and the country with 51 militant demonstrations. The organized population will also participate. These militant demonstrations are being organized by us.

These are my views on general lines on the present situation in Cyprus and on our potentialities.

Of course, the above general plan, and the means which will be used for its successful execution, require more detailed study and, after they are connected with diplomatic demands, we could make the necessary modifications. The thing, however, which does not accept any modification is the need for continuation of the militant struggle which has started, because its abandonment will mean the interment of the Enosis question.


Your comrades are working well. I have granted leave to Makriyannis who has left for Athens to bring his family. Eight men have come already and they are all used.

THE FOLLOWING LETTER REFERS TO THE OPERATIONS MENTIONED IN THE DIARY ENTRIES FOR 21ST AND 22ND JUNE. Grivas noted in the margin next to the last two paragraphs--Report to Gen has been made.

21st June, 1955

To Leader,

With the first explosion which will be heard, British soldiers will immediately descend into the town from Wolseley Barracks.

Although the postponement of the move of the Governor to Troodos has not been officially denied, it is certain that he will not leave Nicosia and has also cancelled a visit to the house of Dr. Marangas.

The police have been ordered to keep the lights out in their station and to watch every movement outside.

A British Major has said to an employee of his office that within twenty days the Archbishop will be killed definitely by the Turks.


To: Person unnamed.

From : "D".

It is necessary that you should take precautionary measures for your personal safety.

The English, faced by an "impasse", are planning your murder, using the Turks as their instruments.

An English Major told a clerk in his office that within a few days you will be murdered by Turks.

I believe that the first measures that you must take are the following:

(1) When you are going anywhere, do not tell anyone beforehand, not even in your own circle, right up to the last moment.

(2) A second car must follow your own.

(3) When you are going to conduct Divine Service take special care when going in and coming out of Church. I think that in the entrance to the Church there should be people who should keep an eye on suspicious persons.

(4) Be careful when at the Archbishopric that people don't enter and place dynamite [at night] **** beneath your bedroom. D.
 This letter is referred to in the diary for 24th June as addressed
 to the Gen (the Archbishop) and in a marginal note in the letter
 reproduced on page 67.


The results of our continued struggle, when we think of what we intended to do, are very poor. As I have repeatedly stressed, both orally and in writing, our main target is: the execution of police traitors who will be followed by English military men. Second target: the blowing up of Government buildings.

Till now no traitor has been executed and no attempt has been made against any of them.

The groups continued throwing hand-grenades without results against various targets. They are thrown without study and without system. This tends to destroy the first good impression which the people formed after our first attack in April. These men, who sympathize with our struggle, are asking themselves if we are in a position to do something serious.

After this, I declare that the targets of all groups will be police traitors and judges who have imposed heavy sentences on our fighters.

It is only after the execution of these traitors that the groups will turn against English Army men.

The groups must have in mind that the traitors must fall, even if all of us are in danger of being killed.

I shall not order "cease fire" unless the heads of traitors, which each group should execute, fall.
 (Signed) The Leader,


D. informed me last night that Kyriakos Aristotelous (Kyriakos) has returned from England on Friday night for the purpose of dissolving EOKA. D. thinks that he must be killed as soon as possible.

I enclose a note with information given to me by D. Arrangements must be made for a group of persons to guard D. at night. What do you think about this?
 (Signed) X.

Assistant Superintendent Kyriakos Aristotelous was killed on 15th April, 1956. See diary and note for 16th June, 1955.


I cannot offer any congratulations for the recent period of fighting activity, because I have not seen the self-sacrifice and audacity among everyone which characterized the fighting activity of the 1st April.

The results were superficially impressive and not what I had expected. Of all groups Famagusta showed the most zealous effort, in spite of the fact that all its groups were newly formed. Nicosia, although composed of old groups that had been active on the 1st April, did not come up to my expectations, and the heads of groups did not control the activities of their members, so that they acted as they wished.

Larnaca was simply a spectator, although she had been supplied with material. There was faintheartedness there. Limassol, as had happened during the general attacks of the 1st April, only produced the most mediocre results.

Paphos, active for the first time, produced something. However, the leaders were carried away by their enthusiasm and did not act within the framework of the orders that had been given, with the result that material was lost. The Organization will impose punishment for this.

Kyrenia accomplished practically nothing, in spite of so much preparatory work. There was faintheartedness there too, for which punishment will be imposed.

Generally, however, everybody omitted to carry out the most important mission which had been entrusted to them: the execution of traitors. So that not only was not a single one executed, but there was not a single attempt against anyone. I cannot attribute this to anything else but faintheartedness.

I wonder therefore, if, with such a situation and with the behaviour shown by the commands and groups, it is possible for me to make progress.

If everyone made the genuine effort that was shown by all on the 1st April, it would be possible for me to forge ahead, in which case we would have the initiative in the situation.

Unfortunately I am now obliged to clear up the situation within the Organization, and get rid of the fainthearted so that I may go ahead with the courageous members. This kind of struggle requires men who do not fear death and who do not love life....

The groups must be re-organized and their number must be reported to me, as well as the strength of each....

Details of the re-organization of the groups must be reported to me by the 18th July.
 The Leader,


I order the following:

(1) Full black-out of the movements and activities of the groups of attack so that nothing may be discovered by the police.

(2) The groups must stop activity and re-organize themselves in accordance with an order by me communicated to you on 26th inst.

(3) The groups of executioners must continue to be active so that they may execute police traitors and judges when they are given the opportunity.

(4) The purchase and storing and proper preparation of material for hand-grenades.

(5) The groups must always be ready so that, when the resumption of activity is ordered, they may be able to act.
 (Signed) The Leader,

This order is referred to in the diary for 26th June, 1955.



I bring to your knowledge that to the detriment of all, the relations between Averof and Taki have become worse. They now quarrel in public. I was present during the scene when one of them, while they were quarrelling, said "If we go on like this they will catch us all". There were a few people about who were strangers.... This, I must report with regret, happens also with others. It seems to me that only with understanding each other and collaborating can we go forward. Officers, title-holders, rankholders and subordinates don't fit here. When a few think that they are made to order about others and others are there to worship them we won't get anywhere. I'm writing this because some people's brains have got too much air. They seem to have forgotten that we are a secret conspiratorial organization and not the regular Army where the simple soldier has to shine the sergeant's boots and anything he might be ordered to do. If you think that I am wrong please tell me because there are many who think like me and the situation of some others is discussed in disparaging terms.



My revered uncle,

Firstly I would like to inform you that nothing happened with Agros. We never went, nor did we get near. What happened (a lie) was the fear of the policemen who saw a shadow and fired. The shadow was the shadow of an acacia tree and in order not to lose face they said that it was masked men. Maybe they did the whole thing on purpose so that the troops would come to protect them. This happened because now there are two large vehicles. One is with eight soldiers and barbed wire at one end of the village and the other one on the other end. Tonight we heard that they have left. We are thinking of attacking on Friday. I can't tell you about plans because conditions might change before then. In any case it will be difficult at night. Probably between seven and eight in the evening. We might hit them in the road. But as they are afraid they always take a child or two with them on their motorbikes. I don't know what will happen. If I can get one of the vehicles on its own I think that I will attack. An order of yours from today says that no arms should be used, what do you mean? The affair at Amiandos is quiet. Only one man did not go to work and he is hiding. Yesterday, on Monday we nearly killed ourselves waiting for the vehicles with the dynamite, but it didn't come because they had told him not to go. We will see on Monday. But this scheme has tired me out. I will write later in this connection. An old problem is the food on the mountain. Please send 25 0s [pounds sterling]. 0d. so that they can be prepared quickly. Half at Trooditissa and half on top of Karvouna. The places are nearly finished. I have no more money left. Please send 30 0s [pounds sterling]. 0d. for our expenses. Also the first aid kit ought to be ready. I think we ought to give something to the family of the man who has become a partisan. They have just told me that at Amiandos opposite the police station they will make an Army camp very quickly. They took the site today....

How will I notify about all this in time? The best of all would be that you should come and give us your orders from near, otherwise we will be losing golden opportunities.


PS Yesterday I went to Kakopetria with Mr. Papas LOK. The Kakopetria group has been disbanded. To my requests that they should help me with the dynamite, they replied that as long as Polos is there they would not do anything. They are all angry. Please intervene because otherwise we will lose the best group, or send my comrade or if you think it right, I will go down there. It is enough that I see them once. When they believe that I am their group leader they will start again in the struggle. Nobody wants to see him.
 Romanos is the Bishop of Kyrenia's younger brother, Renos
 Kyriakides. This letter was addressed to Grivas who is sometimes
 referred to as "Uncle" by the terrorists.


As regards our sacred struggle, my humble opinion is that the following tactics should be followed for the purpose of achieving satisfactory results: (a) Primarily, the internal front should be purged. The traitors and those reacting should be identified and denounced in statements addressed to the people of Cyprus; and the more dangerous of them should be eliminated. The result will be hat the patriots will be able to act with greater freedom, and lesser dangers and the traitors and those inclined to become traitors will be terrorized and thus stop their sinister activities and their close cooperation with the oppressor. Any such person as, notwithstanding this, may wish to continue his disgusting co-operation and treason should be remorselessly punished and his punishment should become an example. (b) The success of our fight is fully and quickly secured if we pay particular attention to the question of the Mukhtars. This class of Government employees, such as they are at present, constitute the backbone of the Government machine. Their collective resignation would naturally lead to complete disintegration of the Cyprus Government machine. This would be feasible if those known for their treacherous co-operation with the Government and their servile attitude were first dealt with and then the Greek Mukhtars should all submit their resignations. At the same time the Greek population should be warned to reject any offer of appointment in the place of those dismissed. Anyone disobeying and not prepared to comply with this should be punished in an exemplary manner ...

Now we must touch on another chapter and this is the present situation in Paphos which is suffering "physically" more than any other district. Paphos has been unfortunate, in these critical times, to be deprived of leadership and their religious leader (The Bishop) and the political leader (the Mayor) inspire no confidence and have not the slightest national activity to show; on the contrary they have been reactionary and treacherous to our cause. First, the Bishop who, unfortunately, by his position happens to be the national leader of the district, is the subject of talk and discussion amongst the people of Paphos for his contemptible acts. No person in Paphos has ever had any lower reputation than his, and his moral, religious and national misconduct is widely commented upon....

In any case it is a common conviction in Paphos that the Bishop here is closely co-operating with the Government and passes on all the information that comes to his knowledge. Therefore, we are obliged to recommend that no secret should be confided to him either by the Ethnarchy or by the Greek Consulate.
 This memorandum, which was found with the diary, is unsigned
 and undated. See also letter reproduced on page 60 about the
 Bishop of Paphos.


To the Leader,

General Keightley leaves Kyrenia every morning around 7 a.m. and returns to Kyrenia a little before 1.30 p.m. His motor car bears the number 60NB63. It is a black limousine, a Humber. See reference in diary to C. in C. Middle East Land Forces, dated 26th June, 1955.



I see with sorrow that you are dismissing me from the organization after the last misunderstanding. I am sorry. I also sincerely seek your pardon, because I know that I am in the wrong. I ask you to forgive me, and take me back into the fold of the organization, and I promise you that there is no question of the same things happening in future.

With respect, Kris.


Kakopetria, 28th June, 1955

Revered Father,

I am writing to you from Kakopetria where we have come since 12 days approximately....

The day before yesterday we went to Kalokhorio to see the weapons of the Group there, but for reasons of safety they were not brought out as some police movements had been observed. My wife undertook to carry here from Romanos one pistol, a hand-grenade and three detonators for Sunday's operation.

I beg of you to pass on to the Leader the conclusion I have arrived at about the Kakopetria group which has been doomed to inactivity and degeneration because of Polos. Nobody wants him and they are quite right because all he wants is to show off, like a pirate. It appears that he has been influenced by the magazine he reads....

We must all be proud of Romanos' group. They are all fine chaps and determined. In the persons of Romanos and Skoufas the boys have found two fit and capable leaders. God helps us, Father Stavros, but let Him help more those who feel more strongly the anxiety and agony of engaging in such an attack....

I thank you, Father Stavros, for everything and my wife and I are always at your disposal.

Yours respectfully, I.K.

28th June, 1955



The second period of our operations has been brought to a conclusion. The material results were lower than I expected. Each local leader is to summon his Group Leaders, and they must make a self-criticism together, to discover the mistakes that have been made, and to take measures to ensure that they are not repeated. What I distinguished in some groups was a lack of militance and impetus, due to which the results were not satisfactory.

If from a material point of view the results were not satisfactory, from the point of view, however, of the consequences on the international horizon, and especially on English public opinion, they were highly satisfactory.

Our activity showed the world that there exists in Cyprus a focal point of agitation and excitement against the English administration, with self-determination as its creed. A focal point which cannot be wiped out, which the Government of Cyprus is not in a position to wipe out, in spite of the measures it is taking. This attestation on the part of international personalities is an honour for us, and it contributed to the fact that warm advocacy of the principle of self-determination was heard. As a result, English diplomacy began to discuss the Cyprus question, and the English Government is thinking of changing its rigid policy, the policy of "Never". I do not know what may emerge during the interval before the expiration of the time limit of the submission of the new Greek appeal to the United Nations Organization if, that is, English intransigence is going to yield and be willing to discuss the Cyprus question, or if it will keep its former rigidity. It is our duty to be ready to face the worst, and to take up our activity again, which will finally tend to influence not only the English but diplomatic circles of UNO, when the Greek appeal is submitted or discussed.

Below I give general instructions, where exactly our next activity will extend, so that each man may be prepared. And I shall have the opportunity of stating my thoughts orally to local leaders.

The object of our next operations will be to terrorize the police and to paralyze the administration both inside cities and in the country. If this abject is attained, the results will be as follows:

Disillusion of the police with the prevailing state of affairs, so that, most probably, if they do not help us openly, they will tolerate our actions, or they will not be in a position to prove them.

Active participation of the Army in security, a thing which will deploy it, and tire it out excessively. Such a thing will react on the morale of the Army, which will influence its leaders as well.

More generally, in the face of our insistence and persistence, and the abnormal state of affairs, it is almost certain that UNO, and even the interested members of NATO, will seek an understanding.

The sought-for results will be attained:

(1) By murderous activities against members of the police, who do not sympathize with us, or who hunt us down.

(2) By ambushes against police patrols in the cities and attacks on police stations in the countryside.

(3) By obstructions of the movements of police forces in the countryside, by placing ambushes (whether it is a question of single persons or groups of policemen).

Written and verbal instructions of mine will determine the method and means by which the above will be pursued. However, what I have to emphasize particularly is this: that nothing serious can be attained if all are not inspired by a feeling of self-sacrifice and love of dangers which emanate from great works.

Consequently, before any other work, the meaning of our struggle and what we expect from it must be stressed to the men. I think we are approaching the end. Boldness and impetuosity will give us the best results.
 The Leader,
 (Signed) Dighenis.
 This is the plan referred to in the diary entry for 28th June, 1955.


I swear in the holy, honest and liberation struggle which is carried out for the freedom of the Island of Cyprus, under the following conditions:--

(a) I will obey the orders of my superiors in whatsoever difficult, hard and risky job I am to undertake.

(b) I am ready to sacrifice my life for the sake of the freedom of my country.

(c) Serving in the organization I have to obey all orders and set aside any obstacles.

(d) I will not divulge the secrets of the organization and the "code names" of the other combatants.

The people who do not obey the aforesaid rules will be executed, and also those who divulge the secrets of the organization or who fail to obey the orders. Any member who feels that he is afraid or a coward should not take the oath.

Each member who has taken such oath has to sign with the new name of the organization EOKA.
 Signature of Member,

This is a translation of a captured Oath form signed with the initiate's code name.

EOKA 15th Feb., 1956


Our aims during the present period are as follows:

(1) Re-organization and preparation of our militant groups (training, EOK, OKT ******), for co-ordinated action, following my orders.

(2) Re-organization and preparation of the Youth for militant demonstrations, following my orders. A Girls Student Branch to be organized, likewise the children of the Elementary Schools who will also take part in demonstrations in accordance with my orders.

(3) Liquidation of traitors.

(4) Attacks on isolated servicemen.

(5) Stimulate the hoisting of flags on all the elementary schools.
 The Leader,

28th Feb., 1956


You must attack Kinousa. In order to avoid casualties and bad results for you a recce should be made one night before. We must ascertain the following:--

(1) Number of sentries and their positions.

(2) Lighting, what exists?

(3) and habits of the English sentries.

We must also find out beforehand the positions you will take up and the weapons you will use, and they are to have such field of fire so that even if the commandos return the fire, it will be impossible for them to hit you. If you think you can find suitable positions do so today, as Lennox-Boyd is here and it will be a greeting for him. On the other hand, if you wish to go tonight and attack tomorrow, so much the better....

30th March, 1956

From Dighenis to Kimon.

I approve the placing of time bombs at the Airport, yet you do not indicate what length of time you want. I ordered that you should be given a time bomb of one hour which I calculate will explode after two hours because of the reduction in temperature. Take great care in preparing the filling so as not to be unsuccessful.
 Several acts of sabotage have occurred at Nicosia airport since the
 date of this letter, including one incident in which an aeroplane
 exploded a few minutes before about 60 people, including women
 and children, were due to board it.


My esteemed Chief,

I kiss your hand.

It is with a great degree of emotion that I write to you, to inform you that they have found all the hide-outs. They had a traitor whom they took up in a helicopter and he pointed out all of the hide-outs. All communications by road have been totally cut off for the last five days. No one is allowed to enter or leave Kambos. There are approximately 2,000 soldiers. They set off from the school and proceed as far as Ambelikou.

They arrested Botsaris ******* and one other at Kambos. There are soldiers at Aghia; at Milikouri they have encamped in the gardens. From Yerakes they have descended--from Lefka ascended and have surrounded all the hills, thus cutting off all supplies and captured them ([dagger]). They came to arrest me personally 4 times but never found me. Is it possible they will come to where you are? There are more troops at Panayia than ever before.

I am unable to forward the mail as I have no means of communication whatsoever. The searches which are taking place are fantastic. No motorcar can come to Kykko or depart from there without undergoing the most minute search. We are in a very dangerous position to forward the mail and I beseech you to make arrangements for me to forward to a place which is closer to you.

I believe they will set up camp at the school. They are with us every minute. The searches which have taken place have been very thorough. At the spot where we had our gun position until recently there are now about 200 soldiers.

When I feel there is no longer any danger I will ascend to the road accompanied by two of my assistants and if they allow me I will raise my arms and then lower them--you will know that all danger has passed. I hope to be able to do so after the elapse of a few days.

They have arrested both our chauffeurs, also our cook and two monks. We are in very grave danger. Be careful of all roads--they control them all--do not make use of any roads. They are watching all roads and heights.

Do not inquire again about anyone here--he will be in danger of immediate arrest. At this very moment there are soldiers outside--only the Virgin Mary will save us.

This is what I write to you and wish you good-bye. We call on the Virgin Mary for help.
 (Signed) Asklypios.
 This and subsequent correspondence reflect the heavy pressure
 being exerted on the terrorists at this time--see diary for May and
 June, 1956.


It is necessary for a liaison to be established very soon in order that we may discuss some burning questions. Damon is, in my opinion, the most suitable person for the purpose. He is a person of sterling character and wholly trustworthy. I hope you will agree with me about this person, the more so because it is dangerous for us to entrust this very pressing matter once more to a woman. I should like to be informed of your views on the political solution of our Cyprus Question. We have indications that the English would be ready to accept the Makarios proposal. On the strength and persistence of the Organization depends the resumption of negotiations with the British Government in this direction. I await your news on this point. Personally I think we should not reject the offer to which the English may be gladly ready to go forward on the basis of the Makarios proposals. This opinion of mine is based on the serious dangers which may well arise (1) from a general spreading of the divisions between Greeks and Turks, and (2) from the traitorous stand taken by the left wing. In any case I shall be glad to be informed of your views very early.

It is understood that after the preparation of such a constitution on the basis of the Makarios proposal, Makarios would be released to come to London for final consultations.

I consider we should stop the boycott against Coca Cola.

The Press publishes information that three Turks from Turkey, one general and two officers, have recently come to Cyprus and are carrying out a tour round the Island in civil dress, as commercial travellers.

I await your early views on the question of the person whom I suggest we should use as liaison over the political question.
 The terrorists are still exercised about the Communists and now
 about the Turkish attitude--communal rioting is taking place.

1st June, 1956

From Dighenis,

As regards the political matters my opinions are as follows: I agree that the discussions should be resumed on the basis of the Makarios proposals. The question is, however, where the discussions will finally end. I do not think that there should be any concession on our part on the essence of these proposals; on the contrary we should insist on their complete acceptance.

The Organization will do its duty as it has done up to now. As long as I live there is no question of our yielding, but we shall continue the struggle until we fall or are victorious. I do not know how much longer it will be possible to win the battle because of the following uncertain factors:

Whether Harding will receive or not yet other reinforcements? I think that the strength of his army now greatly exceeds 20,000, and that he has received a little while ago other reinforcements.

What is the reaction of the Turkish minority?

If I am going to get reinforcements from inside and how many? Until this moment I am working practically with what I brought from Greece and they are very little to support me.

In conclusion, taking into consideration the great numerical strength of our enemy, we shall not be able to impose a solution by force. Accordingly we are obliged to exploit politically the excellent results of our dynamic activity up to now. And our efforts should be directed to that end.


Yours of the 1st June, 1956, received. I have received no previous order of yours appointing me to command ZIGHI in the Limassol area.

I beg you to brief me further on this matter.

I will send you a report as soon as I have taken over the automatics from Nikiforos.

I have been very worried about you during the recent searches. Unfortunately--I personally have not been able to do anything, because as yet, I am not capable of long marches. I made an attempt to leave with the group, but terrible pains forced me to give up.

One of the groups failed to blow up the road: Limassol-Nicosia by means of electrical detonation, because detonation failed to go off. The other has been sitting in ambush for over a week continuously towards Amiandos, but have had no target.

I have given orders for them to attack the guard at Mitsero with Brens and rifles--whereas the light automatics will reinforce groups OKT which will be laying ambushes.

The above actions have been ordered as a result of your verbal orders to step up activity as soon as Harding arrives in London; Cicero passed these orders on to me prior to his arrest.

Do you agree to the kidnapping of British padres? If so please give your orders--please note that they are armed and take part in searches and road blocks.

I am of the opinion--Chief--that you should take shelter somewhere and not expose yourself to so many dangers. The loss of five or ten of us would not be a serious loss to our struggle but your loss--God forbid--would mean deterioration of the struggle immediately with the result that we would break up in a very short time and then everything would be lost.

(Signed) Aris.

6th June, 1956


We sent them three shotguns and a supply of ammunition. Only the priest knew where they were.

Mitas and Pippilitus who followed the boys and who have never co-operated, took all their equipment and when we demanded it back they said they would not take orders from anyone but would work alone. Mitas has the shotgun which he obtained at Amiandos Station. I have taken the decision that if they do not co-operate I will execute them.

Aris. (Mars).


Received yours of 1st June. Happy that communications have been restored. Have sent a report to the centre but don't know whether this has been forwarded to you or destroyed. We will stubbornly continue the fight against all the reactions of our opponents. In our area the ambushes will be less frequent because in all the roads garden walls, fences and trees have been cut down and cleared 10 metres deep from the side of the road, so that the organization of ambushes becomes problematical. In other places they are using sudden small road blocks and auxiliary police in closed cars, usually vans. That is why we concentrate on striking on roads where the traffic is light, and on sabotage. I have also asked Koraes to send us time bombs.



The Island of Cyprus, which has been under British control since 1878, occupies a key strategic position in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean. Geographically, it is an extension of the Anatolian mainland, lying only 50 miles south of Turkey; 60 miles to the east is Syria, 240 miles to the south are Egypt and the Suez Canal, while Athens is 500 miles to the west.

For 2,500 years Cyprus has been a crossroads between east and west, ruled in turn by Phoenicians and Egyptians, Persians and Arabs, Romans, Lusignans, Genoese and Venetians. Alexander the Great conquered it and so did Richard Coeur de Lion. In 1571 the island fell to the Turks who held it for more than 300 years until, in 1878, they surrendered control to Britain under a convention by which--
 if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to
 take possession of further (Turkish) territories in
 Asia ... England undertakes to join the Sultan in defending
 them ... In order to make necessary provision for executing her
 engagement, the Sultan consents to assign the island of Cyprus
 to be occupied and administered by England.

In 1914, when Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, Britain annexed the island. This annexation was recognized by Turkey and Greece under the Treaty of Lausanne and, in 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony.

Since the British occupation of Cyprus, progress has been most marked in the economic and social fields: a measure of this is the steady increase in population from 186,000 to over 500,000. About 80 per cent of the people are Greek-speaking (although the island has never at any time belonged to Greece) and about 18 per cent are Turkish-speaking.
COPYRIGHT 2007 Eastern Mediterranean University Press
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2007, Gale Group. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Publication:Journal of Cyprus Studies
Date:Jan 1, 2007
Previous Article:Part I: extracts from the captured Grivas diaries.
Next Article:Part II: examples and extracts from the mass of captured documents (Appendix II - Appendix V).

Related Articles
Undermining progress in early 20th century North Carolina: general attitudes towards delinquent African American girls.
GIFA 2007, Part two: showcasing metalcasting's cutting edge: as the final installment of a two-part series, this article looks at melting, cleaning,...
Casting conversion of railroad part puts inventory on fast track.
Into the deep.
Terrorism in Cyprus--the Grivas diaries.
Part II: examples and extracts from the mass of captured documents (Appendix II - Appendix V).

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2021 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters