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Part I: extracts from the captured Grivas diaries.

The diary opens as the terrorist leader was preparing to leave Greece for Cyprus in the Autumn of 1954

26TH OCT., 1954: 16.00 hours. Departure for Rhodes by "Eyeon".

27TH OCT., 1954: We arrived in Rhodes at 15.00 hours in the heavy rain....

28TH OCT., 1954: Awful weather. Departure postponed. I had my first meetings with Haris, studying the possibilities of organizing in Rhodes a centre which would work in our favour....

IST NOV., 1954: No news about the caique. Agony....

6TH NOV., 1954: The whole morning it has been pouring "cats and dogs". In the afternoon the caique entered the harbour and was refuelled.
 The departure has been fixed for tomorrow evening.
 We have agreed with Makris for the organization of a Centre in


Rhodes, and we made the necessary arrangements for the expedition of a second load (arms)....

8TH NOV., 1954: Departure from Rhodes (Callithea Bay) at 00.15 with rather good weather.

9TH NOV., 1954: Stormy weather. We were all sick....

At 22.00 hours we arrived at the pre-arranged place of disembarkation, where we met those who were waiting for us and who have taken us to Khlorakas Village and we were taken into the house of Azinas Nikolaou....

12TH NOV., 1954: ... first, training and organization of a group. During this period we should not appear to anybody who could discover our mission and this until the arrival from Greece of the expected load of arms.

Second, preliminary during which we should contact the

Ethnarchy and organize our activities. Thirdly, the arms....

13TH NOV., 1954: In the evening the training of five men of the Khlorakas group was started with automatics and sabotage. Duration from 19.00 to 23.00 hours....

19TH NOV., 1954: We were busy organizing the Nicosia Groups. PEON * three groups of six men each. Papastavros ([dagger]) also sent three men for training. Difficulties in finding houses....

22ND NOV., 1954: Azinas has been detailed to see Papastavros and the PEON group and to inform them that members willing to participate in fighting operations will receive the necessary orders from military leaders only, and they will have nothing to do with their organization. The PEON have agreed. Papastavros could not be found.

Makarios has sent notice through Kranidiotis ([double dagger]) that we should not yet proceed to any act of violence and he is sending instructions by courier....

From Athens, Gazouleas has informed Azinas that the load of arms has departed from Greece on the 20th inst. Notis has arrived in Nicosia from Karavas....

26TH NOV., 1954: While discussing Sokratis Loizides with Azinas the latter told me the following:

"I had warned you not to bring him with you because I knew what was going to happen. I repeated the same thing to the Archbishop. He has political ambition. Even the day before yesterday he told me he is sorry he did not bring his wife with him to Cyprus."

.... Apparently he thought we were going to a wedding....

30TH NOV., 1954:.... We wrote by code to Efstathopoulos in Athens to let us know what is happening to the caique used for the transportation of the load of arms....

14TH DEC., 1954:.... Kranidiotis, meeting Azinas, informed him that no instructions from Makarios had been received regarding the beginning of our activities, and this contrary to his promise.... See entry for 22nd November.

16TH DEC., 1954: The first news from UNO is unfavourable for Greece. America's position is against us and after this we should expect nothing from UNO. What is going to happen now? Our wise diplomats who were boasting that a solution would be found through UNO, what do they intend to do now?....

As I repeatedly stated I always had the conviction that there was nothing to expect from the UNO from the moment Churchill visited America. He had arranged everything with Eisenhower. It was obvious, and our diplomatic representative should have realized it, and from the time America was not favourable to us ... our struggle was lost....

23RD DEC., 1954: ... With Azinas I tackled the question of the Archbishop's arrival in Athens, and I pointed out that he should be put in the picture of the situation here. He asked me to make a note of whatever I want to be known to the Archbishop, so that tomorrow he could send this by diplomatic courier to Athens in an envelope which would be handed over to the Archbishop. I wrote the following note:

"That between the 10th and 20th January, we will be ready to act with hopes of success so long as the expected arms from Athens reach us ..."

26TH DEC. 1954: ... Yankou came back from his village. He reported to me that he met the Bishop of Kyrenia, who knows that both I and Sokratis are here ...

29TH DEC. 1954: ... What was the reason for announcing through the Press that Savvas Loizides and Papagos had a meeting on the 27th inst., that is to say two days before Makarios' arrival in Athens? Have they got in mind to use pressure on the Archbishop to compel him to be more moderate? ...

31ST DEC., 1954: ... Tonight the last sabotage group will go out for reconnoitring its targets, that is the CBS ** at Athalassa and the nearby two military wireless stations....

3RD JAN., 1955: He then gave me a bulletin of information from the local authorities from which it is quite clear that they are aware of my arrival.

Here follows in the original the text of a notice relating to the illegal entry into Cyprus of Col. Grivas (p. 89).

5TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came back from Athens today. At 15.30 hours he visited me at home. He reported the following: The following have been secured through Xintaras: 600 kilos Dynamite, 2200 Detonators, 2200 metres fuse.

The following through Gazouleas:

Pistols (18), rounds (700), automatics (2), automatic rounds (1 box), hand grenades (12).

Papagos is in favour of action and has asked why we have not yet started. The Archbishop also.

The Archbishop offered money for a caique and for purchasing of more arms and ammunition as long as these could be found....

6TH JAN., 1955: ... It looks as if my harsh language has impressed all present, and has brought results because they have realized that we have undertaken a struggle with a final decision to succeed and that I have no intention to play, so that I will execute all those who will not conform themselves to my instructions.
 This is the first indication of internal friction, but, as the later
 entries will show, Grivas goes through a period when he begins
 to despair of his fellow conspirators, who continually let him
 down. It is only as the terror campaign gets into its stride that
 Grivas appears to have imposed something like military
 discipline upon the organization.
 Archbishop Makarios and Grivas now start their intensive
 preparations for the opening of the campaign of violence.


10TH JAN., 1955: We are expecting the arrival of the Archbishop from Athens. He arrived at 16.30 hours; he was mat at the aerodrome with great enthusiasm and by big crowds.... Azinas put himself in touch with the Archbishop and he left afterwards for Zodhia. He returned at about 20.30 hours and he told me that the Archbishop had arranged a meeting for tomorrow.

11TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came to my house at 10.00 hours and told me that the Archbishop wants to see me. Azinas took me in his car and we drove to Larnaca to the Bishopric where we were to meet the Archbishop. I saw the Bishop of Kitium with whom I talked until the arrival of the Archbishop. He congratulated me for my courage in coming to Cyprus. He told me that Sokratis must return to Greece. I told him about targets which I have earmarked for attack, etc. He appeared to be aware not only of all my movements but also of our present position and future plans, and he told me that he had discussed these yesterday with the Archbishop. When the Archbishop arrived he told me that on his voyage to America he had met Kyrou in Paris and that they had agreed fully on the action to take. Later, however, the position had changed--they were hoping to get America's support, which would have meant a majority at UNO. Kyrou had then sent a telegram to the Consul here (I wrote about this in my diary on 29th November) without the Archbishop's knowledge. After America turned against us immediate action was necessary, but it was too late by then since they did not have the means of communicating with us quickly.

I told the Archbishop all about the work we had done and are doing; I also talked to him about the excellent morale of our men. The Archbishop told me that Papagos wants action; the Archbishop added that he (the Archbishop) had decided on the 25th March as the date on which operations were to begin. Azinas had objections as regards this date because he considered it to be too late. I too told the Archbishop that this date (25th March) ought not to be definitely decided upon, since the postponing of action until that date would have the following disadvantages:

(1) The security risk of us not being able to keep our movements and activities secret until that date, the element of surprise representing 90 per cent of our chances of success. To date the British have taken no precautionary measures against action on our part, since all Government offices are completely unguarded and unprotected and even military establishments are badly guarded and we are easily able to approach these during the night.

(2) We should take advantage of winter weather conditions (rain, snow, etc.) which work on our side--we should also take advantage of the fact that the nights are much longer and can cover all our movements and activities.

I asked the Archbishop about Papagos and the Archbishop told me that Papagos is now in full agreement with our activities. Until recently Papagos had stood out against us because he had heard that in our movement Greek officers were involved and he feared that these officers might well organize themselves against him! What a terrible thing it is when politicians and, worse still, men in charge of Governments react in this manner to matters of national importance and make use of them for their own party interests! Instead of Papagos sponsoring us--behind the scenes at any event--he has been restraining us until today, and anything we have done we have done in spite of him since all has been accomplished by me and my collaborators (the assembling of arms, dispatches, hideouts, my departure, etc.).

When Papagos was put before the accomplished fact of all that had been done, and when he was faced with the impasse of the UNO decision, he was forced to change his mind. But what help has he given us? None!

The Archbishop also told me that he had arranged that our liaison with Papagos in Athens should be Savvas Loizides.

My interview with the Archbishop ended because we were told that a police car with wireless was stationed outside the Bishopric. The Archbishop left with the Bishop of Kitium. After half an hour I left with Azinas for Nicosia. On the way I expressed some of my fears to Azinas which my interview with the Archbishop had given rise to.

I told Azinas that it was probable that Papagos would want to make use of our movement and of our struggle to further his political ends. For this reason he would be sending us, as group leaders, officers who were in his trust.

These officers might be expected even to take on the leadership of our movement.

I told Azinas that Loizides was not the right man to be the intermediary between Papagos and ourselves, since Loizides intends to take up politics and in the next election to become a member of the Rally Party. For this reason Loizides will follow Papagos blindly and might even become an obstacle to our activities.

I then asked Azinas to mention this point to the Archbishop, and to point out to him that we will not tolerate an exploitation of our cause. Azinas agreed to do this and to look into the whole matter fully.

In connection with material from Athens, Azinas told me that the Archbishop had paid 65.000.000 on the fifth instant to Efstathopoulos and Gazouleas. Of this 65.000.000, 25.000.000 were paid to Gazouleas for the new material and the remaining 40.000.000 were paid to Efstathopoulos in respect of his instalment to the cargo ship. Another 40.000.000 to Valvis will be paid to the cargo ship as a final payment after the delivery of the material to us.

13TH JAN., 1955: I told Yiankos today to arrange at the earliest for the setting up of proper communications and liaison with all the groups of our organization. I have already asked Azinas to mention to the Archbishop that it is necessary that our organization should have a name, and I suggested EOKA.

14TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came to see me today at my house. He told me that he had seen the Archbishop. He added that he would talk to me later because at the moment Notis was present at my house. At about 14.00 hours Azinas called on me again and showed me a telegram from Gazouleas, by which he was informed that the caique with the material left on the 13th inst. Following this information we both left at 16.00 hours for Khlorakas as follows:

(1) to keep watch along the coast where unloading was intended.

(2) to watch for any possible police activity at Ktima.

I told Kosta that we would be back at Khlorakas on Sunday, when I would enlarge on the instructions which I had given him previously. We left Khlorakas at 19.45 hours, and got back to Nicosia at 22.40 hours.

15TH JAN., 1955: At about 11.10 hours Azinas sent me a message via Pangos to come to his house. Azinas informed me that the Archbishop, whom he had seen, had told him that a policeman had informed the authorities that a caique from Greece would be arriving in the Xeros area on the 19th or 20th inst.... I have been worrying my head all day trying to think who could have been the traitor. Is he a Greek? My only hopes are now in God! He who has been my guide until today will continue helping me. I believe this. In spite of this treason I believe that the caique will arrive safely--God will see to this as well as to the safe arrival of the material.

17TH JAN., 1955: We are worried about the caique--will it arrive today? May God keep helping us!

18TH JAN., 1955: At 08.30 hours Yiankos brought me a code message which he had received at Limassol yesterday evening, at 23.00 hours. The message is as follows:

"Dear Leader, Nothing to report until noon today. In the afternoon we found definite information that the police have been alerted.

Five Special Branch policemen arrived from Nicosia in the afternoon. The Army's radar is in constant operation, sweeping over a 15-mile radius. I have concluded that the Army are collaborating with the police. I have issued all the necessary instructions. I will inform Andreas tomorrow ..."

I gave instruction to Yiankos to go and see Makarios and to tell him that it is necessary that he should send down to Xeros some of his own men on a diversionary operation and to explain to him that it would not be wise for me to use my own men from the sabotage groups for this purpose.

Yiankos returned at about 11.30 hours and informed me that Makarios had told him that it would be dangerous for this operation to be performed by his own men and that my own men should therefore be used.

Azinas telephoned to the office to say that he is coming to Nicosia.

He (Azinas) arrived at about 12.30 hours and reported to me as follows: "Early this morning at about 02.00 hours nine policemen were patrolling the area where the boat is expected-they left in the early hours. They were seen by our own men who were guarding the area. The police at Paphos are nervous. According to information we have, the state of the alert of the police at Paphos will end at noon today, at which time the police reinforcements will leave. On the road to Limassol police are stopping cars and asking drivers to produce their licences. In Nicosia too a certain amount of police activity has been observed."

On the strength of the above information I have decided as follows:

(1) There is nothing more to be done at Paphos in addition to the instructions which were issued yesterday--i.e. observation of police movements guarding the coast. Caique only to be signalled if the coast is clear. Speedy removal of material.

(2) A diversionary operation is to be organized at Xeros so as to give the impression that something is really happening there. This operation is to be executed by members of the sabotage groups Masonides Christakis who will be given the relevant instructions.

19TH JAN., 1955: Yiankos has passed on to me a recommendation by the Archbishop to the effect that we should limit our movements until Sunday. In his message the Archbishop also asks whether we shall be going to Larnaca to inspect our groups in that town. To this my answer was "Yes".

20TH JAN., 1955: At 16.15 hours we left for this reconnaissance and we visited a place near Boghaz-Trikomo, but it was getting dark and we had to put it off till tomorrow. We then went to Lysi, via Famagusta, and I visited there an officer of the reserve, by the name of Afxentiou. *** This officer solemnly declared to me that he wished to place himself under my command with a view to his undertaking operations. I told him that I wanted him for sabotage missions in the Dhekelia-Pyla District and also in the Famagusta region.

21ST JAN., 1955: At 10.00 hours Yiankos brought me a note from Azinas to the effect that the caique did not turn up last night. What can be happening?

At 13.00 hours Azinas came to see me and I discussed with him the alternative conclusions which I had reached. I then asked him to prepare to leave tomorrow. He told me that he agreed as to the necessity of his departure and that he had already obtained the Archbishop's approval, though the Archbishop wanted then to delay it until next Monday.

22ND JAN., 1955: At 10.30 hours Azinas came to see me ... still no caique. Azinas had seen the Archbishop and notified him that he would have to go to Athens about the caique, but the Archbishop had not agreed initially that it was necessary for Azinas to go. The Archbishop was worried in case the British got to hear of this and should jeopardize the whole business, but he agreed in the end that Azinas should go.

24TH JAN., 1955: Azinas is to leave for Athens TODAY with the following instructions: First of all he is to see the Admiral and Gazouleas in Athens and to make inquiries about the leakage. He is then to go to Rhodes-since it must be assumed that the caique is still there-and hand to the captain sealed orders which are to be opened and explained to him only just before he sails and in such a manner as to prevent communications by the captain or by members of his crew with anybody ashore. Two landing places have been earmarked as follows: --

Under the code letter A--Khlorakas-Paphos area. Under the code letter B--Periovolia-Tou-Trikomo area. Practicable landing times at A--between 8-9. Practicable landing times at B--between 1-2 a.m.

The caique is, first of all to close in at A, and if the landing signal is not given, the caique is then to proceed to B.

The landing signals at both A and B are to be as follows--three dots and one dash in green followed by three dots and one dash in red. These signals will be repeated at intervals of 5-10 mins. The caique is not to give any identification signal. In the event of sudden danger and of the necessity to cancel the shore signal after this has been given, repeated greens will he signalled as fast as possible.

The caique is definitely to have an escort to control the captain and to be able to show him the landing places and to check him on all points that have been laid down.

Azinas furthermore, is to discuss with Haris arrangements for the future consignments of material from Greece to Cyprus, and to inquire into the possibility of shipments from Athens, via Rhodes as a check point or, better still, of direct shipments from Rhodes if it is possible to find both the material and equipment there.

Azinas is to obtain from Makarios the letter to Stephanopoulos for the replacement of the Harbourmaster at Rhodes by N. Standouli.

Azinas left by air at 13.30 hours after visiting me and discussing again the above.

At 20.30 hours I met Afxentiou at Yiankos' house and we discussed his mission. He reiterated his promise to obey my instructions implicitly....

26TH JAN., 1955: At 20.00 hours approximately I went to Palouriotissa to meet Afxentiou, whose training is about to be completed, in order to give him certain instructions. Whilst I was there, Notis gave me a written report to the effect that at about midnight on the 25th/26th January, a caique was intercepted off Paphos, with a cargo of sabotage material, arms and hand-grenades. The report went on to say that the crew of the caique were escorted to Nicosia at about three o'clock this morning, as well as the caique's cargo, which was taken in two trucks after being taken off the vessel. This afternoon three more men were brought in. What a misfortune! ...

Who was it who gave us away? May our own curses and particularly those of Cyprus weigh heavily upon him! There will always be traitors, but I had not imagined possible that there could be in this particular instance Greeks whose love for money overrides all else.

We are stubbornly determined to continue the struggle even with our reduced means. I have charged Yiankos to inform the Archbishop accordingly. At about 21.30 hours Lefkios arrived at Palouriotissa bringing the arms with him. We stored the arms there.

I am closing my diary at this point and I shall hide it in case it should fall into enemy hands. Hard times these!

28TH JAN., 1955: Notis left at 06.30 hours for Nicosia. He returned at about 21.00 hours bringing with him to K arms and four young men from the Nicosia sabotage group who are to join a guerrilla band.

Instructions were given to the leader in charge at K to prepare for guerrilla fighting. He has already organized couriers, earmarked safe houses in the villages and formed groups for the manufacture of bombs and for the supply of stores and food....

Notis arrived at K at about 22.00 hours, but he did not bring any arms because the right opportunity had not presented itself. A combat group had been formed and he talked to the members of this group, but had derived little satisfaction from his talk-they put forward a number of reasons to excuse themselves from attending training tomorrow. Finally Notis had dismissed them.

I have come to the conclusion that our security here is unsatisfactory-Our host is careless in letting in too many people to see me. I have therefore decided to move to L and I have instructed Notis accordingly to make arrangements for tomorrow ...
 Hereafter Grivas refers to the Archbishop as Genikos, Gen
 or G.--see Appendix II.


31ST JAN., 1955: In the morning our host asked us to leave because he was worried. I told him this was impossible and after a lot of trouble we succeeded in persuading him to let us stay. But what a dastardly conduct on his part! And because he is afraid there is real danger that he might give us away. Together with my two escorts--Papadopoulos and Droushiotis--I have spent the last 12 hours in agony.

At last, at 19.00 hours, Masonides arrived and took me to Nicosia, to Metochi Kykko, where I saw Gen. Gen criticized our security, after which he informed me of the statements which the arrested men had made. So far so good. Sokratis had been caught on board the caique. He had confessed that he had embarked at Perama, that he belonged to a National Movement in Greece campaigning for Enosis and that the cargo was intended for use in dynamiting operations in the event of UNO's decision being negative, etc.

Gen gave instructions in connection with operations. He precluded active guerrilla operations for the present, and said that military objectives should be attacked but without inflicting casualties. He did not approve of my suggestion of parallel action by guerrilla groups, and I was forced to comply. A display of activity to follow the sentencing of the accused.

1ST FEB., 1955: At 19.00 hours Notis came to the Strovolos house and he told me what he had done. He informed me that he had found a house in Nicosia by Kyrenia Gate. He had transferred two crates of ammunition from the house at Palouriotissa. I gave general instructions to prepare for action against the following targets:--Episkopi, Symvoulos, Dhekelia, the wireless station at Athalassa, Lakatamia and the Wolseley Barracks. Depending on the availability of explosives, it is probable that further targets will in due course be added to this list.

In connection with the question of us being able to select further targets, Lenas and Afxentiou should be contacted and before the attacks are prepared Notis should then go and join them in order to study the matter....
 Episkapi and Dhekelia are the new military cantonments in
 Cyprus.


3RD FEB., 1955: At 19.00 hours I moved into the new house. My first impressions were good....

I submitted to Gen an estimate for this month's expenses.
 Hire of one car 4000 [pounds sterling]
 Expenses in respect of the movements
 and subsistence of an outside courier(and car) 2500
 Rent of house where I reside 900
 Rent of house for my assistant 900
 Rent of a house by Yiankos 1300
 Rent of a house which is to be reserved
 in case of need (the house has been found) 1500
 Rent of one garage for the storage of
 Material 200
 Rent of a meeting room 300
 Expenses in respect of my own subsistence
 and that of my assistant, of one bodyguard
 and courier and of two other people 6000
 Expenses in connection with storekeeper's
 board and lodging (he maintains and
 cleans the arms) 2500

 20100 [pounds
 sterling]


8TH FEB., 1955: Work on the excavation of my secret cellar has been started ...

9TH FEB., 1955: Gen has returned to me the money receipts which I had given him, with the request that I should write these out in a different manner--i.e. simply to the effect that I have received sum, such-and-such.

Notis reported that he had entered Government House and made the necessary reconnaissance. He suggested two places; either near the ... **** where the results would be poor, or somewhere in the centre of the building where the bedrooms are located. As regards the latter alternative, a further detailed reconnaissance will be necessary.

10TH FEB., 1955: Notis reported to me as follows:

(a) He had been told by Papastavros that he (Papastavros) had shown my article to Gen and that Gen had told him that it is not advisable that we should represent the people who were caught at Khlorakas, as being dynamite smugglers. Gen would be writing an article in this connection and, if I wished to do so, I could alter my own article as regards the point which he mentions.

(b) He has been offered 60 sticks of dynamite at 2s. each, 2 crates of dynamite, 1 crate containing pistols and two light automatics with 500 rounds. No price was quoted to him for these last items but they will let him know on the 13th instant, which is the date on which they expect delivery....

As regards (b), I have written to Gen asking him to make available the necessary funds.

11TH FEB., 1955: Gen has made 100 [pounds sterling] available for the purchasing of arms and with reference to my letter of yesterday's date.

13TH FEB., 1955: This evening according to Notis, police are patrolling the Trikomo area up to Boghaz, where Intelligence Agents have since established themselves. They are obviously looking for me in that district, since it also happens to be my place of birth....

15TH FEB., 1955: Gen informed me that he would be arranging to see me soon....

17TH FEB., 1955: More progress with the cellar--a cement floor has been laid....

I also received reports from Orestis to the effect that Gen, whom he had seen, had promised to help him with the mission with which I had entrusted him....

I then prepared a full report for Gen, whom I put completely in the picture as regards the above, including the gist of the reports I had received from Evagoras, Polos, and Cicero ***** and a copy of the report from the man in charge at Paphas. I shall be sending this report tomorrow morning through the usual channels.

18TH FEB., 1955: I sent to Gen the report which I had prepared last night for his information....

19TH FEB., 1955: I wrote and sent to Gen a report in connection with the publication of the unauthorized newspaper, Enosis....

21ST FEB., 1955: I sent to Gen a receipt for 200 [pounds sterling] which is to be set aside for the purchase of armaments.

Notis came home at 23.00 hours and told me that he had taken delivery of only 17 mines, as the remainder were unsuitable. He also submitted to me a report about target reconnaissance at Limassol. He will be leaving again for Limassol tomorrow to finish the work in hand.

He has found a place suitable for the preparation of a mountain hideout, and he asked for my permission that work should be started on it and in accordance with the instructions which I have already issued. I approved....

24TH FEB., 1955: At 17.00 hours Gen sent a message to the effect that he wished to see me at 20.00 hours. I replied that I could not see him today but that I would meet him tomorrow at that same time and at the same place where we had met on the last occasion ...

25TH FEB., 1955: Gen advised me that he would be unable to meet me today and that he would be getting into touch with me again to arrange a meeting on another occasion. At about 15.00 hours Notis returned from Limassol. His excuse was to the effect that he wanted to take all the necessary security precautions in person, for the meeting with Gen. I reprimanded him. He did not appear very pleased with the Limassol men, four of them definitely lacking spirit....

1ST MARCH, 1955: Notis had departed in low spirits after saying that he would be submitting a report. I often think that this man is either irresponsible or else something has happened of which I have no clue, because his conduct is often unjustifiable--a sensible man could not possibly behave in this manner, appreciating as he would the gravity of our situation and the seriousness of our mission. But he takes advantage of the fact that I am restricted in my movements. Were it not for this, I would tie him to a post and dismiss him from all responsibility in the ranks of our Organization.

2ND MARCH, 1955: Having thought things over, I have decided either to remove Notis for good or, at any rate, to limit his responsibilities. This would mean that I would have to take a more active part in target reconnaissance and thereby run the obvious risk of being discovered....

I instructed Hermis as follows:

He is to take charge of all the work in Nicosia town, including the direction of both combat and killer groups. One of the targets for the latter group will also be the Cyprus Mail offices. The managerial staff are to have their homes reconnoitred and their habits observed, and the killer group is to be in readiness. There is to be a re-distribution of the hand grenades, in view of the reshuffling of the groups. Hermis is to receive his orders exclusively from me and he will be coming under my direct control. In answer to his query as to whether Notis would be intervening, my answer was an emphatic "No"....

4TH MARCH , 1955: I recommended to Zidros that he should clean out the dead wood from the sabotage group with a view to retaining only the brave and spirited men. I stressed to him the necessity that our first attack should be crowned with success, since apart from other considerations, it will be a matter of prestige to us and will raise the morale of our people. Zidros strikes me as being a man of determination and I am expecting excellent results from him. We shall see.

5TH MARCH, 1955: Averof ****** advised me that a meeting had been arranged between myself and Gen for next Monday, 7th instant, at 20.00 hours....

Paschalis reported to me that the grocer of whom we buy supplies has not been paid, that we owe him about 99 [pounds sterling], of which 30 [pounds sterling] in cash taken by Notis. He also added that Notis has not paid the rent of the house and this had to be paid from his own money.

To me this is incomprehensible. Why hasn't Notis paid? What has he done with the money he has taken?

Why has he not delivered the cash to Averof and the account of the administration of all the money he received, although the fixed date for doing so expired last night? ...

7TH MARCH, 1955: At 20.00 hours Notis came to fetch me for my meeting with Gen. I asked him why the grocer had not been paid and he replied that he had paid him. Also, why Averof had borrowed 70 [pounds sterling] from Christoudis for paying our debts? I reprimanded both of them for doing so without my being informed. I saw Gen. He informed me of the following; as long as the Government of Cyprus know very well from several different sources that the caique was transporting ammunition and arms and that a revolution was being prepared we should not keep it secret any more.

He also had a letter from Savvas Loizides whose opinion is identical with his for the following reason: if we will still maintain the excuse that the caique was smuggling dynamite then his brother Sokratis would appear in the eyes of Greeks and foreigners as a smuggler, and this should be avoided.

It appears that Gen spoke of the above owing to unfavourable remarks made in the unlawful newspaper Enosis in its issue of the 10th February.

Gen asked my opinion on the above and I replied as follows: I am against the opinion of making such a statement today because this will hamper our action, meaning all the planned sabotage.

The opposite version is to our advantage so that we can allay all British suspicion and to give them the impression that we will do nothing, and as the British know of my presence here it is better that I should let it be known purposely that I am completely discouraged and I am looking for a way to get out of Cyprus by some clandestine means.

After the outburst of the struggle in Cyprus then we can let the truth be known regarding the caique. Gen has agreed with my opinion.... Savvas again. For the satisfaction of his brother and himself let the earth burst in fire. Then, we discussed targets and the date of the beginning of our activities.

Regarding the date, I suggested that this should be after the 25th March....

8TH MARCH, 1955: At noon Notis came to the house. We discussed the account which he submitted to me and I made remarks on some expenses which should not have been made. Money was overspent and beyond our calculations.

I asked him why the grocer had not been paid, and he still insisted that he had been paid. (The above statement was made in the presence of Paschalis who reported that he was informed by the grocer that he had not been paid.) ...

In the evening, and on Paschalis' suggestion, I wrote to Hermis to ask the grocer if he had been paid....

I sent a note to Hermis to entrust one of the Nicosia execution groups with the reconnoitring of the following targets: the Secretariat and the Office of Education. It is already possible to undertake these targets because we have obtained more material. We brought sixteen more mines and there is more material which is offered. Thank God at last. Something important will be achieved with God's help....

Hermis came to the house. I gave him instructions for sabotage plans on the targets of the Secretariat and Office of Education. He should also take delivery from Notis of the necessary sabotage material for all targets....

11TH MARCH, 1955: I submitted to Gen a report of all expenses as from the 27th Jan., 1955, to the 9th March, 1955, as well as of all money received. I also applied for l10 [pounds sterling] for the purchase of mines and one barrel of amatol....

12TH MARCH, 1955: No reply from Gen regarding the car, etc., etc. I was compelled to send Paschalis with a note to Averof, so that the latter should ask to meet the courier and apply for a reply.

At 09.00 Notis came to my house. He reported that the material for Famagusta and Nicosia has been prepared and delivered as follows:
In Famagusta (Zidros):

 25 bottles of petrol of the 3 fuses type.
 3 explosive fillings, slow burning, of 7 kilos each.
 1 time bomb of 7 kilos.
 30 detonators.

For the above the following material was available:

 31 kilos explosives.
 75 dynamite sticks.
 5 sticks Nobel 808 (sic).
 20 metres fuse.
 30 okes ******* of petrol.
 25 bottles.

In Nicosia (Hermis):

 5 explosive fillings slow burning of 6 kilos each.
 2 explosive fillings slow burning of 4 kilos each.
 2 time bombs of 6 kilos each.
 34 offensive hand grenades.
 10 bottles of petrol.
 4 bottles of petrol.
 4 bottles of petrol with detonators and naked fuse.

For the above the following material was available:

 50 kilos explosive.
 75 detonators.
 9 sticks Nobel 808 (sic).
 16 metres fuse.
 38 sticks of dynamite.
 12 okes of petrol.
 18 bottles.


I gave the following instructions:

For the use of the remaining material in Limassol.

The written instructions (today's) for all work to be done in Limassol.

14TH MARCH, 1955: On my invitation Averof came to my house at 19.39 hours so that I could give him my instructions. He was compelled to admit that Notis had received from Christoudis about 150 [pounds sterling] and that he himself had not received money from Christoudis, whereas in the beginning he had admitted receiving 70 [pounds sterling].

He also said that the foodstuffs had not been paid for, and that the van had not been returned to its owner.

Yet he was unable to explain why he had covered him for such a long time. He begged me not to mention this to Notis.

I advised him to find out either through Masonides or somebody else what happened to all the money taken by him from Christoudis, as well as what excuse he gave about the van. What am I going to do with that rogue I got entangled with? ...

Those who gave him money without my authority are bearing great responsibility for such abuse.

To prevent even Notis repeating such abuse and especially when Gen gave him money without any authority from me, I had to write a letter to the latter asking him that he should give money to no one unless he has authority from me and a duly signed receipt. But even Christoudis, why did he give him money?

This incident has greatly upset me, not only because of honesty but also because it has a bad effect on all of our members who heard of it.

Should I execute him with my own hands? But then our struggle will be discovered....

19TH MARCH, 1955: At about 20.30 hours we went to Michaelopoulos' house where we met Christoudis. We discussed the functioning of a duplicator for the issue of leaflets by our organization....

21ST MARCH, 1955: I am reporting to Gen that I AM READY and am awaiting orders to begin. Any delay in the actual waiting period means danger. I submit an inventory of all arms and ammunition which have been purchased and how these have been disposed of in the different districts for the first sabotage operations. I am also asking permission for the hiring of cars during these days and purchasing of material as a reserve, because our dynamite operations must continue intensively. I am also asking for the purchase of pistols. All my efforts tend to convince everybody of the necessity to be discreet and keep complete secrecy of our intentions and movements....

22ND MARCH, 1955: I am preparing myself for the start of the struggle. I am studying details. I am preparing my hideout as S. Command. Arms and ammunition. I am arming my bodyguards. I am sorting my files....

At eight o'clock I left for Saittas to meet all the group leaders there (guerrilla and sabotage) and make the necessary arrangements, this meeting having been pre-arranged by Notis whom I sent yesterday. I first met the Amiandos sabotage leader and then Avramis in charge of the Amiandos guerrilla group....
 Grivas is now ready to begin his operations and it only remains
 for Archbishop Makarios to name the actual date when Grivas
 is to be free to launch the campaign of violence.


At 14.00 hours I left for Nicosia where I arrived at about 16.30 hours. I do not feel tired, although I have been working hard since yesterday. Our efforts and our fight must give results. I am glad to see the results obtained after so many months of intensive work, perseverance and method, and this only with the help of Notis who, in spite of all his defects, works hard but not without reprimands and advice from me....

26TH MARCH, 1955: At noon, Evagoras came, having just returned from Limassol. He reported about all the work he has performed. He handed in nominal rolls of all guerrilla groups and the mission of each group. Arms and ammunition have been distributed to all men of Amiandos and Pyrgos groups.

He gave instructions to the youths in connection with the writing of slogans, etc.

I gave instructions for today and tomorrow:

To inspect all groups under Zidros to find out if they are in order and to recommend discretion. The Yeri group, with Polos, to be entrusted with the target of the Governor's House and a reconnaissance to be made. To come in touch with the Zodhias group, to recommend discretion and if we need them we will let them know. The machine-gun and Breda to be transferred to Kyrenia....

27TH MARCH, 1955: Averof reported that Gen wants to see me on the 29th inst. and at 20.00 hours at the same place ...

29TH MARCH, 1955: 20.00 hours. I saw Gen.... WE CAN START. He gave me his blessing. God is with us....

At 22.00 hours I went back home. I am thinking of when to start. The night of the 31st March or the night of the 1st April? I must start as soon as possible because as we go along the moon will hamper us. The moon is six days old today.

Tomorrow I see the section leaders and if they are ready we will start on the night of the 31st March.

I close my book now because I am preparing to bury it.

THE NEXT VOLUME OF THE DIARY RECORDS THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE.

30TH MARCH, 1955: At 20.30 hours I assembled Hermis, Orestis, Zidros and Evagoras in the house of Michaelopoulos and announced to them my decision for the beginning of activity in the night of 31st March-1st April at 00.30 hours. They agreed....

31ST MARCH, 1955: I examined the question of my HQs. I thought that I was not safe in the house where I am staying and so I would not be able to lead the struggle. I was thinking of moving to Kyrenia, but finally decided to stay in Nicosia in order to communicate more easily with the various Centres and intervene more actively in Nicosia where the Centres did not seem to be active. I made this decision against the exhortations of Evagoras who wanted to go to Kyrenia for the purpose of finding a building. Finally Evagoras did not go there because Papaflessas had not met him as pre-arranged. So I have definitely decided to stay in Nicosia.

Evagoras left for Limassol at about 12.30 hours. He will be in charge of all sabotage groups in Limassol District. I wished him success.

At 13.30 hours I left for the house in Strovolos where I temporarily established my HQ, so that I could communicate more easily with the Centres, and where my frequent contacts with the couriers would not betray my permanent HQ....

The time of activity is drawing near. At 00.30 hours I noticed a short interruption of the current but without any other result. What has happened? Has the attempt to cut off the current failed?

Some minutes after 00.30 hours the first explosions are heard. They are followed by others and finally the last one, which was also the biggest.

We went to bed at 03.00 hours. We shall know the results tomorrow.

1ST APRIL, 1955: The first news from the newspapers shows that the results were satisfactory. Information which I received in the evening says:

NICOSIA: Athalassa Radio Station: It was burning. It seems that the group who made this attack was successful.

LAKATAMIA RADIO STATION: Nothing.

WOLSELEY BARRACKS: Insignificant damages. The same with the Secretariat and the Education Office.

LARNACA: All targets were attacked satisfactorily.

FAMAGUSTA: Results not satisfactory. I have no more information.

LIMASSOL: Two targets only were attacked in the town; they are: Police Headquarters and Ayios Ioannis Police Station. More information is wanted about Episkopi, Polemidia, etc.

ARRESTS: Orestis with the leaders of two other groups and two more persons were arrested.

Zidros is wanted by the police. It is said that he has been arrested.

Atromitos abandoned his position and came here to allege that while going to his targets he was met by the police and was thus obliged to leave the material. This is why two attacks in Limassol did not take place.

No information at all about Evagoras.

One of the members ordered to cut off the electric current was electrocuted; this explains the short interruption of the current at about 00.30 hours without complete cutting off of the current in Nicosia.

I came in contact with Averof and ordered that terrorist attacks should continue in the evening.

The Athens Radio Station has broadcast a report from Paris about terrible explosions in Cyprus.

"The Voice of the Fatherland" has said nothing at all about the events and has confined itself to praising Sokratis Loizides. This was certainly done after instructions from his brother Savvas in Athens. After this I was obliged to submit a report to Gen expressing my bitterness at the attitude of the Radio Station and Loizides who by bad luck appears on the scene again to exploit for himself the work of others.

Loizides brothers seem to bring bad luck in the struggle again. 2ND APRIL, 1955: I have issued an order on the way in which the sabotage groups must act; i.e., the continuation of terrorist attacks in the town so that the police may be unable to cope with the situation. This will oblige the Government to use military forces for its security and I shall be later able to organize the rebel struggle which is already being prepared. I have also given orders for the recruitment of new members in the sabotage groups, the finding of material and the selection of leaders....

The "Voice of the Fatherland" broadcast was something for which the word "Shame" would be the least to be said about it. After this I was obliged to address to G the following letter:

"I am obliged to return to the question of the contents of the broadcasts 'Voice of the Fatherland'. Today's broadcast was worse than yesterday; it went so far as to say that Freedom is not gained with terrorism, as Gandhi did not succeed in liberating India with means like this! Those who listened to it were petrified and were asking themselves whether they should continue the struggle. Mr. Loizides, who yesterday spent half an hour eulogizing his brother, could well today spend a few minutes in strengthening the morale of the people of Cyprus, who are today carrying out a bloody struggle. As I have many times told you, I shall conduct the struggle, which you have entrusted to me, even if I am left ALONE; but if I survive I shall have many things to speak about everybody and about what he has contributed in this struggle. If I die I shall leave them in writing."

At this stage Grivas complains bitterly of lack of support on the Greek radio, but later, as the diaries reveal, as a result of the Archbishop's influence the Greek radio gave its complete support to the encouragement of terrorism in Cyprus. As a result, and after months of toleration Her Majesty's Government decided in March, 1956, to jam these pro-terrorist transmissions.

Averof reports that Zidros has not been arrested. It seems that he is in Akanthou or Kyrenia where he has been ordered to go in case of danger of arrest. Attack on Dhekelia failed because the driver refused to carry the group there....

I have not yet come in contact with Larnaca, because all of our active members have been arrested.

Four pupils of the Gymnasium, members of our Organization, have been arrested for pasting proclamations on walls.... 3RD APRIL, 1955: I ordered group-leaders to assemble as I want to see them.

Averof came to my house in the evening and handed me a letter from Genikos in reply to a letter sent to him in connection with "The Voice of the Fatherland".

This letter, also captured, is reproduced on page 60.

4TH APRIL, 1955: ... Evagoras came from Limassol in the afternoon. It seems that he was afraid. I sent him away impolitely and I did not let him speak to me. He dissolved the groups, and it seems that he lost the arms and ammunition. As he is afraid that he has become known to the police he has come here to seek asylum. I knew that he was a mean fellow but I thought that he was a bold man. He is cowardly and a dastard. I have issued orders to all groups here not to approach him because he has been expelled from the Organization. I have also given orders that he should be driven away from the house in Ayios Dometios where he is staying. It seems that he was afraid to go to Strovolos.

Averof has informed me that Zidros is in Lysi and not in Akanthou. Bad luck again. Now that he has been proclaimed he wants us to take him away. To previous appeals to him, through his friends, to tell us where he is so that we might carry him away, he did not reply; neither did he ask for contact with us as he had been ordered before the commencement of the fight.

How can you work and draw a plan against the English when two of your chief leaders have the mentality about which I have spoken above? I am now alone. God will help me, it is on Him that I base myself and not on men.

And as if this was not enough, the Gen sends me a letter and gives his opinion that our activities must stop in the towns so that we may re-organize ourselves!! I must take lessons now from the various faint-hearted fellows who surround Genikos and give advice to him because they are afraid of their skins and are interested in their leisure. Because such are the men who give their opinions to Genikos who, although it is only yesterday that he wrote to me, "Go ahead, you are doing well...."

It is a critical turn of the struggle now....

7TH APRIL, 1955: I have given two proclamations to be duplicated; the one is about the English soldiers and the other about the English bases in Cyprus.

I have prepared a report to the Gen on the situation and on the re-organization of groups for future activity....

I am also in danger in the house where I am staying. Evagoras is walking about in Nicosia and is staying in a pension with his mistress. I am afraid that, he is a coward, he may disclose everything if arrested. His mistress also knows a lot of things.

Kris came to me in the evening and reported to me on the activities of Evagoras in Limassol and on his cowardice. He was responsible for the failure in Limassol. During the explosion in Episkopi he was in the car trembling, and it was Krassides who made the attack. Also in the explosion in Troodos he gave orders for it only at about 22.30 hours and so the members had not time enough at their disposal. For the explosion in Polemidia there were no members to cause it. After the explosion at Episkopi he drove towards Polemidia but he later changed his mind and returned to Limassol. He returned to Limassol using the public road and this was done against my repeated orders on this subject. The result was that Krassides was discovered because Krassides' car was ordered to stop by Yermassoyia police and it failed to stop. The result was that Krassides and the men with him were arrested on the following day....

An information bulletin by Cicero says that there is a traitor among us in Limassol....

10TH APRIL, 1955: I regret to see that there is no enthusiasm in Greece. Nothing can be expected from them. In Rhodes somewhat more serious events occurred but again without much fighting spirit. What can we do? We shall go on alone; but I am certain that when praises are awarded after the end of our struggle, we shall be given crumbs whilst others will claim the victory. At least this is what happens in Greece....

Both the Athenian and the local press are expecting a change of the English attitude after the filling of the Foreign Office with Macmillan (Churchill has retired and Eden has succeeded him as Prime Minister). The press also carries reports that the Cyprus question is causing great headache to England.

11TH APRIL, 1955: I sent an order to Tselingas ******** demanding a report on our members in Limassol District.

I sent an order to Zidros demanding:

(1) The submission of a report on the events of April 1st.

(2) The place where he is keeping the sabotage material which has been given to him.

(3) To start sabotage activity in Kyrenia District and say what material he needs.

(4) Whom he suspects of being a traitor in the Famagusta Groups.

(5) Training of rebel-groups and the forming of new groups must be expedited. He must first execute the missions which have already been entrusted to him. When he is ready he is to report.

(6) To keep me aware of the progress of the work, which he has hitherto failed to do. He has so far reported nothing on what he was ordered to do in Kyrenia.

I have sent a letter to Genikos, asking him to take an interest in the families of those arrested....

I strongly suspect that Evagoras is betraying us. He is the man who can do anything. He is a thief and rake and he can do everything; he can even betray his fatherland....

13TH APRIL, 1955: Owing to the arrest of Evagoras I left the house of Pasch. at 07.30 hours and went to Sofoklis' house.... Cicero reports that Evagoras was arrested at 16.00 hours and was interrogated until 22.00 hours when he was left free. He made them believe that he was a man of the underworld. His attitude is strange; why does he not hide himself since he can? And why do the police not arrest him? These are two questions to which I find it difficult to give an answer. I think that Evagoras is a traitor. If he is not, then the police do one of two things; they either let him free to see with whom he comes in contact or they want to make him their agent. I have given orders to my men to follow him and see what happens so that we can take our measures. Polos has left for Amiandos. The recruiting of Government Officials has failed. I shall issue a proclamation to the Government employees tomorrow, calling them not to submit to the force used by Government.

14TH APRIL, 1955: Averof came to my house in the evening and I gave him orders. I also gave him a proclamation to Government officials for publication and distribution.

16TH APRIL, 1955: Hermis came in the evening. I appointed him as in charge of all sabotage groups in the Island. His assistant in Nicosia will be Eleftheriou and Eleftheriou will be assisted by Markos....

17TH APRIL, 1955: 14.00 hours. Averof came to my house. He reported to me that the Communists are preparing dynamite explosions in Lefka and that they have proposed to one of our members in Paphos to carry out these attacks. Averof gave him orders to find out if this is a serious effort emanating from AKEL. He will pretend that he accepts but he will demand of them to support him if he is arrested. If they agree he will ask them to give him time to learn how to use the material; he will then take it and report to us.

We must take more serious measures. So I have issued an order to the sabotage groups and the EOKA Youth, in which I demand organized and

systematic watching of the Communists. I have also asked Genikos to dispose the sum of 500 [pounds sterling] for the purchase of pistols with which the sabotage groups will be supplied....
 Here follows the first indication of a clash of interests with the
 Communists, whose organization AKEL was proscribed in
 December, 1955.


I wrote a warning to leading Communists and AKEL officials to cease reacting in any way to our work; otherwise we shall punish them and report their acts to the Greek and Cyprus people.

19TH APRIL, 1955: I drafted a letter to Genikos returning to my old proposal that the competent authorities in Athens should not grant visas for Cyprus to Communists in Greece....

At 12.00 hours I saw Azinas and gave him instructions for acts of sabotage in the Court premises in Ktima. I told him that the acts of sabotage should take place before 2nd May (date of the start of the trial of the 13). I also gave him instructions to organize the youth and prepare an armed group. He reported to me that he had advised Sokratis Loizides on the night of his arrest not to go to the seashore to receive the ship. He however, replied that he would go and if the ship came he would leave Cyprus by it. I am greatly concerned with the suppression of every Communist move. I am examining the question.

20TH APRIL, 1955: In the night I saw Hermis and Averof and gave them orders. Averof reported to me that a representative of the students, Renos Kyriakides, ********* arrived here yesterday and wanted to see me. I fixed a meeting with him for tomorrow.

21ST APRIL, 1955: A group of students (Cypriots) who have been trained in sabotage in Crete are ready to help us....

He suggested that a group of Cypriot students trained in the use of arms (about six) should come to Cyprus at once and if possible until the end of this month. They will fight with rebel-groups. The rest (about four) will come later.

If they are in possession of arms these arms must be sent here by a very quick ship so that she may not be in danger of being caught. About this he will consult Sakellarios (Admiral). He will also consult Evstathopoulos and Gazouleas for the coming of one or two officers of the reserve.

I agreed with him and he will depart from Cyprus on 25th....

25TH APRIL, 1955: Hermis also reported that a person was sent by the Bishop of Kitium wanting members of our Organization to be recommended to him for training. As regards this report I have sent a letter to Genikos in which I report what has happened and make it known to him that I shall not permit others to give orders in the Organization. Nothing will be done without approval. Neither are we in need of trainers.

27TH APRIL, 1955: I have sent a letter to Genikos requesting that the Athenian newspapers should be advised to censure the pressure exercized by the Government on its employees to enlist in the Special Constabulary. As all means used have failed, forms have been sent by the Government to them which they have been ordered to fill and state why they do not wish to enlist....

28TH APRIL, 1955: At 13.00 hours Hermis came and gave me reports of Nicosia groups. I instructed him to expedite the organization of groups in Nicosia, Morphou and Trikomo. I also instructed him to organize in a better way the groups in Famagusta and Larnaca and form youth-groups in these two towns. I told him that the group-leaders must start organizing groups in big centres of their areas so that we may prevent any movements or reaction by the Communists.

The organization of the country is difficult. Neos is unable to undertake the organization of the youth outside Nicosia. I am not satisfied with Tselingas' work. I am trying to face the situation created by the Communists with temporary measures until I find the fit persons.

Unfortunately I do not find the proper persons; most of them have lost their courage....

29TH APRIL, 1955: X ********** has informed me that Genikos has written that no activity should take place now as "very important national interests are risked." He stresses that we must wait for instructions.

This letter is reproduced on page 62.

2ND MAY, 1955: I saw Dafnis (Hermis) at noon. He reported to me on his contacts in Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol. Work in Famagusta is satisfactory. They have about twelve members of sabotage groups. Reports on targets will be submitted....

3RD MAY, 1955: I saw Averof in the evening. He reported on his mission. He said that two students arrived today from Athens but they reported to him that on their arrival they were recognized by relatives of theirs. He told them to stay here as he will decide what to do tomorrow. He also told me that two more students will arrive tomorrow and the rest, between four and six, will come by sea on Thursday.

4TH MAY, 1955: I have sent an EOKA oath to Averof which he will give to the students who have arrived. He will ask them if they agree before they are detailed to do work....

5TH MAY, 1955: Christodoulos reported to me that Averof has announced to him the arrival of four more students. 16.00-18.30 hours I saw five students. The sixth is in Paphos. I talked with them. There are some difficulties. The most important is whether they must start underground activity from the very beginning or not. I think that they must go to their villages and work in secret. All of them said that they could do so, with the exception of Romanos ***********, who said that he cannot on account of his parents. After this I ordered Romanos to work unlawfully and be responsible for the organization of the Amiandos groups.

6TH MAY, 1955: The Athens Broadcasting Station ("Voice of the Fatherland") has broadcast that, after the rejection by the Government of England, in today's debate in the House of Commons, of any proposal for negotiations on the Cyprus question, and as the English Government has said NEVER again, then the people must wait for the results of the Elections of 26th May and, if the new Government adopts the same policy again, THE CYPRIOTS MUST RESORT TO ARMS AND FIGHT UNDER THE FLAG OF DIGHENIS ([dagger]).

8TH MAY, 1955: The nationalist papers are only interested in their pockets. None of them has protested either at the curfews or at the order that the Government officials must guard their offices themselves. And this is done when the Communist mouthpiece Demokratis is militantly attacking the Government and is thus indirectly serving us! The Mayor of Famagusta protests at the law for curfews while none of the other Mayors has protested.

(Grivas had written about this to Gen on 6th May--see page 64.)

9TH MAY, 1955: In reply to a report from Neos I have given orders for the holding of a demonstration of youth during the trial of Artemiou, pupil and member of the Youth. The trial will take place on 11th May, and it must be militant. Sacrifices or arrests must not be taken into consideration....

16TH MAY, 1955: Cicero informs me that in a three-storied house at Palaea Sphaghia [Old Slaughterhouses] in Athens a centre of espionage is operating for the Cyprus police. I have informed the Gen to inform Athens through the Greek Consulate....

17TH MAY, 1955: Order for completion of preparatory work for the execution of traitors and for submission to me of the necessary reports....

22ND MAY, 1955: I am preparing a report to the Gen for the continuation of our activity....

The report is reproduced on pages 65-7.

I sent to X a report on the situation, measures proposed, and a general plan of activity. I also sent him a report against Principal Spyridakis which he must give to the Gen after his arrival (he is expected to arrive next Tuesday 24th inst.)...

X (Papastavros) was of course an obvious person to keep it for the Archbishop on his return.

24TH MAY, 1955: The demonstration of Nicosia pupils which I ordered has been held. I am waiting for the results.

The demonstration of the pupils was very good and militant. About 600 boys and girls participated in it. It was held in accordance with my orders. The route followed was the one I wanted. The police were stoned and they are on the alert.

25TH MAY, 1955: I was informed that an attempt was made against the Governor in the Pallas Cinema. A time-bomb exploded at 23.10 but only damage was caused because the Governor had left at about 23.00 hours.

Thalis reports that the time bomb was planted by members of Astrapi group. He did not inform me beforehand because it was late when he heard that the Governor would also go. He thought that the performance would be over at about 23.20 hours, as usually; but it was over at 23.00 hours.

Averof informs me that one of our members was arrested. At midday another member of the group which committed the sabotage was arrested....

27TH MAY, 1955: Arch. arrived from Egypt at about 12.30 hours without previous notice.

I gave orders for the formation in the towns of groups specialized in fighting in the towns. They will be used for action against military and police patrols.

I saw Dafnis. He visited Larnaca, but the situation there is not good. The man in charge is not active; he seems to be afraid. I ordered him to show special interest in Famagusta and Limassol.

Nemesis was released on the day before yesterday....

28TH MAY, 1955: I ordered Thalis to study the possibility of placing a time-bomb during the parade in Nicosia on the occasion of Elizabeth's birthday.

29TH MAY, 1955: Zidros submitted a report on the attack on a company encamped in Boghaz (Kyrenia). I studied it and returned it to him with my remarks....

30TH MAY, 1955: I was much tired today; or rather I am tired because they do not know how to work. They are all willing to work, but there is no system and they do not have the required knowledge. What shall I do? I shall go on to the end. I shall succeed in spite of all difficulties. I am alone in this effort. God is on my side.

31ST MAY, 1955: I studied plans submitted by Heron (Nicosia). I returned them with remarks.

The Gen has brought me a letter from Evstathopoullos which reads: "I am well. My sister-in-law was married. The child was baptized. The power of attorney expires on June 30th."

He sent me a copy of the power of attorney which was made in Athens....

2ND JUNE, 1955: On this question I have made a report which I shall forward to the Gen.

The authorities do not seem to have noticed yet my presence here, and they want to know who Dighenis is.

3RD JUNE, 1955: X has written to me that the Gen wants to meet me and to give him the place of meeting. I have replied....

4TH JUNE, 1955: I received a report from Cicero on the question of arms from Egypt. He came in personal contact with one of our men who is in correspondence with the Cypriot in Suez who made the proposal in April, and the latter invited him to go to Egypt as the question has been settled. Both his friend, a general and two officers, are willing to reinforce us. I have asked for approval by the Gen to send this person to Egypt.

The Gen has fixed a meeting with me in the Met. on 7th inst. at 18.30 hours.
 Met. are the first three letters of the word "metochion" (in
 English, "annexe", and it must mean the Kykko Annexe in
 Nicosia.


6TH JUNE, 1955: Disaster! A fire broke out near my house. I came near to becoming a prey of the fire. Great anxiety. I was compelled to throw into the hiding-place all documents and arms and close the hiding-place which is useless for the present. The police came, but fortunately nothing more happened. The fire was put out. It was caused by firewood burning near a near-by house.... I received a note from X instructing me to meet the Gen at the Kykko Annexe tomorrow at 06.30 hours.

7TH JUNE, 1955: The meeting was held. He spoke to me about the youth movement and Spyridakis. My impression is that he approved of the youth movement but he would like everything to emanate from him. He has found everything ready, but he does not know how to handle them. As regards Spyridakis, his opinion is that he is a cowardly man. He asked me about the arms of which we are in need. It is only now that he has understood that we need arms as well!! Oh! If only I had before the brains which I have now!! No one wanted to listen to me when we had the chance. Now he wants arms!

About Egypt (the sending of arms from there), he does not believe that we shall succeed and so he does not approve it. He wants us to start. Papagos asked him why he stopped!! Another one who wants everything ready for exploitation! I told him that I shall start after the end of the old moon and that I am making preparations to place a time-bomb in the Government House on the 9th June, at the celebration of Elizabeth's birthday. We parted with his blessings: good success.

8TH JUNE, 1955: The Athens Radio Station commenting on the reasons which have compelled England to reconsider its policy towards the Cyprus Question, gives the following three reasons: (1) American pressure. (2) The situation created between Greece and England and its consequences on NATO. (3) The activity of EOKA.

At 19.30 hours Heron, Thalis, Dafnis came to the house and I gave them orders. I spoke to the first two on the attempt in the Government House on 9th June and 10th June in the house of Chief Justice Hallinan, where the Governor has been invited for dinner. The first attempt with the time-bomb will take place in any case (in spite of a desire of the Gen that the placing of the bomb should be made under certain reservations). As regards the second attempt, three ways were discussed (a time-bomb, hand-grenade and automatic guns). I ordered them to make inquiries and report to me tomorrow, which is the best way.

9TH JUNE, 1955: No attempt was made in the Government House. The man detailed to place the bomb says that he was not allowed to take his bicycle in which he had the bomb. The bicycle was left in the yard and far from the building....

10TH JUNE, 1955: Last night's events were favourably commented on by the Athens Radio Station, which praised the policy adopted by EOKA, a policy of blows at the English without weakening its forces....

17.00 hours. I saw Romanos in the house of Ayios Dometios, and I gave him order concerning the preparation of the struggle, selecting targets and the tactics to be adopted.

I ordered Thalis to try to attack the house of Chief Justice Hallinan tonight, when the latter will give a dinner to the Governor....

14TH JUNE, 1955: Last night four members of Nicosia groups were arrested while carrying explosives....

At 22.30 hours I noticed suspicious movements outside my house and I was compelled to take out my automatic gun to defend myself if required....

16TH JUNE, 1955: I issued an order to Zidros fixing the 20th June at 23.30 hours, as the day of attack on targets.

I made arrangements for a general attack on targets in the whole island.

I fixed day X as the day of beginning of new activity. This day is next Sunday, 19th inst.

I informed Thalis to murder Kyriakos on ... next Sunday because he will leave for England shortly.
 Assistant Superintendent Kyriakos Aristotelous went at this time to
 England for police training. He was murdered by EOKA at a
 nursing home in Nicosia on 15th April, 1956.


We are making preparations for the operations. I gave instructions to Averof concerning the distribution of material to the various groups in the towns.

My only effort is to take them by surprise, which is the best factor to success. If we do not take them by surprise our success is doubtful, if not impossible. For this reason I have issued orders and drawn their attention on this point....

18TH JUNE, 1955: We discussed the question of ambushing the car carrying explosives to Amiandos. I gave instructions how the attack will be made and how the material will be concealed. I demanded that the ambush should take place on 20th inst. (Monday), if he was ready, so that it might be synchronized with dynamite attacks in the towns which will begin on the night of 20th inst., (three attacks against bars will be made on 19th inst.). If, however, Romanos is not ready, the ambush will take place on Monday after the next, 27th inst. (The car carries explosives to Amiandos every Monday only.) I also gave general instructions to Romanos for the preparation of attacks against police stations. I also told him that all sabotage attacks be made by men of sabotage groups and that he must not use members of rebel-groups. I advised him to spare our forces so that we could continue working.

In the evening, before the time fixed, hand-grenades were thrown in Nicosia into an English bar. There were no victims but only material damage. This was so because the man who threw the grenade did not throw it into the hall but behind a sofa. In Famagusta only one of the two refreshment places was attacked, without victims. The second one was not attacked because, according to Melas, the car did not come to carry the men to the place.

20TH JUNE, 1955: The results of the dynamite attacks were not the expected ones.

Famagusta: Results satisfactory. Only one attempt failed.

Nicosia: Fair. One attempt was satisfactory; the attack on Ayios Dometios Police Station. The attack against the Military Police failed.

Kyrenia: Rather a failure. Zidros did not raid Boghaz. I do not know why. He also did not raid Ayios Epiktitos Police Station and the store on the west of Ayia Erini. He only attacked Kyrenia Police Station with fair results. The attack on Lapithos Police Station was rather a failure. One of our men was seriously wounded, and one gun was abandoned. Two hand-grenades were thrown at the house of the British Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces.

Paphos: Results good.

21ST JUNE, 1955: I have communicated an order to Heron and Thalis, saying that I am not satisfied with the results of the Nicosia groups and demanding the intensification of activity, particularly against the police traitors, no matter if they are Greeks or Turks. My design is to terrorize the police so that we may be given more freedom of action. Unfortunately Zidros' (Kyrenia) failure does not give me the opportunity to start an armed struggle. I want to intensify terroristic measures. We shall see the results of tonight.

22ND JUNE, 1955: According to reports in the Press, last night's dynamite explosions were a success. In Nicosia a time-bomb went off in the Central Police Station with one townsman dead and a lot of others wounded (policemen and civilians, especially Turks). A hand-grenade was thrown at the English in Varosha. It was good work. In Larnaca a hand-grenade was thrown at the house of an Englishman. In Limassol a dynamite explosion took place in the Ayios Nikolaos Police Station. In Amiandos the police station was raided and the result was that the Sergeant in charge was killed and another policeman was seriously wounded.

The situation is developing favourably.

I called Thalis, Heron and Dafnis to see them at noon. My plan is: "The police must be attacked first." This will paralyze it. It seems that these attacks bear fruit.

I sent an order to Ramanos to prepare the operation against the car carrying explosives. The operation will be organized on Monday, 27th inst. He must also study the possibility of attacking the Governor by ambush next Sunday (26th inst.), while he is going to his summer residence in Troodos. About this I shall send Averof to Romanos tomorrow with special instructions. I shall direct this operation personally.

I saw Heron and Dafnis (Thalis did not come). I reviewed the situation and told them that the next turn will be against traitors. I emphasized that the promotion of the Cyprus Question will depend on the favourable development of our operations. All of us must work even if we are in danger of being killed.

I have written to the Gen to ask for time-bombs from Athens.

23RD JUNE, 1955: I have sent for duplication a proclamation to the police.

I sent an order for ruthless attacks on police traitors and judges sentencing Cypriot patriots.

I have sent an order to Kimon to study the possibility of attacking police stations and submit a report....

24TH JUNE, 1955: I have sent a letter to the Gen advising him to take measures for the protection of his life, following information that the Turks are organizing his assassination.
 This letter is referred to in the marginal note Grivas made on the
 letter reproduced on page 67. The letter to the Archbishop is
 reproduced on pages 67-8.


I have given a sharp order to Heron and Melas to make their chief mission the execution of police traitors...

This order is reproduced on pages 68-9.

I called Averof and ordered him to go to Boghaz area and find good places where ambushes can lie for the purpose of murdering the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces. Zidros' group will participate with a machine-gun....

Nothing of importance took place last evening. It seems that our men in Nicosia were afraid. In spite of all my encouragement they have done nothing for the murder of traitors. One pupil was arrested in Paphos for carrying a Sten-gun. I have sent an angry letter to Kimon asking on whose order the removal of the Sten was made from its hiding place. I characterized this action as treason....

26TH JUNE, 1955: Nothing was done last night. Our men in the towns lost their courage. Shall I not expect more or are the local leaders not fit ones? Most of the objects were achieved except the execution of traitors. None was executed and no attempt was even made against the life of anybody.

I sent Averof with Elias last night to Boghaz to find places for ambushing the Commander-in-Chief Middle East.

I saw Averof who has come back from Boghaz. I was not satisfied with the results of his efforts to find places for ambushing. I shall go there, myself, to find the proper places. I have not yet come in contact with Zidros. Papaflessas did not want to bring him in contact with me, fearing that he was followed....

I gave orders that no arms will be removed and used without my orders. I sent order to Romanos reprimanding him for raiding Agros Police Station, without previously reporting anything to me, the result being that the raid failed.

I gave orders that the combat groups should stop activity, except the groups of executioners. Activity will be continued against traitors....

This order was actually dated 27th June, 1955--page 71.

I reported to Gen that I have ordered suspension of activity and that I am preparing something more serious after the new recourse to the UNO. I ask for approval to execute by ambush the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces.

At 14.00 hours I went to Boghaz to find the proper place for ambushing the Commander-in-Chief. I found two places.

I received a report from Heron saying that an unsuccessful attempt against the life of Poullis was made last night at 23.00 hours.

27TH JUNE, 1955: I was informed by Christodoulos that a police search was carried out in the near-by village of Orta-Keuy. As I was afraid that the search might be extended to our area, we were obliged to put our arms and documents in the hiding place.

28TH JUNE, 1955: My plan for future operations is as follows: The sabotage groups in the towns will have the police as their special target with a view to paralyzing and terrorizing them. They will be neutralized and the Army will have to reinforce them and thus scatter.

The rebel-groups will raid police stations, execute police traitors and seize their arms. They will also organize ambushes for trapping isolated policemen and depriving them of their arms. They will also seize the arms of isolated soldiers (couriers, motor cyclists).
 This plan is set out in the order reproduced on pages 76-7. By
 the spring of 1956 the Security Forces had been reorganized
 and reinforced. The Archbishop and other leaders of the
 campaign of violence had been deported and the terrorists
 themselves were under very heavy pressure. The remainder of
 the diary illustrates how Grivas and his men were harried in the
 early summer of 1956, during which period heavy losses were
 inflicted upon them.


16TH MAY, 1956: At about 18.00 hours Ipsilandis came and met me. He came after I had told him to come, but Athanatas was not with him. (His whereabouts are unknown.) I gave him 37 instructions how to escape from encirclement and, in case of raids, how to face any attacks. He left about 19.00 hours.

At about midnight our courier came back from the school. There was no serious movement.

We stored food supplies and put everything in order in the hiding places.

An English soldier was killed and another one was wounded in the Nicosia airport.

20TH MAY, 1956: We got up at 04.00 hours. With the exception of five or six persons moving on a hill to the north of Lykourgos ************ no serious movement was noticed.

Yesterday evening a soldier was wounded in Rizokarpasso. This morning a soldier was wounded in Limassol.

Everything is quiet in our sector during the whole day. The searches in the Lefka-Kambos area continued. The Radio Station reported the discovery of shotguns and a machine-gun. We are without link with the other branches and Nicosia. I intend to set up a link on the 11th inst. I shall send a link to the school in the evening of the same day to see what is happening.

25TH MAY, 1956: This day is the worst of the struggle for me; I am quite estranged from the sections and without information. I'll try to come into contact with them again soon.
 At this stage of the campaign the deaths of Turkish Cypriots
 led to a serious development--outbreak of rioting between
 the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots who are
 implacably opposed to Enosis.


As the result of the murder of a Turkish policeman on the night of the 24th inst., anti-Hellenic demonstrations of Turks and clashes occurred in Larnaca and Limassol with wounded men on both sides. Looting and acts of vandalism by Turks against Greek shops took place in Nicosia and Ktima.

At 20.00 hours two military jeeps passed below our camp. They were on the road leading from Peravasa to Milikouri. We took security measures, fearing lest they had laid some kind of ambush by the road.

27TH MAY, 1956: At about 01.00 hours two couriers arrived with Benakis. When I got up I met Benakis in the new area of our hide-out (high up between the road Milikouri to Vassa and Kykko to Panayia). The question of our link with Nicosia and with the food suppliers as well as all other questions were solved.

My intention is to come out of the encirclement. I shall first choose a hilltop and then move to Ay. Arkha from where we shall be able to go to the Limassol District.

At about 19.00 hours we left for the new hide-out approximately 1 mile SW of height 4014. After a tiresome and extremely dangerous march, on account of the steep ground, we arrived there at about 11.15 hours of the next day. This march was the most tiresome of the struggle, and perhaps the most tiresome and most dangerous march of my life. At 02.00 hours we had a rest until 06.00 hours at a place about 500 metres east of the secondary road and then continued our way until 07.30 hours when, after having a lunch and rest until 10.30 hours. We continued our march until 11.15 hours.

We arrived there exhausted. The radio set was out of order as it is knocked here and there, and so we lost the only contact with the outside world.

29TH MAY, 1956: Disturbances have taken place in Nicosia between Greeks and Turks with two dead and fifteen injured ...

1ST JUNE, 1956: I have been informed of the arrest of Sevastianos on 26th May, 1956.

No link has yet been re-established despite all efforts. I received from Lykourgos a letter ... sent through the school. He asks for my opinion on new negotiations on the basis of the Makarios proposals, after being sounded on the subject. I replied that I agree under the condition that no deviation at all should be made from these proposals.

2ND JUNE, 1956: The Cyprus Radio Station reported the arrest of Palykarpos and Georghis last night. They were responsible for Nicosia. Benakis returned at 18.00 hours. He reported on the unsuitability of the new camp by Ay. Arkha.

Harding left for London for discussions with the English Government.

4TH JUNE, 1956 [May in original]:
 Grivas here makes a curious mistake over the date for several
 days.


The Cyprus Radio Station and "Voice of the Fatherland" repeated today the results of the searches carried out on 19th May, 1956, on the NW part of the Island. During these searches Bouboulis and Batsaris ************* were arrested as well as 15 rebels; 41 shotguns, 3,000 rounds of ammunition and some automatic weapons were discovered--(they had with them three automatic weapons; one Bren, one Sten and one Tommy-gun). The number of the arrested men seems to be exaggerated because the groups of both men were no more than fourteen, of whom two escaped. We have no exact information about the losses.

5TH JUNE, 1956 [May in original]: We went to find hiding places in the afternoon. The results were not favourable. It was decided that they should be made with barrels which we shall ask to have.... They will be placed in the ground with foodstuffs in them. The whole work will finish on the 14th inst.

Harding made statements in London saying that he believes that he will suppress terrorism by the end of the year. He also does not advise the Government to re-start negotiations with Makarios.

8TH JUNE, 1956: About 02.30 hours after the departure of the sentry, I was woken up by the barking of a dog and as at such a time it is impossible for a dog to be in the area of the hideout, I came to the conclusion that SF were in the neighbourhood. I woke up my men and at about 3.00 we left the hideout. When we reached the crest, and as soon as it was light, we observed four two-ton military vehicles full of soldiers going towards Milikouri. We saw them drop off on the way traitors Bauboulis and Botsaris (Cairo Broadcasting, etc., heard that ops were taking place NW of the Island). Then I decided to move south as far as road Peravasa--Panayia and thence via the saddle to Ay. Arkha. First stop.

About 10.00 hours we reached the heights overlooking the road to Peravasa-Panayia. After a rest I sent at about 12.00 hours two scouts to a height which stands to the east of the saddle, from which they could observe the road from Peravasa to Milicouri and to report to me if it was clear so that we could cross it. They set off and at about 13.00 hours we, the remainder, moved. At about 13.30 hours the scouts returned and reported that they met vehicles on the road and there were soldiers on the surrounding heights. At last, at about 16.00 hours, they succeeded, in returning unobserved.

After this I decided to shoot across the road Peravasa-Panayia, which we succeeded in doing. Although I noticed traces of fresh footmarks on the way and new empty English cigarette-packets and realized that soldiers had passed that way, I decided to continue the march because there was no other way out. Fortunately by about 19.30 hours we reached the high ground to the south of the road, where I decided we should remain and then very early the next day get up and occupy the forested heights further east of my present position, and from where we could watch the road Peravasa-Milikouri and arrange to cross it in the evening.

We turned in. At about 20.00 hours we heard two bursts from automatics more or less from the direction of Lykourgos.

9TH JUNE, 1956: About 03.00 hours we woke up and continued our march towards a height in order to check our position, which we reached about 04.00 hours. There we observed a motor car SE and at a distance of three kilometres we observed a helicopter landing-ground ... cars going on the road to Arminou.

* Pancyprian National Organization of Youth.

([dagger]) Priest of Phaneromeni Cathedral--see biographical note page 91.

([double dagger]) Secretary to the Ethnarchy Council.

** Cyprus Broadcasting Service near Nicosia which was attached on the 1st April, 1955.

*** Known as Zidros. See page 92.

**** Interpretation of the abbreviation "lev" which appears in the original has not been possible--Translator.

***** Polykarpus Georghiades. See page 93.

****** Yannakis Drousiotis.

******* An oke is about 2 4/5 lb.

******** Constantinos Lefkosiotis.

********* Known as Romanos. See page 92.

********** A symbol, which appears as a diagonal cross, with a bishop's crook vertically down the centre, denotes Papastavros. See page 91.

*********** Renos Kyriakides. See page 92.

([dagger]) Grivas himself. See page 92.

************ Markos Drakos. See page 92.

************* Poliviou.
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Publication:Journal of Cyprus Studies
Geographic Code:4EXCY
Date:Jan 1, 2007
Words:15719
Previous Article:Preface.
Next Article:Part II: examples and extracts from the mass of captured documents (Letters, Orders and Memoranda a copy of a Letter from dighenis - Appendix I).


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