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Part 1: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.

Part 1 presents complete summaries for each case, alphabetically by year published. The major topic section and subtopics are identified before each case summary. This format makes it easier for the reader to review every case. Part 2 presents the summaries under each of the 50 major topic areas.

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Exhaustion

31. PERSONNEL: Supervision

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Adams v. Bouchard, 591 F.Supp.2d 1191 (W.D.Okla. 2008). A jail inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against sheriff's deputies and a sheriff, alleging the deputies assaulted him, used excessive force, and that the sheriff failed to properly supervise the deputies. The defendants moved for summary judgment and qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate properly exhausted administrative remedies prior to bringing the federal action. The court found that the inmate's efforts towards exhausting his [section] 1983 excessive force claim against sheriff's deputies were insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to his claim that the sheriff failed to supervise the deputies. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the force used by the sheriff's deputies against the inmate was necessary. According to the court, the sheriff's deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged excessive force that prison officials could not maliciously and sadistically inflict injury for the very purpose of causing harm. (Oklahoma County Detention Center, Oklahoma)

11. DISCIPLINE: Evidence

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Officer on Prisoner Assault

Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison guard, alleging that the guard assaulted him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a jury instruction related to the alleged spoliation of film and photographic evidence of the alleged assault. The prisoner had asked the court to sanction the defendant for failing to produce stationary video footage that shows the prisoner being escorted back to his cell, a post-incident narrative video that contains interviews of staff members about the incident, and original photographs of the prisoner's injuries. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court remanded the action to determine whether the guard should be subject to any form of spoliation sanctions. (Ionia Maximum Security Facility, Michigan)

31. PERSONNEL: Due Process, Property Interest

Akande v. Grounds, 555 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2009). A former employee of a state corrections agency brought an action against the agency and agency officials, alleging that they deprived him of a property interest in his employment in violation of the due process clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections was not deprived of a due process property interest in his employment by a supervisor's decision to alter the employee's job duties. The court noted that the employee remained at the same position and received the same salary, and that the Illinois Personnel Code defined the employee's protected property right as the right not to be removed, discharged, demoted, or suspended for more than 30 days without cause, but none of those events occurred. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Robinson Correctional Center)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Records

26. JUVENILES: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act, Programs

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER: Juveniles, Treatment Programs

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584 F.Supp.2d 1314 (M.D.Ala. 2008). A disabilities advocacy program brought a suit against the director of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS) seeking access to residents, facilities, staff and records under federal law. The parties filed a joint motion seeking court approval of a settlement. The court held that the limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on prospective relief concerning conditions had no application because the suit was not concerned with conditions of confinement or effects of actions by officials on confined juveniles. The court also found that the advocacy group was not subject to the limitations on prisoner suits under PLRA. The court held that the settlement of the suit was fair, adequate, reasonable and not illegal or against public policy, and thus warranted the requested court approval. According to the court, the agreement contained a detailed plan for facilitating access, a process for dispute resolution between the parties, and a provision for the court's retaining jurisdiction for one year for the limited purpose of enforcing compliance. (Alabama Department of Youth Services)

28. MAIL: Legal Mail, Rejecting Mail, Packages

38. RULES & REGULATIONS-PRISONER: Mail, Packages

Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate filed a Bivens action against prison officials, alleging their handling of his incoming legal mail violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. On remand, the district court denied the warden's motion to dismiss and his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The warden appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against the warden, and that the due process right to receive notice was clearly established. The court held that the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulation governing an inmate's notification of rejected correspondence, which distinguished between letters and other correspondence by requiring notification for rejections of the former but not for the latter, was unreasonable under procedural due process principles. The court found that there was no governmental interest advanced by the regulation, that inmates did not have an alternative means of receiving notice, and that there was no additional burden placed on prison officials by having to give notice. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that the warden had responsibility for lack of notice as to the prison's rejection of packages containing legal mail were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against the warden. The inmate had alleged that the warden was personally involved in creating, applying, or interpreting a policy that failed to adhere to notice requirements, and that even if the warden had no role in deciding what notice procedures to follow, the inmate alleged that the warden failed to train or supervise mail room employees to follow notice requirements. (Federal Correctional Institution, Waseca, Minnesota)

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Parole

36. RELEASE: Parole-Revocation

Brown v. McNeil, 591 F.Supp.2d 1245 (M.D.Fla. 2008). An inmate of the Florida penal system whose conditional release supervision had been revoked, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted summary judgment. The court held that the state court's decision to uphold revocation for failure to make supervision payments was unreasonable, and the state court's decision to uphold revocation based on violation of curfew provisions was unreasonable given that the inmate violated curfew only one time, and had been given permission to violate curfew several times. According to the court, the state court's decision to uphold the parole commission's revocation of the inmate's conditional release supervision for failure to make $30.00 per month cost of supervision payments and being $312.41 in arrears, was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal due process principles. The court noted that the state court's finding that the failure to pay costs was willful, substantial, and material, was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, where testimony and evidence of record revealed that inmate did not have the ability to remain current with his supervision payments given his other financial obligations at the time. (Florida Parole Commission)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Discrimination, Harassment

31. PERSONNEL: Free Speech, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Racial Discrimination

Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 583 F.Supp.2d 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A correctional officer brought an action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and several other institutional and individual defendants, alleging race discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, [section] 1981, [section] 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officer satisfied the personal involvement requirement for stating a [section] 1981 hostile work environment claim against his co-workers; (2) the alleged harassment by his co-workers was not done under color of law for the purposes of a [section] 1983 claim; (3) the officer's complaints to supervisors about alleged discrimination and harassment based on his race did not constitute speech protected under [section] 1983 and did not relate to matters of public concern; (4) the officer's state law claims against individual state officials and employees were barred by the election-of-remedies provision in NYSHRL; (5) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the actions and statements of his co-workers created a hostile work environment under Title VII; (6) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the DOCS took appropriate steps to put an end to the alleged harassment; and (7) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether his co-workers and supervisors acted with retaliatory animus. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Policies/Procedures

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner Suicide

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

29. MEDICAL CARE: Delay of Care, Deliberate Indifference, Negligence, Suicide

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Suicide, Failure to Protect

45. SUPERVISION: Inadequate Supervision

46. TRAINING: Failure to Train

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined in a "drunk tank" of a county jail brought a [section] 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants in their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all officers and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was protected by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the county was not liable under [section] 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where verbal policies existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under [section] 1983 for the suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no evidence of a pattern of similar violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the deputies' conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make any attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate indifference, nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for the county to be liable under [section] 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Due Process, Procedures

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner who allegedly suffered permanent vision impairment due to a prison's failure to treat his eye condition while he was incarcerated brought a civil rights action against prison officials for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations regarding a prison official's role as head of the prison's medical unit in treatment of the prisoner's eye condition were sufficient to support his [section] 1983 claim against the official for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Although the prisoner's complaint did not say that he ever spoke with the official or explain how she came to know of his eye condition, it may have been possible to show through discovery that the physicians and nurses to whom the prisoner spoke reported to the official on his condition, and that the official rather than the other members of the health unit made the decision to leave the condition untreated. The court found that a prison complaint examiner was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need when she rejected as untimely the prisoner's grievance regarding the alleged failure of the prison's medical staff to treat his eye condition. The court noted that the examiner was fulfilling her duty to dismiss untimely grievances, and was not required to go beyond the duties of her job and try to help the prisoner. (Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility, Wisconsin)

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: Due Process, Probable Cause, False Imprisonment

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Evaluation, Suicide

Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2009). A former detainee, who had been seized by deputies for a psychological evaluation, brought a [section] 1983 action against deputy sheriffs and others alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the deputies had probable cause to seize and detain the detainee for a psychological evaluation, after a dispatcher received a 911 call from a hospital to report that the detainee, who had called the hospital to report an adverse reaction to his prescription medication, had threatened suicide. The deputies knew that the detainee had made prior suicide threats, that police had responded to those threats, and that firearms had been found in the home. The court held that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless seizure of the detainee for psychological evaluation in his home. (Burke County, North Carolina)

31. PERSONNEL: ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Protection, Sex Discrimination

Cole v. Taber, 587 F.Supp.2d 856 (W.D.Tenn. 2008). A female correctional officer brought a suit against a county and county officials and supervisors, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, equal protection, and the First Amendment. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officer, who could not perform 90% of the essential functions of her job was not otherwise a qualified individual under ADA. The court held that the officer's equal protection rights were not violated and that her speech did not concern matters of public concern for the purpose of her First Amendment retaliation claim. The officer admitted that she could not perform 90% of the essential functions of her job due to ruptured tendons and a degenerative joint disease that made it difficult for her to walk. According to the court, male county correctional officers who received temporary assignments to light duty work to accommodate illnesses that were not job-related were not similarly situated to the female correctional officer who was denied permanent assignment to light-duty jobs to accommodate her foot injuries, as required to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination based on alleged differing treatment afforded to female and male officers regarding permanent accommodations. (Shelby County Division of Corrections, Tennessee)

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Medical Care

29. MEDICAL CARE: Contagious Diseases, Records-Access

Costa v. County of Burlington, 584 F.Supp.2d 681 (D.N.J. 2008). An administrator, individually and as the representative of a deceased pretrial detainee's estate, brought civil rights and state law claims against a county and the warden of a county jail, alleging that the inmate contracted Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) during her incarceration and ultimately died as result of MRSA-related pneumonia. The administrator appealed the pretrial rulings of a United States Magistrate. The district court denied the appeal in part and dismissed in part. The court held that broadening the scope of discovery of documents concerning other inmates' medical treatment beyond grievances related to MRSA would have been too intrusive and minimally probative. (Burlington County Corrections and Work Release Center, New Jersey)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Placement, Protective Custody

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Prisoner on Prisoner Assault, Threats

27. LIABILITY: Bivens Claim, Failure to Protect

Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a Bivens action against several corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the officers' failure to prevent an assault by a fellow inmate. Following a jury verdict for the inmate on the issue of administrative exhaustion, the district court granted summary judgment for the officers. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the subjective prong of the inmate's claim was unsatisfied, since the inmate had given the officers inadequate details of the danger involved. The prisoner told officers that other inmates were "pressuring" him and "asking questions," but never gave more details despite the officers' requests, preventing them from determining whether a true threat was at play. The inmate declined offers to remain in protective custody. (Federal Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Delay in Care, Deliberate Indifference

Davis v. First Correctional Medical, 589 F.Supp.2d 464 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison medical center and others, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that a delay in surgery to treat and relieve a hernia and to resect the inmate's small bowel due to an obstruction did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need. The court noted that the inmate had been treated repeatedly for his medical conditions, that any delay in surgery was caused by diagnostic testing and scheduling, and that there was no evidence that the delay was intentional. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware).

29. MEDICAL CARE: Contract Services, Inadequate Care, Negligence

Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services, 555 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a registered nurse and other defendants, asserting a state law claim of gross negligence and [section] 1983 claims for alleged subjection to excessive force and inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The nurse moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment as to the [section] 1983 claim of inadequate medical care and the state law claim of gross negligence. The nurse appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that summary judgment was precluded due to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court also found summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse's conduct in providing care for the prisoner was the proximate cause of the prisoner's injury. (Carson City Correctional Facility, Michigan)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Discrimination, Working Conditions

31. PERSONNEL: ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Discrimination, Retaliation, Working Conditions

DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008). A former employee brought an action against the D.C. Department of Corrections, alleging that the department discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, [section] 1983, [section] 1981, and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the parties in part and denied in part. The court held that the employee sufficiently exhausted his ADA claims and that there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the department discriminated and retaliated against the employee. The court also found that evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the department's proffered reasons for termination and refusal to rehire were pretextual. The court held that the department did not violate Title VII, [section] 1983 or [section] 1981. The former employee had been diagnosed with diabetes and his condition required him to eat meals at designated times and prevented him from skipping meals. He was transferred to the third shift and he requested an accommodation because he believed working that shift would be incompatible with the diabetes treatment regimen prescribed by his physician. The Department denied his accommodation request and transferred him to the third shift. He was eventually transferred to the first shift after using 208 hours of sick leave during his first three months on the third shift. When he was later denied a promotion, he filed an EEOC complaint. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Medical Care, Use of Force, Wrongful Death

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Use of Force, Medical Care

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriffs Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action under [section][section] 1983, 1985, and 1986 and Virginia law, against a city sheriff's department, sheriff, deputies, and prison health providers, alleging excessive use of force, failure to train, assault, battery, conspiracy, breach of a non-delegable fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the estate of the pretrial detainee who died following cardiac arrest after transfer from a jail to a hospital could not sustain a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against the employees of a prison health provider, absent evidence that they actually knew of and disregarded a serious risk of harm to the detainee, or that they actually knew of and ignored a serious need for medical care. The court noted that the city sheriff and sheriff's deputies did not knowingly disregard a substantial risk of harm to the pretrial detainee in violation of Fourteenth Amendment when they relied on medical personnel's decisions as to the appropriate course of treatment for the detainee's medical needs.

The court found that the city sheriff's deputies did not act with deliberate indifference when, in an attempt to transfer the detainee to a hospital for treatment, they forcibly removed the detainee from his cell, placed him face down on a stretcher, and covered him with a blanket to stop him from spitting and throwing feces at the deputies. According to the court, there was no evidence that the deputies knew that the detainee suffered from an excited delirium or serious heart condition. The court noted that the detainee was naked, slick with feces and urine, spitting, yelling, being combative, threatening to throw more bodily fluids, trying to bite, and was HIV and Hepatitis C positive. (Roanoke City Jail, Virginia)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Suicide, Wrongful Death

15. FACILITIES: Facility Design, Suicide

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Screening, Suicide

29. MEDICAL CARE: Intake Screening, Suicide

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Intake Screening, Suicide

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections officers, and negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers' liability under the due process clause for the detainee's suicide. The court noted that the suicide was a "complete surprise" to the police chief who spent one and a half hours with the detainee, the detainee told an officer "he had much to look forward to, and [did] not believe in suicide," the detainee was placed in a cell next to an inmate who was on suicide watch and could be regularly observed, and the officer intervened when he noticed the detainee was still kneeling during a second observation of the detainee. The court found that county employees, through the jail's suicide policy, were not deliberately indifferent as to whether the pretrial detainee successfully committed suicide, as required to support a due process claim. According to the court, the policy was annually reviewed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and was never found deficient, the detainee's screening form did not trigger a suicide watch, and the employees acted without deliberate indifference in allowing the detainee to retain his shoelaces while in his jail cell.

The court held that under the Pennsylvania negligence law, architects who designed the jail had no duty to prevent the suicide of the detainee who strangled himself by tying his shoelace to a ventilation grate above a toilet and applying pressure to his neck. According to the court, there was no direct causal connection between any alleged negligence by the architects and the detainee's suicide. According to the court, while Pennsylvania courts had not addressed this specific issue, other jurisdictions have held that an architect cannot be held liable for a prison suicide: (1) in an Oregon case "We refuse to extend suicide liability to architects, contractors, engineers, and a vast array of other parties involved with the design and construction of buildings ... Architects and contractors should not be exposed to endless suicide liability when they have relinquished their authority and control over the facility to the owner;" (2) in an Illinois case "The magnitude of the burden placed on architects to eliminate all fixtures, such as grilles, that might be of aid in the commission of a suicide and, at the same time, to design an attractive and feasible cell at a reasonable cost would seem to be great;" and in an Alabama case "We hold ... that an architect designing a prison or jail owes no duty to design the prison or jail to be suicide-proof." (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates, Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: False Arrest, False Imprisonment

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest, False Imprisonment

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: False Arrest, False Imprisonment

Farag v. U.S., 587 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Airline passengers detained after a flight landed brought a Bivens action against Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, a city police detective, and counterterrorism agents, alleging that their seizure, detention, and interrogation after the flight landed violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and false arrest and false imprisonment claims against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the agents did not have probable cause to detain the airline passengers and that, as an issue of first impression, the agents could not rely on Arab ethnicity alone as probable cause to arrest airline passengers. The court held that the detention of the airline passengers at the terminal after their plane landed was a de facto arrest, rather than a Terry stop, for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that upon entering the terminal the passengers were met by police dogs and at least ten uniformed police officers in SWAT gear carrying shotguns. They were taken to separate locations about thirty-five to forty-feet apart, each accompanied by two police officers, ordered to raise their hands, and frisked. They were held in separate cells at a police station. The passengers were removed from the airline concourse and taken to a jail cell between five and fifteen minutes away by car. The court found that the four hour detention of passengers in a city jail was not a justified Terry stop for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment claims and common-law false imprisonment and false arrest claims. (Port Authority Police Station, Kennedy Airport, New York)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference, Inadequate Care

Fear v. Diboll Correctional Center, 582 F.Supp.2d 841 (E.D.Tex. 2008). A prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison system, medical center, and prison physician, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The district court dismissed the action. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison physician was deliberately indifferent to his nail fungus condition failed to state a claim under [section] 1983, where the nail fungus condition did not amount to a serious medical need, the physician was responsive to the prisoner's health problem, and the physician followed protocol in treating the prisoner. (Diboll Correctional Center, Texas)

10. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Food, Discipline

11. DISCIPLINE: Food

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Discipline

Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2009). A female inmate brought a civil rights action against a prison official, alleging the official deprived her of 16 meals over a 23-day period in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court entered summary judgment for the official, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the official's conduct in allegedly depriving the inmate of 16 meals over a 23-day period for the inmate's failure to remove a paper from the rear window of her cell was a sufficiently serious deprivation of a life necessity, as required to establish violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the official's argument--that the alleged deprivation was due to the inmate's personal choice not to comply with a prison policy--failed to demonstrate how the inmate's failure to remove a paper from a window jeopardized her safety or security during in-cell feeding. The court found that the official was not entitled to qualified immunity because the inmate's right to adequate meals was clearly established, and the case law alerting prison officials to their obligations to provide inmates with adequate meals should have put the official on notice of her Eighth Amendment rights. (High Desert State Prison, California)

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Credit For Time Served, Parole

36. RELEASE: Credit, Parole-Conditions, Parole-Revocation

Garner v. Caulfield, 584 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2008). A parolee filed a habeas petition to challenge his detention following revocation of his parole. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the parolee was not entitled to credit toward service of his sentence for his stay at a residential program akin to placement in a halfway house, which was a condition of parole. The court found that the Parole Commission issued a valid parole violator warrant before the date on which the petitioner would have reached his full-term expiration date, and therefore it was authorized to revoke the petitioner's parole. (United States Parole Commission, District of Columbia)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Sex Discrimination, Sexual Harassment

Garrett v. Department of Corrections, 589 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla. 2007). A female employee brought gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims in state court against the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) and the State of Florida under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Following removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the DOC could be held liable for inmate sexual harassment directed at the female employee, particularly when the department refused to take appropriate corrective action. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employee subjectively perceived the environment at a prison, in which male inmates made obscene comments and masturbated in front of her, to be severe and pervasive, and as to whether the inmate's conduct constituted objectively unreasonable sexual harassment. (Florida Department of Corrections, Lake Correctional Institution)

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Imprisonment

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Release

36. RELEASE: Timely Release

Gary v. Floyd, 582 F. Supp. 2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against an arresting officer and a police department, alleging he was arrested pursuant to improperly obtained warrants. The arrestee sought compensatory and punitive damages for allegedly being held for approximately one month after the charges against him were dropped. The district court held that the arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest and that the department could not be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. But the court found that the arrestee was entitled to amend his complaint to include as defendants a sergeant and directors of the detention center. According to the court, an amendment to the arrestee's complaint, alleging that he was not released from confinement within a reasonable time after charges of forgery were dismissed, would not be futile, even though the sergeant's affidavit indicated that the arrestee was released within 48 hours after the detention center received notification that he was to be released. The arrestee alleged that the detention center was immediately notified when the charges were dismissed, but that he was not released for nearly one month. (Greenville City Police Department, Greenville County Detention Center, South Carolina)

37. RELIGION: Free Exercise, RLUIPA- Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Gladson v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 551 F. 3d 825 (8th Cir. 2009). State inmates sued an assistant warden, alleging that he violated their free exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) rights by limiting their observance of a Wiccan holiday. The inmates sought damages and injunctive relief. The district court denied injunctive relief and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison did not substantially burden the Wiccan inmates' observance of the Samhain religious holiday, and thus did not violate their free exercise or RLUIPA rights. According to the court, the inmates failed to offer any evidence that a grant of only three hours for the celebration significantly inhibited or constrained their conduct or expression, meaningfully curtailed their ability to express adherence to their faith, or denied them reasonable opportunities to engage in activities fundamental to their religion. The court noted that a former prison treatment director had reduced the quantity of food available for the celebration but that the current treatment director had not continued that practice. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

36. RELEASE: Parole-Revocation, Parole- Due Process, Liberty Interest

Gordon v. Alexander, 592 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). State inmates brought an action against the New York State Division of Parole and its chairman, asserting various violations arising out of the Division's failure to resolve administrative appeals within 120 days, its failure to advise parole appellants of the right to institute judicial proceedings, and its failure to give proper consideration to statutory and regulatory factors. The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss. The court held that the parole system did not vest inmates with a liberty interest, and the failure of the state to inform the inmates of their right to judicial review did not violate due process. According to the court, the New York parole scheme is not one that creates in any prisoner a legitimate expectancy of release and accordingly, prisoners have no liberty interest in parole, and the protections of the Due Process Clause are inapplicable. (New York State Division of Parole)

24. IMMUNITY: Eleventh Amendment

31. PERSONNEL: ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act, FMLA- Family and Medical Leave Act, Rehabilitation Act (RA)

Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2008). A former state employee brought an action against his employer and others, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court dismissed all but the employee's RA claims, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that receipt of federal funds by a subunit of a Pennsylvania judicial district waived Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) for claims against the employer. The court noted that an Eleventh Amendment immunity waiver under the Rehabilitation Act applies to all of the operations of a state department regardless of whether the particular activities are federally assisted. (Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole Department, Pennsylvania)

27. LIABILITY: Consent Decree- Termination, PLRA

29. MEDICAL CARE: Equal Protection, Inadequate Care

Hines v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2008). Inmates appealed an order of the district court that had terminated a consent decree that regulated prison medical care. Inmates had filed a class action against the state in 1973, resulting in a 1977 consent decree that set medical standards for the prison. The appeals court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not require an investigation and/or evidentiary hearing before termination of a consent decree. The court noted that the consent decree that regulated prison medical care did not constitute a final judgment, and therefore inmates had no property right that would entitle them under the due process clause to further discovery and a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. The court found that although the record presented a picture of what, at times, may have constituted less than optimum care of inmates, it failed to show current and ongoing deliberate disregard of the inmates' serious medical needs, which was required to maintain the consent decree. According to the court, the type of day-to-day oversight on all aspects of medical care encompassed in the consent decree was broader than necessary to assure protection of the right to reasonable medical care in the face of a known substantial risk of harm to the inmate. Because the consent decree was not narrowly tailored nor was it the least intrusive means to protect the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights, it violated the provisions of PLRA . (Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights)

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST: False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Probable Cause

Holguin v. Lopez, 584 F.Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Tex. 2008). An arrestee brought [section] 1983 and state law claims against an officer. The officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part and dismissed in part. The court held that the arrestee stated a cause of action in his complaint for false arrest and false imprisonment under Texas law, in that he sufficiently alleged that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest him for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and the charge of phone harassment. (Socorro Police Jail, Texas)

31. PERSONNEL: Discipline, Free Speech, Retaliation

Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008). A social worker employed by a county corrections department brought a [section] 1983 First Amendment action against a sheriff, alleging that she had been disciplined in retaliation for reporting an assault by a corrections officer. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the social worker, denied the sheriff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and denied the officer's motion to throw out the jury verdict. The sheriff and officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the social worker's internal complaint to the department's internal affairs division, alleging that she had been assaulted by a corrections officer in a parking lot, was speech made pursuant to the social worker's official duties, not speech made as a citizen. According to the court, the report fulfilled the social worker's responsibility as a department employee to report incidents of misconduct immediately to her supervisor. The court found that a police report filed by the social worker, alleging that she had been assaulted by a corrections officer in a parking lot, was not speech addressing matters of public concern, as required to support the social worker's [section] 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the sheriff. According to the court, the police report amounted to a personal grievance against the officer, and statements in the report were tied to a personal dispute and were not intended to bring to light any wrongdoing by the sheriff. The court noted that its finding that the county employee's speech about an alleged assault by a fellow employee was not protected, and that she had suffered no First Amendment injury from the alleged retaliation that followed the speech, precluded recovery on the employee's [section] 1983 Monell claim against the county and the sheriff. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by a denying motion to sever the accompanying state-law assault and battery claim against the fellow employee, and instead giving limiting instructions. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion reduce the $50,000 punitive damages award in the civil assault and battery action, even though the jury may have been confused as to how to assess damages given the fact that the plaintiff had asked the jury for $5,000 in damages. The altercation occurred in a staff parking lot after a dispute about parking spaces. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Alien, Military Facility, Medical Care

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care, Records

Husayn v. Gates, 588 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention as an enemy combatant. After denial of the detainee's motion for disclosure of his medical records, the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that counsel was entitled to review the detainee's medical records and staff records regarding his seizure-related episodes, despite the government's contention that the records were inherently related to detention, treatment, or conditions of confinement, and thus were exempted from judicial review. The court found that the records were necessary to permit counsel to assess whether and to what extent the detainee's medical condition affected his right to habeas relief, and to determine whether to challenge the legitimacy of his Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearing. The detainee alleged that he suffered over 120 seizures since he was first detained in 2006, and that they are currently frequent and severe. He alleged that they consist of excruciating pain in his head near the site of an old mortar injury that left him unable to think clearly or speak for an extended period. (United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Medical Care

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Conditions of Confinement

29. MEDICAL CARE: Inadequate Care

Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145 (D. Conn. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a [section] 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was denied necessary medical care in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. The district court held that the claim was cognizable as a habeas petition. According to the court, the claim asserted by the prisoner who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer, that she was denied necessary medical care in federal prison in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and seeking restoration of certain medical treatment, specifically hormone medication, was cognizable as a habeas petition challenging her conditions of confinement pursuant. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

2. ADMINISTRATION: Discrimination, Employee Qualifications

31. PERSONNEL: Promotion, Racial Discrimination

Jo v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2008). A lieutenant with the District of Columbia Department of Corrections commenced a [section] 1983 action against the District, three District employees, and others, alleging that he was denied a promotion to the rank of captain because of his South Korean descent. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the District demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to promote the lieutenant and that the decision was not pretextual. The court also found that the lieutenant failed to demonstrate the existence of any policy. The court noted that the use of the lieutenant's picture on a recruitment poster that contained the phrase "Professional Dedicated to Duty" did not give rise to an inference of discrimination, on account of the lieutenant's South Korean descent. According to the court, there was no evidence that the persons selected for depiction in the poster were the most qualified lieutenants in the Department, and other individuals depicted in the poster were not even supervisory employees. (D.C. Department of Corrections)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Searches

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Searches, Equal Protection

41. SEARCHES: Body Cavity Searches, Strip Searches

Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 584 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). Female former arrestees filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of District of Columbia, under [section] 1983, claiming violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The arrestees alleged that the marshal strip searched all females awaiting presentment to a superior court judge, without reasonable and particularized suspicion that any female was carrying contraband on her person and without strip searching any male arrestees. The District of Columbia moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia was a federal official who was not amenable to suit, under [section] 1983, as an employee, servant, agent, or actor under the control of the District of Columbia, precluding the female former arrestees' class action. The court noted that the marshal was empowered to act under the color of the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and a District of Columbia law provided that the marshal acted under the supervision of the United States Attorney General. According to the court, the District of Columbia lacked authority to control the conduct of the former United States Marshal, precluding the female former arrestees' class action under [section] 1983. The arrestees were held for presentment for an offense that did not involve drugs or violence, but they were subjected to a blanket policy of a strip, visual body cavity search and/or squat search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband. (District of Columbia, Superior Court Cellblock)

13. EX-OFFENDERS: Claims, Release

36. RELEASE: Parole, Timely Release

Johnson v. U.S., 590 F.Supp.2d 101 (D.D.C. 2008). A former inmate brought a civil rights action against the federal Bureau of Prisons and others, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that absent a showing that the former inmate's conviction or sentence had been invalidated, or that his parole violator term had been invalidated, the former inmate could not recover damages on his civil rights claims for time spent in custody beyond the date on which he should have been released on parole. The court held that the former inmate's denial of placement upon parole in a community corrections program due to an insufficient number of beds did not equate to an "atypical and significant hardship" worthy of due process protection. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Due Process, Exhaustion, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference, Dental Care

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Medical Care, PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act

48. USE OF FORCE: Cell Extraction, Use of Force

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under [section] 1983 and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to some of his [section] 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims against employees of the county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue appeals at all, or did not pursue appeals to the final step.

The court found that the inmate's placement in isolation at the county jail only lasted three or four days, and thus did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship compared to the burdens of ordinary jail confinement in violation of the inmate's due process rights for the purposes of [section] 1983 action, although it appeared that the inmate lost some privileges during his time of isolation.

According to the court, evidence was insufficient to show that the inmate was injured, or that whatever force was used by correctional officers, who removed the inmate from his cell during his transfer to segregation, was more than necessary, as would have supported the inmate's [section] 1983 claim for alleged violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

The court held that evidence was insufficient to show that medical staff at the county jail acted with deliberate indifferent to the inmate's medical needs as to requested dental care, as required to support his [section] 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that although the inmate had to wait two months to see a dentist, the dentist filled the inmate's cavities and took x-rays related to that treatment. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Law Library, Legal Material, Right to Counsel

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Law Libraries

Jones v. Lexington County Detention Center, 586 F.Supp.2d 444 (D.S.C. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se civil rights action against a county detention center and sheriff, alleging his inability to have access to legal research materials violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the detainee did not have a constitutional right of access to a law library while being temporarily held in a county detention facility awaiting trial on criminal charges, where the detainee did not allege that he had been incarcerated for too long and was not pursuing any speedy trial claims. The court noted that a state is only required to provide criminal defendants legal counsel, not legal research materials. According to the court, the detainee's lack of access to a law library while being temporarily held in a county detention facility was not an "actual injury," as required to confer standing for the detainee to allege a deprivation of a constitutional right of access to the courts. (Lexington County Detention Center, South Carolina)

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Medical Care

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Classification, Medical Screening

29. MEDICAL CARE: Intake Screening, Deliberate Indifference, Negligence

Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich. 2008). The personal representative of an arrestee's estate brought an action against a county and two employees of the jail where the arrestee died of heart failure. The arrestee had been brought to the jail on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Two days after her admission she was found unresponsive in her cell and could not be revived. It was subsequently determined that she died of heart failure (ischemic cardiomyopathy). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that neither a jail interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, nor a jail nurse, who first came into contact with the arrestee when she was summoned to assist in CPR and other efforts to revive the arrestee after she was found unresponsive in her jail cell, were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical needs. According to the court, neither employee perceived a substantial risk to the arrestee's health and well-being and yet disregarded that risk, and any purported negligence in the interviewer's assessment of the arrestee's medical needs did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court held that the conduct of the interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, did not amount to "gross negligence" within the meaning of Michigan's governmental immunity statute, and therefore she was not liable for failing to secure immediate medical treatment for a condition that shortly would result in the arrestee's death. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Due Process, Equal Protection, Exhaustion

33. PRIVACY: DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid

37. RELIGION: Free Exercise, RFRA-Religious Freedom Restoration Act

41. SEARCHES: DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sought to enjoin application of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Act), alleging the Act violated his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that DNA collection burdened his free exercise of religion failed to state a claim under the First Amendment and RFRA. The court found that the potential criminal penalty for failure to cooperate with the collection of a DNA sample did not violate RFRA. According to the court, the collection of prisoner DNA furthers a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. The court also found that the DNA Act does not violate equal protection despite the fact that it requires collection of DNA only from felons who are incarcerated or on supervised release, rather than those who are no longer under the supervision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where the BOP's measure of control over supervised and incarcerated felons makes it significantly easier to collect their DNA samples. The court noted that the extraction, analysis, and storage of the prisoner's DNA information did not call for the prisoner to modify his religious behavior in any way, did not involve any action or forbearance on the prisoner's part, and did not interfere with any religious act in which the prisoner was engaged. (Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Military Facility, Aliens

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Alien, Juvenile

26. JUVENILES: Conditions

Khadr v. Bush, 587 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainee moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the government filed a cross-motion to dismiss or to hold the petition in abeyance pending completion of military commission proceedings. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not bar a challenge to detention based on the detainee's capture as a juvenile, but the detainee's challenge to detention based on his capture as a juvenile was barred by the habeas statute. The court found that a provision of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) barring courts from having jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States as an enemy combatant did not apply to the habeas claim brought by a detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba., where the detainee's claim was entirely independent from the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission. But the court held that the detainee's petition challenged the conditions of his confinement, rather than the legality of his detention, and, thus, was barred by a provision of habeas statute barring the courts from having jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States as an enemy combatant. The court noted that the detainee's request for relief was not tantamount to a request for outright release and was more accurately characterized as a request seeking a different program or location or environment. (United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

4. ASSEMENT OF COSTS: Attorney Fees, Court Costs, Pretrial Detainee

5. ATTORNEY FEES: Determination

27. LIABILITY: Settlement

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Discipline

King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against corrections officers and others, alleging constitutional violations relating to a false accusation of threatening a guard. Prior to trial, the defendants made a package settlement offer, which was rejected by the detainee. Following the trial of one officer, a jury awarded the detainee damages in an amount less than the settlement offer. The parties moved for attorney's fees and costs. The district court granted the detainee's motion and denied the defendant's motion. The officer appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the package settlement offer is to be taken on its own terms and compared with the total recovery package in determining whether a defendant is entitled to costs following the detainee's success at trial. The court held that the officer was entitled to costs, excluding attorney's fees, and that the detainee was entitled only to attorney's fees and costs accrued prior to the rejected offer. (Hillsborough House of Corrections, New Hampshire).

20. GOOD TIME: Due Process, Equal Protection

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Due Process, Good-Time

50. WORK-PRISONER: ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act, Discrimination, Liberty Interest, Termination

Kogut v. Ashe, 592 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). A county jail inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was prevented from participating in various jail work programs as a result of discrimination based on his disability. The district court granted petition. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was prevented from participating in a good-time work program that would have affected the duration of his confinement as a result of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was sufficient to form the basis of habeas relief. The court noted that while an inmate may have no right under the Constitution to credit for good-time, he may not under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) be barred, based on discrimination arising from his disability, from work programs that may have the effect of reducing his sentence. He alleged that he suffers from disabilities which affect his ability to perform certain types of work assigned in the jail. The inmate alleged that he was "denied any and/or all access" to work assigned through the "County Correctional Facilities Work Programs" and provided 16 inmate work request forms in support of this claim. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Access to Court, Due Process, Statute of Limitations

Laurence v. Wall, 551 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2008). A pro se inmate brought a civil rights action against prison employees. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to effect timely service of process. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the inmate showed good cause for failure to timely serve the defendants, where the trial court failed to direct the United States Marshal to serve process for the inmate. (Adult Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Brutality

29. MEDICAL CARE: Involuntary Treatment

41. SEARCHES: Urine test

Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8 Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought [section] 1983 claims against a correctional officer and nurses alleging that they violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to undergo catheterization to avoid prison discipline when he could not provide a urine sample for a random drug test. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison nurses' actions in attempting catheterization of the inmate were objectively reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights against brutality. The court noted that the nurses were following a request from a correctional officer, and the inmate had undergone voluntary catheterization in the past when he was unable to urinate. (Western Missouri Correctional Center)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Teleconference

Lunsford v. RBC Dain Rauscher, Inc., 590 F.Supp.2d 1153 (D.Minn. 2008). Prisoners brought a pro se suit against a securities clearing house, brokerage firm, and brokerage firm employees, alleging a civil rights conspiracy, due process, contract, and securities law violations in closing of their brokerage accounts. Following arbitration of some prisoners' common law and securities law claims, the prisoners moved to vacate the award. The defendants moved to confirm the award and to dismiss the remaining claims. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that requiring the prisoners to testify telephonically did not merit vacation of the award. The court noted that prisoners were not a protected class and had no fundamental right to maintain securities brokerage accounts with private entities, as required to support claims for a Fifth Amendment due process violation, civil rights conspiracy, and neglect to prevent civil rights conspiracy. (RBC Dain Correspondent Services, Nations Financial Group, Inc., Federal Correctional Institute, Edgeville, South Carolina)

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Use of Force

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

McCall v. Crosthwait, 590 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An arrestee brought a [section] 1983 action against a police officer and others, alleging that an officer used excessive force against him when he was in a municipal jail, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the police officer's use of force against the arrestee and the injuries sustained by the arrestee, allegedly arising out of the officer pushing the arrestee in the jail with such force that he fell into a steel door and plexiglass window, was de minimis under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, even if the officer pushed the arrestee into a jail house door unprovoked, a hospital found no injuries after the jail incident aside from a minor contusion to the arrestee's right elbow and shoulder. (Montgomery Municipal Jail, Alabama)

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Searches

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS: Searches

27. LIABILITY: Supervisory Liability

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Searches

41. SEARCHES: Strip Searches

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a police roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil rights action against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to which she was transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations in the motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the warden at a central booking facility, for intrusive searches to which she was subjected.

The court found that the allegations in the offender's complaint--that she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a visual body cavity search as the result of a policy implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and by a warden at the central booking facility--adequately pleaded the minimum facts necessary to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary and the warden under [section] 1983. The policy allegedly authorized strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons admitted to the facility, regardless of the charges filed against them or circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Facility, Maryland)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Delay in Care

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Medical Care

Myrie v. Calvo/Calvoba, 591 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se [section] 1983 action alleging jail medical personnel violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The medical personnel filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's claim that deprivation of his eyeglasses caused significant eye deterioration constituted a serious deprivation of medical needs, but the allegation that a jail physician neglected to take care of his vision problem in a sufficiently prompt manner did not sufficiently allege the physician was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. According to the court, allegations that jail medical personnel's delay in locating his medical file, and the resulting cancellation of his appointment with a physician, delayed or denied his access to medical treatment in violation of Due Process failed to state a claim. (Otis Bantum Correctional Center, New York)

12. EXERCISE ABD RECREATION: Outdoor Exercise

24. IMMUNITY: Qualified Immunity

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Exercise

Norwood v. Woodford, 583 F.Supp.2d 1200 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed an action alleging that prison officials deprived him of outdoor exercise, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and retaliated against him for asserting his right to be free from harm, in violation of the First Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was deprived of outdoor exercise for 39 days was sufficient to satisfy the objective component of his Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the issue of whether state prison officials acted with deliberate indifference when they denied the inmate any outdoor exercise for a 39-day period during an alleged emergency lockdown situation involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court noted that it was clearly established at the time of the deprivation that state prison officials' denial of outdoor exercise for inmates for an extended period of time could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, and thus the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Officer on Prisoner Assault, Sexual Assault

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Failure to Protect, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Assault

Ortiz v. Lasker, 590 F.Supp.2d 423 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A female inmate brought a [section] 1983 action alleging that a male corrections officer physically and sexually assaulted her. The inmate moved for a default judgment and the district court granted the motion in part. The court held that the inmate was entitled to a default judgment on her claims of unconstitutional denial of liberty, use of excessive force, assault and battery, and sexual assault against the male corrections officer following the officer's failure to respond to the allegations asserted in the complaint. The inmate alleged that the officer twice cornered her in a locked, isolated classroom, and subjected her to verbal and physical abuse, including but not limited to forcible rape. The court held that the inmate failed to allege intent or disregard of a substantial probability to cause severe emotional distress, as required to state a claim against the male corrections officer for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law. (Albion Correctional Facility, New York)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Wrongful Death, Use of Force

17. FEMALE PRISONERS: Failure to Protect

46. TRAINING: Failure to Train

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force, Stun Gun

Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008). The administratrix of a detainee's estate brought a [section] 1983 action in state court against county defendants, alleging that they used excessive force when they used tasers on her. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The county and sheriffs department moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. According to the court, under North Carolina law, the sheriff, not the county encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority over hiring, supervising, and discharging personnel in the sheriff's office. The court found that the sheriff's deputies' alleged use of excessive force in attempting to control the detainee by use of tasers, and the sheriff's department's alleged failure to train and supervise its employees as to the use of tasers, could not be attributed to the county, so as to subject it to [section] 1983 liability for the detainee's death. The court held that the county sheriffs department lacked the legal capacity, under North Carolina law, to be sued under [section] 1983 liability for the detainee's death. (Bladen County Sheriff's Department, North Carolina)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference, Inadequate Care, Contract Services

Porterfield v. Durst, 589 F.Supp.2d 523 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate brought an action against prison physicians and a correctional medical service, alleging Eighth Amendment violations following the amputation of his finger. The finger had been injured when the tray slot door to his cell was slammed shut by a correctional officer. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that the physicians' conduct contributed to his injury because the physicians' administration of a particular antibiotic and prescription of post-surgery physical therapy fell within the ambit of their discretionary medical judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a correctional medical service was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. (Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Delaware Department of Correction)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Release

27. LIABILITY: Failure to Protect

36. RELEASE: Work Release, Failure to Protect

50. WORK-PRISONER: Work Release

Sandage v. Board of Com'rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008). The family of murder victims brought a civil rights action under [section] 1983 against county officials, alleging that a county sheriff's department's failure to act on the victims' complaint deprived the victims of their lives without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims had complained that they were being harassed by a murderer who was a county jail inmate and they asked county officials to revoke the inmate's work-release privilege and re-imprison him. The inmate ultimately murdered the victims while he was on work release. The inmate had been serving a four-year sentence for robbery. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the sheriff's department's failure to act on the victims' complaint did not deprive the victims of due process. The court noted that the county officials had no duty to protect the victims against private violence, and the officials' failure to revoke the inmate's work release did not create the danger that the inmate posed to the victims. (Vanderburgh County Jail, Indiana)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Law Library

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Law Library

Shell v. Brun, 585 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a [section] 1983 action against the employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging various constitutional violations. Following the dismissal of certain claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment on access to courts and failure-to-protect claims. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that a prison superintendent knew of the inmate's alleged problems with the law library that allegedly caused him difficulties in prosecuting a proceeding challenging a disciplinary report. According to the court, there was no evidence that any limitations on prison law library hours and book withdrawals were unreasonable, made it more difficult for the inmate to prosecute a state administrative proceeding challenging a misbehavior report, or that the outcome of the inmate's administrative proceeding would have been different but for those policies. The court noted that prison officials may place reasonable restrictions on inmates' use of facility law libraries, as long as those restrictions do not interfere with inmates' access to the courts. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

37. RELIGION: RLUIPA- Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Restrictions, Opportunity to Practice

38. RULES & REGULATIONS-PRISONER: Religious Articles

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Religious Articles

Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a state department of corrections, alleging its policy prohibiting in-cell use of tarot cards violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner was a follower of Wiccan and asserted that tarot cards were part of his religious practices. Following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of the department of corrections. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, where the potential effect of in-cell use of tarot cards on the guards and allocation of prison resources outweighed the restrictions felt by any interested inmate-users. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Conditions

11. DISCIPLINE: Retaliation

33. PRIVACY: Right to Privacy

Sital v. Burgio, 592 F.Supp.2d 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against corrections officers, a hearing officer, and a deputy superintendent employed by New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the prisoner moved for summary judgment on all but one of his claims. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court held that no evidence supported a finding that alleged false disciplinary reports were issued with a retaliatory motive. The court held that the conditions of the prisoner's confinement in a drug-watch room, where he was held for six days so that officers could examine his feces to see if they contained drugs, and during his nine-month stay in a special housing unit (SHU) did not constitute violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments giving rise to the [section] 1983 claim. According to the court, although the conditions were unpleasant, evidence did not support a finding that the conditions were particularly severe, or that they jeopardized the prisoner's health or safety. The court found that legitimate penological interests of maintaining prison security and discipline, particularly concerning the suspected smuggling and possession of illegal drugs, outweighed any privacy right enjoyed by a state prisoner, and thus the prisoner failed to state a [section] 1983 claim related to the prisoner being forced to defecate in full view of other persons in the drug-watch room. (Attica Correctional Facility. New York)

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Release Date

36. RELEASE: Release Date

Strother v. Nardolillo, 583 F.Supp.2d 645 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A petitioner moved for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's decision to detain him after the completion of his maximum sentence in a state prison for a parole violation related to a prior conviction in Delaware. The district court dismissed the petition as second or successive to a previous habeas petition and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed. On remand, the district court held that the petitioner was required to show collateral consequences or continuing injury to maintain the petition. The court noted that the petitioner was released from custody during the pendency of the proceedings, and thus collateral consequences could not be presumed. (George W. Hill Correctional Facility, and Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference, Medication, Mental Health

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Deliberate Indifference, Evaluation, Medication, Delay in Care

33. PRIVACY: Confidential Information, Sex Offenders

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Confidential Information, Sex Offender

Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se [section] 1983 action against a sheriff, deputies, and jail employees. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found that the jail employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a delay in prescribing the inmate's "mental health" medications. The court noted that on the day that the inmate submitted a request for mental health clinic services, the jail nurse referred the request to the county Mental Health Department (MHD) pursuant to standard practice at the jail, but because the inmate did not appear to be an emergency case and because he made no further requests for mental health services, he was not seen by a psychiatrist from MHD for more than two months. He was prescribed Prozac but did not, according to the court, suffer serious adverse effects as a result of the temporary gap between his request for mental health care and his psychiatric examination.

The court found that jail officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a corrections officer's alleged disclosure to other inmates that the inmate had been charged with rape. The court noted that following the disclosure, the inmate spoke with a captain who agreed to, and did remove another inmate who had allegedly taunted him about the rape charge from the inmate's housing unit. The inmate was not harmed, or placed in imminent danger, as a result of the disclosure. According to the court, disclosure to other inmates that the inmate had been charged with rape did not violate any of the inmate's privacy rights, since the information was not privileged or otherwise protected, and the inmate was also a sentenced offender under the authority of the New York State Department of Correctional Services. (Steuben County Jail, New York)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: Medical Treatment

29. MEDICAL CARE: Deliberate Indifference

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against corrections officers. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the claim of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, and, following a jury trial, entered judgment for the officers on an excessive force claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that while the prisoner was in segregation, two corrections officers could not have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs relating to his degenerative joint disease and other back problems, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the officers were not assigned to the segregation unit at the time. (Menard Correctional Institution, Illinois)

31. PERSONNEL: Free Speech, Retaliation, Termination

Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2008). A former employee brought a [section] 1983 action against a Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that she was fired in retaliation for filing reports of misconduct. The DOC moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the filing of reports was not protected speech, and the termination was not retaliatory. The court noted that the employee, who was responsible for advising DOC officials about legal and regulatory issues regarding procurement, did not speak as a citizen and thus her speech was not protected by the First Amendment when, pursuant to her official duties, she filed a report with the Illinois Attorney General and the director of Department of Central Management Services (CMS) which flagged potential misconduct within DOC. According to the court, the filing of such a report was a means to fulfill the employee's employment obligations. The court held that termination of the employee was not in retaliation for her alleged action in reporting to the FBI that a contract approved before she became employed by the DOC may have been issued because someone rigged the bidding process, absent competent evidence that the decision-maker who did not renew the employee's term of employment knew or thought that the employee was the person who had called the FBI. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

1. ACCESS TO COURTS: Access to Attorney, Restrictions

38. RULES & REGULATIONS-PRISONER: Access to Attorney, Restrictions

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Access to Attorney, Security Restrictions

U.S. v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2009). An alien inmate convicted of capital offenses moved to allow attorney-client access without special administrative measures (SAM) restrictions that allegedly violated the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The appeals court held that modification of the SAM was warranted to permit the attorney to use a translator in a meeting with the inmate, and modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigators to disseminate the inmate's communications. The court also found that modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigator to meet with the inmate. The court found that the SAM was an exaggerated response to the prison's legitimate security interests and unacceptably burdened the inmate's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. (Central District, California)

36. RELEASE: Pre-Release, Supervised Release, Work Release

50. WORK-PRISONER: Work Release

U.S. v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal supervisee who had been transferred to a county work-release program at the midpoint of his federal prison term, pursuant to a "prerelease custody" statute, moved to dismiss the government's petition to revoke his supervised release. The supervisee contended that his period of supervised release had expired prior to the revocation petition. The district court denied the supervisee's motion, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that transfer to the work-release program did not mark the beginning of the supervised release period, given the continuing Bureau of Prisons (BOP) control. The court noted that the period of work-release was "imprisonment" within the meaning of the statute, and thus the period of supervised release commenced only upon the inmate's release from work-release. (Bannock County Jail Work Release Program, Montana)

29. MEDICAL CARE: Involuntary Medication, Psychotropic Drugs

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Involuntary Medication

32. PRETRIAL DETENTION: Involuntary Medication

U.S. v. Moruzin, 583 F.Supp.2d 535 (D.N.J. 2008). A defendant was indicted on charges of bank robbery and jury tampering. The government moved for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to the defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the administration of medication would not significantly further the state's interests, that alternatives existed to involuntary administration of the drug Haldol, and that involuntary administration of Haldol was not in the defendant's best medical interest. (Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

27. LIABILITY: Class Action

30. MENTAL PROBLEMS (PRISONER): Failure to Provide Care, Psychiatric Care

39. SAFETY AND SECURITY: Restraints

48. USE OF FORCE: Restraining Chair

Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). County jail inmates sued a county sheriff and a county's administrator of jail operations in their official capacities, alleging disregard of risks to inmates from restraint chairs and other devices, and the denial of access to psychiatric care for indigent inmates. The district court granted the inmates' motion for class certification and the defendants petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The appeals court granted the petition and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates, and abused its discretion by refraining from any consideration whatsoever of the action's merits. (Garfield County Jail, Colorado)

10. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Lethal Injection

Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008). Death row inmates brought a [section] 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a state's lethal injection protocol, and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from executing them during the pendency of their action. The inmates' motion for a stay pending appeal was denied. The district court entered summary judgment in the state's favor, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the action was subject to the statute of limitations for general personal injury actions and the cause of action accrued on the date the inmates' convictions and sentences became final on direct review, or on the date on which the challenged protocol was adopted. The court found that the state did not fraudulently conceal its lethal injection protocol. (Mississippi Department of Corrections and Mississippi State Penitentiary)

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Death Penalty

10. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Lethal Injection

Walker v. Epps, 587 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Miss. 2008). Death row inmates brought a [section] 1983 action against prison officials, challenging the constitutionality of a state's lethal injection protocol, and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from executing them by lethal injection during the pendency of their action. The state moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the three-year statute of limitations on the inmates' [section] 1983 action accrued on the later date of when their individual cases became final on direct review or on the effective date of the state' adoption of lethal injection as a means of execution, which was the date when each inmate knew that, as a matter of right, any impediment to setting an execution date had been removed. (Mississippi Department of Corrections)

50. WORK-PRISONER: Compensation, Prison Industries

Walton v. U.S., 551 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner brought an action to recover from the United States for copyright infringement involving the government's use of calendars he created as part of his assigned duties in prison. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner was in the "service of the United States" when he created calendars as part of his assigned duties in prison, and thus the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over the prisoner's copyright infringement action against the United States. The court noted that the prisoner worked on the calendar on government-furnished computers while supervised by United States employees as part of his assigned duties at a government facility, and received compensation for his efforts. The prisoner developed and produced desk-blotter calendars for the years 2000 and 2001-2002. Federal Prison Industries made a substantial number of those calendars, which it distributed to General Services Administration warehouses throughout the country, and it also sold the calendars to private purchasers. Prisoners assigned to that work were given compensation ranging from $0.23 to $1.15 per hour and various other benefits. (United States Prison, Leavenworth, Kansas)

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Habeas Corpus Relief

Welch v. Mukasey, 589 F.Supp.2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was being illegally detained as a material witness in a federal investigation of an alleged conspiracy. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which habeas relief could be granted. According to the court, the petitioner failed to allege any facts that would support a finding that he was in custody pursuant to any material witness warrant, that federal custody was imminent or that he was subject to a removal order. (Orleans Correctional Facility, New York)

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: Bedding, Sanitation, Mattress, Toilets

15. FACILITIES: Cells, Sanitation, Equipment

23. HYGIENE-PRISONER PERSONAL: Toilets

40. SANITATION: Bedding, Housekeeping, Toilets

Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against correction officers and a superintendent, alleging that the defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and denied him equal protection of the law, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court held that the prisoner's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated by a soiled mattress, the plexiglass shield over the front of his cell, another inmate's overflowed toilet, the use of a single slot to pass objects through a cell door, the denial of his preferred cleaning materials when other suitable materials were made available to him, or a single two-week period during which the plaintiff's cell was not cleaned. The court noted that the prisoner's complaints related principally to his personal preferences as to the cleanliness of his cell. Prison officials did not display deliberate indifference to the prisoner's complaints, but instead responded quickly and appropriately, in that the prisoner received a new mattress within two days of his request, and he was moved to a new cell without a plexiglass cover within five days of his complaint. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

7. CIVIL RIGHTS: Racial Discrimination, Parole

36. RELEASE: Due Process, Liberty Interest, Parole-Denial

Wilborn v. Walsh, 584 F.Supp.2d 384 (D.Mass. 2008). A state inmate filed a [section] 1983 action against state parole board members alleging that he was denied parole because of his sexual orientation. The members moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. According to the court, the issue of whether the state parole board denied the homosexual prisoner parole because of his sexual orientation involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the prisoner's due process claims against parole board members. The court noted that even though a prisoner has no right to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him benefit for any number of reasons, it may not deny the benefit to the prisoner on the basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests. (Bay State Correctional Center, Massachusetts Parole Board)

14. FAILURE TO PROTECT: Protection From Harm, Prisoner on Prisoner Assault

48. USE OF FORCE: Excessive Force

Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought two [section] 1983 actions against prison officers, alleging excessive force and retaliation in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments. The district court summarily dismissed both actions. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner did not sufficiently allege excessive force by the prison officers in violation of the Eighth Amendment where the prisoner failed to concretely allege a physical assault by an officer. According to the court, the assault alleged in his complaint involved the prisoner's cellmate, and the prisoner proffered no evidence to support the suggestion that the officers returned a cane to a cellmate after learning that the cellmate had allegedly hit the prisoner with a cane. The court found that a prison officer's action in grabbing the prisoner did not constitute "excessive force" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that apart from several minutes where the prisoner alleged he experienced a shortness of breath, the inmate did not allege any physical injuries resulting from the encounter. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility, New York)

22. HABEAS CORPUS: Medical Care, Alien

29. MEDICAL CARE: Failure to Provide Care

Zuhair v. Bush, 592 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008). An alien, who had petitioned for habeas relief from his detention in the Guantanamo Bay military facility, brought an emergency motion to compel immediate medical relief. The district court held that the court would appoint its own medical/mental health expert to examine the detainee and provide the court with a report and any recommendations. The court noted that evidence suggested that the health of the petitioner was continuing to deteriorate. (United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)
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Publication:Detentions and Corrections Caselaw Quarterly
Article Type:Case overview
Geographic Code:1U2NY
Date:Feb 1, 2010
Words:15329
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