PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH: Vol. 98, No. 2, March 2019.
This paper develops and argues for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of nondoxastic attitudes that the author calls policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. The author's defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, the author investigates some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies.
Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention, JOSHUA SHEPHERD
Consequence and Normative Guidance, FLORIAN STEINBERGER
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, that is, a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper, the author argues that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. He shows how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well-motivated desiderata. Moreover, he argues that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, he develops a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive.
Lies, Harm, and Practical Interests, ANDREAS STOKKE
This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying that accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, antideceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, antiabsolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible and sometimes not.
How to Be a Reliabilist, CHRISTOPH KELP
It is the aim of this paper to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities essentially to involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed view should take a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, this paper provides reason to believe that the view compares favorably with both extant versions of virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, the paper will show that in taking abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, it argues that the proposed view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process reliabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases, and the generality problem.
Basic-Know and Super-Know, ANNA MAHTANI
Sometimes a proposition is "opaque" to an agent: he doesn't know it, but he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his knowledge of these opaque propositions, and the author calls this the opaque proposition principle. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. The author explains this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term "know" as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic-know or super-know. She then uses this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then similarly to construct plausible versions of the reflection principle and the sure-thing principle.
Monsters and the Theoretical Role of Context, BRIAN RABERN and DEREK BALL
Kaplan famously claimed that monsters--operators that shift the context--do not exist in English and "could not be added to it." Several recent theorists have pointed out a range of data that seem to refute Kaplan's claim, but others (most explicitly Stalnaker) have offered a principled argument that monsters are impossible. This paper interprets and resolves the dispute. Contra appearances, this is no dry, technical matter: it cuts to the heart of a deep disagreement about the fundamental structure of a semantic theory. The authors argue that: (1) the interesting notion of a monster is not an operator that shifts some formal parameter, but rather an operator that shifts parameters that play a certain theoretical role; (2) one cannot determine whether a given semantic theory allows monsters simply by looking at the formal semantics; (3) theories that forbid shifting the formal "context" parameter are perfectly compatible with the existence of monsters (in the interesting sense). The authors explain and defend these claims by contrasting two kinds of semantic theory--Kaplan's and Lewis's.
Frauds, Posers and Sheep: A Virtue Theoretic Solution to the Acquaintance Debate, MADELEINE RANSOM
The acquaintance debate in aesthetics has been traditionally divided between pessimists, who argue that testimony does not provide others with aesthetic knowledge of artworks, and optimists, who hold that acquaintance with an artwork is not a necessary precondition for acquiring aesthetic knowledge. This paper proposes a reconciliationist solution to the acquaintance debate: while aesthetic knowledge can be had via testimony, aesthetic .judgment requires acquaintance with the artwork. The author develops this solution by situating it within a virtue aesthetics framework based on Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology. The author goes on to apply the solution to the debates on moral testimony and expert testimony. An interesting variant on Gettier cases emerges: cases in which subjects have knowledge, but it has been formed by the wrong competence.
Locke's Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality, PATRICK J. CONNOLLY
Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke's stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke's claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention, it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke's general remarks about demonstration as well as his claims about demonstration in natural philosophy, mathematics, and morality. Careful attention to these detailed discussions motivates a reevaluation of Locke's views on demonstrative knowledge of morality. Specifically, while Locke did believe that some demonstrative moral knowledge might in principle be available to us, he also believed that facts about the difficulty of demonstration meant that this knowledge would in practice be largely unattainable.
Racial Profiling and Cumulative Injustice, ANDREAS MOGENSEN
This paper tries to explain why racial profiling involves a serious injustice and to do so in a way that avoids the problems of existing philosophical accounts. An initially plausible view maintains that racial profiling is pro tanto wrong in and of itself by violating a constraint on fair treatment that is generally violated by acts of statistical discrimination based on ascribed characteristics. However, consideration of other cases involving statistical discrimination suggests that violating a constraint of this kind may not be an especially serious wrong in and of itself. To capture fully the significant wrong that occurs when racial profiling is targeted at black Americans or other similarly situated groups, we should appeal to the idea that this basic injustice is exacerbated when it forms part of a larger pattern of similar actions that collectively realize a state of cumulative injustice.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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