PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH: Vol. 98, No. 1, January 2019.
Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists--as the author will call proponents of the strategy--respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema <p> is true iff v. The aim of this paper is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. The author argues that, while cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.
Exceptions in Nonderivative Value, GARRETT CULLITY
According to most substantive axiological theories--theories telling us which things are good and bad--pleasure is nonderivatively good. This seems to imply that it is always good, even when directed toward a bad object, such as another person's suffering. This implication is accepted by the Mainstream View about misdirected pleasures: it holds that when someone takes pleasure in another person's suffering, his being pleased is good, although his being pleased by suffering is bad. This view gains some of its popularity from the advantages of an axiological theory that is structured in the way advocated by Brentano. However, the author of this paper argues that we should reject the Mainstream View, in favor of an alternative suggested by Aristotle: this distinguishes between nonderivative goodness and exceptionless goodness. When it is good, being pleased is good nonderivatively--but it is not always good. The aim of the paper is to show how a Brentano-style theory can be modified to accommodate this alternative view, and how that supports a case for accepting it.
Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality, MARK TEXTOR
Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. This paper argues that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can be elucidated only by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this understanding of Brentano's thesis standard objections to it no longer arise.
You Didn't Build That: Equality and Productivity in a Complex Society Deflationism, SEAN AAS
This paper argues for Serious Distributive Egalitarianism--the view that some material inequalities are seriously objectionable as such; not merely, say, because such inequalities tend to generate inequalities in status. Social justice requires equality, it argues, because basic social institutions produce important goods and are produced in turn by the relevantly equal contributions of all those that comply with them. For example, basic social institutions make it much easier to produce cooperatively than it would be in their absence; therefore, these institutions produce, among other things, opportunities to participate in particular productive enterprises. But basic social institutions are themselves produced, in large part, by the compliance of those subject to them; these subjects, therefore, contribute to the production of the goods that basic institutions produce. This gives fat least) every compliant subject of basic social institutions a claim on these goods. And, this paper argues, though some do contribute more to the maintenance of basic institutions than others, those who contribute more are too responsible for the fact that others contribute less to point to the consequences of this difference as a reason they should get greater returns. The author concludes that all subjects of basic social institutions have equally forceful and forcefully equal claims on the goods these institutions produce; claims that render inequalities in the distribution of these goods seriously objectionable as such.
Causes as Difference-Makers for Processes, CHRISTIAN LOEW
It is natural to think of causes as difference-makers. What exact difference causes make, however, is an open question. In this paper, it is argued that the right way of understanding difference-making is in terms of causal processes: causes make a difference to a causal process that leads to the effect. The author shows that this way of understanding difference-making nicely captures the distinction between causing an outcome and helping determine how the outcome happens and, thus, explains why causation is not transitive. Moreover, the theory handles tricky cases that are problematic for competing accounts of difference-making.
Berkeley on Inconceivability and Impossibility, THOMAS HOLDEN
Contrary to a popular reading of his modal epistemology, Berkeley does not hold that inconceivability entails impossibility, and he cannot therefore argue the impossibility of mind-independent matter by appealing to facts about what we cannot conceive. Berkeley is explicit about this constraint on his metaphysical argumentation, and, the author argues, does respect it in practice. Popular mythology about the "master argument" notwithstanding, the only passages in which he might plausibly seem to employ the principle that inconceivability entails impossibility are those that argue for the inseparability of primary from secondary qualities. However, an alternative reading of these texts is available that is both consistent with Berkeley's express modal epistemology and credible in its own right.
Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity? SHYAM NAIR
The Truth about Deception, JAPA PALLIKKATHAYIL
The prohibition on lying is often thought to be very stringent. Some have even been tempted to think that it is absolute. In contrast, the prohibition on other forms of deception seems to be looser. This paper explores the relationship between the duty not to deceive and the duty not to lie. This discussion is situated in the context of a broadly Kantian account of morality. Kant himself infamously claimed that one ought not lie to a murderer at the door about the location of his intended victim. This paper aims to explain how a broadly Kantian view can endorse a distinctive duty not to lie without thereby being committed to this kind of conclusion.
Social Constraints on Moral Address, VANESSA CARBONELL
The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay, the author identifies a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. She argues that features of the social world--including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping--can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from engaging in what Stephen Darwall calls "felicitous moral address." We should think of some members of the moral community as having second-class moral citizenship in ways that parallel second-class political citizenship. The injustice of second-class moral citizenship can be understood by drawing an analogy with Miranda Flicker's notion of "epistemic injustice." Flicker's account of how people can be undermined in their capacity as knowers can be extended to show how people can be undermined in their capacity as makers of moral claims, which can be called "claimant injustice."
Non-Classical Knowledge, ETHAN JERZAK
The knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. This paper argues that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. The author develops a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical [K.sub.3] logic. The autor then assesses the philosophical merits of this approach. He argues that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Godel coding. In particular, the author argues that from the perspective of natural language, his nonclassical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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