PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 94, No. 2, April 2019.
Discussion of the soul in this essay departs from the concept of the soul that for thousands of years has occupied the attention of philosophers and theologians and pervaded religious discourse. The author is concerned with what William James referred to as "the popular soul," the soul as it is invoked by expressions such as "an expansive soul," "a soulless person," "soul-mate," and "that melody touched my soul." Skepticism with regard to the existence of this soul is without warrant. The principal topics considered are: how this soul comes into being and develops; what its essential features are; how the world, when the soul is engaged, is transformed; what its relationship is to one's conscience; its importance in a human life; its connections to purity and perfection, to silence; its survival upon death; and the perils posed today to its development and existence.
Empire as a Subject for Philosophy (Polis, Imperium, Cosmopolis), JAMES ALEXANDER
In order to consider the question of whether empire is a subject for philosophy, this paper does three things. It sketches an original typology of three types of state, which the author calls polis, imperium, and cosmopolis, in order to show that the second is an important philosophical conception that lies behind the terminology of empire and imperialism. This paper also considers modern theories of empire and imperialism in order to indicate some of their limitations as theories. And finally, the author indicates that it is important even for philosophers to recognize that all imperial terminology emerges out of a very complicated history in which the concept of imperium has been extended and distorted in meaning, so that, at best, any good theory of empire or imperialism can only be some sort of recapitulation of that history. Neither the second nor the third of these claims undermines the claim of imperium to be a concept of the state which is of great political and philosophical significance.
Taking Politics Seriously, CHARLES BLATTBERG
John Rawls' gamification of justice leads him--along with many other monist political philosophers, not least Ronald Dworkin--to fail to take politics seriously enough. The author begins with why we consider games frivolous and then show how Rawls's theory of justice is not merely analogous to a game, as he himself seems to claim, but is in fact a kind of game. As such, it is harmful to political practice in two ways: one as regards the citizens who participate directly in it, and the other as regards those who do no more than follow it.
Fatalism: Thoughts about Tomorrow's Sea Battle, DAVID COCKBURN
The hold of the fatalistic reasoning that Aristotle criticizes is dependent, first, on the idea, articulated by Frege, that the real candidates for truth and falsity are something other than particular contingent happenings such as affirmations or thinkings, and, second, on the idea that the demand for speculative reflection overrides any demand for practical deliberation. Standard challenges to the reasoning embody the same presuppositions and so simply perpetuate the core confusions. They do so most fundamentally in the assumption that we need a metaphysical grounding for our idea of ourselves as agents who have influence on the course of events.
Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations, BENEDICT SMITH
Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that the author of this paper disputes. The author suggests that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe thatp can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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