On Fanon's Manichean delirium.
FOR MANY readers, entering Fanon's first chapter of The Wretched of the Earth can be a bit disconcerting, not only for the positions expounded there concerning violence, but also for what appears as an implicit affirmation of the very Manicheanism that according to Fanon subtends the colonial order. That is, when Fanon states that the colonial world is "a world divided in two," it is in no way a simple denunciation, but in his eyes, the objective delineation of the parameters of possibility within the existing colonial situation. As Fanon reads the scope and direction of the initial movements of the colonized, he concludes that their actions do not reinforce, nor seek to replicate, this initial situation. Rather, the entire "truth" of the "Wretched's" movement is to actually "split the world in two" and create a rupture from the entirety of this situation that will allow the Wretched to destroy both the colonizer and, figuratively, themselves as colonized. This would be to turn away from the physical violence of the anticolonial war in a strict sense, and toward the innovation required to bring a new subject of political action into existence. As Fanon repeats again and again (despite many subsequent misreadings to the contrary), the success or failure of the Wretched depends on their capacity to achieve what until then had remained, strictly speaking, impossible.
THE AFFIRMATION of Manicheanism has led commentators to view the opening of Fanon s Wretched as a retreat from questions regarding the "ambivalences of identification" touched upon in Fanon's previous writings, most specifically with his invocation of Lacanian psychoanalysis and its mirror stage of the T to approximate the question of "black psychopathology" (1) in chapter six of Black Skin, White Masks. For Homi Bhabha, it is certainly in the opening pages of Wretched, so enmeshed in the anticolonial struggle of revolutionary Algeria, where Fanon is forced to "impede the exploration of the ... ambivalent, uncertain questions of colonial desire. The state of emergency from which he [Fanon] writes demands more insurgent answers, more immediate identifications." (2)
In other words, Fanon's affirmation of an "inversion of colonial Manicheanism" in Wretched has been interpreted as a kind of deviation from Black Skin, White Masks. (3) Although one could derive such an argument from Fanon's writings, the above approach treats Fanon's method of describing the unfolding of the various moments of the national revolutionary impulse as if these moments existed as independent ends.
As ATO Sekyi-Otu has pointed out, the admonition of what Bhabha calls Fanon's "more immediate identification" with the colonized in Wretched hinges on isolating the moment of "reverse Manicheanism" in Fanon from the larger unfolding of Fanon's own dialectical narrative of decolonization. (4) Such an approach treats the question of "anti-racist racism" and "race war" as if these were the final rather than the inaugural moments of struggle. That is, to borrow from the work of Main Badiou, it attempts to use the psychoanalytic structural dialectic of "alterity" to interrupt what it reads as Fanon's appropriations of a classically Hegelian inflected narrative of alienation and disalienation. In that narrative, the moment of encounter implicit in colonization is the unfolding of a simple term in its becoming other, and the moment of decolonization as the "negation of the negation," (5) the return to itself as an achieved concept. Here not only do we see reduced Fanon's own thoughts on Manicheanism, but we are also led to underestimate the achievements Fanon intuits when this Manicheanism is confronted and effectively crushed by the thought and action of the colonized.
A World Divided in Two
NOT ONLY is Fanon's "world divided in two" devoid of social ambivalences between colonizer and colonized, but Fanon goes so far as to claim that the distinction itself exists at the level of a difference in "species," (6) which he further describes as "congenitally antagonistic" due to the very "reification secreted and nurtured by the colonial situation." (7) The language of species used by Fanon is chosen from the vocabulary of the colonists themselves, whose dehumanization of the colonized subject leads them to speak in "zoological" terms when referring, for instance, to the "yellow multitudes." That is, for Fanon, the colonists do not tire of referring to the colonized in terms of "... hordes, ... stink, ... swarming, ... seething ... etc." (8)
In addition, these zoological categories are assigned a hierarchy of value; the animalistic colonized is incapable of holding human values and is thus considered "the quintessence of evil." (9) These differentiations, stemming from a reduction to the biological, then lead the colonists to the necessity of protecting the ruling species from "infection" emanating from the natives. (10) This is a protection that only arrives by the application of the "Aristotelian logic of mutual exclusion" expressed in the strict spatial compartmentalization of the colony into European and Native quarters (of which South African apartheid was paradigmatic but not exceptional for Fanon). (11) That is, the heart of the colonists' project can be delineated through "the geographical configuration and classification[s]" which it then circularly employs to produce the very distinction between the species. Consider Fanon's description of the conditions of the European quarters:
The colonists' sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It's a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trashcans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers. The colonists' feet ... are protected by solid shoes in a sector where the streets are clean and smooth, without a pothole, without a stone ... The colonist's sector is a white folks' sector, a sector of foreigners. (12)
This sector could not stand in sharper distinction to the natives' quarters:
The "native" quarters, the shantytown, the Medina, the reservation, is a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, front anything. It's a world with no space, people are piled one top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. The colonized sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light... It is a sector of niggers, a sector of towelheads. (13)
Accordingly, in the colony there exists a near confluence between geographical location, species/race, and social standing. That is, one's social position within colonial society is directly correlated to which of these "species," which of these "races," one belongs, which in turn determines what physical location one inhabits in the colony. (14) A certain circularity should be noted here between the classificatory schemas of the zoological terms and the physical manifestation of apartheid. That is, there is a relay between the creation of the colonized as an epistemologically "knowable" object and the spatial segregation, or locational "fixing" of that object within the colony. The circularity of this "bio-geographic determinism" is captured nicely by Charles Mills, who explains, "you are what you are in part because you originate from a certain kind of space, and that space has those properties in part because it is inhabited by creatures like yourself." (15)
IT BECOMES clear then from these descriptions that the colonial project is the production of a "Manichean world." In order to keep these worlds apart, domination cannot be hidden; the zone of the colonist and that of the native face each other separated by "napalm and rifle butts," directly opposed but never "in the service of a higher unity" (16) That is, for Fanon, the colonial world stands in immediate contradistinction to "capitalist societies" that are characterized by the fact that an educational system, a system of counselors and teachers, as well as that of a set of "moral reflexes" play a mediating role that helps "to instill in the exploited a sense of submission and inhibition," and which thus functions to ease the labor of the particular into the social organization of the whole. (17)
In colonial societies no such mediation exists and, consequently, "the official, legitimate agent, the spokesperson for the colonist and the regime of oppression is the police officer and the soldier." (18) In addition, unlike capitalist societies, where the "ruling class" is characterized by their possession of factories, estates, and bank accounts, in colonial societies the "ruling species" is characterized simply by being from elsewhere, by being "the others" to the native. Fanon explains this situation in the now oft-quoted statement: "In the colonies the economic infrastructure (the base) is also a superstructure. The cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich." (19) Again, the Manicheanism of colonial society makes it so that the "reality" of the correlation between one's racial belonging and one's economic standing is "never masked," and thus "no conciliation [between these species is] possible, one of them is superfluous." (20)
FANON'S DESCRIPTION is not intended simply to denounce the Manichean world of the colonies, but to outline the conditions of existence that can account for what will soon follow. That is, it allows us to identify the very structure of the colonial world, its Manicheanism, as that which will provide the initial impetus for its demise. Fanon's description allows us to see two aspects of this impetus. First, we see the inability of the colonial system to "mask domination and alleviate oppression." (21) As Fanon notes, the lack of mediation, which presents itself as the reason for the particular brutality of the colonial system, is in fact its Achilles heel. The very symbols of physical subjugation, "the bugle calls and the military parades," the constant need of the colonist to announce "Here I am the master!" which serve as attempts to instill physical fear into the native, simultaneously and unwittingly allow him (or her) to externalize and identify the reason for his plight, while identifying his own continued resistance as a point of excess inassimilable to the colonial structure. (22) That is, these actions by the colonist allow the colonized to "identify his enemy and put a name to all his misfortune," to move from defeat to action, simultaneously warding off the threat of fatalism. (23)
Second, this lack of mediation and the consequent reliance by the colonist on physical violence creates a situation in which the native is physically "dominated," but there is nothing in place to assure that he is "domesticated." (24) As Fanon points out, in words that help us to understand the importance of the externalization made possible by the Manicheanism of the colonial situation, "the native is made to feel inferior, but by no means [is he] convinced of his inferiority." (25) We might say then (echoing Ranajit Guha) that in the colonial situation there is domination without hegemony. These two elements, the creation of domination and the constantly identifiable "external" reason for that domination, allows the native an anchoring point, a point of decision, in which the logic of Manicheanism used by the colonist becomes the very basis for the colonized to conclude that "destroy[ing] the colonial world means nothing less than demolishing the colonist's sector, burying it deep within the earth or banishing it from the territory" (26) In sum, the Manicheanism introduced by the colonizer and built into the colonial situation as a whole, becomes the basis for unifying the subjugated race against its foreign oppressor. (27)
BY inverting the colonizers' Manicheanism, the colonized are able to fashion a future without the colonizer. If the status of the colonist comes from being "from elsewhere," then certainly those "from here" can expel the colonizer and "eject him outright from the picture." (28) The unification of those "from here" against those "from elsewhere" allows the natives then to act on a dream that had until then remained latent, the dream of "taking the colonists' place," and more simply of going from the position of persecuted to that of persecutor. (29) In short, for Fanon, it is the Manichean reality of the colonial situation that provides all the necessary elements for the initial and "minimum" demand of decolonization ... "the last shall become the first." (30) Manicheanism best lays the groundwork for its own inversion and "the Manicheanism of the colonizer produces a Manicheanism of the colonized," generating "an anti-racist racism," as Jean-Paul Sartre labeled it, or a "race war" as Eldridge Cleaver would refer to it. (31) The Manichean reality provides the material from which the colonized draws to move from "fixedness" to action, even if this minimal demand is still firmly in the grips of reaction.
HAVING BROKEN with fatalism and identified the colonist as the externalizable cause of oppression, the native is also able to identify the mechanism through which that oppression is made a reality--violence. That is, as Fanon states, it is the settler's unmediated violence that has shown the native once and for all that "colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence." (32) It is the violence of the colonizer that has created the colonized; it is through their "bayonets" and "cannon fire" that they have destroyed the very the social fabric of native life, e.g., economy, lifestyle, and modes of dress. (33) Thus it is through this violence that the colonist not only imposes a separation of the species but in fact "fabricates" its other, the colonized. If the colonists can say that the natives are animals, it is because their violence has done everything possible to reduce them to an animal-like existence (all the more vicious, for never having succeeded). Yet, according to Fanon, due to the law of "reciprocal homogeneity" that characterizes the Manichean reality of the colonial situation, this violence emanating from the colonist shows the native the path that he must take to freedom ... "colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat." (34)
Directly following in this line of Manichean inversion, Fanon states that "the colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence." (35) If the Manicheanism of the colonial situation has provided an end goal for the native--the expulsion of the colonize--then the daily imposition of colonialism through visible violence has indicated the means by which this goal might be achieved. That is, it is the direct and organized violence of a unified people that diminishes the capacity of the metropolis to act, forcing the colonizer eventually to abandon the colony. (36) We here find ourselves back at the very first lines of The Wretched of the Earth, "decolonization is always a violent event." (37) It is, then, only in the capacity to move beyond the initial "minimal" demand, beyond reaction, that the colonized can move beyond violence and toward a properly active action.
Manicheanism, Partisan Struggle and Strategy: Splitting the World in Two
SEEING THAT the question of violence is in fact a subset of the larger issue of Manicheanism, what are we to make of Fanon's insistence on the force of the colonized's Manichean inversion of the colonial situation? That is, should we view Fanon's sympathy for this inversion, as Bhabha has done, as an oversimplified identification with the plight of the colonized induced by the exigencies of an anticolonial war? For Fanon, although this inversion was absolutely necessary to break from the structure of colonialism, as he is careful to point out, it is in no way sufficient for a successful process of decolonization. It is important to remember the reason for the necessity of this "inversion." The first reason is that through the Manichean inversion, the colonized are able to see that colonialism did not arise out of ontological necessity but rather through the contingent historical actions of the colonizer. That is, colonization is a historical phenomenon in which the privileged agents are the colonists. Although the existence of this phenomenon limits the conduct of the colonized, the realization of its historicity simultaneously reopens the field of history to the possibility of their own agency.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the rediscovery of historical possibility is accompanied by the acknowledgment that ontological and historical justifications of colonization serve only to obscure the issue of force, and therefore the realization that the violent imposition of colonialism can be answered in the violent actions of the colonized. In this turn of events, success or failure does not lie simply in a tactical defeat of the colonizer but in the enormous strategic victory achieved in exposing the absolute "exhaustion of politics" under the colonial structure. (38) It is at this point of exhaustion that, according to Fanon:
Tactics and strategy merge. The art of politics is transformed into the art of war. The militant becomes the fighter. To wage war and to engage in politics are one and the same thing. (39)
By viewing both colonization and decolonization as simply "a question of relative strength" and thus of open struggle, the colonized have given up on "government inquiries" and "searches for justice" within the colonial context. (40) Thus the logic of exclusion that maintains the colonial structure resurfaces as a point of excess over and above this structure from which the colonized can be clear that the only legitimacy sustaining the colonial regime is that of force. (41) "Restructuring the world" is possible.
As FANON notes (as early as Black Skin, White Masks), this realization is worldwide, and subjects throughout the Third World were "shattering their chains" with the example of the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu to emulate. That is, through the organization of force, and more specifically the conduct of "guerilla war" (what Fanon refers to as "that instrument of violence of the colonized"), a Dien Bien Phu was "now within reach of every colonized subject. (42) The Manichean inversion allows the colonized to see that colonization is a question of the organization of force, and that that kind of organization, through guerilla warfare, is imminently within reach.
Through this analysis of the "exhaustion of politics," Fanon is firmly within the formation of the Third World partisan. This was a figure developed independently and in particular places and instances, but which was formed within the overall situation of colonialism and came to conclusions strikingly similar to those set out by Mao Zedong, whom Carl Schmitt called the "new Clausewitz" (or as we might say today, an inverted Clausewitz), comparing him to the nineteenth-century German military theorist who famously declared: "war is the continuation of politics by other means." Mao writes:
"War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has not been a war that did not have a political character... When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away those obstacles in the way... It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed. (43)
This conclusion not only produces a challenge to the colonizers, who cannot fathom a future in which they are no longer the central subjects of history. It is also, and more importantly, a contestation to those would-be or semi- sympathizers who mistakenly reduce the possible agency of the colonized to a compromise or action within the colonial structure. Fanon rightly notes that these objections to the organization of force and to the unleashing of violence repeated a certain developmentalist logic that makes the colonized losers from the start. To demonstrate this oft-repeated logic, Fanon cites a passage from Friedrich Engels' Anti-Durhing that is worth reproducing in its entirety:
Just as Crusoe could procure a sword for himself, we are equally entitled to assume that one fine morning Friday might appear with a loaded revolver in his hand, and then the whole "force" relationship is inverted. Friday commands and it is Crusoe who has to drudge... So, then, the revolver triumphs over the sword; and this will probably make even the most childish axiomatician comprehend that force is no mere act of will, but requires very preliminary conditions before it can come into operation, that is to say, instruments, the more perfect of which vanquish the less perfect; moreover, that these instruments have to be produced, which also implies that the producer of more perfect instruments of force, vulgo arms, vanquishes the producer of the less perfect instrument, and that, in a word, the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general therefore on "economic power," on the "economic order," on the material means which force has at its disposal. (44)
WITHIN Engels' text, Fanon saw the construction of an argument that attempts to bury conflict within the discourse of economic development, nullifying the question of political will and thus seemingly freezing the relations of force throughout time--fatalism, resignation and apathy Given the pervasiveness of this logic, even within the nationalist parties in the colonies in which the anticolonial struggle had been defeated before it was even initiated, it is important to highlight Fanon's understanding that the formation of the consciousness of species/ race struggle brought on by the inversion of colonial Manicheanism ran directly counter to the logic exemplified by Engels' text. That is, to use the terminology developed by Michel Foucault while analyzing a strikingly parallel situation, what Fanon is describing is a paradigmatic case of the formation of the "historical/political" discourse of the partisan, which faces off against the "juridical/ philosophical" discourse dominant in "the West" and through which the West assures its dominance within the colonial situation. (45)
ACCORDING to Foucault, juridical-philosophic discourse is the discourse of sovereignty, which begins with three pre-given concepts: law, the unity of power, and the subject. (46) By starting with the "individual" (the subject) as pre-given, sovereignty is able to present subjection as the necessary given in any relationship of power. (47) It is worth noting how strong the connection between the production of the individual and the structure of subjection is for Fanon as well. As he states, first among the "values" that the colonist tries to inculcate into the native intellectual is that of individualism:
The colonialist bourgeoisie hammered into the colonized mind the notion of a society of individuals where each is locked in his subjectivity, where wealth lies in thought. But the colonized intellectual who is lucky enough to bunker down with the people during the liberation struggles, will soon discover the falsity of this theory. Involvement in the organization of struggle will already introduce him to a different vocabulary. "Brother," "sister," "comrade." (48)
Thus, in sharp contrast to "sovereign discourse," "historical/political" discourse begins with the situation of domination, with the establishment of sovereignty through the defeat of one portion of society by another. Therefore, and much as Fanon himself sees, it is "the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject," the historical/political discourse of the partisan sees the individual and his or her subjection not as a necessary pre-given but as "manufactured" within the relations of power (Fanon 2004, 2). To quote Foucault, the emphasis of historical/political discourse is on "how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects" (Foucault 2003, 45). Importantly then, politics for the partisan (i.e., as described by Fanon in the Third World movement as a whole) far exceeds the "political institutions" of any given society which are in fact a subset of "a relation of force" within which the subjugated, the colonized, act along with the colonizer. The logic of the partisan, according to Foucault, is that power does not emanate from the sovereign; rather, sovereignty itself is the expression of a given relation of force that involves the entirety of a society.
As a consequence, the binary or Manichean logic of the partisan in this "race war" acts as a rather distinct antidote to sovereignty. That is, it is the subject of juridical-philosophic universality which subtends sovereignty, that subject which "establishes itself between the adversaries, in the center and above them, imposing one general law and founding a reconciliatory order" which is directly challenged by the partisan insistence that you must belong to one side or another in this war. (49)
Perhaps in light of these insights we can more fully explore the discussion of Fanon's apparent praise of the Manichean logic of decolonization. Within this context, the issue of violence cannot simply be reduced to physical force; as Fanon states, "the occupier can easily phase out the violent aspects of his presence." It therefore might more productively be seen as the mechanism through which anticolonial movements as a whole attempted to link the issue of strategy and tactics to political outcomes; a new relation of force. (50)
This necessitates a logic which has the virtue of positing all relations of force, unlike the logic presented earlier by Engels and the nationalist bourgeoisie parties, as purely contingent and thus immanently reversible (an insight that today seems somewhat obvious, keeping in mind that such flippancy is only possible thanks to the very process of decolonization in which Fanon is so intensely immersed). Furthermore, if the colonial situation is in fact composed from top to bottom as a relation of force, or a war, that exceeds the institutions of what in the West has been termed "the political" (that space contained in the interaction between state and civil society), then in recognizing that war the colonized would have to do far more than merely expel the colonizer. They would in fact have to produce entirely new spaces for political action; their aim would thus have to be to achieve the, until then, impossible, and change politics itself.
Beyond War: Innovate
IT IS EQUALLY important to note that, throughout the first chapter of Wretched, Fanon captures the virtue of the inverted Manicheanism of the colonized while never himself viewing that Manicheanism as an end. Rather, as he states on a number of occasions, this demand ("the last shall become first") is simply the "minimal demand" which he will later explain is related to the expression of a vague form of "a national framework" that is more likely to lead to manipulation by the parasitical "national bourgeoisie" than to liberation. The truth is that for Fanon
very little happens in the spaces of the colonizer or in those of the colonized. In fact, Fanon refers to this entire "really" the entirety of the spaces in the given order of places of colonization, as the "zone of death." But within the space of the colonized, the establishment of an "anti-racist racism" is an initial action that like all first actions for Fanon is mere reaction, but nevertheless a reaction (the Manichean inversion) that can be sprit within itself.
As Fanon explains, this reaction, like all reaction, is more likely than not to continue forever in the logic of "reciprocal homogeneity" and "hate" that characterizes the colonial situation. But the reaction that brings to light the "exhaustion of politics" within the colonial structure, far beyond the mere deployment of physical violence, leads to the collective realization that colonization/ decolonization must be a question of "relative strength" between two distinct subjective forces. In this realization the colonized has stepped onto the scene to smash the self-satisfied fullness of the colonizer, not only reintroducing the possibility of a reversal of fortune, the possibility of moving from "persecuted to persecutor," but more importantly, the possibility of what Fanon would term "scission," a break from the colonial structure, the space for the existence of another subject altogether. In Fanon's words, they have introduced the possibility of turning away from Europe and affirming "the new." Therefore, for Fanon, the spaces of the colonized are themselves sprit in two between mere reaction, firmly within the "zone of turbulence," and what Fanon terms "the zone of action."
THIS "zone of action" however cannot by definition exist between colonizer and colonized, as Homi Bhabha would have it, as each of these figures and therefore everything between them is still firmly in the "zone of death." Rather, the "zone of action" comes into being in the point of scission, the point of decision of the colonized to destroy themselves as colonized, and "the new," or as Fanon had previously put it, "the unforeseeable." In other words, the Wretched have called the bluff of the colonizer, and to the colonizers frequent exclamations, "you are not like us!" they have set out, through an unparalleled collective organization of the will (a careful process of organization, selection, and discipline detailed in chapters two and three of Wretched), to make this statement an unqualified truth, answering, "We will make ourselves far more different than you can imagine!" They have set out to achieve the alteration of being, to bring into existence another element, in but not of, the colonial situation--themselves as an independent subjective force.
FINALLY, we should be careful here, as the production of an actual duality, the production of the Wretched as an active subjective element is irreconcilable with the first element (i.e. colonialism), with regard to the question of difference. The first element, Europe's Manichean dualism ("a world divided in two") is the mechanism for the production and reproduction of a purely monological discourse. In contrast, the struggle of the colonized to bring into existence an actual duality (the Third World partisan's struggle described by Fanon as "Split[ring] the world in two") is the onto-historical condition of possibility for the end of that monologue, for difference. Far from the today fashionable declarations of "Long live difference!" The Wretched of the Earth reminds us that difference today stands on the shoulders of millions of anticolonial militants.
(1.) Bhabha, Homi K., The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994) 44.
(2.) Bhabha, Homi K., "Remembering Fanon," New Formations 1, (1987): 118-124.
(3.) Gibson, Nigel, "Fanon and the Pitfalls of Cultural Studies," Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives, ed. Anthony C. Alessandrini (New York: Routledge, 1999) 102.
(4.) Sekyi-Otu, Ato, Fanon's Dialectic of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
(5.) Badiou, Main, Theory of the Subject (New York: Continuum, 2009) 3-12.
(6.) Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004) 1.
(7.) Ibid., 2.
(8.) Ibid., 7.
(9.) Ibid., 6.
(10.) Gibson, Nigel, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) 108.
(11.) Fanon, Wretched, 3.
(12.) Ibid., 4.
(14.) Ibid., 5.
(15.) McKittrick, Katherine, and Woods, Clyde, Black Geographies and the Politics of Place (Cambridge: South End Press, 2007) 7; and Lipsitz, George, How Racism Takes Place (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011) 28.
(16.) Ibid,. 4.
(18.) Ibid., 3. If Black Skin, White Masks, is productively read alongside, and against, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, I propose that these descriptions of a lack of a site for mediational education within colonial society will be seen to be formulated by Fanon more directly in relation to, and against, Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right. In other words, what Fanon is most specifically referencing in the above paragraph is the lack of existence of "civil society" within the colony. See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 219-274.
(19.) Ibid., 5.
(20.) Ibid., 4.
(22.) Ibid., 17.
(23.) Ibid., 31.
(24.) Ibid., 16.
(26.) Ibid., 6.
(27.) Ibid., 10.
(28.) Ibid., 5,9.
(29.) Ibid., 16.
(30.) Ibid., 10. [Fanon's phrase invokes Jesus's words in Matthew 20:16: "So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many are called, but few chosen" (King James Bible).--Ed.]
(31.) Fanon, Wretched, 50; and Sartre, Jean-Paul, Black Orpheus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988) 296.
(32.) Fanon, Wretched, 23.
(33.) Ibid., 6.
(34.) Ibid., 23.
(35.) Ibid., 86.
(36.) Ibid., 30.
(37.) Ibid., 1.
(38.) Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, 119.
(39.) Fanon, Wretched, 83.
(40.) Ibid., 61.
(41.) Ibid., 42-43.
(42.) Ibid., 26 and 31.
(43.) Mao Zedong and Knight, Nick, Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy 1937 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990) 135-136.
(44.) Friedrich Engels as quoted in Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, 25.
(45.) Foucault, Michel, Society Must Be Defended (New York: Picador, 2003) 57.
(46.) Ibid., 44.
(47.) Ibid., 29, 30.
(48.) Fanon, Wretched, 11.
(49.) Ibid,. 51, 53.
(50.) Ibid., 91.
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|Title Annotation:||Frantz Fanon|
|Publication:||The Black Scholar|
|Article Type:||Critical essay|
|Date:||Sep 22, 2012|
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