North Korean National Guerilla strategies: strategic intelligence preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) using the PMESII model.
--Mao Tse Tung, On Guerilla Warfare
The purpose of this assessment is to provide an understanding of how a protracted guerilla war may be employed to embroil the U.S. in an unpopular and costly (both human and monetary) war so that a fractured North Korea could remain intact. The assessment does not cover all strategies (i.e., tactical and operational) but attempts to outline the overall strategic plan. The Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) Model is a system-of-systems analytical approach to identify a potential adversary's war-making capabilities. More specifically, I have used the PMESII model to identify strategies underpinning North Korean survival as a nation state when faced with almost certain conventional military defeat.
The assessment begins with the assumption that either a desperate North Korea attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK) or that the U.S. decided that regime change was necessary. The results of the battle have the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in control of the fighting, having pushed into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) with forces poised in the vicinity of the Kaesong Heights. With conventional military defeat imminent and his regime about to collapse Kim Jong-II (KJI) rallies the military and the population to begin an unconventional guerilla war. (1)
KJI's purpose in altering his strategy is to buy time, diminish support for the CFC offensive, and make the war more costly; thereby making the conflict unpopular. This strategy, combined with continuing propaganda efforts and working through third-party nations, will underpin his attempts at a diplomatic solution. His end state will be the cessation of hostilities and an intact North Korea.
From a historical perspective there is overwhelming evidence that North Koreans completely understand the nuances of guerilla warfare and are better prepared than most countries to execute such a strategy.
The North Korean guerilla experience was born in the early 1930s when a young Kim Sung-ju (later renamed Kim II Sung) fought against Japanese forces in Manchuria. (2) During this time, Kim gained valuable guerilla experience and began forging his political beliefs. Eventually, Kim would rise to the position of Sixth Division Commander, Second Army. That Kim II Sung fought with the Chinese guerillas is important to note because it is here that he was taught Mao Tse-Tung's guerilla warfare strategies. Not only was he indoctrinated into Mao's guerilla mindset, but he survived to see the fruits of his strategies against the Japanese.
Kim learned to employ a variety of classic guerilla tactics. These tactics included deception, hostage taking, and small unit operations (usually using hit-and-run tactics). He realized that he was outnumbered and therefore split his ranks and used the mountainous topography of Korea to his benefit.
"The nature of his operation was such that the forces were divided into many small companies and detachments, constantly moving from one location to another in deep mountain forests and difficult to reach areas." (3)
One of the keys to guerilla survival is the ability to resupply. Kim reverted to strong-arming the rich, attacking small supply trains, trading opium and ginseng for crops, and by sometimes threatening farmers. After several Japanese attempts to kill Kim, he finally retreated to the Soviet Union and received additional military training in 1941. (4) After his stay in the Soviet Union, he was propelled into power by the Soviets; the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was established on 8 February 1946 and Kim II Sung was appointed its chairman.
After the split between North and South Korea was solidified, Kim II Sung concluded that a forceful reunification was the preferred method for bringing the two Koreas together. But before he tried a conventional approach, he attempted a more unconventional approach using guerilla forces. (5)
"From September 1949 to March 1950, Communist guerilla activities in the South were intensified, and two Communist leaders in the South, Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha, used guerillas sent from the north." (6)
The use of guerilla forces was designed to incite a Communist revolt in the South, a much preferred method to an actual invasion. More than 3,000 guerilla forces were sent, including more than 600 graduates from the Kangdong Political Institute (a Communist indoctrination school). Fortunately, these activities were halted as most of the infiltrators were arrested. It does show that Kim II Sung was still thinking of his military roots and the importance of guerilla warfare in North Korean military doctrine. But his attempts to use unconventional warfare ended there.
During the Eighth plenum (or general assembly) of the Worker's Party of Korea Central Committee in 1964, Kim-II Sung pronounced his revised strategy for unification. This strategy involved the strengthening of three revolutionary forces: revolutionary forces of the north, revolutionary forces of the south, and international revolutionary forces. (7) His reference to revolutionary forces translated into a call for subversive activities to organize and undermine the Park Chun Hee government. To some degree, this kind of activity continues in the ROK today. Certainly a case could be made that groups like HanJongry'un (Korean National Federation of General Student Assemblies) or Bum Dae Wi (Pan-National Countermeasures Committee) are somewhat extensions of unconventional warfare. These groups do not hide the fact that they are pro-North Korean and ultimately desire a unified Korea under Communist rule.
Today, one can also look at the emphasis in the Special Purpose Forces (SPF) in the Korean People's Army (KPA). As currently understood, the special operation force guerilla tactics were born from military doctrine and ideas of Mao Tse-Tung learned in Manchuria and the Korean War. Their strategy will consist of the use of both conventional and unconventional forces that provide mutual support. This is commonly referred to as a "Two Front" strategy or a form of a "mixed tactics strategy." (8)
Still, there is more evidence that the DPRK understands and is committed to the use of unconventional warfare. Ever since the Armistice was signed, the North Koreans have continued to use unconventional forces attempting to undermine the ROK government. Examples include--
* Commando raids along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (1966 to 1971).
* The assassination attempt of Park Chung Hee (1968).
* A North Korean agent's attempt to assassinate President Park, killing the First Lady instead (1974).
* The discovery of infiltration tunnels (1974 to 1990).
* The Kwangju Incident (sometimes referred to as a massacre) and alleged ties to communist plots and assassins (1980).
* The attempted assassination of then president, Chun Doo Hwan by North Korean agents in Rangoon (1983).
* The bombing of the South Korean airliner Flight 858 (1987).
* The case of Kim Dong-Shik, an armed north Korean agent who infiltrated Puyo, South ChungJong Province (1995).
* The North Korean spy submarine (Sango) running aground off South Korea's east coast (1996). These and other numerous other infiltrations and subversive attempts to undermine the ROK's sovereignty have continued over the past 50 years.
So what would be North Korea's response if they ever had to face the U.S. or CFC forces? They would most assuredly lose a conventional battle. Even if they employ all of their assets (e.g., nuclear, chemical, biological, missiles) they would eventually be defeated, and probably rather swiftly. So how would KJI respond if he knew that defeat was imminent?
The grand strategy of a protracted guerilla war would be to induce world opinion to pressure the combative nations to stop fighting and therefore retain control over North Korea. Within this grand strategy their plan would be to complicate any CFC efforts to win popularity among the masses and spread fear among those who may be tempted to support CFC efforts. The PMESII strategies are as follows--
Guerilla efforts are designed to impact diplomatic solutions for retention of the status quo (i.e., two Koreas still exist). Prolonging the war effort and exacerbating both the human and economic costs associated with such an engagement will increase global political pressures to facilitate a cease-fire.
Externally, DPRK diplomacy will be limited because of its historic belligerence and lack of national respect on the world stage. The most likely diplomatic avenue will be directed through a third party nation, almost certainly China or Russia. Their diplomatic strategy will be aimed at convincing world opinion that:
* The war is harming regional and world economies.
* The U.S. is responsible for the war and they are the imperialistic aggressors.
* The rest of the world should intervene or possibly face regime change themselves because U.S. power left unchecked is a global danger.
* North Korea does not represent a threat to any nation.
Another major political player will be Japan. While Japan will, from the outset, be a staunch U.S. supporter, there are factions in Japan that will act to serve P'yongyang's interests. Overt acts such as organizing demonstrations, lobbying Japanese political leadership, and broadcasting support messages will attempt to influence Japan's support for a U.S. led regime change.
Internally, the DPRK political strategy will be focused on the teachings of Chu'che (9) to emotionally stir nationalism to continue the guerilla cause. Political leaders, more than likely local military leadership, must emerge to rally local populations to support the insurgency. This critical task of spiritually unifying the people and the guerillas is one of the most important tasks in order for the insurgency to succeed.
Overall, their political strategies will be closely linked to their information strategies to ensure their political messages and themes are received both internally and externally.
The KPA was originally trained and armed by the former Soviet Union. It used the Soviet model as its underlying doctrine with modifications to adapt to the Korean terrain and military structure. North Korean guerilla tactics are derived from the military principles of Mao Tse-Tung and later molded by the "Great Leader" Kim II Sung. This zeal for guerilla proficiency became more prominent over time and by 1974 the slogan "to produce, study, and live with the guerilla system" was introduced to the North Korean people. The public was to apply this mindset in all activities, giving birth to sayings like: "the guerillas at work," "study like a guerilla," and the "guerilla lifestyle." This ideological fervor was renewed after the demise of the Soviet Union, the death of Kim II Sung, and the current economic crisis. The range of threats that guerilla forces pose is often difficult to counter in traditional military ways.
These forces will be formed from a multitude of sources. These include organized paramilitary forces, disorganized units, stay-behinds, bypassed units, surviving special operations forces, party officials, criminals and civilians, and repatriated or escaped enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG), College Training Units, Red Youth Guard, and various security forces. They will quite literally "make war everywhere." (10) Also complicating this factor will be the hostile terrain that defines so much of North Korea.
The key to survival of guerilla forces is the ability to find sanctuary and obtain food, water, and arms. Another key to their success is to maintain local support in order to successfully attack CFC assets and interests, deceive CFC forces as to their intent and locations, conduct resupply operations, and recruit new members.
This military strategy would prolong the conflict by avoiding direct engagements with CFC forces. This strategy would put constant pressure on CFC forces through the use of small-scale raids with an occasional larger scale attack, if possible; but generally with the use of hit-and-run tactics, terrorist style vehicle bombings, and other traditional guerilla tactics. At the Fifth Korean Worker's Party (KWP) Congress in 1970, Kim II Sung said:</p> <pre> Our country has many mountains, and rivers, and has long seacoasts. In the terrain of a country, such as ours, if one takes good advantage of this kind of terrain, carrying out mountain and night combat with skill, and correctly applying combinations of large scale and small scale warfare, regular and irregular combat, even in the case of an enemy who is armed to the fingertips with the latest military technology, we can do a good job of annihilating him. The special experience of the struggle for National Liberation in our country bear this out, and in the same manner, the Vietnam War of today also bears this out (11). </pre> <p>So as far back as 1970, the North Korean leadership understood the abilities to defeat technically superior forces using unconventional tactics. The North Korean leadership realizes that the insurgents in Iraq have complicated the U.S. resolve and caused international discourse. Because of their deep rooted Maoist beliefs, lessons learned from Vietnam and Iraq, and their inability to re-tool and modernize their own Army forces; the North Koreans will look at cheaper and more effective ways to defeat a superior force. (12)
Therefore, a guerilla strategy would be designed to disrupt offensive momentum, interdict resupply efforts, inflict casualties, and achieve political and psychological effects in order to set conditions for a favorable end state. This strategy means denying victory to CFC forces but not winning! Henry Kissinger once said that "the guerilla wins if it does not lose ... the conventional army loses if it does not win." The essence of this strategy simply involves outlasting the CFC resolve.
Economically, the guerillas are dependent upon local populations for logistic and economic support. This support is closely linked to their political, social, and informational strategies. Maintaining psychological support of the local populations is absolutely critical. Once spiritual unification is attained between the guerillas and the people, economic aid will become much easier to obtain and will also enable the locals to take risks in aiding the guerillas. A major theme to convince locals to support the insurgency that has been on going for decades is that their economic plight is caused by the "American imperialists."
In an effort to augment supplies, North Korean guerillas will target CFC supply routes, civil-military operations (CMO), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their intent would be to first sustain their efforts and then to use what is left to help influence local support with free handouts. They may also use buried or underground facilities or caches for untapped food and ammunition stocks.
The guerillas will need little, but may receive clandestine aid from countries wanting to see the U.S. fail. Whether they receive aid or not, the North Korean people are used to austere conditions and have experience in scavenging for sustenance without much assistance.
The North Koreans are not fond of Americans. In fact, they are taught to hate and distrust America. The "American imperialists" are blamed for just about everything that goes wrong in their society. Their citizens are repeatedly told that America has its foot on the throat of North Korea. Because of America's malicious treatment they are hungry, poor, and unable to improve human conditions. Most, or at least many, North Koreans truly believe the negative stereotypes. But they are incapable of verifying whether these stereotypes are true or false because of their isolation. Because of this mindset, North Koreans are already socially prepared to be formidable guerillas.
Chu'che, or the philosophy of self-reliance, permeates the North Korean culture and society. This philosophy is the guiding principal for all events in a north Korean's life. Chu'che is a "working class" struggle against capitalism and more specifically the U.S. (some could correctly argue that Japan is also in this category). Chu'che is a collective theory that was extracted from the Confucian ideals of collectivism and then applied to a political system. Chu'che denies individual freedoms but offers collective freedom from "invidious U.S. intentions." The ideology is borne out of necessity and historic fear of foreign occupation. Most assuredly, this historic fear of occupation will be used as a psychological theme to persuade local populations to support the guerilla activities. KJI stated that if "Chu'che is to be established in ideology, servility to big powers and all other outdated ideas should be opposed." The North Koreans have suffered greatly to uphold this framework and will be more than willing to defend it.
Therefore, the guerilla social strategy will depend on Chu'che. Actually the DPRK's social strategy to ensure successful and enthusiastic participation in conflict, whether it is conventional or unconventional, has been ongoing for the last fifty-one years. This social drum beat can be read daily in the Rodong Sinmum (the DPRK's official newspaper) and heard over DPRK's radio and television stations. The primary themes used in these media:
Exalt the greatness of KJI. "... the great leader Comrade Kim Jong-II, the great of the greatest and the greatest of all great generals, who defends and glorifies my fatherland with his military-first revolutionary leadership". (13)
Damn the U.S. as an imperialist warmongering nation. "... It is based on the atrocious policy of aggression, which is aimed at eliminating our independent Republic at any cost, that the belligerent U.S. forces have defined our country as one of the 'outposts of tyranny' after they described it as part of an axis of evil." (14)
And extol the virtues of their superior ideology (Chu'che) while explaining that the principles of military-first politics will carry them to victory (Normally associated with the first theme). "Our fatherland is shining brilliantly as the invincible and ever-victorious fatherland of military-first politics under the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong-II." (15)
Because of these few simple basic themes being hammered upon in their media, it is difficult for most North Koreans to really distinguish between DPRK's propaganda and reality. This kind of mass brain-washing is reminiscent of Hitler's Nazi regime. Because of the confused state of the North Korean people, the DPRK is socially primed for blind obedience to KJI, his ideas, and his reality.
The guerilla's infrastructure will be hinged upon their ability to seek refuge in the towns and villages that traverse North Korea. In order to strategize their infrastructure, the guerilla forces will have to win the psychological war and reinforce the population's indoctrination. Defeating guerilla tactics is impossible without the assistance from the citizenry. In other words, their infrastructure strategy is merged with their information strategy to produce favorable pockets of support.
The guerilla's infrastructure should be similar to the model (See Figure 3 above) that the North Vietnamese used against the U.S. (15)
Support cells will reside within the local populations. Squad size units that operate in the vicinity of these local populations will provide support in terms of propaganda, arms, and sustenance. Regional units (platoon strength) will in turn help attack and harass local police and military units to support local cells. Still larger units, company size and larger, will be used to conduct larger attacks at key locations and times. The key to the entire network are the cells at the local level. "If that is expanding like a virus within the body politic of the country then the guerilla units, which are the open manifestation of the disease, will be spreading and erupting all over the surface of the country." (17)
Another infrastructure factor that would aid the guerilla forces is the series of underground facilities and caches. Peter Hayes, who has traveled to North Korea several times and is executive director of the Nautilus Institute, a Berkeley California "think tank", said, "As you travel around and look around, you see that what looked like a regular hill is actually a bunker. It takes a while for your eyes to adjust and to make the mental shift, but after a while, you realize that all of North Korea is an underground facility." Supporting Hayes' observation is Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., the author of three books on the North Korean military, who estimates the total number of underground facilities at 11,000 to 14,000. (18) Anyone who has visited the tunnels discovered along the DMZ can attest to the digging abilities, primitive as they may be, of the North Koreans. These underground facilities will permit the guerilla forces unique hiding places and advantages especially because of the particular ruggedness of the North Korean geography.
The internal information strategy will be almost singly focused on the Chu'che doctrine to repel the invaders. The guerilla's information dissemination strategy will be limited. Traditional methods like television, the Internet, newspapers, and radio will be extremely restricted if available at all. The most likely information dissemination strategies will be by word-of-mouth, ad hoc billboarding and by common folk such as farmers or even children carrying leaflets or messages. Methods for gaining popular support will vary greatly. They will use bribes and gifts (e.g., food, money, valuables) to encourage informants to divulge information on CFC movements and activities. They may also threaten and coerce certain populations to support the resistance. Their information strategy will appeal to the collective nature of the Koreans and emphasize that sovereignty and independence from the imperialists is their mandate. Remember, the regime has had over fifty years to convince the North Korean people of the brutality and hatred of the U.S. and the "lap dogs" in the ROK. It will take months, if not years, for the people of North Korea to trust CFC forces. They will likely fault CFC for the devastation around them which will undoubtedly occur during the preceding months of war (just as coalition forces are experiencing in Iraq). Any insurgent movement will seek to exploit this situation to their advantage as part of their information strategy.
Included in their informational strategy will be the use of psychological operations (PSYOP). The themes and messages that will be used will be consistent with social themes but will emphasize that the imperialist warmongers are now at their socialist door and will try to end this nirvana called the DPIRK. The PSYOP teams will incite populace emotions and play to their sense of nationalism, honor and pride. They will instill hatred of the U.S. soldiers which will be fairly easy to accomplish since they live on a constant diet of how evil the Americans are already.
Another key to their information campaign will be the role that political leaders will play. It is fairly well known that guerilla success largely depends upon powerful political leaders who work to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must understand overarching goals and manipulate local leaders to push the guerilla strategy. If these leaders do not emerge, the guerilla campaign will ultimately falter because of a lack of population support.
It is highly likely for the guerilla PSYOP campaign to target U.S. soldiers or coalition partners. It is fairly easy to accomplish and inexpensive, especially if the North Koreans pre-print the messages, which is extremely likely (See Figure 4).
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Their external information campaign will include appeals to other countries and organizations that the U.S. is the aggressor and that the conflict should end. China will be an important player as the North Korean government appeals to Beijing to stop the fighting and preserve the Communist buffer between CFC forces and the Chinese border. They will also appeal to the European Union (EU) to pressure the U.S. to stop the war.
It is also likely that the DPRK leadership will try to find or manufacture U.S. atrocities to prove to the world that the U.S. is the aggressor and an evil nation, even if it was North Korea that attacked first. These types of information campaigns do not necessarily have to come from with the DPRK. Computer hackers and web masters can be hired to proliferate information themes and propaganda through a variety of sources and methods.
No matter what conditions bring North Korean forces and the U.S. to war, it is an almost certainty that without help, the DPRK will lose the conventional conflict. Faced with a certain defeat, the North Korean leadership will decide to transform their forces capable of conducting a protracted guerilla war. Guerilla warfare has been a part of the North Korean military doctrine ever since Kim II-Sung learned the art of this form of warfare from Mao TseTung in the 1930s.
The purpose of this strategy is borne out of their history and proven tactics in other theaters of war (China, Vietnam, and Iraq). Politically, their strategy will be aimed at convincing world opinion that the war is harming regional and world economies. They will try to fix blame on the aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Their military strategy would be reminiscent of a Vietnam campaign combined with a few of the more successful Iraqi insurgent strategies. The guerillas will attempt to prolong conflict by avoiding direct engagements with CFC forces. Their tactics will include the use of small-scale raids, an occasional larger scale attack, use of hit-and-run tactics, terrorist style vehicle bombings, and other traditional guerilla methods.
Economically, the guerillas will remain dependent upon the local populace for logistic and economic support. They will exert constant pressure on CFC supply routes, CMOs, and NGOs. The guerillas will be able to sustain themselves with little but may need occasional support. They may even receive economic support from countries that want to see the U.S. fail. Their receipt of external support may not matter. North Koreans have gone without help for so long that they are very accustomed to scavenging for sustenance, especially if their underground caches are still intact. Their military tactics are successful at obtaining subsistence from NGO and CFC supply routes.
The cornerstone of their social strategy has been and will be based on Chu'che. Socially, the North Koreans are not fond of Americans. In fact, they are taught to hate and distrust America from the very beginning of their lives. This deep rooted hate is real, as the North Koreans have been fed a constant diet of anti-U.S, propaganda and they are too isolated to distinguish fact from fiction. This type of socialization is a perfect breeding ground for hate necessary to successfully conduct such a war.
The guerilla's infrastructure will be based on their ability to seek refuge in the towns and villages that traverse the rugged North Korean territory. Their ability to seek refuge undoubtedly will be linked to their informational strategies that gain and maintain support for "the cause." Their informational strategies must be both external and internal. Externally, they must portray the U.S. as the aggressor following an out-of-control foreign policy. They must appeal to other nations to stop the war so that economic ruin does not befall all of East Asia. Internally, they will continue to emphasize the concept Chu'che. They will also target CFC forces with propaganda leaflets in an attempt to cause friction among the ranks. This tactic will become more successful as the conflict matures.
These strategies will ultimately enable the DPRK regime to buy time, diminish support for the CFC offensive, and make the war more costly, unpopular, and lengthy. Their end state will be a fractured but existing North Korea. North Korea wins by not losing and the CFC forces lose if they do not win.
Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.
The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to Inhabitants of guerilla zones and their national consciousness Awakened.
I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet; that would have been fragmenting resources and exposing them to defeat in detail.
--General William C. Westmoreland
In the case of guerilla groups, the Standard of equipment is of a low Order and they must depend for their Sustenance primarily upon what the Locality affords.
The rank and file is usually much more primitive Than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore Always be essentially simple and repetitious. The Most brilliant propagandist technique will yield No success unless one fundamental principle is Borne in mind constantly ... it must confine itself to A few points and repeat themover and over.
--Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Propaganda Minister
A' represents the underground organization within the population in the villages and towns of the country. The cells are responsible for subversion, penetration, intimidation, terror, propaganda and sabotage, and for providing the guerilla units at 'B,' 'C,' and 'D' with recruits, supplies and intelligence 'B' represents village guerilla units, initially of squad size, operating round their own villages and giving armed support to 'A.' 'C' represents regional guerilla units, initially of platoon strength, which are normally confined to their own districts. It is their task to support 'A' offensively, by attacks on small police or military posts, by ambushing and by harassing government forces. It is also their task, defensively, to prevent government forces from regaining control over the population in their areas. 'D' represents regular guerilla units which may start at company size and be built up to battalion and regimental strength. These are deployed initially in remoter areas where they can be safely trained and expanded, until a situation has been developed where they can accelerate the advance of the whole insurgent movement into the more populated areas of the country by carrying out attacks and ambushes against regular government forces. From No Exit from Vietnam, Robert Thompson.
(1.) Although some guerilla forces may already exist internally to North Korea during conventional operations, this phase would include all forces to transition from conventional to unconventional warfare. Transitional (i.e., end of conventional hostilities to post hostilities) lessons learned from Iraq will not be lost on the North Koreans. The speed and ability of these forces to preserve manpower and weapons will be critical during the transition.
(2.) The fighting was actually carried out by the Chinese guerilla armies, as the Koreans had no organized resistance.
(3.) Dae-Sook Sue, Kim II Sung, The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 38.
(4.) Ibid., 52.
(5.) The revolt was led by Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha.
(6.) Ibid., 121.
(7.) Ibid., 226.
(8.) James M. Minnich, North Korean Tactics (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and Staff College), 9.
(9.) North Korean society revolves around the "religion of Kim II Sungism" and his chu'che ideology, North Korea's own brand of Marxism-Leninism, national identity, and self-reliance. Kim's "religion" and chu'che have supplanted Confucianism and other religious and philosophical beliefs such as Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Ch'ndogyo. From http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country studies/north-korea/all.html.
(10.) "We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people. We must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength." On Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse-Tung
(11.) Joseph Bermudez Jr., Armed Forces of North Korea (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 10-11.
(12.) This may, in fact, be one of the reasons that the DPRK recently declared it is nuclear capable.
(13.) FBIS, "DPRK Radio Describes Nuclear Weapons Possession as 'Guarantee for Peace,' " Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, 9 April 2005.
(14.) FBIS, "DPRK Party Organ Urges US To Cancel Military Exercises To Show 'Will To Coexist '" Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (via Uriminjokkkiri Internet) in Korean 9 March 2005.
(15.) FBIS, "DPRK Radio Describes Nuclear Weapons Possession as 'Guarantee for Peace'."
(16.) Ibid., 33.
(17.) Demick, Barbara, "North Korea's Ace in the Hole." Los Angeles Times, 14 November 2003.
Dan Burgess (Major: U.S. Army, Retired) is currently a contractor in Mclean, Virginia. During his last overseas assignment in the Republic of Korea, he served as the Eighth U.S. Army Chief of Intelligence, Information Operations. Dan has served as an instructor at the Field Artillery School, Commander of a Field Artillery (FA) battery, Division Artillery $2, III Corps Targeting Officer, and Battalion S2 with both a light infantry battalion and an FA battalion. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration from the University of Central Oklahoma and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC). Readers may contact the author via E-mail at email@example.com and telephonically at (703) 489-3166 or (703) 489-5055.
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|Author:||Burgess, Daniel S.|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2005|
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