No total totality: forced labor, stalinism, and de-stalinization.
Anatolii I. Shirokov, Dal'stroi v sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom razvitii SeveroVostokaSSSR (1930-1950-egg.) (Dal 'stroi in the Socioeconomic Development of the Northeastern USSR [1930-1950s]). 654 pp. Moscow: Rosspen, 2014. ISBN-13 978-5824318944.
Aleksei V. Zakharchenko, NKVD iformirovanieaviapromyshlennogo kompleksa v Povolzh 'e, 1940-1943 (The NKVD and the Formation of the Aviation Industrial Complex in the Volga Region, 1940-43). 480 pp. Samara: Institut rossiiskoi istorii Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, Povolzhskii filial, 2013. ISBN 978-5934246588.
Recent historical writing about the Soviet Union includes notable, muchneeded, and diligent works dedicated to the consolidation, development, and expansion of the prison camp system, as well as the role that it played in the Soviet Union's transition from a dictatorship to an "ordinary" authoritarian regime. Researchers have made use of new sources to produce valuable work examining the deep internal conditions leading to the expansion of the I Gulag. (1) The books under review are vivid examples of this historiographical trend. Descriptions of the camps and their economic structures, as well as summaries of statistical evidence about the number of prisoners and industrial output--characteristic of earlier Gulag research--are not completely absent from these new works, but they have taken on a secondary role. To a much greater degree, the authors focus on the practices of administering the camp economy and realizing departmental interests; the evolution of inmate society; and implicit or explicit signs of crisis in the Stalinist system of forced labor.
Alan Barenberg dedicates his brilliantly written book to the largest division of the Gulag: the camp complex of Vorkuta, in the northern European part of the USSR. The region, ill-suited for habitation but rich in resources (primarily coal), was the ideal place for a Stalinist camp. Vorkuta became the symbol of the camp system for these and many other reasons. After the camp was eliminated, it became an informative example of how the Gulag's economic and social structures evolved and were maintained. Equally emblematic is Anatolii I. Shirokov's subject of study: the notorious Dal'stroi Trust, which mined gold from the rich deposits on the Kolyma river basin in the northeastern USSR. Over a quarter-century (1932-56), the basin yielded 1,200 tons of gold and huge amounts of other nonferrous metals. Around 850,000 prisoners passed through the camps at Kolyma from 1932 to 1953, of whom 120,000 died (482, 638). Aleksei Zakharchenko focuses his study on a lesser-known and smaller, though no less significant, site of Stalinist forced labor. The famous airplane factories near Kuibyshev, which were constructed by prisoners in extreme conditions in compressed time frames, played a significant role in the war with Nazi Germany, supplying the front with a large portion of its Soviet planes.
Despite thematic differences, each of these three works analyzes the same phenomenon: the formation, development, and expansion of major production complexes under the direction of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, later Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD-MVD USSR). (2)
I am grateful to Liudmila Novikova, Victoria Frede, Paul Werth, and Rhiannon Dowling for their valuable comments and skillful translation. This article was prepared within the framework of a subsidy granted to the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) by the government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program.
The authors examine two models of Gulag expansion: the first through camp colonization of distant and hard-to-reach parts of the country; and the second through the use of forced labor in populated regions of substantial economic value. The northern area of the European part of the USSR with its center at Vorkuta, as well as a large territory in the northeast of the country, has predominantly been settled by prisoners or former prisoners. The Bezymianskii Camp, which held 40,000--90,000 prisoners, was opened near Kuibyshev (formerly Samara), a city of 400,000 that served as the Soviet capital in evacuation at the beginning of the war. Likewise, these three camp complexes have met different fates. As the authors of these books show, Vorkuta and Dal'stroi continued to exist and evolve throughout the late Stalinist, post-Stalin, and even post-Soviet periods. The Bezymianskii Camp (Bezymianlag) was disbanded after completing its assigned tasks, and its contingent of prisoners scattered throughout the expanses of the USSR. Its dissolution was made possible in part by the composition of the prisoner population at Bezymianlag. In contrast to the Vorkuta and Dal 'stroi camps, the construction sites near Kuibyshev mainly received people who were charged with petty crimes, not "counterrevolutionaries." They generally had short prison sentences, and those who avoided new charges for offenses committed in the camp had a greater chance of early release. Political prisoners and recidivists with long sentences who were sent to remote camps settled in great numbers in these regions of Gulag colonization, forming their own communities.
Yet despite geographical and economic differences, the three camp complexes studied display a surprising number of similarities in their development. Using new sources, the three authors study important processes and trends in the development of the Stalinist camp system, many of which have already been established in other publications. These idiosyncratic "patterns" are themselves a valuable discovery. They attest to the fact that, thanks to a broader field of research and new questions, we are approaching a more complete understanding of the Gulag phenomenon.
The focus of this new, more complete historiography is the careful study of the basic priorities of Soviet forced labor: the contradictions between the punitive and the economic priorities of the camp system. The first "scholars" of this contradiction were, of course, prisoners themselves, who frequently experienced its effects in their own lives. Camp life was permeated with careless treatment of prisoners, who were nonetheless expected to achieve maximal production results. The horrible living conditions in the camp barracks, hunger, hours of construction and inspection in freezing weather, and incredibly long days depleted prisoners' strength, leading to exhaustion and higher death rates. The guards' harsh regime of rules and demands limited the mobility of prisoners, and did not allow for sites to utilize the skills of qualified workers. The most glaring example of the priority of punishment over production was the mass executions in the camps, the peak of which was in 1937-38. Barenberg (29-31) and Shirokov (193-95) describe these shootings in Vorkuta and in Kolyma, respectively. Zakharchenko reveals a surge of executions at Bezymianlag at the beginning of the war (435-37).
Generally speaking, Stalinist camps were essentially punitive, and in certain periods they did become mass execution sites--though not always intentionally. Statistics show that from 1930 to 1952 up to 1.7 million people died in the camps and colonies. At times, the death rate reached incredible levels. In 1933 it was more than 15 percent, and in 1942 over 25 percent. (3) Paradoxically, forced labor, although it began as a method of destruction, facilitated the rebirth of the camp system by weakening its punitive goals in favor of economic expedience. Prisoners, since they were not only "enemies" or "socially harmful elements" but also a labor force, became members of a unique type of camp "union" under the leadership of the camp administration. Under pressure to fulfill economic plans, the leadership of the Gulag and the administrations of the camps periodically considered improving the conditions of prisoners' lives, facilitating increased production through less harsh camp conditions. (4)
In recent years, much research, including the books under review, has allowed for a closer look into the paradoxical dynamics of the Gulag's "regeneration." (5) The improvements made in camp conditions during the mid-1930s had all but ended by the years of the Terror. Mass executions of inmates and purges of camp administrations were accompanied by a harshening of camp conditions, additional discrimination against political prisoners, the elimination of such "liberal" institutions as "deconvoying" (allowing prisoners to move about without guards), colonization (settling prisoners outside the camps in special settlements, where their families were sometimes able to live with them), and so on. During the Terror, the great influx of inmates meant a surplus of workers for the camp administrators and made it possible to show less concern for health and safety. The apogee of this cruel process was the 1939 decision to stop counting workdays--which had previously been used to reward inmates for fulfilling production norms by shortening their sentences. The economy of forced labor was thereby deprived of its most powerful stimulus to production. The fact that there was no longer the possibility of an early release, combined with the overall growth of prisoners with prolonged sentences, led to a fundamental shift in the camp atmosphere. (6)
The "strict" Gulag system represented the complete domination of the goal of punishment over the goal of economic efficiency, and this domination only intensified during the war. Even though those members of the prison population serving shorter sentences were freed so they could be drafted into the Red Army, and the labor force in the camps contracted, this did not lead to an improvement in camp conditions. Rather, as shown by Zakharchenko (209-17), inmates suffered increased exploitation. The war extended the expansion of the forced labor system just as it legitimized the Stalinist system as a whole.
Gradual but increasingly noticeable changes began to take place after the war, in the last years of Stalin's life. Alan Barenberg defines this process as the search for "normalcy." The economy of the MVD became an important part of the Soviet economic complex. Economic priorities dictated its rules. In the camp system two mutually exclusive tendencies grew increasingly apparent. On the one hand, neither the use of terror nor the formal practices of limited and unlimited violence toward prisoners lessened. The symbol of this powerful punitive tendency in the postwar years were the so-called special camps. (7) Tens of thousands of the most dangerous prisoners, from the perspective of the authorities, were held in these camps in penal servitude. At the same time, in the Gulag a few changes were taking place with the goal of increasing labor productivity and fulfilling production plans. Gradually technological progress came to the camps. Although spades were still widely used, even the most stubbornly conservative Gulag officials were forced to adopt the use of excavators. All the various ways in which conditions in the camps had historically been relaxed were concentrated in the postwar years. The demands of production allowed many prisoners to move about without a convoy or even to live outside the camp. At many sites, the institution of counting workdays was reestablished. Many prisoners were given early release on the condition that they voluntarily continued to work at a given site. The height of this trend toward the destruction of the classic Gulag form of forced labor came when prisoners began to be paid for their work. This important symbolic recognition of the economic inefficiency of forced labor signaled an abandonment of attempts to maintain it, in favor of introducing economic stimuli into the camp economy. (8)
However, such unnatural intermingling of heterogeneous elements rarely leads to success. The payment reform did not produce any visible effect in the long term. The introduction of a foreign stimulus into an economy of forced labor--an economy that was punitive by nature--happened painfully slowly. There was not enough money, due to the unprofitability of the camps and hold-ups in financing. There were well-known incidences in which even the prisoners' meager salaries were confiscated for other uses. (9) There were other unexpected side effects as well. The presence of cash among prisoners increased tension in the camps. The camp administration suddenly had new opportunities for theft and extortion. Criminals had new reasons for theft and murder. All-in-all, in this hostile environment, economic stimulus underwent a fundamental distortion (Barenberg, 93-95).
Not only the presence of money in the camps facilitated increased tension, disorder, and agitation among prisoners in the last years of Stalin's life. Escapes from the Gulag and unrest among prisoners eroded the system. The Gulag could not withstand the onslaught of the real, not imaginary, enemies of Soviet power who filled the camps after the war. Prisoners from the Baltic states and the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, experienced in armed combat against Soviet power, continued the active fight in the camps: establishing underground groups, destroying the networks of camp security services, and so on. (10) The many contradictions in the Stalinist Gulag had reached such a peak by this time that its ruin seemed imminent. It was not only the good will of Stalin's successors that led them, immediately after his death, to begin the tedious and contradictory work of dismantling the camp system in its Stalinist form--though this did play a role. The Soviet leaders recognized more and more (however reluctantly), that the oppositional mood was easier to placate through concessions and "soft power" than through terror and growth of the Gulag. The scale of insurrections in the camps after the death of Stalin at the very least underscored the need for change and made the new Soviet leaders more determined to bring about reform. (11)
Among the larger uprisings of the post-Stalin era was the Vorkuta uprising, the analysis of which should attract the attention of Barenberg's readers (132-49). The uprising, as Barenberg shows, provided the impetus for the further dissolution of the camp system. It became the norm to deconvoy prisoners and allow them not only to work but also to live outside the camp zone. Many found living quarters in the city. A few prisoners were assisted by the camp and mine administration to construct their own homes--a strategy that was especially attractive to those whose families had moved to join them. But most often, the old camp order ended when the camp fence was destroyed and the barracks turned into city dormitories (157). It was paralyzingly eloquent and symbolic, the fact of the Gulag's destruction and simultaneous survival! In the camp barracks, turned into ordinary living space, many people lived for years.
As Barenberg shows, these far-reaching changes were made possible, and even sprinted ahead of the established rules, thanks to the active support of the camp and mine administrations. Tired of riding the fence between punitive regimes and the imperatives of production, the administrators rushed to turn prisoners into semifree workers, "slaves into serfs" (156-60). This was a lasting and steady trend, although poorly understood due to the paucity of documents.
Already in April 1930, soon after the network of camps was expanded, the leaders of the Unified State Political Administration (OGPU) were entertaining plans to turn the camps into colonial settlements. The prisoners would have then become settlers, fulfilling specific jobs in distant regions of the country. "Those who wish to can register their families," stated the document. (12) These projects antedated the changes that took place in the camps after the death of Stalin by more than 20 years. In the 1930s, though, massive transfers of prisoners into settlements did not happen. The expansion of the Terror undercut these "liberal" reforms. So-called "colonization" existed in the form of a small auxiliary to the camp system. Even so, the NKVD leadership continued to postpone plans for transitioning away from using prisoners as the primary labor force. A general plan for the development of Kolyma, developed under the head of Dal'stroi, E. P. Berzin, in 1937 predicted that by 1947 there would be a full transition in which prisoners would be replaced by free workers as the main source of labor. Berzin, however, was arrested, and a new general plan was prepared in 1941, based on the idea that prisoners would make up more than half of the Dal'stroi workforce by 1947. (13) There was nothing remarkable about this plan, considering that Stalin himself in 1939 unambiguously expressed his desire to preserve the camp system and limit the use of early release for prisoners. (14) The new waves of terror herded a new mass of prisoners into the camp and did not allow for "free-thinking" NKVD employees. After the war, however, the MVD leadership made more than one suggestion to turn prisoners into settlers, working off a sentence of labor outside the camp on MVD construction sites. (15) Even though there was support for these initiatives, the MVD leadership did not dare to propose them to Stalin, probably because they understood the leader's conservative tendencies. Stalin's death finally opened the door for the long-postponed reorganization to be realized.
The periodic return of the higher camp administration to the idea of prisoners' partial liberation attests to the advantage that these administrators clearly saw in having voluntary rather than forced laborers. Without a doubt, the MVD leadership and the Gulag administration were aware of the many different practices used to deal with--which at the same time exacerbated--the camp system's economic crisis, such as the ubiquitous employment of massive report padding (tufia). (16) It would have been impossible to reduce the amount of report padding while employing forced labor. Prisoners faced a simple choice: die from backbreaking labor or try to fake it. The lower-level administrators winked at these methods of "plan fulfillment." They, too, had a simple choice: report their production shortfalls, lose their jobs, and go to prison themselves as enemies whose sabotage caused the failure of the program; or look the other way and risk being charged in court with deception. The latter option was the safer one. Thus tufta reached astronomical levels. In November 1942, one brigade constructing housing for the Kuibyshev aviation factories confirmed the construction of 8,500 ovens by ten workers, when the plan for that section called for only 360 ovens to be built (Zakharchenko, 457-58). Clearly the utter extravagance of this report was the main reason for its lack of success. Yet most prisoners and the members of the administration who helped them were more skillful at fraudulent recordkeeping.
From the bottom to the top, falsification of records pervaded the entire economy of forced labor. At the top, these falsifications took more respectable forms. For example, the NKVD-MVD leaders used their position to lobby in government departments to adopt acts allowing incomplete projects to be counted as complete (Zakharchenko, 162-74, 318-19). The NKVD managed to attract a significant amount of resources for its projects--an amount that often exceeded economic demand. Shirokov and Zakharchenko expose such important phenomena of the economics of forced labor as its departmental self-seeking, lack of control, and prodigality.
The most important characteristic of the economy of forced labor, the trait that was essential to its development, was secrecy--the fact that it was closed to the outside world. It was always in secret that the worst abuses and crimes of the Soviet Union took place. In the case of the Gulag, secrecy was compounded by the isolation of most units in distant, difficult-to-reach regions of the country. Themselves under pressure to produce according to impossible plans, leaders of camp-industrial complexes lived day to day and often managed the camp economy through barbaric methods. Yet sooner or later came the reckoning. The history of gold-mining in Kolyma, discussed in detail by Anatolii Shirokov, represents an important example of this dynamic.
The achievements in production of which Dal'stroi boasted before the war have now been shown to have been due to the ruthless treatment of prisoners and predatory exploitation of gold deposits. In a race to accumulate ever more plunder, the workers hastily developed richer lodes, taking only the "dummy gold," as they called it then (143, 144, 156, 461). (17) They hurriedly skimmed off the cream of the deposits, not considering how much they were wasting in the process. Many deposits were ruined. Nor did the constant transfer of forced laborers and equipment from place to place in search of better deposits facilitate construction of stable industrial infrastructure, infrastructure that was invaluable in the long term for economic development. Looting of this sort could not last long. After the war, Dal'stroi fell into a critical state that could be considered one manifestation of a growing general crisis of the Stalinist economy of forced labor. The number of prisoners grew, the directors were changed, orders and threats came from Moscow, yet production did not increase.
It should come as no surprise then that, fearing similar problems, the leaders of the MVD tried not only to avoid responsibility for prisoners by recategorizing them as "out of camp settlers" but also to divest themselves of control over economic entities in general. After Stalin's death, this trend prevailed, and the MVD's concerns were transferred to their respective economic ministries. (18) Of course, it cannot be said that this occurred solely as a result of this impetus from the MVD and its new leader, Lavrentii Beria. A wide range of socioeconomic and political causes undoubtedly played a role. Yet this issue remains poorly understood by researchers.
The year 1953 has come to be understood as the key turning point in the history of the Stalinist Gulag, as subsequent years saw essential elements of the Stalinist socialist system eliminated. Barenberg rightly insists on the possibility of studying "Soviet history through the story of one particular camp" (5). In addition, an important vector of de-Stalinization--as the term is broadly defined to include socioeconomic context in addition to the issue of political rehabilitation--was the formation of new communities in the traditional regions of Gulag colonization. In his careful, richly documented, and wonderfully written work, Barenberg examines this process in the broad chronological period from the formation of the Gulag to the present day. The author's fruitful central conceptual point is the transition of a place from a Gulag town to a company town. This process began to gain momentum in the period of the camps. The boundaries between the camps and the towns were not only eroded by the many former prisoners who settled in the towns. A great number of formal and informal channels for interaction existed. Economic necessity led to prisoners working together with free laborers in plants. The city itself was built by prisoners. Many facts undergird Barenberg's now popular position about the close connections between the Gulag and the non-Gulag, about their mutual influence and imbrication in a united goal. (19) This was particularly true in the regions of Gulag colonization, where the transition from camp dictatorship to "soft" authoritarianism almost completely coincided with the same transition in Soviet society as a whole.
Although from the beginning, the construction of the city of Vorkuta implied a sharp divide between the city and the camp zone, with time, and particularly after Stalin's death, the town space became a place for melding the different segments of the population--prisoners and free laborers--into one community. Even the formation of Vorkuta's architectural aspect--as Barenberg shows with sophisticated research--reflects these complex processes of social demarcation and blending. The construction of the children's hospital beginning in 1950 can be seen as an important practical and symbolic event, signaling the gradual shift from a camp town to a company town. The search for "permanent cadres"--that is, free skilled workers--unavoidably focused attention on the social facilities of Vorkuta and allowed for the formation of a city environment such that the headquarters of the Gulag bureaucratic structure and housing for the camp administration were no longer the top priority. Meanwhile, the influence of the Gulag in the form of barracks was reflected in the architectural cityscape of Vorkuta for decades.
These architectural symbols and landscapes also reflected the difficult processes of coping with the legacy of the Gulag. Just as the barracks remained at the foundation of new municipal housing, so too did deeply rooted camp experiences persist in the habits of many leaders of the new company town. Many of the technical and technological aspects of production in enterprises remained the same as they had been. The enterprises themselves--the mines of Vorkuta or the gold mines of Kolyma--remained the only economic foundation of life in the regions of camp colonization. Completing the picture were the many differences between prisoners and free workers and the bias that those in power felt against people with camp experience. The company town remained a divided and hierarchical environment, with its own castes and mutual enmity between them. Did this mean that, even after Stalin's death, the colonization of remote areas meant the creation of zones of discrimination against former prisoners?
The difficulties that former prisoners encountered while adapting to their new post-camp lives are the subject of some important recent works. (20) Barenberg adds his own contribution to this historiographical development, though he appears to resist making hasty conclusions. He shows how and why Vorkuta became an attractive place for former inmates and a relatively friendly environment in which they could live. Former prisoners were among their own kind in such Gulag centers. There were many of them. They could count on the support of their brethren who had similarly convoluted histories, and they took advantage of that support. At the same time, the process was difficult and painful. Thus the title of the chapter in Barenberg's book ends with a question: "From Prisoners to Citizens?" (198-230).
The question is all the more fitting if we recall that former prisoners made up only a portion of the residents of the company town. The contraction in the prison population as a result of camp closings after Stalin's death only increased the need for free cadres. Admittedly, at first they were not yet completely free workers. The flow of the labor force to remote areas was assisted by mobilization campaigns: drafts of youth from the Komsomol, recruitment programs, enlistment of demobilized soldiers, and so on. Even so, this was an important step away from Gulag colonization.
Barenberg's research helps us understand the other possibilities that existed in Soviet conditions besides camp colonization of remote regions, responding to those who say that massive use of coercive labor was the only means of realizing forced industrialization. Barenberg's findings support the thesis that there were alternatives to Gulag colonization. He shows that in spite of the difficult circumstances of life and labor, there were strong inducements attracting new recruits to Vorkuta. The high turnover rate of the workforce consistently fell, attesting to the formation of a stable social community in the region (176-77, 190-91). There is no doubt that a study of different types of colonization in the context of state centralization and the Soviet race to develop will be one of the most important and interesting directions in research on forced labor. The use of shift-based methods, the mobilization of nonprisoners, and the settlement of prisoners outside the camps--these options are not simply speculative fictions. To varying degrees they were employed, even under Stalin.
Nonetheless, colonization on the whole from the 1930s to the 1940s took an extremely repressive turn that was characteristic of the Stalinist period in general. This foundation, despite the many renovations of the walls and facades, for many years haunted the development of the colonized regions and their populations. To a significant degree, the residents of former Gulag areas remain to this day hostages of the Gulag's legacy. The process of morally transcending the Stalinist past is undergoing an extremely telling evolution in such regions. From energetic beginnings, they often stumble over proStalinist, or at minimum, pro-Soviet nostalgia. This nostalgia has an obvious socioeconomic origin. Rugged remote areas like Vorkuta and Magadan suffer greatly from economic changes that are disadvantageous to them. In the context of the crises of the last decades, policies of active colonization by the Soviet state appear relatively favorable. Anatolii Shirokov quotes one of his colleagues as saying "the reality of the growth in crime brings up the question of significantly expanding the prison system, making punishments harsher, and correspondingly, using the prisoners' labor for economic ends.... Again we find ourselves at the threshold." (21) We shall hope that nonetheless Russia will not cross this threshold. It is possible that such intensive studies of the Gulag experience and of the use of forced labor in Soviet history will play a restraining role in this regard.
Translated by Rhiannon Dowling
International Center for the History and Sociology of World War II and its Consequences
National Research University Higher School of Economics
107996 Moscow, Russian Federation
(1) For a review of the literature on the history of the Gulag, see "The Soviet Gulag: New Research and New Interpretations," special issue of Kritika 16, 3 (2015).
(2) This continues the historiographical trend of studying specific camps and camp-economic complexes in detail. For recent works, see Vitalii Zeliak, Fiat ' metallov Dal 'stroia: Istoriia gornodobyvaiushcheipromyshlennosti Severo-Vostoka v 30-50-khgg. XXveka (Magadan: Kordis, 2004); Nikolai Upadyshev, GULAG na evropeiskom Severe Rossii: Genezis, evoliutsiia, raspad (Arkhangel'sk: Pomorskii universitet, 2007); Nick Baron, Soviet Karelia: Politics, Planning, and Terror in Stalins Russia, 1920-1939 (New York: Routledge, 2007); Rashit Bikmetov, Ispol'zovanie spetskontingenta v ekonomike Kuzbassa, 1929-1956 (Kemerovo: Kuzbasskii gosudarstvennyi tekhnicheskii universitet, 2009); Steven A. Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Evgenii Burdin, Volzhskii kaskad GES: Triumfi tragediia Rossii (Moscow: Rosspen, 2011).
(3) Aleksandr Kokurin and Iurii Morukov, "GULAG: Struktura i kadry," Svobodnaia mysl'-XXI, no. 10 (2000): 114-15. Due to the work of many scholars, we can confirm that these numbers do not reflect the full extent of camp casualties. It is enough to recall, for example, the mortality rates during transport or the practice of releasing fatally ill and exhausted prisoners. Many prisoners "were released to die" so as not to show up in the camp's mortality statistics (Michael Ellman, "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments," Europe-Asia Studies 54, 7 : 1152).
(4) For directives and other documents related to this matter, see Aleksandr Bezborodov, ed., Naselenie Gulaga: Chislennost ' i usloviia soderzhaniia, vol. 4 of Istoriia stalinskogo Gulaga: Konets 1920-kh-pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov, ed. Iurii Afanas'ev et al., 7 vols. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004).
(5) This is the central question addressed by a group of historians conducting research for a project initiated by Paul Gregory. See Paul Gregory and Valerii Lazarev, eds., The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2003).
(6) Oleg Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror, trans. Vadim A. Staklo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 196-213.
(7) A. B. Roginskii, M. B. Smirnov, and N. G. Okhotin, Sistema ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR- Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven'ia, 1998), 52-53; Nikolai Morozov, Oso bye lageria MVD SSSRv KomiASSR (1948-1954) (Syktyvkar: Syktyvkarskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2001).
(8) Leonid Borodkin, "Trad v GULAGe: Mezhdu prinuzhdeniem i stimulirovaniem," in GULAG: Ekortomika prinuditel nogo truda, ed. Borodkin and P. Gregori [Paul Gregory] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008), 129-56.
(9) Bikmetov, Ispol 'zovanie spetskontingenta v ekonomike Kuzbassa, 317.
(10) Marta Craveri, Resistenza nel Gulag: Un capitolo inedito della destalinizzazione in Unione Sovietica (Soveria Manneli [Catanzaro]: Rubbettino, 2003); V. A. Kozlov, ed., Vosstaniia, bunty i zabastovki zakliuchennykh, vol. 6 of Istoriia stalinskogo Gulaga.
(11) In the last two decades, many documents have been published related to the change in the political, economic, and social course after the death of Stalin. We are, however, still in the beginning stages of studying this important transition. See, e.g., V. Naumov and Iu. Sigachev, eds., Lavrentii Beriia, 1953: Stenogramma iiul'skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie materialy (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond "Demokratiia," 1999).
(12) N. V. Petrov and N. I. Vladimirtsev, eds., Karatel'naia sistema: Struktury i kadry, vol. 2 of Istoriia stalinskogo Gulaga, 80-81; Kate Brown, "Out of Solitary Confinement," Kritika 8, 1 (2007): 85-87.
(13) P. S. Grebeniuk, Kolymskii led: Sistema upravleniia na Severo-Vostoke Rossii, 1953-1964 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2007), 29-30.
(14) Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag, 207.
(15) A. Tikhonov, "The End of the GULAG," in Economics of Forced Labor, 68-72; Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 130-31.
(16) Reports of tufta and discussions of measures to combat this growing threat are a fixture in almost all research on the Soviet camp system. This, no doubt, is proof of the prevalence of repon padding in the economy of forced labor.
(17) This was the gold from veins that could be mined most quickly and easily without the use of hydraulic or other heavy equipment.--Trans.
(18) A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov, eds., GULAG: Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei, 1917-1960 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond "Demokratiia," 2000), 786-93.
(19) For research on the "revolving doors" between the Gulag and the non-Gulag, the massive and regular release of prisoners that facilitated tight connections between these worlds, see Barnes, Death and Redemption', and Golfo Alexopoulos, "Amnesty 1945: The Revolving Door of Stalins Gulag," Slavic Review 64, 1 (2005): 274-306.
(20) Nancy Adler, The GulagSurvivor (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002); Amir Weiner, "The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics," Journal of Modern History 78, 2 (2006): 333-76; Marc Elie, "Les politiques a l'egard des liberes du Goulag: Amnisties et rehabilites dans la region de Novosibirsk, 1953-1960," Cahiers du monde russe Al, 1-2 (2006): 327-48; Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
(21) I. D. Batsaev, Osobennostipromyshlennogo osvoeniia Severo-Vostoka Rossii vperiod massovykh politicheskikh repressii (1932-1953): Dal'stroi (Magadan: Severo-vostochnyi kompleksnyi nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut Dal'nevostochnogo otdeleniia RAN, 2002), 191. Similar perspectives on the past and present of Magadan oblast, all things considered, are popular throughout that region, no doubt the result of difficult socioeconomic conditions and the shock of the 1990s. See, e.g., A. N. Isakov, Severo-Vostok Rossii v gody perestroiki i perekhoda k rynochnym otnosheniiam (1985-1995): Stranitsy letopisi noveishei istorii (Magadan: Severovostochnyi kompleksnyi nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut Dal'nevostochnogo otdeleniia RAN, 1999).
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|Title Annotation:||"Gulag Town, Company Town: Forced Labor and Its Legacy in Vorkuta," "Dal 'stroi in the Socioeconomic Development of the Northeastern USSR (1930-1950s)" and "The NKVD and the Formation of the Aviation Industrial Complex in the Volga Region, 1940-43"|
|Article Type:||Book review|
|Date:||Sep 22, 2015|
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