Printer Friendly

Nation-wide decentralized governance arrangements and capacities for integrated watershed management: issues and insights from Canada.

Abstract

This paper explores existing decentralized governance arrangements and capacities for integrated watershed management in Canada across its thirteen provinces and territories, with particular emphasis on organizations with governing Boards that are principally, but not exclusively, comprised of persons from the local/regional community. 'Capacity' is broadly considered across human, social, institutional and economic dimensions. The research identifies and discusses 115 organizations as forming the potential foundations or 'building blocks' for nation-wide governance arrangements on the basis of the following criteria: (a) having a Board of management that includes community representation; (b) having responsibilities for integrated watershed management; (c) being independent or quasi-independent from government and having dedicated paid staff; (d) operating at sub-national scale; and (e) representing the dominant and larger-scale organizational network for watershed management in the respective province or territory. These criteria are influenced by the need to transfer ideas and insights about capacity development from Canada's decentralized governance arrangements to the Australian setting as part of a broader research agenda. The paper explores the notion that there are enough similarities within and between individual provincial and territorial arrangements to constitute a recognizable set of nation-wide governance arrangements and capacities that could be more purposefully 'evolved'. Such 'evolution' could occur through formal acknowledgment, expansion, utilization, development and support, and could be particularly beneficial for delivering on emerging national agendas, such as water and climate change. A broad suite of capacity issues and insights are presented in the form of an exploratory SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, many of which are the focus of discussion in other literatures and have been with us for a long time. The paper provides a national synopsis and snapshot, and highlights that much still remains to be done in the domain of integrated watershed management. It aims to stimulate thinking about the merits of and prospects for developing nation-wide decentralized governance arrangements and capacities for integrated watershed management, and to inform dialogue and agenda-setting in this regard among system actors (i.e., subnational organizations, overarching organizations, governments, municipalities, First Nations, etc.) as a first-step.

L'auteure traite des arrangements de gouvernance decentralisee et des moyens d'action pour la gestion integree des bassins hydrographiques existants dans les treize provinces ou territoires, en examinant plus particulierement les organismes dotes de conseils d'administration qui sont principalement, mais pas uniquement, constitues de personnes de la communaute locale ou regionale. On considere le terme [much less than] capacite [much greater than] dans son sens large, c.-a-d. englobant les dimensions humaines, sociales, institutionnelles et economiques. La recherche reconnait et decrit 155 organisations formant les assises potentielles d'arrangements de gouvernance a l'echelle nationale selon criteres suivants: a) etre dote d'un conseil d'administration qui comprend des representants de la communaute; b) assumer des responsabilites de gestion integree des bassins hydrographiques; c) maintenir un role independant ou quasi independant vis-a-vis du gouvernement et etre dote d'un personnel salarie distinct; d) fonctionner a l' echelle sous-nationale; e) representer le reseau organisationnel dominant ou de grande envergure traitant de la gestion des bassins hydrographiques dans la province ou le territoire respectif. Ces criteres sont influences par la necessite de transferer et d'adapter les idees et les visions sur le developpement des capacites, des arrangements de gouvernance decentralisee du Canada a la situation de l'Australie, dans le cadre d'un mandat de recherche elargi. L'auteure aborde la notion voulant qu'il existe suffisamment de similitudes au sein de chaque arrangement provincial ou territorial, ou entre eux, pour permettre d'y voir un ensemble identifiable d'arrangements et de capacites de gouvernance a l'echelle nationale qui pourraient etre elabores dans ce but precis. Une telle elaboration pourrait avoir lieu par le biais de la reconnaissance, de l' accroissement, de l'utilisation, du developpement et du soutien; de plus, elle pourrait repondre a beaucoup d'attentes touchant certains enjeux nationaux emergents, tels que I'eau et les changements climatiques. Une vaste liste d'enjeux et de visions touchant les capacites est presentee sous forme d'une analyse FFOM (forces, faiblesses, occasions et menaces) exploratoire, dont plusieurs elements font I'objet de debats dans d'autres publications et sont depuis longtemps sujets d'actualite. L'auteure nous propose aussi un synopsis et un portrait national de la situation, de plus elle met en evidence qu'il reste beaucoup a faire dans le domaine de la gestion integree des bassins hydrographiques. Cet article vise a stimuler la reflexion concernant les merites des arrangements et des capacites de la gouvernance decentralisee a l'echelle nationale pour la gestion integree des bassins hydrographiques et de ses perspectives d'epanouissement, et aussi a alimenter, comme premier pas, les echanges et l' establishment des enjeux a cet egard aupres des intervenants du secteur, que ce soient les organismes nationaux a differents echelons, les gouvernements, les municipalites, les Premieres nations ou d'autres.

Keywords

Capacity building, community participation, decentralized governance, integrated watershed management

Introduction

Canada is a constitutional monarchy and federal parliamentary democracy based on English common law (except in the case of Quebec). It has thirteen provinces and territories, each with unique historical, cultural, social, political, ecological and economic contexts. The constitution vests powers for the management of land and water primarily at provincial level (Muldoon and McClenaghan 2007). However, Blomquist et al. (2007: 135) emphasize that natural resources (particularly water) are not simply a provincial matter in Canada, as "the federal government has power over, or plays a significant role in, interprovincial and international trade, navigation and shipping, conservation and protection of oceans and fisheries, and water on federal lands, in national parks, and in First Nations communities."

At the national level, Bakker (2007a: 3) notes an absence of leadership and "a diminished (and in some instances ineffective) federal government focus on water issues over the past two decades," and goes on to describe Canadian water governance and management as at a "crossroads" (p 16). While a Federal Water Policy was released in 1987, it has "largely been ignored by subsequent governments, and it remains little more than a statement of good intentions that have gone unfulfilled" (Saunders and Wenig 2007: 126). Despite calls for a stronger federal role in freshwater management (Shrubsole and Draper 2007), and most recently by the Gordon Water Group of Concerned Scientists and Citizens (Morris et al. 2007), federal governments have been described as "retreating" from traditional functions (de Loe and Kreutzwiser 2007: 89).

At the provincial level, the twenty first century has seen resurgence in the interest by governments in water management with the introduction of new laws, regulations and policies (de Loe and Kreutzwiser 2007), with responsibilities increasingly devolved to lower levels of governance, in keeping with the principles of "subsidiarity" (Marshall 2007) and "co-management" (Plummer and Arai 2005). Decentralized governance or distributive governance (Bakker 2007b) may be characterized as "administrative decentralization", where administrative functions are devolved to local/regional state or non-state actors from central government, or "democratic decentralization", where authority and resources are transferred to local/regional independent or semi-independent state or non-state actors (Hutchcroft 2001). Decentralized governance is purported to enhance efficiency, equity, democracy and accountability (Ribot 2002, Wallace 2003), as well as improve local/regional participation, ownership and commitment (Bradshaw 2003, Kellert et al. 2000). While some commentators query the motivations of governments for decentralization in Canada, emerging participatory-based governance arrangements nevertheless align with broader trends in public administration (Plummer and Arai 2005). The focus of this paper is not to argue the merits or otherwise of decentralized governance--about which there is a large body of literature--but rather to examine the possibilities for evolving existing decentralized arrangements and capacities in Canada on the assumption that there are benefits in doing so.

Regional and local authorities and other subnational bodies are emerging globally (Jennings and Moore 2000, Gleeson 2003), and are established in some 60 countries (Ribot 2002). Kemper et al. (2007) outline a number of international case studies of decentralized governance in the case of watershed management, de Loe and Kreutzwiser (2007) report the emergence of watershed-based authorities at the local level in France, with devolved responsibilities for strategic planning, and Horbulyk (2007) identifies the emergence of watershed-based organizations in the United States. Regional councils, primarily based on watershed boundaries, were formed in New Zealand in 1991 (Connor and Dovers 2004), while Australia has institutionalized regional governance structures across the nation (Robins 2007a, Robins and Dovers 2007a, b). These arrangements are typically not static in nature, form or function, but rather continually evolving through varying degrees of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' influences at different stages of their development.

In the case of Canada, it is difficult to establish a nation-wide picture of its decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management, de Loe and Kreutzwiser (2007: 91) remark that each of Canada's provinces and territories "is conducting its own, largely independent, experiment". As a result, the literature describes and explores a diverse range of organizations and arrangements in particular provinces and territories (e.g. Bakker, 2007c; Hanna and Slocombe, 2007; Ivey et al., 2004). This paper explores the notion that there are enough similarities within and between individual provincial and territorial arrangements to constitute a recognizable set of nation-wide governance arrangements and capacities that could be more purposefully 'evolved'. Such 'evolution' could occur through formal acknowledgment, expansion, utilization, development and support of existing decentralized entities and capacities. This could provide particular benefits for delivering on emerging national agendas, such as water and climate change.

This paper emerged from a broader research agenda to transfer ideas and insights from Canada's decentralized governance arrangements and capacities to the Australian setting, where organic community (i.e., 'bottom-up') and state-led initiatives have been progressively formalized, expanded, homogenized and professionalized through 'top-down' federal government interventions to deliver national programs. The approach and content of the paper is therefore designed to complement an article published on capacity development of Australia's decentralized arrangements (Robins and Dovers 2007a), and also reflects the limited time (six months) and resources available to conduct the research. This context necessarily influenced development of the following selection criteria, on which basis 115 organizations were identified as collectively forming the potential foundations or 'building blocks' of nation-wide decentralized arrangements:

* Having a Board of management principally, but not exclusively, comprising persons from the local/regional community (i.e., persons with watershed planning and management interests, such as landholders, councillors, local industries, environmentalists, Indigenous communities, etc.);

* Having responsibilities for aspects of integrated watershed management (but not solely confined to specific issues, such as fisheries or riparian enhancement);

* Being legally independent or quasi-independent from senior governments (but generally reliant on their financial support and subject to their intervention, directly or indirectly) and having dedicated paid staff (i.e., not government committees or local community groups);

* Operating at a subnational scale (but not cross-province or trans-national scale); and

* Representing the dominant and larger-scale organizational network for watershed management in the respective province or territory.

Further to the last criterion, while the research largely confines itself to exploring the dominant network of like organizations within a given jurisdiction (e.g. in the case of Quebec, its 33 Watershed Organizations and Regroupement des Organisations de Bassin Versant du Quebec, their overarching advocacy and coordination body), this is not to imply that a process of purposefully developing nation-wide arrangements and capacities could not--or should not--include other organizations. While the paper focuses on these dominant organizational networks, it is acknowledged that nation-wide arrangements and capacity development could be extended to other watershed-related organizations at larger-scale (e.g., Niagara Escarpment Commission or Save The Oak Ridges Moraine Coalition in Ontario) and smaller-scale (e.g. Meewasin Valley Authority in Manitoba; Atlantic Coastal Action Program).

The focus of the paper is oriented towards issues of capacity building (i.e, enhancement), especially with respect to the governing Boards of these decentralized organizations. The increasing expectation of community members to participate in public policy decision-making (IIIsley 2003), which has become more pronounced in Canada since the 1970s (Shrubsole and Draper 2007), needs to be matched by their capacity to meet the responsibilities devolved by governments (Marshall 2007). Commentators have noted that the transfer of responsibilities and accountability through decentralized governance often fails to devolve the requisite power and resources or provide for the building of capacities (Lane et al. 2004, Paton et al. 2004, Armitage 2005). Confusion around the terminology of 'capacity building' and its practice acts as a further impediment (European Centre for Development Policy Management 2003, Macadam et al. 2004, Ryan and Rudland 2002). Table 1 presents the scope of capacity considered in this paper as including human, social, institutional and economic dimensions.
Table 1. A conceptual framework for understanding the elements of
capacity building

                 Social Capital

Human        Cognitive    Structural    Institutional  Economic
Capital       social      (networks)      Capital      Capital
              norms)

Knowledge   Trust and    Networks       Governance     Infrastructure
Skills      reciprocity  Relationships   arrangements  Financial
Experience  Values,                                    resources
            attitudes
            and
            behaviour
            Commitment
            Motivation
            Sense of
            place

(Modified from Moore et al. 2006.)


Interpretation of the discussion that follows is aided by having a clear understanding of the purpose of Boards with community representation in these decentralized arrangements for integrated watershed management. The following desirable characteristics of a 'good' Board were compiled in the conduct of related research in Australia, and are provided here for context (reproduced with minor modifications from Robins 2007b: 248):

* Having a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities (as strategic rather than operational);

* Understanding strategic, program, project and risk management, and using best available science and technology to inform decisions;

* Having a sense of corporate commitment, solidarity and unity of purpose, and an ability to work effectively together and with others (especially the organization's staff);

* Having a sense of social commitment and an ability and willingness to engage with the community (media, politicians, landholders, Indigenous peoples, industry, local government, philanthropic bodies, etc);

* Understanding accountability (to the whole region and tax payers) and fiduciary responsibilities, and having an adequate understanding of financial planning and management;

* Engaging regularly and honestly in audit and reflection processes, including recognizing short-comings in skills and experience and actively seeking to fill any gaps;

* Showing leadership and being open to learning from the skills, experiences, knowledges, values and cultures of others (e.g., within and outside integrated watershed management);

* Having an awareness of existing service delivery organizations and mechanisms and a preparedness to utilize them;

* Understanding drivers of change and participating in driving change, including looking beyond local interests, loyalties and the region to the wider picture;

* Having process skills (e.g., chairing, negotiation, team and relationship building, fund-raising, etc);

* Having basic information technology (IT) skills (e.g., using email); and

* Having adequate knowledge of the subject (i.e., principles and technical aspects of integrated watershed management across its biophysical, social, economic, cultural, historical and political dimensions).

The paper is presented in two parts. Part I describes Canada's existing arrangements for decentralized governance for integrated watershed management, and provides context for Part II, which focuses on a collective examination of experiences and how these arrangements work in practice. Part II is presented as an exploratory SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis to inform purposeful building of capacities, with particular emphasis on governing Boards. The aim is to elicit a broad suite of capacity issues and insights--rather than present a priority list of actions oriented to the interests and domain of any specific stakeholder group--to encourage and inform dialogue among system actors (i.e., decentralized organizations, overarching organizations, governments, municipalities, First Nations, etc). Ontario, and specifically the Grand River Conservation Authority and British Columbia's Fraser Basin Council are used as case studies informed by interviews with the individuals listed under Acknowledgements, and are therefore explored more comprehensively than other provinces or territories in both parts of the paper.

PART I--Decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management

This section provides an overview of Canada's decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management in accordance with the criteria outlined in the Introduction. Mandates are reported here as stated by enabling instruments or reported by organizations; commentary on specific experiences with these arrangements and how they work in practice is the subject of Part II. A total of 115 organizations are identified and discussed individually or as groupings of like organizations (for example Manitoba's Conservation Districts). Further information is provided in Appendix A and B, including synoptic tables (Tables A1, A2 and B). Arrangements in the territories are collectively reported here, while the 19 organizations concerned are individually described in Appendix B. Five provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island) do not meet these criteria. The reasons why--and the organizations that do exist--are briefly outlined in Appendix A.

Alberta--Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils

The province of Alberta currently has eight not-for-profit, non-government organizations recognized as Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils (WPACs) under the Alberta Government's Water for Life strategy, which range in area from 20,000-54,000 [km.sup.2] except, in one case, 6,500 [km.sup.2]. The strategy marks a shift to devolving responsibility to regional organizations, focusing on outcome-based approaches and delivering services collaboratively (Government of Alberta 2003). It provides for the establishment of WPACs, and local watershed stewardship groups (WSG), throughout the province together with the Alberta Water Council (AWC). The overarching AWC, appointed in 2004, provides direction and advice on the strategy's implementation. The Council, together with the WPACs and WSGs, are charged with making recommendations to government, stakeholders and the public on improving water management throughout Alberta's watersheds. The strategy is supported by a framework document that further defines the mandates of WPACs, WSGs and the AWC (Government of Alberta, nd). WPACs may apply to Alberta Environment for funding support based on a Work Plan: "A Work Plan should include a summary of the WPACs mission, vision and goals, a three-year Action Plan, and the current operating year budget requirements" (Alberta Environment 2006).

The Alberta Government actively assembles stakeholders with a view to becoming a WPAC where a watershed group representing the entire catchment did not previously exist (Government of Alberta 2003). Six organizations have been established between 2004-2007 (post-strategy), while the Bow River Basin Council was formed in 1992 and the North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance in 1997. Organizational staffing ranges from 0.5-5 persons, with additional contract and project staff as required. Boards vary in size from 9-17 members, and are generally elected from the membership base, together with some appointees, including from Alberta Environment, for terms of two years.

British Columbia--Fraser Basin Council

Only five per cent of land in British Columbia is privately owned (Harcourt et al. 2007). The province does not have a network of decentralized organizations akin to the other provinces discussed in this section. A single organization, the Fraser Basin Council (FBC), is described here. The Agricultural Land Commission does not have an integrated watershed management mandate, and the Fraser River Estuary Management Program is not governed by a Board with strong community representation, so these have been excluded from the analysis.

The Fraser Basin covers an expanse of 240,000 [km.sup.2], with 2.7M residents, of which 78 per cent live in the lower reaches and estuary, including Vancouver (Blomquist et al. 2007). The FBC was established in 1997 under the Society Act (British Columbia), succeeding the earlier Fraser Basin Management Board (FBMB) (1992-96), established under the auspices of the federal, provincial and municipal governments on 26 May 1992. The FBC is a charitable, not-for-profit, non-government organization, and currently employs 25 staff. It is mandated "to bring people together to solve complex, multi-jurisdictional issues in the Fraser Basin, to take advantage of opportunities, and to strengthen the capacity of institutions and individuals to deal with emerging issues that threaten the overall sustainability of the Basin" (Fraser Basin Council). This mandate is detailed in its constitution and "Charter for Sustainability" (Fraser Basin Council 2002).

FBC has three major streams of funding--base, fee-for-service and donor. Base funding is derived from a formula agreed under the Charter whereby each of the eight regional districts represented in the Basin contributes around ten cents per resident, which is matched by both federal and provincial governments. Its annual budget is around CA$6M, and is steadily rising.

The FBC has a two-tier governance structure (Fraser Basin Council 2007). The Fraser Basin Council Society (hereafter referred to as "the Society") is the peak authority comprising seven members. Society members have lifetime membership and may or may not hold a position in the second tier of governance. These members represent the four orders of government, civil society and the private sector. The second tier is the Fraser Basin Council (hereafter referred to as 'the Board') comprising 36 directors, with scope recently introduced for an additional four directors. Directors are appointed for a three-year term, which may be renewed up to a total of nine years. While the FBC is a non-government organization, its government directors have equal 'rights' and decisions are made by consensus.

The Board Chair is appointed by the Society, and may or may not be a Society member. Appointment is by invitation and based primarily on profiles and networks. Positions for regional directors are advertised, and nominations and recommendations brought forward by the respective representative groups. Federal and provincial governments each nominate three directors, generally senior managers, through the Fraser Caucus (comprising 6-10 related agencies). Municipal and First Nations orders of government each nominate eight directors. An elected representative (i.e., councillor) is nominated by each of the eight Regional Districts, comprising about 65 local governments. The eight First Nations nominees represent different language groups and are mostly sitting members from First Nations Councils, comprising 98 First Nations communities. The remaining 14 positions comprise ten regional representatives (from the community and private sector in each of the Basin's five designated regions), three Basin-wide directors (representing social, economic and environmental expertise) and the independent Chair.

Manitoba--Conservation Districts

The province of Manitoba currently has 18 Conservation Districts (CDs), which are local-scale (1000-7000 [km.sup.2]) organizations established under The Conservation Districts Act 1976. The Act replaced the earlier Watershed Conservation Districts Act 1959 and the Resource Conservation Districts Act 1970, and has less focus on watershed-based management than the initial 1959 legislation. CDs are therefore variously formed under these legislations. The majority are based on municipal boundaries. The first CD was established in 1972 (Barg and Oborne 2006), and the most recent in December 2006 (Government of Manitoba 2006). The legislation also established the Conservation Districts Commission (CDC) to provide advice to the minister, and advice and policy guidance to CDs through policy directives approved by the minister (Barg and Oborne 2006). The legislation requires that each CD submit an annual report and operating budgets to the responsible minister.

Renewed impetus for watershed-based sustainable planning and management emerged in 2003 with the release of The Manitoba Water Strategy (Government of Manitoba 2003). The strategy identifies CDs as the favoured delivery agent. The water strategy and its emphasis on CDs was subsequently embodied in The Water Protection Act 2005, which assigns responsibilities for developing integrated watershed management plans to designated Water Planning Authorities (WPAs). CDs, among others, may apply for WPA status, and six were designated in 2006. The Act requires that a WPA submit a watershed management plan to the minister for approval. The water Act also established the Manitoba Water Council (MWC), which is mandated, inter alia, to monitor the development and implementation of watershed management plans in the province; coordinate the activities of advisory boards and similar entities that perform functions relating to water; and assist in reporting sustainability indicators relating to water.

Most CDs have around three full-time staff members. Each CD has a Board of Directors, comprising representatives chosen by member municipalities and representing each Sub-District watershed. A CD Board consists of "the Chair of each Sub-District Committee or where the district involves a single municipality, four persons appointed by the council of that municipality with a maximum of two persons being elected councillors of the municipality" (Government of Manitoba). One person is also appointed to each CD Board by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The number of Board members ranges from 5-13 members.

CDs are supported by an overarching organization, the Manitoba Conservation Districts Association (MCDA). The mandate of the MCDA is:

* Advocacy: To provide a consistent, unified voice to influence decision making in landscape sustainability;

* Education: To build and enhance relations with public and private partners; and,

* Promotion: To promote the identity of the Manitoba Conservation Districts Association to create presence and visibility (Manitoba Conservation Districts Association).

Ontario--Conservation Authorities

Conservation Authorities (CAs) emerged in Ontario following appeals for a new conservation initiative in the late 1920s and 1930s in response to extensive soil erosion and flooding following drought and deforestation. The Conservation Authorities Act was passed in 1946 in recognition that the scale of the problems extended beyond the scope of the provincial government to effectively manage and following agreement by a number of municipal councils to participate in a cooperative management arrangement (Michaels et al. 2007). CAs are "local, watershed management agencies that deliver services and programs that protect and manage water and other natural resources in partnership with government, landowners and other organizations" (Conservation Ontario). They are mandated to ensure the conservation, restoration and responsible management of Ontario's water, land and natural habitats through programs that balance human, environmental and economic needs.

There are now 36 CAs; the first of which was formed in 1946, the majority in the 1950-60s (influenced by Hurricane Hazel in 1954), and the most recent by 1980. They range in area from 500 [km.sup.2] to just over 7000 [km.sup.2]. A Board of Directors comprising municipally appointed members governs each CA; 75 per cent of whom are elected municipal politicians (Conservation Ontario 2007). Board membership ranges from 6-28 people. The employees of provincial agencies had full voting rights until the 1960s, and it was subsequently deemed inappropriate for agency employees to serve on Boards (Mitchell and Shrubsole 2007).

Only five of the 36 CAs are located in the north of the province. Together, the 36 CAs encompass 20 per cent of the province and 90 per cent of its population (11M people) (Conservation Ontario 2007). The average annual levy collected by CAs is about CA$8 per person. Capacities are highly variable throughout the network comprising a total of 3000 employees (Conservation Ontario 2007), ranging from four to 400 full-time equivalents in any individual CA.

Twenty-nine CAs have formed foundations to raise funds and community awareness, organize volunteers and administer specific projects, such as land acquisition. Foundations are legally independent of CAs, and have their own Boards of management. They are registered charities through which donations or bequests of money, real or personal property may be made to the CA and are eligible for tax credits to the donor as charitable gifts under income tax regulation. Some of these foundations are inactive or primarily formed for the purposes of seeking resources from large-scale foundations.

The 36 CAs are represented by Conservation Ontario, an umbrella coordination and advocacy organization. Its core purpose is defined as to "promote and continually strengthen a watershed-based conservation coalition in Ontario" (Conservation Ontario 2007). It is a non-profit corporate organization governed by a 72 member Council and a Board of Directors. It became an association in 1981, and now has 13 staff members.

Quebec--Watershed Organizations

The province of Quebec has a network of 33 Watershed Organizations (WO) recognized under the government's water policy released in November 2002 (Government of Quebec 2002). The process leading to the policy commenced in 1990 (Fitzgibbon et al. 2006). The policy states that the government undertakes to; "gradually introduce integrated watershed-based management" and "provide financial and technical support for the establishment of 33 watershed agencies" (p. 8). WOs are initiated at regional level; some existed prior to the policy's release, although sometimes with narrower mandates and not necessarily operating at watershed scale.

WOs are not-for-profit, non-government organizations registered under the Companies Act. The water policy states that three sectors--municipal, economic and community-based (citizens and groups)--will have 20-40% (min-max) representation. Watershed Organizations must include representatives of the following bodies, who will not have a majority voice: citizens and citizen groups; elected officials designated by the municipalities or regional county municipalities within the watershed; and water-user representatives in the watershed (agricultural, industrial, forestry, hydro-electric, commercial, and institutional sectors). While governments are represented on WOs, they do not have voting rights. WOs are charged with developing and implementing master water plans for their respective watersheds, requiring consultation with the public and local experts. A master water plan comprises an overview and diagnosis of the watershed, issues, directions and goals, together with an implementation action plan. WOs are mandated to contract basin stakeholders to undertake water management activities, and to monitor and report on their implementation. They have therefore been devolved responsibilities traditionally performed by the state (de Loe and Kreutzwiser 2007).

WOs are supported by a non-profit organization, Regroupement des Organisations de Bassin Versant du Quebec (ROBVQ) or Coalition of Watershed Organizations of Quebec, which was formed in November 2001 to:

* promote the broad principles of integrated water and aquatic ecosystem management;

* support the establishment and operation of watershed and basin organizations throughout Quebec;

* represent watershed or basin organizations in forums with governments and other organizations involved in water resource management;

* defend the common interests of members;

* promote exchange of information between Coalition members;

* develop and disseminate tools for governance and management, training, planning and monitoring; and

* represent watershed or basin organizations with different international forums including the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO).

Territories

All three territories have co-management arrangements for aspects of integrated watershed management established under Land Claims Agreements with First Nations peoples. These organizations are individually described in Appendix B, including in the form of a synoptic table (Appendix B, Table B). The 19 organizations identified by the research are:

* four Land and Water Boards (Northwest Territories)

* one Planning Commission, and one Water Board (Nunavut)

* three Regional Land Use Planning Commissions, nine Renewable Resource Councils and one Water Board, (Yukon)

These organizations are variously mandated to issue land use permits and water licenses, conduct land use planning (of water, wildlife and offshore areas) and undertake environmental reporting--although generally not in national parks. Their powers are generally confined to making recommendations to federal and territory governments and the affected First Nation(s) for consideration, such as on the conservation of fish and wildlife, the establishment of Special Management Areas and forest resources management. In doing so, they are directed to consider the benefits for First Nations residents in particular and all Canadians in general.

Most have been formed relatively recently, although a few are much older. Organizational areas are regional to supra-regional in scale (16,000 to 1,994,000 [km.sup.2]), and reflect First Nations land claim areas as well as the vastness of the territories (474,000-1,994,000 [km.sup.2] in land area) and their sparse populations (31,000-42,600 persons) (Statistics Canada). Decentralized organizations in Nunavut and Yukon have jurisdiction across the entire territory. The Mackenzie Land and Water Board in the Northwest Territories has jurisdiction over about two thirds of territory lands, within which three lower level Land and Water Boards currently operate, at the variable scales of 16,000, 39,000 and 280,000 [km.sup.2], and others are anticipated following further land claim settlements.

Organizational staffing ranges from 2-11 persons, and Board membership is uniformly small at 4-9 members. Appointment of Board members is explicitly defined in legislation, and generally comprises at least one third nominated by First Nation(s), with appointees approved by the federal Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs.

PART II--SWOT Analysis: Issues and insights to inform capacity building

The paper has established that 115 decentralized organizations have emerged in eight of Canada's 13 provinces and territories. Federal governments have played a significant role in the establishment of territorial organizations and the Fraser Basin Council. This part of the paper presents a broad suite of issues and insights related to capacity development in the form of an exploratory SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, particularly concerning governing Boards as the research focus. It is informed by the aforesaid interviews with key informants and supplemented by reviews of websites and key literature, together with peer reviews of draft versions of the paper. The breadth of the research scope, together with time constraints, necessitated a case study approach, with informant interviews principally focused on Fraser Basin Council (British Columbia) and Conservation Authorities (Ontario). Informants and reviewers are identified in the Acknowledgments, including titles and affiliations, and were targeted for their standing and experience, including related publishing in some cases. The outcomes of these discussions are reported collectively and, for privacy reasons, any specific quotation is not attributed to an individual.

The aim of the analysis is to stimulate thinking about the merits of and prospects for developing nation-wide decentralized governance arrangements and capacities, and to provide the foundations for informing dialogue and--as a first-step--agenda-setting in this regard among system actors (i.e., decentralized organizations, overarching organizations, governments, municipalities, First Nations, etc). Priority actions for individual actors--which are necessarily context specific and may be informed by further reference to specific literatures--are beyond the scope of this paper, which is exploratory in nature and directed at providing a synoptic overview. It is also important to reiterate that any process of purposefully developing nation-wide arrangements and capacities may be expanded to include other organizations not explicitly identified and discussed in this paper.

Strengths

The frameworks underpinning these decentralized governance arrangements provide valuable insights in some cases. The longevity of Ontario's Conservation Authorities (CAs) is often inferred as an indicator of model success (e.g., Fitzgibbon et al. 2006); however, its legislative underpinning precluded dissolution of CAs for almost half a century. Dissolving a CA remains difficult under amended legislation, but in doing so ensures a stable organizational link between upstream and downstream communities by precluding any individual municipality from readily opting out. The Fraser Basin Council (FBC), described by Blomquist et al. (2007: 139) as "a highly effective organization with a visionary and wide-ranging agenda," operates under a non-regulatory good faith agreement, the Charter for Sustainability, and provides an alternative model for collaboration between partners.

Land Claim Agreements in the territories have formalized co-management arrangements for First Nations communities. Multi-party representation structures provide a stronger voice for Indigenous peoples about aspects of integrated watershed management in their homelands. The importance of relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians is also notable in the formal and informal structures of the FBC (Muldoon and McClenaghan 2007), such as the recently formed New Relations Committee. Blomquist et al. (2007: 143) describes the presence of eight First Nations representatives as, "A striking feature of the make-up of the [FB] council."

The decentralized governance arrangements described in this paper represent varying degrees of independence from governments. Most may be described as 'at arm's length.' This sometimes enables them to connect and play a brokering role within and between state and non-state actors, bring environmental agendas to the fore, and present a less partial perspective. In the case of FBC, Blomquist et al. (2007: 145) found that, "the council's status as a nongovernmental body and its broad representation are extremely helpful in addressing issues that cross agency domains and jurisdictional boundaries and promoting inclusion of a wide range of perspectives." An informant noted that some environmental non-government organizations perceive CAs as compromised by their close relationships with municipalities; however, they are able to push municipalities further than they would normally be prepared to go without alienating them.

Governance arrangements in Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec are strongly connected to municipalities. For example, Grand River CA has 26 members directly appointed by 22 municipal councils representing 34 upper and lower tier municipalities (Grand River Conservation Authority, nd). The centrality of municipalities should theoretically facilitate integrated watershed management agendas with the broader activities of its member institutions, especially land use planning. Plummer et al. (2005) report greater protection of lands adjacent to watercourses through land use planning resulting from the strong links between CAs and municipalities embodied in the Municipalities Act. Through municipal-oriented structures, there are examples of highly participative, democratic and transparent processes. In the case of Manitoba, for example, Conservation Districts (CDs) are established at the initiation of the region (i.e., bottom-up) and Board members are appointed from Sub-District watersheds (although the boundaries of CDs, in many cases, do not align closely with watersheds).

The raising of levies through participating municipalities or organizations provides both a reliable revenue stream and high accountability for organizational expenditures and progress. This model works most favorably for organizations with larger rate-payer bases. In the case of Ontario, declining provincial government support in the 1990s made CAs temporarily poor, but forced them to seek grass-roots support, become independent and progressively diversify their revenue sources. For example, the annual budget of Grand River CA for 2007 is CA$23.7M or CA$8.19 per resident (a 2.6 per cent increase from 2006), with revenue sources comprising 13 per cent government grants, 51 per cent self-generated revenue, and 36 per cent municipal revenue (Grand River Conservation Authority 2007).

The formation of charitable foundations attached to decentralized organizations is an innovative vehicle for raising funds, community awareness and volunteers. Its utility, however, is greatest in more populated regions, although even in those with fewer residents it provides a useful mechanism for accessing and channeling tax-deductible funds. The foundation model could be expanded to cover multiple organizations, especially to pool expertise and provide a mechanism for redistributing resources to the area of greatest need (rather than greatest revenue base). The ability to leverage funds from multiple sources, whether through foundations or other mechanisms, is a strength of most of the provincial organizations identified.

The existence of overarching organizations (e.g. Alberta Water Council, Conservation Ontario, Manitoba Conservation Districts Association, Regroupement des Organisations de Bassin Versant du Quebec, Yukon Land Use Planning Council) provides a valuable coordination and advocacy role, and facilitates cross-organizational sharing and learning, although mostly confined within a single jurisdiction. Conservation Ontario was described by one informant as "an essential piece of the model's architecture," especially in giving smaller organizations a political voice.

There are examples of innovative formalized agreements. These extend to twinning relationships between organizations, such as the cross-province partnership agreement between the FBC and Grand River CA, which has extended to convening joint meetings of their governing Boards. Some organizations practice staff sharing, which provides access to technical expertise that may otherwise be unaffordable and supports greater cross-regional sharing and learning. The Grand River CA has a Memorandum of Understanding with three universities within its boundaries. The CA provides these universities with a list of research priorities, and an annual research forum enables university researchers to communicate findings to the CA.

Some organizations have focused on ways of attracting and retaining high quality Board members. FBC positions, for example, are reportedly highly contested and its well-connected appointees generally serve a full-term. Harcourt et al. (2007) suggest it has "developed more influence than ever because of the timeliness of its mission and the clout of its chairs." Other organizations have put in place mechanisms for maintaining and transferring corporate memory. Quebec's Bassin Versant Saint-Maurice appoints its members in municipal election years on an even/odd basis, ensuring that half the membership is consistent between years, as does Alberta's Beaver River Watershed Alliance.

Weaknesses

There is a tension for decentralized organizations, individually and collectively, between being too close and too distant from governments. Either can prove a weakness at different times in an organization's evolution. For example, CAs described as "children of the province," continue to confront difficulties in shifting from a 'parent-child' footing to one of equal relations with the responsible provincial ministry. The province was described as "still in control mode" and not wanting to enable CAs through an empowering framework. The same situation may emerge in Alberta and Quebec as decentralized arrangements mature. In the case of British Columbia, an informant remarked that "there is no appetite for a basin-wide entity by provincial and federal governments". Michaels et al. (2007) note the imperative for decentralized organizations of maintaining cooperative working relationships with municipalities, provincial government and other stakeholders to achieve watershed management goals, as regulation or economic incentives cannot be readily or extensively employed.

The composition of Boards and processes for and terms of appointment vary significantly across the 115 organizations identified. While many Boards are elected, greatest priority tends to be given to sectoral representation, especially municipalities in the case of Manitoba and Ontario. CAs have seen a shift to municipalities nominating councillors rather than citizens, such that "you don't necessarily get the best and most committed" and some merely act as a "watchdog" for their municipality; however, through engagement with CAs these individuals sometimes become "ambassadors" and "open the lines of communication with municipalities, get issues on the agenda and develop relationships at a whole range of levels." Factors such as gender, age and cultural diversity do not feature strongly in the design of Board membership nor does the mix of skills that members collectively bring to the position. The exception, in terms of representation, is First Nations, but only with respect to Board composition in the territories and the FBC. In the case of CAs, the legislative framework precludes direct representation by First Nations, while their participation in CDs has historically not been a major priority (Barg and Oborne 2006). Some organizations have participatory mechanisms other than direct Board representation in place, such as youth forums. Terms are sometimes as brief as twelve months, while others are open-ended. The impact of term times on effective and efficient decision-making processes and retention of corporate memory needs further consideration.

The mandates of the organizations identified in this paper vary both between and within jurisdictions. Some organizations have a narrowly defined mandate, while others have a broader charter, which is not necessarily fully exercised, either by choice or necessity. The ability of Manitoba's CDs to coordinate surface water management is limited in most cases, despite "implied responsibility and authority" in their enabling legislation (Barg and Oborne 2006). The mandate of CAs was described by an informant as "good in theory," but not used to its full extent. While de Loe and Kreutzwiser (2007: 99) comment that, "Locally led processes such as source protection planning in Ontario will fail if participants come to believe that they do not actually have the power to design and implement solutions locally." Some decentralized organizations in place in the territories are purely advisory in nature. While governments have usually followed their recommendations, there are exceptions (including, legitimately, when governments have higher order issues to consider). In the Yukon, the mandate of Regional Land Use Planning Commissions extends only to preparing land use plans. Without any mandate for implementation, First Nations communities are reliant on the good will of governments for the plans to have any effect. The mandate of the Yukon's Renewable Resource Councils does not extend to non-renewables (oil, gas, etc), which presents substantial scope for future conflicts over management and financial revenue. In the case of British Columbia, an informant described the FBC as a "toothless tiger" with only the "power of persuasion."

There are some notable differences among the decentralized arrangements described in terms of population and proximity to urban centers. These factors are especially relevant when decentralized structures are based upon municipal levies as a core revenue stream. The most successful CAs (cited by informants, in alphabetical order, as Credit Valley, Grand River, Toronto and Region, and Upper Thames) have the largest populations, as well as a number of environmentally progressive municipalities. The narrower scope of activities of some CAs is attributable in part to their limited fiscal capacity and associated smaller rate bases, while the near absence of CAs in the province's north reflects the lack of organized municipalities, which is a legislated requirement for the formation of a CA.

Access to financial resources and proximity to urban centers has implications for staffing. Differences in staffing between organizations is quite marked, ranging from only 0.5 in the case of Lesser Slave Watershed Council (Alberta) to around 400 in the case of Toronto and Region CA (Ontario). Access to financial resources contributes favorably to securing professional staff (both in terms of quantity and quality), as well as technical and information resources. Fiscally-limited organizations tend to have fewer staff and do not have the same depth of technical skills, and may not be in a position to offer attractive salary packages and career opportunities as better resourced organizations. "Bedroom communities" to the City of Toronto were noted as having "better access to financial, human, technical, and information resources than many, perhaps most, Ontario communities" (Ivey et al. 2004: 43).

The organizations described in this paper operate within the context of variable land areas, from local to meta-regional in scale. There are also boundary issues, which the current arrangements do not always address well, and which limit the capacity of some organizations to take a whole-of-watershed approach to planning and implementation. CDs participated in watershed boundaries workshops in 2006 as "a crucial first step in a process toward having all CDs operate on watershed boundaries" (Manitoba Conservation Districts Association 2007), as most do not currently have authority over all contributing headwaters or collecting waterways downstream. Some local-level organizations may lack the capacity to consider and operate at larger scales; however, larger regions have reported "distances and geographical spread as a challenge for keeping connected." Together with staffing and resourcing issues, these differences have implications for enabling individual organizations to achieve sustainable watershed management outcomes.

The quality and scope of regional planning and implementation differs both within and between jurisdictions, and is sometimes adversely affected by changing contexts. An informant noted that the legislation underpinning CAs inherently creates organizations with different capacities for planning and implementation. de Loe and Kreutzwiser (2007: 99) suggest that "enormous variation from region-to-region can be expected in the quality and comprehensiveness as well as in the rate of success of implementation" in the case of Ontario's emerging source protection planning system. In the case of CDs, Barg and Oborne (2006: 126) remark that, "few have developed management plans to guide their long-term operations," although several have recently commenced watershed planning activities. According to Blomquist and Schlager (cited in Plummer et al. 2005), the gap between prescription and practice of integrated resource management is wide. A higher level of planning is sometimes evident in watersheds with designation as a Canadian Heritage River (e.g., Veale 2004; Plummer et al. 2005).

Lack of recognition of the entities described in this paper as having potential to form nation-wide governance arrangements presents a fundamental barrier to sharing and learning across jurisdictions, and to its purposeful evolution--through formal acknowledgment, utilization, development and support--as a national entry point for interacting with regions and their stakeholder groups and for delivery of national programs and services. Reluctance on the part of the federal government to show leadership and invest significantly in integrated watershed management presents a further obstacle to any collective evolution of capacities of these organizations (and others) and their expansion more nationally.

Opportunities

A federal policy on sustainable watershed management is needed to guide and support planning and delivery of programs and services at subnational level (e.g., Morris et al. 2007). National entities like Canadian Water Resources Association (CWRA) and the Gordon Water Group of Concerned Scientists and Citizens together with overarching coordination and advocacy organizations could press for greater and more strategic involvement of the federal and, in some cases, provincial/territorial governments in developing decentralized organizational arrangements and capacities, especially in response to prominent global and national issues like water and climate change. The scale of this cross-jurisdictional development, coordination and communication role is such that it extends beyond the mandates and resources of provincial/territorial governments, overarching organizations or other national associations or interest groups. At the provincial level, Alberta and Quebec were described by an informant as having "great overarching policy frameworks," but supported by limited resources (e.g., around CA$65,000 per region in the case of Quebec) and without having yet developed strong regional capacity. Conversely, the absence of a watershed-based planning framework in Manitoba is implicated in the frustrations of many CDs in progressing effective water management according to Barg and Oborne (2006), while Ontario was characterized as having no provincial policy framework. It was suggested that historical reluctance of the province to reengage meaningfully and substantively with CAs acted as an impediment to comprehensive, integrated policy development.

Research is vital for informing organizational decision-making, and is an arena that presents many opportunities for improvement. The role of federal government is currently weak, whereas Muldoon and McClenaghan (2007) suggest that providing foundational science should be a "cornerstone" of its involvement. Both federal and provincial/territorial governments could work more proactively with overarching organizations and related national entities (e.g., CWRA, Canadian Water Network, Gordon Water Group of Concerned Scientists and Citizens) in undertaking, commissioning, collating, integrating and disseminating research within these organizational networks. Research findings also need to be harvested from outside traditional domains.

Establishing decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management in those provinces without such organizations in place presents an opportunity to build upon the current network. Saskatchewan stands out as a large province without decentralized governance arrangements equivalent to other jurisdictions of the same scale. Opportunity exists to expand the appointment terms and mandates of organizations in the territories, such as the Yukon's Regional Land Use Commissions, to having longer-term implementation responsibilities.

The experiences of Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and the territories would suggest that there is value in putting in place overarching organizations where they do not already exist to facilitate better coordination and play an advocacy role for the collective. By working together under an umbrella organization, the collective can also afford to engage in activities that they cannot efficiently and effectively do individually (e.g., engage international speakers for conferences, keep abreast of research findings, etc.). Under the umbrella of Conservation Ontario, there are some 50 working groups organized around specific issues. For example, CAs in the Greater Golden Horseshoe (a geographical sub-region of Southern Ontario) work together to coordinate equitable service delivery across municipalities. Cross-regional coordination is also sometimes externally imposed, such as the Ontario Government's requirement that CAs work across organizational boundaries under new management structures for the purposes of developing source water protection strategies.

There are many opportunities for greater cross-regional sharing and learning among organizations, both within and between provinces and especially between 'mature' and 'recent' organizations. For example, the Grand River CA as an exemplar has much to share with other decentralized organizations, including CAs--it was awarded the internationally renowned Thiess Environmental Services Riverprize for excellence in river management in 2000 (Veale 2004), and has ISO14001 certified environmental management systems in place for all its operations. There are many innovative examples of approaches to exchanging ideas and building networks and relationships, which could be readily built upon. For example, the Manitoba Conservation Districts Association (MCDA) conducted a "Learning Experience Tour" in 2006, taking 34 CD Managers and Board members, together with MCDA Executive and staff, to tour and meet with the South Nation CA fin Ottawa) and Conservation Ontario (Manitoba Conservation Districts Association 2007). While CAs have collectively developed an information management strategy, both to improve their information management and "nudge the provincial and federal governments to develop broader standards that could be used across jurisdictions" (Wilcox cited in Michaels et al. 2007: 227).

More structured approaches to building the capacity of staff and Board members (e.g., through mentoring and coaching, exercises, briefings and debriefings, competency-based training, etc.) would be beneficial to both the individuals concerned and their organizations (see Robins 2007b, 2008a). By way of example, some Board members have been described by informants as "technologically challenged," and First Nations members as "dismayed by the volumes of paperwork." The territories are reportedly starting to recognize the need for and value of skills development and facilitation in operating more professional organizations. The effort of Nunavut in building capacity among Indigenous peoples, including supporting training for staff in the southern provinces, was cited by an informant as having "provided a big pay off." In the case of the FBC, the capacity of directors is actively developed through rotating its meetings between its five designated regions to familiarize directors with local contexts and build relationships, including enabling informal mentoring among directors. Attention to capacities is especially important when staff and Board members are initially appointed. FBC and Grand River CA have informal orientation programs for newly appointed directors.

Governance arrangements in the territories provide a wealth of experience about working with First Nations and the integration of differing knowledge and value systems. The development of working relationships between province-based and territory-based organizations presents an opportunity for building stronger connections with and outcomes for First Nations communities. There is scope to link First Nations representatives participating in Boards across Canada to facilitate sharing and learning, and provide mutual support. There are some provincial examples of organizations working in close partnership with First Nations that could be built upon. For example, three First Nations may join the Alonsa CD to form a watershed-based district (Barg and Oborne 2006), while the Grand River CA has a protocol agreement with Six Nations of the Grand River to provide notification of any proposed developments within unsettled land claim areas abutting the Grand River (Veale 2004).

Networking and relationship building opportunities also extend outside the decentralized arrangements described. Ways of working more effectively with and learning from smaller and larger scale organizations and initiatives that fall within or bridge across organizational boundaries could be explored and further developed (e.g., Niagara Escarpment Commission, Prairie Provinces Water Board, Lake Winnipeg Stewardship Board, Remedial Action Plans for the Great Lakes Areas of Concern, Meewasin Valley Authority, Atlantic Coastal Action Program, Irrigation Districts, etc). A research informant noted the need to work "with the congregation rather than the choir," and outreach beyond the sustainability community, including bridging rural and urban divides and working with "dying" rural communities facing structural changes.

Some organizations have actively pursued international outreach and learning. Grand River CA has a twinning relationship with the San Roque Lake Watershed in the Province of Cordoba, Argentina, through the International Rivers Foundation and a partnership with the City of Dalian in China (together with the University of Waterloo), while the FBC has participated in outreach activities in the Philippines, Russia, China, Iraq, Syria, New Zealand and Australia, especially through participation in conferences. Quebec has participated for more than a decade in the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO). The INBO operates a Twin Basins project, which connects watershed organizations internationally. Conservation Ontario has a deliberate strategy of raising its profile locally to internationally in endeavoring to ensure the longevity of its organizational network.

This research found that most organizational websites and, in some cases, those of overarching coordination and advocacy organizations, are poor and would benefit substantially from further development. Some organizations are without websites despite several years of operation. Many websites do not provide basic information about the organization, and often assume readership by local stakeholders. Websites could be better utilized to report on organizational progress, and provide ready access to key publications. Some websites do not have basic features such as search engines.

Threats

The specter of governments withdrawing support is a concern of particular importance to those organizations that are highly dependent on government backing and resources. Perceptions about government support also have implications for maintaining credibility among stakeholders. Trends in government resourcing towards specific projects--"governments want projects, not organizations with overheads and ongoing costs"--with definitive outcomes that "are a political accomplishment that they can put their stamp on" was identified by research informants as presenting concerns for continuity, longevity and long-term programming and staffing. For example, The Red Deer River Watershed Alliance (2006) suggested that the Alberta Government needed to provide WPACs with "a clear understanding on the expected support (funds, staff, resources) that will be provided," as well as "a clear understanding on the process and criteria used ... to allocate funds/grants."

Integrated watershed management organizations often operate in complex, changing operating environments (Plummer et al. 2005). For example, the Grand River CA is operating in "one of the fastest growing areas in Canada, with anticipated growth of over 30% over the next 20 years" (Veale 2004). In the case of the territories, Armitage (2005: 710) highlights, "complex and rapidly evolving dynamics of intensive resource development and economic growth, issues of sovereignty and security, climate change, and political transformation." Such changes may present opportunities (e.g., higher rate-bases), but also risks to organizational stability and longevity for those without sufficient adaptive and innovative capacity.

Mandates are unclear or changing in some instances, while there are occasions where organizations, knowingly or unknowingly, stray beyond their stated mandates. An informant also lamented that "governments like to put you into a box that's smaller than your mandate." In Alberta, the roles and level of responsibility of WPACs are reported as "changing rapidly" (Scott 2006). Blomquist et al. (2007: 141) remarked that, "at times even the [FB] council members are not entirely clear what actions are within the council's scope." In Ontario, Muldoon and McClenaghan (2007: 256) suggest that "huge questions remain regarding how First Nations communities will be involved in developing watershed-based source protection plans and how their objections or wishes will be respected within the proposed committee structures." Newer organizations are more prone to failing to clearly identify and adhere to their core business, and can commit their energies across too many arenas; described by an informant as "the temptation to be ten miles wide and a quarter of an inch thick." The FBC noted the importance of being strategic and focusing on core business, as there are many good ideas and opportunities such that an organization can readily "take on too many projects" (it currently manages more than 110) and find itself "spread too thinly." Blomquist et al. (2007: 145) comment that "it is acknowledged that there have been occasions when funding opportunities associated with involvement in one or another project have stretched the [FB] council's own broadly defined scope and agenda rather far." An informant noted, however, that there is an inherent tension in working with diverse constituencies within a sustainability framework, and that it is not possible to "make everyone [business, governments, green groups, etc.] happy."

The potential for governments or other funders to expect organizations to perform equally in terms of planning, management and reporting outcomes despite their different contexts and capacities poses a genuine concern. An informant also noted that "it is to the detriment of an organization not to shape its agenda to the watershed community." It is reasonable, however, that contemporary organizations should effectively account for their activities and expenditure against mandated responsibilities, especially where public funds are concerned. One informant suggested that there was a need to demonstrate through reporting processes that the organization can 'walk the talk' or risk losing its reputation. Auditing and reporting among organizations is currently highly variable and not always readily accessible or comparable. The focus of much reporting is highly output-based (e.g., kilometers of fencing, number of trees planted) rather than outcome-based. According to Barg and Oborne (2006: 127), the CD program is not guided by a specific performance measurement framework and "does not contain provisions for monitoring and evaluation." They further comment that annual reporting principally comprises a factual outline of activities together with audited financial statements. CAs have resolved to improve outcome-based reporting through publishing annual watershed report cards (15 produced todate). FBC indicated increasing pressure to report quantitatively against expenditures, which it saw as a challenge for an organization with emphasis on people, networks and relationships. This is perhaps highlighted in the comments of one informant, who described the FBC as not having produced evidence of the efficacy of its "quiet influence behind the scenes" approach. However, the FBC publishes state-of-the-basin reports and snapshots on sustainability (e.g., Fraser Basin Council, nd), together with biennial conferences focused on basin conditions (e.g., Fraser Basin Council 2006), which Blomquist et al. (2007: 138) suggest "greatly improved information flow."

Membership of some Boards was noted as being greater than it needed to be, and very large ones (e.g., 36 FBC directors) present particular hurdles. An informant noted that "care and feeding of Boards is not an insignificant activity," and they have to have meaningful involvement. Members of large Boards do not generally have the same opportunity to engage in dialogue as smaller entities. Effectively engaging with members and progressing significant agendas is therefore made more difficult. Some CAs with larger membership have reportedly created committees for the purposes of getting their members more engaged. Consensus-based processes can be particularly time-consuming and frustrating (Blomquist et al., 2007: 146), and can result in sub-optimal ('lowest common denominator') outcomes where many parties are involved. The focus of Boards on operational rather than strategic issues also presents a concern in some instances. Some informants reported cases of Boards progressing from being more hands-on to engaging in more strategic and policy-oriented dialogue with organizational maturity. Siloism and parochialism were also cited by several informants as threats to achieving sustainable outcomes, including municipal representatives who give priority to their local interests. An informant commented, "It continues to be a huge challenge for people to think about the whole system." The relationship between CAs and their municipalities was described as one of 'love-hate' in some instances, especially as policy emphasis has shifted from protecting people from the environment, initially through engineering solutions and then floodplain development prevention, to protecting the environment from people.

Most decentralized organizations with community representation on their Boards face concerns about access to and retention of high quality Board members, especially as a result of burnout. Blomquist et al. (2007: 141) warns against the potential for organizational disruption resulting from, "Losing strong and committed champions who possess well-developed managerial skills as well as political acumen." In the territories, there is a relatively small pool of individuals, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, who are involved in a plethora of Boards both within and outside the watershed management sector and travel long distances to participate in meetings. Barg and Oborne (2006: 126) comment, in the case of CDs, that, "Some have experienced high staff turnover." Some research informants noted a trend in reducing the number of CA committees, and suggested that Board membership is no longer "a particularly demanding position." However, upon reflecting on the history of CAs, Mitchell and Shrubsole (2007) caution against the potential for burnout of volunteers. Population growth and declining environmental conditions, suggested an informant, are anticipated to increase rather than decrease demands on Board members. In the case of the Grand River CA, the Board meets twice monthly, and members are expected to review a large agenda package before each meeting and be prepared for discussions and voting on any recommendations. In addition to travel, members also serve on ad hoc committees, accompany staff and the Chair to municipal council presentations (usually 1-2 per year), and attend CA functions and events. In the case of the FBC, a Board member is estimated to dedicate around 30 days each year in formal organizational meetings in addition to meeting preparation and follow-up tasks and their engagement in local or Basin events (estimated as a 0.25 full-time equivalent position). Some members participate in monthly operations committees and other issue or task specific committees (e.g., finance, youth, New Relations), and attend monthly meetings conducted at regional level (face-to-face-and by telephone).

Access to and retention of high quality staff members is a limiting factor in some regions, primarily as a consequence of remoteness, limited career development prospects and less attractive remunerations. Conversely, there are also examples of staff remaining for periods of 15-20 years, which in some cases was thought to be unhealthy for organizational culture in terms of adversely affecting the career prospects of others or developing new ways of thinking and operating. Younger professionals reportedly used the territories and more remotely located organizations as a training ground and career entry point for moving into positions in more urban settings. Younger professionals, including First Nations employees, generally work for a period of 2-3 years before moving on, and this is increasingly the case even in well-resourced organizations in populated areas. This presents issues for corporate memory retention and the development of local relationships; however, it was noted that there was anecdotal evidence that these people often moved between or to related organizations rather than out of the system. Rapid organizational growth and change can be a contributing factor to burnout, and is often a challenge in the establishment phase of organizations and for small organizations pursuing substantial agendas. In the case of FBC, around half its staff members have been employed in the last 18 months, many of whom are financed by project or 'soft' funding.

Duplication of effort (and inefficient use of resources) is currently widespread across organizations. The Red Deer River Watershed Alliance (2006) reported that "many WPACs are undertaking similar activities (e.g. Policy & Procedures Manual, stewardship toolkits, watershed management pamphlets)," and recommended that "we should look at joint initiatives." Systems need to be put in place to identify and transfer lessons within and between jurisdictions. Overarching advocacy and coordination organizations play this role to some extent. Sharing and learning between organizations can present issues of conflict that arise through making inter-regional comparisons. Board member remuneration is one such comparison, where the recompense received in one jurisdiction differs from another, and may introduce discontent where it perhaps did not exist previously. For example, the FBC reimburses travel expenses, and non-government Board members are eligible for an honorarium upon request; currently set at CA$175 per day, compared to the typical per diem rate of CA$50-80 for CAs. The Chair of Grand River CA is paid the equivalent of a part-time position. Payments have increasingly been sought by First Nations elders over the last decade in recognition of their status, especially in the territories, and such remunerations vary both spatially and temporally.

Conclusion

This paper has identified 115 organizations across Canada with devolved responsibilities for aspects of integrated watershed management and Boards that have community representation. It has canvassed the potential to purposefully 'evolve' these, and potentially other organizations, as foundations or 'building blocks' of nation-wide arrangements and capacities--through formal acknowledgment, expansion, utilization, development and support. The paper has focused particularly on ideas and insights for development of capacities across human, social, institutional and economic dimensions, especially in relation to their Boards of management.

The SWOT analysis identified that these decentralized arrangements have a number of existing strengths. These organizations are mostly underpinned by specific legislation or framework agreements, in some cases giving strong voice to Indigenous peoples. In some cases, they play a valuable role in connecting people and brokering knowledge, and bringing environmental agendas to the fore. Some are intimately connected to municipalities, and have highly participative, democratic and transparent processes for appointing Board members. The capacity to raise levies provides a reliable revenue stream and, where the rate-payer base is large, can financially underpin the organization. Charitable foundations, affiliated with individual or multiple organizations, provide a further vehicle for raising funds, community awareness and volunteers. Overarching organizations play a coordination and advocacy role in some cases, and can provide a political voice for smaller entities. Some formalized agreements for cross-organizational sharing and learning have emerged, including staff-sharing. There are some examples of efforts to attract and retain high quality staff and Board members, and maintain and transfer corporate memory.

This analysis has pointed to the tensions that can emerge for decentralized organizations in being too close or too distant from governments. The variability in Board composition and processes and terms of appointment has been identified, including inadequate attention in some cases to gender, age and cultural diversity as well as the collective mix of skills. Organizational mandates range from narrow to broad, and are often not fully exercised or recognized. Populations and proximity to urban centers vary widely between regions and directly affect revenue raising capacities and the ability to attract and retain staff and Board members, as well as technical and information resources. The size of regions spans local to meta-regional scale, and boundary issues sometimes limit whole-of-watershed approaches to planning and management. Regional planning and implementation varies in quality and scope both within and between jurisdictions, while sharing and learning across jurisdictions is impeded by lack of recognition of nation-wide arrangements and capacities, and federal government failure to show leadership and invest nationally in watershed management.

The federal government is without a comprehensive policy in place to guide watershed management at subnational level, as is the case for some provincial/territorial governments. National entities and overarching organizations could take a lead role in lobbying governments to put these policies in place, as well as invest in a national program of capacity building. National entities, overarching organizations, provincial/territorial governments and federal government could also take stronger roles in research, development and dissemination. Building a more formalized national network necessitates establishing and/or evolving decentralized governance arrangements in some jurisdictions, including changing and/or expanding the mandates of some existing organizations. Establishment of overarching coordination and advocacy organizations where they do not already exist is also likely to add capacity. There is scope for developing and investing in more structured approaches to building the capacity of staff and Board members, and in greater sharing and learning among the network, including outreach internationally and outside traditional networks. Linking First Nations Board representatives nationally was suggested as a mechanism for improving these networks and building mutual support. Electronic modes of communication were identified as an important area needing further development.

Ensuring organizational stability and longevity within an environment of uncertain government commitment and operational complexity and change was noted as a particular concern. This uncertainty sometimes extended to unclear and changing mandates, and occasionally to straying outside specified mandates, most often in the case of newer organizations. Governments and funders were noted as sometimes having unrealistic expectations that organizations with different contexts and capacities will perform at the same level. Failing to adequately and meaningfully monitor and report against expenditure and activities was identified as a risk to accessing future resources and to organizational credibility. Several issues of potential concern were identified with respect to some Boards, including their large size, the tendency to focus at an operational rather than strategic level, the constraints of consensus-based processes, siloism, and parochialism, capacities to think systemically and access to and retention of high quality members, including burnout. Remoteness, limited career development prospects and unattractive remunerations were cited as key impediments in the case of accessing and retaining high quality staff members. Burnout is also an issue for staff in some cases. There is currently widespread duplication of effort (and therefore inefficient use of resources) across organizations. The potential for conflicts arise through making inter-regional comparisons, such as Board member remuneration, was also raised.

This SWOT analysis was intended to stimulate thinking about the merits of and prospects for developing nation-wide decentralized arrangements and capacities for integrated watershed management, and to inform dialogue and agenda-setting in this regard among system actors (i.e, decentralized organizations, overarching organizations, governments, municipalities, First Nations, etc) as a first-step. The capacity issues and insights borne out in this paper have been collectively framed as a complex phenomenon requiring a long-term, holistic and strategic approach to development (also see Robins 2008b), but with the potential to realize significant benefits for watershed management across the country. Provincial/territorial and federal governments, but also other organizations, may draw from the many examples and insights presented here, in framing and shaping policies, programs, research and other initiatives associated with capacity development.

Acknowledgments

The following informants participated in interviews and, in most cases, provided comments on a draft version of this paper:

* Academics: Assoc. Prof. Kevin Hanna and Prof. Scott Slocombe (Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario); Prof. Bruce Mitchell (Professor of Geography and Associate Provost, Academic and Student Affairs, University of Waterloo, Ontario)

* Conservation Ontario: Bonnie Fox (Policy and Planning Specialist), Don Pearson (General Manager) and Charley Worte (Manager Source Water Protection Planning)

* Fraser Basin Council, British Columbia: Amy Leighton (Program Coordinator), Steve Litke (Program Manager), Terry Robert (Program Manager), Marion Robinson (Manager, Fraser Valley Region) and Gail Wallin (Manager, Cariboo-Chilcotin Region)

* Grand River Conservation Authority, Ontario Barbara Veale (Coordinator, Policy Planning & Partnerships)

I wish to thank my supervisors, Prof. Stephen Dovers, Prof Val Brown and Dr. Richard Baker (The Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National University), and sponsor in Canada, Prof. George Hoberg (Department of Forest Resources Management, University of British Columbia), for their support, input and guidance, together with Prof. Rob de Leo (Canada Research Chair in Water Management, Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Ontario), Prof. Tony Dorcey (Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability & School of Community and Regional Planning, University, of British Columbia), Steve Turgeon (Conseiller en gestion integree de l'eau par bassin versant, Ministere du development durable de l'environnement et des parcs) and two anonymous journal reviewers and Beth Dempster (Managing Editor, Environments) who provided comments on and improved the quality of the final article.

I also acknowledge the generous support of the Department of Education, Science and Training (Australian Postgraduate Award), Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (Postgraduate Research Scholarship), The Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists (Science Program Scholarship), Land & Water Australia (Knowledge for Regional NRM project and Social Institutional Research Program), and Australian Government NRM Team through the Natural Heritage Trust.

References

Alberta Environment. 2006, draft. WPAC Quick Facts: Grant Application and Review Process. Fact sheet. Edmonton: Alberta Environment.

Armitage, D. 2005. Adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource management. Environmental Management 35(6): 703-715.

Bakker, K. 2007a. Introduction. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Bakker, K. 2007b. Governing Canada's Water Wisely. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Bakker, K., ed. 2007c. Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Barg, S., and B. Oborne. 2006. Adaptive Policy Case Study: Analysis of Manitoba's Conservation District Policy. In Designing Policies in a World of Uncertainty, Change, and Surprise: Adaptive Policy-making for Agriculture and Water Resources in the Face of Climate Change: Phase 1 Research Report. Winnipeg, Manitoba and New Delhi, India: International Institute for Sustainable Development and The Energy and Resources Institute.

Blomquist, W., K. S. Calbick, and A. Dinar. 2007. Canada: Fraser Basin. In Integrated River Basin Management Through Decentralization, K. E. Kemper, W. Blomquist and A. Dinar, eds. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

Bradshaw, B. 2003. Questioning the credibility and capacity of community-based resource management. The Canadian Geographer 47(2): 137-150.

Connor, R., and S. Dovers. 2004. Institutional Change for Sustainable Development. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.

Conservation Ontario. 2007. Member Manual 2007-2010. Newmarket, Ontario: Conservation Ontario.

Conservation Ontario, nd. http://conservation-ontario.on.ca/faq/index.html [Accessed on 26 Nov 2007].

de Loe, R. and R. Kreutzwiser. 2007. Challenging the Status Quo: The Evolution of Water Governance in Canada. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

European Centre for Development Policy Management. 2003. Factors Underpinning Successful Capacity Development and Good Performance. Maastricht: ECDPM.

Fitzgibbon, J., B. Mitchell and B. Veale. 2006. Sustainable Water Management: State of Practice in Canada and Beyond. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Water Resources Association.

Fraser Basin Council. 2002. Charter of Sustainability. Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Basin Council.

Fraser Basin Council. 2006. Sustainability: Inspiring Action. 2006 State of the Fraser Basin Conference (brochure), Vancouver Convention and Exhibition Centre, 16-17 November 2006. Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Basin Council.

Fraser Basin Council. 2007. Director's Handbook. Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Basin Council.

Fraser Basin Council, nd. The 2006 State of the Fraser Basin: Sustainability Snapshot 3. Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Basin Council.

Fraser Basin Council, nd. History of the Fraser Basin Council. http://www.fraser-basin.bc.ca/about_us/history.html [Accessed on 26 May 2008].

Gleeson, B. 2003. Learning about regionalism from Europe: 'Economic normalisation' and beyond. Australian Geographical Studies 41(3): 221-236.

Government of Alberta. 2003. Water for Life: Alberta's Strategy for Sustainability. Edmonton, Alberta: Alberta Environment.

Government of Alberta, nd. Enabling Partnerships: A Framework in Support of Water for Life: Alberta's Strategy for Sustainability. Edmonton, Alberta: Alberta Environment.

Government of Manitoba. 2003. The Manitoba Water Strategy. Winnipeg, Manitoba: Government of Manitoba.

Government of Manitoba. 2006. Province Announces New Conservation District. News Release. 5 December 2006.

Government of Manitoba. nd. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/fippa/directories/localbodies/conservationdistricts.html [Accessed on 12 Dec 2007].

Government of Quebec. 2002. Water. Our Life. Our Future. Quebec: Ministere de I'Environnement.

Grand River Conservation Authority. 2007. Putting your money to work to protect the environment. The Grand: Annual Report (Spring): 5.

Grand River Conservation Authority. nd. Conserving Our Future. Cambridge, Ontario: Grand River Conservation Authority.

Hanna, K. S. and D. S. Slocombe, eds. 2007. Integrated Resource and Environmental Management: Concepts and Practice. Toronto, Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Harcourt, M., K. Cameron and S. Rossiter. 2007. City Making Paradise: Nine Decisions That Saved Vancouver. Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & Mclntyre Ltd.

Horbulyk, T.M. 2007. Liquid Gold? Water Markets in Canada. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Hutchcroft, P. D. 2001. Centralization and decentralization in administration and politics: Assessing territorial dimensions of power and authority. Governance: An International Journal of Environmental Policy and Administration 14(1): 23-53.

Illsley, B. M. 2003. Fair participation--a Canadian perspective. Land Use Policy 20(3): 265-273.

Ivey, J. L., J. Smithers, R. C. de Loe and R. D. Kreutzwiser. 2004. Community capacity for adaptation to climate-induced water shortages: Linking institutional complexity and local actors. Environmental Management 33(1): 36-47.

Jennings, S. F. and S. A. Moore. 2000. The rhetoric behind regionalization in Australian natural resource management: Myth, reality and moving forward. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 2(3): 177-191.

Kellert, S. R., J. N. Mehta, S. Eddin and L. L. Lichtenfeld. 2000. Community natural resource management: Promise, rhetoric, and reality. Society and Natural Resources 13(8): 705-15.

Kemper, K. E., W. Blomquist and A. Dinar, eds. 2007. Integrated River Basin Management Through Decentralization. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

Lane, M. B., G. T. McDonald and T. H. Morrison. 2004. Decentralisation and environmental management in Australia: A comment on the prescriptions of The Wentworth Group. Australian Geographical Studies 42(1): 103-115.

Macadam, R., J. Drinan, N. Inall and B. McKenzie. 2004. Growing the Capital of Rural Australia--The Task of Capacity Building. RIRDC Publication No. 04/034. Canberra: Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation.

Manitoba Conservation Districts Association. 2007. MCDA Magazine 2006/07: Challenges, Change & Consensus. Brandon, Manitoba: Manitoba Conservation Districts Association.

Manitoba Conservation Districts Association. Homepage. http://www.mcda.ca/[Accessed on 26 May 2008].

Marshall, G. R. 2007. Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level. Occasional Paper 2007/01. Armidale, New South Wales: Institute for Rural Futures, University of New England.

Michaels, S., D. McCarthy and N. P. Goucher. 2007. Information Management for Water Resources: Concepts and Practice. In Integrated Resource and Environmental Management: Concepts and Practice, K. S. Hanna and D. S. Slocombe, eds. Toronto, Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, B. and D. Shrubsole. 2007. An Overview of Integration in Resource and Environmental Management. In Integrated Resource and Environmental Management: Concepts and Practice, K. S. Hanna and D. S. Slocombe, eds. Toronto, Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Morris, T. J., D. R. Boyd, O. M. Brandes, J. P. Bruce, M. Hudon, B. Lucas, T. Maas, L. Nowlan, R. Pentland and M. Phare. 2007. Changing the Flow: A Blueprint for Federal Action on Freshwater. Canada: Gordon Water Group of Concerned Scientists and Citizens.

Muldoon, P. and T. McClenaghan. 2007. Tangled Web: Reworking Canada's Water Laws. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Paton, S., A. Curtis, G. T. McDonald and M. Woods. 2004. Regional natural resource management: Is it sustainable? Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 11 (4): 259-267.

Plummer, R. and S. M. Arai. 2005. Co-management of natural resources: Opportunities for and barriers to working with citizen volunteers. Environmental Practice 7(4): 221-234.

Plummer, R., A. Spiers, J. FitzGibbon and J. Imhof. 2005. The expanding institutional context for water resources management: The case of the Grand River watershed. Canadian Water Resources Journal 30(3): 227-244.

The Red Deer River Watershed Alliance. 2006. The Red Deer River Watershed Alliance. Presentation at the WPAC Summit 2006, 5 October 2006. Alberta: Bow River Basin Council. http://www.brbc.ab.ca/pdfs/061004-Red%20Deer%20WPAC%20Summit.pdf [Accessed on: November, 24, 2007].

Ribot, J. C. 2002. Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular Participation. Washington DC: World Resources Institute.

Robins, L. 2007a. Major paradigm shifts in NRM in Australia. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 7(4): 300-311.

Robins, L. 2007b. Capacity-building for natural resource management: Lessons from the health sector. EcoHealth 4(3): 247-263.

Robins, L. 2008a. Capacity building for natural resource management: Lessons from risk and emergency management. Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 15(1): 6-20.

Robins, L. 2008b. Making capacity building meaningful: A framework for action. Environmental Management DOI: 10.1007/s00267-008-9158-7.

Robins, L. and S. Dovers. 2007a. Community NRM Boards of management: Are they up to the task? Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 14(2): 111-122.

Robins, L. and S. Dovers. 2007b. NRM regions in Australia: The 'haves' and the 'have nots'. Geographical Research 45(3): 273: 290.

Ryan, R. and S. Rudland. 2002. Capacity Building: A Conceptual Overview. Bondi Junction, New South Wales: Elton Consulting.

Saunders, J. O. and M. M. Wenig. 2007. Whose Water? Canadian Water Management and the Challenges of Jurisdictional Fragmentation. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Scott, T. 2006. NSWA's Approach to WSG Partnerships. Presentation by North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance at the WPAC Summit 2006, 5 October 2006. Alberta: Bow River Basin Council. http://www.brbc.ab.ca/pdfs/0610052006%20WPAC%20Summit%20NSWA%20WSG%20presentation.pdf [Accessed on: November, 24, 2007].

Shrubsole, D. and D. Draper. 2007. On Guard for Thee? Water (Ab)uses and Management in Canada. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Government of Canada, Statistics Canada. nd. Available at: http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/phys01.htm; and http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/demo02a.htm?sdi=population [Accessed 2 Jan 2008].

Veale, B. 2004. Watershed Management in the Grand River Watershed. In Towards a Grand Sense of Place: Writings on Changing Environments, Land Uses, Landscapes, Lifestyles and Planning of a Canadian Heritage River, G. Nelson, ed. Waterloo, Ontario: Environments Publications, University of Waterloo.

Wallace, K. 2003. Confusing means with ends: A manager's reflections on experience in agricultural landscapes of Western Australia. Ecological Management & Restoration 4(1): 23-28.

APPENDIX A: Additional Information on Decentralized Arrangements in the Provinces

This appendix further describes the arrangements outlined in Part I: "Decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management" with respect to the provinces, including Tables A1 and A2 which provide synopses. Five provinces do not have decentralized governance arrangements that accord with the criteria specified in Part I of this paper, namely New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island. These provinces are briefly discussed here according to two groupings: (a) those characterized by small-scale, community-operated organizations, and (b) those with province-wide governance arrangements.
Table A1. Provincial* synopsis of decentralized governance arrangements
for natural resource management

                           Description

Alberta   Regional body:   Charged under the Water     Formed:
          Watershed        for Life strategy to        1992-2007
          Advisory and     achieve safe, secure
          Planning         drinking water supply,
          Councils (A)     healthy aquatic
          (Alberta Water   ecosystems, and reliable,
          Council)         quality water supplies for
                           a sustainable economy, but
                           may have a broader mandate
                           in the region

          Total no: 8                                  Area:
                                                       6500-54,000
                                                       k[m.sup.2]

          Enabling                                     Staff: 0.5-5
          instrument:
          Water for Life
          strategy

          Corporate form:
          Not-for-profit,
          non-government
          organizations

British   Regional body:   Mandated to bring people    Formed: 1997
Columbia  Fraser Basin     together to solve complex,
          Council (B)      multi-jurisdictional
                           issues in the Fraser
                           Basin, to take advantage
                           of opportunities, and to
                           strengthen the capacity of
                           institutions and
                           institutions and
                           individuals to deal with
                           emerging issues that
                           threaten the overall
                           sustainability of the
                           Basin. FBC has no
                           delegated statutory
                           responsibilities.

          Total no: 1                                  Area: 240,000
                                                       k[m.sup.2]

          Enabling                                     Staff: 25 (D)
          instrument:
          Society Act (C)

          Corporate form:
          Charitable,
          not-for-profit,
          non-government
          organization

Manitoba  Regional body:   Mandated to develop and     Formed:
          Conservation     implement soil              1972-2006
          Districts (E)    conservation and water
          (Manitoba        management programs. The
          Conservation     primary goal of the
          Districts        Districts is the
          Association      sustainable use of the
          (F))             water and soil resources
                           and maintaining and/or
                           improving the
                           environmental social, and
                           economics of Agro-Manitoba
                           (G)

          Total no: 18                                 Area: 1000-7000
                                                       k[m.sup.2]

          Enabling                                     Staff: ~3
          instrument:
          Conservation
          Districts Act
          1976, (Rev.
          1987) (G)

          Corporate form:
          Incorporated
          bodies

Ontario   Regional body:   Mandated to ensure the      Formed:
          Conservation     conservation, restoration   1946-1980;
          Authorities (H)  and responsible management  mostly
          (Conservation    of Ontario's water, land    1950-1960
          Ontario (I))     and natural habitats
                           through delegated
                           statutory responsibilities
                           and programs that balance
                           human, environmental and
                           economic needs (J)

          Total no; 36                                 Area: 500-7000
                                                       k[m.sup.2]

          Enabling                                     Staff: 4-400;
          instrument:                                  mostly
          Conservation                                 20-40; 1300
          Authorities Act                              in total
          1945 (J)

          Corporate form:
          Incorporated
          bodies

Quebec    Regional body:   Charged under the           Formed:
          Watershed        national Policy             2002-2007
          Organizations    on Water with
          (K)              devolved
          (Regroupement    responsibilities
          Versant          for developing
          du Quebec (L))   and implementing
                           master water
                           plans and
                           contracting basin
                           stakeholders to
                           undertake water
                           management
                           activities, and
                           to monitor and
                           report on their
                           implementation

          Total No:33                                  Area: unknown

          Enabling                                     Staff:
          instrument:                                  unknown
          Quebec Water
          Policy

          Corporate form:
          Not-for-profit,
          non-government
          organizations

             Board appointment and representation

Alberta   Where a watershed group          Term:
          representing the entire          Generally
          catchment does not exist,        2-yrs
          Alberta Environment assembles
          stakeholders with a view to
          becoming a WPAC. Generally,
          election from membership base

                                           Mbrs:  9-17

British   Board Chair is appointed by the  Term:
Columbia  Society, and may or may not be   3-yrs, may
          a Society member. Federal and    be renewed
          provincial governments each      up to
          nominate 3 directors; Municipal  9-yrs (C)
          and First Nations each nominate
          8 directors; 10 regional
          representatives (from the
          community and private sector in
          each of the Basin's five
          regions), 3 Basin-wide
          directors (representing social,
          economic and environmental
          expertise) (C)

                                           Mbrs: 36

Manitoba  Boards generally comprise a      Term:
          Chairs of Sub-District           unknow
          committees (numbering 3-11).     Mbrs:
          Members represent the            5-13
          rate-payers and municipalities
          within the District.

Ontario   All members appointed by the     Term: 1-14
          respective watershed             yrs, but
          municipalities proportional to   some chose
          population; on average 75 per    to appoint
          cent would concurrently hold     anually
          councillor positions and the     Mbrs: 6-28
          balance would be citizens; in
          some cases, councillors
          represent 100 per cent of
          members.

Quebec    Appointment processes vary       Term:
          between organizations. For       Generally
          example, Board members may       2 Yrs.
          be appointed according to        Mbrs:
          categories (e.g., elected,       14-27
          citizens and groups of
          citizens and water users)
          or nominated at the annual
          general meeting of the
          broader membership base. A
          smaller Executive often
          plays an overall
          management role (Chair,
          First Vice President,
          Second Vice President,
          Secretary and Treasurer).
          Government members do not
          have voting rights.

Footnotes:
* Provinces excluded on the basis of not meeting the research criteria
for decentralized government arrangements: Saskatchewan, Prince Edward
Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador; New Brunswick; (A) see
Table A2; (B) Online at: www.fraserbasin.bc.ca (Accessed 30 Oct 2007),
unless otherwise specified; (C) Fraser Basin Council. 2007. Director's
Handbook. Fraser Basin Council, Vancouver; (D) M. Robinson, Manager,
Fraser Valley, Fraser Basin Council, pers. comm., 30 Oct 2007; (E)
Unless otherwise specified, data/information is based on reviews of
websites for 17 Conservation Districts accessed via Manitoba
Conservation Districts Association website: Online at: www.mcda.ca
(Accessed 26 Nov 2007); (F) MCDA is an overarching advocacy and
coordination association for all Conservation Districts; (G) A revision
of the original Conservation Districts Act of 1976. The 1976 Act
combines and represents the resource management objectives of the
Watershed Conservation Districts Act introduced in 1959 and the
Resource Conservation Districts Act of 1972, Alonsa Conservation
District. Online at: www.mts.net/~alonsacd/id17.htm (Accessed 26 Nov
2007); (H) Unless otherwise specified, data/information sourced from
Conservation Ontario's website (conservation-ontario.on.ca) and D.
Pearson, General Manager, Conservation Ontario, pers. comm., 7 Dec
2007; (1) Conservation Ontario is an overarching advocacy and
coordination association for all Conservation Authorities; (J)
Conservation Ontario. 2007. Member Manual 2007-2010. Conservation
Ontario, Newmarket; (K) Unless otherwise specified, data/information is
from English google-translations of the following websites:
Regroupement des Organisations de Bassin Versant du Quebec
(www.robvq.qc.ca), Bassin Versant Saint-Maurice (www.bvsm.ca) and
Committee on Consensus and Recovery of River Basin Richelieu
(www.covabar.qc.ca) (Accessed 26 Nov 2007); (L) Regroupement des
Organisations de Bassin Versant du Quebec is an overarching advocacy
and coordination association for all Watershed and Basin Organizations.

Table A2. Synopsis of decentralized governance arrangements for natural
resource management in Alberta

Regional      Description and website *
body

Battle        An inclusive, collaborative and
River         consensus-based community
Watershed     partnership that is working to
Alliance      guide, support and deliver actions
              to sustain or improve the health of
              the Battle River watershed
              www.battleriverwatershed.ca

Beaver        A non-profit organization whose
River         purpose is to maintain or improve
Watershed     the ecology of the Beaver River
Alliance      Watershed while respecting the
              diverse values of the watershed
              community through broad community
              engagement, partnerships, sound
              scientific study, education, and the
              implementation of sustainable water
              management and land use practices
              (E) Website to be developed in early
              2008 (C)

Bow River     A multistakeholder, charitable
Basin         organization dedicated to conducting
Council       activities for the improvement and
              protection of the waters of the Bow
              River Basin, considering riparian
              zones, aquatic ecosystems, quality
              and quantity of water, and effects
              of land use on surface and
              groundwater www.brbc.ab.ca

Milk          Strives to proactively preserve and
River         improve the economic, social and
Watershed     environmental interests of the
Council       watershed through effective
              partnerships and sound science
              www.milkriverwatershedcouncil.ca

Lesser        A not-for-profit, non-government
Slave         organization working in partnership
Watershed     with government (J) towards the
Council       sustainability of the Lake and its
              watershed for the economic, social
              and environmental benefit of future
              generations Does not have its own
              website: see
              http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/watershed/
              Lesser_Slave.html
              For related information/reports: see
              http://www.3.gov.ab.ca/enve/water/regions/Isb/Index.html
              (J)

North         A non-profit society whose purpose
Saskatchewan  is to protect and improve water
Watershed     quality and ecosystem functioning in
Alliance      the North Saskatchewan River
              Watershed (society status obtained
              in 1999 (L)) www.nswa.ab.ca

Oldman        A not-for-profit organization
Watershed     working in partnership with
Council (M)   communities and residents to
              maintain and improve the Oldman
              River Watershed through
              partnerships, knowledge, and the
              implementation and integration of
              sustainable water management and
              land use practices
              www.oldmanbasin.org

Red Deer      An inclusive, collaborative
River         partnership that promotes a healthy
Watershed     watershed to ensure a legacy of
Alliance      ecological integrity and economic
              sustainability www.rdrwa.ca

Battle River Watershed  Formed: 2007 (A) Area: 30,000
Alliance                [km.sup.2] Staff: 2 (B)

Beaver River            Formed:2007 Area: 22,000
Watershed Alliance      [km.sup.2c] Staff: 1.5 (D)

Bow River Basin         Formed: 1992 (WPAC designation
Council                 in 2004 (G)) Area: 25,000
                        [km.sup.2] (F) Staff: 2 plus contractors for
                        specific tasks (G)

Milk River Watershed    Formed: 2006 Area: 6500
Council                 [km.sup.2] Staff: 1 (1)

Lesser Slave Watershed  Formed: 2007 Area: 20,000
Council                 [km.sup.2] (J) Staff: 0.5 (K)

North Saskatchewan      Formed: 1997 (WPAC designation
Watershed Alliance      in 2004) (L) Area: 54,000 [km.sup.2L]
                        Staff: 5 plus project staff

Oldman Watershed        Formed: 2004 Area: 30,000
Council (M)             [km.sup.2] (N) Staff: 2

Red Deer River          Formed: 2006 Area: 45,000
Watershed Alliance      [km.sup.2N] (O) Staff: 3

Regional      Board appointment and representation
body

Battle River  Directors are elected at the annual   Mbrs: 15 (A)
Watershed     general meeting to fill a position    Term: 2-yrs (A)
Alliance      for a certain category (industry,
              individual, agriculture, business,
              environmental NGO, municipal
              government or First Nation) (A)

Beaver River  Some Board members appointed by the   Mbrs: 16 (C)
Watershed     organizations they represent. Other   Term: 2-yrs,
Alliance      seats are filled through an election  set up on a
              process at the annual general         1-yr rotation
              meeting (C)                           for
                                                    consistency,
                                                    with half the
                                                    positions
                                                    filled each
                                                    year (C)

Bow River     Two directors elected from each of    Mbrs: 12 (H)
Basin         the six membership categories. The    Term: unknown
Council       Board elects the Chair and the First
              and Second Vice Chairs from its
              members. (H) Bow River Basin Council
              has around 120 members (G)

Milk River    Only 5 Board members are not elected  Mbrs: no less
Watershed     through a membership voting process,  than 13 and no
Council       namely provincial government (1 seat  more than 17 (I)
              appointed by Alberta Environment)     Term: 2-yrs (I)
              and municipalities (2 seats
              appointed by the two Towns and
              Villages and 2 seats appointed by
              the four Rural Municipalities). (I)

Lesser Slave  Most Board members are appointed by   Mbrs: 17 (J)
Watershed     the group that they represent (e.g.,  Term: The term
Council       municipal, agricultural). The Board   of members is
              did not call for new Board members    specified in
              at its annual general meeting (Jun    the
              2007). Municipal representatives      organization's
              were appointed in Oct 2007 following  Bylaws (approved
              elections. New Board members will be  Jan 2007) (J)
              determined for those groups not
              appointed by their members at the
              next annual general meeting (Jun
              2008) (J)

North         Board of directors elected annually   Mbrs: 13
Saskatchewan  from membership. North Saskatchewan   Term: unknown
Watershed     Watershed Alliance has over 200
Alliance      members

Oldman        Board members are nominated and       Mbrs: 17
Watershed     elected at the annual general         Term: 2-yrs,
Council (M)   meeting each March (N)                without any
                                                    restrictions on
                                                    the number of
                                                    terms a member
                                                    can serve (N)

Red Deer      Directors are elected by the          Mbrs: 9-16 plus
River         membership: currently: Environment/   Past Chair
Watershed     Stewardship (3); Agriculture/         Term: 2-yrs
Alliance      Business/Industry (3); Municipal
              Government (3); Provincial/Federal/
              Academic (3); First Nations (2);
              Individual (2)

Footnotes:
* All data/information sourced from organizational websites listed
unless otherwise indicated (Accessed 28 Nov 2007); also accessible via
http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/watershed/
planning_advisory_councilshtml;
(A) D. Samm, Manager, Battle River Watershed Alliance, pers.
comm., 28 Nov 2008; (B) ibid, Battle River Watershed Alliance has two
people who work under contract; (C) J. Prusak, Alberta Environment
ember, Beaver River Watershed Alliance, pers. comm., 1 Dec 2007; (D)
ibid, Program Manager position to be filled 1 January 2008, with half-
time administration position (including accounting/budgeting and
secretariat support, as well as office space) provided to WPAC by
another group, which WPAC does not pay for; (E) Beaver River Watershed
Alliance. 2007. Program and Advisory Council: Position Description.
Beaver River Watershed Alliance, Watershed Planning and Advisory
Council: Position Description. Beaver River Watershed Alliance,
Bonnyville, Alberta.
(Online at: www.landstewardship.org/Beaver_River_job.doc.
Accessed 28 Nov 2007); (F) Bow River Fly Fishing. Online
at: http://www.thebowriver.com/bow_river_basin.htm (Accessed 28 Nov
2007); (G) M. Murray, Executive Director, Bow River Basin Council,
pers. comm., 29 Nov 2007; (H) Bennett, M. 2001. Bow River Basin
Council. Water News. 20(3). Online at: http://www.cwra.org/Publications
/CWRA_-_Water_News/Water_News_Archives/water_news_archives.html
(Accessed: 10 Dec 2007); (I) S. Riemersma, Project Coordinator, Milk
River Watershed Council, pers. comm., 13 Dec 2007; (J) R. Burr, Team
Leader, Environmental Management Northern Region, Alberta Environment,
pers. comm., 7 & 11 Dec 2007; (K) ibid, part-time Executive Director
anticipated, together with formalized working relationship with
Community Futures Lesser Slave Lake Region; (L) G. Watt-Gremm, Basin
Planner, North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance, pers. comm., 28 Nov
2007; (M) Merger of the Oldman River Basin Water Quality Initiative
with the Oldman Basin Advisory Council following release of Water for
Life strategy; (N) S. Palechek, Executive Director, Oldman Watershed
Council, pers. comm., 28 Nov 2007; (O) Online at: en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Red_Deer_River (Accessed 28 Nov 2007).


(a) New Brunswick has numerous organizations operating within small-scale watersheds, such as Nashwaak Watershed Association Inc., Fredericton Area Watersheds Association, Shediac Bay Watershed Association, CanaanWashademoak Watershed Association and Mill Creek Watershed Group. These organizations are operated by volunteers (i.e., without paid dedicated staff). Organizations operating in Newfoundland and Labrador (e.g., Indian Bay Watershed Association) and in Nova Scotia (e.g., Woodens River Watershed Environmental Organization and recreational associations (Government of Nova Scotia)) are generally local in scale, and are without employees and managed by volunteers. Many are narrowly confined to specific interest areas, such as fisheries and river enhancement, and do not have devolved responsibilities for integrated watershed management. These sorts of organizations also operate within the domain of many of the decentralized bodies described for Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec, and, while having an important role to play, are not the focus of this research.

(b) Saskatchewan has province-wide arrangements in the form of a Treasury Board crown corporation: the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority. It has an Advisory Committee, with a broad spectrum of public representation, mandated "to identify and evaluate a wide and interrelated range of water issues, challenges and opportunities and provide the Authority's Board of Directors and Executive Management with information and advice." The Board of directors comprises three government deputy ministers (Saskatchewan Water Authority, a), and appointment to the Advisory Committee is made by the Minister's Order and Committee (Saskatchewan Water Authority, b). As above, other provinces have similar arrangements, where community members participate in government consultative processes through committee structures. Province-wide arrangements are also in place in the case of Prince Edward Island, which is small in land area (5,700 [km.sup.2]) and population (140,000 people) (Government of Prince Edward Island) relative to other provinces and territories.

Alberta--Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils

The Water for Life strategy, under which Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils (WPAC) are formed, aims to achieve a safe, secure drinking water supply, healthy aquatic ecosystems, and reliable, quality water supplies for a sustainable economy. The devolution of responsibilities to regional organizations is reportedly a response to community interest "in having a significant role in managing Alberta's water resource, in directly influencing policy and legislation development, tracking and reporting on the condition of watersheds, and influencing change within watersheds" (Government of Alberta 2003).

Thirteen Irrigation Districts operate within WPAC regions--the largest of which is St. Mary River Irrigation District, servicing 1,500 [km.sup.2] of irrigated lands--and have similar governance structures, including an overarching organization, Alberta Irrigation Projects Association (AIPA); however, the focus in this paper is on larger scale arrangements, where they exist, and their relationship to lower order and/or more issue specific arrangements.

British Columbia--Fraser Basin Council

The earlier Fraser Basin Management Board (FBMB) comprised an independent Chair, 12 representatives from the four orders of government (i.e., federal, provincial, municipal, First Nations) and six from non-government organizations (Biomquist et al. 2007). Its aim was "to address sustainability issues and to develop a strategic plan for sustainability of the Fraser Basin" (Fraser Basin Council 2002: 3), building upon the Fraser River Action Plan, which was developed following identification of the Basin as a priority area by federal government in 1990. The resulting strategic plan for sustainability of the entire Basin became the Charter of Sustainability, and the FBMB representatives its signatories.

The Charter "is a good-faith agreement among Fraser Basin residents and organizations to work towards the social, economic and environmental sustainability of the Fraser Basin ... It is not a legally binding document nor does it interfere with any existing laws, agreements, treaties or policies" (FBC 2002: 2). It sets out the organization's vision, principles and strategic directions. The Fraser Basin Council (FBC) does not have any delegated statutory responsibilities, but rather focuses on processes, problem-solving and encouraging change, especially through dialogue and collaboration among the parties represented within its governance structure. The organization states that, "In all its activities, the FBC remains impartial, transpartisan, independent and non-political in its primary role as an advocate for a sustainable Basin" (Fraser Basin Council).

FBC's core funding is untied, but must be accounted for. Fees are charged for services such as event organization (e.g., BC Clean Forum), workshop facilitation, secretariat and project management services, information integration and communication, and the like. The FBC has established an endowment fund, which currently totals CA$600,000-700,000 with CA$50,000 per year in growth. The organization oversees the allocation of some project resources to local groups and, recently, a pool of research funds available to academic institutions.

Manitoba--Conservation Districts

The Conservation Districts Act 1976, and earlier Watershed Conservation Districts Act 1959 and Resource Conservation Districts Act 1970, emerged from a history of concern about surface water management, especially flooding associated with increased agricultural drainage, and the outcomes of three commission inquiries between 1918 and 1949 (Barg and Oborne 2006). The 1976 Act is designed to create partnerships between the provincial government and rural municipalities to implement soil conservation and water management programs.

The establishment of a Conservation District (CD) may be initiated by a municipality, a coalition of municipalities or the province through making application to the provincial cabinet. Several CDs formed in the 1990s (following only one established in the 1980s) in response to provincial funds supporting new districts and, at the same time, the MCDA "became more formalized, better funded, and more professional-towards playing an increasingly credible role in representing all CDs in a unified manner in discussions with government and other stakeholders" (Barg and Oborne 2006: 126). Provincial investment in the CD program has gradually increased over the past decade in line with the creation of new CDs, while allocations to individual CDs have not increased markedly (Barg and Oborne 2006).

The Conservation Districts Commission (CDC) comprises at least nine members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. Following a recent revision of the Act (The Conservation Districts Amendment Act 2006), two or more of these appointees to the CDC must be public representatives. The Manitoba Water Council (MWC) comprises at least five members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, representative of Manitoba's regional diversity and of local government, agricultural and environmental perspectives. The term of office is at the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, and members may be reappointed.

Ontario--Conservation Authorities

The Conservation Authorities Act 1946 reflected and built upon integrated resource management experiences in New Zealand, England, Wales and the United States (Ohio Conservation Districts and the Tennessee Valley Authority) (Michaels et al. 2007). The Ontario Conservation and Reforestation Association, the Federation of Ontario Naturalists and individuals writing for The Farmer's Advocate advocated for conservation and wise resource management, especially an integrated approach based on natural watershed boundaries, throughout the Depression and World War II. Mitchell and Shrubsole (1992) provide an overview of CAs, with case studies of the Ganaraska CA, as the first pilot study that informed the CA model, and the Grand River CA. The basic principles upon which they are formed are described in Mitchell and Shrubsoie (2007: 27-28) as: watershed as the management unit; local initiative to be essential; provincial-municipal partnership to be a core aspect; comprehensive perspective required; and coordination and cooperation to be pursued (see also Fitzgibbon et al. 2006). According to veale (2004: 266), "Municipal representatives keep their local municipal council apprised of the programs and projects of the Authority and act as the liaison between the Authority and the municipality."

The formation of CAs was encouraged by the provincial government's offer of additional resources to municipal collectives prepared to work collaboratively under this umbrella. However, they experienced a dramatic reduction in support by the province during the term of the Progressive Conservative Government under its so-called 'common sense revolution,' with the Ministry of Natural Resources (responsible for CAs) experiencing a 55 per cent reduction in budget between 1990-1997 (Plummer and Arai 2005). Provincial representatives on Boards were withdrawn at this time. At the same time, the Act was amended to enable the dissolution of CAs (which the legislation did not previously allow). All 36 CAs have persisted, although two commenced but did not conclude dissolution proceedings, and underwent an adjustment phase of tailoring services and programs to their available revenue, and exploring new avenues for raising income. The nature of these cutbacks varied between CAs, as each focused on its watershed priorities and core business. Following a lengthy hiatus, the provincial government is reengaging and increasing investment in CAs triggered by public concerns from water shortages in 1998 and 1999 and drinking water contamination in Walkerton in 2000 (resulting in seven deaths and illness of 2300 residents) (Ivey et al. 2004) and the subsequent inquiry into the safety of drinking water across the province (Michaels et al. 2007). However, provincial government involvement is more narrowly defined than in the past with investment focused on funding source protection plans and watershed-based water budgets (Nowlan 2007; Ivey et al. 2002).

Their key areas of activity now include:

*Environmental Protection--protecting local ecosystems and improving the quality of life;

*Water and Land Resource Management--managing water and land resources on a watershed basis, maintaining secure supplies of clean water, conserving soil, protecting communities from flooding (including construction and operation of flood control structures and regulation of floodplain development) and contributing to municipal planning processes through sound environmental practices/advice; and

*Lifelong Learning--creating educational experiences in a natural environment that enrich the lives of peoples of all ages, by instilling an appreciation and enjoyment of natural heritage.

Today, CAs' revenue sources include watershed municipal levies, provincial and federal grants, user fees (e.g., Conservation Areas and Nature Centers), property rental income, hydro-electric production, tree-planting service fees and tree sales, financial support from partners, and foundations. CAs collectively "own approximately 120,000 hectares"; second only to the Ontario Government (Conservation Ontario 2007). Together, CAs administer CA$250M in programs and services. Total revenues in 2005 (based on audited financial statements) comprised self-generated fees (45 per cent), municipal fees (30 per cent), special projects (9 per cent), and provincial (14 per cent) and federal (2 per cent) grants or contracts (Conservation Ontario 2007).Ivey et al. (2004: 44) cites Credit Valley as one of the most financially stable CAs with 1999 revenues of $3.2M, of which 68 per cent was derived from municipal levies. Some CAs have developed international connections, which are typically funded by external (usually federal) resources.

Charitable foundations established by CAs are attractive to corporations wanting to green their image and/or connect with the local community. Revenue is for new activities, not replacing cutbacks, and generally for local interest projects, such as the "Campaign to restore Kidd Creek" (Lake Simcoe Conservation Foundation nd), which has currently raised CA$70,000 (Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority 2006). CA foundations collectively received CA$1.8M from the lottery-based Ontario Trillium Foundation in 2007. An informant suggested that projects "need to be sexy, with a beginning and an end point" so that they are attractive enough to sell to the public. Only six foundations have dedicated staff. The remainder depends upon "borrowed" CA staff (generally the communications officer). Differences in experience and capacity between organizations in this arena are therefore significant. A cohort (8-9 CAs) is developing 'planned giving' (legacies and endowments) programs. Toronto and Region CA has a fulltime employee dedicated to this activity.

Conservation Ontario's 72 member Council comprises General Managers (i.e., CA staff) and Chairs of the individual CAs. A Chair, two Vice Chairs, two CA staff representatives and a member-at-large are elected from the Council to constitute the Board of Directors. The Council meets bi-monthly, and internal committees are formed from time-to-time. Members are also appointed to external committees as required. Conservation Ontario is primarily funded through levies provided by the Conservation Authorities, but currently receives significant funding from the Province of Ontario in support of the Source Water Protection program.

Quebec--Watershed Organizations

Quebec's water policy (Government of Quebec 2002) aims to reform water governance in line with the principles of participatory governance, sustainable development and integrated water management. It also aims to enhance consensus building and accountability among basin stakeholders and the broader community. The policy identifies 33 priority rivers based on environmental values or conflicts of use. Watershed Organizations (WOs) operate in these priority areas.

Since 1996, Quebec has been a member of the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO), and held the position of Chair from May 2002 to January 2004. The INBO was formed in 1994 and has 134 member organizations from 51 countries around the world. It promotes the need for integrated river basin management to underpin sustainable development. One of its objectives is to develop permanent relationships with organizations interested in river basin management and facilitate the exchange of experiences and expertise (Government of Quebec).

The governance structures of the Bassin Versant Saint-Maurice (BVSM) and Committee on Consensus and Recovery of River Basin Richelieu (COVABAR) are discussed here as examples of broader organizational governance structures. Both organizations are managed by an Executive comprising five members (Chair, First Vice President, Second Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer). BVSM has a 27 member Board of Directors, while COVABAR has 14 members and an overarching Council of Consultation comprising 70 members from 13 electoral colleges.

The BVSM Board has 21 members with voting rights in accordance with the following categories for seats of office: elected (8), citizens and groups of citizens (6), and water users (7). Four of the "citizens and groups of citizens" category are appointed by electoral colleges in election years on an even/odd basis. Water users comprise agroecology, economic, education, wildlife, forestry, tourism and health. There are six government members from various ministries. The COVABAR Board consists of a Chair, ten Executive Vice Presidents and three delegates of the heritage corridor organizations representing the three important segments of the catchment area (the Haut, Mi-Richelieu and Richelieu). They are nominated and selected from the Council of Consultation immediately after the annual general meeting of members. Fifty per cent of the members of the Council of Consultation are elected at the annual general meeting for a term of two years.

Additional References

Alberta Irrigation Projects Association (AIPA). nd. http://www.aipa.org[Accessed 21 November 2007].

Government of Nova Scotia, Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. nd. http://www.gov.ns.ca/fish/sportfishing/extension/partners.shtml [Accessed 11 Dec 2007].

Government of Prince Edward Island. nd. http://www.gov.pe.ca [Accessed 21 November 2007].

Government of Quebec, Developpement durable, Environnement et Parcs. nd. http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/eau/bassinversant/index_en.htm [Accessed 29 Nov 2007].

Ivey, J., R. C. de Loe and R. D. Kreutzwiser. 2002. Groundwater management by watershed agencies: An evaluation of the capacity of Ontario's conservation authorities. Journal of Environmental Management 64(3): 311-331.

Nowlan, L. 2007. Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Taking Canada's Groundwater for Granted. In Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water, K. Bakker, ed. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press.

Lake Simcoe Conservation Foundation. nd. Campaign to Restore Kidds Creek. Newmarket, Ontario: Lake Simcoe Conservation Foundation.

Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority. 2006. 2006 Annual Report: Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority. Newmarket, Ontario: Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority.

Mitchell, B. and D. Shrubsole. 1992. Ontario Conservation Authorities: Myth and Reality. Publication Series No. 35. Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, Department of Geography.

Saskatchewan Water Authority. nd, a. http://www.swa.ca [Accessed 21 November 2007].

Saskatchewan Water Authority. nd, b. http://www.swa.ca/AboutUs/WhoWeAre.asp?type=AdvisoryCommittee [Accessed 21 November 2007].

APPENDIX B: Additional Information on Decentralized Arrangements in the Territories

This appendix further describes the decentralized governance arrangements outlined in Part I: "Decentralized governance arrangements for integrated watershed management" with respect to the territories, including a synopsis in Table B.

Northwest Territories--Land and Water Boards

The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act 1998 (MVRM Act) establishes co-management boards in the Northwest Territories to provide for an integrated and coordinated system of land and water management in the Mackenzie Valley. The Act emerged from the Gwich'in and Sahtu Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements, and established an overarching Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (LWB) and co-management boards for the Gwich'in (16,000 [km.sup.2]) and Sahtu (280,000 [km.sup.2]) settlement areas. The Wek'eezhii LWB formed in 2005 with signing of the Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement, which gave land (39,000 [km.sup.2]), resources and self-government rights to the Tlicho people. By law, these co-management boards are regional panels of the larger Mackenzie Valley LWB, which has jurisdiction throughout the entire Mackenzie Valley (800,000 [km.sup.2] estimated land area).

Under the MVRM Act, Land and Water Boards (as regulatory authorities) administer the Mackenzie Valley Land Use Regulations, and the Northwest Territories Waters Act/Regulations. Their mandate is to "regulate the use of land and waters and the deposit of waste so as to provide for the conservation, development and utilization of land and water resources in a manner that will provide the optimum benefit to the residents of the settlement area and of the Mackenzie Valley and to all Canadians" (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board). Boards are directed under the Act to account for environmental and social impacts of proposed developments, and to involve affected communities, Tribal Councils, co-management boards, and appropriate government agencies when conducting reviews of applications. Board decisions are legally binding on government and developers applying for authorization for projects (Wek'eezhii Land and Water Board).

The Mackenzie Valley LWB has three main functions, namely the issuing of land use permits and water licenses in the unsettled claims area until the balance of the land claims are settled in the Mackenzie Valley, processing transboundary land and water use applications in the Mackenzie Valley, and ensuring consistency in the application of the legislation throughout the Mackenzie Valley. It comprises three permanent regional panels (the Gwich'in LWB and the Sahtu LWB each comprising five members and the Wek'eezhii LWB comprising four members), four additional members (two nominated by First Nations, one nominated by the Government of the Northwest Territories, and one other), and a Chair (nominated by a majority of members and appointed by the federal Minister).

The Gwich'in and Sahtu LWBs comprise five members: two nominated by the Tribal Council, one nominated by the Government of the Northwest Territories and one by the Government of Canada. The Board Chair is nominated by these four members. The Wek'eezhii LWB has four members. All nominees are appointed by the federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a term of three years. Land and Water Board staff number between five and eight.
Table B. Territorial synopsis of decentralized governance arrangements
for natural resource management

                              Description

Northwest    Regional body:   Mackenzie Valley   Formed: 1998-2005
Territories  Land and Water   LWB is
             Boards (A)       responsible for
                              issuing land use
                              permits and water
                              licenses in the
                              unsettled claims
                              area until the
                              balance of the
                              land claims are
                              settled,
                              processing
                              transboundary
                              land and water
                              use applications,
                              and ensuring
                              consistency in
                              the application
                              of the
                              legislation.
                              Other LWBs
                              administer the
                              Mackenzie Valley
                              Land Use
                              Regulations, and
                              the Northwest
                              Territories
                              Waters
                              Act/Regulations.

             Total no: 4                         Area: 800,000
                                                 [km.sup.2](MVLWB);
                                                 16.000 [km.sup.2]
                                                 (GLWB); 39,000
                                                 [km.sup.2] (WLWB);
                                                 280,000 [km.sup.2]
                                                 (SLWB) (B)

             Enabling                            Staff: 5-8
             instrument:
             Mackenzie
             Valley Resource
             Management Act
             1998

             Corporate form:
             Regulatory
             authorities

Nunavut      Regional body:   Responsible for    Formed: unknown
             Planning         land use planning
             Commission (C)   (of water,
                              wildlife and
                              offshore areas)
                              and various
                              aspects of
                              environmental
                              reporting and
                              management across
                              Nunavut

             Total no:1                          Area: 1,994,000
                                                 [km.sup.2] (excl.
                                                 national parks)
                                                 (E)

             Enabling                            Staff: 6
             instrument:
             Nunavut Land
             Claims
             Agreement Act
             1993

             Corporate form:
             Co-management
             Institution

             Regional body:   Mandated to        Formed: 1996
             Water Board      provide for the
             (D)              conservation and
                              utilization of
                              waters in
                              Nunavut, with the
                              exception of in
                              national parks,
                              for the optimum
                              benefits for the
                              residents of
                              Nunavut in
                              particular and
                              Canadians in
                              general It has no
                              compliance or
                              enforcement
                              powers

             Total no: 1                         Area: 1,994,000
                                                 [km.sup.2] (excl.
                                                 national parks)
                                                 (E)

             Enabling                            Staff: 11
             Instrument:
             Nunavut Land
             Claims
             Agreement Act
             1993

             Corporate form:
             Co-management
             Institution

Yukon        Regional body:   Mandated to make   Formed: unknown
             Renewable        recommendations
             Resource         to government on
             Councils (F)     any matter
                              related to the
                              conservation of
                              fish and
                              wildlife, the
                              establishment of
                              Special
                              Management Areas
                              and forest
                              resources
                              management

             Total no: 9                         Area: 474,400
                                                 [km.sup.2] (G)

             Enabling                            Staff: 2 (H)
             instrument:
             Yukon First
             Nations Final
             Agreements

             Corporate form:
             Non-government
             advisory
             bodies

Yukon        Regional body:   Mandated to        Formed: 2000-2004
             Regional Land    develop regional
             Use Planning     land use plans
             Commissions (I)  and make
             (Yukon Land Use  recommendation to
             Planning         federal and
             Council (J))     territorial
                              governments, and
                              the affected
                              First Nation(s)
                              for
                              consideration

             Total no: 3                         Area: 474,400
             (K)                                 [km.sup.2] (G)

             Enabling                            Staff: 4 (M)
             instrument:
             Yukon First
             Nations Final
             Agreements (L)

             Corporate form:
             Non-government
             advisory
             bodies

             Regional body:   Mandated with      Formed: 1994
             Water Board      responsibilities
             (N)              for issuing
                              licences for the
                              use of or deposit
                              of waste into
                              water

             Total no: 1                         Area: 474,400
                                                 [km.sup.2] (J)

             Enabling                            Staff: 7
             instrument:
             Yukon Umbrella
             Final
             Agreement;
             Waters Act

             Corporate form:
             Independent
             administrative
             tribunal

                              Board appointment
                              and
                              representation

Northwest    Regional body:   Mackenzie Valley   Term:
Territories  Land and Water   Land and Water     unknown
             Boards (A)       Board (LWB)        Mbrs: 4-5
                              comprises:

             Total no: 4      * 3 permanent
                              regional panels:
                              the Gwich'in LWB
                              and the Sahtu LWB
                              each comprising 5
                              members, and the
                              Wek'eezhii LWB
                              com prising 4
                              members:

             Enabling         * 4 additional
             instrument:      members: 2
             Mackenzie        nominated by
             Valley Resource  First Nations, 1
             Management Act   nominated by the
             1998             Government of the
                              Northwest
                              Territories, and
                              1 other; and

             Corporate form:  * Chair nominated
             Regulatory       by a majority of
             authorities      members and
                              appointed by the
                              federal Minister

Nunavut      Regional body:   Nominated by       Term:
             Planning         Inuit              unknown
             Commission (C)   organizations and  Mbrs:7
                              the governments
                              of Canada and
                              Nunavut

             Total no: 1

             Enabling
             instrument:
             Nunavut Land
             Claims
             Agreement Act
             1993

             Corporate form:
             Co-management
             Institution

             Regional body:   unknown            Term:
             Water Board                         unknown
             (D)                                 Mbrs: 8

             Total no: 1

             Enabling
             Instrument:
             Nunavut Land
             Claims
             Agreement Act
             1993

             Corporate form:
             Co-management
             Institution

Yukon        Regional body:   50 percent         Term:
             Renewable        representation of  unknown
             Resource         First Nations      Mbrs: 8
             Councils (F)                        (H)

             Total no: 9

             Enabling
             instrument:
             Yukon First
             Nations Final
             Agreements

             Corporate form:
             Non-government
             advisory
             bodies

Yukon        Regional body:   Members comprise   Term: A
             Regional Land    one third          term is
             Use Planning     nominated each by  for a
             Commissions (I)  Governments, by    period of
             (Yukon Land Use  First Nation(s)    not more
             Planning         and by either or   than 2-
             Council (J))     both depending on  yrs,
                              the demographic    unless the
                              ratio of First     parties
                              Nation to          otherwise
                              non-First Nation   agree
                              residents of the   Mbrs: 6
                              region. Members
                              are nominated
                              either by the
                              federal
                              government (in
                              consultation with
                              the Yukon
                              Government) or by
                              the First
                              Nation(s) in
                              whose Traditional
                              Territory the
                              planning region
                              is located.
                              Members are
                              appointed by the
                              Minister of
                              Indian and
                              Northern Affairs

             Total no: 3
             (K)

             Enabling
             instrument:
             Yukon First
             Nations Final
             Agreements (L)

             Corporate form:
             Non-government
             advisory
             bodies

             Regional body:   Board members are  Term:
             Water Board      appointed by the   unknown
             (N)              Minister of        Mbrs: 4-9
                              Executive
                              Council, and must
                              be at least one
                              third First
                              Nations. The
                              Premier appoints
                              a Chair and Vice
                              Chair from within
                              its membership,
                              in consultation
                              with the Board.
                              Members are not
                              representative
                              delegates

             Total no: 1

             Enabling
             instrument:
             Yukon Umbrella
             Final
             Agreement;
             Waters Act

             Corporate form:
             Independent
             administrative
             tribunal

Footnotes:

(A) All data/information sourced from the following websites unless
otherwise indicated: Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board. Online at:
www.mvlwb.com (Accessed 2 Nov 2007); Gwich'in Land and Water Board.
Online at: www.glwb.com (Accessed 2 Nov 2007); Sahtu Land and Water
Board. Online at: www.slwb.com (Accessed 4 Nov 2007); and Wek'eezhii
Land and Water Board. Online at: www.wlwb.ca (Accessed 4 Nov 2007); (B)
Area figures sourced online from the following websites (Accessed 13
Dec 2007): Gwich'in LWB (www.gwichin.nt.ca/LCA);
Sahtu LWB(www.slwb.com), Wek'eezhii LWB
(www.atns.net.au/agreement.asp?EntityID=2056); Mackenzie LWB area
estimated; (C) All data/information sourced from Nunavut Planning
Commission. Online at: www.npc.nunavut.ca (Accessed 6 Nov 2007); (D)
All data/information sourced from Nunavut Water Board, unless otherwise
indicated. Online at: www.nunavutwaterboard.org (Accessed 6 Nov 2007);
(E) Nunavut Planning Commission. Online at:
http://npc.nunavut.ca/eng/nunavut/general.html (Accessed 11 Jan 2008);
(F) All data/information sourced from Government of Yukon, Department
of Environment, unless otherwise indicated. Online at:
www.environmentyukon.gov.yk.ca/services/boardscouncils.php (Accessed 10
Dec 2007); (G) Wikipedia. Online at: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yukon
 (Accessed 11 Jan 2008); (H) Figure for Alsek RRC. Online at:
www.alsekrrc.ca (Accessed 10 Dec 2007); (I) All data/information
sourced from Yukon Land Use Planning Council, unless otherwise
indicated. Online at: www.planyukon.ca (Accessed 10 Dec 2007); (J)
Yukon Land Use Planning Council is the peak body coordinating
community-based regional land use planning processes in the territory;
(K) A further five regions anticipated; (L) The Umbrella Final
Agreement was signed in 1993 and, as of September 2006, 11 of 14 Yukon
First Nations have negotiated Final Agreements in effect (between 1995-
2006), following an agreement-in-principle in 1989. Government of
Yukon. Online at: www.eco.gov.yk.ca/landclaims/lc_faq.html (Accessed 10
Dec 2007); (M) Figure for North Yukon RLUPC. Online at:
nypc.planyukon.ca (Accessed 10 Dec 2007); (N) All data/information
sourced from Yukon Water Board, unless otherwise indicated. Online at:
www.yukonwaterboard.ca (Accessed 10 Dec 2007).


Nunavut

Nunavut has a population around 27,500 people, of which 20,500 are Inuit (Nunavut Planning Commission, a). Nunavut separated officially from the Northwest Territories on 1 April 1999 under the Nunavut Act 1993 and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act 1993 (Wikipedia). It has two territory-wide (1,994,000 [km.sup.2]) organizations of interest and relevance: the Nunavut Planning Commission and Nunavut Water Board. Both organizations are co-management entities created under the Agreement. They form part of a larger regime constituted of other co-management entities. These include the Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal (which arbitrates disputes), the Nunavut Impact Review Board, the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, the Regional Wildlife Organizations, and local Hunters and Trappers Organizations (Nunavut Water Board).

The key features of the Agreement are described as including:

* title to approximately 350,000 [km.sup.2] of land, of which 35,300 [km.sup.2] include mineral rights;

* equal representation of Inuit with government on a new set of wildlife management, resource management and environmental boards;

* the right to harvest wildlife on lands and waters throughout the Nunavut Settlement Area;

* capital transfer payments of $1.148 billion, payable to the Inuit over 14 years;

* a $13 million Training Trust Fund;

* a share of federal government royalties for Nunavut Inuit from oil, gas and mineral development on Crown lands;

* where Inuit own surface title to the land, the right to negotiate with industry for economic and social benefits from non-renewable resource development;

* the right of first refusal on sport and commercial development of renewable resources in the Nunavut Settlement Area;

* the creation of three new federally funded national parks;

* the inclusion of a political accord, that provides for the establishment of the new Territory of Nunavut and through this a form of self-government for the Nunavut Inuit (Nunavut Planning Commission, b).

(a) Nunavut Planning Commission

The Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) is responsible for land use planning (of water, wildlife and offshore areas) and various aspects of environmental reporting and management across the territory. It has six planning regions (West Kitikmeot, Akunniq, Kivalliq, North Baffin, South Baffin and Sanikiluaq). Its main function is "to develop land use plans, policies and objectives that guide resource use and development throughout Nunavut, with an emphasis on protecting and promoting the existing and future well-being of the residents and communities of the Nunavut Settlement Area" (Nunavut Planning Commission, b). The NPC has seven Commissioners nominated by Inuit organizations and the governments of Canada and Nunavut, and is supported by six staff.

(b) Nunavut Water Board

The Nunavut Water Board (NWB) was created in July 1996 under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, and its jurisdiction extends to the whole of Nunavut (except national parks), including Inuit-owned lands where additional provisions also apply. It has responsibilities and powers over the use, management and regulation of inland water in Nunavut, and aims to provide for the conservation and utilization of waters in Nunavut, with the exception of land within national parks, for the optimum benefits of the residents of Nunavut in particular and Canadians in general. It has no compliance or enforcement powers, which is the responsibility of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. Water license inspectors are appointed by the responsible Minister for this purpose.

The NWB works collaboratively with other co-management entities in Nunavut to coordinate and expedite review, screening, and processing of water license applications, including referrals to the NPC to verify conformance with approved land use plans. The NWB has eleven staff and eight directors.

Yukon Territory

The Yukon Territory has a population around 30,000 (Encyclopedia of Canadian Provinces), of which 8,000 are Yukon Indians representing 14 First Nation communities. The land claims process began in the Yukon in 1973. As of January 2007, Final and Self-Government Agreements have been signed with 11 First Nations for access, rights and obligations to land and resources, and the right to govern their own affairs (Government of Yukon). The Yukon First Nations Umbrella Final Agreement, which covers an area of 474,400 [km.sup.2], guarantees at least one third, and as much as two thirds, representation for these 14 First Nations on Land Use Planning bodies; one third membership on the Yukon Water Board and 50 per cent representation on the Development Assessment Board, Surface Rights Board, Territorial Fish and Wildlife Management Board and the Renewable Resource Council (Government of Canada, a). Only the Land Use Planning bodies, Renewable Resource Council and Yukon Water Board are discussed further here.

(a) Regional Land Use Planning Commissions

Regional Land Use Planning Commissions (RLUPCs) are non-government advisory bodies mandated with the responsibility for developing land use plans. There are currently three RLUPCs in the Yukon, of eight proposed planning regions. Regions are based, where practicable, on the Traditional Territories of First Nations, or groups of First Nations. RLUPCs make recommendations to the Government of Canada, Government of Yukon, and the affected First Nation(s) as the three parties to the Agreement. The Agreement explicitly states that "Canada shall consider the recommendations of the Committee" (Government of Canada, b).

Commission members are nominated either by the federal government (in consultation with the Government of Yukon) or by the First Nation(s) in whose Traditional Territory the planning region is located. A Commission usually has six members (appointed by the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), comprising one third nominated each by Governments, by First Nation(s) and by either or both Governments and First Nation(s), depending on the demographic ratio of First Nation to non-First Nation residents of the planning region. The term of a RLUPC is "for a period of not more than two years ... unless the parties otherwise agree." Costs are borne by the federal government, and each RLUPC is required to prepare an annual budget subject to review and approval of the federal government (Government of Canada, b).

The North Yukon RLUPC (now Vuntut Planning Commission) was appointed in August 2000 for a term of three years. It has four staff. It has established its operating procedures, budgets and administrative protocols, and released a draft of the North Yukon Land Use Plan for public comment (the first such plan in the territory). The Teslin RLUPC was appointed in August 2001 for a term of three years. Its inaugural meeting took place in December 2001, and has established an office in the community of Teslin. The Peel River Watershed Planning Commission (formerly the Peel River Watershed Advisory Committee established in 1996) was appointed by the responsible Minister in October 2004. The Commission established shared office space with the Yukon RLUPC in early 2005. The Yukon RLUPC has provided administrative assistance. A draft Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan was anticipated by spring 2007.

RLUPCs are supported by the Yukon Land Use Planning Council; a peak body coordinating community-based regional land use planning processes in the territory. Its mission is described as: advocating land use planning as a comprehensive means of addressing cultural, social, economic and environmental sustainability, and promoting an open, fair and public process carried out by all Yukoners, as set out in Yukon First Nations Final Agreements.

(b) Renewable Resource Councils

Renewable Resource Councils (RRCs), as the "primary instrument for local renewable resources management" (Alsek Renewable Resource Council), have been established in nine First Nations Traditional Territories (Alsek, Carmacks, Dan Keyi, Dawson District, Laberge, Mayo District, North Yukon, Selkirk and Teslin). RRCs are independent public interest advisory bodies, which may make recommendations to government on any matter related to the conservation of fish and wildlife, the establishment of Special Management Areas and forest resources management. As an example of governance structures, the Alsek RRC has two staff and eight Board members. Its meetings are bi-monthly and open to the public.

(c) Yukon Water Board

The Yukon Water Board (YWB) (which has existed in various forms since the early 1970s) was identified in the Umbrella Final Agreement, and became a "land claims board" in 1994. It is established under the Waters Act 2003 as an independent administrative tribunal responsible for issuing licences for the use of or deposit of waste into water. Its objective set out in the Act is "to provide for the conservation, development and utilization of waters in a manner that will provide the optimum benefit from them for all Canadians and for the residents of the Yukon in particular." It has delegated authority for the approval of Class 4 placer mining land use approval and has specific responsibilities under the Yukon Environmental and Socio Economic Assessment Act 2003. A water use license, or water license terms, contrary to a decision document issued under that legislation cannot be issued. The YWB has seven staff. Board membership is from four to nine persons, in accordance with the Waters Act and Umbrella Final Agreement. Board members are not representative delegates. The Minister of Executive Council appoints Board members. The Premier appoints a Chair and Vice Chair from within its membership, in consultation with the Board.

Additional References

Alsek Renewable Resource Council. nd. http://www.alsekrrc.ca [Accessed 10 Dec 2007].

Encyclopedia of Canadian Provinces. nd. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/canada/Nunavut-to-Yukon/Yukon-Territory.html[Accessed 10 Dec 2007].

Government of Canada, Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs. nd. a. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/ykn/umb_e.html [Accessed 11 Dec 2007].

Government of Canada, Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs. nd. b. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/gwich/gwic/appc7_e.htm[[Accessed 11 Dec 2007].

Government of Yukon, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, nd. http://www.emr.gov.yk.ca/mining/yukon_first_nations_land_claims.html [Accessed 11 Dec 2007].

Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, nd. http://www.mvfwb.com/html/mandate.htm [Accessed 2 Nov 2007].

Nunavut Planning Commission. nd, a. http://npc.nunavut.ca/eng/nunavut/general.html [Accessed 11 Jan 2008].

Nunavut Planning Commission. nd, b. http://npc.nunavut.ca/eng/nunavut/claim. html [Accessed 11 Jan 2008].

Nunavut Water Board nd. http://www.nunavutwaterboard.org/en/about_us [Accessed 5 Nov 2007].

Wek'eezhii Land and Water Board. nd. http://www.wlwb.ca/background.html [Accessed 2 Nov 2007].

Wikipedia. nd. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nunavut [Accessed 5 Nov 2007].

Lisa Robins is a PhD scholar at The Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National University, and Principal of Robins Consulting. Her experience in working with regional NRM bodies and in national research coordination and integration over a period of 18 years underpins her interest in and research focus on capacity building. She can be reached at lisa.robins@anu.edu.au or robins.consulting@bigpond.com
COPYRIGHT 2007 Wilfrid Laurier University
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2007 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:Robins, Lisa
Publication:Environments
Article Type:Country overview
Geographic Code:1CANA
Date:Nov 1, 2007
Words:22122
Previous Article:Deep Futures: Our Prospects for Survival.
Next Article:Impact and benefit agreements: a contentious issue for environmental and aboriginal justice.
Topics:


Related Articles
Watershed management is key to improving America's water resources.
Thinking like a watershed.
Reflections on recent developments in watershed management in Ontario and their implications for natural areas management(1).
Linking integrated community sustainability planning and watershed planning in Ontario, Canada.
Introduction: global governance of water.
Governance and the global water system: a theoretical exploration.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2021 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |