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Muscovy's conquest of Kazan.

Matthew P. Romaniello, The Elusive Empire: Kazan and the Creation of Russia, 1552-1671. xiii + 297 pp., maps, illus. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ISBN-13 978-0299285142. $29.95.

Non-Orthodox and non-Slavic populations initially predominated in certain of the territories annexed to the Grand Duchy and Tsardom of Moscow over the 14th through 16th centuries. Fully integrating them into the Muscovite state as tax-bearing subjects under the authority of Muscovite law and the Orthodox Church was a long process requiring their dilution through Russian colonization and their subjection to "Russifying" institutions and policies. Just how Russian colonization and administration engaged and transformed the original native culture and economy varied. The mix of non-Orthodox and non-Slavic peoples brought under Tsar Ivan IV's sovereignty with the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 could be considered as already more "prepared" for life as imperial subjects. Kazan's population consisted of Finno-Ugric peoples, some hunters and gatherers but others agriculturalists, living under the hegemony of a Muslim Tatar ruling class holding service-conditional land grants from a khan legitimated as a Chingisid; the Muslim religion of the ruling class was articulated by a literate ulema, and Kazan's economy was already well integrated into the Asian luxury trade. (1)

Matthew Romaniello's The Elusive Empire deals with the incorporation of the former Kazan Khanate into the Muscovite state over the period 1552-1671 --Tsar Ivan IV's conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 is traditionally considered one of the great achievements of his reign and a mark of Muscovy's emergence as a multinational empire. It has also been recognized as an important event in world history, for by annexing Kazan and the neighboring Astrakhan Khanate (1556), Muscovy took control of the entire course of the Volga and drove a wedge between the Ottomans and their Sunni co-religionists beyond the Caspian. From this point on, Orthodox Christian Russia began in earnest the campaign of rolling back Muslim Turkic nomad power from the Inner Eurasian steppe. The Kazan region later played an important role in Russian history as the theater of the 1671 Razin Revolt. Matthew Romaniello therefore takes 1552-1671 as the time frame for his study of the incorporation and final pacification of the Kazan territory-"the bookends of the story of Muscovy's absorption of the Middle Volga Region" (5).

Military conflict between the Grand Principality of Moscow and the Khanate of Kazan began soon after the khanate's founding in 1438 by Ulug Muhammad. Kazan was politically brittle, in that there were cultural and religious divisions between its Finno-Ugric rural population (Chuvash, Mordvin, Cheremis, Votiaks) and its Muslim Tatar nobility, as well as factional polarizations within the latter. This allowed the Moscow grand princes to place puppet rulers on Kazan's throne three times (Muhammad-amin and Shah Ali, in 1487, 1518, 1521) and to claim Kazan as their protectorate. But protectorate or direct sovereignty over Kazan was also sought by the Girei khans of Crimea, and the danger to Moscow from Kazan increased significantly in 1532-51, when Crimean Khan Sahib Girei established a closer alliance with the Ottoman sultan and consolidated his nephew Safa Girei's hold on the Kazan throne. Kazan forces undertook major campaigns against Muscovy in 1536-37 and 1545, convincing Tsar Ivan IV to find a lasting resolution of the Kazan problem. (2) The tsar's resumed efforts to place Shah Ali, the tsarevich of Kasimov, on Kazan's throne provoked a civil war between Kazan's pro-Moscow and pro-Crimean noble factions, and this was followed by the dispatch of a large Muscovite army to the Middle Volga in 1552.

Romaniello treats the Muscovite conquest of Kazan as an incremental process occurring over four decades. In contrast to the preceding Muscovite campaigns against Kazan, Ivan IV's campaign of "conquest" in 1552 brought quick and decisive victory in the sense that the military overthrow of the Kazan Khanate was achieved in just a few weeks, the noble faction supporting Girei candidates for the Kazan throne was soundly defeated, and the tsar's sovereignty was politically cemented as well as symbolically asserted by the installation of a Muscovite vicegerent. Conquest in the broader sense of the pacification of the outlying population, the Cheremis of Vetluga and Rutka basins (the Lugovaia storona, to the west) and the Tatar princes and mirzas (on the Arskaia storona, to the east) took until 1557, however (30, 37-38). The sources do not speak in any detail about the scale of Muscovite army operations in these years, but the suppression of the revolt apparently required the defeat of the neighboring Nogais, the overthrow of the Astrakhan khanate, and the destruction or forced emigration of much of the Kazan Tatar nobility. (3) Conquest in the sense of the thorough and lasting integration of Kazan "subjects" into the Muscovite empire took decades more, as a "slow, contingent, and heavily negotiated process by which the state built its authority and knit together existing economic, political, and social networks" (5).

The 1552 overthrow of the Kazan Khanate had occurred early in the Muscovite imperial project, as one of its opening acts, at a time when the Moscow state had just begun developing the mechanism for imperial rule: networks of frontier garrisons linked up along fortified defense lines, a central government apparatus of chancelleries (prikazy), and the chancellery-directed provincial government system of town governors (gorodovye voevody). Nor had the Orthodox Church made much progress in developing an efficient organization for religious conversion and confessionalization. This meant that the political integration of Kazan into the Muscovite empire could not be achieved by simply extending to Kazan territory established bureaucratic-military principles; integration had to move gradually and improvisationally, relying on both force and concessions coopting native elites. Romaniello finds the most striking form of cooptation was the integration of Tatar elites into the pomest 'e-bounty service system; the most striking example of force was the mass relocation of the non-Muslim Mordvin population south of the new Simbirsk Line.

Because it was not possible in the 16th century for the tsar to impose a single, unified, ramified administration over the Kazan region, Moscow had to content itself with assembling an "institutional bricolage" (8) combining Muscovite with local practices and structures of authority. This required leaving some functions less than fully centralized and devolving some authority upon local native elites coopted by adjusting policy to address their particular needs.

Romaniello finds that the integration of Kazan cannot be understood except by stressing the adaptation of Muscovite techniques of rule to the special circumstances of the Kazan region. He therefore argues we should abandon the habit of imagining the Muscovite state as a fully centralized, organizationally uniform monolith and instead rethink the Muscovite political system as a "composite monarchy" (9). This composite character is reflected in the special role of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa (Chancellery of the Kazan Court) as the concentrated authority for governing Kazan territory from Moscow. It found reflection in other adaptations as well: in the fact that the gorodovye voevody serving as district governors on the Middle Volga were given a different kind of authority from their counterparts in central Muscovy and other regions; in the fact that a special exception to the rules of the state service system was made, to allow the enlistment of non-Russians; in the fact that an independent Orthodox archbishopric had to be created for Kazan, which attained the status of a metropolitanate in 1589; and in the fact that state and church ideology had to be adjusted so that propaganda could emphasize different terms of sovereignty rationalization to convince non-Russian Muslims and pagans to accept an Orthodox tsar without requiring the church to undertake a campaign of forced conversion.

Romaniello has much to say about the adaptation of religious discourse to the reality of a composite state. He views the construction of the Cathedral of St. Vasilii the Blessed in Moscow in 1555-61 as, above all, a celebration of the initial 1552 conquest as a victory of Christendom over the Muslim infidel, conveying the false impression that Kazan's political and cultural integration had already been fully achieved. (4) Metropolitan Germogen's subsequent work in founding new monasteries and supporting new regional miracle cults quickly elevated Kazan to the status of Orthodoxy's "third city" after Moscow and Novgorod. Kazan's status was consolidated after Germogen's elevation to patriarch in 1606 and his martyrdom by the Poles. This in turn enabled the Orthodox Church in Kazan to develop the landed wealth, juridical privileges, and political protection from the patriarchate to enable the metropolitan and the monastery estates to sometimes check the power of the town governors (64, 76-77).

Chapter 1 describes the 1552 overthrow of the Kazan Khanate and argues that before Moscow could fully pacify the subject population it first had to define a border by building a defense line held by garrisons-the Arzamas Line, completed in 1578. The garrison outposts of the Arzamas Line shut down the trails the Nogais and other steppe nomads used to infiltrate Kazan territory and the garrisons served as the nuclei of new towns, which shared defense and commercial functions with new fortified monasteries. The Arzamas Line thereby performed a double function: it encapsulated Kazan territory within Muscovite imperial borders, and it laid out a pattern of military and monastic colonization for Russification within those borders. (5) Administrative bureaucratization and centralization began in earnest after the end of the Troubles, when this became imperative across Muscovy to reestablish order.

Chapter 2 examines the development of chancellery and town governor administration in the Kazan region after the Time of Troubles. By this time the number of central chancelleries had multiplied, allowing the Chancellery of the Kazan Court to focus more on fiscal and judicial matters. The recent Troubles had convinced Tsar Mikhail's government to universalize the town governor system of provincial administration, which required reliance on detailed working orders, frequent governor reports, and end-of-term audits to enhance central chancellery control over the governors. But the prikazvoevoda system was also adapted to Kazan circumstances. Kazan's strategic and commercial importance required that its senior governors be men of Moscow rank, usually boyars; the volume and importance of the business they oversaw required that they have larger clerical staffs, often headed by secretaries (d 'iaki) who were specialist career bureaucrats and who sometimes amassed considerable patronage power of their own; and the governor's offices more often had to work in cooperative or adversarial parallel with the metropolitanate and the monasteries. This resulted in a more complex institutional bricolage than was found in most other regions. (6)

Chapter 3 examines the economic potential and actual value of the region for international trade and Muscovite trading interests. This is an especially effective chapter, confirming that even after the "mercantile system" prescribed by the 1667 New Trade Statutes the state's "actual control over the economy remained quite nominal" and the state was unable to coax much trade in commodities or specie along or across the Volga from Persia and Central Asia. (7) However, there was enough revenue from customs collection to help cover the expenses of the governors' offices and pay for the repair of fortifications and granaries (15, 115).

Chapter 4, based on extensive archival research, focuses on the policy of allowing Kazanians--transplanted Russians but also native non-Russians--to enroll in state military service and hold service-conditional land grants (pomest 'id) on Kazan territory. (8) The assignment of pomest'e rights was handled by the Chancellery of the Kazan Court rather than by the Service Lands Chancellery (Pomestnyi prikaz). This enabled Moscow to follow a different set of procedures in defining pomest'e right in the Kazan region, and that in turn allowed Moscow to create a uniquely Kazanian regional service gentry mixing Russians, Tatar mirzas of Chingisid descent, Tatar and Chuvash and Mordvin converts to Christianity (novokreshchene), and unconverted non-Russians. The newly converted naturally intermarried with Russian families to consolidate their gentry status; what was especially striking here was the continued existence within the Kazan gentry for over a century of Tatar servicemen who were not required to convert (125).

Chapter 5 looks at the non-Russian Kazan peasantry, which was placed into three categories: iasachnye liudi liable for fur tribute; non-Russian peasant tenants on monastery estates; and non-Russian tenant peasants on the estates of Russian landlords. Many of this last category eventually ascended into garrison duty as lower-service-class strel'tsy (musketeers). Not surprisingly Moscow's policies toward these non-elite non-Russian subjects were more conflict-fraught than policy toward the non-Russian service gentry; the reasons for this were military change and the 1649 enserfment of the peasantry. The completion of the Belgorod Line in 1653 reduced the need for strel'tsy to defend the Arzamas Line, while more Kazan manpower was needed farther south to man the new Simbirsk Line under construction from 1640. Moscow preferred to see the Simbirsk Line held by Mordvin strel'tsy because Muslim Tatars were thought to be less reliable against the Crimean Tatars and Nogais, so large numbers of Mordvin were forcibly resettled along the new Simbirsk Line. Meanwhile, the arrival of serfdom provoked peasant tenant flight toward the southern border, and the government responded with mass dragnets to catch and return the fugitives. The dragnets and the relocation of the Mordvin led to widespread unrest among Kazan peasant tenants and sparked petitions of complaint from churchmen whose peasant tenants were threatened. Romaniello sees this as an illustration of the special complexity of administrative policy in the Kazan region, with the monasteries speaking out as the protectors of the non-Russian peasantry against the town governors' attempts to enforce new chancellery policies (16, 176).

Chapter 6 describes how the spread of Stepan Razin's revolt in 1671 played on these social tensions. The Razin insurgency scored its initial successes in the Middle Volga region by exploiting the resentments of the relocated Mordvin population and giving voice to grievances (from Russian as well as non-Russian subjects) against the abuses of power by the town governors. The revolt spread across the new Simbirsk Line. But the revolt did not directly challenge the tsar's sovereignty, and it largely spared the Orthodox Church, perhaps because the church had defended its non-Orthodox peasants. The bulk of the non-Orthodox population ultimately stood by the tsar and helped defeat the rebellion--showing to Romaniello that in the final analysis Moscow's long strategy of accommodation had succeeded in creating loyal subjects. Sufficient accommodation had been made precisely because state authority was not monolithic, because in Kazan there were actually four poles of authority cooperating and competing for power and resources--the central chancelleries and the patriarchate, the town governors and their secretaries, and the Kazan metropolitanate and the monasteries (12).

Romaniello represents the recent and now dominant revisionist paradigm in the historiography of Muscovy that characterizes the Muscovite state as centralizing but not despotic, governing through negotiation and accommodation and not just command, and able to elicit or manufacture some consent, at least from elites. Negotiation was most apparent in the courts, in the government's response to grievance petitions, and in private responses shaped by patronage relations, but collective consultation was not formally institutionalized in estate-representative institutions. Muscovy was not "an estate-representative monarchy," as B. N. Cherepnin claimed on the basis of false comparisons between the Muscovite Zemskii sobor and the estate-representative parliaments of Western Europe. (9) Romaniello does not make that mistake. At first glance, one might expect him to fall into this error because he describes Muscovy as a "composite monarchy," a term popularized by H. G. Koenigsberger and J. H. Elliott, who took as the test of composite character the formal division of power between the crown and estate-representative assemblies. (10) But that is one foundation for composite rule, not the only one. In some cases composite rule derived from dynastic unions, as in the case of Spain, with its separate Cortes assemblies for Aragon and Castile, or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where there were separate diets for the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The existence of composite monarchy thus did not always reflect a persisting balance of power between estate-representative institutions and royal authority. It might reflect only the particular legacy of state construction and survive long after the stage of actual estate-representative power relations had passed. Most early modern European states retained a composite political culture in that they had been formed through the annexation of once-independent sovereignties, with the crown recognizing certain of these annexed territories as in union aeque principaliter ("equally important," so as to avoid controversies about precedence), preserving certain particular rights in taxation, administration, and religious freedom. In the case of 17th-century France, these rights survived codified in institutional arrangements other than national parliaments and continued long after the suspension of the Estates-General. (11)

"Composite monarchy" is an appropriate term for Romaniello to use, because it breaks us of the habit of assuming administrative uniformity and hypertrophic centralization across the entire Muscovite realm. His argument that it also reflected the importance Moscow placed on permitting institutional bricolage in order to expedite the political integration of Kazan is convincing. Neither idea is actually controversial, but they both bear repeating because of the tendency to assume that the political regime of Ivan IV must have been rigidly centralized and ruthlessly Russifying.

However, the author could clarify that composite monarchy should not be considered some special new concession to the problems of imperial expansion in the reign of Ivan IV. The composite character of the Muscovite monarchy derived first of all from the history of the Moscow principality's territorial expansion over the 14th-16th centuries and the fact that different realms were annexed under different circumstances: by treaty, dynastic marriage, escheat, and conquest. Thus the 1584 coronation of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich gave as his full title, "Tsar and Grand Prince Fedor Ivanovich, Autocrat of all Rus', Vladimir, Moscow, and Novgorod. Tsar of Kazan and Astrakhan, Sovereign and Grand Prince of Pskov, Smolensk, Tver', Iugora, Perm', Viatka, Bolgar, and others, Sovereign and Grand Prince of the Novgorod lower lands, of Chernigov, of Riazan', of Polotsk, of Rostov, of Obdora, of Kondinsk, Commander (povelitel') of all the Siberian lands and northern countries, and Sovereign and Possessor (obladitel') of many other realms." (12) The annexation of Novgorod the Great was accompanied by the dismantling of the traditional institutions of the Novgorodian "republic" and the mass confiscation of estates, which were redistributed to Muscovites as pomest'ia. By contrast, the absorption of Vladimir, Tver', and Riazan' left their original local elites largely intact and preserved their kinship and patronage solidarities, so that a strong sense of traditional community identity survived in these districts. (13)

In other cases, significant regional differences in legal and administrative practice resulted from original demographic and economic variations that the Muscovite government could not avoid accommodating. In the White Sea North, for example, the predominance on the land of sokha-taxed state peasants (chernososhnye liudi) and the underdevelopment of votchina or pomest'e landholding by servicemen required that the chancelleries allow peasants to alienate their allotments as if they were de facto allods and permit the spread of fiscal self-administration by elected zemskii officials on a wider scale than in other regions. (14) Especially significant variation in legal practice, service landholding norms, and the status rights and obligations of servicemen occurred south of the Abatis Line from the 1630s, when the military colonization of the new Belgorod Line frontier selected for settlement by odnodvortsy, yeomen recruited from plebeian social origins, with smaller service lands, smaller entitlement rates, few or no peasant tenants, and (until the 1650s) exemption from distant service in the campaign army. This regional differentiation of the southern frontier from central Muscovy was reflected in the concentration of southern pomest 'e affairs under the Military Chancellery rather than the Service Lands Chancellery, and its odnodvorets social character was long protected by special policies regarding the remand of fugitive peasants and the ban on the formation of magnate allods. (15)

In Western and Central Europe the prevalence of composite monarchy owed a great deal to the compromises settling the religious wars. (16) Muscovy escaped religious war between Catholic and Protestant, but because the Orthodox Church was inadequately confessionalized before the end of the 17th century, it was not possible for Moscow to completely suppress regional separatist feeling based on the competing claims to spiritual primacy of the Novgorod and Kiev metropolitanates. The integration of Kazan posed a special doctrinal challenge to the church, which had to practice reticence about the matter of Muslim subjects "to reconcile the increasing numbers of Tatars in Muscovy with the definition of Muscovy as a strictly Orthodox realm." (17)

It should be stressed especially that at the time of Kazan's incorporation into Muscovy it was natural that Moscow would adapt institutions to Kazan conditions rather than impose institutions unchanged. This was because there was as yet no uniform administrative system in the Muscovite heartland. The centralprikazy had just begun to emerge in the 1550s and 1560s; approaches to local government varied considerably, with some communities being sold rights of zemskii self-government while others were under fortifications stewards [gorodovye prikashchiki), annual commandants (godovye voevody), secretaries (d'iaki, as in Novgorod), and still others remaining under vicegerents (namestniki). The pursuit of administrative uniformity became a priority only in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The Elusive Empire is solidly grounded in archival research (primarily in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts [RGADA]) and theoretically informed by Romaniello's familiarity with comparative literature on early modern monarchy. The book is most successful when focusing on describing the state's evolving system of rule mediated by the "four poles of power," with secondary attention to how Kazan elites adapted to Moscow's service and fiscal demands; this reflects the fact that the surviving sources come primarily out of the chancellery archives and speak primarily to the center's interests. There are few surviving sources allowing the author to reconstruct the culture and economy of Kazanians before the 1552 conquest or those aspects of culture and economy that continued to be less affected by the state's demands. The only criticism one could make is that the book has very little about Kazan society before 1552 (and this omission was probably dictated by considerations of manuscript length). Given that the author is stressing the role of cooptation of native elites in shaping political integration, a few pages could have been devoted to Moscow's earlier attempts to vassalize Kazan, which predated by decades the 1552 overthrow of the khanate and managed to put already in place a pro-Moscow faction among the Tatar nobility. There is only one short reference to the Khanate of Kasimov (vassalized to Moscow from the 1440s, a de facto province of Muscovy after the Troubles), which may have served as a precedent for the institutional adaptations Moscow made in order to integrate Kazan. One is also left wondering whether the pre-1552 practice in Kazan of service-conditional soyurghal landholding (a variation on pre-Mongol iqta) made it easier for Moscow to integrate the Tatar nobility into its pomest e-based service system.

Dept. of History

University of Texas at San Antonio

One UTSA Circle

San Antonio, Texas 78249-0652 USA

brian.davies@utsa.edu

(1) Contrast the pacification and political integration of the Kazan Khanate with the example of the less sedentarized and less politically centralized Greater Nogai Horde. On several occasions Moscow obtained oaths of fealty from its most powerful beys, but while the Horde was thereby vassalized and made politically dependent on Muscovy, the beys were unable to deliver to Muscovy the Horde intact and on permanently defined grazing lands. See B. B. Kochekaev, Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia v XV-XVII w. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1988), 89-108.

(2) Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s) (The Hague: Mouton, 1974); Brian Davies, Warfare, State, and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 14-16. Pelenski deals largely with Muscovite-Kazan relations before 1552 and especially with how Muscovite sources attempted to appropriate the Chingisid tradition of sovereignty for the Orthodox "reconquista" of Kazan.

(3) I. P. Ermolaev, Srednee Povol'zhe vo vtoroi polovine XVI-XVII vv.: Upravlenie Kazanskim kraem (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1982), 19-25.

(4) Others have emphasized that the Church of the Intercession (the Cathedral of St. Vasilii the Blessed) was a "composite set of correlated chapels" conveying multiple messages, including the idea of Moscow as the New Jerusalem. See Michael S. Flier, "Political Ideas and Rituals," Cambridge History of Russia, 1: From Early Rus' to 1689, ed. Maureen Perrie (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 394, 407.

(5) For another example of the construction of defense lines serving as the first stage in planned military colonization and policy changes adapting administrative and social practice to frontier conditions, see Brian Davies, State Power and Community in Early Modern Russia: The Case of Kozlov, 1635-1649 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).

(6) For an illustration of the development of this bricolage over the course of the 17th century, see the succession of Kazan working orders in V. D. Dimitriev, "Tsarskie nakazy kazanskim voevodam XVII veka," Istoriia i kul'tura Chuvashskoi ASSR: Sbornik statei 3 (1974): 285-419.

(7) A more definitive assessment of Kazan's importance as a link in the Asian luxury trade--which is beyond the scope of Romaniello's study--would require a detailed comparison over time of Kazan customs transactions and customs values with those of Astrakhan, the major entry port, and Moscow, the major market. See the picture suggested by the figures reported in Richard Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture of Russia, 1600-1725 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 643-644.

(8) This was not unprecedented--it had been allowed in the earlier instance of the Kasimov Khanate--but both instances illustrate the readiness of the Muscovite state to extend to non-Russians terms of military service that kept intact their original elite status. On the service Tatars of Kasimov, see Bulat Rakhimzianov, Kasimovskoe khanstvo (1445-1552 gg.): Ocherki istorii (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2009), 79-82.

(9) Davies, State Power and Community, 6; Poe, "The Central Government and Its Institutions," Cambridge History of Russia, 1:460-62.

(10) H. G. Koenisgberger, "Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe: Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale" Theory and Society 5,2 (1978): 191-217; J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," Past and Present 137, 1 (1992): 48-71.

(11) For example, even after the suspension of the Estates-General in 1614, France remained divided into pays d'etats preserving the power of the local estates to continue holding representative assemblies with the right of approving and collecting their taxes. Other territories were carved into pays Selections, districts deprived of estate consent to taxation and fully under the fiscal authority of royal tax collectors. Even the policy of exempting the nobility from taxation was not uniform across France; in some provinces the main tax, the taille, was assessed on persons, with nobles exempt, while in other provinces the taille was assessed primarily on allodial property held without overlordship or feudal obligation--which made noblemen holding such non-feudal lands liable for paying taxes on them. "Royal absolutism" prevailed after 1614 only in the symbolic sense that all-national estate representative government had ended with the suspension of the Estates-General. But France remained a composite monarchy, and royal administration had to adapt different administrative policies to different pays and to negotiate with provincial elites in order to exercise its hegemony across the nation. The persistence of a composite administrative structure was reinforced by regional variations in economic specialization and differences in how the grandees and lesser nobles of certain regions adapted to the challenges of an emerging capitalist rural economy; it was, of course, reinforced by the compromise settling the Wars of Religion, which required concessions to provinces with large Huguenot populations; but it was also reinforced by the success of some provincial patronage networks and the failure of others in negotiating their rights with the crown after the Fronde.

(12) Dhz. [Giles] Fletcher, O gosudarstve russkom: Sochinenie Fletchera, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1906), 24.

(13) Valerie Kivelson, Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Sergei Bogatyrev, "Localism and Integration in Muscovy," in Russia Takes Shape: Patterns of Integration from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. Bogatyrev (Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 2004), 60-61.

(14) A. I. Kopanev, Krest'iane russkogo Severn v XVII v. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984), 209-16.

(15) Davies, State Power and Community; 3.

(16) Elliot, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," 58.

(17) Janet Martin, "Religious Ideology and Chronicle Depictions of Muslims in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," in The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel Rowland, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Shields Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2009), 298-99.
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Author:Davies, Brian L.
Publication:Kritika
Article Type:Book review
Date:Sep 22, 2014
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