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Mind: Vol. 124, No. 494, April 2015.

Dignity and the Value of Rejecting Profitable but Insulting Offers, EFTHYMIOS ATHANASIOU, ALEX JOHN LONDON, and KEVIN J. S. ZOLLMAN

This paper distinguishes two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. It provides a formal model of how decision makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. The paper then uses this model to illustrate ways in which the Kantian evaluative standpoint enjoys a kind of internal stability that the Hobbesian framework lacks. The paper shows that, under certain conditions, Hobbesians prefer to cultivate Kantian commitments in others and promote the presence of Kantians in the population. Agents who are conflicted between Kantian and Hobbesian commitments have powerful reasons not to resolve this commitment in favor of Hobbesian values. In repeated versions of the ultimatum game, the Hobbesian chooses to behave like a Kantian, including publicly repudiating his Hobbesian commitments. Here again, however, the Hobbesian is able to achieve a desired benefit only on the condition that there are genuine Kantians in the population. Finally, the paper explores the reasons why a community of Hobbesians would opt to enshrine a Kantian conception of dignity into law. It concludes with some remarks about the policy implications of this work.

Time-Slice Rationality, BRIAN HEDDEN

This paper advocates time-slice rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of intemalism about rationality. Time-slice rationality conflicts with two proposed principles of rationality, conditionalization and reflection. Conditionalization is a diachronic norm saying how your current degrees of belief should fit with your old ones, while reflection is a norm enjoining you to defer to the degrees of belief that you expect to have in the future. But they are independently problematic and should be replaced by improved, time-slice- centric principles. Conditionalization should be replaced by a synchronic norm saying what degrees of belief you ought to have given your current evidence, and reflection should be replaced by a norm which instructs you to defer to the degrees of belief of agents you take to be experts. In this way, time-slice rationality puts the theory of rationality on firmer foundations and yields better norms than alternative, non-time-slice-centric approaches.

What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows, COLIN KLEIN

Pain asymbolics feel pain but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. This paper argues that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics' indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break down. This paper explores the consequences of such a view for both motivationalism and the categorization of pain asymbolia as a syndrome, arguing for a close link between asymbolia and various forms of depersonalization.

Predication as Ascription, DAVID LIEBESMAN

This paper articulates and defends a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, the paper draws out these consequences and shows how they favor the ascription view. The paper then develops the view and elicits a number of its virtues.

A New Unified Account of Truth and Paradox, NEIL TENNANT

This paper proposes an antirealist account of truth and paradox according to which the logico-semantic paradoxes are not genuine inconsistencies. The global proofs of absurdity associated with these paradoxes cannot be brought into normal form. The account combines epistemicism about truth with a proof-theoretic diagnosis of paradoxicality. The aim is to combine a substantive philosophical account of truth with a more rigorous and technical diagnosis of the source of paradox for further consideration by logicians. Core logic plays a central role in the account on offer. It is shown that the account is not prey to the problem of revenge paradox.
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Title Annotation:Philosophical Abstracts
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Date:Jun 1, 2015
Previous Article:Journal of the History of Philosophy: Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2015.
Next Article:The Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 65, No. 259, April 2015.

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